Hypo Real Estate

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Hypo Real Estate Holding GmbH
Country	Germany
Seat	Munich
legal form	GmbH
founding	2003
Website	www.hyporealestate.com
Business data 2017
Total assets	EUR  1,295 million  (Dec. 31, 2017)
Employee	11  (10 full-time, 1 part-time)
management
Board	Management Wolfgang Groth Jochen Heuchert

The Hypo Real Estate Holding GmbH ( HRE ) is a since 2009 nationalized German banks holding with headquarters in Munich , the 123.98 billion euros guarantees plus 7.7 billion euros of direct aid through capital measures from the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) claims (as of 30th September 2010). The company was previously Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, which was converted into a GmbH by means of a change in legal form in accordance with §§ 190 ff., 238 ff. UmwG with entry in the commercial register AG Munich on December 13, 2016. The HRE Group included Deutsche Pfandbriefbank and Depfa Bank , which are active in the areas of commercial real estate finance as well as public and infrastructure finance.

Hypo Real Estate Holding was founded in 2003 and went public in October 2003. It was admitted to the DAX on December 19, 2005 at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange . From December 22, 2008 to September 18, 2009 it was again listed in the MDAX . From then until October 9, 2009 it was on the SDAX . HRE was 5 October 2009 by a transfer of the Annual General Meeting (squeeze-out) nationalized . As a result, HRE no longer met the free float criteria for the SDAX, so that Deutsche Börse AG discontinued its listing on October 9, 2009. The financial market stabilization fund acts as 100% owner for the Federal Republic of Germany.

HRE was previously affected by the international financial crisis from 2007 onwards . In the course of this crisis, it was the first German bank to receive government guarantee commitments in the three-digit billion range. She also claimed guarantees from the Financial Market Stabilization Fund .

The FMS Wertmanagement in Munich on 8 July 2010 as a bad bank spun off for handling risk positions and non-strategic business units. It is an independent part of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization ( FMSA ). The remaining debts were put at € 119 billion in 2013.

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank was spun off on the instructions of the EU Commission and floated on the stock exchange on July 16, 2015, i. H. privatized again.

According to the Federal Statistical Office, taxpayers had to bear up to EUR 51.8 billion in defaults and EUR 480 billion in guarantees in 2012 due to bank rescue measures - in particular by HRE and WestLB .

Group

meaning

With a real estate financing volume of around 63 billion euros, the Hypo Real Estate Group is one of the largest financiers for commercial real estate customers in Germany and, as such, one of the largest real estate financing institutions in Europe. With an issue volume of around 146 billion euros (according to the 2007 annual report), HRE is also a major issuer of Pfandbriefe .

The Hypo Real Estate Group was also one of the first banks in Germany, the so-called large-scale portfolio of non-performing loans (non-performing loans) sold to relieve their balance sheets. In 2004, loans with a volume of 3.6 billion were sold to Lone Star , and another 394 million to Morgan Stanley and Citigroup .

Emergence

In September 2001 the Nürnberger Hypothekenbank, the Süddeutsche Bodencreditbank and the Bayerische Handelsbank merged to form what was then HVB Real Estate Bank AG. The major shareholder and namesake of the listed company was the Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank . Following a purchase offer in summer 2002, HVB initiated the squeeze-out of minority shareholders in spring 2003 .

By splitting off parts of the commercial real estate financing business of HVB, the shares in HVB Real Estate Bank AG, Westfälische Hypothekenbank AG and HVB Ireland and a majority stake in Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG (later renamed Hypo Real Estate Bank International AG), the In 2003 the “new” Hypo Real Estate Holding Group was created (according to some commentators as a bad bank of the Unicredit Bank ). Hypo Real Estate Holding AG became the parent company of the HRE Group. The foundation of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG was legally by a so-called spin-off ( spin-off ) for the re-establishment after the conversion law after the supervisory board of HVB in March 2003 and the General Assembly had approved in May of 2003. The spin-off from HVB became legally effective on September 29, 2003 when it was entered in the commercial register . In the spin-off, HVB shareholders received one Hypo Real Estate Holding share for 4 HVB shares. The former HVB Real Estate Bank AG has been operating as Hypo Real Estate Bank AG since autumn 2003 and, after the merger with Westfälische Hypothekenbank AG (autumn 2003) and Hypo Real Estate Bank International AG (autumn 2008), includes both national and international Real estate business of the Hypo Real Estate Group. In 2009 Hypo Real Estate Bank AG was renamed Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG.

Former shareholder structure

As of December 31, 2008, 52.21 percent of the share capital of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG was in free float. The American financial investor J. Christopher Flowers acquired a total of 24.9 percent through a public offer in June 2008 and paid around 1.1 billion euros or 22.50 euros per share for its shares.

Other major shareholders with a total share of 23.66% were at that time:

Share in percent	Surname
7.00	Grove International Partners, New York, USA
5.33	HRE Investment Holdings II 1 S.à.rl
5.14	Orbis Global Equity Fund Ltd., Hamilton, Bermuda
4.99	Capital Research and Management Company , Los Angeles, USA
1.20	Capital Group International Inc.

This shareholder structure changed with the federal government's entry into the HRE rescue (see below).

Former subsidiaries

• Depfa Bank plc In
  2007, Hypo Real Estate took overDepfa Bank plc byway of a share swap , whose subsidiary Depfa Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG became a direct subsidiary of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG at the end of 2007. This takeover wasrecommended and also preparedby the British law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer . For each Depfa share, Hypo Real Estate paid 0.189 of its own shares plus € 6.80, a total of around 5.2 billion euros. The last day of trading for Depfa shares was October 2, 2007.Depfa’s CEO at the time, Gerhard Bruckermann, earned EUR 120 million with the takeover. With effect from December 19, 2014, the federally owned liquidation agency FMS Wertmanagement AöR took over DEPFA BANK plc in Dublin and its subsidiaries from Hypo Real Estate Holding AG in full.
• Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG
  The former subsidiary of the holding company is Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG , which was created from the merger of Hypo Real Estate Bank AG and DEPFA Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG. The merger took place in mid-2009. Hypo Real Estate Holding describes the new Pfandbrief bank as the »strategic core bank of the Group«. Since March 7, 2013, private customers in the deposit business (overnight money, fixed-term deposits) have been served under the “pbb direkt” brand. It is sold over the Internet. The IPO of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange took place on July 16, 2015, since then Hypo Real Estate Holding has only held a 20 percent stake until this stake was reduced to 3.5% in May 2018.

Financial crisis

In the years 2004 to 2006 the share price doubled and rose (probably) to more than 55 euros per share due to the published (supposed) business expectations. As a result of the international financial crisis from 2007 , the rate fell to below 15 euros in early 2008. Despite the crisis, the balance sheet total increased from 161 billion euros in 2006 to 400 billion in 2007. On September 28, 2008, it became common knowledge that Hypo Real Estate was threatened with bankruptcy due to a liquidity bottleneck . According to the board of directors, discussions with banks and government representatives had taken place for a long time because the subsidiary Depfa had refinancing difficulties on the interbank market. On March 9, 2009 the share price fell to an all-time low of EUR 0.64.

According to a report by the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung of February 20, 2009, HRE is said to have invested a further 600 billion euros in “so-called off-balance sheet transactions” outside of the actual balance sheet. The loans taken out for this would currently have to be constantly refinanced. The company rejected the Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung's claim in a press release.

prehistory

First signs of economic problems

After the first effects of the subprime crisis in 2007, CEO Georg Funke assured the Handelsblatt on November 7, 2007 after good quarterly figures that HRE had “emerged stronger from the market crisis of the past few months”. On January 15, 2008, HRE surprisingly announced an extraordinary write-down of € 390 million on American CDOs and, at 35%, experienced the largest daily loss of a DAX stock to date. The share fell from the closing price on January 14, 2008 from € 33.52 over the next 9 trading days to € 13.96 (as of January 28, 2008).

Examination by BaFin / Deutsche Bundesbank

Knowing this announcement, BaFin brought forward an audit of the HRE Group, which was planned for 2008 in 2007, to February 18, 2008. In a letter dated February 6, 2008, it commissioned the Deutsche Bundesbank, under the leadership of the Munich headquarters, to review the two Munich-based subsidiaries of HRE - Hypo Real Estate Bank AG and Hypo Real Estate International AG. In a letter dated February 25, 2008, BaFin extended this mandate to DEPFA Deutsche Pfandbrief AG in Frankfurt am Main. The on-site examination at the HRE Group began on February 18, 2008 in Munich and lasted until April 4, 2008. The examination in Dublin took place from February 27 to March 12, 2008. This review was made possible (abroad) by an agreement between Ireland and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1993, which allowed the German authorities - with the consent of the Irish authorities - to review the business activities of branches of German companies in Ireland.

Lack of legal regulations

However, BaFin / Dt. Bundesbank only carry out this review to a very limited extent. The German provisions of the German Banking Act (KWG) in force at the time allowed BaFin to review a financial holding only in the form of so-called “consolidated group supervision”, a. expressly ruled out an examination of the liquidity of this "systemically important" financial construct. On the occasion of a small question from the FDP parliamentary group, the Federal Government pointed out in its (then) answer that the German legal situation was in accordance with the EU directive applicable at the time (Banking Directive 2000/48 / EC, and Capital Adequacy Directive 2006/49 / EG) stand: "Even at EU level, extensive monitoring of financial holding companies is NOT mandatory."

As early as spring 2007, BaFin had made the Federal Ministry of Finance aware of this regulatory gap (in which HRE operated) and applied for a change. Financial holdings should also be placed fully under the supervision of BaFin in order to be able to control them more effectively. The Federal Ministry of Finance under the then Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück did not act initially. Legal remedial action was only created after BaFin made another attempt. However, not until mid-February 2009 (as part of the further development of Pfandbrief law ) - and therefore definitely too late.

Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück initially asserted that the German supervisory authority BaFin was not allowed to inspect at all in Ireland (abroad). It relies on either the Irish banking regulator to provide information or the HRE Holding to provide information voluntarily.

“If a bank like Depfa in Ireland gets into trouble and brings HRE into very serious trouble, the German banking supervisory authority cannot intervene at all. This is under Irish supervision. Therefore, it must also be about improving banking supervision in Europe. ” (Steinbrück in an interview with Handelsblatt on October 9, 2008)

The Bundesbank audit team examined the portfolio of problematic securities at Depfa and the bank's business model, which consisted of financing long-term loans by taking out short-term loans. The profit resulted from the difference in interest rates between the different terms.

As early as March 15, the bankers wrote an interim report that was sent to BaFin two days later. The Depfa final report itself was then sent to BaFin almost three months later, on June 27, 2008. As stated in the final report of the auditors, the Irish bank was found to have had "large, short-term unsecured funding" and the resulting "serious consequences" were pointed out. In short: if short-term refinancing suddenly stalled, HRE would be insolvent.

The audit report listed a total of 49 violations of “the proper conduct of business and the functionality of risk management” - including 12 in the “serious” category and 29 “moderate”. In a letter accompanying this report, the auditors pointed out that the "sometimes serious findings, particularly in the area of ​​risk management [...] cannot be tolerated."

The final report was received by the Federal Ministry of Finance on August 18, 2008. However, it was allegedly filed there by the clerk and was presented neither to management level nor to the Federal Minister of Finance.

Trigger of the crisis

The business area of ​​the HRE subsidiary Depfa Bank plc was the financing of long-term loans (esp. Pfandbriefe ) through short-term loans on the interbank market ( maturity transformation ). As a result of the Lehman bankruptcy, interbank trading collapsed and a liquidity bottleneck at Depfa Bank plc of initially 35 billion euros could not be closed. That is, the repayment of due short-term loans was not possible and bankruptcy threatened. It was not possible to clarify what contribution overvalued properties made to the bank's capital stock.

First crisis summit

On 29 September 2008 agreed Jochen Sanio , president of BaFin , German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck , Martin Blessing of Commerzbank , Josef Ackermann of Deutsche Bank and Klaus-Peter Müller from the Federal Association of German Banks on Hypo Real Estate, a performance guarantee for To make available. Following the crisis summit, the Ministry of Finance announced that HRE should not disappear from the market, but that it would have to hand over its daughters to a special purpose vehicle .

Since HRE, as a spin-off from Hypo-Vereinsbank, went public exactly five years earlier, the question of liability was raised due to the five-year limitation ( statute of limitations ). If the guarantee had been signed just one day earlier, the federal government would have been able to successfully assert claims (damages, liability) against Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank or the Italian Unicredit.

Since September 22nd, HRE had previously been negotiating with Deutsche Bank as lead manager in order to secure further refinancing. This failed "because the banking community was not sufficiently sure that it could or wanted to do it," said Hans Tietmeyer, former member of the HRE supervisory board before the 2009 investigative committee. In his lecture, Josef Ackermann reported on the crucial conversation on the evening of 29 September: The bank representatives quickly realized that a solution “was simply no longer feasible among the banks alone.” Without a state solution, there would have been dramatic upheavals in all markets, “We would have had a meltdown on Monday morning, far beyond Germany . “The representative of the federal government, State Secretary Jörg Asmussen , refused. Ackermann continues: "Then I got up and said: Then we'd better go back and prepare for tomorrow." ... "But of course it was always clear to us that we just had to come to a solution this evening. Because there was far too much at stake. ”A short time later, Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück called him , to whom he described“ that he would probably have to explain to the world at 10 a.m. in a press conference what that would mean for Germany and probably far beyond the Eurosystem means. ”The minister initially wanted the banks to participate at 50:50. Ackermann initially offered 7 billion euros. After further negotiations between Ackermann and Steinbrück and Chancellor Merkel, the result was "60 to 40 at the expense of the financial industry, but with an upper limit of 8.5 billion euros."

Second crisis summit

At the end of the first crisis summit, the then CEO of HRE, Georg Funke, announced : “The new credit line implements a far-reaching, innovative approach with which we can adapt our financing structure so that it does justice to the current malfunctions in the international money markets. The Hypo Real Estate Group will no longer have to make use of these money markets for the foreseeable future. "

However, just three days later, on October 2nd, 2008, Georg Funke and the then CFO Markus Fell informed BaFin by telephone that Depfa's liquidity situation had again deteriorated dramatically and that Depfa could no longer be financed. The participating private banks therefore withdrew their loan commitments on October 4, 2008.

In the meantime, it is assumed in the press that the then HRE group top management deliberately deceived the Federal Finance Minister, the banking supervisory authority, the other financial institutions involved, including their own shareholders, about their real financial situation. When the Munich public prosecutor's office carried out a search at HRE in December 2008 (see below), the search warrant stated that there was a suspicion that the situation at HRE had been misrepresented in the notification of September 29 (see above) because the members of the management board had already known at the end of September that no credit facility had been made available in sufficient amount. At the subsidiary bank Depfa there was a significantly higher need for protection. (Search decision of the Munich Local Court of December 9, 2008, business number: ER III Gs 11322/08 - not public).

Another crisis summit on October 5, 2008 between the federal government and the German financial industry then led to a rescue package for the troubled group that was topped up by 15 billion euros. In the opinion of Bundesbank President Axel A. Weber , this measure was necessary to avert a collapse of the interbank system, i.e. the business dealings between banks.

Change of leadership

Immediately after the first crisis summit, Depfa boss Paul Leatherdale and Bo Heide-Ottosen, who is responsible for public finance on the board of Hypo Real Estate, announced that they would be leaving the company at short notice.

On October 7, 2008, the chairman of the board, Georg Funke, resigned after several politicians, including Federal Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück, called for his replacement. A little later, the chairman of the supervisory board, Kurt F. Viermetz, also resigned.

Axel Wieandt was appointed as Georg Funke's successor . Wieandt had been responsible for Corporate Investments at Deutsche Bank since 2003 .

Utilization of the financial market stabilization fund

On October 29, 2008, HRE stated in a press release that the contracts for the first rescue package for 50 billion euros, negotiated on October 6 with a German financial consortium, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Ministry of Finance, would be negotiated and would be ready by mid-November 2008. In order to secure HRE's short-term liquidity needs in the meantime, an application was made to the financial market stabilization fund on October 28 for a guarantee of 15 billion euros for liquidity from the Deutsche Bundesbank. In addition, an application for further, comprehensive support - including any capital measures - was submitted to the financial market stabilization fund. On October 31, 2008, HRE announced that the Financial Market Stabilization Fund had accepted this application for loan guarantees of up to EUR 20 billion. On November 21, 2008, this fund was increased by 10 billion euros to 30 billion euros and on January 20, 2009 by 12 billion euros to 42 billion euros. On February 11, 2009, the guarantee framework was increased by a further 10 billion euros to now 52 billion euros. Together with the loan guarantees of 50 billion euros from mid-November 2008, Hypo Real Estate received a total of 102 billion euros in grants and guarantees (87 billion euros directly from the state and 15 billion euros from other banks).

Reorganization of the supervisory board

In the wake of the rescue operations, the federal government and a consortium of banks took over the supervision of HRE and restructured the supervisory board. On November 17, 2008, it became known that the previous HRE supervisory board had almost completely changed and that seven new members had moved into the supervisory body.

All members who did not belong to the consortium led by the major HRE shareholder JC Flowers announced their resignation . These were Klaus Pohle (who temporarily took over the chairmanship of the HRE Supervisory Board after Kurt Viermetz's resignation), Gerhard Casper, Johann van der Ende, Frank Heintzeler, Thomas Kolbeck, Pieter Korteweg, Thomas Quinn and the former Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer .

The new chairman of the supervisory board was Michael Endres , a former board member of Deutsche Bank.

In addition to Endres, new members of the supervisory board were: the former Commerzbank board member Bernd Knobloch , ex-Bundesbank board member Edgar Meister , the former state secretary in the Federal Ministry of Economics, Siegmar Mosdorf , the head of Landesbank Berlin , Hans-Jörg Vetter, ex-Dresdner-Bank -Chef Bernhard Walter and the former head of DGZ / DekaBank, Manfred Zaß.

Complaints from ex-board members

In January / February 2009, three former members of the HRE board of directors decided to file a lawsuit at the Munich District Court I to withdraw their dismissal without notice, or to enforce extensive additional salary claims in court.

Ex-CFO Markus Fell , whom the new management of HRE accused of having been jointly responsible for a too risky monetary policy at Depfa and of not having changed the strategy in time when the global financial crisis worsened, intends to present in court that the Allegations are incorrect and he was wrongly dismissed. Fell had previously received 450,000 euros a year as a fixed salary and received a further 450,000 euros success bonus.

Ex-board member Frank Lamby demanded in his lawsuit the payment of 37,500 euros "pension claims" to which he would still be entitled.

Former CEO Georg Funke , who was also dismissed in December, initially sued HRE for the additional payment of his salary for December 2008 and January 2009 and asserted claims for an additional payment of 151,172.03 euros. At the beginning of March 2009, however, Georg Funke filed for even more extensive claims. The manager ("I am also affected by the drop in the price of the HRE share.") Now demanded that his executive board contract continue to apply until the regular expiry in September 2013 and that his pension entitlements be maintained. Funkes fixed salary agreed in the contract was 800,000 euros per year, which added up the claims (until 2013) to around 3.5 million euros. In addition, there were contractually guaranteed pension entitlements of 560,000 euros per year. With an (assumed) 15-year term of the pension, these claims alone would amount to a further 8.4 million euros.

In return, the HRE justified the expulsion of Funkes with five serious allegations against him:

Funke is responsible for a "grossly poor preparation" of the 2007 acquisition of the Irish-based Pfandbriefbank Depfa by HRE. Subsequently, he did not prevent "continued violations of Irish banking supervision law". Due to inadequate risk management and control, he committed further "breaches of duty". He also did not change HRE's dangerous monetary policy. According to HRE, Funke should have changed its monetary strategy in good time in view of the financial crisis that has been going on since 2007. He is also accused of having misrepresented the risks at the end of September 2008 - during the first rescue operation by the federal government for HRE - because the liquidity requirement had to be corrected upwards by 15 billion shortly after this rescue operation.

Entry of the federal government

After further capital was required for HRE, the federal government apparently agreed on January 26, 2009 on a majority stake of 50 percent plus one share.

The behavior of the federal government to rescue the HRE was sharply criticized by some opposition politicians. Oskar Lafontaine (Die Linke) and Volker Wissing (FDP) accused Finance Minister Steinbrück of embezzlement . Firstly because the Ministry of Finance waited until September 29, 2008 to reach an agreement; According to Wissing's allegation, the limitation period for possible liability of the former owners of HRE ( Unicredit Bank ) expired on exactly this day , so that the state now had to be solely liable for HRE. The government, on the other hand, judges the allegations to be unjustified, since, according to Section 133 (3) of the Transformation Act, claims are allegedly only available to creditors of the Bavarian Hypo und Vereinsbank AG and Hypo Real Estate Holding AG. Lafontaine criticized the state financial aid flowing to the holding company without ensuring that the taxpayer's money was being used properly.

Demand for nationalization

Due to the guarantees and subsidies of around 102 billion euros already given by the state and the risk that this money would be lost in the event of bankruptcy or a sale, the federal government advised on nationalizing the bank holding company.

The subsidiary Depfa, which was one of the decisive factors in the crisis , was a profitable, state-owned company before privatization until the early 1990s. Thus, in the event of a re-nationalization of Hypo Real Estate, the German state would incur double losses, on the one hand through the loss of state profits of Depfa, on the other hand through the costs of the now necessary re-nationalization.

In February 2009, Hans-Werner Sinn , President of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research and a member of the supervisory board of Unicredit Bank , called for Hypo Real Estate to be nationalized in order to save the bank holding company using state finances. As soon as the situation on the financial market has calmed down, the holding company will then be privatized again, if Sinn will.

On February 19, 2009 it became known that contracts and z. In some cases, previously off-balance sheet transactions would increase the balance sheet total for 2008 to over one trillion euros.

First entry of the federal government

At the end of March it became known that HRE had made a record loss of more than 5 billion euros in the 2008 financial year. The result after taxes was minus 5.461 billion euros. The loss is partly due to amortization of goodwill and other intangible assets from the first-time consolidation of Depfa totaling 2.482 billion euros. In addition, there would be a number of special or one-off effects, according to a statement by the bank. The core capital ratio of HRE fell from 8.7 percent (December 31, 2007) to 3.4 percent (end of 2008). and thus below the legally prescribed minimum limit of 4 percent.

Strictly speaking, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) should have closed the HRE and the bank would have suffered a total loss. The 2008 annual result was initially not included in the calculation, so the rate was still 6.2 percent. This could be averted by the capital injection by the federal government ( SoFFin ) shortly before the publication of the annual financial statements .

For example, the state took a minority stake - as a first step towards a planned full takeover. On March 28, 2009, the federal government (SoFFin) secured 20 million shares in the bank for a price of EUR 3 each, which were issued through a capital increase and then held an 8.7 percent stake in HRE. When the federal government paid a price per share that was above the current share price, the group received a total of 60 million euros in government money.

"With the intended long-term liquidity and capital support [...] the Federal Republic of Germany is creating the conditions for the continued existence of the Hypo Real Estate Group via SoFFin", explained the CEO of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Axel Wieandt .

Rescue Takeover Act

On March 20, 2009, the Bundestag approved the Rescue Takeover Act . The law authorizes the government to expropriate the shareholders of private banks and to take control of the “systemically important” HRE (in this specific case) in order to restore it or to avert further damage to the financial market. The total of 102 billion euros that HRE has already received in state aid and from private credit institutions are also to be secured. On April 3, 2009 the law passed the Federal Council and was signed by the Federal President on April 7, 2009.

Takeover offer by the federal government

On April 17, 2009, the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin) announced that the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) had approved the takeover offer by the Federal Republic of Germany to all HRE shareholders in the amount of 1.39 euros per share the day before. The offer was 10 cents above the legal minimum price of 1.26 euros per share. The relatively cheap offer was made because it was hoped to be able to acquire 100 percent of the shares in HRE. The acceptance period ran from April 17 to May 4, 2009.

If all shareholders had accepted the offer, the federal government would have had to pay a total of 290 million euros for the shares. Should the shareholders refuse the offer, however, the federal government could expropriate the shareholders on the basis of the Financial Market Stabilization Amendment Act , which was created especially for HRE. According to the law, June 30th was the last date for this.

The shareholders would then have had to be compensated - as prescribed by the Basic Law - but only at the statutory minimum price of 1.26 euros, which corresponded to the average stock market price in the two weeks before the announcement of the expropriation decision.

However, it was questionable whether US financial investor JCFlowers , who held 21.7 percent of HRE shares at the time, would accept this offer. “There is still a clear preference to remain in the company as a shareholder” - said Flowers. He threatened legal action against expropriation.

The SoFFin guarantee of 52 billion euros was extended on April 14, 2009 by four months to August 19, 2009.

Takeover through capital increase

The federal government was unable to achieve a controlling majority through the takeover offer because US investor J. Christopher Flowers in particular was unwilling to sell his 21.7 percent package. After all, the federal government was able to acquire 47.3 percent of the shares through the takeover offer and further share purchases on the stock exchange, which corresponds to almost the absolute majority (50%).

The federal government then took the risk (as it had not yet acquired 50% + x) to convene an extraordinary general meeting on June 2, 2009, at which a gigantic capital increase was to be voted on. Unlike a normal capital increase, this should only be able to be subscribed by the federal government. Usually three quarters of the votes present are required for such a measure; A special regulation (§ 7 III 2. FMStBG) in the law for the stabilization of banks provides for banks that need state aid, but only a simple (= absolute) majority in such a vote if half of the share capital is represented.

If at least 94.6 percent of the capital had been present (twice the federal government's share) and if all shareholders except the federal government had voted “No”, this capital increase would have failed because 50% + x would not have been achieved. In real terms, however, only 74.06 percent of the capital was present. In addition, the chapter not represented by the federal government voted by no means only with “no”: In addition to the approx. 109 million yes-votes of the federal government, there were approx. 5 million additional yes-votes from the other shareholders, as well as approx. 17 million abstentions . The proposal for a capital increase was thus accepted with a large majority of 73.95 percent.

After the federal government had subscribed to 986.5 million new shares, its stake was increased to 90 percent. In the next step, he was able to carry out a so-called squeeze-out in accordance with the current legal situation, in which the remaining shareholders must forcibly sell their shares. If the capital increase had not succeeded, US investor Flowers and the other shareholders would have threatened a total loss. This would also have been associated with significantly higher legal risks.

The company received the money to subscribe to the new shares; it was urgently needed by them due to the current imbalance. With the complete takeover of Hypo Real Estate, the federal government wanted to ensure that its syringes in the billions would mainly be used to rescue the company and not benefit the shareholders. If the federal government had not stepped in, Hypo Real Estate would probably have had to file for bankruptcy and the shareholders would have suffered a total loss; they still received the purchase price paid by the federal government, which nevertheless means very high losses for many shareholders.

After the complete takeover, HRE is to be radically "shrunk". The cut of 1,000 jobs has already been decided, and numerous foreign locations are to be closed.

New redesign of the supervisory board

A new supervisory board was elected at the general meeting of HRE on August 13, 2009. The previous members of the supervisory board, who took over their posts in autumn 2008 (see above), left. The supervisory board has been reduced from 12 to 6 members. These were / are Bernd Thiemann , ex-boss of DG Bank, who also took over the chairmanship of the supervisory board. KfW board member Günther Bräunig , the former President of the Federal Audit Office, Hedda von Wedel (CDU), the former Germany boss of the US bank Morgan Stanley , Dagmar Kollmann , Albert Peters from the Federal Ministry of Finance, Alexander Groß , Ministerial Director from the Federal Ministry of Economics.

nationalization

On October 5, 2009, HRE was nationalized as the first bank in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949. By resolution of the Extraordinary General Meeting, the remaining shareholders will receive cash compensation of EUR 1.30 per share.

Another 3 billion euros from the state

After HRE had already received around 3 billion euros in state capital in the summer of 2009, the HRE Group announced on November 4, 2009 that it would receive a further financial injection of 3 billion euros from the federal rescue fund SoFFin. In addition, the SoFFin steering committee has extended the liquidity guarantees, which were last limited to November 18, 2009, amounting to EUR 52 billion to June 30, 2010.

The capital injection that has now been resolved is divided between HRE Holding and its subsidiary Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG, which has since taken over the ongoing core business. SoFFin pays 700 million euros into the reserve of HRE-Holding. At the same time, the subsidiary Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG will receive EUR 1.3 billion as the core bank for ongoing business. Another billion euros will be made as a silent contribution. This would increase the core capital ratio of the Münchner Bank, which had fallen to 6.9 in the middle of the year, again to 10.7 percent. Before the next step of the rescue fund, however, it was necessary for the EU Commission to conclude the ongoing EU state aid proceedings on the aid that HRE received from the federal government with a permit.

Surprising resignation of the CEO Axel Wieandt

On March 25, 2010 (one day before the Annual General Meeting), CEO Axel Wieandt surprisingly resigned from his position. This was preceded by controversial discussions about the further development of HRE; Wieandt's efforts to lead HRE more strongly as a private bank and thus to reduce the influence of the state as owner were not accepted by the federal government. In addition, there was a dispute about the remuneration of the board members: By using state aid, the fixed salary of the board members was € 500,000 p. a. limited by law, additional bonus payments must be approved by the federal government. Wieandt's position "I (and others) have given up well-paid positions to support the federal government in the restructuring" can be reconciled with the federal government's view that "high bonus payments to the HRE board members cannot be conveyed to the taxpayer as long as he is the HRE stabilize with billions of euros for restructuring ”does not have to bring together, so that he left office at short notice. Wieandt was head of strategy at Deutsche Bank until 2008 and returned to his previous employer at the end of May 2010. The head of risk management at HRE Manuela Better was appointed as a transitional successor.

Further guarantees amounting to 40 billion euros

Although the head of the bank, Manuela Better , was quoted with a rosy outlook on September 9, 2010, the SoFFin steering committee announced on September 10, 2010 that the bank had provided guarantees of 40 billion euros over the previous 103.5 billion Euros in order to counteract an impending insolvency due to massive liquidity problems on September 22nd, according to more favorable scenarios on September 30th. Part of the money required was caused by risk premiums on bonds from crisis-ridden euro countries that are held by the bank. According to an internal paper of the bank, 20 billion are required for so-called transaction risks, which result at the end of September 2010 through the outsourcing of very risky securities to an emerging bad bank . The SoFFin steering committee does not have to reassure itself with parliament for such inquiries.

Foundation of FMS Wertmanagement as a "bad bank"

On October 1, 2010, HRE outsourced loans and securities with a nominal value of around 173 billion euros to the newly established public-law “Abwicklungsanstalt” FMS Wertmanagement as part of the Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilization , a so-called “ bad bank ”. The securities issued by HRE to raise funds and secured by state guarantees in the amount of around 124 billion euros were also transferred. According to HRE's plans, these securities are to be replaced by securities without state guarantees by mid-2011.

The securities and loans transferred to FMS-Wertmanagement are to be processed within a period of ten years. The aim is to achieve the best possible sales revenue and keep losses as low as possible.

By the end of 2010, the previous SoFFin guarantees for FMS-Wertmanagement were reduced in several steps to 15 billion euros. These guarantees for individual securities are no longer necessary, since the SoFFin is anyway liable for its liabilities according to the statute of FMS-Wertmanagement. A reduction in the state risk is therefore not associated with the return of the guarantees.

Approval of state aid by the EU Commission

In mid-July 2011, the European Commission approved the restructuring plan, which had been improved several times, and subsequently the state aid for Hypo Real Estate, subject to conditions. In order to justify the ten billion euros in aid from the federal government and the state guarantees of around 145 billion euros, the nationalized institute would have to shrink to 15 percent of its former size by the end of 2011 and withdraw to a few business areas. Joaquín Almunia , the European Commissioner for Competition , spoke of the conclusion "one of the most important aid cases of the financial crisis" . Federal Minister of Economics Philipp Rösler said that the basis for a rapid privatization of the Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG had been laid.

Work-up

BaFin special audit

In spring 2008, the BaFin carried out a special audit of the risk management of the Hypo Real Estate Group. The Deutsche Bundesbank was commissioned with this test. According to media reports, six auditors from the Deutsche Bundesbank traveled to Dublin on February 27, 2008 to examine the books of DEPFA Bank plc. The Federal Ministry of Finance was regularly informed about this. The final report was received by the Federal Ministry of Finance on August 18, 2008. However, it was allegedly filed there by the clerk and was presented neither to management level nor to the Federal Minister of Finance. The auditors found, among other things, an “extensive, short-term unsecured refinancing” at DEPFA Bank plc. Whether and to what extent BaFin reacted to the results of the special audit is not yet known. The financial supervisory authority checks evidence of violations of the law during the liquidity crisis at HRE. The public prosecutor's office in Munich forwarded “a suspicious transaction report from a market participant” to the authority. "The examination has not yet been completed, but we consider the allegations made to be substantiated," said a BaFin spokeswoman. Possible violations of the law include unauthorized market manipulation , insider trading and a violation of the guidelines on ad hoc publicity by the bank's decision-makers.

Criminal complaints from shareholders

The German Protection Association for Securities Possession (DSW) filed a criminal complaint against those responsible at Hypo Real Estate with the Munich public prosecutor on October 14, 2008 . There are several suspicions of legal violations, said Ulrich Hocker, managing director of the DSW.

In its criminal complaint, the DSW asked the public prosecutor's office to clarify whether, in connection with HRE's financial distress, there may be criminal offenses such as incorrect capital market information (Section 400 (1) of the Stock Corporation Act ), violation of the prohibition of market manipulation (Section 20a of the Securities Trading Act ) and suspected fraud ( 263 Criminal Code ) are present.

At the end of December 2008 / beginning of January 2009, further shareholders filed lawsuits against HRE.

On December 16, 2008, 65 BLKA investigators, 15 public prosecutors and two officials from the Bafin financial supervisory authority searched the HRE headquarters in Munich and the private rooms of some board members during a major raid .

It was determined against all HRE board members who were in office between November 2007 and September 2008. These included u. a. the former CEO Georg Funke and the former chairman of the supervisory board Kurt Viermetz (both resigned from their posts in October 2008) as well as Bo Heide-Ottosen, who has since left the company, and Markus Fell (who was still in office at the time of the raid and who has now also retired) .

The process, in which around 80 existing shareholders are demanding around one billion euros in damages , was planned for 2012 before the Munich Higher Regional Court .

Internal audit

The HRE supervisory board has commissioned the law firm Milbank Tweed Hadley McCloy to investigate “the existence of any breaches of duty” by the former CEO Georg Funke and board member Bo Heide-Ottosen. “In the interests of the company and all those involved, the supervisory board decided to conduct this open investigation by an independent, renowned law firm,” explained the then chairman of the supervisory board, Klaus Pohle .

Depending on the outcome of the investigations, there may be criminal consequences, but also effects on the payment of the remuneration of the two board members after the termination of their employment relationships. Funke could only draw his retirement pension of 560,000 euros per year immediately if his contract had been terminated prematurely through no fault of his own. Otherwise Funke would have to wait until he turns 60.

Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry

In February 2009, Oskar Lafontaine ( Die Linke ) requested a more detailed investigation of what was going on at HRE, and on March 4, 2009, Die Linke submitted a motion to set up a parliamentary committee of inquiry .

However, the votes of this one opposition party alone were not enough to push through the establishment of a committee of inquiry. It took until March 25, 2009 until all three opposition parties (Die Linke, FDP, Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen) were able to agree on a joint proposal. It should take again until April 23, 2009 before the vote in the Bundestag could take place. The FDP, Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen and Die Linke voted to set up the committee. The members of the CDU / CSU and SPD abstained.

The committee had eleven full and eleven deputy members, four each from the CDU / CSU and SPD and one each from the FDP, Die Linke and Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. The SPD MP Hans-Ulrich Krüger heads the committee. The CSU MP Daniela Raab was elected deputy chairwoman .

Investigation order

The committee of inquiry should clarify whether the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), the Financial Market Stabilization Fund (SoFFin), the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), or the Deutsche Bundesbank through decrees, directives, misjudgments, public statements, omissions or other actions to the difficulties of the HRE contributed to or exacerbated them. It should also be examined whether the burdens on the federal budget could be avoided. It was also about the question of whether the communication channels between the BMF, Deutsche Bundesbank and BaFin from the beginning of 2007 to October 2008 were suitable for being able to react "appropriately and immediately" to risks that were already emerging at HRE. And it should be clarified whether, if necessary since when and to what extent the Federal Government or Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück was informed about the liquidity bottlenecks at HRE.

Witnesses to the investigative committee

In the following, the following witnesses to the HRE disaster (partly public, partly non-public) were questioned by the U-Committee (the witnesses are listed here alphabetically. For the chronological order of the questioning see German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000: Recommended resolution and report of the 2nd Committee of Inquiry, p. 368/369: List of meetings):

• Josef Ackermann , CEO of Deutsche Bank AG
• Jörg Asmussen , State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF)
• Martin Blessing , CEO of Commerzbank
• Robert Bosch, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, employee in the "Banking Audits" department
• Jens Conert, Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), Head of the Banking Department
• Manfred Eder, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, Head of the “Banking Examinations 1” unit. In spring 2008, Eder was responsible for the Depfa special test.
• Rainer Englisch, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, employee in the "Banking Audits" department. English was the head of the six Bundesbankers who checked the two Irish HRE institutes - DEPFA Bank pcl and Hypo Public Finance Bank - from February to March 12, 2008 in Dublin on behalf of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
• Helmut Frank, BaFin , Head of Division / Big Bank Department at BaFin. In 2003 Frank was responsible for the supervision of HVB.
• Georg Funke (Funke was loaded, but refused to testify)
• Herbert Ernst Groh, architect and contractual / business partner of the predecessor companies of HVB
• Klaus Jakob, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, Head of the Regional Banking and Financial Supervision Department at this Headquarters
• Klaus Kratzer, lawyer
• Susanne Krecker, BMF, clerk in the banking department
• Nicolette Kressl, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF)
• Sabine Lautenschläger-Peiter, BaFin, Executive Director for Banking
• Frauke Menke, BaFin, Head of the Banking Supervision Department
• Thomas Mirow , former State Secretary in the BMF
• Lars Möller, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, employee in the “Banking Audits” department. Lars Möller was one of the six Bundesbankers who checked the two Irish institutes of HRE - DEPFA Bank pcl and Hypo Public Finance Bank - from February to March 12, 2008 in Dublin on behalf of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).
• Klaus-Peter Müller , former President of the Association of German Banks
• Manfred Nötzel, Senior Public Prosecutor at the Munich I Public Prosecutor's Office
• Thorsten Pötzsch, Federal Ministry of Finance, Head of the Banking, Insurance, Investment, Stock Exchange and Securities Division
• Jürgen Prahl, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, employee in the “Banking Audits” division. Jürgen Prahl was one of the six Bundesbankers who examined the two Irish institutes of HRE - DEPFA Bank pcl and Hypo Public Finance Bank - in Dublin from February to March 12, 2008 on behalf of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
• Jochen Sanio , the President of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)
• Eckehard Schmidt, the independent trustee of Hypo Real Estate Bank AG appointed by BaFin
• Karl Schnitzler, Deutsche Bundesbank , Munich Headquarters, heads the “Ongoing Supervision 1” department within the “Banking Supervision” department
• Stefan Schrader, BaFin, Head of Section BA 34,
• Ulrich Schröder, CEO of KfW Bankengruppe
• Wolfgang Sprißler, Vice Chairman of the Supervisory Board at Unicredit Bank ,
• Peer Steinbrück , Federal Minister of Finance (SPD)
• Holger Techet, KPMG , Deutsche Treuhand- Gesellschaft AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft,
• Hans Tietmeyer , HRE, the former Bundesbank President (1993 to 1999), sat on the HRE Supervisory Board from the end of May and mid-November 2008
• Marian Vesely, former employee (from 1983 to 1997) of Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank
• Kurt F. Viermetz , former chairman of the HRE supervisory board
• Axel A. Weber , President of the Deutsche Bundesbank
• Jens Weidmann , Head of Department IV (Economic and Financial Policy) in the Chancellery
• Axel Wieandt , CEO of HRE from October 13, 2008
• Gero Wiechens, KPMG , Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft AG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft and has been responsible for auditing the HRE financial statements since December 2008
• Stéphane Wolter, former clerk in risk controlling at HRE

Report of the committee of inquiry

Until the Bundestag's summer recess, the committee only had 5 weeks of meetings. The electoral term and thus the committee of inquiry ended in September 2009. In 23 meetings with a total of 125 hours, the witnesses were heard and the results discussed with great time pressure. In the 372-page report of September 18, 2009 (Drs. 16/14000), the results of the surveys are compiled and evaluated (differently) by the committee members.

HRE creditors

In addition to the question of the relevance of bank bailouts for the German banking system, the question of the creditors who are directly threatened by bankruptcy is repeatedly asked. There is no official information because, according to a spokesman for the Ministry of Finance, these are "trade and business secrets". On the other hand, since there was great interest in those who were “rescued” with public funds, some daily newspapers published documents leaked to them. According to the detailed listing of the Tagesspiegel, it was a matter of creditors with unsecured borrowings from the money market and borrower's note loans of the Hypo Real Estate Group as of September 26, 2008 worth 83.41 billion dollars, including private German banks, cooperative banks and public German banks , Savings banks, insurance companies and pension funds, German public authorities, foreign banks and central governments and others. The Tagesspiegel found no evidence that these investors were justified in secrecy. There is also no recognizable risk of bankruptcy. The question of the cost sharing of the creditors is open.

Evaluation of the HRE

After the rescue, experts from the federal government came to a significantly higher assessment of the valuable assets of HRE. The secret note was leaked to the press and speaks of "significantly higher valuation results of almost 30 billion" - instead of the 15 billion euros previously mentioned by the banks. Volker Wissing, FDP representative in the investigation committee: "The private banks have obviously downscaled the values ​​... And the state simply believed the private banks." At the time, this could have increased the willingness to save HRE from tax revenues.

Taxpayer costs

“Zeit” put the costs for taxpayers at 19.1 billion euros up to (2010). “That's 237 euros for every citizen, whether baby or old, whether cleaning lady or worker. That is almost as much as the federal government is spending per capita this year on education, research, technology and the economy. ”In response to a question from the parliamentary group of the Greens, the federal government put the known costs at 20.3 billion euros in 2018.

Movie

• Greed and megalomania. How the politics of the bank rescue was ripped off. Television documentary, Germany, 2010, 57 min., Script and director: Hubert Seipel , production: WDR , first broadcast: March 25, 2010, 12:20 am, ARD , summary ( memento of March 28, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) from WDR; Respondents and topics: Ackermann , Asmussen , BaFin , Depfa , Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer , Sanio , Gerhard Schick , Steinbrück , Volker Wissing .

literature

• Handelsblatt , September 30, 2008, pages 22 to 25

Web links

• ARD documentary: Greed and megalomania (youtube)
• Internet presence of Hypo Real Estate Holding
• Focus, February 6, 2009: So far, only taxpayers have been expropriated
• Financial Times Deutschland, August 4, 2009: What the HRE committee brought ( Memento from February 6, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )
• telepolis, May 5, 2009: Corpses pave their way ... The history of the HRE bankruptcy
• Internet presence of the brand pbb direct
• Early documents and newspaper articles on Württembergische Hypothekenbank AG in the 20th century press kit of the ZBW - Leibniz Information Center for Economics .

References and comments

1. ↑ Annual report 2017 in the Federal Gazette . Hypo Real Estate Holding GmbH . Retrieved December 13, 2018.
2. ↑ Current measures ( Memento from April 17, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) SoFFin ()
3. ↑ Press release of the Financial Market Stabilization Fund of November 4, 2009 SoFFin
4. ↑ Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten: Rescuing banks will cost German taxpayers 236 billion euros. June 23, 2015, accessed March 9, 2017 . 
5. ↑ handelsblatt.com July 22, 2015: State gets rid of all Pfandbriefbank shares
6. ^ Hans-Jürgen Leersch: How it all began - Banken I: The banking crisis in Germany started small. In: The Parliament. October 8, 2012, accessed March 9, 2017 . 
7. ↑ Detlev Landmesser: The Pfandbrief in crisis. ( Memento from November 8, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) In boerse.ARD.de, October 6, 2008
8. ↑ Germany: Ravenous For Bad Debt - Workout veteran Lone Star is thriving by buying up Germany's troubled loans. In: Business Week. Retrieved March 14, 2005 . 
9. ↑ Press release of June 24, 2008 ( Memento of September 7, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
10. ↑ Hypo Real Estate Group completes takeover of Depfa . Finanznachrichten.de, October 2, 2007
11. ^ Frank Thewes: Black box bank rescue . In: Focus , No. 16, April 11, 2009
12. ↑ HRE merges DEPFA Deutsche Pfandbriefbank and Hypo Real Estate Bank to form Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG. (No longer available online.) Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, June 29, 2009, formerly in the original ; Retrieved July 17, 2009 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  
13. ↑ Tagesgeld.org: pbb direkt starts with overnight money and fixed-term deposits .
14. ↑ handelsblatt.com July 22, 2015: State gets rid of all Pfandbriefbank shares
15. ↑ HRE significantly reduces stake in pbb Deutsche Pfandbriefbank. In: handelsblatt.com. May 15, 2018. Retrieved May 16, 2018 . 
16. ↑ Dax group Hypo Real Estate is fighting for survival. In: Spiegel Online , September 28, 2008
17. ↑ Finance consortium supports Hypo Real Estate with a billion- euro loan. In: Spiegel Online , September 29, 2008
18. ^ Report from the HAZ
19. ↑ hyporealestate.com ( Memento of February 14, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
20. ↑ Article. In: Handelsblatt , November 7, 2007
21. ↑ Ad-hoc announcement January 15, 2008.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Handelsblatt  
22. ↑ DAX value with record loss . In: Berliner Morgenpost , January 16, 2008
23. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000: Recommended decision and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry , p. 75ff
24. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000: Recommended resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry , p. 77f
25. ^ Troubled Depfa is a political case of pass-the-parcel In: Irish Times , November 21, 2008
26. ↑ s. on this, Bundestag DrS 16/11014 (November 21, 2008): The Federal Government's answer to the minor question from Members Carl-Ludwig Thiele, Volker Wissing, Frank Schäffler, other members and the FDP parliamentary group: Audit activities of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority at Hypo Real estate . (BT DrS 16/10417 - October 22, 2008), here in particular the Federal Government's answer to question 11: Are German financial holding companies checked by BaFin?
27. ↑ Directive 2006/48 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2006 on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions
28. ↑ Directive 2006/49 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2006 on the adequate capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions
29. ↑ Answer of the federal government to the small question of the members of parliament Carl-Ludwig Thiele, Volker Wissing, Frank Schäffler, other members of the parliament and the parliamentary group of the FDP: Examination activities of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority at Hypo Real Estate . (BT DrS 16/10417 - October 22, 2008, here: p. 11)
30. ↑ Treasury blocked stricter supervision . In: Spiegel Online , January 31, 2009
31. ↑ HRE: The federal government has concealed the Depfa test . In: Handelsblatt , October 16, 2009
32. ↑ 2009 will be significantly worse. Interview Peer Steinbrück with the Handelsblatt . In: Handelsblatt , October 9, 2009
33. ↑ Desperate witnesses . ( Memento from May 17, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , May 14, 2009
34. ↑ ^{a b c d} HRE committee. Depfa auditors named grievances . In: Spiegel Online , May 14, 2009
35. ↑ br-online January 26, 2009: Bad news put aside? ( Memento from January 29, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
36. ↑ BaFin test report. How the HRE slid into disaster . In: Spiegel Online , May 27, 2009:
37. ↑ ^{a b c d} faz.net October 14, 2008: Bafin sees violations of the law. Hypo Real Estate Manager under suspicion
38. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for resolutions and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, pp. 54–69
39. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 62
40. ↑ Summary of the discussions to support the HRE from September 26th to 28th, 2008 . ( Memento from August 3, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , July 7, 2009; HRE rescue protocol, available as PDF from this article.
41. ↑ Gambling at dawn . In: Der Spiegel . No. 34 , 2009, p. 58–63 ( online - detailed description of the processes).
42. ↑ Hypo Real Estate is radically rebuilt. By dpa , September 30, 2008 (  ( page no longer available , search in web archives ))
43. ↑ Ministry: The rescue package is not used for HRE processing. From Handelsblatt.com, October 1, 2008 (  ( page no longer available , search in web archives ))
44. ↑ October 7, 2003: Hypo Real Estate goes public
45. ↑ Going public with flavors . In: manager-magazin.de , September 2, 2003:
46. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 203
47. ^ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, pp. 196–198
48. ↑ Press release of HRE September 29, 2008 ( Memento of October 10, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
49. ↑ ^{a b c} Institute is said to have deceived Steinbrück . ( Memento of the original from January 30, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , January 1, 2009 
50. ↑ Hypo Real Estate is said to have deceived Steinbrück . ( Memento from September 11, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , January 2, 2009
51. ↑ After the failure of the 35 billion euro package - the crisis summit is supposed to save HRE. In: Tagesschau (ARD) , October 4, 2008 ( online ( memento of October 8, 2008 in the Internet Archive ))
52. ^ Visit from the public prosecutor's office . ( Memento of the original from February 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 17, 2008 
53. ↑ ^{a b} Market manipulation. Raid on Hypo Real Estate . In: Handelsblatt , December 17, 2008
54. ↑ After the federal government and the financial sector reach agreement - 15 billion euros more credit for HRE. In: Tagesschau (ARD) , October 6, 2008 ( online )
55. ↑ Inter-bank system faced a crash. ( Memento from November 2, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) In: Frankfurter Rundschau , October 7, 2008
56. ↑ Politicians demand resignation from HRE boss Funke. In: Spiegel Online , October 6, 2008
57. ↑ HRE supervisory board chief Viermetz resigns . In: Spiegel Online , October 10, 2008
58. ↑ Press release Hypo Real Estate: Supervisory Board appoints new Management Board members ( Memento of October 10, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
59. ^ The (current) board of directors of Hypo Real Estate ( Memento of October 14, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
60. ^ The (current) supervisory board of Hypo Real Estate ( Memento of October 17, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
61. ↑ Deutsche Bank helps Hypo Real Estate with twelve billion . In: Spiegel Online , October 19, 2008
62. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: HRE press release of October 29, 2008: Liquidity lines and financial market stabilization fund ) (PDF)
63. ↑ Hypo Real Estate applies for new help worth billions . In: Spiegel Online , October 29, 2008
64. ↑ Hypo Real reaches for the reserve . In: manager-magazin.de , October 29, 2008
65. ↑ Hypo Real Estate receives 15 billion euros . In: Spiegel Online , October 31, 2008
66. ↑ New state billions for Hypo Real . ( Memento from June 30, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , October 31, 2008
67. ↑ [1]
68. ↑ de.reuters.com
69. ↑ HRE receives additional 10 billion euros , faz.net
70. ↑ Michael Endres is supposed to control Hypo . ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , November 12, 2008
71. ↑ HRE press release November 17, 2008: Changes in the Supervisory Board of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG ... ( Memento from January 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
72. ↑ After the rescue operation. Hypo changes almost all supervisors . ( Memento from February 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , November 18, 2008
73. ↑ Ratlose retirees at Hypo Real . ( Memento from July 31, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , November 18, 2008
74. ↑ Endres becomes chief inspector . In: manager-magazin , November 17, 2008
75. ↑ Funke demands millions . ( Memento of the original from April 30, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , February 26, 2009 
76. ↑ Broken managers are suing their ex-bank for payments . The West, February 26, 2009
77. ↑ Az. 5 HKO 16 44/09
78. ↑ ^{a b c} Focus-Online February 26, 2009: Fired boss sues for additional payment
79. ^ Ex-board members are suing Hypo Real Estate . In: Spiegel Online , February 26, 2009
80. ↑ Ex-CFO is suing the expulsion . ( Memento of the original from March 19, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , January 23, 2009 
81. ↑ AZ. 5 HKO 170/09.
82. ↑ Az. 5 HKO 21 22/09.
83. ↑ Ref .: 5 HKO 2683/9.
84. ↑ I'm sorry for the development . ( Memento of the original from April 22, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 19, 2009 
85. ↑ Ex-HRE boss Funke wants to sue for a million dollar salary . In: Spiegel Online . March 6, 2009
86. ↑ HRE chief killed. Funke is suing millions of dollars . In: Stern Online , March 6, 2009
87. ↑ Ex-boss of the bankrupt bank sues for salary . In: Frankfurter Rundschau , March 6, 2009
88. ↑ From the life of a bankrupt banker . In: Stern Online , March 21, 2009
89. ↑ Grossly poor . ( Memento of the original from December 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung Online , December 1, 2009 
90. ↑ HRE accuses ex-board member Funke of serious misconduct . In: Spiegel Online , December 1, 2009
91. ↑ Serious allegations against Funke . In: manager-magazin.de , December 1, 2009
92. ↑ de.reuters.com
93. ↑ faz.net ( Memento from February 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
94. ↑ handelsblatt.com
95. ↑ focus.de
96. ↑ dailynet.de ( Memento of the original from February 20, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
97. ↑ die-topnews.de
98. ↑ to rescue Hypo Real Estate  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. .  May 4, 2009, ZEIT ONLINE
99. ↑ [2]
100. ↑ Hypo Real Estate frightens Berlin: One trillion loaned out . In: Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung , accessed on February 19, 2009
101. ↑ Billion loss. Federal government participates in Hypo Real Estate . In: Spiegel Online , March 28, 2009
102. ^ Welt-Online March 28, 2009: The state becomes a shareholder in Hypo Real Estate
103. ↑ Nationalization planned . In: manager-magazin.de , March 28, 2009
104. ↑ ^{a b c} faz.net March 28, 2009: HRE expects losses after billions of euros ( memento of March 30, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
105. ^ Hypo Real Estate. Capital ratio falls below the minimum limit . In: manager-magazin.de , March 28, 2009
106. ↑ faz.net March 28, 2009: The state joins Hypo Real Estate
107. ↑ Capital injection from the federal government. In: Frankfurter Rundschau Online , March 29, 2009
108. ^ Hypo Real Estate. By the grace of the state . ( Memento of March 30, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Handelsblatt , March 29, 2009
109. ↑ 100 billion euros is not enough . In: manager-magazin.de , March 29, 2009
110. ↑ Welt-Online March 29, 2009: Hypo Real Estate needs billions more
111. ↑ faz.net March 20, 2009: Bundestag approves Bank Expropriation Act
112. ↑ Federal Council Plenary Protocol 857 / April 3, 2009
113. ↑ HRE law passes the Federal Council ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
114. ↑ Köhler signs expropriation law . In: Frankfurter Rundschau , April 7, 2009
115. ↑ SoFFin: Public takeover offer by the Federal Republic of Germany, acting by the Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds, represented by the Finanzmarktstabilisierungsanstalt, to the shareholders of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG ( Memento of April 21, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
116. ^ SoFFin: Offer Document ... ( Memento of May 21, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
117. ↑ faz.net April 17, 2009: The federal purchase offer applies
118. ↑ Federal government offers 290 million euros for Hypo Real Estate . In: Die Welt Online , April 9, 2009
119. ↑ Take the 1.39 euros - and out . ( Memento from September 10, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , April 15, 2009
120. ↑ BaFin approves takeover of HRE . In: Spiegel Online , April 17, 2009
121. ↑ HRE takeover: The acceptance period for shareholders is running . ( Memento of the original from April 20, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Die Zeit Online , April 17, 2009 
122. ↑ And if you are unwilling to become a shareholder ... In: Die Zeit Online , February 19, 2009
123. ↑ Investor Flowers is playing poker for his fortune . In: Die Zeit Online , March 15, 2009
124. ^ Zeit-Online April 17, 2009: Expropriation. Federal government gives HRE shareholders a last chance
125. ↑ Tagesschau (ARD) - SoFFin guarantees 52 billion euros - billion guarantee for HRE extended from April 14, 2009
126. ↑ HRE shareholders disdain the federal offer . In: Handelsblatt , April 24, 2009
127. ↑ Reuters April 24, 2009: Federal government pulls out all the stops at Hypo Real Estate
128. ↑ Focus April 24, 2009: HRE investors have so far offered SoFFin 1.28% of the shares ( memento of April 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
129. ↑ ( page no longer available , search in web archives: Hypo Real Estate: press release on the result of the extraordinary general meeting )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
130. ^ Neue Zürcher Zeitung Online, June 3, 2009: Green light for nationalization of Hypo Real Estate
131. ↑ ( page no longer available , search in web archives: Hypo Real Estate: press release on the result of the extraordinary general meeting )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. All figures are based on the information provided by Hypo Real Estate: 113,614,139 votes in favor, 40,018,793 votes against, approx. 230 million shares in circulation, of which the federal government holds 47.3 percent.  
132. ↑ HRE shareholder Flowers prepares for lawsuit . In: Handelsblatt , April 26, 2009
133. ↑ s. HRE press release dated August 13, 2009: HRE general meeting elects new board ( Memento from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
134. ↑ Return of a convict at HRE . In: Handelsblatt , August 17, 2009
135. ↑ Changing pages with flavors . ( Memento of the original from July 21, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , July 16, 2009 
136. ↑ Duel for the HRE Supervisory Board . In: Handelsblatt , July 16, 2009
137. ↑ HRE press release of November 4, 2009: SoFFin decides to provide further support for HRE Group: next tranche of recapitalization amounting to 3 billion euros; Liquidity guarantees extended to June 30, 2010 ( memento of the original from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
138. ↑ Die Welt-Online November 5, 2009: Hypo Real Estate receives another three billion from the state
139. ↑ Capital aid. HRE boss Wieandt needs further billions from the federal government . In: Handelsblatt , November 6, 2009
140. ^ Hypo Real Estate. Soffin shoots billions . ( Memento of the original from January 15, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung Online , November 5, 2009 
141. ↑ Axel Wieandt - The prodigal son returns home . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 2, 2010
142. ↑ Hans-Martin Tillack: 40 billion euros additional state guarantees: HRE is again facing bankruptcy . In: Stern Online , September 10, 2010
143. ↑ AFP : HRE receives 40 billion euros more state guarantees . September 10, 2010
144. ↑ HRE press release of October 3, 2010 ( memento of October 11, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) accessed on November 17, 2010
145. ↑ FMS-Wertmanagement press release of December 22, 2011 ( Memento of the original of March 10, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved March 21, 2011 
146. ↑ § 7 Paragraph 1 No. 1 of the Statute ( Memento of the original from June 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved March 21, 2011 
147. ↑ Hypo Real Estate: EU Commission approves aid - manager magazin . In: manager-magazin.de , July 18, 2011 (accessed December 28, 2012).
148. ↑ EU approves the reconstruction of the HRE at nzz.ch, July 18, 2011 (accessed on July 18, 2011).
149. ↑ State aid approved ( Memento from February 6, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )
150. ↑ DSW press release October 14, 2008: DSW files criminal charges against those responsible at Hypo Real Estate ( memento of the original from October 18, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
151. ↑ DSW press release of November 10, 2008: DSW: Munich Public Prosecutor's Office is investigating Hypo Real Estate ( Memento of the original from December 31, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
152. ↑ ^{a b} allegation of mismanagement. Hypo Real Estate initiates investigation against ex-bosses . In: Spiegel Online , October 14, 2008
153. ^ A wave of lawsuits overwhelms Hypo Real Estate . ( Memento of the original from June 23, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 22, 2008 
154. ↑ Rotter Rechtsanwälte, Munich, press release. From December 22, 2008: Claims for damages against Hypo Real Estate
155. ↑ Welt-Online January 16, 2009: Investors want to sue Hypo Real Estate
156. ↑ Serious suspicion. HRE tip is said to have deceived shareholders . ( Memento of the original from February 1, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 18, 2008 
157. ↑ Welt-Online December 17, 2008: Suspected manipulation. Raid on the scandal bank Hypo Real Estate
158. ↑ HRE press release December 20, 2008: Hypo Real Estate: Cancellation agreements with executive board members ( Memento of the original dated February 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
159. ^ Accusation of infidelity. Raid on former Hypo bosses . ( Memento from August 3, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , December 18, 2008
160. ^ Tagesschau.de: Raid on Hypo Real Estate
161. ^ Munich billions lawsuit . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung Online , June 21, 2011
162. ↑ HRE press release of October 14, 2008: Supervisory Board commissions legal investigation ( Memento of October 31, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
163. ↑ Hypo Real takes on Funke . ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , October 15, 2008
164. ↑ At Hypo Real Estate, the fish stinks from the head . ( Memento of October 7, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , October 7, 2008
165. ↑ Focus-Online February 19, 2009: Lafontaine calls for investigation
166. ^ Die Linke March 4, 2009: Application for the establishment of a committee of inquiry BT-DrS 16/12130 (PDF; 68 kB)
167. ↑ ^{a b} FDP, Die Linke, Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen: Joint application for the establishment of a committee of inquiry BT-DrS 16/12480 (PDF; 83 kB)
168. ↑ ^{a b} ( page no longer available , search in web archives: German Bundestag: Current Issues April 24, 2009: Hans-Ulrich Krüger heads the investigation committee )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
169. ↑ HRE committee of inquiry established . In: Handelsblatt Online , April 23, 2009
170. ↑ German Bundestag: 2nd Committee of Inquiry ( Memento from June 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
171. ^ German Bundestag: 2nd Committee of Inquiry - Members ( Memento from July 5, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
172. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a decision and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 366/367: List of witnesses heard
173. ↑ hib message. August 2009: HRE rescue operation was "no negligent poker" ( Memento from December 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
174. ↑ ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: hib message 223/2009 - July 28, 2009: Bank bosses: HRE bankruptcy had to be prevented in any case )
175. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
176. ↑ hib announcement 192/2009 - June 18, 2009: The alarm bells didn't have to ring ( memento from July 23, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
177. ^ Disaster for the Treasury . ( Memento from July 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 23, 2009
178. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
179. ↑ hib report 166/2009 - May 28, 2009: Witness: Depfa crisis caused by Lehman Brothers bankruptcy ( Memento from August 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
180. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
181. ↑ English: No deficiencies in the Bundesbank audit of the HRE subsidiary Depfa . ( Memento of May 22, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) hib message 145/2009, May 14, 2009
182. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 78
183. ↑ Talk a lot, say little . ( Memento from May 17, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , May 15, 2009
184. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 51 u. 239
185. ^ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 64
186. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
187. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 102
188. ^ Disaster for the Treasury . ( Memento of the original from July 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 23, 2009 
189. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 50
190. ^ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 60
191. ↑ hib notification 222/2009 - July 28, 2009: Ex-Finance Secretary Mirow: HRE was not a central topic in the BMF ( Memento from December 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
192. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
193. ↑ Ex-bank president Müller calls for more state supervision ( memento of December 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) hib message 235/2009, August 18, 2009
194. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 34
195. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 176
196. ^ Disaster for the Treasury . ( Memento of the original from July 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 23, 2009 
197. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
198. ↑ hib report 225/2009 - July 30, 2009: Bafin boss Sanio: "We could not close the HRE" ( Memento of December 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
199. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, pp. 61 and 302
200. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 71: Authorities involved. German Bundesbank
201. ↑ hib report 172/2009 - June 4, 2009: HRE crisis: Bafin witness rejects criticism of the banking supervision ( memento of August 9, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
202. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 40
203. ↑ hib announcement 223/2009 - July 28, 2009: Bank bosses: HRE bankruptcy had to be prevented in any case  ( page no longer accessible , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
204. ↑ hib announcement 237/2009 - August 20, 2009: Steinbrück blames Lehman bankruptcy alone for the HRE crisis ( memento of December 10, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
205. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for resolutions and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, pp. 59 and 297
206. ↑ hib announcement 208/2009 - July 2, 2009: Tietmeyer: HRE supervisory board not adequately informed by the management board ( memento of December 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
207. ^ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 64
208. ↑ hib announcement 193/2009 - June 19, 2009: Ex-head of the HRE supervisory board attacks Steinbrück ( Memento from August 5, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
209. ↑ hib announcement 236/2009 - August 19, 2009: HRE rescue operation was "no negligent poker" ( Memento from December 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
210. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 59
211. ↑ German Bundestag, DrS 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry, p. 52
212. ↑ German Bundestag, Drs. 16/14000, recommendation for a resolution and report of the 2nd committee of inquiry (PDF; 5.4 MB)
213. ↑ in detail z. B. the daily mirror on September 13, 2009: Hypo Real Estate. The rescued
214. ↑ ARD Monitor No. 597: Deutsche Bank and Allianz - Profits at the expense of taxpayers ?, broadcast on August 13, 2009
215. ↑ Arne Storn: Hypo Real Estate: 237 euros from each. In: Die Zeit , September 27, 2013.
216. ^ Cerstin Gammelin Berlin: Every family pays 3000 euros for the financial crisis . In: sueddeutsche.de . September 12, 2018, ISSN  0174-4917 ( sueddeutsche.de [accessed September 14, 2018]).