Foreign Policy in Germany 1848–1851

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A map of Europe from 1848, which among other things anticipates a German national state and a Scandinavian Union

The foreign policy in Germany 1848-1851 dealt with foreign and Germany policy issues from the March Revolution in 1848 to the restoration of the German Confederation in 1851. This also includes the activities of the Frankfurt National Assembly and the Provisional Central Authority in 1848/1849, then the dispute over the Erfurt Union in 1849 / 1850. During these two or three years simmering border and nationality conflicts broke out. It was also important how the five great powers reacted to the attempts at German unification at the time: a German nation-statewould have had consequences for the European balance. Two of the great powers, Austria and Prussia , belonged to Germany themselves.

During the revolutionary period of 1848/1849, the liberal and democratic politicians in Germany, as well as nationally thinking conservatives, pushed for a German federal state to replace the German Confederation (a federation of states). The emerging German Empire was only recognized by a few smaller European states and the USA . In addition, the orders of the central authority were only partially followed in the individual states.

Camp of the Schleswig-Holstein Army near Rendsburg, 1850

In addition to Austria and Prussia, Great Britain , Russia and France were great powers. Its main goal was to suppress revolutionary movements at an early stage and to prevent territorial changes. In the years 1848–1851 they asked themselves what advantages or disadvantages a united Germany would have for them. The Russian government in particular interfered in the German question by threatening war, because it saw the emerging German nation-state primarily as a product of the revolution.

After the end of the National Assembly in the early summer of 1849, Prussia tried to found a German Empire under more conservative auspices. This led to the so-called Erfurt Union or German Union. Austria tried to prevent this and countered with the plan of a Greater Austria . A war between Prussia and Austria could just be averted in the autumn crisis of 1850 . In 1851 the German Confederation was completely restored .

Politically and ideologically, the principle of (revolutionary) popular sovereignty and the monarchical principle stood opposite each other, i.e. whether the German nation-state should be founded by the people and their national assembly or by the monarchical governments. Another contrast was that between the historical-legalistic and the nationality principle . According to the former, Germany consisted of the areas of the German Confederation. According to the latter, the nationality of the inhabitants of an area was decisive.

The most violent national conflict was that which led to the Schleswig-Holstein War . In the Prussian province of Posen there was also some use of force, and the Limburg question caused diplomatic difficulties for the central authority when residents of this Dutch province wanted to join Germany. Such problems made the formation of the nation state even more difficult.

prehistory

Pentarchy of the great powers in Europe

Map of Europe from a contemporary atlas from 1848

For almost the entire period from 1789 to 1815, the France of the Revolution or Napoleon's France waged war with other European countries. After Napoleon's fall, the great powers wanted to prevent such a situation from happening again for all future. France with its renewed monarchy soon rose again into the circle of the great European powers, so that one speaks of a pentarchy (rule of the five). For these great powers, political stability (the status quo ) was the ultimate common goal.

The Vienna Congress of 1814/1815 had two main tasks. On the one hand, it was a matter of carrying out the peace that was concluded with France, of reorganizing the continent. In addition, it was a "German constitutional congress" ( Ernst Rudolf Huber ) at which the German states formed a federation. The "German constitutional question [...] was at the same time a question of European politics". Russia and France in particular often interfered in the affairs of the new German Confederation. In practice, the system of the Congress of Vienna was less stable than expected, since the great powers also pursued their own interests in addition to their common interests.

German Confederation

Territory of the German Confederation , 1815 to 1848 and 1851 to 1866

The German Confederation was not a German nation-state, but a confederation of states . The member states retained their independence. This also accommodated the fact that the members pursued different domestic politics. With the help of the German Confederation, revolutionary endeavors should be fought in the center of Europe. This happened, for example, when troops of the federal government or a member state came to the aid of a German state against revolutionaries in a federal intervention . Or the federal government took measures against a state, by means of a federal execution , if a state did not comply with federal obligations. In general, the federal government tried to suppress undesirable tendencies at an early stage by restricting the freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly.

Two of the five great powers belonged to the federation, namely Austria and the less powerful Prussia. Together with Russia, they were considered the conservatives of the five great powers. Some of the larger of the more than thirty German states were called medium-sized states; sometimes they are summarized under the term Third Germany . This primarily refers to four kingdoms: Bavaria and Württemberg in the south and Hanover and Saxony in the north. Sometimes the Grand Duchy of Baden in the extreme south-west is also included.

In Germany there were various groups who wanted the situation to change. The democrats or radicals wanted to establish a German nation-state as a democratic republic with universal suffrage . The actual liberals and moderate conservatives, on the other hand, strove for a constitutional monarchy with a balance of power between monarchs and representatives of the people. According to the liberal view, only the rich and educated should vote. A united Germany could better promote trade and economy and would be an important power factor in Europe or even in the world. In addition, they expected a more free development than in late absolutism or the half-hearted early constitutionalism of many German states.

Hall of the Bundestag in Frankfurt

For many states in Europe, the German Confederation was a welcome construction:

  • The states of the German Confederation formed a buffer especially between France and Russia.
  • The federal government prevented the emergence of a unified Germany that would shake the power constellation.
  • He protected the smaller German states from Austria, Prussia and foreign powers. (France, for example, wanted the Rhine to be its eastern border.)
  • Some non-German monarchs were heads of German territories, which gave them an interest in maintaining the status quo. They also sent envoys to the Bundestag in Frankfurt: the Netherlands (for Luxembourg , from 1839 for the eastern part of Luxembourg and Limburg ), Denmark (for Holstein ), Great Britain (for Hanover, until 1837).
  • The federal government suppressed revolutionary efforts within Germany.

A British diplomat, Frederick Lamb, Ambassador to Vienna, put it this way in 1832: Germany should be monarchical and federal, incapable of its own aggression, but strong enough to repel foreign aggression from the east or west.

In 1830 another revolution had broken out in France. It brought a more liberal monarchy to power, in which parliament had a little more power. Belgium split off from the United Netherlands, and in Germany several other, smaller states gave each other a constitution for the first time. In the 1840s a revolutionary mood rose again in Europe, which erupted in France in February 1848. This February Revolution led to a republic in France, and the monarchs had to set up liberal governments in many European countries, including Germany.

German Empire 1848/1849

Entry of the Reichsverweser into Frankfurt, July 1848. Reichsverweser Archduke Johann served as provisional German monarch and set up an imperial government.

In Germany it was not just about liberalization, but also about creating a nation state. Under pressure from the revolution, the states in the German Confederation had a national assembly elected. This was the first all-German parliament. It had been given the task of drafting a constitution that was then to be agreed with the state governments .

The National Assembly met from May 1848 and not only worked on a constitution, but even set up a German government. To this end, it passed a Reich law with a provisional constitutional order and elected a replacement monarch, the Reich Administrator .

The Reichsverweser appointed ministers and together with them formed the so-called Provisional Central Authority . It was also called the Reich Government or Reich Ministry. The Bundestag ended its activities and transferred its rights to the Reichsverweser. However, the situation of the imperial government remained precarious: it could not exercise any direct power, had hardly any officials and was dependent on the support of the national governments. The governments gave this support at their own discretion.

The National Assembly on the New Germany

In the National Assembly it became clearer how the Democrats and Liberals imagined a united Germany. When the National Assembly debated the shape of the future Germany, besides the political system and the national borders, it was about the importance of Germany in the world in the future. In the debates a kind of “ magnetic theory ” crystallized, according to Günter Wollstein: A core area should be created that should be attractive through a liberal constitution, through the economy and power politics, including the overseas fleet. A later increase in power would then result automatically and peacefully, through foreign policy alliances and territorial expansion. Sometimes the aspect of freedom was put in the foreground, sometimes power politics. This magnetic theory only got its real meaning in connection with Alsace and Lorraine.

The Frankfurt National Assembly met in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt.

In the future there would have been three centers of power in Europe (apart from Great Britain): Romance France, Germanic Germany and Slavic Russia. Italy and Poland's future was seen as less and less important in the course of development. Because of its central position, Germany was to become the mainstay of a new peace and international order; Sometimes there was also fear that Germany would overstretch itself in terms of power politics.

Liberals and democrats viewed Russia as barbaric and despotic and saw it as the main opponent of the new Germany. Some even believed in a "decisive battle" between Germany and Russia. Liberals wanted Great Britain as a future ally because of the constitutional example and the kinship and, despite the unreliability, because of its trading interests. They saw the desired liberal, constitutional and federal Germany as a mediator between the Unitarian West and the despotic, backward East. Democrats considered revolutionary France to be the decisive partner, despite the conservative turnaround there. Russia could then no longer stop the triumphant advance of a progressive world order. Another vision of the future dreamed of a Germanic world domination that would be exercised by a German-led Central Europe together with the USA.

A map of Oettingen-Wallerstein from 1848, with the German Confederation in dark color. The areas of Austria and Prussia that did not belong to the federal government are indicated in hatching.

Other new revolutionary approaches failed in Europe in 1848, according to Günter Wollstein. The failure of the National Assembly was "to a large extent" due to its "own position on the national question". The system of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 was not changed and made other corrections difficult. According to Wollstein, the National Assembly debates suffered from the following problems:

  • Prussia and Austria owned large areas outside of the German-speaking area, and the system of the Congress of Vienna prevented national changes. The members of the National Assembly lacked the necessary sense of proportion to work out an appropriate concept for Germany.
  • The MPs had adopted ideas for the future of the economy and geopolitics from Friedrich List . In addition, they were enthusiastic about a policy of national honor. But as it was, they made it difficult for the foreign powers to endorse the new Germany.
  • During the pre- March period , the oppressed liberals and democrats had formulated national struggle goals. Now they could not translate these goals into politically feasible guiding principles.

A middle ground was desirable, which was not found in 1848. The longing for a united, free and thus powerful Germany remained.

Reich diplomacy

Friedrich von Rönne (here in later years) was the German envoy to the United States of America

The Reich Government tried to ensure that their instructions were recognized within Germany. In addition, she was looking for general recognition by the foreign powers. If one followed the thesis that the German Reich was the renamed German Confederation, then recognition did not seem to be a problem. But the other countries decided for themselves whether they wanted to recognize the empire.

The major foreign powers had two main reasons against a German nation state. It would have destroyed the balance of powers and affected their own supremacy. Konrad Canis: "Much Germany St. Paul's Church signaled them a hegemonic urge which was the continental position of power especially Russia and France, but also England's limit." Second was born, the nation state from the revolution and thus unpredictable, like the French Revolution of 1789 . The great powers feared social and state upheavals as a result of new, expected crises.

The imperial government was recognized by the accreditation of an ambassador, not only from the USA but also from Sweden , the Netherlands , Belgium , Switzerland , Sardinia , Naples and Greece . In addition, the small German states agreed that the Reich represented them internationally. The larger, however, did not want to withdraw their own envoys in favor of imperial envoys .

Borders and nationalities

In the debates of the National Assembly there are examples of a nationalism that was later assigned to integral nationalism in research . The best-known in this context is probably a contribution by the young East Prussian Wilhelm Jordan in the Posen debate, in which he called mourning over the fall of Poland a "mindless sentimentality". In general, he complained about a national self-forgetfulness in Germany. However, according to Wolfram Siemann, such speeches were not typical. Instead, the debates on Bohemia led the National Assembly to adopt generous minority protection .

The MPs usually made far more prudent decisions than certain contributions to the debate would suggest. But some decisions put a considerable strain on relations with other countries. In doing so, the National Assembly had to take into account a public opinion that rejected national restraint, especially on the Schleswig-Holstein question. After years of feeling national weakness, MEPs allowed themselves to be carried away by absolute claims. So they demanded areas that had not belonged to the federal government, the incorporation of which would have broken international treaties and some of which were not German-speaking.

Schleswig-Holstein question

Schleswig and Holstein 1848

The question about Schleswig (and Holstein) "was by far the most important individual foreign policy problem for the members of the Paulskirche," wrote Günter Wollstein in his study of Greater Germany at the National Assembly. It was about the only "armed conflict for reasons of national politics" at that time. The interests of other states were affected, which wanted to see control of the Baltic Sea access still with Denmark. Prussia's intervention led to tension between Berlin and Frankfurt; the members of the National Assembly made the dispute over the two duchies the decisive test for the new Germany.

Manfred Kittel said that on the Schleswig-Holstein question, the “judgments and prejudices” of the German liberals about neighboring states were bundled together like in a burning mirror. These judgments concerned "the type of diplomatic relations with them and [...] the fundamental importance of factors such as humanity and power for German foreign policy."

Uprising and national assembly

For centuries, who was Danish king in personal union also Duke of Schleswig and Holstein. Schleswig itself was under constitutional law an imperial fiefdom of Denmark, Holstein a Roman-German imperial fiefdom (until 1806) or a member of the German Confederation (from 1815). Holstein was German-speaking, while in Schleswig German, Danish and North Frisian were spoken. However, increased taxes after the Napoleonic Wars caused displeasure. Furthermore, a national German and Danish movement emerged. The German National Liberals wanted to unite Schleswig and Holstein and join a German nation-state to be formed, while the Danish National Liberals wanted to cede Holstein and integrate Schleswig into a future Danish nation-state. Both national liberal movements stood in opposition to the constitution of the previous multi-ethnic Danish state .

Kiel in March 1848: The pro-German provisional government of Schleswig-Holstein is proclaimed.

In January 1848 the new Danish king announced that he would give the entire Danish state a constitution. Finally, on March 20, 1848, the March Revolution took place in Copenhagen , which for the first time gave the Danish National Liberals a decisive influence on government work. This led to the rumor in Kiel that the king had been taken prisoner by the mob, whereupon German-speaking citizens rebelled and established a national German provisional government in Kiel . On March 26 and 28, this asked the German Bundestag for recognition, and Schleswig should be admitted to the Bund.

German-oriented Schleswig-Holsteiners ultimately belonged to the pre-parliament and the Fifties Committee , which prepared the election for the future National Assembly. It was decided almost unanimously that Schleswig-Holsteiners should also be elected to the future National Assembly. That was equivalent to admitting Schleswig to the federal government or the new empire.

After a vote on June 9, the National Assembly, in which members from Schleswig-Holstein were also represented, claimed Schleswig-Holstein as part of the German Empire. The Schleswig-Holstein question had thus become a symbol of unity efforts. However, a claim was made that could hardly be met at the time. After all, Schleswig was not purely German-speaking and the Danish king was, according to old law, duke of the Elbe duchies .

War and the international dimension

The Kiel Provisional Government had taken a Danish fortress while the Danish king sent troops to quell the uprising. Prussian troops came to the aid of the threatened Provisional Government. However, the Prussians did not manage to bring about a decision quickly. Since April 19, there had been a sea war in which Denmark captured many German ships and threatened the economic development of the coastal countries. In May, Prussian troops had already arrived in Jutland , the actual Denmark north of Schleswig. But because Russia and Sweden threatened military intervention, Prussia withdrew its troops to the German-Danish language border near the city of Schleswig.

Danish ships block the port of Kiel

Schleswig-Holstein was of the utmost importance to the European statesmen of the 19th century. On the one hand, they feared that breaking up the national question there could indirectly lead to conflicts elsewhere. On the other hand, an open war could easily arise in that region because the great powers were defending important interests there. After all, it was about the sea route to the Baltic Sea, with all the strategic and trade-political consequences. For example, between 1860 and 1862, a quarter of British imports and exports passed the Sound near Denmark.

In 1848, the Russian Tsar Nicholas I not only rejected the Schleswig-Holstein government as revolutionary, he also feared that Germany could become stronger in the Baltic Sea region. In addition, Denmark could be driven into the arms of Sweden . But Russia did not want a Scandinavian Union because it would have made Russian expansion in the Baltic Sea more difficult. Sweden had already mobilized its troops and threatened that if German troops march into North Jutland, Sweden would actively support Denmark. As a result, Russia threatened Prussia with war unless it withdrew Prussian troops.

France feared Russian expansion and a unified Germany, because the latter would have made French expansion on the Rhine more difficult. Revolutionary France also did not support the rebellious National Liberals in Schleswig-Holstein because it did not want to risk the goodwill of the other great powers. It was therefore also important that the old condition be restored.

British Foreign Minister Palmerston had to admit that some of the complaints by the German-oriented Schleswig-Holsteiners were justified. But under the given circumstances, and because of the unrest of the Chartists in his own country, he could no longer intervene as a diplomatic measure. The nationality principle, which provided for the unification of all German speakers in a political unit, was not accepted by any government in Europe. The attitude in Berlin and Frankfurt towards the Elbe duchies ensured that the non-German great powers became more suspicious of any attempt to change anything in the political organization of Germany. After all, it was not a problem for the German Confederation that it did not include all German speakers.

Malmo Armistice, September 1848

Caricature of the Malmö armistice, with the Prussian (left) and Danish kings in warm fraternization

Shortly after the vote on June 9, 1848, Prussia received a new government that was more cautious on the Schleswig-Holstein question. Sweden had already sent soldiers to the Danish island of Funen to support Denmark. Now Sweden brokered the Malmo Armistice Agreement of July 2nd. The agreement was not implemented, among other things because the Prussian government had concerns about whether it should first contact the new German Reich government.

After further rounds of negotiations, a new armistice agreement was reached on August 26, 1848, which was now called the Treaty of Malmö . It was only later that the outraged National Assembly learned that the content deviated greatly from the specifications given by the Imperial Government of Prussia. Among other things, the army of Schleswig-Holstein was divided into a Schleswig and a Holstein part. A new central authority for both duchies should be given a Danish-oriented boss. The legislation of the insurgent Provisional Government was annulled. Denmark should lift the blockade and release the captured Prussian ships.

In Frankfurt, the MPs debated the results of the negotiations emotionally. The imperial government complained about the way Prussia had ignored them. Nevertheless, she advocated acceptance of the contract, which was acceptable in view of the situation. In the event of a rejection, the Reich government would resign.

Caricature for the solemn funeral of a seven-month-old child, which refers to the seven-month truce. As a funeral one saw the debate or vote on 5./6. September on. The coffin is followed by Heinrich von Gagern and the members of the imperial government.

Finally, on September 6, 1848, the National Assembly voted 238 to 221 in favor of postponing the adoption (and thus rejecting it for the time being). The decisive factor for this was that the left center and the non-attached, who had mostly supported the Reich government so far, had mostly joined the left on this issue. As a result, the Leiningen government resigned.

On September 16, the National Assembly corrected itself: The rejection of the armistice was rejected by 258 votes to 237. Instead, 257 MPs agreed to a motion from four Schleswig-Holsteiners compared to 236: the ceasefire should be accepted, but renegotiations should be made. Radical forces and politically dissatisfied people used the acceptance of the armistice as an opportunity to insult the relevant MPs as traitors. In the subsequent September riots, there was an uprising and the murder of two Conservative MPs. This seriously damaged the reputation of the revolution.

Another war and the Prussian peace treaty in 1849/1850

Danish sea ​​blockade at the mouth of the Elbe, summer 1849

After September 1848, the National Assembly concentrated on drafting the Imperial Constitution . In doing so, she avoided the question of how one could subordinate the individual states to central power. But the first paragraph was about the Elbe duchies again. Schleswig left out the suggestion “The territory of the previous German Confederation will form the German Empire”. It was then agreed on the addition that the situation in Schleswig and the borders of Posen should be settled later.

The armistice was signed for seven months. Denmark had tried in vain to get the new state guaranteed from Russia, Great Britain, France and Sweden. Therefore it tried to plunge the National Assembly (and indirectly also the German movement in the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg) into a crisis. Denmark announced the armistice on February 22, 1849, one month before the end of the seven months. As he had hoped, war broke out again on April 3rd.

On May 1, Prussia was again tempted to support the Schleswig-Holstein rebels. Thereupon the Russian tsar threatened the King of Prussia to seek an understanding with France. The Russian Prime Minister Nesselrode added that a Russian fleet was being prepared to support Denmark. When the king still did not back down, Russia suspended negotiations with Prussia for the time being. Finally, there was British pressure. So Prussia signed an armistice on July 10, 1849. The Schleswig-Holsteiners were now only supported by the Frankfurt Reich government and troops from smaller individual states.

Friedrichstadt : Memorial stone for those who fell in the Schleswig-Holstein Army in September and October 1850
Schleswig-Friedrichsberg: Memorial stone for the soldiers of the Danish army who died in the battle of Schleswig in 1848

At the beginning of 1850, the Russian tsar demanded that the Prussian king finally abandon the revolutionaries in Schleswig-Holstein. The king and his cabinet relented because they feared that Russia would otherwise support Austria on the German question. On July 2, 1850, Prussia signed the Berlin Peace Treaty with Denmark. This treaty said that Denmark could call for help from the German Confederation. Federal intervention might help Denmark regain its rightful rule in Holstein. If the federal government is not prepared to do so, Denmark may itself intervene militarily. With this, Prussia recognized the German Confederation and the old federal law, in contrast to its rest of Germany policy.

The situation of the German-oriented Schleswig-Holsteiners became hopeless, because on July 4, 1850 Russia, Great Britain and France (and later Austria) signed the First London Protocol. By then at the latest, all five great powers had committed themselves to restoring Danish rule. In January 1851 commissioners of the federal intervention came to Schleswig-Holstein. They ensured that the governorship , which was still installed by the Frankfurt central authority, ended its work in Holstein. The commissioners later returned Holstein to Denmark. With the London Protocol of 1852, the previous Danish state was enshrined as a “European necessity and permanent principle”. At the same time, the Duchy of Schleswig should not be more constitutionally bound to the actual Kingdom of Denmark than Holstein.

Poses question

In turquoise Poznan as part of Prussia, in green Russian Poland

The Prussian province of Posen (also the Grand Duchy of Posen) had around 800,000 Polish-speaking, 400,000 German-speaking and 80,000 Jewish inhabitants around 1848. The Germans lived mainly in the west of the province and in the cities. With the often mixed settlement areas, a division that was fair for both sides was impossible.

At the beginning of the March Revolution in 1848, a Polish and a German committee were formed. While the Polish side wanted to make the undivided province the nucleus of a large Polish state, the Germans saw their future in the German Empire and wanted to see the province divided. But they lacked a clear idea of ​​what would become of the part in which the majority was Polish.

There was great sympathy in Britain and France for the restoration of a Polish state; Austria and above all Russia rejected them vehemently. The German revolutionaries traditionally saw in the Poles an ally against the old conservative powers, but during the revolution the conflicting goals of the German and Polish revolutionaries became more apparent.

In April, the Polish revolutionaries conquered large parts of Poznan and also committed acts of violence against Germans. This led to counter violence and the invasion of Prussian troops. The Wielkopolska uprising was suppressed as early as May . In Russian Poland, however, the situation remained stable over the long term.

The Bundestag included the part of Poznan with most of the German-speaking areas on April 22, 1848. Other areas should follow later. In this way, the part that was intended for the Poles (“Duchy of Gnesen”, with its own administration) became smaller and smaller.

The National Assembly also consisted of German-Poznan MPs and debated Poznan in July 1848, among other things. After some very anti-Polish contributions to the discussion, the National Assembly finally confirmed the division, as had already been initiated by the Bundestag. In February 1849, it approved a partition plan that left the Poles only a very small area. On October 3, 1851, however, the German Confederation spun off the Prussian province of Posen again, so that the previous situation was restored in this respect as well.

Limburg question

The Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (green), with the border of the German Confederation from 1839

Limburg was originally a normal Dutch province like other provinces. However, after the Belgian Revolution of 1830, the province was disputed for years between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the new Kingdom of Belgium . In 1839 the final solution was to divide the province.

From then on the Dutch part was both a Dutch province and, as the Duchy of Limburg , a federal member of the German Confederation. The latter compensated for the fact that Luxembourg was also divided at the time and the German Confederation thus lost residents. The Dutch king was the Grand Duke of Luxembourg and Duke of Limburg. His envoy in Frankfurt at the Bundestag had the appropriate votes for both areas.

In the revolution of 1848 the question arose whether the Duchy of Limburg should become part of the new Germany. Because the Dutch government was unpopular because of the high taxes, many black, red and gold flags also waved in the duchy. The Frankfurt National Assembly welcomed the acceptance of Limburg, but did not give it a high priority. In the course of the year, enthusiasm for Germany in Limburg cooled after liberal reforms had taken place in the Netherlands.

In terms of foreign policy, the Limburg question harbored a high potential for conflict. The area was considered a cornerstone of the system that would keep France in check. This was due to Limburg's location and above all to its fortresses near Maastricht and Venlo . Belgium and Russia gave the Netherlands moral support. Great Britain also tended towards the Netherlands, but saw Limburg as more of an internal German problem. The German government wisely did not ask for the two fortresses, otherwise the reaction would have been different.

Austrian territories

Großdeutsch or Kleindeutsch

Caricature from 1848 with a German double-headed eagle. On the left the head of Hesse Heinrich von Gagern , Prime Minister from December 1848. On the right his predecessor Anton von Schmerling from Austria.

In 1846 Heinrich von Gagern came up with a plan for a German double alliance . This was supposed to regulate the complicated relationship between Austria and Germany. A closer federation, also called the West Reich, formed a federal German nation-state. It was taken into account that Prussia would be the supreme power in the closer alliance. This closer federation would then be linked to Austria via another federation. The wider federation would include Austria and limit itself to foreign and defense policy. This would mean that Austria would have to forego influence in the closer alliance, but would have a free hand for its imperial goals, for example in the Danube region.

Gagern presented this plan to the National Assembly in October 1848. Later, the plan was also intended to serve Prussia to make its Erfurt Union acceptable.

At the end of 1848 Austria made it clear that it did not want to separate its German-speaking parts from the rest. Most of the Frankfurt MPs, however, refused to accept the whole of Austria, since no German nation-state could be formed with the many foreign nations of Austria. The plan of Reich Minister President Gagern gave the MPs the hope that ties to Austria could be maintained. Therefore they authorized Gagern to negotiate with Austria accordingly.

Finally, the Reich constitution of March 28, 1849 stated that the previous areas of the Federation belonged to the German Reich, and precautions were taken in the event that "the German-Austrian lands do not take part in the federal state" (§ 87) . The deputies elected the Prussian king as German emperor after there had been indications that he would take on this function in a small German empire. The fickle King Friedrich Wilhelm IV rejected the crown in April 1849.

Bohemia and Italy

Attack of Austrian troops on Prague in June 1848, the city of the Slav Congress

Both German speakers and Czech speakers lived in Austrian Bohemia . Unlike in the case of Posen, however, hardly anyone thought of a division here, because there was an overall Bohemian consciousness. However, the representatives of the Czechs and a Slavic Congress in Prague announced that they by no means wanted to belong to a German Empire. On the other hand, some Frankfurt MPs suspected that the Slavs in Austria could be supported by Russia. Radical nationalists like Wilhelm Jordan openly spoke of the intention to Germanize Bohemia . German-Bohemian MPs in Frankfurt, however, were more moderate. In their opinion, Bohemia might want to belong to Germany if the new empire was attractive enough.

When people talked about the fight against the system of the Congress of Vienna in March, they thought of Poland, but less of an Italian nation-state . For the Frankfurt National Assembly, the national question was important in Tyrol , where there was a mixture of German-speaking and Italian -speaking . She was also interested in Austria's war against the uprisings in northern Italy. The conservative MP Joseph von Radowitz saw the Austrian rule there as a bulwark against the West, i.e. France, and in Trieste above all the access to the Adriatic Sea .

Erfurt Union and Greater Austria Plan 1849–1851

Turn in March / April 1849

Contemporary map, around the beginning of 1850: the states of the Erfurt Union in light pink

When the Prussian king finally rejected the Frankfurt imperial crown, he announced a new attempt at unification. The German states should immediately appoint representatives in Frankfurt. The new federal state under Prussian leadership should be more federal and the Reichstag should have less power than according to the Frankfurt constitution. The federal state should then enter into an alliance with Austria. While Austria broke off the negotiations unsuccessfully on May 25, 1849, the plan for a Union of Erfurt met with a positive response in the rest of Germany, including among the governments.

Austria also had a vision for the future Germany. As early as March 9, 1849, his head of government Felix zu Schwarzenberg presented a plan that became known as " Greater Austria " or the Schwarzenberg Plan. Accordingly, the areas of Austria and Prussia that did not yet belong to the German Confederation should join it. Thus all of Austria would have been under federal protection and would have led a huge Central European bloc that was supposed to strengthen Austria's role as a great power.

While in the spring of 1849 the National Assembly and the Revolution were fought in part by force, there were two opposing plans for the future of Germany. Austria and Prussia tried primarily to expand their own power. The Prussian plan could partly hope for the interest of the national movement, since it promised a common parliament. Austria, on the other hand, oriented itself towards the old confederation. That was more tempting for the more conservative medium-sized states like Bavaria and Hanover. Nevertheless, they too remained skeptical of the Greater Austria plan and the danger that Austria's hegemony would become increasingly oppressive.

During this time Austria and Prussia jointly liquidated the legacy of the German Empire. Reichsverweser Archduke Johann transferred his powers to a federal central commission on December 20, 1849 . This later directed the affairs of the Reich over to the renewed German Confederation.

Division of Germany in 1850

In the course of 1850 the Austro-Prussian antagonism became more concrete when Prussia and other states set about breathing life into the Erfurt Union. Most of the time it was about the same states that had also recognized the Frankfurt Imperial Constitution. In January 1850 a union parliament was elected, which adopted the provisional union constitution in April . But instead of immediately setting up a union government, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV waited for the individual states involved to formally confirm the constitution. This delayed the establishment of the nation state. In addition, the union lost members, after the important kingdoms of Hanover and Saxony, finally also Kurhessen. Without this principality, however, there was no direct land connection between the east and west of the Union.

In the meantime Austria set about reactivating the German Confederation. On August 27, 1849 it had declared that the German Confederation would continue to exist. In fact, the Bund was not repealed, the Bundestag only suspended its activities. In May 1850, Austria invited to a conference in Frankfurt. It united only ten states, but besides Austria it also included the four important medium-sized kingdoms. Germany was divided. On September 2, the Bundestag was reconstituted and claimed the powers of the old.

Reactions from the great powers

Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, in the 1830s

Great Britain and Russia warned the Prussian king against accepting the Frankfurt imperial crown and hoped that Austria would intervene. The Tsar even threatened Berlin with war. He had to assume that a small Germany would have got into a war against Austria and perhaps other German states as well. The result could have been a civil war or another revolution. The Russian invasion of Hungary is to be understood in this sense: The Tsar thereby strengthened Austria and signaled that he was ready for military intervention.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was settled on July 13, 1849. After that, Britain was ready again to think more positively about German unity. It welcomed the plan for a Germany under Prussian leadership. Only Prussia has enough strength of its own for it; Austria suffers too much from its internal problems. But Prussia should respect the political existence of the smaller states. Such a German federation could then enter into close ties with Austria for a common defense policy. The British government then seemed no longer worried about the Customs Union or any future naval rivalry.

In the period 1849/1850 France was generally unsure whether it should see Prussia as a danger or an ally. President Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (later Emperor Napoleon III) and his foreign ministers were at odds; the latter distrusted Prussia. In the spring of 1849 Drouyn de Lhuys seemed to want to allow Prussian domination north, but not south of the Main. His successor Tocqueville, however, advocated, for fear of Russia, a restoration of the German Confederation, no supremacy of Prussia.

The French president, in turn, wanted to benefit from a fratricidal war between Prussia and Austria, and would demand compensation. He wanted an alliance with Prussia if France would get the left bank of the Rhine. With this in mind, he offered Prussia on June 15, 1850: If there were to be a Prussian-Austrian war, France would stand on Prussia's side and in return would get the Palatinate (Bavaria) . Prussia, however, did not want to buy German unity by losing territory and rejected the proposal.

In November 1850 the Prussian-Austrian tensions reached their peak. France did not see itself threatened by a disturbance of the equilibrium and remained neutral. At most, it would have supported Prussia if Russia had intervened in Austria's favor. Such considerations were generally unpopular in France. After Prussia withdrew, France returned to its policy of defending the independence of the smaller German states.

Autumn crisis of 1850 and restoration of the covenant in 1851

In the course of October and November 1850 the conflict between Austria and Prussia almost escalated. The problem areas of Holstein and Kurhessen in particular contributed to this. On September 2, the Danish king asked the Rump Bundestag for a federal intervention, which was to take action against the still existing governorship in Holstein. The Prussian king, however, declared the resolutions of the (incomplete) Bundestag null and void. An intervention, as prepared in October, seemed to be viewed by Prussia as a case of war. The "Rumpfbundestag" intervened not only in Holstein, but also in the constitutional conflict in Hesse.

The military confrontation was then, after Russian threats or mediation, prevented by Prussian-Austrian negotiations ( Olomouc punctuation of November 29th). The governorship, which was still set up by the Frankfurt central authority, ended its work in Holstein in January 1851. In the first months of 1851 a Dresden conference was held in order to possibly find an agreement on a federal reform. There the different concepts of Austria and Prussia were still opposed, and in the end the German Confederation was restored with only minor changes.

outlook

Otto von Bismarck was a conservative publicist during the revolution. From 1851 to 1858 he served in Frankfurt as the Prussian envoy to the Bundestag.

In the years after 1850 Austria and Prussia worked together again, as they did before the revolution. However, around 1860 the contrast flared up again. This was not least due to Austria's rigid stance, which opposed any changes that might have jeopardized its supremacy in Germany. This not only alienated Prussia, which wanted to participate in the supremacy. The smaller German states also wanted more economic and legal unification, as they had already experienced through the Zollverein .

Despite the beginning of the era of reaction , the issues of the years 1848–1851 remained largely on the agenda, and by the end of the 1850s at the latest, the German question began to move again. The Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Italian War (1859) shook the state system of the Congress of Vienna because they made great powers such as France, Russia and Austria enemies. Russia approached Prussia instead of Austria. This new constellation made it possible to resolve conflicts militarily without leading to a general European war. On top of that, the Italian nation-state became a potential ally of Prussia against Austria.

Twelve years after the provisionally last peace treaty of 1852, war was again waged around Schleswig and Holstein. This German-Danish War of 1864 initially promised Austro-Prussian cooperation under the umbrella of the German Confederation. Prussia's Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck took the dispute over joint rule in Schleswig and Holstein in 1866 as an opportunity to leave the Federation. The following German war ended Austria's domination in Germany and led to the dissolution of the German Confederation .

Prussia annexed Hanover and other states in northern Germany. The rest and Saxons were united in the North German Confederation of 1867: the allied states had a constituent Reichstag elected. The latter then agreed a national constitution with the governments . In 1870/1871 the southern German kingdoms and Baden as well as Alsace-Lorraine became part of the North German Confederation. With the constitution of January 1, 1871, this was renamed the German Empire .

research

German unification and abroad

Munich flares , 1848: The German Michel is offered foreign medicine, but the Frankfurt medicine is enough for him.

In February 1950, Federal President Theodor Heuss told professors and students in Bonn:

“The fact is that this Frankfurt [...] remains questionable in terms of foreign policy from the start. This non-wanting to see the Frankfurt experiment by the European powers, this being tied to Berlin and Vienna as old facts, especially to Russian power, ultimately let the all-German experiment stranded out of the European situation. "

On the other hand, Frank Lorenz Müller objects that the attitude of the great powers Russia, Great Britain and France was not quite as uniformly negative as an older research had described it. Despite the lack of recognition by these powers, the German revolution did not fail because of foreign countries, because at no point did they intervene directly against the establishment of a nation state or threaten to do so. The basic stance of the National Assembly, especially on the Schleswig-Holstein question, had devastating consequences abroad, so the National Assembly then had to give in under international pressure.

Even Hans-Ulrich Wehler considers it a legend that a successful nation-state establishment had failed to intervention by the great powers. Russia has not shown a “credible determination” to actually wage a “war of prevention”. France was preoccupied with its own problems. Great Britain has even shown benevolence that the German-born Prince Consort Albert would have supported a parliamentary monarchy in Germany. The foreign policy conditions were by no means unfavorable. Wehler already sees a Wilhelmine "encirclement complex" here, which is transferred to the situation of 1848.

Hans Georg Kraume believes that the resistance from abroad was not directed against the unification of Germany as such, but against the national political program that threatened the neighboring states and great powers: strategically, economically, territorially. It remains to be seen whether Germany could have asserted itself externally: the major foreign powers had repeatedly interfered in German affairs, and it was to be expected that Russia wanted to prevent a liberal, united Germany.

Munich flares , 1848: “A European thunderstorm. A vision. "

Also Jörg-Detlef Kühne remembered as the saber-rattling Russia in the summer of 1848 threatened Prussia with intervention and this made true a year later in Hungary, and like Britain skeptical and irritated waited. Like Kühne, Ernst Rudolf Huber recalls the great powers' right to guarantee, but also to intervene: they reserved the right to object to constitutional amendments by the German Confederation because the Federal Act was part of the Vienna Congress Act . However, Huber counters, a guarantee right should have been expressly agreed. Because of this claim, Great Britain and France protested in 1850/1851 against the whole of Austria joining the German Confederation, even if the German states had unanimously changed the federal constitution .

Langewiesche finds it unfair to measure the national movement only in terms of its dreams of power, as they were contemplated “in the first euphoria of revolutionary power”. She put back and derived no territorial demands from the idea of ​​the empire - admittedly not from voluntary self-restraint, but because the demands could not have been enforced. It was similar with other nationalities in Europe. The small German nation-state, as the National Assembly ultimately wanted to establish out of realism, would have left the European state order intact. A Greater German state, on the other hand, would have been accepted by the major European powers just as little as by Austria. Moreover, without Austria, Prussia's overweight would have stifled German federalism . A greater Austria would certainly have been unbearable for Europe.

Günter Wollstein is skeptical about the foreign policy possibilities of a unified small Germany: If Friedrich Wilhelm IV had accepted the imperial crown and the imperial constitution in 1849, the situation would have been no different from the autumn crisis of 1850 . Prussia would either have capitulated to Austria, lost in a war against Austria, or a European war like in Napoleon's time could have come about . The historian Werner Eugen Mosse compared the situation in the autumn crisis of 1850 with the 1860s and saw a decisive role in the medium-sized German states:

“If Hanover and Saxony had given Prussia their unconditional support at this crossroads [1850], then it could now have secured what it actually did not achieve before 1866 at the cost of two campaigns. If Bavaria and Württemberg had also agreed to work together with the northern states, then the results of 1870 would have been anticipated without a policy of ' blood and iron '. In reality it now almost entirely depended on the German governments what advantages Germany could gain from British diplomatic support, on the diversion of the Russians in the Balkans and the general European detente that followed the Prussian-Danish armistice. "

nationalism

Some historians already recognize nationalistic attitudes in the debates of the Paulskirche, which are reminiscent of the Wilhelmine Empire or even of National Socialism . A counter-thesis comes from Ulrike von Hirschhausen , according to which power and readiness to use violence played a far less role than according to the older ideas of continuity. Manfred Kittel thinks that the spring of nations in March actually cooled noticeably in September 1848. However, one can hear more nationalistic tones both in the initial phase and more conciliatory in the later. Therefore one cannot simply speak of a straight line development from liberal-emancipatory nationalism to national egoism.

The writer Arnold Ruge belonged to the democratic left in the Frankfurt National Assembly. In 1856 the political police in the German Confederation considered him more dangerous than Karl Marx .

According to Kittel, the liberals had to experience that political modernization and freedom rights do not automatically lead to a balance between the peoples. They found the result of the Schleswig-Holstein conflict and the events in Posen particularly painful. Nevertheless, there were such experiences in other European countries of the time, so that one can hardly speak of the beginning of a reactionary German special path . This applied to the “belated” nations of Italy and Poland as well as to France and Great Britain, where the liberals were not free from national egoism either.

Similarly, Jörg-Detlef Kühne rejected the idea that the National Assembly had proven “innocence under international law”; that is just as incorrect as in Switzerland, Italy or other countries with revolutionary experience. In speakers like Dahlmann one sees an international lack of schooling: "The accusation of insufficient political maturity, which the liberals opposed to the democrats on the question of electoral law, also hit them in terms of foreign policy." In any case, the democrat Arnold Ruge already anticipated the idea of ​​the League of Nations in Frankfurt when he proposed a peoples' congress of the great nations of Europe. This should amicably amend the Vienna Treaties and prevent wars, on the basis of international law, through peaceful settlement of disputes and general European disarmament.

See also

literature

  • Manfred Kittel: Farewell to the People's Spring? National and foreign policy ideas in constitutional liberalism 1848/49 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 275, Issue 2 (October 2002), pp. 333–383.
  • Hans Georg Kraume: Foreign policy 1848. The Dutch province Limburg in the German revolution . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1979.
  • Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. University Press, Cambridge 1958.
  • Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977.

supporting documents

  1. ^ Peter Burg: The Congress of Vienna. The German Confederation in the European State System. dtv, Munich 1984, p. 52.
  2. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume I: Reform and Restoration 1789 to 1830 . 2nd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [u. a.] 1967, pp. 543-545.
  3. ^ Peter Burg: The Congress of Vienna. The German Confederation in the European State System. dtv, Munich 1984, p. 87.
  4. ^ Frank Lorenz Müller: The revolution of 1848/1849. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2002, p. 97.
  5. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 325/326.
  6. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 324.
  7. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 325/326.
  8. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 328/329.
  9. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 332.
  10. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 332/333.
  11. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 333-335.
  12. ↑ Konrad Canis: Bismarck's Foreign Policy 1870 to 1890. Rise and Danger , Schöningh, Paderborn u. a. 2004, p. 20.
  13. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 638.
  14. ^ Wolfram Siemann: The German Revolution of 1848/49. Unity of the nation and dissension of nationalities. In: the same: 1848/49 in Germany and Europe. Event - Coping - Memory . Schöningh, Paderborn u. a. 2006, pp. 101–113, here p. 108.
  15. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 321.
  16. ^ Hans Georg Kraume: Foreign Policy 1848. The Dutch province of Limburg in the German Revolution . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1979, p. 224.
  17. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 23/24.
  18. ↑ Manfred Kittel: Farewell to the People's Spring? National and foreign policy ideas in constitutional liberalism 1848/49 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 275, Issue 2 (October 2002), pp. 333–383, here p. 371.
  19. ^ Robert Bohn: History of Schleswig-Holstein . Beck, Munich 2006, ISBN 978-3-406-50891-2 , pp. 52 .
  20. ↑ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 36-38.
  21. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 51 f.
  22. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 40.
  23. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 40.
  24. ↑ Keith AP Sandiford: Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64 a study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion . University of Toronto Press: Toronto / Buffalo 1975, pp. 19/20.
  25. ↑ Keith AP Sandiford: Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64 a study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion . University of Toronto Press: Toronto / Buffalo 1975, pp. 19/20.
  26. ↑ Keith AP Sandiford: Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64 a study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion . University of Toronto Press: Toronto / Buffalo 1975, pp. 23/24.
  27. ↑ Keith AP Sandiford: Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64 a study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion . University of Toronto Press: Toronto / Buffalo 1975, p. 24.
  28. ↑ Keith AP Sandiford: Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64 a study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion . University of Toronto Press: Toronto / Buffalo 1975, pp. 24/25.
  29. ^ Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, p. 20.
  30. ^ Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, p. 21.
  31. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 53/54.
  32. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 53.
  33. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 63/64.
  34. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 74/75.
  35. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 85.
  36. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 86/87.
  37. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 90/91, 93/94.
  38. ^ Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, pp. 26-28.
  39. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 904/905.
  40. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 905.
  41. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 933/934.
  42. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 106.
  43. ^ Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, p. 14.
  44. ↑ Manfred Kittel: Farewell to the People's Spring? National and foreign policy ideas in constitutional liberalism 1848/49 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 275, Issue 2 (October 2002), pp. 333–383, here pp. 359–361.
  45. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 641.
  46. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 165.
  47. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 251, p. 253/254.
  48. ↑ Johan Christiaan Boogman: Nederland en de Duitse Bond 1815-1851 . Diss. Utrecht, JB Wolters, Groningen / Djakarta 1955, p. 594.
  49. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 293/294.
  50. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 298.
  51. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 320/321.
  52. ^ Günter Wollstein: The 'Greater Germany' of the Paulskirche. National goals in the bourgeois revolution of 1848/1849. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1977, pp. 321/322.
  53. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 885/886.
  54. ↑ Jürgen Angelow: The German Confederation . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2003, p. 93.
  55. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 883/884.
  56. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 898.
  57. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 891.
  58. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [et al.] 1960, pp. 900/901.
  59. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 933/934.
  60. ↑ Konrad Canis: Bismarck's Foreign Policy 1870 to 1890. Rise and Danger , Schöningh, Paderborn u. a. 2004, p. 21.
  61. ^ Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, pp. 30/31.
  62. ^ Raymond Poidevin / Jacques Bariéty: Les relations franco-allemandes 1815-1975 . Armand Colin: Paris 1977, p. 28.
  63. ^ Raymond Poidevin / Jacques Bariéty: Les relations franco-allemandes 1815-1975 . Armand Colin: Paris 1977, pp. 28/29.
  64. ^ Raymond Poidevin / Jacques Bariéty: Les relations franco-allemandes 1815-1975 . Armand Colin: Paris 1977, pp. 28/29.
  65. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, p. 908.
  66. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1960, pp. 933/934.
  67. ^ Theodor Heuss: Constitutional law and constitutional policy. From monarchical constitutionalism to democratic parliamentarism. Address given to professors and students at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Bonn on February 16, 1950 . Scherpe-Verlag, Krefeld 1950, p. 6.
  68. ^ Frank Lorenz Müller: The revolution of 1848/1849. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2002, p. 98.
  69. ^ Frank Lorenz Müller: The revolution of 1848/1849. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2002, p. 101 f.
  70. ^ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German history of society . Second volume: From the reform era to the industrial and political “German double revolution” 1815–1845 / 1849 . Beck, Munich 1987, p. 757.
  71. ^ Hans Georg Kraume: Foreign Policy 1848. The Dutch province of Limburg in the German Revolution . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1979, pp. 223/224.
  72. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: Revolution and legal culture. The significance of the revolutions of 1848 for legal development in Europe . In: Historical magazine . Supplements, New Series, Volume 29: The Revolutions of 1848 in European History. Results and aftermath. Contributions to the symposium in the Paulskirche from June 21 to 23, 1998 (2000), pp. 57–72, here pp. 69/70.
  73. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789 . Volume I: Reform and Restoration 1789 to 1830 . 2nd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [et al.] 1967, pp. 676-679.
  74. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Reich, Nation and State in recent German history. In: Historical magazine , volume. 254, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 341-381, here pp. 358/359.
  75. ^ Günter Wollstein: German History 1848/49. Failed revolution in Central Europe . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1986, p. 164 f.
  76. ↑ "If, at this juncture, Hanover and Saxony at least had given Prussia their unqualified support, she could now have secured what she would not achieve in fact until 1866 at the price of two campaigns. If Bavaria and Württemberg also had agreed to co-operate with the northern states, even the results of 1870 might perhaps have been anticipated without a policy of 'blood and iron'. In fact, it now depended almost entirely upon the German governments what advantages Germany would gain from British diplomatic support, Russian preoccupations in the Balkans and the general European détente following the Prusso-Danish armistice. "Werner Eugen Mosse: The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71. With Special Reference to England And Russia. Cambridge: University Press 1958, p. 31.
  77. ↑ Manfred Kittel: Farewell to the People's Spring? National and foreign policy ideas in constitutional liberalism 1848/49 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 275, Issue 2 (October 2002), pp. 333–383, here pp. 378/379.
  78. ^ Wolfram Siemann: 1848/49 in Germany and Europe. Event, coping, memory. Schöningh, Paderborn u. a. 2006, p. 226.
  79. ↑ Manfred Kittel: Farewell to the People's Spring? National and foreign policy ideas in constitutional liberalism 1848/49 . In: Historische Zeitschrift , Volume 275, Issue 2 (October 2002), pp. 333–383, here pp. 380/381.
  80. ^ Jörg-Detlef Kühne: Revolution and legal culture. The significance of the revolutions of 1848 for legal development in Europe . In: Historical magazine . Supplements, New Series, Volume 29: The Revolutions of 1848 in European History. Results and aftermath. Contributions to the symposium in the Paulskirche from June 21 to 23, 1998 (2000), pp. 57–72, here pp. 69–71.