Use of German small weapons at sea

The use of German small arms at sea includes combat operations by small combat units of the Kriegsmarine from April 1944 to May 1945 in various theaters of the Second World War . A first use of so-called small weapons , d. H. with manned torpedoes , explosive devices , micro-submarines and combat swimmers , took place on April 20, 1944 in the Mediterranean near Anzio with manned torpedoes of the negro type . This was followed by attacks on Allied naval forces on the English Channel in Normandy as part of the Allied landings there as well as in the Ligurian Sea and the Adriatic Sea . Furthermore, the units officially designated as K-formations (small combat associations) acted from the end of 1944 off the Dutch coast from the Scheldt to the Thames estuary and in the North Sea off Norway .

The small ordnance remained tactically and strategically at all locations below the high expectations of the German Naval War Command (SKL). Apart from a few successes, such as the sinking of the French destroyer La Combattante on February 24, 1945, the small combat units could not show any results of sinking. Their high loss and failure rates could ultimately no longer be compensated for towards the end of the war and in some cases resulted in self-sacrifice . A total of around 500 lone fighters lost their lives by the end of the war.

Mediterranean Sea

The operations of the K-units in the Mediterranean area concentrated during their first operation in the sea area around Anzio . After that, the focus of the K-missions shifted to the Ligurian Sea near Monaco - San Remo and the Adriatic Sea near Pola . The main operations were initially carried out by negroes , who were subsequently replaced by the lens explosive device and assault boats . The small-submarines of the Newche type and the martens designed as successors to the Negroes played a subordinate role due to their limited military use. The successes of the K associations in the Mediterranean region remained modest, with high losses of their own. There are no confirmed sinkings by Allied ships. The only success during this year-long mission was the damage to the French destroyer Trombe on January 17, 1945.

The baptism of fire of the small combat units was the sea ​​combat operation in front of Anzio in the night of April 20 to 21, 1944. The aim of the K units was to sink Allied convoys and ships in the port of the coastal city. However, the operation carried out by 23 negroes was a failure. The majority of reported commercial vessels was unnoticed at the time of the attack, from the German Enlightenment, already expired again, so that the attackers, lack of suitable targets could easily damage only three minor ships and the pier. 10 Negro pilots lost their lives in this attack. Furthermore, the Allies were able to rescue a negro driving in a circle , whose pilot had suffocated, undamaged. This gave them knowledge of the use of this weapon, which later negated German surprise effects.

Ligurian sea

Naval battles in the Ligurian Sea

Part of: Operation Shingle ( World War II )

German naval railway battery fires at enemy destroyers near San Remo in October 1944.

date	August 26, 1944 to April 1945
place	Ligurian Sea , Adriatic Sea
output	allied victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire R.SI	United States United Kingdom Italy
Commander
Werner Hartmann (8 / 1944–10 / 1944) Friedrich Böhme (from 12/1944)
losses
Marten 110 lenses> 23 newts 10 assault boats> 13 (approx. 150 lone fighters)	Damage to the French destroyer Trombe

Italian soldiers of the X-MAS , recognizable by the sleeve badge with the original red X , in March 1944 on the occasion of a troop parade near Rome .

As early as three years before the K-associations were officially founded , German naval units had been deployed to a limited extent in the Italian " Decima MAS " since September 1941 . However, their operations were limited to isolated operations with their explosive vessels and speedboats, which were under the leadership of the Italian Navy. After the capitulation of Italy on September 19, 1943, the stationing ports of the "Decima MAS", including that of La Spezia , were under the jurisdiction of the Fascist Italian Social Republic (RSI) in northern Italy, but were logistically and personally in a desolate condition. so that the operational readiness of the flotilla was not guaranteed. On September 19, 1943, Lieutenant Captain Helmut von Manthey was instructed to restore the flotilla to full operational readiness. Manthey acted as a liaison officer between the "Decima MAS" and the Navy.

The flotilla, which from this point on called itself “X-MAS” (X = 10; MAS = M ezzi d ' As salto), thus actually came under German command. Manthey's priority was the procurement of new attack boats of the type MTSMA as well as of explosive devices of the type MTM in order to replenish the depleted stocks. Internal unrest in the industrial centers of the RSI as well as the dissatisfaction of the members of the Decima MAS delayed the restoration of combat readiness beyond measure, so that Manthey was only able to report the full operational readiness of the flotilla in December 1943. The first attacks in December 1943 and January 1944 with mixed crews (Germans and Italians) against Allied landing craft were unsuccessful.

The "X-MAS" also increasingly suffered from staff losses, as many flotilla members deserted or fled to join the Italian partisan groups that attacked the RSI and the German occupying forces. The remaining relatives increasingly refused the orders of their Wehrmacht superiors, so that the OKM finally sent a staff of 1,765 to Italy in order to be able to secure the loyalty of the flotilla. The "X-MAS" finally lost its previously respected independence from the German associations on May 23, 1944, when its flotilla became an official part of the K associations.

After this takeover, Admiral Hellmuth Heye ordered the flotilla to be moved to northern France immediately, with a view to the invasion that had been expected for months. He revoked this order a little later because the overland relocation brought insoluble logistical problems. The command staff of the German assault boats became Monaco . On August 22nd, 1944, the "Einsatzstab Haun" was formed from the existing storm boats of the flotilla, named after its commander, Corvette Captain Kurt Haun. The new unit was initially relocated to Ville Franche in order to operate in the sea area off Nice . Since August 11, 1944, Haun's flotilla has been subordinate to the previous leader of the submarines in the Mediterranean (FdU Mediterranean), Werner Hartmann . On August 30, 1944, the assault boat flotilla was relocated to San Remo . Their quarters staff stayed there until a few days before the end of the war. On the Mediterranean, all K-formations were placed under the command of the staff of the small combat associations Italy (KdK-Stab Italy). Hartmann remained its head of operations until October 1944. In December 1944 Friedrich Böhme took over this post, which from then on was referred to as KdK-Stab Süd.

On September 5, 1944, Lieutenant Wilhelm Ullrich succeeded Kurt Haun as chief of the flotilla. Under his leadership, the "X-MAS" was given the new name "K-Flotilla 611".

After the heavy defensive battles of the K units in the course of the Allied landing in Normandy , which, in addition to successes, had also revealed the weaknesses of the Negroes and the small submarines of the beaver type , the K units withdrawn from Normandy were transferred to the Dutch Coast reformed. Most of them were lens- type explosive boats and beavers . The martens, considered to be militarily useless (the negroes had meanwhile been completely withdrawn from the front), were relocated to northeastern Italy. Their mission was to attack another Allied invasion fleet that began Operation Dragoon on August 15, 1944 in southern France. Due to previous massive bombing raids on the Kriegsmarine in this region, where 98 German warships and 44 merchant ships together with 104,162 GRT were sunk, they found themselves practically defenseless on the day of the invasion. The martens should receive support from Linsen . The RSI (X-MAS) speedboats should also be used for the first time. mo.

The first flotilla of the K-formations, the 1st Sturmboot-Flotilla (K-Flotilla 611), formerly X-MAS, on the Ligurian coast already left San Remo on August 16 and 17, 1944 for its first deployment however remained unsuccessful. Another attack took place on the night of August 25th to 26th, 1944 as well as on August 27th, 1944 and on August 30th, 1944, all of which were unsuccessful. According to their own statements, they sank an unknown Allied cruiser and a motor torpedo boat during this time. However, both sinkings were never confirmed by the Allies, as was an alleged sinking on August 28, 1944.

As another K-Association, the K-Flotilla 364 (Marder) reached San Remo on September 3, 1944 under Oberleutnant zur See Peter Bergers. The first group of 12 martens also arrived with him . The boats were immediately made ready for action. The first attack on the Allied warships cruising off San Remo took place on September 5, 1944 with five martens , four of which were lost. Three pilots were captured, one lost his life. The Allies had no losses. By September 7, 1944, the second group with 15 martens had arrived in San Remo.

The second day of the attack varies depending on the sources on September 8, 1944, September 10, 1944 or September 10, 1944. In this attack from Vatimiglia, 10 or 14 martens and five assault boats, two of them Italian, were involved , which had the Gulf of St. Tropez as their destination. While the assault boats returned unharmed after contact with the enemy, ten martens were lost. The Allies again suffered no losses. In order to complete the total loss of the martens , Allied warships shelled the port of Ventimiglia on the same evening and destroyed the remaining four martens . The remaining operational martens were then withdrawn to San Remo and from there on to Padua in the Adriatic Sea.

The assault boats stationed in San Remo ran out on the night of September 14th to 15th, 1944 for another mission, which, however, did not lead to any contact with the enemy. Another advance on September 17, 1944 resulted in skirmishes with cruising US destroyers, who then shelled the port of San Remo and destroyed at least 13 assault boats.

On September 19, 1944 and September 20, 1944, respectively, the first micro-submarines of the Molch type of the K-Flotilla 411 arrived in San Remo under their flotilla boss Heinrich Hille. During the test drives that began immediately, several fatal accidents occurred because, after the hasty relocation from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, the trimming of the newts had not been adjusted to the salinity of the Mediterranean. After the chambers were flooded , a newt sank to a depth of 60 meters within seconds. Although the pilots immediately started blowing out the head section, this procedure took too long, so that the boat was crushed by the water pressure.

On the night of September 25th to 26th, 1944, they set out for their first attack from Menton and Nice , with the number of pigs leaving as 9 and 12 respectively. However, the mission ended in another disaster. Only two marten pilots survived the mission. The two returning martens were destroyed a little later by long-range fire from cruisers. After the loss, Hille therefore had no choice but to withdraw the K-Flotilla 411 from the action. The flotilla staff was moved to Trieste without equipment , where it arrived on November 11, 1944. The newts were not used there until the end of the war. This was at the same time the end of the K-associations against the supply routes of the company Dragoon.

On October 18, 1944, the K-Flotilla 213 (explosive vessel type Linse ) arrived in San Remo. Previously, she had already driven from August 24 to September 10, 1944 missions in the Bay of St. Tropez, where they had to complain about 13 losses. The explosive boats were stored in the large flower hall by the harbor. This position was betrayed to the Allies, and on October 20, 1944, a British destroyer set fire to the hall. All 48 explosive devices, four Italian MTMs and 20 transport vehicles were lost.

The K-Flotilla 213, now without emergency equipment, was then relocated to Verona . It was not until November 23, 1944, that their stock of lenses could be brought back to the planned 60 units through new additions. Heye also attributed the high losses and lack of success of the K associations to the inadequate training of the pilots at home. He wrote a corresponding memorandum to the OKM in which he complained about the poor training of the pilots. Under these circumstances, Heye said, no better performance can be expected. The OKM replied that “the use of the K-formations does not primarily serve to destroy the ship, but rather to bind the ship”. The losses of martens in the Mediterranean area could not be compensated for until mid-November 1944 and were accompanied by new instructions for use.

Graphic representation of the marten with " battle paint ".

On the night of November 18th to 19th, 1944, 15 martens left San Remo for an attack, which resulted in 8 further casualties. In December 1944, the assault boats of the K-formations resumed their fight. The attack is indicated with the night of December 9th to December 10th, 1944 or December 11th to December 12th, 1944. Here 24 assault boats and speedboats ran from San Remo to intercept a convoy that was from Marseille to Villefranche . The Allies recorded no casualties in spite of fierce fighting. The K-Associations had to complain about the loss of three boats.

The next marten deployment of the K-Flotilla 363 took place on the night of December 18 to 19, 1944 and on the night of December 19 to 20, 1944, the number of devices used fluctuating between 14 and 15. The attack was again unsuccessful and only 6 pilots returned to San Remo. The last marten attack , carried out by the K-Flotilla 364, in 1944, consisting of 5 boats, took place on December 31, 1944 from the French city of Villefranche-sur-Mer , which however remained unsuccessful. Four of the departed pilots returned. Then the remaining martens of the K flotillas 363 and 364 were relocated to Saonara on the Adriatic coast. In January 1945, the assault boats of the K-formations (K-Flotilla 611) only made two more sporadic attacks. So on January 9 or 10, 1945 and January 17, 1945. On this day, the French destroyer Trombe was damaged by a torpedo attack. The 33 lenses from La Spezia , also used that day , lost 10 units. As a result, the K-Flotilla 213 was withdrawn to Verona at the turn of the year 1944/1945 and from there relocated to Lake Balaton in Hungary for further operations .

In February and March 1945, the offensive activities of the K units were stopped. It was not until April 24, 1945 that the K associations in the Ligurian region pooled their last reserves of marten. However, of the 17 martens expelled from San Remo , 15 were lost. Of the 264 devices used, 162 were lost by the end of the war, with 150 lone fighters being killed. The last attack by the assault boats, which was supported by lenses , took place on the night of April 22nd to 23rd, 1945, but was no longer successful. This ended the K-formations and their missions in the Ligurian Sea.

Adriatic

Operations of the K-Flotilla 612 (assault boats)

• November 20, 1944: Recovery of the wounded from the damaged hospital ship in Tübingen
• November 24, 1944: From Pola 16 assault boats with Dugi-Otok operational area. Termination due to bad weather
• 3rd and 4th December 1944: From Pola against sea targets in the sea area of ​​Cigale without success
• December 6, 1944: Destruction of the Punta Nera lighthouse from Pola
• December 17, 1944: Meiada attacked from Pola and the pier and a storage room were blown up
• January 18 and 19, 1945: Attack against Zara from Pola

The K-formations in the Adriatic were grouped under the 6th K-Division under the command of Kapitänleutnant Witt. It consisted of the K-Flotilla 411 (Molch) , the K-Flotilla 611 (only parts) and 612 (assault boats) as well as the fully motorized MEK 71, which was the main carrier of the K-operations in the Adriatic. In addition, the German command was responsible for an Italian submarine flotilla with four small submarines of the type CB . The headquarters were in Pola in February 1945 . The 1st Schnellboot Division of the Kriegsmarine did not belong to the K-formations, but cooperated with them in operations . In September 1944, the MEK 71 began deploying along the Albanian and Yugoslav coasts as well as the coastal areas of Croatia , with the operational areas concentrated on the northern part of the Adriatic. The martens also stationed there , however, did not find any suitable sea targets in this sea area, so that most of them remained in the ports during the last months of the war.

One of the first K-sorties in the Adriatic took place on the night of September 15, 1944 by six combat swimmers from MEK 71, which aimed at the port of Ancona and failed. Another attempt on September 18, 1944 failed. In October 1944 there was another commando operation against Šibenik (Croatia) and in November 1944 against various ports on the Dalmatian islands. Further acts of sabotage against Selve and Gruizza followed. In December 1944, MEK 71 carried out countless small businesses along the entire Dalmatian coast. They were supported by the 1st Schnellboot Division . Their goals were road and railway bridges, water and electricity works, fuel and goods stores, but also radar stations. Combat swimmers were also active on the islands of Olib , Silba , Melada and Dugi Otok , which were occupied by the British and Tito's partisans . On February 11, 1945 combat swimmers attacked the port of Split , where they were able to damage two ship units.

In April 1945 these attacks were directed towards the west coast of Italy, for example at Senigallia and others. In this last month of the war, the combat swimmers were able to destroy several fuel depots and road bridges. Furthermore also electrical masts and freight wagons. On April 21, 1945, the OKM issued an order that all forces of the K-formations had to withdraw from the Adriatic coast in order to be integrated into the army as ground support units. Most of the devices were then rendered unusable or blown up. That was the end of the K-units' presence in the Mediterranean. The MEK 71 capitulated in Vigo di Fassa in the first days of May 1945 . The MEK 90, whose operations are largely undocumented, reported by radio to the command post south from Agram in March 1945 . Then the trail of the MEK is lost after it reached Germany. The stationed assault boats also did not launch any major offensive until the end of the war and limited their cooperation with the MEK 71.

North Sea

Normandy

Naval battles on the beaches of Normandy

Part of: Operation Neptune ( World War II )

Landing began in June 1944

date	June 21, 1944 to August 27, 1944
place	Normandy Coast ( France )
output	allied victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	United Kingdom United States Canada
Commander
Karl-Friedrich-Böhme
Troop strength
≈ 200
losses
34 negroes 72 martens 20 combat lenses ≈ 105 people	> 375

The Allied landing in Normandy began on June 6, 1944 . The hope of being able to use the K-formations in the form of negroes and beavers as an offensive weapon against the invasion fleet in the first days after the landing failed because of delays in their construction or the long approach. All K-formations in Normandy were under the tactical command of Captain Friedrich Böhme, the chief of the command staff west. A wounding of Boehme meant that he had to briefly transfer the command of operations to his deputy lieutenant Karl-Heinz Potthast. The first K contingent was the K-Flotilla 211 with 36 lenses , of which 24 were battle boats and 12 guide boats on June 21, 1944 in Honfleur . The commander of the flotilla was Kapitänleutnant Ulrich Kolbe. On the night of June 25th to 26th, 1944, 8 guide boats and 23 combat boats ran out at night, initially pulled by R-boats with the destination Seine Bay. However, due to an operating error, a lens detonated in the harbor basin and sank two guide boats in addition to the R-46. Due to the rough sea, however, all lenses sank at the destination or ran full or aground on their return march. Thus practically the entire flotilla was lost without contact with the enemy. Two more half-hearted attack attempts in the last weeks of June ended in the same way, so that Böhme had to report to Heye on June 30, 1944 that no further operations on the lenses were possible.

The K-Flotilla 361 (Neger) with 60 devices left Germany on June 13th. In order to avoid Allied air raids during the day, the relocation was only carried out at night. During the day, the transport vehicles were protected from detection with camouflage nets in the woods. This led to weeks of deployment delays, so that the first group of 30 Negroes arrived in Trouville on June 28, 1944 ; it was immediately moved to Villers-sur-Mer . On July 6, 1944, the second group of 30 negroes arrived. With that the K-Flotilla 361 was complete. It was then to be reinforced by the K-Flotilla 362 and K-Flotilla 363 , all of them negroes , who were still on their way at the time. On the night of July 5th to 6th, the first attack took place, consisting of 26 negroes , two of whom had to turn back due to a technical defect. Other sources put the leaked boats at 30. The remaining boats attacked the anchored Allied ships and sank the two minesweepers HMS Magic at 3:35 a.m. and HMS Cato at 5:11 a.m. with about 50 dead each, as well as the British frigate HMS Trollope . The Trollope was torpedoed by Corporal Walter Gerhold and sank badly damaged two days later. There were no dead. Gerhold received the Knight's Cross on July 6, 1944 for this achievement . There is different information about the number of own losses. It fluctuates between 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 16. The pilots returning home, however, reported excessive successes in scuttling. A total of 6 ships should have been destroyed. Johann-Otto Krieg , head of the K-Flotilla 361, was also awarded the Knight's Cross on July 8, 1944 for his leadership work during the operation. The propaganda cannibalized the initial success of the K-associations and stylized the first two Knight's Cross of the type of weapon to heroes of the kingdom .

The balance of power of the Navy (including K-formations) versus the Allied invasion fleet was about 1:19 at the time of the invasion

Beaver captured by the Allies (photo 1945)

The second attack took place one day later, on the night of July 6th to 7th, 1944, with 21 negroes . The night of July 8th to 9th, 1944, is also mentioned as the start of the attack. The mission ended with a total loss. None of the departing negroes returned. Only two pilots survived but were taken prisoners of war . The Allied fleet lost the mine sweeper HMS Pylades that night and the light cruiser OPR Dragon was badly damaged. It was not until July 19 that the stocks of negroes and martens were replenished. The reinforcement arriving from Germany comprised around 60 brand-new martens , other sources speak of 58 for the K-Flotilla 361 and, for the first time in use, the manned torpedoes of the type Marder of the K-Flotilla 362. 48 lenses also arrived (16 guide and 32 combat boats). On the night of July 20, 1944, there was a third attack in which the HMS Isis was sunk. It has not yet been established whether the loss was caused by a torpedo attack or a sea mine. Further successes have not become known. There are also no figures on further German losses.

One of the largest combined attacks by 58 martens of the K-Flotilla 362 and 48 lenses , of which 12 guide boats of the K-Flotilla 211 took place in the night of August 2nd to 3rd, 1944. It was the largest, but also the last major attack by K- Associations in Normandy. 41 marten pilots lost their lives, which corresponded to a loss of 70 percent. At least 14 lenses , including 6 battle boats, were also lost. On the other hand, the Allies also suffered their greatest losses that night from small-scale weapons attacks. 130 crew members lost their lives in the sinking of the British destroyer HMS Quorn . The minesweeping trawler HMS Gairsay and the landing craft LCG 764 were also sunk . The ships Fort Lalla Rouge , Samlong and MMS Durban suffered severe damage . For the sinking of HMS Quorn , the chief telegraph master Herbert Berrer was awarded the Knight's Cross. Alfred Vetter also received the Knight's Cross. On August 26, 1944, Friedrich Böhme was awarded the Knight's Cross as commander of the K flotilla, and on November 3, 1944, Helmut Bastian received the Knight's Cross. After this 6th award, there were no further awards of the Knight's Cross to members of the K associations until the end of the war. After this battle, the K-formations were almost completely destroyed, so that on August 6 and 7, 1944, the attacks could only be continued by speedboats of the Navy and long-range torpedoes of the Dachshund type .

On the night of August 8th to 9th, 1944, all the lenses of the K-bandages still available were mobilized for a further attack. Including 12 command boats and 16 combat boats. The attack on shipping off Courseulles-sur-Mer did not bring any confirmed success, although the returnees claimed that at least 9 ships had been sunk. Only 8 guide boats survived the fighting. On August 10 and August 14, 1944, the long-range torpedoes Dachshund were again used, which were again shot down by speedboats and unconfirmed losses on the enemy. It was not until the night of August 15-16, 1944 that the K-units, which had since received reinforcements from home, went into action again. That night, 11 martens of the K-Flotilla 363 left, of which, however, seven had to turn back due to the rough seas. The remaining four returned without success. Other sources put the loss of 5 martens .

One day later, from August 16 to 17, 1944, the manned torpedoes were last used in Normandy. By bundling all the devices that were still available, another 42 martens could be mobilized for a mission. The landing craft LCF 11 and the small training ship HMS Fratton (757 GRT) were sunk with 26 own losses (rate 62%) . The French battleship Courbet , already aground on June 9, 1944 as a block ship, received two direct hits. The transport ship Iddesleigh also received a direct hit, although it did not sink.

Due to the high losses of the K units, Friedrich Böhme, head of the command staff West, decided to withdraw the remnants of the K flotillas 362 and 211 on August 18, 1944 from Normandy. Of 158 negroes and martens , a total of 105 had been lost by August 1944, which makes a loss rate of around 60%. The marten flotilla was then moved to Denmark and was no longer used until the end of the war. The martens and lentils , which were already on the march , were stopped and ordered back. When strong Allied tank units emerged from their bridgeheads on August 20, 1944, the German front in France finally collapsed. Hundreds of thousands of Wehrmacht members fled east and blocked all access roads with their columns. There they became an easy target for the Allied combat aircraft that dominated the airspace. However, a German column moved against the current towards Fécamp . Corvette Captain Hans Bartels , commander of the 1st Beaver Flotilla (K-Flotilla 261) sat in their command car . In his pocket was a special ID signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Karl Dönitz :

“Corvette captain Hans Bartels is the leader of a special unit in the Navy. He is executing my direct orders. His mission is secret; nobody is entitled to request information about this. At his request he is to be given all possible support so that he can achieve his goal and fulfill his task "

- Dönitz Grand Admiral Commander in Chief of the Navy

The approach of the beaver flotilla with 20 training beavers took place from August 22nd to 27th 1944 from Belgium via Tournai . Their actual destination Le Havre had already been occupied by Allied troops, so that only the threatened port of Fécamp remained to resume the fight against the ship's targets in the Seine bay. Their approach had also been chaotic due to the Allied air sovereignty. Several soldiers were killed and some beavers destroyed or damaged on the way to the front . The beavers were supposed to be supported by a newly formed flotilla of lenses , which got stuck in Brussels due to the rapid advance of the Allies on the French mainland and eventually had to be relocated back to Germany. On the night of August 29th to 30th, 1944, the beavers took up the fight of the K units. Of the 22 beavers launched into the water, only 14 beavers were able to leave for their first combat mission due to the damage in the harbor ; other sources indicate 16. There was wind force 4 to 5, which meant that twelve of them had to stop their work prematurely. The two remaining beavers , which were steered by Lieutenant zur See Dohse from Funkmaat Bösch, claimed after their return that they had sunk an unknown Liberty freighter and a larger merchant ship. However, both reported sinkings were never confirmed by the Allies. Developments on the land front forced the hasty evacuation of the port of Fécamp on August 31st, with the majority of the beavers having to be blown up. The few devices for which suitable transports were available left the port just an hour before the Allies took it and were soon destroyed by British tanks. During the hasty retreat, the Allies fell into the hands of a damaged beaver , which was immediately taken to Portsmouth for investigation. The remaining beavers were relocated to Rotterdam and re-erected there in order to combat the Allied shipping traffic on the lower Scheldt .

Scheldt estuary

Sea battles at the Scheldt estuary

Part of: Battle of the Scheldt Estuary
( World War II )

Fighting for the Scheldt on November 1st, 1944

date	October 5, 1944 to April 1945
place	Scheldt estuary ( Netherlands / Belgium )
output	Allied victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	United Kingdom United States Canada
Commander
Werner Musenberg
losses
> 70 beavers and newts > 54 lenses

October to December 1944

After the withdrawal of the K-formations from Normandy, a reorganization took place. One part was stationed in northern Germany and later Norway, another moved to the Ligurian Sea and the Adriatic Sea. These two groups no longer played a major role until the end of the war. From now on, the essential core of the K associations was concentrated in the Dutch-Belgian coastal area.

The widely ramified and partly shallow waters of the Scheldt offered the K-formations optimal conditions and at the same time the basis for supplying the trapped German troops in Dunkirk. Since the negroes and martens were intended to be relocated to Denmark and Norway , the fighting on the Belgian-Dutch coast was to be carried out exclusively by beavers and lentils . The lenses were given three important tasks. On the one hand the attack on the Allied convoy traffic in the Scheldt as well as the protection of the German supplies for Dunkirk and furthermore the transport and the support of commando companies of the MEKs For this purpose all explosive boats flotillas should be used. They were supported in this by the micro-submarines of the Seehund type , whose operational area extended from the Thames estuary to the Strait of Dover . The Schelde was for the supply of the second US Army through the port of Antwerp of the utmost strategic importance, especially after the Scheldt estuary in the Scheldt battle except the "fortress Dunkirk had fallen" already in Allied hands. For this purpose, all K-formations, including the MEK 60, which were in the Dunkirk-Hangsthol-North Jutland-Helgoland area, were placed under the command staff of Holland under Corvette Captain Werner Musenberg.

Standard version of the snap Boots lens

Explosive vessel attack (schematic representation); the central boat acts as a command boat, the two outer ones as combat boats

The installation was completed at the beginning of October 1944, so that the first deployment could take place on October 5, 1944. All 60 lenses of the K-Flotilla 214 were involved in the operation, according to a group that was supposed to bring 60 supplies to the Dunkirk fortress as part of the Comrade Company as part of the MEK . Due to a lack of agreements with other German units, however, two lenses were accidentally destroyed by self- fire on the approach . The enterprise was then started. The other four groups ran out to skirmish with British minesweepers in the Scheldt. The following fighting ended in defeat for the K units. None of the attacked targets could be sunk or damaged, and out of 60 lenses only 26 returned to Vlissingen . Another source mentions the loss of 36 lenses in this context . On October 12th, the K-Flotilla 215 with 60 boats arrived in Groningen as reinforcement , which were then moved to Rotterdam . From there 28 lenses were transported to Vlissingen.

On the night of October 22, 1944, these 28 lenses were again entrusted with the supply of the Dunkirk fortress; 14 boats were probably lost to enemy artillery fire. The other 14 boats turned back after losing contact with the command boat. The operation had failed, but was repeated on October 24, 1944 by explosive boats of the K-Flotilla 215. This mission also failed. Further attacks with 12 lenses on October 26th and 27th, 1944 were again ineffective. The damage to two barges claimed for this period was not confirmed by the Allies. On October 30, two units of the K-Flotilla 215 ran out again for further ventures. Nothing was known about successes. On November 1, the strength of the K-formations in the Schelden room was 126 boats, 96 of them lenses and 30 beavers . On November 8th, the stationing place Vlissingen was lost and was taken by a Polish division.

The harbors of Den Helder (36 boats), Scheveningen (36 boats) and Hellevoetsluis (24 boats) became new collection points for lenses . Due to the bad weather conditions, no further attacks by the K units on the Scheldt were possible until the end of November 1944, and the four-week break was used for repairs and the urgent supply of reinforcements. Also for converting beavers and lenses into mine carriers. It was not until November 21st that some lenses leaked again to attack the port of Moerdijk , which was occupied by the Allies . However, they did not find any ships there and instead damaged the port facilities there. After that the weather worsened again, so that neither lenses nor beavers , who had meanwhile arrived with two flotillas in Poortershaven, Hellevoetsluis and Groningen , could intervene in the fighting. A use of 12 lenses on December 5, 1944 resulted in the total loss of all boats. On December 17, 1944, 27 lenses leaked again despite the bad weather. Their use brought no success reports. When the mission was repeated on December 18, 1944, only three boats reached the target area; 13 lenses had run aground on the approach. Another advance, this time with 21 lenses on December 19, 1944, resulted in no enemy contact, but 5 boats were lost.

Groningen The hero IJmuiden Scheveningen Poortershaven Hellevoetsluis Dordrecht Vlissingen North Sea Netherlands German Empire Belgium

Locations of the K-associations in Holland. From January 1945, IJmuiden acted as the division location of the 5th K-Division and as the starting point for the seal operations .

The first beaver deployment began on the night of December 22nd to 23rd 1944 with eight beavers from Poortershaven and 10 beavers from Hellevoetsluis. In the course of this, the beavers were able to assert the sinking of the freighter Alan A. Dale (4707 GRT) sailing under the American flag , formerly a Danish merchant ship, in the Scheldt estuary. All 65 crew members survived the attack. The K-formations lost 12 of the 18 beavers deployed on this mission . On the night of December 23 to 24, 1944, another 11 beavers left Hellevoetsluis for the Scheldt. One sank on the approach without enemy influence, another got stuck and the remaining nine were all lost. Another attack by three beavers on the following night from December 24th to 25th, 1944 again ended with a total loss; their fate is unknown. The lenses, which were also used on December 24th, were also unsuccessful. On December 25th, six beavers were lost in a mine operation. Another accident of the K-formations followed on December 27th: probably due to a technical defect, the torpedo of a beaver detached itself in the lock of the Voore Canal , and 11 of the 14 beavers gathered in the lock were lost.

K inventory December 11, 1944

Location	number	Branch of service
Groningen	60	lenses
The hero	36	lenses
Scheveningen	24	lenses
Hellevoetsluis	12	lenses
Dordrecht	12	lenses
Poortershaven	30th	beaver
Groningen	59	beaver

The three undamaged boats ran out and were all lost. The last beaver mission started on the night of December 29th to 30th, 1944. Of the 15 micro-submarines that ran out, only 5 returned. The number of beavers lost by the end of the year varies, depending on the sources, between 31, approx. 50 (by December 27, 1944) or 52 vehicles. However, a list of the operations mentioned here documents a loss of 53 beavers . In contrast, only a single ship was sunk. Furthermore, the K-associations lost around 115 lenses by the end of the year . The massive losses of beavers , which could hardly be replenished by adding new equipment, forced Captain Werner Musenberg at the end of 1944 to ask the naval warfare command whether a suspension of all beaver operations was conceivable. He cited the numerous technical defects and the lack of information regarding the actual Allied ship movements on the Scheldt estuary and suggested that one should first evaluate the experience of the approaching seal operations in order to then decide whether to proceed with the beaver missions. However, Dönitz rejected the proposal against the background of the “total war mission”. At the turn of the year only 50 reserve beavers were available; another 60 were expected as reinforcements.

January to April 1945

January 1945 brought such bad weather that almost every deployment of the K-formations on the Scheldt had to be canceled. In one of these few operations, which was carried out with 12 lenses against ship targets on January 9th, a boat was lost in rough seas and poor visibility. In mid-January 1945, 27 lenses arrived in Den Helder as reinforcement. An operation with 9 lenses ordered from Hellevoetsluis on the night of 24-25 January led to the loss of 6 boats. On the night of January 29th to 30th, 15 beavers left their base in Poortershaven for an attack, which was also catastrophic. Five vehicles turned back due to technical defects, one stranded, and the remaining six were lost with no success. On February 3, 1945, the beaver base was heavily bombed by Lancaster bombers with " Tallboys ", during which the beavers in their bunkers remained undamaged, but the destroyed port facilities prevented further operations for the rest of the month. The replacements carried out on February 19 and 21 with 15 and 9 lenses respectively remained unsuccessful. On February 21, 1945, newts intervened in the fighting for the first time, but in this case the information differed. While the number of boats in action is 14 (4 from Schevingen and 10 from Hellevoetsluis) also 14 (10 towing from Schevingen and 4 from Hellevoetsluis) and 12 boats, 6, 8 and 10 boats are given for losses.

K inventory January 20, 1945>

Location	number	Branch of service
Hellevoetsluis	27	lenses
Scheveningen	33	lenses
The hero	27	lenses
IJmuiden	26th	Seals
Rotterdam	30th	Newts
Poortershaven	20th	beaver
Amersfoort	60	Newts (reserve)
Zeist	60	Newts (reserve)

At the beginning of March 1945 the weather had improved so much that the K-formations could be used again. On March 6, 1945, while preparing for an attack in the port of Hellevoetsluis, a beaver's torpedo accidentally came off . The explosion destroyed 14 other beavers and severely damaged nine more. The remaining eleven, which subsequently expired, were all lost. A whole beaver flotilla was lost within a day . On March 10, 1945, six lenses leaked towards the mouth of the Scheldt, two of which were lost to defensive fire. The other four boats managed to return home, but were again unsuccessful. On the night of March 11-12, 1945, a major attack took place in which 27 lenses , 15 beavers and 14 newts of the K-Flotilla 1/412, which were actually already on their way to Denmark, and 27 lenses were involved . The mission ended in fiasco. 13 of the 15 beavers were lost, nine of the 14 newts did not return, and 16 lenses were destroyed by the enemy. Overall, the loss rate of the bet that remained unsuccessful was almost 70%. Most of the losses were not caused by Allied ships, but were caused by aircraft of the Swordfish type , which sank another nine beavers on March 11, 12 and 13, 1945 . The Allied air sovereignty was so overwhelming at this point that the Royal Air Force could afford to hunt individual beavers and lenses . The OKM then noted that the pigs could not be used in the Scheldt due to the cold ambient temperature, which was at the expense of the batteries; they have therefore been completely deducted. The last beaver mission on the night of March 23rd to 24th 1945, on which 16 boats left Poortershaven to lay mines in the Scheldt, cost 9 more lives.

The decline of the lenses , beavers and newts in March 1945 ended with the fact that of 56 small submarines used, 42 were lost without having achieved a single success. It didn't look much better for the lens pilots: Of the 66 boats deployed, 27 had been destroyed and they too were unable to report any sinking or damage. The K-Flotilla 413 ( Newche ) that was set up was intended as reinforcement for Holland, but was no longer used. The K-formations on the Scheldt were thus defeated by the Allies within a month without any losses of their own. The great death of the beaver and lentil crews lasted until mid-April 1945.

At the beginning of April 1945, the entire Schelden area had been occupied by British forces. The K-formations enclosed by this could therefore no longer be supplied with supplies overland. The last bases of the lenses were Scheveningen and Hellevoetsluis, where only 51 lenses were still operational. Things didn't look any better with the beavers . On April 9, but ran five beavers from Hoek van Holland made, four of which were lost. On the night of April 11th to April 12th, 1945, another beaver was lost. An attack by 15 lenses that rolled simultaneously that night failed with high losses. Another attack from April 17th to 18th 1945 had to be canceled due to bad weather. In mid-April only a handful of beavers were available. Vice-Admiral Friedrich Frisius , who was present in Dunkirk, suggested moving the remaining units to his fortress area, but this was refused with the explanation that these boats could not be dispensed with. Instead, 12 beavers ran from Hoek van Holland to Dunkirk on the night of April 20-21, 1945 , of which only 6 returned. On the following night, from April 21st to April 22nd, 1945, 6 beavers ran out of Hellevoetsluis to mine in the Scheldt, four of which never returned. After these losses, the beaver flotilla no longer existed. The last beaver mission took place on April 26, 1945, when four boats left Rotterdam in the direction of the Scheldt for mines; only one boat returned from this mission. The loss-making battle on the Scheldt came to an end at the end of April 1945, without any military benefit, and resulted in a total defeat for the local K units.

Seal missions 1945

Naval battles in the North Sea

Part of: Submarine War ( World War II )

Seals operating area in the North Sea region 1945

date	January 1, 1945 to May 6, 1945
place	North Sea - Thames Estuary
output	Allied victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	United States United Kingdom
Commander
Hermann Rasch Albrecht Brandi (from 02/45)
losses
at least 35 seals	at least 8 ships of 17,301 GRT

In December 1944, the total production of the new small submarine Seehund had risen to a total of 169 boats. Now it was possible to replace the small submarines of the Hecht type, which were only partially seaworthy, from the "Lehrkommando 300" as training boats and to gradually replace them with seals . By mid-December 1944, the training command already had 25 seals . The 1st Seal Flotilla (K-Flotilla 312), under the command of Leutnant zur See Albrecht Kiep, was set up on December 24, 1944. It was moved overland to the Netherlands immediately. IJmuiden was to be the port of deployment ; there was already a base for German speedboats. End of December 1944, 24 seals arrived, so that on 28 December 1944, the combat readiness of the seal -Flottille was reported. For the first time the identification of the seals was introduced by the corresponding abbreviation U followed by the consecutive production number. The area of operations named by Rear Admiral Leo Hepp comprised the Outer Scheldt between the Ostend -Kwinte Bank 3 ° 10 East area and that of the south coast of England to the west of 10 ° 50 ° East and south of 52 ° North. This also included the Allied shipping to Antwerp. A short time later, the units were reinforced by the K-Flotilla 313 under Lieutenant Carl Borm. The seal flotillas were subordinate to the lieutenant captain Hermann Rasch, who had his command post in IJmuiden.

January

On January 1, 1945, depending on the source, 17 or 18 small submarines of the 1st Seal Flotilla left the port of IJmuiden for their first patrol of several days. The goal was an Allied convoy off the Scheldt estuary. In this context, Dönitz ordered, due to the lack of alternatives, that the available S-boats should serve as escort protection for the departing seals while deferring their actual offensive task . At the same time, he forbade the laying of mines in order not to restrict the area of ​​operations of the seals even further and to run the risk of losing them in their own minefields.

The potential mine hazard led one of the seals used to run into a sea mine shortly after leaving the lock and explode. U 5035, on the other hand, had to return due to a technical defect. The remaining 16 boats reached their target area. However, the first mission was catastrophic. By January 5, 1945, 15 of the 17 seals used were lost. Including U 5024 , U 5305 , U 5309 , U 5311 , U 5318 and U 5327 . Only U 5035 and U 5013 returned to IJmuiden. 18 pilots were considered dead, the rest were believed to have been taken prisoner. The only success the two returning boats were able to claim was the sinking of the British war fish cutter HMT Hayburn Wyke (324 ts) on January 2, 1945 by U 5304 . U 5304 , on the way back, also ran into a sea mine and sank; the crew was killed. The total loss of the K-Flotilla 312 was a shock for those responsible. From January 6th to 7th 1945 two seals left IJmuiden, but had to turn back due to technical defects.

There are different statements about the number of seals deployed from IJmuiden on January 10, 1945, the second attack by these boats. Their number is given as 4, 5 and 4. U 5311 terminated its mission prematurely after problems with the trim system. The same applies to U 5035 , which was damaged by depth charges after its discovery. U 5042 had to be beached by the crew because both the diesel and the battery charge for the electric drive had been used up after an unsuccessful search for sea targets. Only the boat under Lieutenant Albrecht Kiep and his chief engineer Palaschewski could indicate the presumed sinking of a 3000 GRT unknown coal steamer in marine square AN 7935, which could not be confirmed. On January 15, 1945, new seals of the K-Flotilla 313 (2nd Seal Flotilla) arrived to reinforce them, so that the number of these micro-submarines was 26 again on January 20, 1945. The third attack by 10 seals took place on January 17, 1945 from IJmuiden, but it was unsuccessful. All boats returned to the port unharmed.

K inventory April 8, 1945

Location	number	Branch of service
Hellevoetsluis / Schevingen	51	lenses
IJmuiden	29	Seals
Rotterdam	24	beaver
Amersfoort	60	Newts

On January 21, 1945 another 10 seals ran out. Following technical defects, U 5033 , U 5368 , U 5334 , U 5339 , among others, had to be abandoned. Later a boat followed after the collision with a buoy and another, whose chief engineer (LI) became severely seasick (the boat was later blown up). The three remaining seals reached their area of ​​operation. One of them, U 5303 , got so far off course due to a compass failure that it stranded on the English coast near Great Yarmouth on January 25 and had to be blown up there by the crew; the crew was then discovered and picked up by the British tanker Beacon . The other two seals returned to IJmuiden without success. Thereafter the weather deteriorated rapidly and the port of IJmuiden was covered with a layer of ice that made any further operation impossible. On January 29, 1945, 10 seals ran out of IJmuiden in two groups of five boats each, one group heading for the sea area of ​​Dumpton and the other turning off to Margate . U 5041 , U 5342 and another 6 seals broke off their mission due to various defects and returned to the port. U 5335 returned to IJmuiden on January 31, 1945 without success. Only the submarine under Oberleutnant zS Roß and his LI Vennemann successfully torpedoed a coal steamer of approx. 3000 GRT at the Dumpton buoy. It was the seal's third success in being dumped, and its success rate rose to 5324 GRT. The loss of the ship was not confirmed by the Allies. Also on January 29th, a second group of 15 seals left IJmuiden. Eight of the boats returned after a short time with ice damage, and one seal ran aground. The remaining six were lost at sea. In January 1945, 10 seals were lost in 44 missions due to enemy action, technical defects or self-detonation. This contrasted with the number of a single confirmed sinking.

February

The smallest submarine seal

On February 3, 1945, Albrecht Brandi took over the management of the K associations in IJmuiden. He replaced Hermann Rasch as the previous commander, who in turn took over Brandi's post as a trainer in the training command 300 (seal training). It is not clear whether the change of command was related to the high losses in the previous month. As part of the assumption of command, seven seal drivers received the Iron Cross II. Class while the seal flotillas 312 and 313 were combined in the 5th K-Division. At the same time, those responsible gave up the pack tactics they had previously used . On the same day, IJmuiden was bombed by the Air Force. The seals ready for action were not damaged, but there was immense damage to the port facilities and depots.

The first seal mission in February took place on the night of the 3rd to the 4th or from the 4th to the 5th of February 1945, when 8 seals left for a mission. Including the U 5033 , U 5326 and U 5368 , which suffered from technical defects and had to turn back. U 5311 and U 5339 ran aground, while U 5329 , U 5344 and U 5348 returned home after an unsuccessful search. Another attack took place on February 10 with eight seals . U 5335 , U 5337 , U 5363 and a boat with an unknown number had to abort their mission due to technical defects. U 5330 returned after an unsuccessful search, while the crew of U 5347 stranded and had to blow up their boat. U 5349 remained missing. There are different statements about the whereabouts of the eighth boat, U 5345 . It either returned to IJmuiden or went missing. A third source indicates the whereabouts of the crew (Neefe / Pollmann) as prisoners of war.

Despite the fact that the second seal mission was not over, five seals left IJmuiden on February 12th . While U 5332 and U 5342 had to abort the mission again due to technical defects and U 5354 reached its home port after being severely damaged as a result of 259 depth charges , U 5356 remained missing at sea. On the other hand, U 5361 was able to torpedo and seriously damage the Dutch turbine tanker Liseta (2,628 GRT) from the convoy TAM 80 on February 15, 1945 near North Foreland. There are again confusing information about the whereabouts of U 5361 and its crew. On the one hand, U 5361 with Götz-Godwin and his LI Reck is said to have reached IJmuiden again on February 17, 1945. On the other hand, the crew of the boat is named Götz-Godwin and LI Reck, whereby Reck was washed up on the beach unconscious on February 23, 1945 on the island of Voorne and Godwin's body was washed up on the beach in April 1945 near IJmuiden. U 5361 is labeled as lost.

A combined attack on the Westerschelde was planned for February 16, in which 15 lenses and 4 seals were involved. However, the mission was unsuccessful. While U 5337 and U 5041 were lost, U 5332 and U 5363 came back after unsuccessful use. Both boats were stranded on their way back.

On February 19th, three seals left for the Dumpton bucket. U 5097 was set aground by its crew on the way back from IJmuiden. U 5342 was lost for unknown reasons. Their crew was pronounced dead on March 1, 1945. Only one boat returned from this mission. On February 21st, four more seals went on patrol. U 5365 ran aground on his return; U 5367 had to be beached by the crew on the way back. The returning crews of U 5366 and U 5364 asserted several hits after their return home, none of which could be confirmed. The British armored landing ship LST 364 (1625 ts) in the convoy TAM.87 was hit by a torpedo on February 22, 1945 and sunk. There were 24 dead. It is still not clear whether this shooting was the work of a seal torpedo.

On February 23, five seals set off from IJmuiden again . U 5365 , meanwhile lifted again and prepared for the front, was unsuccessful and ran aground again on the way back, but was later towed to Schevingen for repairs. U 5330 under the leadership of Lieutenant zur See Klaus Sparbrodt and machine mate Günter Jahnke, however, brought the successes hoped for by the K-Stab Holland. While they had not yet found any targets on February 23, 1945, Sparbrodt discovered a ship anchored in the fog at around 10:00 a.m. on February 24, 1945, which turned out to be a destroyer. Sparbrodt hit the French destroyer La Combattante with a torpedo amidships, whereupon the ship (1505 ts ) was torn in two by an explosion and sank. Of the 184 crew members, 118 were rescued. However, allied sources name a sea mine as the reason for the sinking of La Combattante . On the following night of February 24, Sparbrodt also fired his starboard torpedo at a ship, but since he heard no detonation, he started the journey home, mistakenly assuming a missed shot. However, the torpedo fired sank the British cable lay Alert (941 GRT), which sank within minutes. There were no survivors. The sinking of the steamer Rampant and the tankers Nashaba and Auretta on February 26, 1945 was not confirmed or clearly assigned to the seals . For the remaining days in February, no further operations can be carried out due to the bad weather. In February 45 the seals ran out on 33 patrols, losing four boats. The sinking of two ships was a confirmed success. However, another publication indicates the sinking of 3,000 GRT for this month.

March

Mosquito fighter-bombers used to track down and destroy K-units

In March 1945 the fuel shortage in IJmuiden became noticeable. In spite of these bottlenecks, 151 patrols were undertaken that month. Compared to the previous month with 71 missions, this was a massive increase. Seals made 29 K sorties this month , with their first exit on March 6th. On this day 9 seals left IJmuiden, five of which had to break off their voyage due to technical problems. Four of these submarines were sunk by the Allies by March 13, 1945. So on March 7th a seal by MTB 675 and on March 10th by a Beaufighter . On March 11 and 13, 1945, the British frigate HMS Torrington destroyed two seals, about whose identifiers there are differentiated statements. They are named U 5337 , U 5339 and U 5374 .

The intensity of the fighting between the seals and the allied shipping associations peaked that month and was opaque. Two seals were lost on March 11th alone , followed by two more on March 12th. The same fate befell U 5377 and U 5339 on March 13th . By March 18, 4 seals were missing, three of them off the Margate roadstead. On March 22nd, a seal was sunk by the Allies and its crew was taken prisoner. On the same day, the K-Associations lost another seal . Only U 5366 and U 5054 were confirmed returnees this month . On March 26, the British corvette HMS Puffin destroyed an empty seal by ramming it, causing a torpedo to explode. The puffin was badly damaged. On the same day ML 1471 destroyed a seal . On March 27, the last seal of that month was destroyed by ML 586 . From this knowledge it could be deduced that the seal crews were threatened not only with great danger from the allied warships, but also from the swarms of aircraft of the types Mosquito , Wellington and Beaufighters of the Royal Air Force. The total losses to submarines are quantified differently depending on the literature used. They range from 9 to 15 units with up to 30 dead.

Compared with their own departures, the seals were only able to show little success. On March 10, U 5364 asserted the torpedoing of an unknown destroyer. A day later, the British coal freighter SS Taber Park (2878 GRT) was torpedoed and sunk by an unknown seal . There were 28 dead. On the night of March 21, 1945 U 5366 succeeded in torpedoing the ammunition transporter SS Charles d'McIver ; the seal returned to IJmuiden unharmed. On March 25, ML 466 was torpedoed and sunk by an unknown seal . A day later the steamer SS Newlands (1556 GRT) was sunk. On March 30, the coastal freighter SS Jim (833 GRT) was sunk by an unknown seal ; twelve crew members survived, eight died. There is also different information about the Allied losses that month. 3 ships with 5,267 GRT or 5 ships with approx. 15,000 GRT are named.

On March 27, 1945, three seals left IJmuiden for the company named Kamerad . They were supposed to provide food for the trapped troops of the Dunkirk Fortress. The lenses previously used for these missions had too often been destroyed by Allied artillery and fighter planes. Empty torpedo tubes - colloquially called "butter torpedoes" - were used to transport the supplies. The mission was successful despite some difficulties. The three seals brought, among other things, 4.5 tons of fat to Dunkirk and made their way back - each filled with 4,500 letters from the trapped soldiers. A total of 13,500 messages had been transported from the fortress by the end of the mission. It was clear to the OKM that a basic supply of the enclosed associations from the sea was basically possible, even if the few seals were never able to deliver the actual target of required goods. In the end, Dunkirk was only called once by the seals on May 2, 1945 .

April

Strategic situation in April 1945: As of April 18, 1945, the K units in “Fortress Holland” were cut off from any supplies from home.

At the beginning of April 1945 the allied ring had closed around the fortress Holland. The disruption of rail and road routes exacerbated the precarious fuel, ammunition and food crisis. The only open supply route for the K-units in IJmuiden was the sea route along the German-Dutch coast. Friedrich Frisius , fortress commander of Dunkirk, therefore suggested moving the remaining K-formations to his area in order to use the seals to fully supply the fortress. The background to his idea was that only the seals had sufficient range to reach German supply bases along the coast. However, his request was rejected. On April 8, 1945, 29 seals were still stationed in IJmuiden. These stocks could be increased again by the end of April, but the information on this fluctuates between 19 and 20 newly added vehicles.

On April 5, 1945, a single seal went into action. Another followed on April 6, 1945. However, only U 5366 returned, the other boat remained missing. On April 7, 1945, nine seals ran out. A total of 36 seals were on patrol in the period from April 5 to 28, 1945 , with 16 seals at sea on April 12 . So far, only the following operations could be reconstructed from the fighting of the seals in April 1945. On April 9, the American army tanker Y 17 (484 GRT) was torpedoed by U 5309 ; there were no survivors. U 5309 arrived in IJmuiden one day later. On the same day, U 5363 (Buttmann / Schmidt) sank the British liberty ship SS Samida from the convoy TBC 123 and severely damaged the American flag SS Soloman Juneau before it fell victim to ML 102 (ML = engine launch). Also on April 9th, an unknown seal was sunk in an air raid.

On April 11, 1945, U 5070 severely damaged the SS Port Wyndham with 8,580 GRT from the UCB 63 convoy . The ship can be towed, but is irreparably damaged. On April 12, 1945, two seals left IJmuiden , including U 5366, destined for the Thames North and Thames-Scheldeweg. U 5366 sighted an H-class destroyer there , but missed the target with both torpedoes and returned to IJmuiden on April 17, 1945. On April 16, 1945, the British cable layer Monarch (1,150 GRT) was torpedoed by U 5368 and sank; the tiny submarine drifted to the coast near Katwijk for five days . U 5305 and U 5071 returned to IJmuiden with no confirmed successes. Another sinking that was never confirmed by the Allies is the sinking of the tanker Goldshell from the convoy TAM 40 . According to the situation report, eight seals were still at sea on April 18, 1945 . Another four seals had left Wilhelmshaven the day before to reinforce them. The remaining eight seals attacked again that day. At 5:46 a.m. on April 18, 1945, the steamer Lady Philomena sank , just three minutes later the Norwegian steamer Karmt (4,991 GRT). There were three dead here. On the afternoon of April 22, 1945, the steamer Benjamin H. Bristow from the ATM 123 convoy was badly damaged. One day later, on April 23, 1945, the steamer Svere Helmersen became the last victim of an unknown seal . An official assignment to a seal was never made by the Allies in any of the cases. On April 29, 1945, the last seal was sunk by the Allies southeast of Lowestoft . On May 2, 1945, four seals , U 5074 , U 5090 , U 5107 and U 5365, left IJmuiden to supply the Dunkirk fortress. On that day, they once again brought food and ammunition to the enclosed fortress of Dunkirk and surrendered to the Allied ground troops on May 8, 1945 with the units enclosed there. Already on May 6, 1945 the command staff of Albrecht Brandi's K units had capitulated to the 1st Canadian Division. The U 5074 captured vehicle can be viewed today at the Musée national de la Marine in Paris .

There is confusing information about the success of the seals in April 1945. The highest is given as 120,000 GRT. Other sources cite a sunk tonnage of 93,000 GRT, but from January to April 1945. However, both figures are not very credible. The most probable is the final sinking of 2 ships with 8,019 GRT, although these figures are also refuted by the confirmed sinking of the 3 ships ( Y 17 , Samida and Monarch ). In addition, there were several other sinkings by Allied ships, which were neither confirmed nor clearly assigned to a seal .

Northern sea

Hitler's fear of a possible invasion of Norway and Denmark by the Allies in the winter of 1944/1945 led, among other things, to the fact that the K-units of the Kriegsmarine were to be massively established and strengthened there. Commander of all K-funds in Scandinavia should initially become captain at sea Friedrich Böhme. However, uniform management of the widely spaced K-associations proved operationally difficult. Therefore the command area was split up. For the K-units stationed in Denmark, Captain Paul Friedrich Düwel in the K-Staff Skagerrak, who was replaced by Albrecht Brandi in February 1945, was initially appointed. His pedant for the K units stationed in Norway was Captain Wilhelm Beck in the K Staff North. In a first wave, the K flotillas 365 (marten) , 361 (marten) and 263 (beaver) were relocated to Denmark and Norway. At that time there were a total of 492 boat units in Denmark and Norway. On November 2, 1944, the forces were divided as follows:

Norway

• 60 Beavers Vestfjord - Lofoten
• 60 Newts Vestfjord-Lofoten
• 30 Beaver Oslo - Kristiansand
• 60 Newts Oslo-Kristiansand

Denmark / Northern Germany

• 60 beavers in Aarhus- Oesterhurup
• 60 martens in Aså
• 12 pike in Aså
• 30 newts Heligoland
• 30 newts Borkum
• 30 Beaver mouth of the Ems
• 60 lenses Fedderwardersiel

In a second wave, the K flotillas 215, 216 (both lenses ), 265, 267 (beavers) , 362, 366 (marten) and 415 (newch) followed . The Marine Einsatzkommandos (MEK) 30 and 35 were also dispatched. These units were distributed and divided into four K divisions. These formations, no more than 600 pieces of equipment, were supposed to hold up the expected enemy fleet. With its numerous fjords, Norway had an excellent strategic starting position for K-formations in the event of an invasion. In addition, one of the most important shipping routes of the Second World War, the Great Britain – Murmansk route , ran along the Norwegian coast. Since the power of the German naval units stationed in Norway was too low to seriously disrupt the route, the K-formations were supposed to cut this "artery" before its end point in Murmansk. However, the K associations were too weak for these companies.

The first and only K operation in the North Sea concerned the port of Murmansk when it was reported that the Soviet battleship Archangelsk might not be anchored in the Kola Bay in an operational manner. However, the operation under the code name Caesar was unsuccessful.

The other K units in Norway and Denmark did not leave for sea battles until the end of the war. They spent the last five months of the war training teams, maintaining their equipment, or regrouping K-formations, but these were no longer of any strategic value. On May 3, 1945, like all units of the Kriegsmarine, they received the code word “rainbow” by radio, the order to scuttling their ship units in the event of surrender. With the surrender of the Wehrmacht on May 8, 1945, the battle of the 85 officers and 2,500 NCOs and men of the K-units stationed in Scandinavia was over. They went into British captivity. They had either destroyed their remaining devices beforehand or handed them over to the Allies.

Combat swimmers

The combat swimmers of the Kriegsmarine , also called sea fighters, were a type of weapon within the K-formations. Its origins go back to the time of the First World War . Their missions, which were always carried out as part of the MEKs, only became popular with the intended destruction of the Nijmegen railway bridge and the associated road bridge . The best-known operation is the attempted destruction of the Remagen Bridge in March 1945. The combat swimmers of the Kriegsmarine were deployed at all focal points on the fronts, primarily on the western front , and later, increasingly, on the eastern and southern fronts in the Adriatic . Individual MEKs continued to operate until the end of the war. One of the most important representatives of this branch of arms is Alfred von Wurzian , who is also one of its co-founders.

Remarks

1. ↑ The designation "X-MAS" was largely retained until the end of the war.
2. ↑ The date of the sinking is dated August 17, 1944 in the publication by Cajus Bekker ( Lone Fighters at Sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968, p. 65), which is proven to be incorrect is. VE Tarrant ( The last year of the German Navy. May 1944 - May 1945. Podzun-Pallas, Wölfersheim-Berstadt 1994, ISBN 3-7909-0561-5 , p. 104) does not mention this attack at all.
3. ↑ Herbert Otto Berrer (born February 2, 1921 in Stuttgart - Botnang ; † February 9, 1992 in Hamburg ) joined the Navy on October 1, 1939. On December 2, 1943, he reported to the K-associations, where he experienced his first combat mission at Nettuno in April 1944 . Then it was deployed in Normandy. He was then transferred to Denmark, where he was no longer used until the end of the war.
4. ^ Alfred Paul Johannes Vetter (* May 24, 1923 in Kiel ; † May 15, 1984) joined the Navy on October 1, 1941 as an administrative officer candidate. He came to the K-units on December 20, 1943 via the naval operations department in Heiligenhafen. In Normandy he was a squad leader of an explosive boat group. He then served in the Surendorf torpedo testing facility and finally from April 18, 1945 until the end of the war in the Marine-Panzer-Jagd-Regiment I.
5. ↑ However, the damage cannot necessarily be assigned to U 5361 , as U 245 also asserted the torpedo.
6. ↑ Last known position of HMS LST 364 at 51 ° 18 ′ 0 ″  N , 1 ° 55 ′ 0 ″  E , location of the wreck of HMS LST 364 at 51 ° 18 ′ 24 ″  N , 1 ° 54 ′ 52 ″  E
7. ↑ Her deployment in Norway only lasted from August 1944 to September 1944. After that, she was transferred back to Germany.
8. ↑ As of November 2, 1944
9. ↑ Beck's military staff calculated that at least 40 K flotillas would be necessary to defend the Norwegian coasts in order to prevent a possible landing. However, at no point was it more than nine.
10. ↑ On this "artery" were delivered to the Soviet Union by the end of the war: 15,493 aircraft, 15,000 tanks, 427,284 trucks and 701,636 tons of ammunition with a total of 12 billion US gold dollars.

literature

• Cajus Bekker : lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968 (also: Koehler, Herford 1978, ISBN 3-7822-0169-8 )
• Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9
• Helmut Blocksdorf: The command of small combat units of the navy. The "Storm Vikings". Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-613-02330-X
• Harald Fock: Naval small weapons. Manned torpedoes, small submarines, small speedboats, explosives yesterday - today - tomorrow. Nikol publishing houses, Hamburg 1997, ISBN 3-930656-34-5
• Jürgen Gebauer (Ed.): Marine Encyclopedia. 2nd revised edition. Brandenburgisches Verlags-Haus, Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-89488-078-3
• Martin Grabatsch: torpedo rider . Storm swimmers, explosives boaters. A secret weapon in World War II. Verlag Welsermühl, Wels 1979, ISBN 3-85339-159-X
• Helmuth Heye: Naval small weapons. In: Defense. 8, 1959, ISSN  0043-213X , pp. 413-421
• Michael Jung: Sabotage under water. (The German combat swimmers in World War II). Mittler, Hamburg a. a. 2004, ISBN 3-8132-0818-4
• Paul Kemp: Manned torpedoes and small submarines. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1999, ISBN 3-613-01936-1
• Richard Lakowski: Reichs- u. Navy secret. 1919-1945. With more than 200 previously unpublished documents from the files of the Kriegsschiffbau office. Brandenburgisches Verlags-Haus, Berlin 1993, ISBN 3-89488-031-7
• Manfred Lau: Ship deaths off Algiers. Combat swimmers, torpedo riders and naval task forces in the Mediterranean 1942–1945. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-02098-X
• Klaus Mattes: The seals. Small submarines. Last German initiative in naval warfare 1939–1945. Mittler, Hamburg a. a. 1995, ISBN 3-8132-0484-7
• Lawrence Paterson: Arms of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3 ( Ullstein 26887 Maritime )
• Werner Rahn (Ed.): German Marines in Transition. From a symbol of national unity to an instrument of international security. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 ( contributions to military history 63)
• Eberhard Rössler : History of the German submarine construction. JF Lehmann Verlag, Munich 1975, ISBN 3-469-00507-9
• Michael Welham: Combat Swimmer. History, equipment, missions. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-613-01730-X

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb bc bd be bf bg bh bi} Lawrence Paterson: Arms of Despair. German combat swimmers and micro-submarines in World War II. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-548-26887-3
2. ^ Jochen Brennecke: The turning point in the submarine war. Causes and consequences. 1939-1943. Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-453-03667-0 . P. 488.
3. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac} V. E. Tarrant: The last year of the German Navy. May 1944 - May 1945 . Podzun-Pallas, Wölfersheim-Berstadt 1994, ISBN 3-7909-0561-5
4. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak} Helmut Blocksdorf: The command of small combat units of the Kriegsmarine. The "Storm Vikings". Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-613-02330-X
5. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Harald Fock: Marine-Kleinkampfmittel. Manned torpedoes, small submarines, small speedboats, explosives yesterday - today - tomorrow. Nikol publishing houses, Hamburg 1997, ISBN 3-930656-34-5
6. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u} Werner Rahn: German Marines in Transition - From a Symbol of National Unity to an Instrument of International Security . R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7
7. ^ Jürgen Rohwer: Chronology of the war at sea, 1939–1945. The naval history of World War Two. 3rd revised edition. Chatham, London 2005, ISBN 1-86176-257-7 , p. 340
8. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h} Cajus Bekker: ... and yet loved life. 8th edition. Adolf Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1980, ISBN 3-453-00009-9
9. ↑ ^{a b c} Janusz Piekalkwicz: The Second World War. Weltbild Verlag, Augsburg 1993, ISBN 3-89350-544-X
10. ↑ Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy. Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, ISBN 3-7648-2498-0 , pp. 199-200
11. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j} Cajus Bekker: Lone fighter at sea. The German torpedo riders, frogmen and explosive device pilots in World War II. Stalling-Verlag, Oldenburg 1968
12. ↑ Helmuth Heye: Naval small weapons. In: Defense. 8, 1959, ISSN  0043-213X , p. 413
13. ↑ Cajus Bekker: Battle and sinking of the navy. Sponholtz Verlag, Hannover 1953, pp. 176/177
14. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w} Klaus Mattes: Die Seehunde - Klein-U-Boats - Last German initiative in the naval war 1939-1945 . Mittler & Sohn Verlag 1995, ISBN 3-8132-0484-7