Simplicity

The beginning of Simplikios' commentary on the text On Aristotle's Heaven in a 14th-century manuscript from the collection of Cardinal Bessarion , Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana , Codex Vaticanus Graecus 254, fol. 9r

Simplikios ( Greek  Σιμπλίκιος Simplíkios , Latin Simplicius ; * around 480/490; † probably after 550) was a late ancient Greek philosopher of the Neoplatonic direction. He lived in the Eastern Roman Empire and emerged primarily as a commentator on Aristotle's writings , which he interpreted as Neoplatonic. According to the view prevailing in late ancient Neo-Platonism, he considered Aristotle to be a Platonist and tried to harmonize Platonic and Aristotelian teachings . He also wanted to defend the classical philosophical tradition and the religious worldview of the Neo-Platonists against Christian criticism. He discussed the nature of the universe, tried to define the term matter , examined the phenomenon of time and dealt with the problem of the origin of evils . In his commentary on the handbook of the Stoic Epictetus , an introduction to ethics , he presented the founding principles of what he saw as correct action. He placed great emphasis on the human ability to lead a self-determined life and defended free will .

In the late Middle Ages , the Aristotle commentary on Simplikios had a considerable aftereffect. Modern scholars of antiquity value his writings as valuable sources for earlier epochs in the history of Greek philosophy, especially for the time of the pre-Socratics , because he had access to a wealth of material that is lost today. Because of his conscientiousness and thoroughness in dealing with older doctrinal opinions as well as his well thought-out analyzes and prudent statements, he is considered one of the most important scholars of his time.

Life

Simplikios came from Cilicia , a region on the south coast of Asia Minor ; otherwise nothing is known about its origin. He received his philosophical training in Alexandria , where the influential Neoplatonist Ammonios Hermeiou was his teacher. Like Ammonios, Simplikios lived in the tradition of the ancient Greek religion. So he belonged to a shrinking minority; The Christian state religion had long prevailed in the Eastern Roman Empire. Among the disciples of Ammonius were zealous representatives of the pagan (" pagan ") faith, but also Christians. Ammonios avoided religious disputes and tried to maintain a relatively relaxed relationship between the religions in his school.

Simplikios later went to Athens, where the pagan Neoplatonists traditionally distinguished themselves more sharply from their Christian surroundings than in Alexandria. His teacher there was Damascius , a staunch opponent of Christianity, who had also studied with Ammonius in Alexandria and became the last head ( scholarch ) of the Neoplatonic philosophy school in Athens in 515 at the latest . This school, founded by Plutarch of Athens , claimed to continue the tradition of the Platonic Academy . It remained a refuge of the pagan religion until the end, which for the local philosophers was inseparable from Platonism. After the activities of the Neoplatonists in Athens had long been tolerated by the Christian emperors, the religious contradiction came to a head under Emperor Justinian . In 529 the emperor banned pagan teaching, a little later he repeated and tightened the ban. Government measures led to the school being closed. Simplikios, Damascios and five other philosophers decided to emigrate. Perhaps as early as 531 or 532 at the latest, they emigrated to the Persian Sasanid Empire . There the Great King Chosrau I, who had ruled since September 531, offered them refuge at his court in Ctesiphon , where they could count on tolerance.

Chosrau took a benevolent attitude towards the Neo-Platonists and the ancient Greek religion; he promoted all efforts that counteracted the religious unity of the Eastern Roman Empire and thereby weakened it. Nevertheless, the philosophers were soon disappointed with the conditions at the Persian court. When the Eastern Romans made an " Eternal Peace " with the Persians in autumn 532 , the great king insisted in one of the clauses of the peace treaty that the philosophers should return to the Eastern Roman Empire undisturbed and adhere to their religious convictions there. In the same year the Neoplatonists left the Persian Empire.

Perhaps Simplikios now settled in Carrhae , a town on the border with the Persian Empire, and founded a new Platonic school there. This hypothesis, first presented in 1984 by the gnosis researcher Michel Tardieu at a congress, has since met with considerable approval, but has also met with opposition. It relies on evidence such as the fact that Carrhae offered a favorable environment because pagan traditions were still deeply rooted in the city's population. In favor of the hypothesis, it is mainly asserted that a Greek school of philosophy existed there in 943, as can be seen in a report by the contemporary scholar Abu 'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusain al-Masʿūdī .

Most of his surviving works - perhaps even all - Simplikios wrote only after his return from the Persian Empire; evidently a rich library was still available to him. In the commentary on Aristotle he argued violently against the Christian philosopher Johannes Philoponos , whom he accused of lust for fame and unjustified criticism of the cosmology of Aristotle. Like Simplikios, the attacked had studied with Ammonios Hermeiou. Therefore, Simplikios attached importance to the statement that he criticized Philoponos harshly, but harbored no personal grudge against him from the past, because he could not remember ever having met him.

When Simplikios died is unknown; it is usually believed that he was still alive around the middle of the 6th century. What is certain is that he outlived his teacher Damascios, who was still alive in 538.

Works

The extensive oeuvre of Simplikio, consisting exclusively of comments, has only been partially preserved. To the resulting partial count the comments to three works of Aristotle: the categories , the physics and the treatise On the Heavens . They were created after the return from the Persian Empire and testify to the literacy and expertise of the author. The physics -Comment contains two digressions that in modern research as a corollary de tempore ( "digression over time") and corollary de loco are called ( "digression about the place"). Simplikios also commented on the version of the doctrinal conversations of the Stoic Epictetus, which was distributed as an encheiridion (handbook) . The Encheiridion deals with the principles of ethics that were part of the propaedeutics in Neoplatonic teaching . The Neoplatonists considered the virtues described there as a prerequisite for a philosophical life.

These commentaries are among the most valuable sources for the ancient history of philosophy. In contrast to many other Neoplatonic commentaries, these are not student transcripts from lectures, but texts that the author himself formulated in writing. They contain an abundance of quotes from today's lost literature and representations of the doctrines of other thinkers about which little or nothing has been passed on otherwise. In particular, Simplikios owes a considerable part of the fragments of the pre-Socratics, including the most important literal passages from the didactic poems of Parmenides (around two thirds of the verses that have survived) and Empedocles . Its importance as a mediator of the ideas of stoic and peripatetic philosophers is also great . Simplikios also provides a lot of important information about the views of members of the Platonic Academy as well as of Middle and Neo-Platonists and Pythagoreans . Some of his accounts allow a reconstruction of the teachings presented in the lost writings of these authors. The length and depth of detail of his works is to be seen against the background of the circumstances at that time: In view of the endangerment of the pagan educational goods by militant Christian circles, which was evident in the forcible closure of the Athens School of Philosophy, he tried the result of the centuries-long efforts of the philosophers through a thorough one Save illustration for the future.

The Aristotle interpretation shows that Simplikios proceeded very carefully and conscientiously in dealing with the texts with which he was concerned. He also took philological aspects into account by comparing manuscripts and making text-critical efforts to determine the authentic wording. His care in evaluating his sources was exceptional for an ancient philosopher. As characteristics of a good commentator he called impartiality and familiarity not only with the individual interpreted script, but with the complete works and the expression of Aristotle. He expressly disapproved of obedience to authority. He noted that a good commentator would not try to prove all of Aristotle's theses to be correct, as if he were infallible. Although he valued Aristotle and regarded him as a Platonist, he kept his distance, examined the Aristotelian arguments and took a partly approving and partly negative position. He also dealt with the views of earlier commentators such as Alexander von Aphrodisias and Iamblichus von Chalkis . He reported on the positions of his predecessors, some of whose works are now lost, and examined their plausibility. He criticized the theses of recognized authorities wherever it seemed necessary to him. He called the Peripatetic Eudemos of Rhodes the best Aristotle commentator , from whose now lost physics he saved a lot of material for posterity through his quotations. He judged his own performance with modesty.

A late antique commentary on the first book of the elements of Euclid that has not survived (or at least on the definitions, postulates and axioms at the beginning of the first book) was ascribed to Simplikios in the Middle Ages and is still counted among his authentic works today. Excerpts from it are handed down in a medieval Arabic Euclid commentary. Simplikios' comments on Aristotle's meteorology and on a work by Iamblichus on the Pythagoreans are also lost. Furthermore, there are indications that he comments on Plato's dialogue Phaedo and a rhetoric Manual of Hermogenes of Tarsus wrote.

The fact that Simplikios also wrote poetry emerges from a Proclus - Scholion , in which two verses from him have come down to us.

Traditionally, Simplikios is also attributed a surviving commentary to Aristotle's work On the Soul ( De anima ) . This attribution is defended by Ilsetraut Hadot, but more recent research is dominated by the opinion that the work comes from another Neoplatonist. The proposal to identify the commentator, who is called "Pseudo-Simplikios", with Priskianos Lydos is controversial . Carlos Steel and Matthias Perkams plead for the authorship of the Priskianos. John F. Finamore and John M. Dillon , Henry J. Blumenthal and Pamela Huby oppose their thesis - as well as the traditional classification under the works of Simplikios . Although the commentator mentions two other works that he wrote, these are lost today and therefore do not help identify him. It is a commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle and an excerpt from Theophrastus' physics or a commentary on an excerpt from this work by Theophrastus himself. Because of the traditional attribution of the De anima commentary, these two writings were previously counted among the lost works of Simplikios. Alleged traces of a lost metaphysical commentary by Simplikios in Byzantine scholias have proven to be absent. The author of the De anima commentary tried to show that Aristotle agreed with the central theses of the Platonic theory of the soul.

Teaching

One of the main concerns of Simplikios was the harmonization of the Platonic and the Aristotelian philosophy. This effort corresponded to the endeavors widespread in late antique Neo-Platonism to represent the most well-known authorities of the classic pagan tradition as representatives of one and the same venerable doctrine. The systematic exposition of this doctrine should offer a superior alternative to Christianity. At the same time, the Christian argument that the pagan thinkers differ from one another and therefore do not possess the truth, should be invalidated. In this sense, the differences between Platonism and Aristotelianism were downplayed by some Neoplatonists. Simplikios gave his readers the impression that Aristotle's objections to Plato's teachings did not concern their material core, but only certain formulations. In other ways, too, he postulated a fundamental correspondence between the core ideas of the important philosophical teachers and directions, insofar as they seemed to be compatible with the Neoplatonic worldview. When in doubt, he opted for a harmonizing interpretation. Where this was not possible, he took a clear position, for example with his rejection of the materialism of the Stoics.

Simplikios explained his approach on the occasion of his examination of the philosophical definition of time: It is not important to know Aristotle's view on this problem; rather, one must first recognize what time actually is. Then, proceeding from this, one can get closer to the insights of Aristotle.

cosmology

In astronomy, Simplikios, like Aristotle, assumed the geocentric worldview that prevailed in antiquity . He believed that the earth was at rest in the middle of the universe. With regard to the celestial movements, however, he deviated from the Aristotelian model, which provides transparent, uniformly rotating hollow spheres (spheres), arranged concentrically around the world center, to which the celestial bodies are attached. According to the model, this attachment means that the celestial bodies are kept in their constant circular paths. Simplikios believed that this concept was partly outdated by the later astronomical knowledge presented by Ptolemy . But he did not consider the model of Ptolemy to be the final solution either. He was of the opinion that none of the previous theories offered a satisfactory representation and explanation of the planetary movements, none was necessarily and demonstrably correct. Even his own theory did not meet his criteria for scientific proof. In contrast to Aristotle, he assumed an axis rotation of all heavenly bodies and did not consider their circular movements to be homocentric. According to his idea, only the sphere of fixed stars revolves around the center of the universe. The planets, which in ancient times also included the sun and the moon, carry out a more complex movement, which includes at least one circular movement, the center of which is not the earth.

Aristotle said that the universe is not in one place. It is not localizable, because outside of the spherical sky, which is surrounded and limited by nothing, there is no reality. Simplikios contradicted this view. He asserted that, according to the Aristotelian doctrine, the circular motion of the celestial sphere was a local motion, i.e. a change in place, and this presupposed that the sky was in one place. Simplikios saw the reason for Aristotle's error in the inadequacy of the Aristotelian definition of the term “place”. Aristotle had defined the place as the boundary between what is included and what is included. With this he defined it as a two-dimensional surface. Accordingly, the sky encompassed by nothing could have no place. Simplikios asked whether “embracing” should be understood as encasing from the outside or penetrating what is encompassed. Both lead to a contradiction: if the encompassing permeates the encompassed, the place is not the limit; if the place only envelops what is encompassed, is only the surface of what is encompassed and not this itself in one place, which is absurd. Simplikios contrasted Aristotle's concept with his own understanding of place. According to this, the place is a space (χώρα chṓra ) and a "vessel" (ὑποδοχή hypodochḗ ), an expanded reality that affects all parts of a thing in the place. It is not a cavity and also not - as Proclus thought - an immaterial body, but material and expanded. The matter of the place is not the same as that of the body that is in the place; rather, they are two different types of matter. There is no discrepancy in this, because from Simplikios' point of view nothing stands in the way of a mutual interpenetration of two materials. The place is not an accident , not a property of something (such as the spatial extent that a thing exhibits as one of its properties and which in the theory of categories falls under quantity ). Rather, it is itself an extended ousia (“beingness”, often translated as “ substance ”). It plays an important role in the world order, because it is the measure that assigns its position to every body and organizes its parts within the body. Thus, the place is not a neutral space in which objects happen to be located, but it is the principle of the ordered structure of the entire cosmos and of each individual thing. He does not take in things passively, but rather shapes the situation powerfully.

Like Aristotle, Simplikios considered the spatial expansion of the universe to be finite. He defended the Aristotelian doctrine of the beginninglessness and indestructibility of the cosmos against the position of Philoponos, who, as a Christian, assumed a creation as a temporal beginning and a future end of the world and founded his view philosophically. One of the arguments of Philoponos was: If the world has no beginning in time, an infinite number of days must have already passed. But if the number of days that make up the past is endless, today's day could never have been reached, because that would have ended a succession of infinitely many days. On the other hand, Simplikios argued that the past years no longer existed because they belonged to the past; So it is not a question of the crossing of an infinite number of real - not only potentially - existing units, which Aristotle ruled out. This counter-argument is not valid, however, since a real succession of the past years has taken place and the elapse of the years does not change the real infinity of their number. Within the framework of the Aristotelian system, which only allows potential infinity, the argument of Philoponos is compelling from today's point of view. The question that remains open, however, is whether the possibility of an infinite past is also logically excluded outside of the Aristotelian understanding of infinity. This is still a controversial issue.

Following on from Aristotle's explanations, Simplikios differentiated between the approaches of two types of natural scientist: the "physicist" (physikós), by which he meant a natural philosopher , and the "mathematician", that is, a non-philosopher who tries to grasp physical conditions with mathematical means. A special case of such a “mathematician” is the astronomer. Both types of research investigate the same subject, but in different ways. The “physicist” asks about the nature of spheres and celestial bodies, he looks at them from a qualitative point of view, while the astronomer deals with quantitative points of view, based on arithmetic and geometric arguments. The “physicist” asks about causal relationships, the astronomer restricts himself to a description that is supposed to do justice to the observed phenomena without explaining them causally. Simplikios considered the natural-philosophical, "physical" approach to be the only scientifically profitable one. He said that astronomers should not be satisfied with inventing "hypotheses" - mere rules of calculation for " saving the phenomena " - but should use a physical theory well founded by causal argumentation as the starting point for their considerations. Only such a well-founded astronomy can provide real knowledge. It must be able to explain all observed phenomena, including apparent fluctuations in the size of celestial bodies.

Aristotle had already taken the view that mathematics as a superordinate science should provide axioms to a subordinate science such as astronomy and that it was responsible for the justification and explanation of astronomical conditions, the phenomena. The superordinate science knows the causes, the subordinate only the facts. Following this principle, Aristotle used geometrical definitions and insights for his cosmological explanations. Philoponos turned against his argumentation method. He said that a mathematical argument related to physics could be invalidated by referring to the nature of physical reality, because this restricted the mathematical possibility to such an extent that the argument lost its reason. Thus, mathematical principles are not fully applicable in the physical world. At Simplikios this view met with vehement criticism. He called for an unimpeded transition from physics to its mathematical principles and, conversely, an unrestricted application of mathematical principles to physics and especially to astronomy. He considered deductive reasoning more important than gaining insights through induction . Accordingly, he presented Aristotelian cosmology as a strictly deductive system.

Space and matter

One of the problems that Simplikios had to deal with when commenting on Aristotle's physics was the relationship between amorphous primordial matter and space. For this, the basic text of the Neo-Platonists was Plato's Dialogue Timaeus . There the cosmological connections are presented in the context of a creation story. According to the Neoplatonic interpretation, however, creation does not mean a real temporal origin of the cosmos; rather, Plato only fictitiously projected temporal causal relationships onto a temporal level for didactic reasons, in order to make them easier to grasp for time-bound human thinking. According to the report in Timaeus , the Creator God, the Demiurge , did not create the primordial matter out of nothing, but found it. Before he began to work, it was in a state of chaotic motion. Even before creation there was an invisible, formless substrate that was, so to speak, the “place” of the irregular movement of primordial matter: the chṓra . In ancient Greek, this word denotes space, which is why the expression is usually translated as “ space ” in this philosophical context . However, this does not mean a potentially empty space. Rather, the chora has both spatial and material character, so that one can speak of “space-matter”. Space can only be conceptually separated from its material content, not really. The task of Plato's creator was to shape the formless primordial matter by introducing forms and to create a sensibly ordered cosmos out of the chaos.

Aristotle, who rejected the idea of ​​a temporal creation of the world, dealt with the question of primordial matter from a different perspective than Plato. According to his concept, the primordial matter is the first "underlying" ( hypokeimenon ), the substrate or subject of all properties in a body. If one mentally removes all of its properties from a body, nothing remains, according to Aristotelian understanding, except for the subject, which is determined by these properties, and that is the unqualified primordial matter. However, it is not clear from Aristotle's remarks how he imagined it. In any case, he criticized the platonic concept. He said that one could not assign the function of matter to the place, because the place is immovable and therefore separable from a movable thing, while the matter of the thing is inseparable from it. One should not equate the place with extension. Apparently, Aristotle viewed matter either as expansion or as similar to expansion, at least from the point of view that it, like expansion, must be determined by properties that it receives.

Since neither Plato nor Aristotle had presented a clear, elaborated concept of primordial matter, it remained for the ancient thinkers to clarify what one had to imagine matter as the subject of the properties of a body. The question of the subject of physical properties is discussed controversially in natural philosophy up to the present day. The solution that Simplikios advocated and believed to be that of Aristotle was to equate primordial matter with an indefinite three-dimensional expansion. According to his understanding, the properties that one must mentally take away from a thing in order to get to the primordial matter include its specific length, width and depth. What remains as the first subject or primordial matter after the removal of all properties is an indefinite extension. However, such a thing does not occur in physical reality, because material objects that actually exist always have a certain expansion. The peculiarity of this concept of the Simplikios is that the extension is not understood as one of the properties of an object, as usual, but is made the subject of properties itself. By defining primordial matter as an indefinite extension, it loses the mysterious character that it still had in Aristotle.

Time theory

Simplikios worked hard to understand the phenomenon of time. He understood time as the image of Aion , "Eternity". He also made a distinction between flowing, physical time and a metaphysical “first time”, which he regarded as a precondition for physical time. He determined physical time as the measure of the being of the moved. In his theory, the first time is the authority that orders and measures physical time. It enables the flow of physical time and effects the regulated character of the processes. In the first time that which is in the process of becoming and moving receives its relative unity. The flowing time is by itself not able to convey this unity and to order the development of the changing. Thus the first time as the cause in the ontological hierarchy is above the flowing time that is dependent on it, but it is not to be equated with the Aion. The key to its understanding lies in its relationship to the world soul , because it is assigned to the world soul as a principle of its unity and order.

Simplikios tried to resolve the paradoxes of the time discussed by Aristotle . These are aporias , apparent or real dead ends, into which one gets when unacceptable consequences result from statements that have been accepted as correct. According to Simplikios, neither Aristotle nor any of the later thinkers succeeded in solving the problem of the paradox of time. One of the paradoxes is that time is divisible. Something that is divisible can only exist if it has existing parts. But time has no existing parts, because the past no longer exists, the future does not yet, and the present is not part of time, since it is a point in time without extension and time is not composed of points in time. So there is no time. Another paradox is that every moment has to cease to exist, but in principle there cannot be a point in time when that happens. The moment cannot cease to exist while it still exists, nor can it cease to exist until the next moment, for each moment presupposes the end of the previous one. There can be no “next” moment, since expansionless moments, like geometric points on a line, do not adjoin one another. Simplikios found it necessary to clarify the problem of paradoxes in order to gain a complete understanding of time. From the paradoxes it follows not only that there is no extension in time, but also that there cannot even be the unextended now. If no solution is found, no one will be convinced that time exists.

One approach taken by Damascius, which is described in Simplikios, denies the existence of expansionless moments and assigns the now as the smallest, indivisible unit of time an existence as a real present. The flow of time is presented as erratic. So the present becomes a real part of the time. But Simplikios couldn't get used to the idea of ​​volatility. He stuck to the continuous, non- quantified time postulated by Aristotle . He ruled out the possibility of an instantaneous (no time required) accidental change in a substance in a material substrate. A substantial change - the change of the substance itself through the appearance of a new form in the material substrate - he regarded as instantaneous, but he saw in it only the conclusion of a preparatory process that previously took place in matter and was continuous. He also assessed the relational change - such as the change in the mutual position of two bodies - which, unlike Aristotle, he did not consider accidental.

Simplikios was of the opinion that the now is partless and without attributes, but not indeterminate; he saw in it the construction principle of continuity and equated the principle of the shape of the time with the principle of continuity. The primary fact in his time theory is continuity, not the numerical order of time. In this his position differs from that of Aristotle, according to which the temporal delimitation, the structuring of time by an “earlier” and “later” is a mathematical and physical reality, although its physical existence is difficult to prove and verify . Concerning the problem of paradoxes, Simplikios took the view that physical time can be divided at will, but only in the imagination, not in reality. The division of time into moments does not describe reality, but is only a conceptual construct. The paradoxes arise from the fact that the presented parts are equated with real ones. Time is understood as a static being, but its reality is in the flow of becoming. For Simplikios, the reason for the emergence of the paradox lies in the nature of the human soul , which looks at time. The soul stands between the realm of the timeless, unchangeable being and that of change. She has thinking access to both, although she initially equates the mode of being of her thinking object with her own and thus only partially grasps its reality. Based on the fixed concepts of her thinking, she initially has no access to change and the time in which it takes place. Only through insight into its own nature can it grasp the difference between its mode of being and that of things arising and passing away and understand the peculiarity of what is becoming and of time.

The nature of the soul and the origin of evils

The Neoplatonists were decided representatives of a monistic worldview. They were convinced that there was only one single primal principle, “ the one ”, which should be regarded as the sole origin of all that is and that is good . Therefore they fought against dualism , which assumes an independent principle of the bad as the opposite pole of the good and the cause of the evil and thus denies the unity of reality. Simplikios also took a stand on this problem and defended Neoplatonic monism. In his Epictetus commentary, he argued against Manichaeism , a religious doctrine that had been widespread since the third century and offered a decidedly dualistic explanation of the bad. He had personal contact with a Manichaean who gave him information about his faith.

According to the absolute dualism of the Manicheans, there is a kingdom of good and one of evil . These have always faced each other as irreconcilable adversaries and are in constant battle. Simplikios attacked the cosmogony of the Manicheans, their doctrine of the origin of the cosmos, according to which the creation of the world is part of this conflict. As part of his refutation efforts, he accused them of the fact that their stories were not real myths, but monstrosities. In addition, they did not understand that mythical representations are not true in the literal sense, but are to be interpreted symbolically.

Following the traditional belief of the Neoplatonists, Simplikios did not assign any real reality to the bad (kakón) . It is only a "deprivation", a deprivation of the good. There is no such thing as a “nature of evil”. In reality, everything bad can be explained as a lack of good. Simplikios opposed the Manichean dualism with the Platonic conviction, also shared by Aristotle, that every striving aims at something really or supposedly good. Nobody deliberately wants something bad as such. According to this understanding, one arrives at something bad and harmful when one strives for an apparent good and thereby acquires an evil, because one either does not recognize its badness or accepts it for the sake of the good goal. Every action that ultimately leads to something bad can be explained by the fact that the actor wanted to achieve something good and useful, but got lost and failed to achieve what was actually intended. Wrong decisions and badness of a person are thus only the consequences of a lack of insight, not of an evil nature in him. Even if there were something inherently bad, it would be for its own benefit, that is, something good. This is even presupposed in the Manichaean worldview, as Simplikios pointed out to them: According to their myth, the kingdom of evil strives in the struggle against good to gain a benefit for itself from it; so - so Simplikios - it actually wants something good, although it is supposedly absolutely bad. Accordingly, absolute evil seeks that which is contrary to its own nature. This assumption was absurd for Simplikios.

From the point of view of Simplikios, the error of the Manichaeans goes back to an actually good, justified concern: They raised the bad to an independent principle in order not to have to trace it back to God. So they wanted to avoid ascribing the causing of evil to the absolutely good deity. But they "fell into the fire while fleeing the smoke"; the apparent way out has become their undoing, for they have thus assumed a nonsensical position. According to them, the good has voluntarily exposed itself to the influence of the opposing power in combat and suffered losses in the process. According to Simplikio's argument, this is absurd: If the good behaved like this, it would be unreasonable and incapable and thus bad. A really absolutely good thing cannot get involved in a fight; it is inaccessible to anything bad. The Manichean idea of ​​a struggle between two original principles presupposes that one principle attacks the other, i.e. penetrates into its area. But this is impossible with principles that are by nature absolutely opposed to one another, because one would either have to change its nature or be destroyed in contact with the other. Both are excluded by definition. In addition, Simplikios accused the Manicheans that their world interpretation deprived people of the realm of what fell within their jurisdiction, because it relieved them of responsibility for their ethical decisions. If an eternal, powerful principle of evil is the cause of evil, then it is also the cause of human error. Bad actions of a person can then no longer be traced back to him, because in this case he is exposed to an overpowering influence and his self-determination is suspended.

According to Simplikios' understanding, man is never helplessly at the mercy of evil; he can always choose the good that corresponds to his natural disposition. Furthermore, the area in which bad actually occurs is narrowly limited. Impairments affecting the body are not considered to be bad in the strict sense of the word, and the presence or absence of material goods is immaterial. Material processes of decay are just as necessary as processes of creation and make sense within the framework of the world order. The interplay between the composition and dissolution of bodies is not in itself a bad thing; when you look at it from a higher perspective and see the whole thing, it turns out to be a necessity. Only mental bad attitudes are really bad, because only the immortal soul is important, not the perishable body. Thus, real evil does not exist in the nature that surrounds man, nor in his living conditions, but only in his soul, and there it can be eliminated through knowledge and a philosophical way of life. In addition, physical inadequacies are also limited to a relatively small part of the cosmos. They only occur in the earthly area, because only there do the processes of arising, change and decay take place that enable physical defects to occur. According to the worldview of the pagan philosophers of that time, Simplikios believed that the process of becoming and passing away took place exclusively in the "sublunar" space - below the moon. He regarded the whole sky above the lunar sphere as a perfect region to which everything bad was alien.

In the doctrine of the soul, Simplikios distinguished three types of souls:

• the "first" souls, whose residences are above the lunar sphere in the area of ​​the immortal bodies. They never go down to earth and they know no evil. Since they follow their own nature unhindered, they are focused exclusively on the imperishable good. Therefore, they cannot make wrong decisions. There are no impulses in them that relate to the material and transitory.
• the souls that indeed originate from the world of the immortal, but descend to earth and inhabit human bodies there. You occupy an intermediate position between the divine world of pure being and the animal and vegetable world of pure becoming and have access to both areas. Through their descent, they come into contact with the bad. Since they have lost their exclusive focus on good, they must find out what is good for them and make error-prone decisions. This can lead to a disposition opposite to their good nature. But they are able to turn to the good again through spiritual effort and thus to realize what is natural for them. When they ascend to their home beyond the lunar sphere, they are freed from all evils.
• the souls of animals and plants that only know their earthly habitat. In their activities they are always focused on the physical to which they are related. Since animals lack reason, they are at the mercy of their irrational desires. But that is not a bad thing for them, it is natural for them. They follow the urge to preserve life; so they too have something good as their goal. Their way of experiencing evil is graduated: Lower animals are purely body-related, similar to plants; in some higher animals the experience of evils approaches that of humans.

ethics

The interest that Simplikios showed in the doctrine of the soul and the question of the bad was - as with all Neoplatonists - practical. It was about the utilization of the knowledge gained for the conduct of life. With this in mind, he stated at the beginning of his comment on Epictetus that the Stoic's handbook is aimed at readers who not only want to take note of the content, but are also prepared to be moved by the words and the advice in their lives to implement. The goal is to make the soul so free that it no longer fears anything, does not allow itself to be troubled by anything and cannot be overwhelmed by anything below it. In this way she would achieve the natural state that was intended for her within the framework of the world order. For Simplikios this goal was also the guiding principle of his own work as a commentator. He wanted to bring Epictet's stoic guide to a philosophical life closer to his readers, who were influenced by the Platonic-Aristotelian way of thinking. He placed particular emphasis on providing reasons and making the sense and use of Epictetus' rules and warnings understandable.

Simplikios placed great emphasis on the distinction between what is in the power of man and falls within his responsibility, and what one has no access and influence on. The distinction between “what is up to us” (ta eph 'hēmín) and everything else was the basis of Epictet's ethical program. Epictetus demanded full concentration on the only essential own area of ​​responsibility, which must be recognized at all times. Simplikios saw his task as a commentator in helping the reader to a more precise understanding of what “is up to us”. He was concerned with matters about which the soul can make free decisions. He is convinced that this is the only area in which a good life is good and a bad life bad. When the soul is active according to its own nature, it is free and able to make self-determined and self-beneficial choices. Then she decides according to a criterion that lies within herself and corresponds to her good nature. In contrast to inanimate bodies, it is self-moving and therefore the cause of its own movements and activities. Therefore it can turn to the one and good, which is its origin, on its own strength and then act accordingly. For this it is necessary that it makes itself independent of the movements that are initiated from outside. But opinions and activities of the soul that are stimulated or influenced from outside are not to be regarded as something foreign, but as something of their own, because it is the soul itself that has made that which comes from outside its own; it is then their own movement. All of her impulses come from within, as opposed to being pushed from outside.

Simplikios responded to objections that can be raised against this concept. He dealt with deterministic and fatalistic notions, according to which “what is up to us” does not exist because human action is determined by coincidences or necessities and not by free will .

Following Epiktet's advice to pursue the goal uncompromisingly, Simplikios said that one should approach it with full seriousness and not casually. Epiketet's view was that in practicing a reasonable, virtuous demeanor, a moderate approach was not appropriate for beginners. Rather, a philosophy student should radically turn away from his previous questionable habits in order to concentrate fully on his set goal. One should start with small things, but be consistent in doing so. Aristotle had already recommended that undesirable character traits should be dealt with harshly at first; Later, when the pupil had gained insight and had developed his character well, he could soften the initial severity again without falling victim to temptation. Simplikios agreed in principle with these considerations, but distanced himself from the demands of radical stoicism, which he considered unrealistic. He stated that no one could completely switch off his desires. He considered acting too quickly to be harmful. According to his teaching, irrational aspirations should not be suppressed or even destroyed. Rather, what matters is that they submit to the rule of reason and thus take their appropriate place. Here Simplikios took up Plato's metaphor of the “child in us”. The "child" in the adult stands for the irrational that makes itself felt in the life of the soul. It is at the mercy of senseless impulses, strives unbridled for sensual pleasure and develops unnecessary fear due to wrong ideas. According to the Platonic understanding, this child should not be killed, but taught and trained. Simplikios found that education ( Paideia ) is mainly “the improvement of the child in us through the educator in us”.

reception

middle Ages

Arabic speaking area

In the Arabic-speaking world, Simplikios was known as Sinbilīqiyūs . At least the commentaries on the categories and on the first book of Euclid's Elements have been translated into Arabic; in 987 the scholar Ibn an-Nadīm mentioned them in his Kitāb al-Fihrist . He mentioned the name of Simplikios among mathematicians and astronomers, but also attributed a commentary on De anima to him, which had been translated into Old Syrian and is also available in an Arabic version. The Persian mathematician an-Nayrīzī , who was active in Baghdad in the late 9th century, had already quoted the Euclid commentary extensively in his own commentary on the elements . The writer Ibn al-Qifṭī (1172-1248), who treated Simplikios in his manual on the history of science, relied on the information given by Ibn an-Nadīms . He also referred to him as a mathematician and also claimed that he was respected and had successors who were named after him, so there was a Simplikios school.

The philosopher al-Fārābī , who died in 950 and a keen exploiter of ancient thought, used the categories comment without ever naming the author. He shared the harmonizing view of the Simplikios. The philosopher Averroes (Ibn Rušd, 1126–1198), in whose works there are numerous correspondences with texts of Simplikios, never mentioned the Neoplatonist. He was so familiar with his arguments against Philoponus that research suggests that he had access to material from the Physics Commentary.

Western and Central Europe

In the 12th century, Gerhard von Cremona translated the Euclidean commentary an-Nayrīzīs into Latin. This also made the Simplikios quotes contained therein known in the West. Gerhard gave the name of the philosopher again as Sambelichius . Around the middle of the 13th century, Albert the Great used Gerhard's translation for his own Euclid Commentary, including material from Simplikios.

The Latin- speaking late medieval scholars of Western and Central Europe had only two writings by Simplikios: the commentaries on the categories and on About Heaven, which Wilhelm von Moerbeke had translated into Latin. Moerbeke completed the translation of the category commentary in March 1266, that of the commentary on Über den Himmel in June 1271. Even earlier - in the period 1235–1253 - Robert Grosseteste had made a partial translation of the commentary on Über den Himmel . The commentary on the categories was used by numerous scholars of the late 13th and 14th centuries, including Thomas Aquinas , Heinrich von Gent , Aegidius Romanus, and Johannes Duns Scotus , and it had a powerful impact. Thomas joined the harmonizing interpretation of the relationship between Plato and Aristotle, represented by Simplikios. In his commentary on Above Heaven, Petrus de Alvernia used an abundance of material from the relevant work of his ancient predecessor, and Heinrich Bate , in his large handbook Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium (mirrors of divine things and certain natural things), partly agreed and partly rejected on theses that Simplikios had presented in his commentary on Over the sky . Duns Scotus found it necessary to point out that the judgment of reason deserves a higher rank than the authority of Simplicios. From this it can be seen that the Aristotle commentary on Simplikios enjoyed an extraordinary reputation.

One page of the copy of Simplikios' commentary on the physics of Aristotle made by Theodora Rhaulaina between 1261 and 1282 . Moscow, State Historical Museum, Codex 3649, fol. 221r

Byzantine Empire

The Byzantine princess Theodora Rhaulaina, a niece of Emperor Michael VIII , copied Simplikios' physics commentary in the period 1261–1282 . This codex, which is particularly important from a text-critical point of view, has been preserved and is now in the History Museum in Moscow.

The Byzantine philosopher Georgios Gemistos Plethon († 1452), a Platonist and opponent of Aristotelianism, disapproved of the harmonization of Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy pursued by Simplikios. He claimed that Simplikios had only undertaken this to contrast an alleged unity of the pagan philosophers favorably with the disputes among Christians. But he did not come up with anything convincing.

Early modern age

Aristotle commentaries

One page of the humanistic copy of the physics commentary by Simplikios, made in 1441/1443 . Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale , Gr. 1908, fol. 213v

In the 15th century the original Greek texts became accessible to humanists . Johannes Argyropulos , a Byzantine humanist living in Italy, and Palla Strozzi made a copy of the physics commentary in 1441/1443 . Cardinal Bessarion (1403–1472), one of the leading humanists of his time, studied the commentary on Over Heaven . He had access to two manuscripts and sought text criticism. The scholar Zacharias Kallierges from Crete edited the category commentary in Venice in 1499 . The first edition of the Physics Commentary was published in 1526 as Aldine by Gian Francesco d'Asola. In January 1527, d'Asola published the first Greek edition of the Commentary on On Heaven ; However, this was not the original text, but a reverse translation of Moerbeke's Latin version. It was not until 1865 that the first edition of the original Greek text was published. The De anima commentary was still generally regarded as the work of Simplikios, although the Averroist Francesco Piccolomini († 1604) advocated the inauthenticity in his De anima commentary published in 1602 . The first edition appeared in Venice in 1527. The main role in the early modern reception of Simplikios' Aristotle commentary was not played by the Greek text editions, but by the humanistic translations into Latin. In the 1540s, Latin translations of all surviving Aristotle commentaries were first printed; a number of other prints followed in the course of the sixteenth century, testifying to the continuing interest of scholars in these works.

The justification of the harmonizing (“concordist”) interpretation of the history of philosophy by the late ancient Neo-Platonists, with whom Simplikios particularly excelled, was discussed controversially. The influence of current ideological contradictions became noticeable: the concordist humanist Agostino Steuco (1497–1548) defended Simplikios, while the averroist Marco Antonio Zimara, an older contemporary of Steuco, and the anti-platonic Jesuit Benedictus Pererius (Benedetto Pereira; † 1610) tried to refute the concordism of the Neoplatonist. The concordism in the De anima commentary attributed to Simplikios was emphatically opposed by the Aristotelian Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589), who opposed the Platonization of Aristotle.

The commentary on De anima, believed to be authentic, played an important role in the debates of the sixteenth century on intellectual doctrine. Averroistic-minded scholars referred to Simplikios, in which they saw a representative of the Averroistic doctrine of the unity and uniqueness of the intellect. They said the position of the Simplikios essentially coincides with that of the Averroes. These Averroists were called followers of the Simplikios or "Simplikians" (Simpliciani) . The most famous spokesman for the Simplikians was Marco Antonio Genua († 1563), who taught in Padua, a stronghold of Averroism.

In his Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (Dialogue on the Two Most Important World Systems), published in 1632 , in which he opposed the Copernican system to the Ptolemaic system, Galileo Galilei had three participants in the conversation, including a consistent Aristotelian who defended the Ptolemaic system and the he called Simplicio . He was referring to the ancient Aristotle commentator.

Epictetus Commentary

The interest in the commentary on Epictetus by Simplikios first arose in the vicinity of Bessarion, whose pupil Niccolò Perotti translated the introduction to this work into Latin and preceded his translation of the manual, which he dedicated to Pope Nicholas V in 1451 . Angelo Poliziano used the commentary in 1479 to defend the handbook against criticism by Bartolomeo Scala. He also used it for his Latin translation of the handbook . Despite the early interest of humanist circles in commenting on Epictetus from late antiquity, the first edition was not published until 1528 in Venice. In his De perenni philosophia (On Eternal Philosophy) published in 1540, Agostino Steuco often referred to the Simplikios script. Although he rejected Christianity, but miraculously taught the same thing about God as the Bible. His conception of the good, of free will, providence and the task of the soul was consistent with the Christian one. Steuco could only explain this with the assumption that Simplikios was influenced by Christian doctrine.

In 1546 the first complete Latin translation of the Commentary on Epictetus appeared in Venice by Angelo Canini (Angelus Caninius); another, made by Hieronymus Wolf , was first printed in Basel in 1563. A new edition of the Greek text, obtained by Daniel Heinsius , appeared in 1639, 1640 and 1646 in Leiden.

In the 17th century the commentary on Epictetus was noticed by the Cambridge Platonists : John Smith found confirmation of his convictions in it and Ralph Cudworth dealt with the work of Simplikios. Cudworth saw the ancient philosopher as an important authority, but took a more critical stance than Smith.

Modern

For Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , Simplikios was "the most learned and astute of the Greek commentators on Aristotle". In Hegel's time, as he had to tell his listeners, “several” of the works of the Neo-Platonist were still unprinted. The first modern critical edition of the Aristotle's commentaries by Simplikios was not started until 1882 by the Berlin Academy of Sciences ; The last volume appeared in 1907. The project was under the direction of Hermann Diels . At that time, the commentaries were valued primarily as sources for the history of philosophy of earlier epochs and for the ancient reception of Aristotle. From this point of view, the renowned Graecist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff judged that the “excellent Simplikios” was “a good man” and that the world could never thank him enough for the preservation of fragments from lost older works. The philosophical contribution of the Simplikios received less attention; the disdain for late ancient Neo-Platonism, which was disreputable as too speculative, which was widespread in the 19th and early 20th centuries, stood in the way of an impartial assessment. In the second half of the 20th century, however, research into his teaching intensified. Since then, his comprehensive synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas has been recognized as a significant achievement. The modesty of his behavior as a scientist is also recognized.

Eduard Zeller (1903) found the commentaries “the work of great diligence and extensive learning” and offered a “careful and mostly sensible explanation” of the texts presented. However, the denial of the considerable contradictions between Aristotle and Plato is completely wrong. Simplikios hardly produced an original philosophical achievement, but was only "the thinking processor of a given teaching that has come to its conclusion in all essential relationships". Karl Praechter (1927) judged that Simplikios was one of the most attractive phenomena of the late antiquity due to its "mutual complementation and tempering of the Platonic and Aristotelian way of thinking". His "love for solid learning both in the philosophical and philological-literary field as in that of the exact sciences" is to be appreciated.

Richard Sorabji (1987) paid tribute to the Simplikios idea that physical reality should be understood as an extension endowed with properties. This concept was trend-setting; it is a forerunner of a modern understanding of physical conditions. There is a parallel here to the thinking of Albert Einstein , who also favored this way of looking at the physical world. Albrecht Dihle (1989) praised the “sometimes very astute interpretations of the Aristotelian texts”. Jens Halfwassen (2004) emphasized that the Aristotle commentaries combined "an immense wealth of information about the entire ancient philosophy" with "philological care and a high philosophical level". However, as a speculative thinker, Simplikios was clearly inferior to Damascius.

Text editions and translations

Critical editions (partly with translation)

Aristotle commentaries

• Hermann Diels (Ed.): Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria (= Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , Vol. 9). Georg Reimer, Berlin 1882
• Hermann Diels (Ed.): Simplicii in Aristotelis physicorum libros quattuor posteriores commentaria (= Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , Vol. 10). Georg Reimer, Berlin 1895
• Michael Hayduck (Ed.): Simplicii in libros Aristotelis de anima commentaria (= Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , Vol. 11). Georg Reimer, Berlin 1882 (wrongly attributed to Simplikios according to a widespread research opinion)
• Johan L. Heiberg (Ed.): Simplicii in Aristotelis de caelo commentaria (= Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , Vol. 7). Georg Reimer, Berlin 1894
• Karl Kalbfleisch (Ed.): Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium (= Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca , Vol. 8). Georg Reimer, Berlin 1907

Epictetus Commentary

• Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète . Brill, Leiden 1996, ISBN 90-04-09772-4
• Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète . Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001 ff. (With French translation)
  • Volume 1: Chapitres I – XXIX , 2001, ISBN 2-251-00493-9

Translations

German

• Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: About time. A commentary on the Corollarium de tempore . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, ISBN 3-525-25166-1 , pp. 140-174 (translation of the Corollarium de tempore ; online )

English

• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 1-4 , translated by Michael Chase, Duckworth, London 2003, ISBN 0-7156-3197-7
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 5-6 , translated by Frans AJ de Haas and Barrie Fleet, Duckworth, London 2001, ISBN 0-7156-3037-7
• Simplicius: On Aristotle's "Categories 7-8" , translated by Barrie Fleet, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 2002, ISBN 0-8014-3839-X
• Simplicius: On Aristotle's "Categories 9-15" , translated by Richard Gaskin, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 2000, ISBN 0-8014-3691-5
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1-4 , translated by Robert J. Hankinson, Duckworth, London 2002, ISBN 0-7156-3070-9
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2–3 , translated by Ian Mueller, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5791-9
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3-4 , translated by Ian Mueller, Bristol Classical Press, London 2011, ISBN 978-0-7156-4063-0
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5-9 , translated by Robert J. Hankinson, Duckworth, London 2004, ISBN 0-7156-3231-0
• Simplicius: On Aristotle's "On the Heavens 1.10-12" , translated by Robert J. Hankinson, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 2006, ISBN 0-8014-4216-8
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1-9 , translated by Ian Mueller, Duckworth, London 2004, ISBN 0-7156-3200-0
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.10-14 , translated by Ian Mueller, Duckworth, London 2005, ISBN 0-7156-3342-2
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.1-7 , translated by Ian Mueller, Bloomsbury, London 2009, ISBN 978-1-4725-5784-1
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.7–4.6 , translated by Ian Mueller, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5785-8
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 1.3–4 , translated by Pamela Huby and Christopher CW Taylor, Bloomsbury, London 2011, ISBN 978-0-7156-3921-4
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 1.5–9 , translated by Han Baltussen et al., Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5786-5
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 2 , translated by Barrie Fleet, Duckworth, London 1997, ISBN 0-7156-2732-5
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 3 , translated by James O. Urmson , Duckworth, London 2002, ISBN 0-7156-3067-9
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 4.1-5, 10-14 , translated by James O. Urmson, Duckworth, London 1992, ISBN 0-7156-2434-2
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 5 , translated by James O. Urmson, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5846-6
• Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics 6 , translated by David Konstan , Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY) 1989, ISBN 0-8014-2238-8
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 7 , translated by Charles Hagen, Duckworth, London 1994, ISBN 0-7156-2485-7
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.1–5 , translated by István Bodnár, Michael Chase and Michael Share, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-3917-5
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.6-10 , translated by Richard McKirahan, Duckworth, London 2001, ISBN 0-7156-3039-3
• Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time , translated by James O. Urmson, Duckworth, London 1992, ISBN 0-7156-2252-8
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1–2.4 , translated by James O. Urmson, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5843-5 (commentary on De anima , the authenticity of which is disputed)
• Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, with 'Simplicius': On Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5–12 , translated by Pamela Huby and Carlos Steel, Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-4725-5847-3 (commentary on De anima , the authenticity of which is disputed)
• Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1–5 , translated by Henry J. Blumenthal , Bloomsbury, London 2013, ISBN 978-0-7156-2896-6 (commentary on De anima , the authenticity of which is disputed)
• 'Simplicius': On Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6-13 , translated by Carlos Steel, Bristol Classical Press, London 2013, ISBN 978-1-78093-208-8 (commentary on De anima , the authenticity of which is disputed)
• Simplicius: On Epictetus, Handbook 1-26 , translated by Charles Brittain and Tad Brennan , Duckworth, London 2002, ISBN 0-7156-3068-7
• Simplicius: On Epictetus, Handbook 27-53 , translated by Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain, Duckworth, London 2002, ISBN 0-7156-3069-5

French

• Simplicius: Commentaire on the Catégories. Traduction commentée , translated by Ilsetraut Hadot, Brill, Leiden 1990
  • Fascicule 1: Introduction, première partie , ISBN 90-04-09015-0
  • Fascicule 3: Préambule aux Catégories. Commentaire au premier chapitre des Catégories , ISBN 90-04-09016-9
• Simplicius: Commentaire on the Catégories d'Aristote. Chapitres 2 à 4 , translated by Philippe Hoffmann, commented by Concetta Luna , Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001, ISBN 2-251-18001-X

Arabic (medieval)

• Rüdiger Arnzen (ed.): Abu l-Abbas to-Nayrīzīs excerpts from Simplicius' commentary on the definitions, postulates and axioms in Euclid's Elementa I (Ps .-?) . Self-published, Cologne 2002, ISBN 3-00-009172-6

Latin (medieval)

• Simplicius: Commentaire on the Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke , ed. by Adriaan Pattin, 1971–1975 (critical edition)
  • Volume 1. Publications Universitaires, Louvain 1971
  • Volume 2. Brill, Leiden 1975, ISBN 90-04-04250-4
• Simplicius: Commentaire sur le traité Du ciel d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. University Press, Leuven 2004 ff. (Critical edition)
  • Volume 1, ed. by Fernand Bossier , 2004, ISBN 90-5867-404-5

Latin (humanistic)

• Simplicius: Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis. Translated by Guillelmus Dorotheus. Reprint of the Venice 1540 edition , ed. by Rainer Thiel and Charles Lohr, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1999, ISBN 3-7728-1220-1 (with introduction)

literature

Overview representations

• Han Baltussen: Simplikios. In: Christoph Riedweg et al. (Ed.): Philosophy of the Imperial Era and Late Antiquity (= Outline of the history of philosophy . The philosophy of antiquity. Volume 5/3). Schwabe, Basel 2018, ISBN 978-3-7965-3700-4 , pp. 2060-2084, 2174-2181
• Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity , Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-19484-6 , pp. 711–732, 1137– 1143
• Richard Goulet, Elisa Coda: Simplicius de Cilicie. In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. Volume 6, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2016, ISBN 978-2-271-08989-2 , pp. 341–394, 1273–1275

Collection of articles

• Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie . De Gruyter, Berlin 1987, ISBN 3-11-010924-7

Investigations on individual topics

• Han Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator. Duckworth, London 2008, ISBN 978-0-7156-3500-1
• Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. In Defense of a Heresy. Brill, Leiden / Boston 2013, ISBN 978-90-04-22708-8
• Pantelis Golitsis: Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote. Tradition et innovation. De Gruyter, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-11-019541-5
• Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: About time. A commentary on the Corollarium de tempore (= Hypomnemata , No. 70). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, ISBN 3-525-25166-1 (Dissertation University of Zurich 1979; online )
• Philippe Soulier: Simplicius et l'infini. Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2014, ISBN 978-2-251-42016-5
• Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Simplikios' Commentary on Epictet's Handbook of Morals. Winter, Heidelberg 2013, ISBN 978-3-8253-6266-9 ( review by John Dillon)

Web links

• Literature by and about Simplikios in the catalog of the German National Library
• Categories - Commentary by Simplikios (Greek; digitized version of the first edition, Venice 1499)
• Christoph Helmig :  Simplicius. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Remarks

1. ↑ Agathias , Historien 2,30,3.
2. ↑ See Richard Sorabji : Divine names and sordid deals in Ammonius' Alexandria . In: Andrew Smith (Ed.): The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Swansea 2005, pp. 203-213.
3. ↑ Johannes Malalas , Chronicles 18:47; on text transmission, see Edward Watts: Justinian, Malalas, and the End of Athenian Philosophical Teaching in AD 529 . In: The Journal of Roman Studies 94, 2004, pp. 168–182, here: 171 f .; on dating and background James Allan Stewart Evans: The Age of Justinian. London 1996, pp. 67-71.
4. ↑ For the dating see Udo Hartmann : Geist im Exil. Roman philosophers at the court of the Sasanids . In: Monika Schuol et al. (Ed.): Border crossing. Forms of contact between Orient and Occident in antiquity , Stuttgart 2002, pp. 123–160, here: 135–138; Ilsetraut Hadot: Dans quel lieu le neoplatonicien Simplicius at-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen? In: The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1, 2007, pp. 42-107, here: 44-49.
5. ↑ Agathias, Historien 2,30,3–4.
6. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot: The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources . In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence , 2nd, revised edition, London 2016, pp. 295–326, here: 306.
7. ↑ Agathias, Historien 2,30,5-2,31,9. For the background, see Rainer Thiel: Simplikios and the end of the Neoplatonic school in Athens. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 18-24; Udo Hartmann: Spirit in Exile. Roman philosophers at the court of the Sasanids . In: Monika Schuol u. a. (Ed.): Crossing borders. Forms of contact between Orient and Occident in antiquity. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 123-160, here: 149-154.
8. ↑ An overview of the older research discussion is provided by Philippe Hoffmann: Damascius . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Vol. 2, Paris 1994, pp. 541-593, here: 562 f. See also Paul Foulkes: Where was Simplicius? In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies 112, 1992, p. 143 and Udo Hartmann: Geist im Exil. Roman philosophers at the court of the Sasanids . In: Monika Schuol u. a. (Ed.): Crossing borders. Forms of contact between Orient and Occident in antiquity. Stuttgart 2002, pp. 123-160, here: 138 f. Tardieu's hypothesis is supported. a. by Ilsetraut Hadot: Dans quel lieu le neoplatonicien Simplicius at-il fondé son école de mathématiques, et où a pu avoir lieu son entretien avec un manichéen? In: The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 1, 2007, pp. 42-107, Polymnia Athanassiadi : Persecution and response in late paganism: the evidence of Damascius . In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies 113, 1993, pp. 1–29, here: 24–29, Rainer Thiel: Simplikios and the end of the Neoplatonic school in Athens. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 42-55, Richard Sorabji: Introduction . In: Robert J. Hankinson (translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1-4. London 2002, p. 4 f. and - after previous doubts - Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 711–732, here: 712 (cf. Han Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. London 2008 , Pp. 48-51). Negative comments include: Robin Lane Fox : Harran, the Sabians and the late Platonist 'movers'. In: Andrew Smith (Ed.): The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Swansea 2005, pp. 231-244, Pantelis Golitsis: Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote. Berlin 2008, p. 20 f. and Concetta Luna: Review by Rainer Thiel: Simplikios and the end of the Neoplatonic school in Athens . In: Mnemosyne 54, 2001, pp. 482-504; Edward Watts: Where to Live the Philosophical Life in the Sixth Century? Damascius, Simplicius, and the Return from Persia. In: Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 45, 2005, pp. 285-315.
9. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, pp. 8-24; Philippe Hoffmann: Les bibliothèques philosophiques d'après le témoignage de la littérature néoplatonicienne des V ^e et VI ^e siècles . In: Cristina D'Ancona (Ed.): The Libraries of the Neoplatonists. Leiden 2007, pp. 135–153, here: 141–144.
10. ↑ Simplikios, In De caelo 26.17-19. See Rainer Thiel: Simplikios and the end of the Neoplatonic school in Athens. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 28-30.
11. ↑ Pantelis Golitsis: Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Physique d'Aristote. Berlin 2008, p. 19.
12. ↑ An introduction is provided by Richard Sorabji: Introduction. In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, pp. 1-10.
13. ^ Rainer Thiel: Stoic ethics and neo-Platonic virtue theory . In: Therese Fuhrer , Michael Erler (ed.): On the reception of Hellenistic philosophy in late antiquity. Stuttgart 1999, pp. 93-103, here: 101 f.
14. ^ Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 711-732, here: 715 f., 725 f.
15. ↑ Michael Chase (translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, Categories 1–4. London 2003, p. 8.
16. ↑ Simplikios, In Categorias 7.23-29.
17. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 991, 27-29.
18. ↑ See the approach of the Simplikios Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 711–732, here: 715 f .; Han Baltussen: Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority . In: Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, pp. 121-136.
19. ↑ Edition: Rüdiger Arnzen (Ed.): Abū l-ʻAbbās an-Nayrīzīs excerpts from (Ps .-?) Simplicius' commentary on the definitions, postulates and axioms in Euclids Elementa I. Cologne 2002; Arnzen considers the authenticity to be uncertain, see p. XXXVI and note 22. English translation: Anthony Lo Bello: The Commentary of al-Nayrizi on Book I of Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Boston / Leiden 2003, pp. 86-203 and Anthony Lo Bello: The Commentary of al-Nayrizi on Books II-IV of Euclid's Elements of Geometry. With a Translation of That Portion of Book I Missing from MS Leiden Or. 399.1 but Present in the Newly Discovered Qom Manuscript Edited by Rüdiger Arnzen. Leiden 2009, pp. 1-19. See Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète , Leiden 1996, p. 5 and note 14 and Abdelhamid I. Sabra : Simplicius's Proof of Euclid's Parallels Postulate . In: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 32, 1969, pp. 1-24.
20. ↑ This comment is quoted in a library catalog from the 14th century, see Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p. 6 note 20.
21. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète, Vol. 1, Paris 2001, p. XXXIX; Ilsetraut Hadot: The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources . In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence , 2nd revised edition, London 2016, pp. 295–326, here: 316–318.
22. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot: The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources . In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence , 2nd, revised edition, London 2016, pp. 295–326, here: 316f., 319–323; Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p. 6 note 17; Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète, Vol. 1, Paris 2001, pp. XXV – XXXVIII.
23. ^ Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée, translated by André-Jean Festugière , vol. 1, Paris 1966, p. 230, note 5 (Greek text and French translation).
24. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot: The life and work of Simplicius in Greek and Arabic sources . In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence , 2nd, revised edition, London 2016, pp. 295–326, here: 312–316 (cf. pp. XXXII f.); Ilsetraut Hadot: Simplicius or Priscianus? On the Author of the Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima (CAG XI): A Methodological Study . In: Mnemosyne 55, 2002, pp. 159-199.
25. ↑ Matthias Perkams provides a research overview: Priscien de Lydie. In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Vol. 5, Part 2, Paris 2012, pp. 1514–1521, here: 1517–1521.
26. ^ Carlos Steel: Introduction. In: Pamela Huby, Carlos Steel (translator): Priscian: On Theophrastus on Sense-Perception, with 'Simplicius': On Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5–12. London 2014, pp. 105-140.
27. ↑ Matthias Perkams: Priscian of Lydia, Commentator on the De anima in the tradition of Iamblichus . In: Mnemosyne 58, 2005, pp. 510-530; Matthias Perkams: Self- Confidence in Late Antiquity. Berlin 2008, pp. 149–153.
28. ↑ John F. Finamore, John M. Dillon (Eds.): Iamblichus De anima , Leiden 2002, pp. 18-24.
29. ^ Henry J. Blumenthal (translator): "Simplicius": On Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1-5. London 2000, pp. 1-7.
30. ↑ Pamela Huby: Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his life, writings, thought and influence. Commentary, Vol. 4: Psychology (Texts 265-327). Leiden 1999, p. 65.
31. ^ Marwan Rashed: Traces d'un commentaire de Simplicius sur la Métaphysique à Byzance? In: Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 84, 2000, pp. 275-284.
32. ↑ Sascha Salatowsky: De Anima. Amsterdam 2006, p. 17.
33. ^ Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 711-732, here: 715-717, 720, 725 f .; Constance Blackwell: Neo-Platonic modes of concordism versus definitions of difference . In: Stephen Clucas u. a. (Ed.): Laus Platonici Philosophi. Leiden 2011, pp. 317-342, here: 322-324; Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : Platonism in antiquity, Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, pp. 248-250; Rachel Barney: Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority . In: Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, pp. 101–119.
34. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 773.
35. ^ Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 14 f., 27–38.
36. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 601,26-603,22.
37. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 604.12-605.5.
38. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 608, 4-5.
39. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 623.1-19.
40. ↑ On this teaching see Gerard Verbeke : Place and Space after Aristotle and Simplikios. A philosophical topology . In: Johannes Irmscher , Reimar Müller (ed.): Aristotle as a philosophy of science. Berlin 1983, pp. 113-122, here: 118-122; Richard Sorabji: Introduction . In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, pp. 1-10, here 1-5.
41. ^ Richard Sorabji: Infinity and the Creation . In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science. London 1987, pp. 164-178; Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 11-14; Philippe Hoffmann: Simplicius' Polemics. In: Richard Sorabji (Ed.): Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science. London 1987, pp. 57-83.
42. ^ Alan C. Bowen: Simplicius on the Planets and Their Motions. Leiden 2013, pp. 38–52.
43. ^ Frans AJ de Haas: Mathematics and Phenomena. A polemic about scientific method in Simplikios . In: Ancient natural science and their reception 10, 2000, pp. 107–129.
44. ↑ See also Barbara Botter: Il "ricettacolo" di materia e spazio in Timeo 48e – 53b . In: Carlo Natali, Stefano Maso (eds.): Plato physicus. Amsterdam 2003, pp. 165-187; Dana R. Miller: The Third Kind in Plato's Timaeus. Göttingen 2003, pp. 19-36. Cf. Thomas Kjeller Johansen: Plato's natural philosophy. Cambridge 2004, pp. 127-132.
45. ↑ See Richard Sorabji: Simplicius: Prime matter as extension . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 148-165, here: 148-153.
46. ↑ See Richard Sorabji: Simplicius: Prime matter as extension . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 148-165, here: 148-155.
47. ↑ Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: About the time. Göttingen 1982, pp. 63-79; Hubert Meyer: The Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios and the Aporias of Aristotle at the time. Meisenheim 1969, pp. 132-134.
48. ↑ Simplikios, In physica 696,24; 700.1-3; 773: 16-19; 795.29 f. On the problem, see Richard Sorabji: Introduction. In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, p. 5 f .; Hubert Meyer: The Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios and the Aporias of Aristotle at the time. Meisenheim 1969, pp. 163-171; Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: About time. Göttingen 1982, p. 130 f.
49. ^ Richard Sorabji: Introduction. In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, pp. 7-9.
50. ↑ Irma Croese: Simplicius on Continuous and Instantaneous Change. Utrecht 1998, pp. 87-120, 151-167.
51. ↑ Hubert Meyer: The Corollarium de Tempore des Simplikios and the Aporias of Aristotle at the time. Meisenheim 1969, pp. 229-236.
52. ↑ Erwin Sonderegger: Simplikios: About the time. A commentary on the Corollarium de tempore. Göttingen 1982, pp. 130, 132 f., 135-137; Richard Sorabji: Introduction. In: James O. Urmson (translator): Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time. London 1992, pp. 7-9.
53. ↑ Simplikios, In enchiridion Epicteti 35.90-91.
54. ↑ Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p. 140.
55. ↑ Christian Vogel: Stoic ethics and platonic education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 269-272.
56. ↑ See the argumentation of Simplikios Christian Vogel: Stoic ethics and platonic education. Heidelberg 2013, p. 267 f .; Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, pp. 118-128, 140-144; Ilsetraut Hadot: The refutation of Manichaeism in the commentary on Epictetus of Simplikios . In: Archive for the History of Philosophy 51, 1969, pp. 31–57, here: 35–45, 54–56.
57. ↑ Christian Vogel: Stoic ethics and platonic education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 177 f., 185–190, 216 f., 272 f .; Ian Mueller (translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3–4. London 2011, pp. 2, 7; Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, p. 91.
58. ↑ See for this classification Christian Vogel: Stoic ethics and platonic education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 107–111, 273 f .; Ilsetraut Hadot (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Leiden 1996, pp. 84-86, 91 f.
59. ↑ See Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 81–89, 360–365.
60. ↑ See Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 96–124.
61. ↑ See Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 111-120.
62. ^ Plato, Phaedo 77e.
63. ↑ Simplikios, In enchiridion Epicteti 249.70 f. See Christian Vogel: Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education. Heidelberg 2013, pp. 124-129, 137-141, 161-164, 200-202.
64. ↑ Helmut Gätje : Simplikios in the Arabic tradition . In: Islam. Journal for the History and Culture of the Islamic Orient 59, 1982, pp. 6-31.
65. ↑ Michael Chase: The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī . In: Lloyd A. Newton: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories. Leiden 2008, pp. 9–29, here: 11 f., 17–19.
66. ↑ Michael Chase: Simplicius 'response to Philoponus' attacks on Aristotle's Physics 8.1 . In: István Bodnár u. a. (Translator): Simplicius: On Aristotle, Physics 8.1-5. London 2014, pp. 1–16, here: 10–12.
67. ^ Critical edition of the Latin text of Gerhard's translation: Paul M. J. E. Tummers (Ed.): The Latin translation of Anaritius' Commentary on Euclid's Elements of Geometry Books I – IV. Nijmegen 1994 (Book I: pp. 1-72).
68. ↑ On Albert's comment, the authenticity of which has been contested, see Anthony Lo Bello: The Commentary of Albertus Magnus on Book I of Euclid's Elements of Geometry. Boston / Leiden 2003, pp. XIV – XXIII.
69. ↑ Fernand Bossier: Traductions latines et influences du commentaire In De caelo en Occident (XIIIe – XIVe s.) . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 289-325, here: 289-293.
70. ↑ Michael Chase: The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the Categories: Thomas Aquinas and al-Fārābī . In: Lloyd A. Newton: Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories. Leiden 2008, pp. 9-29, here: 11, 13-17; Adriaan Pattin (Ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Vol. 1, Louvain 1971, pp. XVIII – XXIII.
71. ↑ Fernand Bossier: Traductions latines et influences du commentaire In De caelo en Occident (XIIIe – XIVe s.) . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 289-325, here: 308-320.
72. ^ Adriaan Pattin (ed.): Simplicius: Commentaire sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, Vol. 1, Louvain 1971, p. XXI.
73. ↑ Dieter Harlfinger : Some aspects of the handwritten transmission of the physics commentary of Simplikios . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 267-286, here: 267 f.
74. ↑ François Masai: Plethon et le platonisme de Mistra. Paris 1956, p. 183 f.
75. ^ Leonardo Tarán: The text of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Physics. In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 246-266, here: 258 f.
76. ↑ See Néstor-Luis Cordero: Analyze de l'édition aldine du commentaire de Simplicius à la Physique d'Aristote . In: Hermes 105, 1977, pp. 42-54; Néstor-Luis Cordero: Les sources vénitiennes de l'édition aldine du Livre I du Commentaire de Simplicius on the "Physique" d'Aristote . In: Scriptorium 39, 1985, pp. 70-88.
77. ↑ Sascha Salatowsky: De Anima. Amsterdam 2006, p. 76, note 169.
78. ^ Constance Blackwell: Neo-Platonic modes of concordism versus definitions of difference . In: Stephen Clucas u. a. (Ed.): Laus Platonici Philosophi. Leiden 2011, pp. 317–342, here: 319 f.
79. ^ Constance Blackwell: Neo-Platonic modes of concordism versus definitions of difference . In: Stephen Clucas u. a. (Ed.): Laus Platonici Philosophi. Leiden 2011, pp. 317–342, here: 320 f., 325–339.
80. ↑ Sascha Salatowsky: De Anima. Amsterdam 2006, p. 138 f.
81. ↑ For the history of this reception, see the detailed account by Bruno Nardi: Saggi sull'Aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI. Firenze 1958, pp. 365-442. See Carlos Steel: Introduction . In: Carlos Steel (translator): 'Simplicius': On Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6-13. London 2013, p. 29 f.
82. ^ Han Baltussen: Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. London 2008, pp. 3 f., 6.
83. ↑ On Perotti and Poliziano see Pierre Hadot : La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'Épictète du XVe au XVIIe siècles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, Cudworth . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 326-367, here: 327-337.
84. ^ Pierre Hadot: La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'Épictète du XVe au XVIIe siècles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, Cudworth . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 326-367, here: 337-346.
85. ^ Pierre Hadot: La survie du Commentaire de Simplicius sur le Manuel d'Épictète du XVe au XVIIe siècles: Perotti, Politien, Steuchus, John Smith, Cudworth . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 326-367, here: 346-355.
86. ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy I (=  Works, Vol. 18), Frankfurt 1986, p. 191.
87. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff u. a .: The Greek and Latin literature and language. 3rd, improved edition, Leipzig / Berlin 1912, p. 283.
88. ^ Han Baltussen: Simplicius of Cilicia. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 711-732, here: 714, 731 f.
89. ^ Eduard Zeller: The philosophy of the Greeks in their historical development, part 3, section 2, 4th edition, Leipzig 1903, pp. 910-914.
90. ^ Karl Praechter: Simplicius (10) . In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Bd. 3 A / 1, Stuttgart 1927, Sp. 204-213, here: 205, 212.
91. ^ Richard Sorabji: Simplicius: Prime matter as extension . In: Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): Simplicius. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa survie. Berlin 1987, pp. 148-165, here: 153-155.
92. ↑ Albrecht Dihle: The Greek and Latin Literature of the Imperial Era. Munich 1989, p. 503.
93. ↑ Jens Halfwassen: Plotinus and Neo-Platonism. Munich 2004, p. 163.

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