Foreign policy of the Weimar Republic

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Reich Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in his speech to the League of Nations, Geneva 1926, immediately after the German accession.

The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic , i.e. the foreign policy of the German Reich from 1919 to 1933, was primarily determined by the consequences of the First World War .

In the war, Germany and its allies had stood against France , Russia , Great Britain , the United States and other countries. With the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, the victorious powers decided, among other things, that Germany had to cede territories and limit its armaments. The Rhineland was occupied by the Allies . In addition, Germany should pay these reparations .

France in particular had a keen interest in Germany remaining weak and wanted to make permanent use of the peace conditions. Great Britain and the United States were often more willing to communicate. On the one hand, they were concerned that France might get a supremacy on the European mainland, on the other hand, they did not want to be too tied to what was going on in Europe.

Germany had to come to an understanding with the West for the revision (review, here meant: amendment) of the Versailles Treaty. This was particularly successful between 1923 and 1929, when Gustav Stresemann was Foreign Minister. In addition, however, the republic tried to cooperate with communist Russia ( Treaty of Rapallo , 1922). It was possible to have many Versailles regulations repealed. Some of them were replaced by agreements in which Germany was equally involved. Prepared by the Locarno Treaties of 1925, Germany became a member of the League of Nations the following year . Other provisions ran out of their own accord, such as the forced unilateral most-favored nation treatment in foreign trade until 1925. The occupation of the Rhineland ended in 1930. Towards the end of the republic, in 1932, the reparations were ended, and in the same year the Western powers granted Germany in principle military equality . Weimar politics was unsuccessful in changing the eastern border with Poland . A German-Austrian customs union failed in 1931 due to French resistance.

In the period of National Socialism from 1933 onwards, Germany switched to the policy of bilateral agreements, violated the Versailles Treaty and agreements signed later, and in 1939 the Second World War began .

prehistory

First World War 1914–1918

Power groups in the First World War, orange Germany and its allies, green the opponents (each including the colonies).

The July crisis in 1914 meant that Germany and Austria-Hungary were at war with France, Russia and Great Britain at the end of August. It would be a big point of contention later who was to blame for the war . In the west, Germany occupied almost all of Belgium , Luxembourg, and much of northern France. In the east, Germany and Austria-Hungary succeeded in gradually conquering the western part of European Russia. Other theaters of war were the Southern Alps , the Balkans , the German colonies , the Ottoman Empire and the oceans.

After the October Revolution of 1917, the Russian communists previously sponsored by Germany were ready to sign the peace of Brest-Litovsk , which was favorable to Germany (March 3, 1918). The German Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann was against the hard peace, but could not assert himself against the military leadership. This peace was later used in arguments against Germany when it came to the severity of the Versailles Peace . The relief in the east gave Germany the hope of being able to victoriously end the war in the west. In the summer of 1918, however, it became clear that the Western Front could no longer be held, partly because of the fresh troops from the United States. They declared war on Germany in 1917.

Armistice 1918

The center politician Matthias Erzberger (center, here in Spa 1918) was the head of the German Armistice Commission.

The Supreme Army Command then urged the Reich government to accept politicians from the democratic parties and to reach an early armistice. The basis should be the Fourteen Points of American President Wilson , which sounded more moderate than the French and British ideas. They provided for a mutual agreement while observing the peoples' right to self-determination .

Since October 3, 1918, Max von Baden was German Chancellor, who accepted representatives of the Social Democrats, Liberals and Catholic center people in the government. Foreign Minister Paul von Hintze would have liked to see a (further) change of government first, then the announcement of a new course in domestic and foreign policy, then internal reforms, then the recognition of the Fourteen Points and then a request for a ceasefire. But it turned out the other way around. According to the historian Peter Krüger, the Reich government did not dare to oppose the unreasonable pressure of the Supreme Army Command. The change had the effect of an opportunistic maneuver abroad, the people in Germany could not process the sudden change from the victory reports to the opposite.

On November 9, von Baden abdicated Kaiser Wilhelm II , whose negative image abroad would have weighed on the peace negotiations. Two days later, a German delegation signed the armistice in Compiègne, France . Here, too, the pressure of the Supreme Army Command was decisive, which considered the fighting to be hopeless and wanted to spare the German troops for the future. The German delegation had to accept many things without any Western consideration, including the immediate evacuation of the occupied territories, including Alsace-Lorraine (the Fourteen Points had already requested this). The peace of Brest-Litovsk was lifted and the sea ​​blockade , which was supposed to starve Germany, remained in place (until March 1919).

Versailles Treaty 1919

Main article: Peace Treaty of Versailles

Europe between the world wars.
The German delegation in Versailles in 1919, third from right: Reich Foreign Minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau .

The peace conference sent by 27 nations, which was supposed to work out the peace agreement with Germany, met from January 1919 in the Palace of Versailles near Paris without German participation. The leadership was held by the representatives of the Big Four, that is, France, Great Britain, the USA and Italy . The German delegation was deliberately received in a humiliating manner and was only able to obtain minor relief through written submissions; The German Foreign Minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau (independent) was deliberately rude when he accepted the draft treaty by making his sharp statement while sitting down and resigned from his office shortly afterwards.

The extensive agreement stipulated:

disarmament
Germany was only allowed to have a professional army of 100,000 soldiers (1914: 800,000, during the war: 2.4 million German soldiers) and had to forego certain weapons such as tanks, submarines, airplanes and poison gas.
Reparations
Germany was to pay for the damage that the victorious powers suffered from the war. The basis for the claim was the assertion in Art. 231 that Germany was solely to blame for the war.
Loss of territory
Germany lost, mostly without a referendum, ultimately thirteen percent of the area and ten percent of the population, as well as the colonies . Conflicts arose mainly over the areas ceded to Poland.
crew
The Rhineland came under the occupation of various victorious powers ; the individual zones should be evacuated after five, ten or fifteen years. The Saar area , which was important because of its coal deposits, was also to be occupied by France for fifteen years.

Future wars were to be prevented by the League of Nations , which had to punish attacking states. Germany was initially excluded from the League of Nations.

Challenges

Germany and Austria

Germany after 1919/1921.
Part of the fortifications of Cologne , which had to be razed because of the Versailles Treaty.

On August 11, 1919, the republican Weimar constitution was promulgated. The news of the Treaty of Versailles burst into the deliberations of the National Assembly , which severely damaged the reputation of the coalition of the SPD , DDP and the center . It already lost its absolute majority in the 1920 election . Nevertheless, it would be inadmissible to say unilaterally that the treaty was the main reason for the final fall of the republic in 1933. Germany had remained undivided and economically important and could again become a great power alongside France and Great Britain. To foreign countries one could argue that only an economically healthy Germany could pay reparations and resist communism.

Three foreign policy camps emerged. The center wanted to eliminate the consequences of Versailles by working with the West and to accept it if Germany got into new contractual ties as a result. (These did not correspond to the German tradition, as late as 1907 Germany was a main opponent of international jurisdiction, as it was discussed in the Hague Peace Conferences .) One spoke of a "policy of understanding" or Western policy. But even among those willing to communicate, an emphatically national stance was widespread, for example in the left-liberal DDP. The SPD was strongly pro-Western and wanted to use its relations with sister parties abroad; foreign policy linked them with the other democratic parties, but did not pay off for them domestically.

The nationalist right, represented primarily by the German National People's Party (DNVP), rejected the understanding as a " fulfillment policy " or "renunciation policy". It wanted to make progress in foreign policy simply by insisting on German interests. Although it too firmly rejected communism, it tried - more than the center - to use Soviet Russia against the West. Even the unilateral termination of the Versailles Treaty was considered.

The German communists were also against the West. Their foreign policy partner of choice was naturally Communist Russia, and they understood the Communist Party of Germany as a section of the Communist International .

In 1919 Austria was reduced to the area it is today and thus cut off from its earlier economic relations in the Danube region. Now “ German Austria ” wanted to join the German Reich, to the enthusiasm of the left and liberals in both countries. The victorious powers, however, prevented this by prohibiting the connection in order not to enlarge Germany, which had just been weakened, and above all to avoid exposing south-east Europe to German economic and political influence. In 1919 Germany behaved very cautiously on this question because it feared Allied pressure, for example further demands by France in the Rhineland.

France and Belgium

German soldiers with mortars in a destroyed French forest, 1914 between Bapaume and Arras.

Of the great western victorious powers, France or the French Third Republic had suffered the most in the war, as significant parts of its north had been contested or occupied. At the Versailles Peace Conference, it achieved many of its war aims. In addition, it wanted, among other things, to see the Rhineland as an independent state in a Western European customs union. But Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau was prepared to drop such demands if the Anglo-Saxon powers gave guarantees for the security of France.

It was widely recognized in 1919 that France's strength was only momentary. Russia, France's important military and financial partner before the war, was lost in the October Revolution . France was faced with the question of whether it should endeavor to permanently weaken its German neighbor or to reach an understanding.

Belgium had suffered severe damage during the war and demanded, among other things, compensation from Germany for the unfavorable exchange of money during the German occupation. Germany, however, thought that this was part of the general reparations payments; they wanted something in return for separate treatment. This overshadowed a possible return of Eupen-Malmedy to Germany.

UK and USA

Great Britain and the United States wanted neither a German nor a French ruled Europe, but neither wanted to be permanently tied to the European continent with its trouble spots. Britain had come out of the war impoverished and embroiled in conflict in Ireland and elsewhere. Since the European victors had borrowed money from the United States during the war, they were extremely interested in a recovery of the European economy: France (but also Great Britain) could only pay its debts to the United States if Germany could pay reparations. The United States, however, strictly refused to formally recognize any link between reparations and inter-allied debt.

As a result, both Anglo-Saxon countries often had a moderating effect on France, and German foreign policy wanted to give the United States the role of arbitrator several times. However, Berlin was partially mistaken in assessing the specific intentions of the United States and recognizing the right time for initiatives.

Russia

The communist government in Moscow had shown in November 1920 that it would withstand the civil war and the (half-hearted) intervention of foreign powers. At first she tried unsuccessfully to gain power through uprisings in neighboring countries, in Hungary and also in Germany. Lenin did not want to improve international relations but to abolish them, just like classes and states.

Soviet Russia, or since 1922 the Soviet Union, was internationally isolated and politically ostracized; a further burden on foreign policy was that it had expropriated foreign assets in Russia. Only gradually did the other states diplomatically recognize the Soviet Union, first Germany, which was similarly isolated.

Poland, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia

Poland in 1920, after the war with Russia and the conquest of the Vilnius area.

France in particular stood up for Poland, which was resurrected in the war and was to replace Russia as a French ally. At the beginning of the Versailles negotiations, Clemenceau spoke of the borders of 1772, before the first Polish partition , while Wilson had only thought of Polish-populated areas in the Fourteen Points. In 1919/20, Poland conquered territory that came very close to that of 1772.

The Treaty of Versailles also gave Poland parts of Germany, including a strip as far as the Baltic Sea (the Polish corridor ), so that East Prussia no longer bordered directly on the rest of Germany. Danzig was separated from Germany as the Free City of Danzig under the supervision of the League of Nations. German-Polish relations were severely strained as a result, but both countries were able to work together in the inter-war period even if the issues at stake were excluded.

Lithuania had also occupied part of Germany, the Memel region . But Lithuania also had a dispute over the borders with Poland, which had conquered the Vilnius area in a flash in 1920 . Germany resisted the temptation to play the two countries off against each other, because this would not only have upset France and Great Britain, but also endangered East Prussia. The Soviet Union was in geographical proximity and encouraged Germany to make appropriate threats to Poland. Instead, the Foreign Office acted as a mediator and was able to help in December 1927 to end the state of war between Poland and Lithuania.

The Czechoslovakia had a German-speaking minority. But in contrast to Poland and Lithuania, Czechoslovakia did not contain any formerly German areas (but Austrian, with the exception of the Hultschiner Ländchen ). Germany was the first state to recognize the Prague coup of October 28, 1918. The Foreign Office did not consider annexing the German-speaking areas ( Sudetenland ). The government in Prague feared a right-wing government in Germany and an annexation of Austria and was aware that the security of the country had to be guaranteed by France. However, they did not want to make Germany an enemy (a Germany that would soon recover). Germany, for its part, was fundamentally concerned about good relations so as not to complicate the situation of the German-speaking minority.

Confrontation with the West 1920–1923

The Versailles Treaty came into force in January 1920. Europe was divided into countries that wanted to keep the current state of affairs and those that wanted to change it (besides Germany, above all Russia, Poland, Hungary and Italy). At first it was unclear which direction German foreign policy would take, and this also depended on the behavior of the victorious powers. France would interpret the Versailles regulations very restrictively.

Reparations

Walter Simons , the independent Reich Foreign Minister from 1920/1921.

Main article: German reparations after the First World War

According to the treaty, a reparations commission should determine the total amount of German debt. France, however, drew the negotiations to the high political level and to the public, which dominated the Spa Conference (1920) and the London Conference (1921). In January 1921, the French finance minister demanded the extremely high sum of 212 billion gold marks at annual rates of twelve billion, three times the annual income of Germany at the time. At the beginning of March, at the London conference, Germany rejected such demands. That is why France - in violation of the Versailles Treaty - occupied Düsseldorf , Duisburg and Ruhrort and levied customs on the borders between occupied and unoccupied Germany.

A payment plan of April 27, 1921 was then known as the “ London ultimatum ” : Germany was to pay 132 billion in much lower annual installments. The cabinet of Chancellor Joseph Wirth accepted the plan after hesitation and thus prevented further occupations. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George was very accommodating to the Germans: apart from part of the total that was only to be paid if the Germans were able to do so, the remaining fifty billion was what the Germans themselves had proposed.

Upper Silesia 1921

During the third Polish uprising in the eastern part of the Prussian province of Silesia , a referendum was held on March 20, 1921 . With a majority of sixty percent for Germany, the League of Nations determined a division on August 12, 1921, which the Versailles Treaty had provided for as a possibility. " East Upper Silesia ", the economically more important part of the voting area, came to Poland. The Reich government under Wirth resigned in protest.

Germany argued that the loss of Upper Silesian industrial areas would weaken its performance. Lloyd George was receptive to this, but could not prevail against France, whose support he needed in the Turkish-Greek conflict . Furthermore, Poland tried to acquire Upper Silesia by force, against which resident groups had formed. Despite the tensions between Germany and Poland, on May 15, 1922, a treaty on national minorities, which was also favorable for Germany, was concluded.

Genoa and Rapallo 1922

Lloyd George campaigned for an international conference at the Cannes Conference, which finally took place in Genoa in April 1922 ( Genoa Conference ). He wanted Germany and Russia to be integrated into a new state system. Relaxation and economic recovery were to be achieved, among other things, by an international financial consortium that was involved (not only) in Russia. The conference suffered from fear of the United States being excluded from economic relations with Russia. France was angry that Germany wanted to pass him by with Great Britain about a payment deferral and wanted to get away from the military controls. Germany, on the other hand, was disappointed by the Reparations Commission and the complaints made by the Control Commission, especially with regard to the German police. The Wirth government was under pressure and saw no success in the policy of compliance; however, Reich Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau had similar ideas about a reconstruction consortium as Lloyd George.

Reich Chancellor Joseph Wirth (center, in profile) and the Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Tschitscherin , in Rapallo in 1922.

At the Genoa conference itself, the German delegation felt isolated and cut off from direct access to Lloyd George. On April 16, 1922, a German-Russian meeting took place in nearby Rapallo, including the conclusion of a contract ( Treaty of Rapallo ). Russia had already made far-reaching proposals in December, and Germany has now agreed with him to waive mutual financial claims. For Russia, the treaty meant the longed-for breach of isolation, while Germany had demonstrated independence from the Western powers.

The signing received an echo abroad, especially in suspicious France, that the contracting parties had not expected. Other ulterior motives were suspected. But the development towards a stable Europe was not permanently damaged. The Rapallo Treaty was popular with the German public. It hardly served as a counterbalance to the contacts with the West, but continued the traditional German illusion of having a “free hand” in foreign policy.

The connection to Russia was continued in 1926 by the Berlin Treaty , a neutrality pact. A component of German-Soviet relations that was only discontinued in 1934 was the secret military cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army .

Occupation of the Ruhr in 1923

French Alpine troops march through Buer (near Gelsenkirchen) to commemorate two officers who were shot by insurgents in March 1923.

Main article: Occupation of the Ruhr

France demanded guarantees from Germany for the reparations, such as the state coal mines and forests in Germany, and in the background repeatedly threatened to occupy the Ruhr area . Belgium and Italy were also represented in the Reparations Commission, and they moved to France's side. On January 9, 1923, the commission found that Germany had deliberately failed to meet its delivery obligations. On January 11th, French troops moved into the Ruhr area to protect reparations agents who were supposed to take German property directly from production.

The Versailles Treaty only stipulated that the occupation of the Rhineland should guarantee the fulfillment of the peace conditions, now Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré saw the pretext that the Ruhr area guaranteed the payment of reparations. France also had plans to control or separate parts of Germany. The Reich government saw no other option than to react with passive resistance: the officials in the occupied area should not cooperate with the occupiers. They wanted to hold out until Great Britain and the USA intervened. Coal mining and industrial production collapsed; Resistant officials and their families were evacuated. The inflation rose even more, riots shook the kingdom.

On May 2, 1923, the Reich government offered a total debt of 30 billion gold marks, but without giving precise details of the guarantees. August 11, 1923, when the British Foreign Minister Curzon criticized France, would have been an opportune time to break off passive resistance, but political opinion in Germany was against it. On September 26, the new Chancellor Gustav Stresemann gave up passive resistance anyway. But Poincaré saw his goal and was no longer interested in an understanding. According to Krüger, he went over the top with this, because his behavior indirectly questioned the Versailles peace conditions.

Understanding in the Stresemann era 1923–1929

Gustav Stresemann of the right-wing liberal DVP became foreign minister after the fall of his cabinet in November 1923 and remained so until his death in October 1929. During the World War he had been one of the supporters of far-reaching annexations . Like all German politicians, he was in favor of the revision of the Versailles Treaty, but he understood that the Reich government first had to recognize the situation at that time. His moderate manner was received extremely positively abroad.

London Conference and Dawes Plan

American expert in Berlin in 1924. Charles Dawes (center, with pipe), and Owen Young (left next to Dawes), who had a major influence on the "Dawes Plan".

The deadlock since the occupation of the Ruhr as well as constructive German proposals led to the establishment of a committee under the American tax officer Charles Gates Dawes . It met for the first time on January 14, 1924 and was supposed to find the means to stabilize the German currency and the German budget so that reparations could be paid. At the London conference in July / August 1924 , France had to forego political guarantees of security, and sanctions against Germany could only be imposed after a court ruling and American approval.

The Dawes Plan meant a two-year moratorium, followed by a slow increase in the annual growth rates for Germany. France received guarantees through restructuring of the Reichsbank and Reichsbahn, among other things . The “Dawes bond”, which was subscribed primarily in the United States, supported the German budget, and the currency was stabilized on the basis of the US dollar .

Locarno 1925

France saw deficiencies in the German disarmament and therefore prevented the so-called Cologne occupation zone from being vacated on January 10, 1925. From the efforts of German foreign policy to satisfy France in terms of security policy, the approach to the negotiations in Locarno, Switzerland, developed in October 1925. Domestically, the Locarno treaty led to the DNVP leaving the coalition, the citizens' bloc . Thanks to the opposition parties SPD and DDP, it could still be ratified in the Reichstag.

Germany had its demands met. The “Rhine Pact” of Locarno meant that the existing border between Germany on the one hand and Belgium and France on the other hand was guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. Germany signed arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia that forbade violent border changes. Stresemann thus prevented having to recognize these limits.

A formulation suitable for this made it possible for Germany to interpret that as a member of the League of Nations it would not be bound by Article 16 in future. This article of the League of Nations statutes stated that member states must allow attackers to be punished. Germany specifically wanted to prevent the event that it would have to let troops of the Western powers pass through its country in the event of a Polish-Russian war, which would have benefited the unloved Poland. Berlin could argue that it was forcibly disarmed and would not be able to defend itself against the attacker's reactions.

Fruits of the understanding policy

Leading politicians in Europe in Geneva when Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926. In the middle, Reich Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann .

While France was still reluctant, Great Britain wanted to integrate Germany into the League of Nations by September 1924 at the latest . Germany was only concerned with the conditions for accession. These appeared fulfilled in Locarno, also through the promise of a permanent German seat in the League of Nations. The admission of Germany was delayed for months in 1926 because Poland suddenly wanted a seat as well. After a minor reform and a non-permanent seat for Poland, the problem was solved, and on September 10, 1926 the German delegation was welcomed in the hall of the General Assembly.

Immediately, on September 17th, a meeting took place between Stresemann and his French counterpart Aristide Briand . In Thoiry near Geneva, Briand Germany apparently proposed a swap. France wanted to resell shares that it had received in the Reichsbahn under the Dawes Plan in order to raise money more quickly. De facto, it needed Germany's approval. In return, the Rhineland would be evacuated as early as 1927. Because of the negative attitude of Prime Minister Poincaré, and probably also because of the interim recovery of the French currency , the conversation had no concrete consequences.

In the course of the understanding policy, Germany had further successes: in 1926 an agreement with France and Belgium, which allowed Germany to use (civil) aviation again, in the same year an international crude steel community between Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, and in 1927 a long-prepared trade agreement between Germany and France. In 1929/30 the Rhineland was evacuated prematurely as a sign of France's goodwill.

Poland

Germany was concerned with preventing the German minority from emigrating from Poland , because the minority was the basis for the required border adjustments. Further plans in the Foreign Office wanted to take advantage of Poland's weak economic situation and promise economic aid for border changes. State Secretary Schubert forbade this consideration by a decree in 1926; Poland's economic recovery also made it increasingly unrealistic. Poland, for its part, tried to undermine Danzig's position. When the Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski made a threatening speech against the German minority in December 1928, he received not only a sharp reply from Stresemann, but also the annoyance of the Western powers. Stresemann took the opportunity to go against the prevailing idea that the minorities in Europe should simply adapt to the respective national people.

In addition, a tariff war overshadowed the German-Polish relationship. Poland wanted to keep the most-favored nation treatment, which Germany had been forced to by the Versailles Treaty, even after the expiry of 1925. When production in Poland was rebuilt in 1924/25, the country wanted to balance its trade balance. Krüger writes of hostility and nationalism on both sides, but points out that tariff wars were not uncommon back then and that Poland was also familiar with such tensions with France. At that time Germany was Poland's most important trading partner.

Disarmament and disarmament

A heavy gun is dismantled, 1919.

The Locarno trial included the evacuation of the Cologne zone and the cessation of military controls. Withdrawal began on December 1, 1926, and was completed within two months, and on December 12, the final protocol of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission was presented. It provided for the recall of the commission on January 31, whose tasks would be taken over by the League of Nations. However, there were no further controls because, despite mistrust, no country wanted to mess with Germany. The final protocol was extremely critical of what had been achieved. The commission was of the opinion that the Reichswehr would be reshaped and the authorities covered the armed forces. In addition, there is still a lot of hidden war material. In fact, Germany was secretly arming (see Black Reichswehr ).

A related issue was general disarmament, which had already been called for in the 1920 Versailles Treaty. This also justified the permanent limitation of German armaments. France had delayed disarmament in order to maintain its current military superiority over Germany, while Germany became more demanding since 1929. When Briand tried in 1927 to obtain a special relationship with the United States, this resulted in a general treaty outlawing war of aggression, the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928 .

Colonial question

Weimar Republic and League of Nations mandates in formerly German colonies

Almost all parties of the Weimar Republic supported the demand of German colonial advocates for the return of the colonies. Since April 1, 1924, the Foreign Office again had a colonial department. The department was headed by Edmund Brückner , the former governor of the German colony of Togo . Brückner pursued the goal of at least gaining mandate administration over some of the former colonies after Germany was admitted to the League of Nations. Stresemann supported this in principle, but for him the colonial question was of subordinate relevance within the revision objectives. The “colonial policy” remained largely insignificant in foreign policy. The government only had a right to a say in colonial politics in individual cases - for example, when Germany protested against the integration of Rwanda-Urundi into the Belgian Congo colony in 1925. On September 9, 1927, Ludwig Kastl became a German delegate to the permanent mandate commission of the League of Nations. The administration of a mandate area was not transferred to Germany. The reluctant colonial ambitions led to a gradual break between the government and the organized colonial movement in Germany. The movement was now completely steered by its radical representatives into opposition to the republic.

Last phase of the republic 1929–1933

January 1930, before leaving for a reparations conference in The Hague (from left): Finance Minister Paul Moldenhauer , Foreign Minister Julius Curtius , Minister for the Occupied Territories Joseph Wirth , State Secretary Carl von Schubert on the right .

German foreign policy had contributed to improving the political climate in Europe and Germany's freedom of movement. However, as early as July 1928 Stresemann appeared more demanding. After his death in October 1929, Economics Minister Julius Curtius (also DVP) took over the Foreign Office, who was able to reap a harvest from his predecessor on November 21, clearing the Koblenz bridgehead. In mid-1930, Stresemann's close colleague Carl von Schubert was replaced as State Secretary by Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow , who had been skeptical of Stresemann's policy of understanding.

Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning (since March 1930; since October 1931 also Foreign Minister) ensured that Weimar's foreign policy was much tougher, less willing to understand and less predictable. In addition, there was pressure from the election success of the NSDAP in September 1930, which Brüning blamed for the lack of concession by the winners of Versailles.

The years since 1929 have been overshadowed by the Great Depression . Stresemann had previously tried in vain to liberalize foreign trade. It failed because of resistance from the Ministry of Economics and Finance. He also had a hard time because other countries did not allow free access to their markets either. During the crisis, the countries actually sealed off their markets. The trade and customs system consisted only of numerous individual agreements, writes Ulrich Kluge.

Europe Plan and Customs Union 1930/1931

Prime Minister Pierre Laval , Chancellor Heinrich Brüning , Foreign Minister Aristide Briand , Reichswehr and Interior Minister Wilhelm Groener (from left), at a dinner in the French Embassy in Berlin in September 1931.

In May 1930, Aristide Briand suggested that the states of Europe should join together in a community with permanent bodies. The plan resulted in the recognition of the borders and the exclusion of Great Britain and the USA, which was not in Germany's interest. Germany did not see itself sufficiently confirmed as a great power to be bound by a European order.

It was the Austrian Chancellor Johann Schober who raised the issue of the customs union when he visited Berlin in 1930. This could promote a connection between Austria and Germany; Austria hoped that this would provide economic relief. Curtius was happy to take up the idea because its implementation would have given the Briining government great prestige in Germany. State Secretary Bülow hoped that other countries such as Czechoslovakia would join the customs union and that in the end Poland could even be brought to revise the border and France could become economically dependent.

The hasty project of the customs union between Germany and Austria , presented on March 21, 1931, proved to be a weak challenge for the European state system. Due to financial pressure from France, Austria had to withdraw its willingness, and on September 3rd Curtius declared that he would not pursue the project any further. The failure was one reason for his resignation in October.

End of reparations and arms restrictions

As early as 1928, the reparations agent of the Dawes Plan had indicated that it would be better to discuss the remaining questions, such as the total amount of German debt, in relatively favorable economic times and not later in a possible crisis. The Young Plan provided that Germany had to pay annual installments according to a certain scheme until 1988. They were lower than the Dawes plan. For the first time, the payment of reparations was officially linked to the payment of debts between the Allies; both should expire at about the same time.

In March 1930, the Reichstag adopted the Young Plan; soon afterwards Heinrich Müller's cabinet fell . All German parties thought the plan was only an interim solution, especially the new, more right-wing Reich government under Briining . She didn't even try to work with the plan.

On the way to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in February 1932, from left: Ministerial Director Walter Zechlin , State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow , Chancellor and Foreign Minister Heinrich Brüning, and Reich Defense Minister Wilhelm Groener .

Not only in foreign policy, but also in domestic policy, Briining paid little attention to the consequences of his policy, which was intended to restore the German budget and end the reparations. His stance originally came from an orthodox financial theory, it was only after the election in September 1930 that the cabinet discussed the possibility of using the economic crisis as an instrument to solve the reparations problem. This was promising because the United States was concerned about its investments in Germany and Great Britain feared a collapse of Germany with a subsequent seizure of power by the Communists or National Socialists.

With the Hoover moratorium of July 1931, the American President Herbert C. Hoover achieved a year-long freeze on reparations and inter-allied debt payments . That came at a rather inconvenient time for Brüning: He wanted a final end to the reparation payments. When he revealed this in January 1932, France and Great Britain reacted with snub and postponed the Lausanne conference . When this met in June and led to an agreement on July 9, Brüning was no longer in office. In fact, the reparations claims ended, if only for a final payment and the redemption of bonds. According to the Reparations Commission, Germany had paid a total of 20,778.9 million Reichsmarks in cash or in kind ; according to German accounts it was 67,673.

A long-prepared Geneva disarmament conference had been in session since February 1932 . The armaments adjustment, which Germany has harshly demanded, could have been achieved in two ways: either by disarming the other states or by arming Germany. For reasons of cost, the Foreign Office tended towards the former, the Reichswehr towards the latter. France in particular did not want to release Germany from the Versailles restrictions. The German delegation, led by the new Chancellor Franz von Papen , left the conference in July amid loud protests. However, the procedure was successful: on December 11, 1932, the great powers recognized - with reservations - the basic equality of Germany.

Foreign policy under Papen and Schleicher

In July 1932 in the Berlin Lustgarten: The National Socialist Joseph Goebbels rejects the solution to the reparations question.

General Kurt von Schleicher had already worked in the background on President Hindenburg when he dismissed Brüning in May 1932. Germany should be even more demanding in terms of foreign policy. On June 1, Schleicher became Reichswehr Minister in the Papen cabinet - he had chosen the new Chancellor himself, also because of the illusion that Papen could reach an agreement with France. France's Prime Minister Edouard Herriot was stunned by von Papen's proposal for an alliance, but also skeptical about his otherwise nationalist appearance. The end of the reparations was of little help to Papen domestically: the strengthened Communists and National Socialists accused him of having final payments as part of the compromise.

At the beginning of December 1932, Schleicher became Chancellor himself. He tried to expand relations with the Soviet Union. In the few weeks of his chancellorship only the already mentioned recognition of military equality came about. But it immediately put him under pressure from representatives of the Reichswehr, who, unlike him, wanted to initiate a major armament immediately .

outlook

After January 30, 1933, it initially seemed that Adolf Hitler would continue to pursue the foreign policy of the previous years, he also took over Foreign Minister Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath from the Papen and Schleicher cabinets. Abroad, Hitler's chancellorship was viewed with concern, but no threat to one's own security was seen. But Hitler had already declared in February to high representatives of the Reichswehr that his aim was to conquer " Lebensraum in the East ". He put into practice what only a minority in the Foreign Office considered desirable in the 1920s, such as the joint German-Soviet conquest of Poland in September 1939.

Hitler-Germany left the League of Nations in October 1933 and tried to achieve its goals through bilateral agreements. An example of this - and at the same time a sensational U-turn to Weimar's Ostpolitik - was the non-aggression pact with Poland in early 1934. However, Hitler could easily conclude treaties because he did not intend to keep them. In 1936 he broke the Locarno Treaty when he allowed German troops to march into the demilitarized Rhineland ( occupation of the Rhineland (1936) ). In doing so, he violated an agreement that Germany had signed of its own free will (unlike the Versailles Treaty).

After the Second World War, the United States became permanently involved in Europe and ensured a relatively gentle treatment of the western zones of occupation in Germany and, from 1949, the Federal Republic. The London Debt Agreement of 1953 also regulated remaining reparations debts from the First World War.

See also: Prehistory of the Second World War in Europe

research

For a long time, Weimar's foreign policy was only a marginal topic in historical studies, but in the early 1970s there was a wave of works on individual topics. The central question was and still is the question of continuity, i.e. to what extent there is a difference between the Weimar and National Socialist foreign policy (and finally also to that of the German Empire ). The "clumsy attempts" to draw a line from Martin Luther to Adolf Hitler that went back centuries had failed, according to Marie-Luise Recker . The theses on the continuity of the ruling classes should be taken more seriously.

Peter Grupp, for example, said that the Weimar goals and methods were the same as in the empire, with Brockdorff-Rantzau an imperial expert followed the previous one. Other historians, on the other hand, saw a new function and sometimes a new policy, despite the old elites; Stresemann, who was capable of learning, was not only a politician of understanding for purely tactical reasons. The changes since 1930 and 1933 have not yet been investigated, judges Gottfried Niedhart , but there is a trend to say that the republican element has gradually declined.

In 1985 Peter Krüger presented the most extensive overall presentation on the subject to date. He praises Stresemann for his understanding of the global changes of the 20th century, such as the interdependence of the world economy . He accuses Brüning of resorting to national propaganda when difficulties arose during the revision. “This partly created the pressure for oneself to be exposed to which one then complained.” Even under Stresemann, Weimar foreign policy, apart from some approaches, had only negative goals, but no conception of an international order that included other countries .

See also

literature

  • Hermann Graml : Europe between the wars. 4th edition. Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, Munich 1979, ISBN 3-423-04005-X ( dtv paperback 4005 = dtv world history of the 20th century 5).
  • Klaus Hildebrand : The past realm. German foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871–1945. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1995, ISBN 3-421-06691-4 .
  • Hans-Christof Kraus : Versailles and the consequences. Foreign policy between revisionism and understanding 1919–1933 . be.bra Verlag, Berlin 2013, ISBN 978-3-89809-404-7 .
  • Peter Krüger : The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1985, ISBN 3-534-07250-2 .
  • Peter Krüger: Versailles. German foreign policy between revisionism and peacekeeping. Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, Munich 1986, ISBN 3-423-04513-2 ( German history of the latest times from the 19th century to the present 4513).
  • Gottfried Niedhart: The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic. 2nd updated edition. Oldenbourg, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-486-57979-7 ( Encyclopedia of German History 53).

Web links

Commons : International relations of the Weimar Republic  - collection of images, videos and audio files

supporting documents

  1. ↑ For a more recent, concise description of the road to war see Sönke Neitzel: Blut und Eisen. Germany in the First World War (German history in the 20th century), Pendo Verlag: Zürich 2003, pp. 16–33.
  2. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 32.
  3. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), p. 122.
  4. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 37.
  5. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 33/34.
  6. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), p. 163.
  7. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), pp. 165, 224.
  8. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), pp. 204/205.
  9. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), pp. 223/224.
  10. ↑ Rounded, after Sönke Neitzel: Blood and Iron. Germany and the Second World War (German History in the 20th Century), Pendo: Zürich 2003, p. 44.
  11. ↑ Wolfgang Michalka and Gottfried Niedhart: The unloved republic. Documentation on domestic and foreign policy in Weimar 1918-1933 , dtv: Munich 1980, p. 397.
  12. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart 1995, p. 404.
  13. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 26.
  14. ↑ Jürgen C. Hess: "It should be the whole of Germany." Democratic nationalism in the Weimar Republic using the example of the German Democratic Party (Kieler Historische Studien 24), Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart 1978, p. 339.
  15. ↑ See the only individual study on the foreign policy of a Weimar party: Stefan Feucht: The attitude of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to foreign policy during the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) (Modern History and Politics 10). Lang: Frankfurt am Main a. a. 1998, p. 542.
  16. ↑ Karlheinz Dederke: Empire and Republic. Germany 1917-1933 , 6th edition, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1991 (1969), p. 126/127.
  17. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 331/332.
  18. ^ David Stevenson: French War Aims and Peace Planning. In: Manfred Boemeke u. a. (Ed.): The Treaty of Versailles. A reassessment after 75 years . German Historical Institute Washington / Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 1998, pp. 87-109, here pp. 90/92, 107.
  19. ^ David Stevenson: French War Aims and Peace Planning. In: Manfred Boemeke u. a. (Ed.): The Treaty of Versailles. A reassessment after 75 years . German Historical Institute Washington / Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a., pp. 87-109, here p. 107.
  20. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Revolutions and peace agreements 1917-1920 (dtv world history of the 20th century). 5th edition, dtv: Munich 1980 (1967), p. 194.
  21. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 164.
  22. ↑ On Great Britain see Stephanie Salzmann: Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. Rapallo and after, 1922-1934 . The Royal Historical Society / The Boydell Press: Bury St. Edmunds / Rochester 2003, p. 171.
  23. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 127.
  24. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 127/128.
  25. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), pp. 32–35.
  26. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 399.
  27. ^ Manfred Alexander: The German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty of 1925 within the framework of the Locarno treaties . R. Oldenbourg: Munich / Vienna 1970, pp. 17, 33.
  28. ^ Manfred Alexander: The German-Czechoslovak arbitration treaty of 1925 within the framework of the Locarno treaties . R. Oldenbourg: Munich / Vienna 1970, p. 26.
  29. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 116.
  30. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 82/83.
  31. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 97/98.
  32. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 99.
  33. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 100.
  34. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 129-131.
  35. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 105.
  36. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 135.
  37. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 133-135.
  38. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 152–154.
  39. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 163, 165.
  40. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 156, 158, 170.
  41. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 174/175.
  42. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 175/176.
  43. ^ Stephanie Salzmann: Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. Rapallo and after, 1922-1934 . The Royal Historical Society / The Boydell Press: Bury St. Edmunds / Rochester 2003, pp. 7, 170.
  44. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 176-179.
  45. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart 1995, p. 469 (“A kind of reinsurance”), p. 470.
  46. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 197.
  47. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 200.
  48. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 202/203.
  49. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 206, 212.
  50. ↑ Jonathan Wright: Gustav Stresemann. Weimar's Greatest Statesman , Oxford University Press: Oxford 2002, pp. 492/493.
  51. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 228.
  52. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 243.
  53. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 244–246.
  54. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 259.
  55. ↑ Eberhard Kolb: The Weimar Republic . 3. Edition. Oldenbourg: Munich 1993, p. 79.
  56. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 312/313.
  57. ↑ The sources are unclear. See Jacques Néré: The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945 , Routledge & Kegan Paul: London / Boston 1975 (1974), pp. 78/79.
  58. ^ Peter Krüger: Versailles. German Foreign Policy Between Revisionism and Peacekeeping (German History of the Latest Times from the 19th Century to the Present), dtv: Munich 1986, pp. 149, 362.
  59. ^ Jacques Néré: The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945 , Routledge & Kegan Paul: London / Boston 1975 (1974), p. 90.
  60. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 305/306.
  61. ^ A b Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 305.
  62. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 471.
  63. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 290/291.
  64. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 291.
  65. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 296.
  66. ↑ Michael Salewski: Disarmament and Military Control in Germany 1919-1927 (Writings of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy eV 24), Oldenbourg: Munich 1966, p. 365, 375/376.
  67. ↑ Michael Salewski: Disarmament and Military Control in Germany 1919-1927 (Writings of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy eV 24), Oldenbourg: Munich 1966, p. 377/378.
  68. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 411.
  69. ^ Winfried Speitkamp : German Colonial History. Reclam, Stuttgart 2005, ISBN 978-3-15-017047-2 , p. 160 ff.
  70. ↑ Gisela Graichen , Horst Founder : German Colonies - Dream and Trauma. 4th edition Ullstein, Berlin 2005, ISBN 978-3-550-07637-4 , p. 379 ff.
  71. ^ Jon Jacobsen: Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West 1925-1929 . Princeton University Press: Princeton 1972, p. 364.
  72. ^ Ulrich Kluge: The Weimar Republic . Schöningh: Paderborn u. a. 2007, p. 298.
  73. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 513/514.
  74. ^ Jon Jacobsen: Locarno Diplomacy. Germany and the West 1925-1929 . Princeton University Press: Princeton 1972, p. 367.
  75. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 516.
  76. ^ Ulrich Kluge: The Weimar Republic . Schöningh: Paderborn u. a. 2007, p. 313.
  77. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 523, 525.
  78. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 528/529.
  79. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 531/523.
  80. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 533/534.
  81. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 476, 483, 485.
  82. ↑ Gerd Meyer: The German reparations policy from the adoption of the Young Plan in the Reichstag (March 12, 1930) to the reparations agreement at the Lausanne Conference (July 9, 1932). Diss. Bonn 1994. Copy Corner Bonn: Bonn 1994, p. 152.
  83. ^ Peter Krüger: Versailles. German Foreign Policy Between Revisionism and Peacekeeping (German History of the Latest Times from the 19th Century to the Present), dtv: Munich 1986, p. 155.
  84. ↑ Gerd Meyer: The German reparations policy from the adoption of the Young Plan in the Reichstag (March 12, 1930) to the reparations agreement at the Lausanne Conference (July 9, 1932) . Copy Corner Bonn: Bonn 1994, pp. 153/154.
  85. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 544.
  86. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 544/545.
  87. ↑ Wolfgang Michalka and Gottfried Niedhart: The unloved republic. Documentation on domestic and foreign policy in Weimar 1918-1933 , dtv: Munich 1980, p. 401/402.
  88. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 548/549.
  89. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, p. 551.
  90. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart 1995, pp. 550/551.
  91. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart 1995, p. 553.
  92. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: The past realm. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871-1945 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart 1995, pp. 556/557.
  93. ^ Marie-Luise Recker: The foreign policy of the Third Reich (Encyclopedia of German History 8). Oldenbourg: Munich 1990, p. 3/4.
  94. ↑ See on Hitler's foreign policy approach Hermann Graml: Europa between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 281.
  95. ^ Hermann Graml: Europe between the wars (dtv world history of the 20th century), 4th edition, dtv: Munich 1979 (1969), p. 335/336.
  96. ↑ Gottfried Niedhart: The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic (Encyclopedia of German History 53). 2nd edition, Oldenbourg: München 2006 (1999), pp. 41/42.
  97. ^ Marie-Luise Recker: The foreign policy of the Third Reich (Encyclopedia of German History 8). Oldenbourg: Munich 1990, pp. 54/55.
  98. ↑ Gottfried Niedhart: The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic (Encyclopedia of German History 53). 2nd edition, Oldenbourg: München 2006 (1999), pp. 48/49.
  99. ↑ Gottfried Niedhart: The foreign policy of the Weimar Republic (Encyclopedia of German History 53). 2nd edition, Oldenbourg: München 2006 (1999), pp. 49/62.
  100. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society: Darmstadt 1985, pp. 552/553.