Highstreet Holding

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Highstreet Holding GbR
legal form Society under civil law
founding March 27, 2006
Seat Amsterdam
Branch property

Ownership and liability structure of the Highstreet real estate consortium , 2010

The Highstreet Holding GbR is a real estate consortium whose sole business purpose has been the ownership and leasing of the department stores of the German department store company Karstadt since 2006. According to German law, Highstreet Holding is a company under civil law (GbR) with a business address in Amsterdam without its own employees. The company name (company) Highstreet is borrowed from the English language and denotes the main shopping street of a town.

In 2010, Highstreet Holding was at the center of one of the most dramatic negotiations in German economic history during the largest insolvency proceedings in German post-war history. The insolvency of Karstadt's holding company Arcandor AG also made it necessary to lower rents, which had to be approved individually by over a hundred creditors. Due to the CMBS securitization form, Highstreet has a fragmented creditor structure. During the lengthy and stressful negotiations, the criticism focused primarily on the High Street consorts. But the CMBS also put additional strain on Karstadt's situation before and during the bankruptcy.

structure

Highstreet consortium leader

On March 27, 2006, the Goldman Sachs real estate company Whitehall became the consortium leader with 51% and took over the sole management authority of the Highstreet Holding over the 49% of KarstadtQuelle AG . On March 19, 2008, the real estate companies of Deutsche Bank RREEF , Generali Real Estate Fund SA, Pirelli RE and Borletti Group (2%) replaced Arcandor AG (until June 30, 2007: KarstadtQuelle AG ) as consorts. The Highstreet Holding GbR is about the Dutch intermediate company High Street Seven BV in turn split into two companies that own the property: High Street A Portfolio GbR with 32 goods and four sports stores and high street B Portfolio GbR with 41 goods and three sports stores. The CMBS bonds in real estate portfolio A belong to Valovis Bank (until March 9, 2007: Karstadt Hypothekenbank AG ) with € 0.85 billion and the bonds in real estate portfolio B belong to the bond creditors of Fleet Street Finance Two (FS2) € 1.12 billion (as of August 2010). Many German finance and real estate companies operate as Dutch “BV” for tax reasons.

As of July 2008, the Highstreet Holding GbR owned and rented a total of 164 properties throughout Germany with a total gross area of ​​3.2 million m² (rental area: 2.1 million m²). At that time, the portfolio comprised 81 department stores, 9 sporting goods stores, 28 parking spaces, 14 office buildings and 32 other assets (with mixed use, retail outlets, logistics, land, etc.). After the bankruptcy from June 2009, department and sports stores were reduced to 86 out of a total of 120 stores due to the closure of unprofitable branches.

history

Karstadt branch Dortmund, Hansaplatz
Karstadt-Sporthaus Hamburg, Mönckebergstrasse

In the spring of 2006, Alexander Dibelius , Germany's managing director of Goldman Sachs , was able to convince the then KarstadtQuelle AG board chairman, Thomas Middelhoff , to renovate KarstadtQuelle AG by selling its department store properties. Goldman Sachs was awarded the contract for the purchase without an invitation to tender, even though over 20 interested parties had already contacted KarstadtQuelle before the official start of the auction . To justify his preference for Goldman Sachs , Middelhoff stated: “They were much faster and more committed than other banks. You don't forget something like that. ”The KarstadtQuelle properties became the subject of one of the largest European property sales ever and was therefore called a“ monster deal ”.

For this purpose, Dibelius founded the real estate consortium Highstreet through the Goldman Sachs real estate company Whitehall , in which Whitehall holds 51% shares. On March 27, 2006, he had Highstreet buy the first tranche of 51% of the Karstadt department stores for 3.7 billion euros. In addition to paying the rent, Karstadt undertook to take over all renovation work on the branch buildings itself. Goldman Sachs / Whitehall received fees of 32 million euros for this. According to the Handelsimmobilien Report , Goldman Sachs planned to sell its Highstreet shares in the summer of 2007 , but the subprime crisis that began in July 2007 prevented the planned sale.

The US real estate crisis also made it difficult to sell more department stores. It was not until March 19, 2008 that Arcandor AG (until June 30, 2007 KarstadtQuelle AG ), advising the banking house NM Rothschild & Sons, sold its 49% stake to Highstreet Holding for 800 million euros, the total of 86 (from then 133, today : 120) Department stores and sports stores rented to Arcandor again . The 49% Arcandor share was taken over by the real estate companies of Deutsche Bank RREEF , Generali Real Estate Fund SA, Pirelli RE and the Borletti Group (2%). The rents were fixed for 15 years and should rise to around 160 million euros for the coming years, "for individual branches up to 20 percent of sales."

Valuation of the real estate

In the 2003 financial year, the book value of the 190 department stores and other warehouses from Karstadt , Quelle and SinnLeffers & Co. totaled 2.8 billion euros. The market value, on the other hand, was 4.7 billion euros, according to the then chairman of the board, Christoph Achenbach. A total rental of all properties would have brought Karstadt only two thirds of the estimated market value, since investment companies such as Cerberus and Blackstone often do not offer more than 60 percent of the market value.

In the mid-2000s, the real estate boom reached its peak and the then chairman of the board, Middelhoff, was confirmed by the finance and real estate industry that the boom had been cleverly exploited to sell Karstadt's real estate . Middelhoff was able to achieve a purchase price totaling 4.5 billion euros. The purchase price was checked by the investment bank NM Rothschild & Sons for 7.5 million euros and found to be cheap, although the price was "significantly higher" than the book value . NM Rothschild & Sons had already subjected KarstadtQuelle's finances to a thorough economic viability check in June 2004 before giving the Debt Advisory on the sale of Arcandor's 49 percent stake to Highstreet . With Karstadt's precise knowledge of the market and book values , the bank found itself in a conflict of interest between the interests of advice and a neutral examination. The British investment bank has been pushing harder into the German market since the mid-2000s.

Use of CMBS

Structure of a “true sale securitization” at CMBS

In order not to have to finance the purchase sum of € 4.5 billion minus the commissions exclusively yourself, Goldman Sachs and two years later the other four syndicates issued bonds and took out loans amounting to around 90% of the purchase price. The buildings, which are all in prime locations , serve as collateral for the bonds .

Whitehall chose Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) as a refinancing tool. The CMBS's receivables and liabilities were transferred to the special purpose vehicle Fleet Street Finance Two PLC , based in Ireland. Fleet Street Finance Two holds a bond of € 1.12 billion. This group, also known internally as Senior B , should include around 200 different investors ( bond holders ). According to Real Estate Capital , there are only 50 bond holders , but many other figures in this magazine also differ from the known data. Bondholders with a large stake are Goldman Sachs with around 10% of the bonds State Street Bank , UBS , HSBC , Fortress and Prudential .

The mezzanine tranches with € 1.4 billion were sold on to investors such as banks, funds and hedge funds . Goldman Sachs also holds large stakes in the mezzanine tranches. In the final phase of negotiations with Berggruen Holdings , the name of the nationalized Royal Bank of Scotland was named as a further investor , as it refused to recognize special rights for Goldman Sachs . More than 80 parties are said to be represented in the group of mezzanine creditors.

Valovis Bank

Karstadt branch in Essen, Limbecker Platz

The former KarstadtQuelle CEO Wolfgang Urban wanted to reduce the company's chronic debt burden and founded Karstadt Hypothekenbank AG in December 2001 in order to be able to issue Pfandbriefe on Karstadt real estate. At the end of 2004, this Pfandbriefbank had issued bonds with a book value of 1.6 billion euros, which were secured by real estate with a market value of around 3.2 billion euros. The “extremely low” interest rate on the Pfandbriefe, at four percent at the time, was seen as an advantage for Karstadt , which cost Karstadt only € 64 million a year, in contrast to the loan interest that was at least twice as high. The properties were not for sale for a term of 30 years for the Pfandbriefe. 37 of the then 190 department stores let Urban the pension funds KarstadtQuelle Mitarbeitertrust e. V. as sole owner of the bank. However, the bank manages only a fifth of the pension assets of Karstadt employees.

In the course of negotiations with Berggruen Holdings , it was only on July 6, 2010 that it became known to a wider public that Valovis Bank ( Karstadt Hypothekenbank AG until March 9, 2007 ) holds the largest share of the claims with the Highstreet consortium at € 850 million. The talks between Berggruen Holdings and Valovis Bank turned out to be difficult and lengthy. The negotiations stalled for several weeks at the beginning, especially on the question of the 850 million loan to Highstreet . After the debate about the question of guilt as to whether Valovis had helped to cause the Quelle liquidation in October 2009, Valovis appeared to be acting against the interests of the employees again because of the initial blockade of negotiations with Berggruen. In addition, interested parties later assumed that she preferred Borletti. On July 6, 2010, Valovis ' legal advisor , Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer , made another offer to talk and the negotiations then continued almost continuously. The Valovis Bank had not converted their mortgage bonds in CMBS.

On July 12, 2010, Valovis Bank announced an agreement. This included an unsolicited takeover of their € 850 million loan from Goldman Sachs / Whitehall and was immediately revoked after a prompt protest from Highstreet . Finally, on August 26, 2010, Berggruen Holdings and Valovis Bank were able to come to an agreement on all points. The chairman of the board, Robert Gogarten, regretted the length of the negotiations, which he attributed to the large number of investors. For its loan of 850 million euros (internal: Senior A ), the bank holds 36 goods, sports and 17 parking garages as security. The parties have agreed, among other things, that Berggruen will receive a preferential right to repay this loan by 2014. In the event of rent arrears, Valovis may suspend the agreed rent reductions at KaDeWe and return to the old rents (“rental step-up right”).

Arcandor bankruptcy

Karstadt branch in Gummersbach
Karstadt branch in Memmingen
Karstadt branch Neustadt ad Weinstrasse

On June 6, 2009, Arcandor stopped the rent payments for Karstadt , the federal government finally refused an emergency loan for Arcandor the next day , whereupon Arcandor declared itself insolvent on June 9, 2009. The bankruptcy proceedings were officially opened on September 1, 2009. On November 7, 2009, the employees promised Karstadt insolvency administrator Klaus Hubert Görg a restructuring contribution. On December 1, 2009, Görg presented his restructuring plan for Karstadt . 120 branches were to be kept and 13 unprofitable branches with 1200 jobs were closed.

In 2008, Highstreet negotiated rental contracts with Arcandor with a term of 15 years, the rent amounted to 280 million euros per year. In addition, there was a rent of 42.6 million euros for the five department stores of the Oppenheim-Esch-Fonds . Another total is 350 million euros in annual rent in 2008. Karstadt's annual turnover in the 2009 financial year was 3.9 billion euros. The high rents from 2006, in addition to the decades of neglect of the core business, are part of the causes of Karstadt's insolvency. While the average rent at the competitor Kaufhof is € 7.59 per m², Karstadt had to pay € 11.27 per m² before the bankruptcy.

The rents of the five department stores of the Oppenheim-Esch-Fonds became a further burden for Karstadt . The buildings in Munich, Leipzig, Potsdam, Karlsruhe and Wiesbaden had been sold to Josef Esch , renovated and then rented back. In Munich the guaranteed rent was 23.2 percent of sales, in Leipzig 19.6 percent, in Potsdam 16.4 percent and in Karlsruhe 14.5 percent ( Karstadt in Wiesbaden was sold). In March 2010 it became known that the subscribers to the Oppenheim-Esch-Fonds wanted to waive a third of their claims of 33.5 million euros. Because of the Oppenheim-Esch Fund , insolvency administrator Görg filed a lawsuit for damages in the amount of € 175 million against Middelhoff and ten other former board members and supervisory board members of Arcandor on July 7, 2010 at the Essen regional court .

On February 23, 2010, a three-quarters majority of the bondholders in London decided to accommodate the insolvency administrator Görg's insolvency plan and waive part of their claims. The negotiations and consultations of the German and British commercial law firms with the CMBS owners represented a novelty in the history of the CMBS. For the first time, the loan periods for CMBS were extended, namely by initially three years from July 2011 to July 2014. The creditors also agreed one to forego a total of 80 million euros in rent for five years.

Negotiations stretched over eight weeks and were described as "incredibly intense" by Cairn Capital's negotiator David Henriques . At the beginning of the negotiations, he completely doubted the success of the restructuring (“we're not going to get this”). Negotiating with all creditors at the same time turned out to be an "impossible task", so he and his colleagues later focused on a group of key bondholders. The result of these negotiations was then presented to the other creditors individually. CMBS analysts identified this approach as a possible model for future CMBS restructuring. The research division of Deutsche Bank commented on this first restructuring negotiations with worry: "In particular, the CMBS market worries, because it not only greater uncertainties are the total market size and maturity structures here in terms, but because the nuclear istische investor structure, a restructuring of the debt by extending Contracts significantly more difficult. "

Before the German-Swedish-American finance company Triton submitted an offer to buy on April 23, 2010, the last day of the extendable purchase period, Goldman Sachs announced that it was interested in buying on April 22, 2010 . At the same time, the bank's plans became known, according to which Karstadt should initially be largely retained in full. Branch closings would follow later and ultimately there would be a sale or an IPO. A merger of Karstadt with Kaufhof is also possible.

Goldman Sachs had also prepared itself in the event that Triton should fail with its offer to the creditors' committee. At the end of June 2010, a key issues paper dated May 20, 2010 became known, which was negotiated with the Karstadt general works council chairman Hellmut Patzelt without ver.di knowledge . It provided for further cuts in staff and a dismantling of department stores and did not oppose a "possible break-up" of Karstadt. Works councils then internally demanded “consequences” from Patzelt.

On May 21, 2010, the German-American investor Nicolas Berggruen made an offer to buy Karstadt . In it, he did not approve any further restrictions or closings for the workforce, but wanted to reduce Highstreet's rents in return . The next day, Dibelius announced its own purchase offer from the high street consortium leader Goldman Sachs .

On June 7, 2010, three bidders presented their improved purchase offers for Karstadt to the creditors' committee. The offer from the Goldman Sachs company Whitehall was the first to be rejected immediately because of the low initial investment of around EUR 20 million and the lack of collateral. After Triton could not convince the committee either, the Berggruen Holdings were awarded the contract to buy Karstadt . The following negotiations were led by their COO Jared Bluestein for Berggruen Holdings .

Chronicle of the negotiations

For more than three months, Karstadt was at the center of a tough power struggle between the opposing rental interests of Highstreet and Berggruen . While Highstreet was favored by the yield interests of the financial industry and by Metro CEO Eckhard Cordes , employment policy interests accumulated behind Berggruen, which temporarily divided the government cabinet. After the insolvency administrator Görg failed to find an investor for the mail order company Quelle , he wanted at least to save Karstadt as a whole company from being broken up. The Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs , Ursula von der Leyen , accepted Berggruen's call for mediation and got in touch with the High Street consorts. Her temporary employee Thomas Heilmann took over the mediation to the investors of High Street, who let his work for his PR agency Scholz & Friends rest during this time and then gave up completely. The union ver.di , under the leadership of the deputy chairwoman Margret Mönig-Raane , relied on Berggruen's offer almost from the start and promoted his concept to high-ranking representatives of the High Street consorts.

In the early days of the negotiations, Goldman Sachs advocated the lowest possible rental discounts. Deutsche Bank later did so with its temporary support for the Italian luxury department store entrepreneur Maurizio Borletti, who wanted to pay higher rents than Berggruen. At times the negotiations were suspended by the two largest High Street consorts as well as by Valovis Bank . The Essen District Court had to postpone the examination date for the insolvency plan three times during the negotiations (June 10, July 16, August 10, 2010), as an agreement by Highstreet was postponed further and further. The next court hearing on September 3rd eventually became the final day of the decision. The Far Eastern Karstadt suppliers no longer wanted to wait any longer, as the order deadline for textile goods for the next season expired in September.

Eleven weeks of stagnation

  • At the start of the negotiations, Highstreet confronted Berggruen with a demand for a share in Karstadt's profits as compensation for the rent reductions, otherwise liquidation is threatened. This demand was made by some creditors and later dropped.
  • The talks between Highstreet and Berggruen made slow progress at first. It later became known that Dibelius had tried in vain to sell Karstadt and its real estate to the Spanish department store monopoly El Corte Inglés .
  • On June 20, 2010 Highstreet made an offer for rent reductions of around 400 million euros over several years for the first time. Highstreet's offer consisted of rent reductions of 230 million euros over the next five years and the waiver of the originally agreed rent increases of 160 million euros over three years. With that, Highstreet exceeded a “pain threshold”. The offer was initially rejected by Berggruen's company spokesman, referring to the still missing "customary market conditions". In fact, Berggruen's claims were initially almost double the amount. At the end of the negotiations, it remained at 400 million euros.
  • The Karstadt general works council chairman Hellmut Patzelt called on June 21, 2010 in the BamS a special meeting of the creditors' committee, since Berggruen refused to accept the rent reductions offered by Highstreet. The Karstadt rescue threatens to fail once and for all. The Berliner Zeitung saw behind Patzelt's demand for an emergency meeting an attempt by Highstreet to push Berggruen out of the purchase agreement. Insolvency administrator Görg refused to convene the creditors to a special meeting because he still sees opportunities for an agreement.
  • According to Görg, Deutsche Bank changed “on 23/24. June at about the same time as the drafting of the contracts and the definition of the last open details ”from Berggruen to Maurizio Borletti. On June 24, 2010, Borletti spoke up in the media. Berggruen wanted to split up Karstadt in order to sell it again immediately, and the investor, unlike him, had no experience in the industry. After four weeks of abstinence from the media, Borletti gave another interview in the Bild newspaper on July 22nd, 2010 and from then on was in the headlines almost every day with a media campaign against Berggruen and for his subsequent purchase offer from Karstadt . As a consultant for public relations Borletti had the PR Agencies, Hering Schuppener hired already for Arcandor AG to Image had worked Improvement.
  • On June 29, 2010, the Süddeutsche Zeitung published the report that the income of insolvency administrator Görg in the Karstadt case “according to SZ information from negotiating circles is more than 50 million euros. Some even reckon with 55 million euros. ”The SZ article puts Görg's fee into perspective, among other things by stating that twenty employees have to be paid over several years. Görg later replied indirectly: "If those involved had put as much energy into constructive solutions as they did into media campaigns, Karstadt could position itself even more successfully in the market today."
  • On July 2, 2010, Berggruen gave Highstreet an ultimatum to invite until July 6 to a meeting of those creditors who had not yet agreed to the master lease agreement. Three days later he had the “Master Lease Agreement” posted on the internet. Highstreet now responded and invited on July 6, 2010 to the next creditors' meeting on July 28, 2010 in London. The next examination date at the Essen District Court on July 16, 2010 was thus skipped, but behind this period there is a statutory invitation period of at least 21 days for the creditors.
  • On July 4, 2010, the Bild newspaper spread the headline: “Good business. Berggruen pays only one euro for Karstadt. ”The article puts its headline into perspective by stating that Berggruen had committed itself to 65 million euros in investments and 5 million euros for the naming rights.
  • On July 5, 2010, Berggruen called on federal politicians for help and mediation, as High Street was blocking the negotiations. While Federal Economics Minister Rainer Brüderle initially misunderstood Berggruen's request as financial aid and also refused to mediate, Federal Labor Minister von der Leyen repeated her willingness to support the negotiations, which she had first publicly expressed on June 25, 2010. The SPD chairman Sigmar Gabriel accused Brüderle of saying that it was “a shame” to remain “inactive” in the Karstadt case.
  • The Essen District Court extended the trial period to August 10, 2010 on July 16, 2010.
  • On July 25, 2010, Dibelius had it spread via image : “We have cleared the way to an agreement.” This was seen as a signal for the resistance of Goldman Sachs to abandon Berggruen. The business magazine WirtschaftsWoche interpreted this concession as an attempt by Dibelius to “improve his reputation in Berlin”.
  • After the group of bondholders (28 July 2010 bondholder ) had approved the draft agreement with Berggruen, spread a dpa -Meldung the expectation a "total solution for Karstadt is getting closer."
  • Eight weeks after the bidding process ended on June 7, 2010, the Italian department store entrepreneur and high street consort (2%) Maurizio Borletti submitted an offer to buy Karstadt to Arcandor's insolvency administration on July 30, 2010.
  • On August 5, 2010, a spokeswoman for the ver.di union expressed her “mistrust” of the later bidder Borletti, referring to the high losses of his department store chains Printemps and La Rinascente . Borletti does not want to keep Karstadt as a whole, but is only interested in the premium hotels. The entrepreneur probably wants to sell further branches to the Kaufhof owner Metro Group , whose CEO Eckhard Cordes is interested in around half of the branches and has good contacts with Borletti. Borletti's losses (€ -28 million in 2008/09 at Printemps ; € -6.6 million in 2009 at La Rinascente ) and his contact with Cordes were largely ignored in the German media, only the TV magazine Report Mainz and the Karstadt expert Hagen Seidel from the daily newspaper Die Welt drew attention to this again after ver.di.
  • Despite the still outstanding negotiation agreements, the Essen District Court decided not to liquidate on August 10, 2010. The court postponed its examination date again to September 3, 2010, thereby accommodating Görg's request for an extension of the trial.
  • The news magazine Der Spiegel published in advance on August 14, 2010 that Deutsche Bank RREEF Director Andrea Vanni had advertised Borletti as a buyer in a conversation with Görg. In banking circles, Deutsche Bank's commitment to Borletti was explained by the high investments that Deutsche Bank, unlike Goldman Sachs, has not yet been able to amortize or write off .

Final phase

  • On August 24, 2010, Berggruen invited creditors to an early meeting of creditors in London on August 31, 2010 in order to be able to conclude negotiations with creditors in good time before September 3, 2010, the fourth examination date of the Essen District Court for the insolvency plan. Within two hours, Highstreet rejected the application for formal reasons. It stayed with the September 2nd meeting, 24 hours before the district court's decision. As a result, in the last week before September 3, Berggruen had very intensive negotiations with the creditors about the individual contracts that were still open.
  • Berggruen Holdings finally reached an agreement on August 25, 2010 with Valovis Bank as the largest single creditor with 36 department stores. Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer made himself available as mediator .
  • On August 25, 2010, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , Berggruen accused Deutsche Bank of supporting Borletti in spite of fully negotiated contracts. The Handelsblatt commented on the interview with the headline: "Berggruen is stinking against Deutsche Bank". The wording of this statement has often been adopted and varies in “etch”, “giftet”, “rattle”. The reaction of the Deutsche Bank against it was reproduced with "Deutsche Bank criticizes Investor Berggruen".
  • Borletti sent a renewed purchase offer to the insolvency administrator Görg on August 26, 2010 and publicly speculated that Berggruens would fail at the creditors' meeting in London on September 2, 2010. The hope that Berggruens would fail was based, among other things, on a recommendation from Highstreet for a “reserve decision “The creditors' meeting, in the event of a refusal of Berggruen's offers, to approve Borletti.
  • The board member of Deutsche Bank for business in Germany, Jürgen Fitschen , spoke in public on August 28, 2010 in an interview with the daily newspaper Die Welt in favor of Berggruen.
  • Görg publicly intervened on August 31, 2010 and gave Borletti a "devastating" refusal. Contrary to Borletti's claims, he did not send a lease negotiated with Highstreet, but only a Memorandum of Understanding . Borletti's further assertion that his offer was better than Berggruen's was not clear to him. In fact, he does not have “a formal, unconditional offer based on external financing”. In addition, Borletti leaves open how the announced 100 million euro loan from Gordon Brothers is secured and how high the interest burden will be for Karstadt. His offer is therefore "without substance" and "not ready for signature".
  • On September 1, 2010, insolvency administrator Görg sent his liquidation plan to the creditors. This increased the pressure to reach an agreement for Berggruen. The landlords and the creditors' meeting could no longer speculate that he would stand up for Borletti as a buyer after Berggruen's failure.
  • Borletti did not “stay” “in waiting position”, but tried until September 2, 2010 to acquire a blocking minority with shares from mezzanine creditors against Berggruen.
  • On September 2, the representatives of about 200 bondholders met in London ( bondholder ) of Fleet Street Finance Two , one of which had to agree to a 75 percent increase. In addition, over 80 mezzanine creditors from all over the world had to vote unanimously for Berggruen. However, no postal signatures, only electronic signatures were necessary.
  • The last signatures of two creditors reached the Essen District Court on September 3, 2010 one and a half hours after the deadline, which then declared the insolvency plan with the sales contract for Karstadt to be legally valid. Federal Minister von der Leyen publicly thanked the Deutsche Bank board member Jürgen Fitschen for his help, like Mönig-Raane before. Observers praised his assumption of "social responsibility". Berggruen praised von der Leyen's support and expressed his willingness to work constructively with Highstreet Holding.

reception

The longer the negotiations between the High Street consorts, creditors and Berggruen Holdings dragged on, the greater the general resentment, impatience and uncertainty. The initial optimism soon gave way to a description of the situation in which terms such as “ poker ”, “drama”, “crime”, “tugging”, “trembling party”, “hanging party” were often used with the preface “Karstadt-” . The tone intensified after a series of premature reports of success and their revocations in “Mud Battle”, “Chaostage”, “War of Nerves”, “War of the Roses”, “the ever more unspeakable bickering” and “a sometimes barely bearable beating and stabbing”.

From the circles of trade unions, the judiciary and the advertising industry, statements about the uniqueness of the events and thus the "setbacks and disruptive attacks" became public. The vice-chairman of ver.di, Margret Mönig-Raane , spoke of a "one-time process that makes a contract negotiation such jumps, backward gaps and whatever else". A spokesman for the Essen district court said: “It has never happened before”, and an advertising specialist was amazed at the methods of his colleagues: “I have not experienced anything like this in almost 20 years.” The opacity of the proceedings and the anonymity of the creditors increased the general perplexity and uncertainty: "Now nobody can really expect customers or employees of Karstadt to understand the processes involved in this unparalleled department store poker."

The controversial German tabloid Bild played an important role in reporting on the Karstadt negotiations, which was further enhanced by this. Important announcements and statements from Dibelius and Borletti (previously also from Dibelius friend Cordes ) were published exclusively by BamS and Bild . Berggruen paid tribute to this information policy and partisanship and on September 3, 2010 went to the Berlin-based Bild editorial team for a short interview. In it he let Highstreet know that he was interested in constructive cooperation.

After the approval of the Essen district court for the insolvency plan on September 3, 2010, the public reacted with a general "relief" and a "sigh of relief" at the positive outcome of the negotiations between Highstreet and Berggruen. The fifteen months of uncertainty among employees in the branches during the bankruptcy phase was considered to have ended and gave way to great joy and confidence. The mayors and retailers of the cities affected also expressed their relief that Karstadt branches were averted from closing. Since large parts of the inner-city retail trade in many German medium- sized cities is geared towards Karstadt department stores, a closure of Karstadt would have resulted in "strong segmentation and even decay" of the inner cities. This point of view was also taken by Berggruen and the ver.di union .

Several academic retail experts are still more or less skeptical about the future of Karstadt, while others see opportunities for consolidation. Analysts and other representatives of banks continue to insist on a merger between Karstadt and Kaufhof .

Importance of the CMBS

High rent

In addition to the decades of neglect of Karstadt's core business, the high rents were considered to be one of the main causes of insolvency. Berggruen later assessed the rents as “not in line with the market” and therefore wanted to reduce them. Highstreet investors' prospect of increasing rental income made Highstreet's securitized mortgages even more lucrative.

Lots of believers

In the end, the insolvency proceedings were drawn out excessively by the “atomistic investor structure” of several hundred CMBS investors. Insolvency administrator Görg had little leverage to reach an agreement between the disagreed High Street consorts and creditors. An agreement with Berggruen was ultimately dependent on the understanding and goodwill of all involved:

“The performance [von Görg] is also so interesting because the Arcandor case shows how much the requirements placed on insolvency administrators have changed due to increasingly complex financial structures. The tried and tested method of locking important creditors in one room until everyone at the table nods their head is hardly possible today. Ghostly investor consortia such as Highstreet, in which nobody is authorized to issue instructions and which are represented by lawyers on a fee basis, can no longer be used. "

Görg's possible influence on the settlement, which he had lost due to the CMBS-related fragmentation of investors, was again offset by public pressure. The two banks Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, the most important high street consorts, feared a loss of reputation as “Karstadt killer” at one of the best-known German traditional companies. The lack of regulation of CMBS securitisations in the event of insolvency was criticized even by the high street consort Deutsche Bank, "because ultimately the lack of a regulatory framework in times of crisis creates a structurally higher risk of default." For investor Berggruen, these negotiations were his "most complicated" business .

literature

  • Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash. How to ruin a billionaire company: Madeleine Schickedanz, Thomas Middelhoff, Sal. Oppenheim and KarstadtQuelle. Campus Verlag , Frankfurt am Main 2010, hardback, ISBN 978-3-593-39249-3 , chap. Aktion Tafelsilber , pp. 106–113, passim , reading sample , review , discussion .
  • Sophie Ahlswede, Tobias Just: Refinancing Risks in Commercial Real Estate Loans . CMBS are only part of a growing problem. Edited by Deutsche Bank Research, Series: Current Issues 479, April 23, 2010, 20 pages, online file , ( PDF file, 362 kB), with many infographics.

Movies

  • Video Happy Rescue of a Department Store  in the ZDFmediathek , accessed on January 27, 2014. (offline), TV report, Germany, 2010, 2:47 min., Director: Thadeus Parade, Production: ZDF , Editor: Heute-Journal , first broadcast : September 3, 2010.
  • Karstadt - day of decision. TV report, Germany, 2010, 1:37 min., Director: Wolfgang Bausch, production: WDR , editor: Morgenmagazin , first broadcast: September 2, 2010.
  • Video More worries about Karstadt  in the ZDFmediathek , accessed on January 27, 2014. (offline), TV report, Germany, 2010, 1:28 min., Director: Ina Baltes, production: ZDF , editor: today in Germany, first broadcast : August 10, 2010.
  • Karstadt and the banks. Is Deutsche Bank tricking its employees? TV report, Germany, 2010, 7:17 min., Script and direction: Daniel Hechler and Ulrich Neumann, production: SWR , editing: Report Mainz , first broadcast: August 30, 2010 on ARD , film text with online video .
  • Karstadt - The big sale. How the department store went bankrupt. Documentary, Germany, 2010, 45 min., Script and direction: Ingolf Gritschneder and Georg Wellmann, production: WDR , first broadcast: February 24, 2010, 11.30 p.m. on ARD , table of contents ( memento of April 2, 2010 in the Internet Archive ).

Web links

Documents

Individual references with quotations

  1. ↑ Sources for the High Street organization chart: Henryk Hielscher: "How Investor Berggruen stirs up Karstadt landlords" , WirtschaftsWoche , July 12, 2010 and
    Henning Hinze: Wrestling for department store chains: Hedge funds gamble for Karstadt . ( Memento from September 3, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , September 1, 2010.
  2. ^ Highstreet Holding GbR , Bloomberg Businessweek, 2010.
  3. ↑ Sabine Brendel: Department store insolvency: Karstadt seems saved for the time being . , The West , September 2, 2010:
    "one of the most nerve-wracking business pokers of the past decades"
  4. ↑ gxf / AP: Arcandor: The largest German insolvency proceedings . In: Focus , June 9, 2010.
    Henryk Hielscher: Insolvency law planned for corporations . In: WirtschaftsWoche , June 12, 2010.
  5. ↑ Matthias Erlinger: Karstadt: creditors vote for continuation . In: TextilWirtschaft , November 10, 2009.
    Before Highstreet Seven BV , six other Highstreet companies were founded. Pirelli RE board member Paolo Massimiliano Bottelli sat on the supervisory board of Highstreet Six BV and Highstreet Seven BV in 2010 ( source  (     page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and remove it then this note. ). According to Dibelius , these companies in the Netherlands were “simply necessary to unravel and properly organize the highly complicated land register and tax situation of the Karstadt Quelle real estate and the associated debt financing.” Quoted in: Hagen Seidel: Arcandors Fall . 2010, p. 111.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.pirellire.com  
  6. ↑ Press Release ( Memento of the original from October 29, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 88.9 kB) Berggruen Holdings, July 5, 2010 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / mms.businesswire.com
  7. ↑ a b Organization chart of Highstreet.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: WirtschaftsWoche , July 12, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / static.wiwo.de  
  8. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash . 2010, p. 111.
  9. ^ Consortium Announces the Completion of Acquisition of 49% Stake in High Street .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Deutsche Bank RREEF, July 29, 2008.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.rreef.com  
  10. ↑ Real estate consortium Highstreet shows interest. Will Karstadt be taken over by the landlord? tagesschau.de , May 23, 2010.
  11. ↑ a b Sven Clausen, Steffen Klusmann, Klaus Max Smolka, Angela Maier: Agenda: Goldfinger. ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the archive.today web archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , July 12, 2007.
  12. ↑ da./du .: Karstadt property sale under fire . “That wasn't a real auction” . ( Memento of the original from November 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: FAZ , April 3, 2006. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.seiten.faz-archiv.de
  13. ^ Claudia Reischauer, Wolfgang Zdral : Goldman Sachs. The shadow man . In: Capital , July 12, 2006.
  14. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l Jane Roberts: Restructuring of German retail CMBS is first to extend maturity of notes. CMBS rescue deal brokered on Germany's High Street . ( Memento of the original from February 2, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 2.36 MB) In: Real Estate Capital , March 2010, pp. 12–13. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.realestatecapital.co.uk
  15. ^ Real estate transaction on March 27, 2006 In: Annual Report 2006, Arcandor, p. 12 (VIII) Things are looking up. Annual report 2006 . ( Memento of the original from September 23, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 4.49 MB) Arcandor , 190 pp. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.arcandor.de
  16. ↑ a b c d e David C. Lerch: Karstadt. Middelhoff's legacy . In: Der Tagesspiegel , June 20, 2010.
  17. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash . 2010, p. 109f.
  18. ^ A b Ruth Vierbuchen: Karstadt sales: There is a lot at stake for the cities . ( Memento of the original from July 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Commercial Real Estate Report , June 9, 2010. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.rohmert-medien.de
  19. ↑ "Karstadt is finally parting with its department stores" . In: Handelsblatt , June 25, 2007.
  20. ^ Arcandor Group: Karstadt real estate is sold . In: Handelsblatt , March 19, 2008.
    49% stake in real estate joint venture Highstreet sold .  (     Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Arcandor AG, March 19, 2008.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.arcandor.de  
  21. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash . 2010, p. 109.
  22. ↑ a b c d e f g h Clemens Schömann-Finck: KarstadtQuelle future pledged . In: Focus Money , No. 43/2004.
  23. ↑ sam: Karstadt landlords are preparing for bankruptcy . Spiegel Online , May 29, 2009.
    “Middelhoff had officially sold the properties to Highstreet for a total of 4.5 billion euros - insiders assume that after deducting commissions and distributions to investors, Karstadt received significantly less than 4.5 billion euros . "
  24. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash . 2010, p. 122.
  25. ^ Gunhild Lütge: Karstadt in purgatory . In: Die Zeit , No. 28/2010.
  26. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Arcandors crash . 2010, p. 62.
  27. ^ A b rob: Expansion of the investment banking business: Rothschild has big plans in Germany . In: Handelsblatt , March 14, 2006.
  28. ↑ sources graphics securitization structure: For a discussion on the appropriate regulation of the securitization activities of banks .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) Bankenverband, November 2009, p. 10, diagram 1. Louis Perridon and Manfred Steiner: Finanzwirtschaft der Unternehmens. 13th revised and expanded edition. Vahlen, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-8006-3112-1 .@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / shop.bankenverband.de  
  29. ↑ a b redevelopment requirement. Landlord demands a share in Karstadt .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Capital , June 9, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.capital.de  
  30. ↑ € 1,192,021,267 Fleet Street Finance Two PLC (PDF; 3.68 MB) 248 pp.
  31. ↑ Henning Hinze: Struggle for department store chain: Hedge funds gamble for Karstadt . ( Memento from September 3, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , September 1, 2010.
  32. ↑ hei / Reuters: Berggruen apparently also takes the last hurdle . In: Focus , September 2, 2010.
  33. ↑ hei / dpa / AP / AFP: Karstadt's insolvency plan decision is delayed again . In: Focus , September 3, 2010.
  34. ^ Nicole Bastian , Robert Landgraf, Anke Rezmer: Valovis, the tip of the Arcandor pensions . In: Handelsblatt , June 23, 2009.
  35. ↑ Gabi Wuttke: Karstadt: Möning-Raane calls for political intervention . Deutschlandradio Kultur , July 6, 2010, 7:50 am, interview with Margret Mönig-Raane .
  36. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Now Berggruen and Valovis are talking to each other . In: Die Welt , July 8, 2010.
  37. ↑ Hagen Seidel: A tragedy called source . In: Die Welt , September 13, 2010.
    Quelle disaster. How banks sabotaged the mail order bailout . Report Mainz , November 16, 2009, video, 6:19 min .
    Press release: Clarification on the program Report Mainz from November 16, 2009 .  (     Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 0.8 MB) Valovis Bank, November 23, 2009.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.valovis.com  
  38. ↑ Hans G. Nagl, Oliver Stock: Valovis: Karstadt rescue threatens to fail due to a bank veto . In: Handelsblatt , July 7, 2010.
  39. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Berggruen has competition in Karstadt poker . In: Die Welt , August 2, 2010:
    “Borletti is likely to have high hopes for the Valovis Bank. Their boss Robert Gogarten is assumed to have a lot more sympathy for the Italian than for Berggruen. "
  40. ^ David C. Lerch: Rent dispute. Has Karstadt been saved? . In: Der Tagesspiegel , July 13, 2010.
  41. ^ Hagen Seidel: department store chain. "Blackmail" - Karstadt rescuers attack each other . In: Die Welt , July 13, 2010.
    Annette Berger: Quarrel about credit: Highstreet missed Karstadt investor gossip . ( Memento from July 16, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , July 13, 2010.
  42. ↑ a b Karstadt: Valovis reaches an agreement with Berggruen, Borletti counters . In: TextilWirtschaft , August 25, 2010.
  43. ↑ Christine Scharrenbroch: Valovis Bank wants to negotiate directly with Berggruen . In: FAZ , July 6, 2010.
  44. ↑ Karstadt investor Berggruen reaches an agreement with Valovis .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Dow Jones Germany, August 26, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.dowjones.de  
  45. ↑ Karstadt branches. Arcandor discontinues rental payments . In: manager magazin , June 6, 2009.
  46. ↑ itz / wal / dpa / AP / Reuters: Karstadt parent company. Federal government rejects emergency loan for Arcandor . Spiegel Online, June 8, 2009.
  47. ↑ Redevelopment plan for department store group. Karstadt closes another seven branches , tagesschau.de , December 1, 2009.
  48. ↑ a b Zypries demands clarification about Middelhoff's real estate business . ddp / DerWesten, June 6, 2009.
  49. ↑ sam: Arcandor bankruptcy. Karstadt landlords are preparing for bankruptcy . Spiegel Online, May 29, 2009.
  50. ↑ Bar chart with annual sales "Riese in Not" in: Karstadt threatens the end . ( Memento from September 4, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , September 2, 2010.
  51. ↑ Lorenz Wagner, Henning Hinze, Nina Klöckner: The great Arcandor sale . ( Memento from July 31, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , June 7, 2010:
    “No, Deuss does not change anything in the business model. He's doing something that all his successors will do: Instead of worrying about the core business, he's tinkering with the structure of the group. "
  52. ^ Henryk Hielscher: How mismanagement ruined KarstadtQuelle , part 5. In: WirtschaftsWoche , June 8, 2009:
    “… Middelhoff finds investors who are making a total of 4.5 billion euros. At first glance, a terrific deal, in retrospect a toxic deal. Because selling real estate increases the rent burden immensely. And Karstadt is deprived of the opportunity to close down unprofitable locations. The new contracts run for decades - closings are now simply unaffordable. "
  53. ↑ joe / AFP: Deal with Karstadt-Immobilien: Middelhoff threatens millionaire lawsuit . In: stern , July 7, 2010.
  54. ↑ The super-rich received horrific Karstadt rents . In: Die Welt , June 14, 2009.
  55. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Esch-Fonds is also lowering the rent at Karstadt . In: Die Welt , March 14, 2010.
  56. ^ David C. Lerch: Karstadt. Insolvency administrator sued Middelhoff . In: Der Tagesspiegel , July 7, 2010.
  57. ^ Karstadt crisis: creditors pave the way for restructuring . ( Memento of the original from May 5, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Rheinische Post , February 24, 2010. mk: Highstreet restructures loans . Juve , March 23, 2010. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.rp-online.de
  58. ↑ Gleiss Lutz advises on the restructuring of the High Street Real Estate Joint Venture . ( Memento of the original from September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Gleiss Lutz, March 16, 2010.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.rws-verlag.de
  59. ^ A b c Sophie Ahlswede, Tobias Just: Refinancing Risks in Commercial Real Estate Loans . (PDF; 362 kB) Deutsche Bank Research, April 23, 2010.
  60. ^ Hagen Seidel: Goldman Sachs is considering buying Karstadt . In: Die Welt , April 22, 2010.
  61. ^ A b Henryk Hielscher: Verdi "outraged" about Karstadt general works council chief . In: WirtschaftsWoche , July 3, 2010.
  62. ^ Henryk Hielscher: Arcandor insolvency. Karstadt works council chief under suspicion of conspiracy . In: WirtschaftsWoche , June 26, 2010.
  63. ^ Burkhard Uhlenbroich: Secret agreement with trade unions. Goldman Sachs boss Dibelius wants to buy Karstadt . In: BamS , May 22, 2010.
  64. ^ A b c Angela Maier, Gregor Haake: Refurbishment demand: Landlord demands a share in Karstadt . ( Memento from June 11, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) June 9, 2010.
  65. ↑ Jared Bluestein, Chief Operating Officer ( Memento of the original from October 9, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Berggruen Holdings, 2010.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.berggruenholdings.com
  66. ↑ ma: Karstadt: Agreement, break-up or in the end Borletti?  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Immobilien Zeitung , July 28, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.immobilien-zeitung.de  
  67. ^ Controversy over the rescue of Karstadt in the cabinet. Labor Minister von der Leyen (CDU) tries to mediate . In: BamS , August 14, 2010.
  68. ↑ mmo / rts: Clear the way for Karstadt sale: creditors hope for Görg . n-tv , April 12, 2010.
    “Görg's insolvency plan provides for financial concessions from landlords, staff and other creditors in the three-digit million range so that Karstadt can be preserved and sold as a whole. Among other things, he wants to save jobs at the department store giant. "
  69. ↑ David C. Lerch: Thomas Heilmann: "My cell phone was brave" . In: Der Tagesspiegel , September 6, 2010. Interview with Thomas Heilmann.
  70. ↑ Z ur person: the mediator Thomas Heilmann . In: Der Tagesspiegel , September 5, 2010.
  71. ↑ Mehrdad Amirkhizi: Scholz & Friends partner Thomas Heilmann focuses on politics . , horizont.net, September 27, 2010.
  72. ↑ a b Henning Hinze, Birgit Dengel: Agenda: Sales at Karstadt . ( Memento from September 3, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Financial Times Deutschland , September 2, 2010.
    “The time of the bundles with which the parties initially bombed each other is long gone. No more lists of arguments. Rather, there is a slight confidence that an agreement on the sale of the insolvent Karstadt chain to the German-American Nicolas Berggruen will finally be within reach. "
  73. ^ Deutsche Bank moves away from Berggruen at Karstadt . ( Memento of the original from August 19, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Capital , August 16, 2010.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.capital.de
  74. ↑ Christine Weissenborn: Purchase offer: Borletti does not give up the struggle for Karstadt . In: Handelsblatt , August 13, 2010.
  75. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Suppliers doubt the future of Karstadt . In: Die Welt , August 22, 2010.
  76. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Berggruen prevails in the struggle for Karstadt . In: Die Welt , July 26, 2010 (unsuccessful conversations with El Corte Inglés )
  77. ↑ a b c Berggruen rent reductions are not yet enough for Karstadt . Reuters , June 20, 2010.
  78. ↑ The dispute over Karstadt rents continues .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. dpa / Nürnberger Nachrichten , July 20, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / yesterday.nordbayern.de  
  79. ↑ Reinhard Kowalewsky: Karstadt rescue succeeded . ( Memento of the original from September 7, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Rheinische Post , September 4, 2010. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / nachrichten.rp-online.de
  80. ↑ Burkhard Uhlenbroich: No agreement in sight. Karstadt rescue threatens to end. Works council calls for a new meeting of the creditors' committee . In: BamS , June 21, 2010.
  81. ^ Frank-Thomas Wenzel: Violent struggle behind the Karstadt scenes. The works council and Verdi are apparently at odds . In: Berliner Zeitung , June 22, 2010.
  82. ↑ dpa-afx: Karstadt insolvency administrator sees an opportunity for an agreement . In: Handelsblatt , June 23, 2010.
  83. ↑ Verdi and Karstadt insolvency administrators criticize Deutsche Bank . Report Mainz , August 30, 2010.
  84. ^ Frank-Thomas Wenzel: Warning against breaking up Karstadt. Losing bidder turns to politics . In: Berliner Zeitung , June 24, 2010.
  85. ^ Wp: Department store owner Maurizio Borletti attacks Karstadt rescuer Nicolas Berggruen . In: Bild , July 22, 2010.
  86. ↑ Oliver Stock: The hour of the pullers . In: Handelsblatt , 23 August 2010.
  87. ^ Caspar Busse, Stefan Weber: Karstadt insolvency administrator Görg. There are millions to say goodbye . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 29, 2010.
  88. ↑ Hagen Seidel: What do Highstreet allow? In: Die Welt , August 11, 2010.
  89. ↑ a b Karstadt: Publication of Key Terms of the Master Lease Agreement . ( Memento of the original from February 22, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. businesswire.ca, July 5, 2010, Berggruen's draft contract @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.businesswire.ca
  90. ↑ Anke Prokasky: Berggruen puts pressure on . In: Textilwirtschaft , July 2, 2010.
  91. ↑ Definition of: general rental agreement , real estate expertise from A to Z.
  92. ^ Hagen Seidel: Karstadt dispute: ultimatum from investor Berggruen is successful. Fund subscribers will meet in London on July 28th . In: Die Welt , July 7, 2010.
  93. ^ Henryk Hielscher: Karstadt deadline could be extended to July 30th . In: WirtschaftsWoche , July 6, 2010.
  94. ↑ uhu: Good business. Berggruen pays just one euro for Karstadt . In: BamS , August 14, 2010.
  95. ↑ a b Oliver Stock, Christoph Schlautmann: My operational ideas are often bad , Handelsblatt, July 5, 2010, Interview with Berggruen:
    “If things don't go any further, we want to address the German government in the next few days so that they act as a mediator the responsible acts. She too should have an interest in saving Karstadt. After all, 25,000 jobs are at stake - and many German city centers. "
  96. ^ Andreas Kißler: BMWi: No active mediation by the state discussed at Karstadt .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Dow Jones Germany, July 5, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.dowjones.de  
  97. ^ A b J. Maier, K. Doemens, M. Sievers: Berggruen asks politics for help . In: Frankfurter Rundschau , July 5, 2010.
  98. ↑ support. Von der Leyen visits Karstadt in Wedding . In: Der Tagesspiegel , June 25, 2010:
    "As it is said in the context of the Karstadt case, the Minister of Labor has often phoned and written letters over the past weeks and months in order to influence those involved."
  99. ^ Hagen Seidel: sales negotiations. Another three weeks grace period for Karstadt . In: Die Welt , July 16, 2010.
  100. ↑ Burkhard Uhlenbroich: Goldman Sachs boss announces the final rescue of Karstadt . In: BILD , July 25, 2010.
  101. ↑ Ulrich Reitz : The silence of Goldman Europe boss Dibelius . In: WirtschaftsWoche , August 5, 2010.
  102. ↑ The overall solution for Karstadt is getting closer . In: Focus , July 28, 2010.
    Wolfgang Dahlmann: Complete solution for Karstadt is getting closer . dpa / T-Online , July 29, 2010.
  103. ^ Henryk Hielscher: The bizarre Karstadt offer from Mr. Borletti . WirtschaftsWoche , August 2, 2010.
  104. ↑ a b Jutta Maier: Verdi distrusts new Karstadt offer . In: Berliner Zeitung , August 5, 2010.
  105. ^ Karstadt and the banks . Report Mainz , SWR , August 30, 2010.
  106. ↑ Nicole Lange: Three euros for a new start. Business editor Hagen Seidel on his book "Arcandors Crash" . welt.de , September 13, 2010, interview.
  107. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Borletti knocks loudly on Karstadt's door . welt.de , August 5, 2010:
    “According to information from WELT, La Rinascente has burned a lot of money in recent years: In 2006 the pre-tax loss was still 17 million euros. The total was reduced by eleven million euros and ten million euros to a minus of 6.6 million euros in the financial year that ended on September 30, 2009. In that year the workforce was reduced by around 300 employees. Borletti's French department store chain Printemps posted a loss of around EUR 28 million at the end of the 2008/2009 financial year (March 31). "
  108. ↑ Christoph Schlautmann, Oliver Stock: Insolvency proceedings: The last deadline is running for Karstadt's insolvency administrator . In: Handelsblatt , August 11, 2010.
  109. ↑ DPA / APN: Berggruen and Highstreet: Once again "last gallows period" . In: Stern , August 10, 2010.
  110. ↑ Deutsche Bank intervenes in Karstadt battle . Spiegel Online , August 14, 2010, No. 33, p. 68.
  111. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Berggruen has competition in Karstadt poker . welt.de , August 2, 2010:
    “While Goldman wants to close the Karstadt chapter quickly, Rreef is apparently still looking for other options. In banking circles, the different strategy is explained by the fact that Goldman Sachs has now largely written off its own high street investments, while Deutsche Bank 's investment of millions for the bad business with High Street is still on the books of the group. "
  112. ↑ Berggruen invites Karstadt landlords to meetings . AdHocNews, August 24, 2010, 4:57 p.m.
       Another pending game in the Karstadt insolvency proceedings .  (     Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Stern , August 24, 2010, 6:56 p.m.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.stern.de  
  113. ^ David C. Lerch: Countdown for Karstadt . In: Der Tagesspiegel , September 2, 2010.
    “That's why those responsible don't lose any time. "Negotiations will continue uninterrupted," an insider assured on Wednesday. "
  114. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Valovis Bank comes towards Berggruen . welt.de , July 6, 2010.
  115. ↑ Carsten Knop, Brigitte Koch: Karstadt prospect and private investor Nicolas Berggruen: "Deutsche Bank plays with fire" . In: FAZ , August 26, 2010.
  116. Jump up ↑ Berggruen is aggravating against Deutsche Bank . In: Handelsblatt , August 25, 2010.
  117. ^ Karstadt bidding war: Berggruen etches on Deutsche Bank . ( Memento from August 26, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), FTD.de, August 25, 2010.
  118. ↑ DH / dpa: Berggruen poisons against Deutsche Bank . In: Der Handel , August 26, 2010.
  119. ^ Hagen Seidel: Karstadt investor: Berggruen railed against the Deutsche Bank . welt.de , August 26, 2010.
  120. ↑ Deutsche Bank criticizes investor Berggruen . FAZ.net , August 26, 2010.
  121. ↑ Borletti presents another offer for Karstadt . In: Hamburger Abendblatt , August 27, 2010.
  122. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Berggruen challenger does not give up . welt.de , August 30, 2010. Interview with Borletti:
    “But consider: Not everyone involved has agreed to the necessary concessions for Berggruen. If I am properly informed, resolutions from Fleet Street creditors and mezzanine investors are still pending. If it stays that way, Berggruen will not get Karstadt. But then our offer is ready. "
  123. ↑ Landlord relies on Maurizio Borletti . In: Focus , August 11, 2010.
  124. ↑ Ulric Papendick: Deutsche Bank increases its board of directors . In: manager magazin , March 12, 2009.
  125. ↑ Hagen Seidel, Jörg Eigendorf: Berggruen is nervous and impatient . welt.de , August 28, 2010, Interview with Jürgen Fitschen .
  126. ↑ a b Borletti offer rejected . ddp / Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger , August 31, 2010.
  127. ↑ ges: Karstadt insolvency administrator attacks Borletti . In: Der Handel , August 31, 2010:
    "You have only submitted an unsigned memorandum from your lawyers that expressly serves internal purposes only and excludes any liability towards third parties."
  128. ↑ Doreen Kröger: Görg makes an announcement . ( Memento of the original from October 28, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. fabeau.de, August 31, 2010. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.fabeau.de
  129. ^ Elke Sieper: Karstadt insolvency administrator: "Borletti's papers are not ready for signature" . In: TextilWirtschaft , August 31, 2010.
  130. ↑ Karstadt insolvency administrator sends liquidation plan to creditors - FTD .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Dow Jones, September 2, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.dowjones.de  
  131. ^ Gunhild Lütge: Karstadt. The blockade . In: Die Zeit , No. 33/2010.
  132. ↑ Henning Hinze, Birgit Dengel: Agenda: Sales at Karstadt . ( Memento from July 31, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) Financial Times Germany, September 2, 2010.
    wit / dpa: Warenhaus-Poker. Karstadt fears about the last chance . Spiegel Online , September 2, 2010.
    “According to 'FTD' information, the Italian department store entrepreneur Maurizio Borletti has been addressing mezzanine financiers since Wednesday to get them to sell their loans to him. 'So far nobody has been ready to sell,' it was said in financial circles. Such a deal can also be carried out at the last minute. "
  133. ↑ Carsten Knop, Brigitte Koch: Karstadt is saved . In: FAZ , September 2, 2010.
  134. ^ Karstadt rescue: court adjourned decision . In: Focus , September 3, 2010.
  135. ↑ Karstadt: Berggruen can now take over . In: TextilWirtschaft , September 3, 2010.
    Karstadt: Definitely saved . In: Focus , September 3, 2010.
  136. ↑ Kevin P. Hoffmann: After the rescue. Karstadt celebrates on Ku'damm: "We are one big family" . In: Der Tagesspiegel , September 3, 2010.
    "Labor Minister Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), for example, thanked the Deutsche Bank board member Jürgen Fitschen, who had been a great help."
  137. ↑ Dirk Müller: Orientation towards local needs. Investor can take over Karstadt . Deutschlandradio , September 3, 2010, an interview with Thomas Roeb.
  138. ^ A b c Michael Backhaus, Walter Mayer, Burkhard Uhlenbroich: Investor Nicolas Berggruen: "At Karstadt, I am a temporary shepherd" . In: BamS , September 5, 2010. Interview with Berggruen.
  139. ↑ Karstadt buyer relies on good cooperation with landlord group . Reuters , September 5, 2010.
  140. ^ Hagen Seidel: department store chain. "Blackmail" - Karstadt rescuers attack each other . welt.de , July 13, 2010.
  141. ↑ Chaostage at Karstadt: High Street countered Berggruen and Valovis . dpa / Der Handel , July 13, 2010.
  142. ^ Eckhard Fuhr : Karstadt. Everything can turn out well with Nicolas Berggruen . In: Berliner Morgenpost , September 5, 2010.
  143. ↑ Brigitte Koch: Commentary. War of the Roses for Karstadt . In: FAZ , August 18, 2010.
  144. ↑ Karstadt Monopoly continues . ( Memento of the original from August 20, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. fashionunited.de, August 11, 2010.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.fashionunited.de
  145. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Savior status on credit . welt.de , September 4, 2010.
  146. ↑ a b Hagen Seidel: The real rescue of Karstadt is still pending . welt.de , July 25, 2010.
  147. ↑ Christoph Heinemann: I cannot imagine that anyone dares to continue gambling . Deutschlandfunk , September 3, 2010, Interview with Margret Mönig-Raane:
    “It's really a unique one, so I haven't seen it before, you can't say a drama, but a process that makes a contract negotiation such jumps, backward gaps and other things what does [...]. "
  148. ↑ The ongoing dispute over Karstadt is a unique case . , dpa / Sächsische Zeitung , August 10, 2010:
    “The struggle for Karstadt is now an exceptional event among lawyers. 'That has never happened before,' says a spokesman for the Essen district court. "
  149. ↑ Angela Maier: Brutalization of Morals: From hearing and saying at Karstadt . ( Memento from July 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Financial Times Deutschland , July 28, 2010.
  150. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Irresponsible action . welt.de , August 13, 2010.
  151. ↑ For example with Oliver Santen: BILD interview with Metro boss. What will happen to Karstadt now, Mr. Cordes? . In: BILD , December 13, 2009.
  152. ↑ Klaus Röther: jubilation and "huge relief" after Karstadt was rescued .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Gießener Anzeiger , September 3, 2010. VG: Tears of joy at Karstadt Lübeck . HL-live.de, September 3, 2010. Joachim Röderer: Freiburg: Cheers on all Karstadt floors . In: Badische Zeitung , September 3, 2010. oss / gb: Karstadt employees: “We are overjoyed” . In: Abendzeitung , September 3, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.giessener-anzeiger.de  


  153. ↑ Nadja Passon: newsecho.de, September 3, 2010.
    Martina Zick: Leonberg. “Of course we toasted it” . ( Memento from January 10, 2018 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , September 6, 2010.
    Wowereit relieved with the Karstadt rescue .  (     Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , ddp / Berlin Online, September 3, 2010.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.berlinonline.de  
  154. ↑ a b Karstadt rescue: retail in the city breathes a sigh of relief . ( Memento of the original from September 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. gewerbeimmobilien24.de, September 7, 2010.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.gewerbeimmobilien24.de
  155. ↑ Sarah Hubrich: Karstadt: The fear of the sales . , DerWesten, June 8th, 2009.
    Karstadt: The rebirth of the “cult brand” . In: Focus , September 24, 2010.
  156. ↑ ges / dpa: Doubts about the implementation of the new Karstadt concept . In: Der Handel , September 7, 2010.
  157. ↑ Tino Andresen: Berggruen cannot afford to fail . In: Handelsblatt , September 3, 2010. Interview with Thomas Roeb:
    “For a long time I thought merging with Kaufhof was the only solution. But the Karstadt management around Thomas Fox actually has a plan with which to do something. Even with the current rent payments, you are apparently not making any operational losses. [...] With the appropriate leadership that Karstadt now apparently has, I consider the chain to be viable in the medium term. It can still be on the market in 20 years, even if perhaps with a few houses less than today. "
  158. ↑ Stephan Bauer: Experts doubt the future of Karstadt . Finanz.net , September 4, 2010.
    Analysis flash: Commerzbank leaves Metro on "Add" .  (     Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: WirtschaftsWoche , September 7, 2010. Jürgen Elfers: "The current total of 202 Karstadt and Kaufhof department stores would have to be reduced to 60 to 120."@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.wiwo.de  
  159. ↑ Hagen Seidel: Karstadt buyer puts landlord under pressure . welt.de , June 13, 2010.
  160. ^ Annette Becker: Das Schwarzer-Peter-Spiel. Comment on the agreement at Karstadt . In: Börsen-Zeitung , September 2, 2010.
    “The loans, according to the milkmaid bill at the time, were to be serviced from the increasing rental income. It was actually foreseeable that the losing department stores would not be able to afford this in the long run. But greed rules in the hype. "
  161. ↑ Henning Hinze: Karstadt: The fairy tale of the liberation blow in bankruptcy . ( Memento from September 12, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Financial Times Deutschland , September 10, 2010.