Construction of the Berlin Brandenburg Airport

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With the construction of the Berlin Brandenburg Airport (BER) was started in the year of 2006. Even the start of construction took place with a considerable delay in planning, as the original planning from 1997 was still based on commissioning in 2007. The first commissioning plan since construction began was based on the airport opening in November 2011. This date could not be kept and in the following years new opening dates were repeatedly announced, which could not be realized either.

The cause of the delays was a failed construction plan, which led to the airport construction not being approved by the responsible supervisory authorities, as well as a lack of construction supervision. The multiple, unrealized announcements, the bad planning and the exploding costs, which were recently estimated at over seven billion euros, made airport construction a public symbol of a major state project that got out of control. After the construction defects had been rectified, the airport was opened for operation by the responsible building authorities at the end of April 2020.

Construction site overview of the entire system (status: 01/2020)

Choice of location

! existing airfields in Berlin-Brandenburg
! possible locations of the Berlin Brandenburg International Airport, which was then being planned

Just one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall , the first plans for a new central airport began. On December 7, 1989, Lufthansa and Interflug founded a commission with the aim of developing Schönefeld Airport into a major airport. An airport should be built in the north or south of the city. Tegel and Schönefeld should remain open during the transition period. An airport close to the city was ruled out by Lufthansa as well as by Interflug due to the lack of approval.

In 1991 a consortium made up of the companies Mannesmann and AEG prepared the "Mannesmann Study" for the expansion of Schönefeld Airport. This study formed the basis for further planning by the airport company , which resulted in “Masterplan I” and which was published on April 23, 1991. The publication of the documents showing the green spaces planned for Berlin-Schönefeld Airport resulted in the operators buying up around 100 hectares of arable land at inflated prices for a total of 200 million euros. The resulting “construction site east” is still not used by the airport today (as of 2014).

The regional planning procedure (ROV 1994) for Berlin Brandenburg International Airport (BBI) was announced and initiated on July 20, 1993, two years after the master plan was published . It ended on November 16, 1994. The regional planning procedure was preceded at the end of 1992 by a search procedure in preparation for the ROV. The possible airport locations were checked for their suitability, since airports were not part of the federal traffic route plan; a transnational needs test did not take place at this time. The assessment of the Sperenberg, Jüterbog-Ost, Jüterbog-West, Tietzow, Michelsdorf, Borkheide and Schönefeld-Süd locations was based on five criteria with different weightings: the environmental impact was 30% (the impact on nature and humans increased each time 50% in this criterion), 20% each for economic efficiency (favorable location, hub potential, GDP, number of inhabitants in the 45-minute catchment area, expected structural development in the airport area, competition from other airports and night flight options minus construction preparation and construction investments) and the landside Transport connection (40% road and 60% rail connection) and 15% each of technical airport planning (flight safety) and spatial development (development opportunities through the airport for structurally weak regions) in the assessment.

The results of the search procedure were summarized in the Dornier study. The authors spoke out in favor of the Jüterbog-Ost ( former Heidehof military training area ) and - best rated - Sperenberg sites . At these two locations, they emphasized a low level of pollution for people, but a high level of pollution for nature values ​​(the Sperenberg location, for example, consists of unused forest due to ammunition residues). They praised the high level of economy, the options for expanding the airport and transport links, which in Sperenberg was considered the best compared to all other alternatives, as well as flight safety and the potential for spatial development. The expert opinion rated Schönefeld as the worst of the seven locations, but also ambivalent: They saw the greatest noise pollution, the greatest security risk, no development potential for a peripheral region, a violation of the open space protection in the closer interlinked area according to LEPro , an airport that was too small : there would only be an area of ​​2600  ha and not the required 3600 ha available, no expansion options and the communities of Diepensee, Glasow, Karlshof, Rotberg and Selchow would have to be relocated. At the same time, the location has the lowest impact on natural values, has the greatest revenue potential and the transport links to Schönefeld Airport are rather unfavorable for long-distance traffic, but the location can be reached by local public transport in Berlin.

The subject of the regional planning procedure was the construction of an international airport with a capacity of 60 million passengers per year and four runways. The Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Regional Planning of the State of Brandenburg examined the three alternative locations Sperenberg, Jüterbog-Ost and - under political pressure - Schönefeld-Süd. The operation of a Berlin Brandenburg airport was therefore possible from a spatial planning point of view in Jüterbog-Ost and Sperenberg, but not at the Schönefeld-Süd location. Federal Transport Minister Wissmann (CDU) and Berlin's Mayor Diepgen (CDU) still endorsed Schönefeld for reasons of cost. The costs for the Sperenberg location were assessed differently. On the one hand, 98 percent of the land in question would already have been owned by the public sector. The Federal Audit Office criticized the Sperenberg project as being too expensive and based on overly optimistic forecasts. In 1995, the Prime Minister of Brandenburgs Stolpe (SPD) offered Brandenburg to contribute more to the Sperenberg site. Wissmann and Diepgen announced that they did not want to contribute to the additional costs for BER in Sperenberg. Thereupon Stolpe presented a financing concept in 1996 with which Brandenburg could assume all additional costs. Due to the worsening financial situation of the state of Brandenburg, Wissmann, Diepgen and Stolpe finally agreed on the location Schönefeld on May 28, 1996 at a top-level meeting in Berlin. The resolution put u. a. decided to develop the Berlin-Schönefeld (SXF) airport location as a single location with the participation of private investors and to close the Tempelhof and Tegel airports. According to other sources, the political pressure exerted by the committee of inquiry into the "Baufeld Ost" was primarily on the part of Berlin and was decisive for the consensus decision and on the part of the federal government, represented by the then State Secretary in the Ministry of Transport Wilhelm Knittel (CSU), the investment at Munich Airport was secured.

Parallel to the planning approval process , that by submitting the plan approval application for the airport project Berlin-Brandenburg International (BBI) by the Flughafen Berlin Schoenefeld GmbH was initiated (FBS) on 17 December 1999, which was State Development Planning of the State of Berlin and Brandenburg by a treaty subsequently changed by specifying the location in Schönefeld (LEPro, LEP FS, LEP eV and others). Several affected municipalities did not consider the approximately 5000 statements and objections in the ROV according to the Joint Spatial Planning Procedure Ordinance (GROVerfV) to be taken into account. Numerous lawsuits against this state planning followed. They received law in a norm review procedure before the OVG Brandenburg and Frankfurt / Oder. In 2003, the states of Berlin and Brandenburg decided to cure the unconstitutional state planning by means of a new legal basis. In the plan approval decision of 2004 it is stated that the plan approval application does not contain any detailed information on alternative locations and that the application complies with the requirements of regional planning and regional planning. The new LEP FS was also declared unconstitutional by the OVG Brandenburg in 2005. These shortcomings were also later healed. The legal dispute in connection with the plan approval procedure also escalated and led to a construction freeze in 2005. In 2006 the Federal Administrative Court gave the green light for the airport at Berlin-Schönefeld. In February 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court finally dismissed the constitutional complaint and a. to the planning approval decision - and thus the essentially criticized lack of an alternative site assessment.

The planning approval decision for Berlin-Schönefeld Airport was the first procedure in the Federal Republic of Germany that did not follow the recommendation of the regional planning procedure.

At the political level, large parts of the Brandenburg SPD initially endorsed the Sperenberg location, while the CDU predominantly preferred the Schönefeld location close to the city. The Greens rejected Sperenberg out of ecological concerns, which were also shared by the CDU. The Schönefeld Airport, which is close to the city, was preferred by the federal government , especially since permissible 24-hour operation at a more distant location would have meant competition with the aviation hubs in Frankfurt am Main , Leipzig / Halle and Munich .

The Schönefeld location was justified by the proximity to the main area of ​​production and the good accessibility through existing higher-level road and rail connections, the more positively assessed aspects of the effects on the labor market and economic impulses, the better environmental compatibility due to the lack of interference in areas worthy of protection and the reuse of existing infrastructures. The connection with other modes of transport and the separation of settlement and open space were also rated better than the new airport building at the Sperenberg site. On the other hand, the avoidance of noise exposure, the better separation of room uses, especially from the point of view of pollutant emissions, and the lower risk of damage would have spoken in favor of the Sperenberg location .

Location
criteria spatial planning procedure 		Jueterbog Schönefeld Sperenberg
Distance from Berlin Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg
Spatial structure potential Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
costs Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
Land prices Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
Noise pollution Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
24 hour operation Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
Connection Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg
Relocation Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg
Environmental impact and ecology Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg
Contaminated sites Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg
Expansion options Symbol support vote.svg Symbol oppose vote.svg Symbol support vote.svg

Chronology of the project process

Planned opening date
time Planned
opening
2000 2007
2002 2009
2004 Fall 2010
Groundbreaking:
0Sep. 5 2006
  
Oct 30, 2011
Jun 25, 2010 0Jun 3, 2012
May 2012 March 17, 2013
Sep 2012 Oct. 27, 2013
Jan. 2013 unknown
Dec. 2014 2nd half of 2017
Jan. 21, 2017 2018
Dec 15, 2017 Oct. 2020
Nov 29, 2019 Oct 31, 2020

1995 - first calculation

A few months before the consensus decision, the amount of the construction costs in a study by the then BBF for the expansion of Berlin Schönefeld Airport in the first expansion stage was calculated at 1.112 billion marks (adjusted for purchasing power in today's currency: around 797 million euros).

1997–2002 - attempts at privatization

In the consensus resolution of 1996, the privatization of the airport company and the construction of the new airport in Schönefeld were set down with the help of private investors. In the corresponding invitation to tender - the first privatization process - in 1999 a consortium led by Hochtief was awarded the contract to purchase the airport company and build the new airport. However, due to unauthorized contacts between the bidder and the client via the Berlin engineering office WIB, the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court rejected this decision again in summer 1999. After suspicion of fraud against Hochtief, Hochtief was excluded from the award in February 2000. This left only a consortium around IVG , with which the shareholders wanted to reach an agreement by the end of 2000, while Hochtief took legal action against the exclusion. At this point in time it was expected to open in 2007.

In November 2000, the consortia led by Hochtief and IVG merged to form the Berlin-Brandenburg International Partner (BBIP) in response to concerns from the Cartel Office , thereby avoiding delays caused by legal disputes over the exclusion of the Hochtief consortium. In September 2001, the new consortium submitted a joint offer that was around three billion marks more expensive than the original offers of the individual consortia and called for extensive public guarantees for the operators' income. Hochtief and IVG demanded a return guarantee without wanting to participate in the follow-up costs of the scandal surrounding the eastern construction site. After improving the offer, the consortium and the shareholders reached an agreement in principle in August 2002 on the sale of the airport company and the construction of the new airport. The consortium wanted to take over the airport company for 290 million euros, the federal government should provide transport connections and the costs for building the airport, estimated at 1.7 billion euros, should be financed by increasing airport charges. At this point in time, it was expected to open in 2009.

2003 - Failure of privatization

In May 2003, the project to sell the airport company to a bidding consortium of Hochtief and IVG and to have the airport built by the new owners by 2009 finally failed because the shareholders of the airport company could not agree with the bidders on cost risks. After the failure of this second privatization attempt, the shareholders Berlin, Brandenburg and the federal government decided to build the new airport at their own expense. The bidding consortium was paid 40 million euros for the airport plans already drawn up by gmp and as compensation for the lost order .

2004 - Planning approval decision

On August 13, 2004 the expansion of [the] airport [s] Berlin-Schönefeld was approved. The opening of the airport was expected for the 2010/11 winter flight schedule. Two class actions with several thousand plaintiffs were filed with the Federal Administrative Court against the planning approval decision. In the meantime, the demolition of the village of Diepensee began. In December u. a. the general planning of the main terminal was awarded to the planning community Berlin-Brandenburg International (pg bbi) , consisting of the architectural offices JSK and gmp as well as the engineering company IGK-IGR.

2005 - construction preparations

In April 2005, the Federal Administrative Court imposed a temporary construction freeze on the project until the ruling on the planning approval decision, although preparatory measures were still permitted. The planning services for the new airport building were awarded by mid-2005 and the resettlements of Diepensee and Selchow were completed. In addition, preparatory measures for dewatering have begun.

2006 - start of construction of the airport

Construction of the airport - at that time still known as Berlin Brandenburg International (BBI) - began with the groundbreaking on September 5, 2006 - after the Federal Administrative Court had rejected the complaints against the airport's building permit. As part of this decision, however, a night flight ban between midnight and 5 a.m. was imposed. At the start of construction, Wowereit specified November 1, 2011 as the opening date.

2007 - first opening date

In April 2007, the construction of the main terminal was approved. Planned start of flight operations: October 30, 2011.

Instead of the general contractor concept that was initially favored , the construction of the main terminal was re-tendered on October 9, 2007 and divided into seven construction lots, because the offers of the four bidders - again including Hochtief - were well above the calculated costs of 630 million euros and price agreements between the bidding consortia were suspected. The individual trades should then be coordinated by the airport company and were awarded in 2008 and 2009.

The cost of building the airport has now been calculated at 2.018 billion euros.

2008 - Start of construction on the main terminal

Construction site in July 2008

Construction of the terminal began in July, after the shell of the airport train station below had been completed. In addition, Manfred Körtgen has been appointed as the successor to Thomas Weyer as Chief Technology Officer.

The cost of building the airport has now been calculated at 2.4 billion euros.

2009 - Rescheduling and new financing model

In order to increase the opening capacity from 22 to 25 million passengers per year to 27 million passengers, a. the plans for the main terminal subsequently changed in order to build an additional mezzanine floor.

In mid-2009, the costs for the construction of the airport and accompanying measures were calculated at 2.5 billion euros, of which 800 million euros had been built at the time and orders worth 1.5 billion euros had been awarded. The financing consisted of three parts: a total borrowing from eight participating banks in the amount of 2.4 billion euros, a shareholder contribution of 430 million euros and a self-financing contribution from Berlin Airports of 440 million euros.

2010 - Postponement of the opening

The topping-out ceremony for the main terminal was celebrated at the end of April 2010. In June 2010, the opening date initially planned for October 30, 2011 was postponed by seven months. June 3, 2012 was named as the new commissioning date. The delays were justified with stricter security requirements of the European Union and the insolvency of a participating engineering office.

From 2005 to 2010, the federal government paid the airport company € 111.8 million. In addition, the federal government is investing in a separate reception area for parliament and the federal government as well as the military part of the airport.

2011 - First problems with the fire alarm system

Construction site in June 2011

The complex, fully automatic fire alarm system , which is supposed to save lives in the event of a fire with 16,000  detectors and a kilometer-long smoke evacuation system, already showed considerable deficiencies in December 2011. The perfect interaction of the systems installed by five companies was not guaranteed, whereupon the TÜV refused acceptance.

The self-financing contribution calculated in 2009 rose to 530 million euros.

2012 - preparation and failure of commissioning

In the course of operational commissioning, the test phase should be followed by the relocation phase. ORAT -Consulting ( Operational Readiness and Airport Transfer - German : 'Operativebetrieb und Flughafenumzug') of the Munich airport company FMG, which had already successfully carried out the overnight move of Munich Airport in 1992, was entrusted with the organization of the move and the trial operation . The preliminary planning for the move in Berlin took four years and the implementation should take about ten weeks. The move should begin around eight weeks before the airport opens and should be completed two weeks after the airport opens. The plan was to bring everything from the 80 buildings at Tegel and Schönefeld Airports to Berlin Brandenburg Airport from the 80 buildings at Tegel and Schönefeld Airport in a major logistical act on the night of June 2, 2012 , except for the most important things that are needed at the old locations .

For this purpose, among other things, the city ​​motorway going south between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. on the morning of June 3, would have been closed for around 600 journeys by heavy and special transports (for heavy ground handling equipment). Another 2,500 trucks would have loaded and relocated the contents of the offices, warehouses, archives, restaurants, retail and other service providers (190 users in total) of the old airports and the new airport, mostly in advance.

Interior view of the main terminal in March 2012 during trial operation

On the morning of June 2, 2012, the first aircraft were to be transferred to Schönefeld - that is, they would not have flown to their normal destination Tegel, but would have landed in SXF, where the aircraft would have been parked until they were put into operation. By the afternoon, the number of planes landing in SXF (which actually would have flown to Tegel) should increase, and by the evening of June 2nd the first arriving passengers should be handled at the new terminal. It was planned that the last departure in Schönefeld, handled in the old terminal, would be made by an Aeroflot aircraft, while the last aircraft would land in Tegel at 11 p.m. on June 2, 2012. An Air Berlin 737-800 was supposed to take off there last, which symbolically would have ended the operation of the old North Berlin airport with a Berlin sightseeing flight and landing in Schönefeld. Immediately afterwards, the two runways in Tegel would have been blocked for air traffic by crosses. All procedures (IFR / VFR) would be canceled by NOTAM and the airfield reported as closed.

On May 8, 2012, the airport company canceled the opening date announced for June 3, 2012 due to “technical problems with the fire protection technology” and announced that the airport would “open after the summer holidays”. The opening ceremonies, which were to take place on May 24, 2012 with 40,000 invited guests (cost: around two million euros), were also canceled on May 8, 2012. The "public days" planned for May 12th and 13th for all interested parties who were able to view parts of the building and the grounds before the opening took place.

The airport company now announced March 17, 2013 as the new opening date. The fire protection system should be completed by December 2012. At the time the postponement was announced, 95 percent of the buildings had been completed and not all IT problems had been resolved , according to the operator . According to media reports, however, the problems went far beyond fire protection; for example, they also affected door control and baggage handling. Only 50 to 60 percent of the processes should have worked as intended.

On May 23, 2012, the airport company of the planning community Berlin-Brandenburg International (pg bbi) gave notice without notice. The technical director, Manfred Körtgen, was dismissed on May 31, 2012; According to media reports, Körtgen was often not present on the construction site and wrote a dissertation alongside his work. According to insiders, there was never a construction manager with an overview. In mid-June 2012, the airport company filed a complaint against the planning company run by gmp before the Potsdam Regional Court . Accordingly, the work on the safety technology was already 15 months behind schedule at the end of 2010. The claim for damages amounted to over 80 million euros.

Even at this point in time, observers saw extensive errors as the cause of the numerous missed costs and deadlines, including an inadequate management structure, inadequate construction supervision, inadequate crisis management, the composition of the supervisory board with largely non-specialist politicians and employee representatives, but also inadequate budget planning and errors in the tenders.

On December 4, 2014, Rainer Schwarz said in the investigative committee that, according to the rules of procedure, he was not responsible for the technology. Manfred Körtgen was responsible for building the airport. Körtgen saw the main cause of the delays in planning, as he said on October 17, 2014 in the Berlin investigation committee. On June 5, 2015, the Senator for Interior and Sport of the State of Berlin , Frank Henkel ( CDU ), said in the investigative committee that the termination of pg bbi had been a mistake, primarily due to time constraints, of course. The investigative committee of the Berlin House of Representatives did not assess the termination of pg bbi per se as a mistake in view of the planning deficiencies that had occurred , but the consequences of the termination were not correctly assessed and absorbed by the airport company, which resulted in further delays.

In mid-2012, the plan was to submit the application for building acceptance in January 2013 . If the authorities had accepted the systems in January 2013, the missing function tests would have been continued in a six-week trial run from January 18, 2013.

On August 14, 2012, a media report was announced that March 17, 2013 as the opening date could not be kept. The commissioning should instead take place in summer or autumn 2013. On September 4, 2012, the then Prime Minister of Brandenburg Matthias Platzeck announced that the start date would be postponed again. At a press conference on September 7, 2012, Horst Amann , the then chief technology officer , reported that the final phase of the project had been completely redesigned due to significant deficiencies in planning and construction, and named October 27, 2013, the start of the winter flight schedule, as the new opening date.

At the end of December 2012, the then Federal Transport Minister Peter Ramsauer announced that, according to information from the federal government, the opening date on October 27, 2013 might not be held. At the end of February 2013, an inventory of the existing deficiencies was carried out.

Significant delays appeared to have arisen due to serious mistakes by the management, which Thomas Weyer said in the control committee. These occurred particularly since 2008. This included, for example, having an A380 passenger boarding bridge built under pressure from the supervisory board so that a “world airport” would emerge. As a result, Weyer's successor as chief technology officer, Körtgen, was in a bad light.

According to media reports from August 2012, the airport's liquid funds only lasted until November 2012. The airport company could not take out any more loans. The shareholders (federal government, states of Berlin and Brandenburg) initially wanted to close the financing gap by means of a capital increase of around 500 million euros and a shareholder loan. Ultimately, they secured additional funding of 1.2 billion euros. This payment was based on an opening in October 2013. On November 28, 2012, the shareholders applied to the EU to release the aid, which was complied with on December 19, 2012. The airport would have been insolvent three weeks later.

At the beginning of November 2012, the airline Air Berlin announced that it had filed a declaratory action against the operating company Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH (FBB) before the Potsdam Regional Court . The airline estimates the financial damage caused by the postponed opening before the winter operations at Tegel Airport at a double-digit million amount. In January 2014, a spokesman for the Potsdam Regional Court announced that Air Berlin was demanding compensation of 48 million euros. Previous discussions between the operating company and Air Berlin about possible damages had failed. The operating company denied the claim for damages, as no fixed opening date for the airport had been contractually agreed with the airline. Deutsche Bahn also wants to sue the operating company for the costs incurred and arising from the postponement. According to its own information, the company is missing out on revenue of around 620,000 euros per month, according to another source of two million euros. By the end of October 2012, Deutsche Bahn had suffered 34 million euros in damage.

The costs for the terminal, passenger boarding bridges and baggage facility were at least 1.22 billion euros in May 2012, which is twice the originally estimated costs. The total costs at this point in time were estimated at at least 4.5 billion euros, including preliminary costs due to the postponement of commissioning of at least 586 million euros. The additional costs for the taxpayer in August 2012 were at least 1.17 billion euros. Recourse claims as announced by various airlines are not taken into account. Compared to the original cost estimates, costs of around 600 million euros had to be taken into account for noise protection after the original noise protection requirements were systematically failed. The planning has changed significantly over the years.

2013 - Looking for new ways of commissioning

In 2013 the federal government contributed 169 million euros in financial aid, 143 million euros were planned for 2014. At least the first installment was at the expense of other items in the budget of the Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Development, including housing. Due to the further delay in commissioning, further public subsidies are now necessary (as of June 2013).

The airport company put the costs of the delayed commissioning at 15 million euros per month. In April 2013, 35–40 million euros were named. Due to the construction delays, Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH posted a loss of 185 million euros in 2012.

In mid-January 2013, Matthias Platzeck was elected Chairman of the Airport Company's Supervisory Board. Airport boss Rainer Schwarz was dismissed. The then chief technology officer Horst Amann had stated a few days earlier that the planned opening date - October 27, 2013 - could no longer be kept after hot smoke gas tests carried out at the end of 2012 revealed serious defects in the smoke extraction system. He is now assuming an opening date in 2015. Platzeck stated that a new specific date would not be announced for several months.

At the suggestion of the manager Hartmut Mehdorn , who was appointed in spring 2013 at the initiative of Platzeck, Wowereit and Ramsauer , there should be a further phased opening of the airport. His proposals resulted in a partial transition from Tegel to BER, so that Tegel would have continued to operate for a certain period of time until BER could have carried the entire burden of air traffic on its own. This was intended to prevent the BER from being overwhelmed and to enable flight operations within Berlin to be quickly shifted in the event of disruptions, technical failures, etc. The owners initially rejected this variant strictly. They referred to the political resolutions for the immediate complete shutdown of Tegel and the immediately following development of a science center on the site.

On August 16, 2013, the Supervisory Board approved Mehdorn's plans to partially open the airport from spring 2014. The plan was to handle up to ten flights per day in the northern part; that corresponded to almost 0.8 percent of the flights taking place in Schönefeld and Tegel at the time. A new building permit was to be obtained from the Dahme-Spreewald district and counters and baggage belts installed in the area previously planned as a waiting hall. The weekly newspaper Die Zeit reported at the beginning of September 2013 that the start of partial operations planned by Mehdorn in spring 2014 would be delayed by about half a year. In February 2014, Mehdorn canceled the planned test run. The reason he cited was a lack of support from the supervisory board.

2014 - Finding an opening date

In January 2014 it was announced that an opening in 2014 seemed impossible. The chairman of the Transport Committee in the Bundestag, Martin Burkert (SPD), said on May 14, 2014 that an opening after 2017 was likely. Airport boss Hartmut Mehdorn also seemed to expect 2017 at the earliest. On October 14, 2014, the naming of an opening date was postponed again after no specific dates had been given since 2013. According to a BamS report dated November 23, 2014, the opening date should probably be delayed to 2018. After a long time there were no official statements about a completion date, Hartmut Mehdorn surprisingly announced an opening date sometime between June and September 2017 in December 2014. It remained unclear whether the airport should be fully completed by this date.

As it became apparent that the capacity of the new terminal would be exhausted by the time it opened, it was decided in March 2014 to continue operating the old Schönefeld Airport. An interim solution was to be found for the government airport, which was planned to replace the old terminals. In the meantime, it was unclear whether work on the fire protection system had even started at this point in time.

In May 2014, the airport company announced the fire protection system planner di Mauro. On June 11, 2014, property manager Harald Siegle von Mehdorn was dismissed without notice after Siegle had sent a fire letter to three members of the supervisory board. In November 2014, Siegle was awarded a severance payment in the amount of 230,000 euros. Also in June, head of technology Jochen Großmann, who had only held this post for two months, was dismissed on account of corruption allegations. Großmann had previously been responsible for making the smoke extraction system at the main terminal functional and ready for approval, and had arranged for it to be broken down and redesigned.

The new chief technology officer Jörg Marks took up his post on August 1st, 2014. At the same time it became known that safety deficiencies prevented the completion of the north pier because parts of the lightning rods were missing. The emergency generator was also too small. On November 9, 2014, it became known that Marks criticized in an internal report that only 15% of the fire protection deficiencies had been fixed that day.

Due to the ongoing delay in opening, the airport company's financial situation deteriorated. On April 10, 2014, the management of the airport company announced that they wanted to inquire about another 1.1 billion euros from the shareholders. The additional funds, the distribution of which had to be approved by the European Commission , should be used after 2014 to complete the airport and for noise protection measures. The overall concept, which was 1.1 billion euros more expensive, was approved by the Supervisory Board on June 30, 2014. This increased the total costs to 5.4 billion euros.

On May 13, 2014, a confidential letter was published that the airport was in acute danger of bankruptcy. On May 14, 2014, the German Bundestag decided to pay out a tranche of 26.5 million euros from the subsidy of 1.2 billion euros approved in 2012 in order to ensure the airport company's liquidity. On July 3, 2014, the Budget Committee of the Bundestag released a further tranche of 58 million euros.

According to media reports in November 2014, the airport company planned to invest a further 2.19 billion euros in renovation and expansion measures by 2035 after the opening. On December 16, 2014, the supervisory board warned of a further increase in costs due to the fact that the airport will probably not open until 2017. The previous costs of 5.4 billion euros only relate to a period up to around 2016.

2015 - New problems and new general planner

In mid-February 2015 it seemed that the planned opening date in 2017 could not be kept. The companies involved in the construction of the fire protection systems criticized the schedule as “partly unrealistic”, while risks related to the installation of full-body scanners became known. Karsten Mühlenfeld was chosen to succeed Mehdorn as airport manager. On February 13, 2015, a former advisor testified to the committee of inquiry that he had known well before the first planned opening in 2012 that it could not take place. His criticism went in the direction of a lack of general contractor and the management, in particular ex-chief technology officer Körtgen.

According to statements by Mehdorn in the investigation committee on March 20, 2015, the planning to correct the fire protection system should be completed by the end of summer 2015. The correction then requires official approval. As a result, the completion of the (main) terminal is delayed further. Mehdorn indicated that the completion of the terminal, which was previously planned for mid-March 2016, could be delayed to “March / April”.

In mid-April 2015 it became known that the state of Brandenburg is lending 409 million euros to BER airport; the amount should be repaid later.

In May 2015, the estimated costs were around 5.3 billion euros so-called net costs . The gross costs are kept under lock and key. In a pre-notification form, the German government applied to the EU in May 2015 to grant more than 2.5 billion euros in state aid in addition to the 4.3 billion euros it had paid so far.

On May 17, 2015 it became clear that the government section is not expected to be completed before 2021.

In July 2015, the forecasts approached the mark of six billion euros.

In the interim report of the investigative committee of the Berlin Senate in July 2015, it was stated that there were considerable control deficits, which were primarily caused by the airport management. A final committee of inquiry report is expected in 2016.

The insolvency of the German subsidiary Imtech Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG of the Dutch construction company Royal Imtech NV at the beginning of August 2015, according to the airport boss Karsten Mühlenfeld, has "effects on important steps in the schedule" because the company is "one of the most important construction companies for BER- Construction site ". Even Martin Delius , Chairman of the Airport Commission of Inquiry, sees the currently targeted opening date - the second half of 2017 - as "critically endangered" on. In mid-August 2015, the airport company announced that it had “agreed to continue work at BER” with Imtech.

After a three-year search, the engineering company Schüßler-Plan was named as the new general planner at the end of August 2015 .

2016 - Investigation of cost and deadline overruns

The report of the State Audit Office of Brandenburg on the failed opening in summer 2012 revealed results in early 2016 regarding the ineffectiveness of the opening dates and the associated costs. Due to pressure from the Supervisory Board, the new opening dates were set without a reliable schedule and the resulting postponements were associated with further increases in costs. Furthermore, the supervisory board and shareholders' meeting hardly exercised their control function during the construction phase. Rising construction costs and construction delays were not questioned by the shareholders. Contrary to the assertion that the opening in 2012 only failed due to fire protection, large parts of the terminal could not be used at all at that time.

On February 20, 2016, the planning and construction of an additional terminal (T2) with a floor area of ​​45,000 m² was tendered. The terminal should be built on the north pier to handle an additional eight million passengers annually. The new building should be completed by 2019 and planned and built by a "total contractor" (TÜ).

In June, the investigative committee set up by the Berlin House of Representatives to investigate the cost and deadline overruns at BER presented its final report. The report criticizes the decision of the airport company to split the construction of the main terminal into very small parts (approx. 40 awards) without adequately meeting the resulting coordination requirements. Between mid-2012 and 2014, multiple restructurings paralyzed the progress of the project. The investigation report showed weaknesses in the planning, which were reinforced by constant change requests from the airport company. The project manager WSP CBP had not sufficiently informed the management about the timing and planning risks of the project - on the other hand, “the management of the airport company was obviously not interested in uncomfortable assessments”. For its part, the project management was dependent on information from the construction supervision, which was not sufficiently dimensioned in view of the small-scale allocation of trades and the large volume of supplements.

The termination of the general planner pg bbi is not fundamentally criticized, but the management underestimated the scope of the additional tasks and was initially unable to cope with them. The investigative committee established "a clear intention of the management - or the technical manager Manfred Körtgen" to deceive the supervisory board and criticized "a systematic ignoring and suppression of negative information". The committee of inquiry could not clearly answer whether the supervisory board should have recognized the project deadline risks. However, he criticized the decision of the Supervisory Board in 2010 to postpone the opening date by only seven months to June 2012, although the risks of this date were communicated by the management. In general, as the opening date approached, there was a “collective loss of reality” and a “vacuum of responsibility” in the project.

2017 - Another postponement of the opening

Construction of the interim government terminal west of the terminal building at Schönefeld Airport began in early 2017. The areas originally intended for the government airport are initially not available due to the planned continued operation of the SXF terminals even after the opening of BER airport. Furthermore, the last addendum to the building permit for the main terminal was approved by the responsible building regulations office.

Due to problems with the control of automatic doors and problems with the sprinkler system, it became clear in January 2017 that opening in the second half of 2017 would be ruled out and that completion would be delayed by at least a year. Managing director Mühlenfeld then dismissed technical director Jörg Marks in February and replaced him with Christoph Bretschneider. Then Mühlenfeld himself was dismissed and replaced by Engelbert Lütke Daldrup. After initially stating an opening in 2018 as the target, Lütke Daldrup proposed October 2020 as the new opening date in December 2017 and accepted by the Supervisory Board.

2018 - Start of construction of the "low-cost airline terminal"

In February 2018, the South Pier was officially approved and, after the North Pier, was one of the first essential parts of the new airport's building that would be ready for passenger traffic. At the same time, a further increase in total costs by 770 million euros to 7.3 billion euros became known. In March 2018, the planned smoke extraction solution in the transition area between the airport train station and the main terminal was approved. Previously, it had been considered to let fewer trains run at the same time in the station in order to comply with the fire protection requirements.

On May 20, 2018, it became known that the acceptance of the safety power generation and safety lighting of the main terminal in February by TÜV Rheinland had a negative result and, for example, cable work was eleven months behind schedule.

At the beginning of July 2018, the State of Berlin demanded that Norbert Preuss, the supervisory board representative he had appointed, also be hired as an external consultant to supervise the construction work on site, which he had previously suggested himself, according to press reports. This attempt to control the construction progress more closely was seen as a sign of the mistrust of the Berlin Senate towards the management and its chairman Lütke Daldrup. However, the direct award of a consultancy contract to Preuss without a tender was rejected by the supervisory board.

In summer 2018, the construction of the "low-cost airline terminal" T2, the construction of which was initiated by Mehdorn, was approved. The contract for the "highly functional designed [e]" building, the financial framework of which was doubled to 200 million euros before construction began, was awarded to Zech Bau GmbH in September 2018 . The additional terminal, like the main terminal, should now be completed by 2020.

2019 - TÜV approval of the fire protection systems

Berlin Brandenburg Airport in summer 2019. In July, the shell of Terminal 2 (front right in the picture) was completed.

In April 2019, the smoke extraction system at the main terminal, the completion of which was considered an important hurdle to the opening of the airport, was approved by the TÜV. In addition, a TÜV report became known which complained about a high number of defects in the fire alarm system and safety cables. Correcting the deficiencies is therefore "associated with a potentially high level of personnel expenditure, but also with a large number of dismantling operations" and the opening date in October 2020 is at risk.

There was also the problem that dowels used to fasten safety-relevant cables in the main terminal were not approved for this purpose. According to media reports, it was unclear whether the individual approval sought by the airport company could be granted. The completion of the fire alarm system, which was originally supposed to take place by February 2019, was completed in April 2019, according to the airport company; the approval by the TÜV should be completed by June 2019. According to the managing director Lütke Daldrup, the final inspection of the fire alarm system took place by mid-July 2019.

On July 25, 2019, the airport company announced that it would begin with the principle of operation test on July 29 , during which the interaction of all technical systems at the main terminal will be checked. The systems had previously been individually checked by the TÜV. The principle of operation test was completed early at the end of September 2019 and, according to the supervisory board, went better than expected. Nevertheless, there were still deficiencies in safety-relevant cables and their fixings, the rectification of which should delay the submission of the construction completion notification from October 2019 to at least February 2020. On November 29, 2019, October 31, 2020 was announced as the new opening date.

2020 - Removal of defects and completion of construction

In January, the fire protection facilities at the transition from the main terminal to the underground train station were approved by TÜV, and the use of two types of dowels in the cable routes was subsequently approved. According to a media report, around 5,000 of the 16,500 deficiencies in the cable routes at the main terminal were not rectified in February or their removal was not confirmed by the TÜV. This jeopardizes the punctual, defect-free completion of the main terminal, which should take place in the first quarter of 2020, and the start of trial operation at the end of April 2020.

Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic at the time , the trial operation could not take place as planned in spring 2020, but was postponed to the middle of the year. In April 2020, the airport boss Engelbert Lütke Daldrup declared in the special committee of the Brandenburg state parliament that all necessary documents, including previously open test certificates from TÜV , had been handed over to the building supervisory authority . Until then, the TÜV had to check cables for the safety power supply and the safety lighting, up to three weeks later. On April 28, 2020, the main terminal was approved by the building supervision authority of the Dahme-Spreewald district. In September before the airport opened, Terminal 2 was completed after a two-year construction period, but due to the generally greatly reduced air traffic volume at the time, it will not be operational until 2021.

Reasons for delay

The reasons for the long-standing problems in the construction of the airport are due to massive construction defects, in particular fire protection, planning errors before and during construction as well as faulty crisis management and problematic personnel decisions as well as corruption .

Plan changes

Due to the division of the construction of the main terminal into seven, later nine construction lots, there was no general contractor who could have carried out and coordinated the implementation planning for the main terminal. Instead, this was provided by the airport company and its general planner pg bbi . Extensive changes were made to the design and approval planning , especially by the end of 2009 , which in the following years led to delays in the execution planning and construction, especially in the area of ​​technical building equipment. According to the general planning department, change requests led to planning delays of 18 months. Changes to the plan were made partly at the request of the airlines; some of the approx. 500 changes required renewed building applications:

  • The establishment of walk-boarding piers, which do not require a bus transfer between the airport and the aircraft, was decided in 2006 (north pier) and 2007 (south pier). In 2009, the construction of passenger boarding bridges was agreed for the south pier .
  • It was decided in 2007 to enlarge the sales areas of the airport in order to secure the financial viability of airport operations.
  • In order to be prepared for a larger proportion of international transfer passengers, the usage concept of the storeys in the main terminal was changed ( level shift ) and an additional level was set up. These plan changes in particular had a significant impact on the technical building equipment (including smoke extraction), which ultimately resulted in a delay in completion.
  • As a result of the planning of a separate level for non-Schengen traffic (see above), it was decided to build two-storey passenger boarding bridges. At the suggestion of the then chairman of the supervisory board, Wowereit, one of these bridges should be prepared for the handling of the Airbus A380 - especially for image reasons.
  • Changes to the EU security regulations in air traffic have led to an increased space requirement for security checks for passengers. Since a lateral extension of the terminal, which was already provided as an option , would have resulted in a delay of at least three years in the opinion of pg bbi , it was decided in 2010 to erect so-called security pavilions in the terminal. In order to connect these pavilions to the sales areas and also to the fire protection systems, extensive rescheduling and conversion measures were necessary. The rescheduling resulted in a one-year construction freeze in the affected areas, whereupon the opening date was postponed by seven months to June 2012.

As a result of the rescheduling, the approval planning had not yet been drawn up if, due to the high deadline pressure, the construction work had already been put out to tender. The design and implementation planning was partially carried out parallel to the construction. Cost risks resulting from subsequent changes were recognized and criticized as early as 2008, but the airport company stuck to this practice to avoid delays. Prior to 2010, no explicit management approval was required for plan changes. A number of times - most recently in October 2011 - stopping of plans was imposed, which, however, was not consistently adhered to.

As early as 2009, deficiencies in the implementation planning of the technical building equipment were discovered, due to the insolvency of the IGK-IGR engineering office in February 2010, there was a planning delay of nine months in this area. As a result, planning tasks for building automation were outsourced to the contractor Siemens. Despite the increased use of pg bbi in the planning of the technical building equipment, no flawless implementation planning could be created for years. As a result of construction acceleration measures, the airport company increasingly lost track of the construction process, which led to an "increasing discrepancy between the planning and the current situation".

Fire protection

As early as 2011, about six months before the opening was canceled at short notice in May 2012, there were problems with fire protection at BER, which ultimately delayed commissioning significantly. With a gross floor area of ​​320,000 m², the main terminal is one of the largest buildings in Europe. Its cross-storey fire protection system is considered to be particularly complex due to the architecture of the building. It must be able to deal with 364 defined fire scenarios. The fire protection system includes 16,000 fire detectors, over 50,000 sprinkler heads , kilometers of supply and exhaust air ducts with 3400 flaps and 81 fans. Fire protection is made more complicated by the fact that it was not decided until after construction began to build an additional mezzanine floor in the main terminal in order to increase the floor area from the initially planned 200,000 to 340,000 square meters. This made significant changes to the fire protection systems necessary, the planning and implementation of which was not managed by those responsible for a long time.

Fire protection issues were officially cited in 2012 as the reason for the failure of the opening on June 3, 2012. At the time of the cancellation, the fire protection system was not yet ready for testing. According to media reports, the necessary components of the fire protection system (e.g. fire alarms) had been available for a long time, but neither plans nor necessary preparatory work existed. The plan to temporarily control parts of the fire protection-relevant systems manually was not approved by the Dahme-Spreewald district. In the months after the announcement of the commissioning delay, there was no progress in fire protection, according to media reports.

The company Siemens , Bosch and Imtech supplied components for trades of the fire protection system . On November 14th, 2012 at the 6th Berlin Economic Conference in the Red City Hall, Klaus Wowereit (SPD), Berlin's then Governing Mayor and Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the airport company, spoke about the companies involved in fire protection: "The most well-known technology companies are involved, the most well-known inspectors and Planner. There has to be a responsibility that all these wonderful companies are able to get a smoke extraction system in place. "

In January 2013 it was announced that there were deficiencies in the “cabling, programming and adjustment” of the fire protection system. The central computer control could not coordinate the data from the sub-areas of fire detection, fire fighting and smoke removal. The smoke extraction system itself was built contrary to official requirements. T-Systems , a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG , is responsible for data technology . According to Manager-Magazin , Imtech and the Finnish YIT “were awarded the contract for the entire sanitary, heating, cooling, ventilation and air conditioning in the terminal” and thus provided “the heart of the fire protection system”.

Already in 2013 it was criticized that with the new contracts with previous contractors in the field of building technology (including T-Systems, Imtech and Siemens) there was largely "no possibility of potential counterclaims, such as damages, substitute actions from the past or in the future" because of the work in connection with the route rehabilitation would destroy evidence.

In August 2013 it was announced that another 90 kilometers of new cables would be laid.

Experts criticized in January 2014 that the 800-meter-long central cable duct under the terminal was overcrowded. The cables would heat up to 70 ° C at full load, which could destroy plastic sheaths. Retrofitting the cable duct with an air conditioning system was considered. In addition, many cables were undersized, bent or kinked too much.

In April 2014, the technical director of Berlin Brandenburg Airport, Jochen Großmann, stated that the airport's fire protection system had been incorrectly planned. Großmann explained: "We have recalculated the system and you have to be very clear: It was a planning error." The original concept provided that smoke evacuation and fresh air supply not on every floor to the outside, but by fans over several hundred meters should be pumped first into the cellar and then sideways to the outside. In particular, section 14 of the fire protection system (responsible for smoke extraction from the entire main terminal) was completely incorrectly constructed in the planning documents. In order to reduce the complexity of smoke extraction from the main terminal, smoke extraction on the upper floors has been decoupled from smoke extraction in the rest of the building - smoke from the upper floors is instead to be discharged via three-meter-high chimneys on the roof. The systems for controlling the fresh air supply in the main terminal have also been divided into subsections. On May 10, 2014, the Federal Audit Office drew attention in particular to the serious deficiencies in the planning of the new smoke extraction system .

Alfredo di Mauro, the originally commissioned planner of the smoke extraction system, said in a conversation on the ZDF broadcast Frontal21 that Mehdorn had accepted his suggestions to carry out tests to solve the problems. He then made additional calculations for these experiments. A month later he received a letter stating that these documents had been disposed of, allegedly due to a lack of space. On June 1, 2014 it became known that some smoke extraction system projects had been awarded again, i.e. twice, after completion.

On June 23, 2014 it became known that confidential documents of the JSK architectural office , which belonged to the former airport planning association pg bbi , had been found in the garbage container. Furthermore, Alfredo di Mauro is not an engineer, as was generally assumed in Berlin up to now, but only has a journeyman's certificate as a technical draftsman .

Up to the end of June 2014, a “basic assessment to prepare the planning” for the smoke extraction system had not yet taken place. According to press reports, the changed planning documents for the smoke extraction system were completed in April 2015. The smoke extraction system, which was considered one of the main reasons for the failure of the opening in 2012, was finally approved by the TÜV in April 2019. According to the airport boss, the fire alarm system was also approved in summer 2019, and work on the cable works was completed in April 2020.

Further construction defects

Construction work in the main hall in 2011

Since 2012 some examples of shortcomings have been given by the media:

  • According to press reports from December 2012, the escalators between the train station and the Plaza building were a few steps too short.
  • On the western terminal facade, rainwater flowed directly into the openings of the ventilation system, depending on the wind direction.
  • Fireproof dowels were missing on the wall cladding of elevators.
  • The IT system was not sufficiently cooled by cooling units and was therefore not fail-safe.
  • The underfloor refueling on the airfield did not receive the safety approval. Some of the pipe sections did not fit together.
  • 1036 trees on the site were incorrectly planted. 600 of them were to be dug up again and placed in other places.
  • In some stairwells, the banisters were not completely installed, up to five meters were missing.
  • Cable ducts were completely forgotten when the parking garage was built. As a result, cables laid over a suspended ceiling bent through the ceiling.
  • The emergency power supply did not work.
  • A data connection to the fire brigade was missing.

In 2013, there were 75,000 construction defects. According to FBB information from August 2013, around 40,000 of around 150,000 defects had been processed and 85,000 were in progress. 25,000 were judged not to be relevant.

In January 2014, tradesmen's bills in the amount of 400 million euros were unpaid.

In October 2014 it became known that the room numbering throughout the terminal was incorrect. This was caused by renumbering in 2012. At the beginning of 2015 it became known that the responsible building regulations office of the Dahme-Spreewald district would have to deal with the fact that the 5000 rooms would have to be renumbered.

At the beginning of May 2014 it became known that the data cables were also located next to power cables , which could lead to disruptions in operation.

By June 2015, 35 kilometers of new main cables had been laid; In addition, heating pipes were insulated to prevent the neighboring cable ducts from overheating.

In September 2015 it became known that flue gas fans that were too heavy had been installed in some ceiling areas of the passenger terminal. Due to a possible risk of collapse, parts of the terminal were initially closed and on September 21, 2015 a construction freeze for the entire terminal was imposed. The responsible project manager was dismissed for indiscretion . The construction freeze was lifted on October 1, 2015.

On September 28, 2015, airport boss Mühlenfeld announced that around 600 walls had to be torn down, which were intended as fire protection walls , "but were not built that way".

Frictions of construction delays

The main consequences of the inoperability of Berlin Brandenburg Airport are the increasing capacity bottlenecks for air traffic in Berlin and enormous cost increases. In addition, there were numerous personal and legal consequences.

Building permits

The building permit for the North Pier expired on February 18, 2015. Approval for use by the building authorities was granted on December 19, 2014. The building permit for the south pier was originally valid until August 10, 2016 and for the passenger terminal until October 30, 2016.

At the end of April 2016, an amendment to the Brandenburg building regulations was passed by the Brandenburg State Parliament , which came into force on July 1, 2016. In addition to changes to smoke alarms and accessibility, the new version also contains changes to the period of validity of building permits: For building projects that require planning approval , the period of validity of building permits is linked to the period of validity of the planning approval decision (previously it was six years). According to Section 75 (4) VwVfG, a plan approval decision remains valid if construction has started within five years of the expiry of the period for filing. Thus, the risk of a new approval process has been eliminated for the time being.

In the event of a new approval process, stricter building standards would have applied to climate protection and accessibility . New plans should also have been made as to how the fire protection system works under the new regulations (including more rescue options for people with disabilities).

Change of personnel in the supervisory board and in airport management

Since the serious problems in the construction of the airport became known, there have been frequent changes in staff at the airport company, especially in the positions of chairman of the supervisory board, managing director (airport manager) and managing director construction and technology (technical manager). The airport company has had four airport managers and six technical managers since 2012.

Klaus Wowereit resigned as Chairman of the Supervisory Board in 2013 after two canceled BER opening dates and left the office to Matthias Platzeck . After his resignation as head of the Brandenburg government, he took it over again. On December 11, 2014, Wowereit resigned as Governing Mayor. The burden of the airport problems had contributed to this. After Klaus Wowereit left, the head of the supervisory board was initially not taken over by his successor Michael Müller , who was content with a seat in the owners' meeting. After the supervisory board did not comment on a possible change of course for six months after Wower's departure, Michael Müller was declared the new head of the supervisory board on July 3, 2015. In March 2017, Rainer Bretschneider replaced Müller as Chairman of the Supervisory Board.

In May 2012, shortly after the failure of the opening was announced in June 2012, Manfred Körtgen, head of technology at the time, was dismissed and Horst Amann was his successor. Hartmut Mehdorn succeeded Rainer Schwarz as airport manager ( Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH ) in spring 2013 . At the end of 2013, Amann lost his position as head of technology after an ongoing conflict with Mehdorn and was replaced by Jochen Großmann. Due to corruption allegations, which later turned out to be true, Großmann had to vacate his post in June 2014. As of August 1, 2014, his successor was the former Siemens manager Jörg Marks.

Mehdorn announced his departure on December 15, 2014. Three days earlier, on December 12, 2014, Mehdorn had been informed of the alleged corruption cases by Imtech. Mehdorn had resisted an external control of his work, which the supervisory board had initiated, and spoke of "Inquisition" and "culture of mistrust around BER".

The Supervisory Board appointed Karsten Mühlenfeld as airport manager as Mehdorn's successor . At the beginning of 2017 - after the opening date was canceled in autumn 2017 - Mühlenfeld single-handedly swapped technical director Jörg Marks for Christoph Bretschneider. As a result, Mühlenfeld had to vacate his post as airport manager in March 2017 under pressure from Berlin and the federal government. Former State Secretary Engelbert Lütke Daldrup was chosen as Mühlenfeld's successor, Christoph Bretschneider left the airport company after less than a month. Marks returned, but from now on Peter Herrmann was responsible for the construction of the main terminal. Since the end of 2017, the responsibility for the completion of the main terminal lies directly with the airport boss himself, technical director Marks was replaced by Carsten Wilmsen in November 2018.

Management consultant and auditor

In December 2013, Mehdorn had to part with his consultants at PricewaterhouseCoopers because their work was not properly advertised.

On June 27, 2014 it was announced that the federal government, Berlin and Brandenburg would seek external help to check the processes at the capital's airport. The Federal Audit Office had criticized the corruption affair and Mehdorn's information behavior three months earlier. Two months earlier, Mehdorn had the airport and its processes examined by the auditing company KPMG . Federal Transport Minister Alexander Dobrindt stated that contract award practice and cost management should also be assessed. On June 16, 2014, Mehdorn had declared the controlling required by the Federal Court of Auditors to be superfluous, the FBB required "no controlling of the controlling of the controlling".

In mid-December 2014, the new governing mayor Michael Müller blocked Mehdorn's application for further approval of the activities of Roland Berger's management consultants , who had received around eight million euros for their consultations since May 2013.

Civil law disputes

The Berlin Regional Court ended a legal dispute with the former managing director of the BER operating company Rainer Schwarz about his continued payment of his salary with its judgment on October 23, 2014. Since Rainer Schwarz could not prove any serious breaches of duty, he would have the right to payment of his salary until the original end of the contract May 2016.

The lawsuit against the planning association pg bbi due to the planning errors in the smoke extraction system due to the missed opening date on June 3, 2012 should be expanded, became known in April 2014. On November 20, 2014, the airport company again sued its planning office for damages in the amount of 224 million euros, after having previously sued for 80 million euros. The proceedings were suspended after only the Gmp planning office of Meinhard von Gerkan was left of the pg bbi and this office was working again with the BBI.

Criminal investigation

MAWV, RAKW and others

In mid-October 2014, the first hearing took place before the Cottbus Regional Court regarding bribe payments in connection with the laying of water pipes. The accused were the former head of the Märkischer Abwasser- und Wasser Zweckverband (MAWV), Wolf-Peter Albrecht, the ex-head of the company Pipeline and Plant Construction Königs Wusterhausen (RAKW), Wilfried Gromotka and a construction contractor. Among other things, a house is said to have been built for free. The trial before the Neuruppin District Court in connection with the laying of water pipes ended with a prison sentence and suspended sentence on July 10, 2015.

Further allegations of corruption were raised on August 16, 2015 in Bild am Sonntag . Airport executives are said to have instructed the companies Siemens, Bosch and the Telekom subsidiary T-Systems to pay excessive bills . Until the opening date was canceled in mid-2012 by the airport company, the accused had approved almost every request for additional payment - several times in the double-digit million range. Such high back payments are "one-time and suspicious". An airport spokesman then announced that “all payments made since the start of the project would be subject to a new, comprehensive review”. In addition, Der Tagesspiegel reported on August 17, 2015 that the airport company and Siemens had filed a criminal complaint for billing fraud in the construction of the capital's airport; it is about an amount of 1.9 million euros. A blackout in the lights on the southern runway led to investigations into air traffic safety in September 2015.

Jochen Grossmann

On May 27, 2014 Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH announced that Jochen Großmann as Technical Director of Berlin Brandenburg Airport had been given leave of absence by the airport company and that the Neuruppin public prosecutor's office had started investigations against him on the basis of an initial suspicion of corruption.

On June 4, 2014, Großmann was fired after he was accused of having asked the consulting company Arcadis up to 500,000 euros for a contract. Further allegations against Großmann became known on June 16, 2014.

Jochen Großmann was sentenced in October 2014, according to information from the Neuruppin public prosecutor, to a suspended sentence of one year and a payment of 200,000 euros by the Cottbus district court for corruption and fraud. Among other things, he had demanded a bribe of 350,000 euros from a Dutch planning office that had applied for an order.

Imtech

On July 27, 2013, the BZ announced information that Imtech had committed a billing fraud with 40,000 unworked hours with damage amounting to millions; The employees listed were actually working elsewhere.

Imtech had a massive liquidity problem at the turn of the year 2012/2013. Companies involved threatened to stop the work if the airport company did not make financial improvements. As a result, the federal states of Berlin and Brandenburg finally transferred 25 million euros to Imtech for invoices that had not been checked.

Since December 2014, the Neuruppin public prosecutor's office has been investigating four former executives of Imtech and a former division manager of Imtech on charges of bribery for an additional payment of 65 million euros to Imtech by the airport's supervisory board in December 2012 at the suggestion of Amann. The employee was an authorized signatory under Amann and is said to have received two million euros; the public prosecutor's office seized several hundred thousand euros from a house search.

The German subsidiary of the Dutch construction company Imtech filed for bankruptcy on August 6, 2015. The German Imtech was to be sold by Ernst & Young , according to the insolvency administrator on August 20, 2015. In fact, Imtech Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG was transferred to a company belonging to the Gustav Zech Foundation in Bremen and is renamed Rud. Otto Meyer Technik GmbH & Co. KG ( ROM Technik ) continued.

There was also an electric arc accident at the end of June , which was covered up. From July 1, 2015, Imtech had to submit a daily construction plan.

building-costs

Cost development in millions of euros

The total costs for the project were estimated at around two billion euros at the start of construction, in 2015 it was almost six billion and in 2018 the estimate was finally corrected to 7.3 billion euros. In 2019, the pure planning and construction costs were estimated at 4.6 billion euros and the costs for noise protection at 770 million euros.

Accidents

By the end of 2012, accidents at work on the construction site were known, in which four people were killed, 46 were seriously and 197 were slightly injured. In the fatal accidents, one person was run over by a rubber tire roller , another was struck by a falling excavator shovel , one person fell from a height of eight meters and another from around ten meters.

literature

  • Ullrich Fichtner, André Geicke, Matthias Geyer, Andreas Wassermann: Made in Germany . In: Der Spiegel . No. 34 , 2017, p. 64-83 ( online ).

Broadcast reports

documentary

  • Thomas Balzer: Last call for BER - the long way to Berlin Airport, arte , October 28, 2020, rbb television , October 31, 2020 [1]

Web links

Commons : Berlin Brandenburg Airport  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Committee of Inquiry documents

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ How much airport does Berlin need? (No longer available online.) In: berliner-zeitung.de. September 10, 2001, archived from the original ; accessed on February 15, 2015 .
  2. ↑ a b c d e Daniel Delhaes, Fabian Gartmann, Silke Kersting, Jens Koenen: Capital without starting permission . In: Handelsblatt . No. 109 , June 8, 2012, p. 28-33 .
  3. ↑ a b BER airport is to be opened gradually. In: rbb-online.de . August 17, 2013. Retrieved August 18, 2013 .
  4. ↑ a b Wowereit: BER will not open this year either. In: aero.de. January 7, 2014, accessed January 7, 2014 .
  5. ↑ a b BER breakdown airport: Opening is becoming more and more distant . In: Focus . Retrieved November 23, 2014.
  6. ↑ Capital airport will not open in 2017 either. In: zeit.de . January 21, 2017. Retrieved January 23, 2017 .
  7. ↑ Other projects in aviation . In: New Germany . December 7, 1989 ( online [accessed December 31, 2014]).
  8. ↑ Two states, one city . In: Der Spiegel . No. 52 , 1989, pp. 25-29 ( online ).
  9. ↑ Berliner Abendschau of the Sender Freies Berlin from January 19, 1990, from approx. 3:31 pm. Accessed on January 20, 2015 .
  10. ↑ a b Interim report on the BER investigation committee - “Stay down” . 2013, ISBN 978-3-7657-2222-6 , pp. 42 ff . Interim report on the BER investigation committee - "Stay down" ( Memento from October 11, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
  11. ↑ Announcement of the spatial planning procedure - examination of the Schönefeld-Süd, Jüterbog-Ost and Sperenberg locations. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on January 9, 2015 ; accessed on December 31, 2014 .
  12. ↑ a b c d Planning approval decision for the expansion of the Berlin-Schönefeld airport. (PDF; 940 kB) In: mil.brandenburg.de. Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Transport of the State of Brandenburg, August 13, 2004, pp. 350–479 , accessed on December 13, 2012 .
  13. ↑ a b Dr. Luisa Becker-Ritterspach: Controlling the Implementation of Airports - An Investigation of Airport Construction in Frankfurt a. M. and Berlin-Brandenburg , Springer VS, 2015
  14. ↑ a b c Summary of the expert opinion "Results of the location search" Phase 1 of the preparation of the regional planning procedure (Dornier study) . June 14, 1993 ( online [accessed December 31, 2014]).
  15. ↑ a b Capital: On every tree . In: Der Spiegel . No. 10/1995 , March 6, 1995, ISSN  0038-7452 , p. 36-37 ( online [accessed December 28, 2012]).
  16. ↑ a b Jannis Moritz: The role of interest groups in location decisions for large infrastructure projects using the example of the airport BER near Schönefeld , Bachelor thesis 2015
  17. ^ Ordinance on the joint state development plan for securing the location of the airport, 1.2 Regional planning procedure from 1994 . 1994 ( online [accessed December 31, 2014]).
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  142. ↑ Former BER consultant burdens airport management. (No longer available online.) February 13, 2015, archived from the original on February 14, 2015 ; accessed on February 14, 2015 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.rbb-online.de
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