Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

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The EU in 2004

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was a treaty under international law, signed in 2004 but not entered into force , intended to reform the political system of the European Union .

In particular, it should give the European Union a uniform structure and legal personality and replace the basic treaties that were valid until then (above all EU , EC and Euratom treaties); the previous formal division into EU and EC should be dropped. Compared to the previously valid Treaty of Nice , the EU should be given additional powers and its institutional structure should be changed in order to make it more democratic and more capable of acting.

The draft of an EU constitutional treaty was drawn up in 2003 by a European Convention and signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 by the heads of state and government of the EU member states .

It was originally supposed to come into force on November 1, 2006. However, since not all member states ratified the treaty after the failed referendums in France and the Netherlands , it did not become legally binding. Instead, in December 2007, the European heads of state and government under the Portuguese Council Presidency signed the Lisbon Treaty , which came into force on December 1, 2009. Another French or Dutch referendum in the course of this did not take place.

Structure of the draft constitution

The treaty establishing a constitution for Europe was divided into a preamble, four parts of the treaty and protocols.

Preamble The preamble made reference to the “cultural, religious and humanistic traditions of Europe” , “in the certainty that the peoples of Europe […] are determined […] to shape their destiny more and more closely united”. The first sentence of the preamble to the draft constitution originally submitted by the Convention consisted of a quote from Thucydides (II, 37) and read: “The constitution we have ... is called democracy because the state is geared towards the majority rather than a few citizens . ”However, the use of this quote was controversial in Thucydides because of the ambiguous context. It was therefore in the IGC painted the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty.

Part I: Principles The first part of the constitution regulated the principles of the European Union. It contained the definition and the objectives of the Union, its competences, political organs and symbols as well as the principles of its financing and the rules for joining and leaving the Union. Part I of the constitution, however, was not conclusive in and of itself and could only be understood together with the other parts of the constitution.

Part II: Charter of Fundamental Rights In the second part, the fundamental rights for the citizens of the European Union were laid down. The Charter of Fundamental Rights had already been drawn up from 1999 to 2000 by a first convention headed by Roman Herzog , but had not yet been integrated into the European treaty. It is based on the European Convention on Human Rights , in particular the fundamental rights barriers are partially derived from it.

Part III: The individual policy areas The third part of the constitutional treaty was the most extensive. The rules laid down here were intended to replace those of the earlier EC Treaty , whereby the Convention, in addition to incorporating content innovations, also adapted and restructured the existing paragraphs in order to make the text more understandable. This part primarily regulated the processes and details of the principles set out in Part I. In this respect, Part III would have been decisive for the day-to-day practice of EU activities.

Part IV: Transitional and Final Provisions Part IV of the Constitutional Treaty regulates transitional and final provisions, such as the procedure for future constitutional amendments.

Protocols : The thirty-five protocols following the constitutional text should expressly be part of the constitution (Art. IV-442 VVE ex Art. 311 EGV). They contained u. a. important regulations for securing subsidiarity such as the national parliaments' rights of action and objection or power issues such as the distribution of votes in council and parliament. The changes to the retained European Atomic Energy Community were summarized in Protocol No. 36.

Appendices : Two appendices, known since the EEC, followed :

  • Appendix I: List to Art. III-226 of the Constitution.
  • Appendix II: Overseas Countries and Territories to which Part III Title IV of the Constitution applies.

Institutional innovations of the constitutional treaty

The main aim of the constitutional treaty was to renew the institutional foundations of the EU . On the one hand, the internal coordination mechanisms should be expanded and the veto options of individual member states reduced in order to keep the EU capable of acting after the eastward enlargement in 2004 ; on the other hand, the rights of the European Parliament should be strengthened in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU.

The constitutional treaty named the European citizens on the one hand and the member states on the other ( Art. I-1 VVE ) as the source of the European Union's legitimacy . This reflected the coexistence of the legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the Council : While the Parliament is directly elected by the citizens, the Council is composed of the governments of the member states. The executive power of the EU should remain with the supranational European Commission , whose members are appointed by the European Council with the participation of the European Parliament.

The European Parliament

The European Parliament was one of those institutions whose competences were to be developed the most by the Constitutional Treaty. According to Art. I-20, Paragraph 1 of the VVE, it should act as legislator together with the Council of the European Union and exercise budgetary powers together with it . The co-decision procedure , which Parliament and Council grants equal rights in the legislative process, should become the new “ordinary legislative procedure” and now apply in 92 instead of the previous 35 policy areas . In particular, the common agricultural policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters have been included in the remit of Parliament; however, the common foreign and security policy remained the sole competence of the Council.

The EU Parliament was also given new powers with regard to budget sovereignty: after it had previously had budgetary rights for all expenditures except those for the common agricultural policy , the agricultural sector (approx. 46% of the total budget) should now also be included. The EU Parliament should have the final say on all EU spending. The final decision on the EU's revenue should still lie with the Council, so that Parliament could still not independently increase the overall budget or introduce EU taxes.

The constitution left the precise provisions on the composition of the EU Parliament based on the national origin of the members of the European Council to be decided by the European Council . It merely determined a " degressively proportional " representation of citizens, according to which a large state is entitled to more seats than a small one, but fewer per inhabitant. Overall, the number of MEPs should be reduced to 750 from the 2009 European elections (instead of 785 from the 2007 enlargement).

The parliament's voting modes were retained in the constitution: it should decide regularly (e.g. legislation, confirmation of the Commission President) with an absolute majority of the votes cast, in the second reading in legislative processes with an absolute majority of the elected members, in some exceptional decisions (e.g. B. Motion of no confidence against the Commission) with a two-thirds majority .

The European Council and its President

The European Council (ER), which is made up of the heads of state and government of the individual member states and has met regularly since the 1970s, is considered to be an important engine of European integration. So far, however (unlike the Council of Ministers ) it has not been an official EU body. It should also be formally incorporated into the EU structure through the constitutional treaty. The "Council in the composition of the heads of state and government" mentioned in the previous EC Treaty (which in fact but not legally corresponds to the ER) should be merged with the European Council.

According to the Constitutional Treaty, the European Council should set the “impulses” and “political objectives and priorities” of the European Union without, however, taking any legislative action. Its tasks should rather be changes to the structure of the EU itself and fundamental decisions such as new memberships or the transfer of further tasks to the EU. The ER should also propose the President of the Commission. As in the past, the European Council should always make decisions “by consensus”, i.e. unanimously .

An important innovation in the Constitutional Treaty, however, was the establishment of the office of President of the European Council . This should be elected by the ER with a qualified majority for two and a half years (with one-time re-election), not come from the ranks of the members and thus replace the Council Presidency, which has been rotating every six months and is held by a head of government .

This was intended to increase the efficiency of the activities of the European Council: A disadvantage of the previous system of "semester presidents" was, on the one hand, the changing priorities in the political agenda with the presidency and the different mentality of the presidents; was also head of government of his own country. The full-time president should ensure efficient and continuous coordination between the heads of government through the extended term of office and prepare their meetings in the ER. It should also give the European Council - as one of the main decision-making bodies of the EU - a "face". This was intended to demonstrate to the media and citizens that the EU is acting as a whole in the event of an international conflict or important internal decisions .

However, neither the ER nor the President should be allowed to intervene in day-to-day politics and legislation . This should remain the sole responsibility of the Commission (right of initiative ) as well as the Council and Parliament. The draft constitution was therefore criticized for the fact that it would lead to conflicts between the President of the European Council (after all, all EU heads of government are behind) and the President of the Commission .

The Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union (Council) consists of the ministers of the individual member states who are responsible for the current topic on which the Council meets (hence the unofficial name "Council of Ministers"). The main task of the council is to legislate together with parliament . Basically, the Council usually decides unanimously, provided that Parliament has little or no say, and according to the majority principle, provided that Parliament is also involved in the decision-making process.

The Constitutional Treaty should make the latter variant the normal case, so that the Council should generally decide with a qualified majority and a right of veto for individual countries should only apply in a few exceptional cases. However, among other things, all questions of security and defense policy and taxes should continue to be decided unanimously .

For the Council of the EU (unlike the European Council), the principle of a presidency that changes every six months between the member states was retained. The “ Foreign Minister of the European Union ”, elected for five years, was appointed as the permanent chairman of the newly created Council of Foreign Ministers ( see below ).

"Qualified majority"

One major change to the constitutional treaty affected the voting rules in the Council. Up until now , the votes of the individual countries were weighted for the so-called “qualified majority” , with larger countries generally receiving more votes and smaller ones receiving fewer votes; the precise weighting of votes was largely arbitrary in the Treaty of Nice . This weighting of votes should be abolished in the constitutional treaty. Instead, it provided a new definition of the qualified majority: According to the Treaty of Nice, there had to be a majority of (a) at least half of the states, (b) 72% of the weighted votes and (c) 62% of the EU Population represented. According to the draft constitution, it was replaced by the so-called double majority , according to which (a) 55% of the member states must agree, which (b) represent at least 65% of the population of the Union.

If the number of hurdles in the Treaty of Nice was increased to three, then, according to the draft constitution, there would only be two hurdles: the number of states and the population . On the one hand, this twofold majority should reflect in an understandable way the “dual character” ( Joschka Fischer ) of the EU as a union of peoples and states. On the other hand, decisions should generally be made easier by increasing the blocking minority . Thirdly, the regulation would have resulted in a power shift that would have made the large and very small states gain influence at the expense of the medium-sized ones. The losers from this new regulation would have been the states of the order of magnitude from Austria to Spain ; Spain and Poland were particularly hard hit, as they had a disproportionately large influence due to the weighting of votes in the Treaty of Nice. The new rules in the draft constitution would have made it much more difficult for these two countries to organize a blockade : While so far only 28% of the weighted votes were required (Spain and Poland have a total of almost 17%), according to the constitutional treaty either 13 countries or countries with one total population of 225 million (Spain and Poland together live only 78 million).

The redefinition of the majority in the Council therefore became one of the central points of contention during the IGC. Only the change of government in Spain in 2004 , through which the EU-friendly José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero replaced the previous head of government José María Aznar , finally made an agreement possible.

Council of Foreign Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the EU

Another innovation of the Constitutional Treaty was the newly established Council of Foreign Ministers and the office of Foreign Minister of the EU . So far, the foreign ministers of the member states had met in the Council in the so-called Council for General Affairs and External Relations (RAA), which was responsible for both foreign policy and general questions. By Art. I-24 VVE it should be divided into a “Council for General Affairs” and a special Council of Foreign Ministers.

While the General Affairs Council was supposed to have a six-monthly chairmanship between the member states, a new office was set up for the chairmanship of the Council of Foreign Ministers. This was the EU Foreign Minister, who in future was to be elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for five years.

This should solve the problem that previously existed in the coordination of EU foreign policy . On the one hand, there is often a lack of coordination between the governments among themselves, because they often made decisions on their own initiative without at least informing their partners. On the other hand, there are currently three offices with competencies and the right to speak in foreign policy within the EU institutions alone : the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy appointed by the European Council , the Foreign Commissioner and the respective chairman of the RAA.

The future Foreign Minister of the EU should integrate these three offices into one in order to enable "an EU foreign policy free from institutional wrangling". In addition to the chairman of the Council of Foreign Ministers, he should therefore also be the Foreign Commissioner and Vice-President of the Commission . This " double hat " should enable him to manage the difficult coordination of European foreign policy.

In addition, a European External Action Service (EEAS) should be set up in accordance with Art. III-296 para. 3 VVE, which would report to the Foreign Minister. It should work with the diplomatic services of the member states, but not replace them. In terms of personnel and organization, the new EEAS should be better equipped than the existing external representations of the EU Commission ; however, the individual regulations were left to a later decision by the Council of Ministers.

The Commission and its President

According to the Constitutional Treaty, the Commission should exercise "coordination, executive and administrative functions" as it did before. In addition, the Commission's sole right of initiative in EU law-making should be strengthened by reducing the exceptional cases in which the Council can also make legislative proposals.

There were hardly any changes in the Commission's appointment procedure. Their term of office should continue to be five years. After the European elections, the ER was supposed to propose a Commission President who had to be approved or rejected by Parliament. In the event of a rejection, the ER should have made a new proposal, but Parliament should still not be able to nominate its own candidates. After confirmation by Parliament, the Commission President should appoint his Commissioners based on proposals from the Member States, and finally the entire Commission-designate should be reconfirmed by Parliament. During the Commission's term of office, the Commission President should be able to remove any individual Commissioner, but Parliament should only be able to remove the entire Commission by means of a motion of censure .

A major innovation in the constitutional treaty was the downsizing of the commission. This previously consisted of one commissioner per member state and had therefore grown to 27 members as a result of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The heads of government had already agreed in the Treaty of Nice that every country would no longer be allowed to appoint a commissioner as soon as the EU had more than 25 members; however, there was no specific alternative regulation. The constitutional treaty now provided for a rotation principle , according to which there should be a commissioner from two thirds of the member states.

The smaller states in particular were very critical of the principle of a smaller commission. In addition to the majority rule in the Council, this point led to the second major conflict at the Intergovernmental Conference. It was therefore decided that this regulation should only come into force in 2014, until then each country should continue to provide a commissioner. How exactly the rotation principle should work has not yet been clearly clarified at the Intergovernmental Conference, but has been left to a later decision by the European Council. Only the principles of rotation were laid down: according to this, the Member States should be “treated completely equally” in the election of commissioners, but “each of the successive colleges is composed in such a way that the demographic and geographical spectrum of the whole of the Member States of the Union is satisfactory Way is expressed ”. This sentence was interpreted in such a way that there must always be a balance between large and small, northern and southern, rich and poor countries of origin.

Changes to the content of the constitutional treaty

In addition to the institutional changes, the Constitutional Treaty also provided for a number of substantive changes that reorganized the competences of the European Union or restructured certain forms of cooperation between the member states. The following were among the most important of these innovations.

Delimitation of competencies

In principle, the European Union only has the powers that are expressly granted to it in the founding treaties (“principle of limited individual authorization”). In the earlier contracts, however, these competencies were not listed in a specific article, but distributed over the entire contract. This made it difficult to understand the treaty and often led to confusion about the extent of the Union's powers.

In the constitutional treaty, this problem was to be solved by a “competency catalog” (based on the example of the competency catalog in the German Basic Law ), which presented the competences of the Union more systematically. Art. I-12 VVE differentiates between exclusive, shared and supporting competences: In the first case, only the EU should be responsible; in the second case, the EU should be responsible, but the Member States could legislate if the Union did not do so itself. In the case of supporting competence, the EU should be able to support, coordinate or complement measures of the member states, but not be able to legislate itself. The intergovernmental areas of economic and employment policy as well as foreign and security policy , in which the EU should be able to define guidelines, but only by unanimous decision of the member states in the Council of Ministers, were also mentioned .

Art. I-13 to I-17 VVE finally assigned the various policy areas in which the EU has competences to the respective type of competency. The Union's exclusive competences should include, in particular, trade policy and the customs union ; shared responsibility included the internal market , agriculture , energy , transport , environment and consumer protection ; The EU should be able to implement support measures in areas such as health , industry , education and civil protection .

Goals and values ​​of the Union

The “goals and values ​​of the Union”, which are binding for all EU action, were also expressly defined in the Constitutional Treaty. So it said in Art. I-2 VVE:

“The values ​​on which the Union is founded are respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities . These values ​​are common to all member states in a society that is characterized by pluralism , non-discrimination , tolerance , justice , solidarity and equality between women and men . "

Art. I-3 VVE laid down the Union's goals, including the promotion of peace , the creation of an internal market with free and undistorted competition , economic growth , price stability , a social market economy , environmental protection , social justice , cultural diversity, and worldwide eradication of poverty , Promotion of international law etc.

Principle of subsidiarity

Already in the Maastricht Treaty , the principles of were for the EU subsidiarity and proportionality laid down, which have been confirmed in Art. I-12 TCE. Subsidiarity means that the Union will only act if "the objectives [...] can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States either at the central, regional or local level, but [...] can be better achieved at Union level". The Union can only take on a task from the member states if the lower political levels (in the case of Germany: municipalities , federal states and the federal government ) are not in a position to carry them out sufficiently, but the EU is. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decides what “sufficient” means in individual cases .

New to the constitution was the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (PDF) , which explained the relevant regulations in more detail. In order to safeguard subsidiarity, the rights of national parliaments were strengthened: within six weeks after the Commission had put forward a legislative proposal, they should now be able to explain why, in their opinion, this law violates the idea of ​​subsidiarity. In the event of criticism from a third of the parliaments, the Commission should have to review its proposal. You could have rejected the objection of the parliaments, but would have to justify your decision in any case.

Ultimately, the ECJ should remain responsible for maintaining the principle of subsidiarity. As before, the governments of the Member States and the Committee of the Regions should be able to take legal action here ; What was new was that the national parliaments should now also be able to refer to the ECJ in certain cases.

Increased cooperation

Another innovation of the constitutional treaty was the institutionalization of enhanced cooperation in Art. I-44 VVE. This includes steps towards integration between a group of EU members if the project cannot be implemented in the entire EU.

The Schengen Agreement and the European Economic and Monetary Union , through which individual member states have already carried out integration steps faster than other steps in the past, served as models for enhanced cooperation . For the first time, the constitution should prescribe a specific procedure according to which such a non-simultaneous realization of European integration can take place within the uniform EU constitutional framework. If at least one third of the member states are involved, the EU institutions should therefore be able to set European law, although this would only apply in the participating member states. A new special form of enhanced cooperation should be permanent structured cooperation within the framework of the common security and defense policy (Art. I-41, Paragraph 6, VVE).

Own legal personality

According to the previous agreement, only the European Community , but not the European Union, has legal personality . This means that the EC can take generally binding decisions within the framework of its competences, while the EU only acts as an "umbrella organization". In EU foreign policy in particular , this means that the EU cannot act as an independent institution, but only in the form of its individual member states.

The draft constitution should therefore give the Union its own legal personality. This would have given it the opportunity, as a subject of international law, to sign international treaties and agreements in its own name (albeit in principle only by a unanimous decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers), to establish diplomatic relations with other states through the newly created European External Action Service and to become a member of international ones Organizations - such as the Council of Europe or the United Nations - to apply.

Charter of Fundamental Rights and accession to the European Convention on Human Rights

An important innovation was the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , of which Part II of the draft constitution consisted. This charter had already been adopted and solemnly proclaimed by the European Council in Nice in 2000 , but initially it was not legally binding.

The constitutional treaty should make the Charter of Fundamental Rights binding throughout the European Union. In terms of content, it was based on the European Convention on Human Rights . In some parts it went further, in others less far than comparable catalogs of fundamental rights, for example in the German Basic Law . Art. II-113 VVE, however, expressly stipulates the “favourability principle”, according to which the Charter of Fundamental Rights should in no case mean a deterioration in the fundamental rights situation for the individual. If the Charter of Fundamental Rights and other legally valid catalogs of fundamental rights, for example in the constitutions of the individual states, contradict each other, the better regulation for the individual would in principle apply.

Art. I-9 para. 2 VVE also provided for the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This accession has been under discussion for decades, not least because since the Birkelbach Report of 1961 the EU has been referring to the principles of the Council of Europe in defining its political values , which are laid down in the ECHR. However, in order to join the ECHR, the EU needed its own legal personality, which it was only to receive through the constitution.

In addition, an amendment to the convention would be required for the EU's accession to the ECHR, as this is currently only open to member states of the Council of Europe ( Art. 59 (1) ECHR). This adjustment is to take place through the 14th additional protocol to the ECHR, which the ECHR member state Russia has not yet ratified and which has therefore not yet come into force. Finally, an accession agreement would have to be negotiated for the intended accession of the EU to the ECHR, which is a separate international treaty and therefore has to be unanimously decided by the Council of the EU and ratified by all member states of the ECHR. Ultimately, even after the constitution came into force, every member state would have had a veto against accession to the ECHR, as every member state could reject the specific conditions of this accession.

Citizens' Initiative

As a new direct democratic element, Art. I-47 para. 4 VVE should also introduce the possibility of a Europe-wide citizens' initiative . This should enable the European Commission to be asked to present a draft law on a specific topic. The prerequisite would be a million signatures from a number of countries still to be determined by European law. Even in the case of a citizens' initiative, however, the Commission should only act within the limits of its powers; an expansion of the EU's competences in this way would therefore be ruled out.

Voluntary exit and entry criteria

Art. I-60 VVE should for the first time expressly regulate the voluntary withdrawal of a state and thus end the long-standing uncertainty about the existence or non-existence of an (unwritten) right of withdrawal.

In addition, the treaty was also intended to meet the demand for stricter membership criteria. According to Art. I-58, Paragraph 1 of the VVE, countries wishing to join should in future have to respect the values ​​of the EU (ie democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.) and "undertake to enforce them jointly". According to the EU Treaty in the version of Nice ( Art. 49 ), on the other hand, “any European state that respects the […] principles [of the EU]” can apply for membership; it did not contain an express commitment to promote the principles.

Symbolic innovations

Finally, certain innovations in the constitutional treaty existed primarily on the symbolic level. The symbols of the EU ( European flag , European anthem , Europe day , European motto and the euro ) , which have been in use for a long time, were expressly mentioned in Art. I-8 VVE for the first time in a founding treaty of the Union. The terminology in EU legislation should also change: Instead of technical-sounding terms such as regulation and directive , state-typical terms such as European law and European framework law should be introduced.

Drafting, ratification process and failure of the European constitution

The decision to draw up a new, comprehensive treaty, which was supposed to bring together the previous EU treaties, was taken while the Treaty of Nice was still being ratified . This was seen by many observers, but also by the politicians involved, as an inadequate compromise that would not be able to permanently solve the problems that would arise from the forthcoming eastward expansion of the EU . The idea of ​​a European constitution, which the European federalists had already represented in the initial phase of European integration, gained momentum , among other things, through a much-noticed speech by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer in May 2000 and triggered a new finality debate .

European Convention and Intergovernmental Conference

In December 2001 the heads of government of the EU member states commissioned a large convention headed by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to draw up a new European treaty. This second European Convention (“Constitutional Convention”), which drafted a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe between February 28, 2002 and July 18, 2003, consisted of government representatives from the fifteen member states and the thirteen acceding countries and candidates (including the Turkey) as well as representatives of the European Parliament, the European Commission and the national parliaments. A similar convention had previously drafted the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights , but had never been set up to draft an EU treaty.

However, the draft constitution proposed by the European Convention in 2003 was not directly adopted by the heads of state and government in the European Council. Rather, it first put a Intergovernmental Conference , which revised the draft again. Contrary to what the name suggests, it was not a single conference, but a month-long series of talks, meetings and negotiations between officials, ministers and heads of government. While the Convention was a novelty in the history of EU treaty reforms, the Intergovernmental Conference followed the usual procedure before the adoption of new international treaties. In particular, it served to dispel the reservations of individual governments, especially Spain and Poland , regarding the proposed weighting of votes and the distribution of power in the EU Council of Ministers .

Hall where the EU Constitution was signed in Rome

In fact, the talks only got moving with the change of government in Spain in spring 2004 , so that an agreement was reached on June 18, 2004 by the European Council in Brussels. On October 29, 2004 the European Constitution was signed by the heads of state and government of the EU. The place of signature was Rome . On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Italy held the EU Council Presidency in the second half of 2004 , and on the other hand, this choice of location was intended to be a reminder of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, with which the EU predecessor organizations EEC and Euratom were founded.

Ratification and failure of the constitutional treaty

Before the constitutional treaty came into force, however, it had to be ratified by all EU member states . Depending on the state, either a parliamentary resolution or a referendum was necessary. However, several governments, in which a purely parliamentary ratification would have been possible, announced a referendum in order to underline the special importance of the constitutional treaty. These included Spain, France , the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In Germany a referendum was called for by the FDP ; however, this would have required an amendment to the Basic Law, which the other parties rejected. A Europe-wide referendum, such as the one proposed by the European Greens , was also not approved by a majority.

The beginning of the ratification process in the individual states

Ratification in the member states and candidate countries
  • Yes - part of the EU accession negotiations
  • Yes - ratification by parliament
  • Yes - referendum
  • No - referendum
  • Referendum canceled
  • Parliamentary ratification canceled
  • On November 11, 2004, the Lithuanian parliament was the first country to ratify the EU constitution with 84 for, four against and three abstentions. This was followed by Hungary on December 20, 2004 and Slovenia on February 1, 2005, also by parliamentary resolution.

    The first national referendum took place on February 20, 2005 in Spain . It was consultative (i.e. not binding) and ended with an approval of 76.7% for the EU constitution with a voter turnout of 42.3%. The subsequent vote in Congress took place on April 28, 2005; the Senate voted on May 18 by 225 votes to 6 and one abstention in favor of the constitution.

    Italy was the first EU founding member to approve the new constitutional treaty. The Italian House of Commons approved the constitution on January 25, 2005, and on April 6, 2005 the Roman senators also voted 217 to 16 in favor of the treaty.

    On March 11, 2005, the Belgian parliament voted on the (national) constitutional amendment required for a referendum . However, the necessary two-thirds majority was not achieved, so that ratification took place through parliamentary channels. Because of Belgium's federal structure, this also required the approval of the regional and community parliaments, which gradually all voted for the constitution by February 8, 2006.

    In Greece , the parliament ratified the constitution by a large majority (268 for, 17 against and 15 abstentions) on April 19, 2005. The Slovak parliament also ratified the constitution by a large majority (116 for, 27 against and 4 Abstentions) on May 11, 2005.

    In Germany, the Bundestag approved it on May 12, 2005 with 95.8% of the votes cast. 594 members of parliament cast their vote, 569 of which voted yes, 23 no, and two abstained. The Federal Council voted on May 27, with 66 of 69 votes in favor and three abstentions (of a SPD / PDS - coalition -ruled state Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ) for the contract.

    On the same day, however, the member of the Bundestag Peter Gauweiler ( CSU ) brought an organ charge and a constitutional complaint against the constitutional treaty before the Federal Constitutional Court; The legal representative for the action was the Nuremberg law professor Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider , who had already been in charge of the (unsuccessful) constitutional actions against the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the euro . In addition, lawyer Mario Schmid from Freiburg and 34 other citizens filed constitutional complaints. The Federal President Horst Köhler then declared that he would only sign the ratification document once the Federal Constitutional Court had decided on Gauweiler and Schmid's complaint.

    In Austria , the National Council passed the treaty on a constitution for Europe (851 dB XXII. GP) on May 11, 2005 with an overwhelming majority; only one MP ( Barbara Rosenkranz , FPÖ ) voted against. The Federal Council also made a positive decision on May 25, 2005; three of the 62 members, representatives of the right-wing national parties FPÖ and BZÖ , voted against. Previously, in March 2005, the Federal Constitutional Law on the conclusion of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (789 dB XXII. GP), which stipulated a purely parliamentary ratification without a referendum, was unanimously passed in the National Council and the Federal Council. A citizens' initiative for a referendum had no consequences. Hans-Peter Martin submitted an individual application to the Constitutional Court.

    The French and Dutch referendum

    Non- posters (against the "direction of travel" of Europe)

    Finally, on May 29, 2005, there was a referendum in France on the constitutional treaty . According to the French constitution, this was not a mandatory requirement, but was set up by the government under Jacques Chirac mainly for domestic political reasons in order to increase the legitimacy of the constitution and also to improve one's own popularity with - apparently - slight success in a public vote . In fact, the most important French opposition party, the socialist PS , did not find a common position on the constitution internally: while the party leadership spoke out in favor of it, prominent politicians from the left wing of the party, including former Prime Minister Laurent Fabius , were campaigning against it. The communist PCF and the far-right FN, as well as some intellectuals such as the philosopher Jean Baudrillard, also spoke out against the constitution.

    After initially being very favorable to constitutional supporters, poll numbers began to tip over in the weeks leading up to the vote. Finally, voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty with a majority of 54.7% (with a turnout of 69.3%). This result immediately sparked violent reactions in France and the other EU countries, as one of the founding members, who was also one of the “engines” of the integration process, rejected the constitutional treaty.

    Shortly thereafter, on June 1, 2005, another referendum took place on the constitutional treaty, this time in the Netherlands , where it was the first referendum in the country in 200 years. Here a large majority of 61.6% (with a turnout of 62.8%) rejected the constitutional treaty. Although the referendum was not binding, the leaders of the Dutch parliament had announced in advance that they would hold the vote of the citizens if the turnout was above 30%.

    Results of the referendums
    date referendum Proportion of
    yes votes
    electoral
    participation
    Acceptance of the contract
    yes / no
    Feb 20, 2005 SpainSpain Referendum in Spain 77% 42% Yes
    May 29, 2005 FranceFrance Referendum in France 44% 69% No
    June 1, 2005 NetherlandsNetherlands Referendum in the Netherlands 38% 63% No
    July 10, 2005 LuxembourgLuxembourg Referendum in Luxembourg 57% 90% Yes

    The "reflection phase"

    The Constitutional Treaty stipulated that if four fifths of the states (i.e. 20) had ratified the draft by the end of 2006, but difficulties arose in individual member states, the European Council would deal with this issue again. This regulation was adopted primarily as the last anchor with a view to traditionally Eurosceptic countries such as Great Britain . The rejection of the EU constitution in two of the founding members, on the other hand, came as a shock and sparked an immediate intense debate. The initial reactions and assessments in the Union, which were formulated by early June 2005, ranged from pessimism to appeasement and the search for explanations to greater optimism than before. European politicians feared in particular an institutional blockade of the European decision-making processes.

    In mid-June 2005, the Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, in his capacity as chairman of the European Council, stated that “the stocktaking for ratification originally planned for November 1, 2006 is no longer tenable” , “as those countries that do not have ratified, could not give a good answer until mid-2007 ” . The background was that the new election of the French President in May 2007 should be awaited. As a result, a period of reflection and discussion should be initiated for about a year, in which the member states should be given the opportunity to ratify the Constitutional Treaty after extensive public debate without time pressure or to postpone its ratification. As proposed, the European Council therefore decided to take a “pause for reflection” and postponed a new discussion to mid-2007.

    In fact, several countries continued the ratification process even after the French and Dutch no. Thus spoke Latvia (2 June 2005), Cyprus (30 June 2005), Malta (July 6, 2005), Estonia (May 9, 2006) and Finland (June 2006) in the parliamentary procedure for the EU constitution. A referendum took place in Luxembourg on July 10, 2005 , and Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker tied to the successful outcome that he would remain in office. A majority of 56.5% approved the constitutional treaty.

    Denmark , Great Britain , Ireland , Poland , Portugal , Sweden and the Czech Republic interrupted the ratification process. Of these countries, Sweden intended to ratify the EU constitution through parliamentary channels, while Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Great Britain planned referendums. In Poland and the Czech Republic it was not yet decided whether a referendum should take place; In both countries there had previously been strong criticism from the conservative side of the constitutional treaty, which President Václav Klaus had also signed up to in the Czech Republic . In the case of the new member states Bulgaria and Romania , which joined in 2007, approval of the constitutional treaty had already been part of the accession treaties and was therefore ratified at the same time as accession. Finally, in Germany , the Federal Constitutional Court stopped processing constitutional complaints against the treaty after the referendums in France and the Netherlands. Germany therefore ultimately did not ratify the constitutional treaty, nor did a decision on its compatibility with the German Basic Law take place.

    In January 2006, the Austrian EU Presidency proposed restarting the ratification process, but met with massive opposition, especially from France, the Netherlands and Poland. As a solution to the crisis, an EU-wide ratification of the treaty by popular referendum was brought into play in 2006, linked to the elections to the European Parliament in 2009. This would have reduced the importance of vetoes through national referendums. Against this Austrian proposal, however, came u. a. strong resistance from Germany. Various proposals for amendments or additions to the draft constitution, which were discussed during the period of reflection and especially in the French presidential election campaign in 2007, did not meet with unanimous approval: While the French left in particular called for a supplementary social protocol, which was rejected by Great Britain, Nicolas Sarkozy suggested a "miniature contract" which was limited to the most important innovations, but without specifying what these might be. Most of the proposals were also rejected to adopt individual popular provisions of the constitution, such as the European Citizens' Initiative , in advance; Many, especially German politicians, saw this as a threat to the overall balance of the compromise that the various member states had reached with the constitution.

    Lisbon Treaty instead of a Constitutional Treaty

    An end to the "pause for thought" did not become apparent until the European Council on June 15 and 16, 2006, at which the heads of state and government formulated a point in time for the solution of the constitutional crisis at the end of 2008, when France would hold the Council Presidency. An informally discussed schedule stipulated that further steps should be taken to rescue the treaty under the German Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 .

    To this end, the “ Berlin Declaration ” on fundamental European values ​​and political goals of the European Union, adopted on March 25, 2007 on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome , also included a fundamental commitment to the goals of the constitution. On the basis of the positions of the member states, the German Council Presidency then worked out which contents of the constitutional treaty should be incorporated into a new treaty. On this basis, the European Council decided at its meeting on June 21 and 22, 2007 in Brussels to abandon the further ratification of the constitution and instead to adopt a "reform treaty" which would incorporate the substance of the constitutional text into the existing basic treaties ( TEU and EGV ) should incorporate. This reform treaty was signed by the heads of state and government of the EU on December 13, 2007 in Lisbon and is therefore now called the " Lisbon Treaty ". It entered into force on December 1, 2009 after being ratified by all member states.

    Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in the Member States (overview)

    country Ratification date Voting variant Result
    LithuaniaLithuania Lithuania November 11, 2004 houses of Parliament Yes
    HungaryHungary Hungary December 20, 2004 houses of Parliament Yes
    SloveniaSlovenia Slovenia February 1, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    ItalyItaly Italy January 25, 2005
    April 6, 2005
    Chamber of Deputies
    Senate
    yes
    yes
    GreeceGreece Greece April 19, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    SlovakiaSlovakia Slovakia May 11, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    SpainSpain Spain February 20, 2005
    April 28, 2005
    May 18, 2005
    consultative referendum
    House of Representatives
    Senate
    yes
    yes
    yes
    AustriaAustria Austria May 11, 2005
    May 25, 2005
    National
    Council Federal Council
    yes
    yes
    GermanyGermany Germany May 12, 2005
    May 27, 2005
    after BVerfG judgment (proceedings discontinued)
    Bundestag
    Bundesrat Federal
    President
    yes
    yes
    -
    FranceFrance France May 29, 2005
    canceled
    Referendum
    Parliament (2 chambers)
    No
    -
    NetherlandsNetherlands Netherlands June 1, 2005
    canceled
    consultative referendum
    parliament (2 chambers)
    No
    -
    LatviaLatvia Latvia June 2, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    Cyprus RepublicRepublic of Cyprus Cyprus June 30, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    MaltaMalta Malta July 6, 2005 houses of Parliament Yes
    LuxembourgLuxembourg Luxembourg June 28, 2005
    July 10, 2005
    October 25, 2005
    Parliament (first vote)
    consultative referendum
    Parliament (second vote)
    yes
    yes
    yes
    BelgiumBelgium Belgium April 28, 2005
    May 19, 2005
    June 17, 2005 June
    20, 2005
    June 29, 2005
    July 19, 2005
    February 8, 2006
    Senate
    Chamber of Deputies
    Parliament of the Brussels Capital Region
    Parliament of the German-speaking Community
    Parliament of the Walloon Region
    Parliament of the French Community
    Flemish Parliament
    yes
    yes
    yes
    yes
    yes
    yes
    yes
    EstoniaEstonia Estonia May 9, 2006 houses of Parliament Yes
    FinlandFinland Finland December 5, 2006 houses of Parliament Yes
    BulgariaBulgaria Bulgaria January 1, 2007 was part of the negotiations for EU accession Yes
    RomaniaRomania Romania January 1, 2007 was part of the negotiations for EU accession Yes
    DenmarkDenmark Denmark called off referendum -
    IrelandIreland Ireland called off Referendum
    parliament
    -
    PolandPoland Poland called off referendum -
    PortugalPortugal Portugal called off Referendum, after a constitutional amendment -
    SwedenSweden Sweden called off houses of Parliament -
    Czech RepublicCzech Republic Czech Republic called off likely referendum -
    United KingdomUnited Kingdom United Kingdom called off consultative referendum
    parliament (2 chambers)
    -

    Points of contention

    The Constitutional Treaty met with increasing criticism from various political directions and especially from the population of some member states. The criticism was very complex and went from the content to the legitimation to the title of the constitution. Among the major European parties , the majority voted in favor of the Constitutional Treaty, including in particular the European People's Party , European Liberals , European Democratic Party and the greater part of the Party of European Socialists and the European Greens . Only a few members of the left wing of the PES, particularly in the French Parti Socialiste , rejected the draft. The European Left positioned itself clearly against the Constitutional Treaty , on the right the Alliance for a Europe of Nations and the EU Democrats . Some large non-governmental organizations such as Attac also opposed the draft.

    Length and complexity

    Critics of the European constitution stressed the length and complexity of the constitution compared to existing and proven national constitutions. The European constitution with 160,000 words (including declarations and protocols) is too long in comparison with the 4,600 word long US constitution and can hardly be understood by itself. In their endeavor to lay down the goals and fields of activity of the European Union as clearly as possible, the constitutional treaty goes beyond what is usually regulated by a constitution.

    Proponents of the constitution, on the other hand, pointed out that the new text was less long than the previous treaties it was supposed to replace.

    Criticism of the elaboration and ratification process

    The convention was criticized for the fact that its members could not be directly elected or confirmed by the population. It is also only apparently transparent: Despite public plenary meetings, important decisions are not made publicly and the previous meetings of the presidium have not been recorded. The Luxembourg Premier Jean-Claude Juncker ( President of the Council of the European Union during the first half of 2005) said: "The Convention has been heralded as the great democracy show. I've never seen a darker darkroom than the Convention. "

    It was also criticized that the unequal timing of the referendums and parliamentary ratifications enables governments to carry out the ratifications at the presumed most favorable time. This leads to a manipulation of the referendum results in favor of the constitutional supporters. Pressure should also be exerted on individual parliaments through previous decisions . The early referendum in Spain after appropriately favorable polls and the attempt to give the French referendum the “necessary boost” in good time with the German example were cited as examples.

    In the countries where the constitutional treaty was ratified early and without a referendum - including Germany - critics accused the government of wanting to prevent more intensive public discussion . In many, but not all, member states, the unequal financial support and media presence of constitutional supporters and opponents of the constitution was criticized: for example, supporters in France were demonstrably given more airtime before the referendum.

    Criticism of the title of the constitution

    Multilingual rejection of the EU constitution, the euro, freedom of movement (Schengen), the reduction of the power of nation states

    The designation as a “ constitutional treaty ” was also partially attacked. In fact, from the point of view of constitutional advocates, the name should indicate that the EU constitution is not a simple successor to its legally effective predecessors ( EU treaty and EC treaty ), but creates a completely new legal basis for the EU by combining all previous treaties. It was criticized, however, that it was not a constitution in the usual sense, especially since the EU was still not a state , but its sovereignty rights should be derived exclusively from those of the member states.

    On the other hand, the objection was that this criticism was only of a linguistic nature, i.e. based on the denotation and connotation of the terms “contract” and “constitution”. The Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent treaties are also the - not so titled - Constitution of the EU in the legal sense, as they define its political system and take precedence over the secondary law derived from it . Legal and political science as well as the ECJ have therefore been using the term “European constitutional law” or the “European constitutional treaties” for a long time.

    Accusation of lack of social orientation

    The lack of social orientation of the constitutional treaty was criticized in particular from the politically left spectrum . For example, the principle of “open market economy with free competition ” (Art. III-177 VVE) agreed in the constitution was attacked, with which the constitution, in the eyes of its critics, laid down a “neoliberal” economic policy. This economic policy and economic growth were thus given the rank of constitutional goals, while social policy was hardly taken into account. This criticism was expressed particularly in France and was one of the reasons why, in addition to the Communist Party , the left wing of the socialists also rejected the constitutional treaty. The objection was made against the accusation that the European Community has always been built on the growing together of the member states through economic policy and that Art. III-177 VVE is a literal takeover from the old treaty. In addition, Art. I-3 VVE expressly stipulates the “social market economy” and “social justice and social protection” as constitutional goals.

    The Charter of Fundamental Rights also appeared to left-wing critics to be insufficient, as the social rights contained therein should only be viewed as general principles. Since they are not supposed to be enforceable, a substantial part of the charter would ultimately have had no consequences. The lack of a clause on the social obligation of property , such as that contained in the German Basic Law ( Article 14.2 of the Basic Law) , was also criticized . The wording in Art. II-77 VVE, which regulates property rights, is, however, much more general.

    In terms of content, the criticism expressed by the conservative side of the social rights in the Charter was exactly the opposite: Among other things, the right to work was attacked, which was provided for in Art. II-75 VVE and in which parts of the German CSU contained a “relic of the GDR constitution ”.

    Accusation of insufficient democratization

    Furthermore, left and liberal sides as well as the European federalists criticized that the constitutional treaty had missed the chance to overcome the democratic deficit of the European Union . Despite the new competences of the European Parliament through the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure , important questions would still be decided intergovernmentally in the Council of the EU or in the European Council . Compared with the other EU institutions, the European Parliament would still have fewer powers than, for example, a national parliament.

    Accusation of the formation of a European superstate

    The accusation of insufficient powers for the European Parliament was countered by the criticism that was expressed in particular by conservative critics of Europe in Great Britain, but also in some Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, the constitution would create a European “superstate” through the relinquishment of national sovereignty and the loss of veto options in the Council of the EU, which would endanger regional traditions. Purely symbolic elements of the treaty were also criticized, such as the designation as a constitution, the definition of the symbols of the EU or the renaming of the EC regulations and directives as “European laws” and “European framework laws”.

    Accusation of militarization

    Poster: EU constitution as a step towards militarization.

    The accusation has been raised, above all from the political left, that the constitution brings about a militarization of the EU by expanding the common security and defense policy. A passage in Art. I-41 VVE was particularly controversial, according to which the member states undertook to “gradually improve their military capabilities”, in which critics see an obligation to rearm . In addition, the competencies of the newly established European Defense Agency , for example in determining armaments requirements , are criticized. Also the lack of competences of the European Parliament (which according to Art. III-304 VVE may ask questions about military actions by the EU, but unlike the Bundestag in Germany, for example, should not be allowed to make decisions) and the European Court of Justice (which according to Art. III -376 VVE should not be responsible for the review of military actions of the EU) were criticized.

    Criticism of the lack of reference to God

    The lack of reference in the draft constitution to Europe's Christian roots was criticized on the conservative side. The demand for a reference to God in the preamble of the constitution, which mainly represented Catholic countries such as Poland , Ireland and Italy , was also confirmed by the Roman Catholic Church and the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD). In contrast, France , which traditionally attaches great importance to the separation of church and state , refused to include the reference to God in the preamble and pushed through a compromise formulation that only refers generally to the “cultural, religious and humanistic traditions of Europe”. In contrast, the Amsterdam Church Declaration (Declaration No. 11: Declaration on the Status of Churches and Philosophical Communities ) with Art. I-52 VVE could be converted into a provision under primary law.

    Timeline of the European Treaties

    Sign
    in force
    contract
    1948
    1948
    Brussels
    Pact
    1951
    1952
    Paris
    1954
    1955
    Paris
    Treaties
    1957
    1958
    Rome
    1965
    1967
    merger
    agreement
    1986
    1987
    Single
    European Act
    1992
    1993
    Maastricht
    1997
    1999
    Amsterdam
    2001
    2003
    Nice
    2007
    2009
    Lisbon
      Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif Pix.gif
                       
    European Communities Three pillars of the European Union
    European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)
    European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Contract expired in 2002 European Union (EU)
        European Economic Community (EEC) European Community (EC)
          Justice and Home Affairs (JI)
      Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJZS)
    European Political Cooperation (EPC) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
    Western Union (WU) Western European Union (WEU)    
    dissolved on July 1, 2011
                         


    See also

    Portal: European Union  - Overview of Wikipedia content on the subject of the European Union

    literature

    Web links

    Official links

    Constitutional action and constitutional complaint against the constitutional treaty

    Political and social organizations

    Other links

    Individual evidence

    1. 851 dB XXII. GP
    2. 789 dB XXII. GP
    3. Press release of the Werkstatt Frieden & Solidarität, February 21, 2005 ( Memento of September 28, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
    4. Ratification in the member states
    5. ( Page no longer available , search in web archives: articles. ) Sueddeutsche.de@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.sueddeutsche.de
    6. "Ghostly Wandering." In: Der Spiegel . No. 25 , 2003 ( online interview with Jean-Claude Juncker).
    7. Vatican Radio : Germany: Churches Recall God's Reference in the EU Constitution ( Memento of October 16, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), December 29, 2006.