GSG-9 deployment in Bad Kleinen

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Place of access: Bad Kleinen train station

The GSG-9 use in bath small one was a police operation on 27 June 1993 in which the RAF -Terroristen Birgit Hogefeld and Wolfgang Grams in Mecklenburg bath small should be arrested after the undercover agent Klaus Steinmetz informed the authorities about a meeting would have. Hogefeld was arrested in the underpass of the Bad Kleinen train station , while Grams was initially able to flee to the platform. In a subsequent firefight, he shot and killed the GSG-9 officer Michael Newrzella. In turn, wounded Grams committed suicide after repeatedly judicially verified result of the prosecutor's investigation suicide . In the next few days, various media picked up testimony that reported about an "execution" Grams' by police officers, which led to political disputes over the role of the authorities involved and the resignation of Federal Interior Minister Rudolf Seiters , and to this day in the media and especially on the left as a possible sequence of events - which cannot be fully explained due to insufficient evidence. As a result of the deployment, the third generation of the RAF became tangible in terms of its personnel composition, while its influence on the dissolution of the RAF in 1998 remains speculation.

preparation

Klaus Steinmetz , who has been active as an undercover agent for the Rhineland-Palatinate constitutional protection agency since 1985 , managed to penetrate into the environment of the terrorist organization Red Army Fraction in the early 1990s . Steinmetz took part in various non-militant actions and penetrated deeper and deeper into the scene. At the end of February 1992 he met Birgit Hogefeld in Paris. In April 1993 Steinmetz first met Wolfgang Grams, but without identifying him immediately. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution decided to call in the Attorney General and the Federal Criminal Police Office to arrest Hogefeld and Grams and, if necessary, other members of the RAF. At the request of the Rhineland-Palatinate Office for the Protection of the Constitution , the action should be carried out in such a way that Steinmetz could continue to be used as an undercover agent.

Before the operation, the Federal Criminal Police Office gave the assessment that Bad Kleinen station was not suitable for an arrest. The public traffic is so low that undercover civil servants would attract attention. Access should therefore take place outside the station at a later time after arrival. The station was extensively monitored by the Federal Criminal Police Office, including bugs and surveillance cameras hidden in flower pots and garbage cans. On the Schweriner See a boat of the Federal Border Police served as a relay station, which had been repainted for camouflage at short notice.

On June 24, 1993, Hogefeld and Steinmetz met in Bad Kleinen, drove on to Wismar and moved into a vacation home that they had rented after their arrival. The whole time Steinmetz carried a tracking device and a bugging device in a laptop, without knowing it, so that he could be located at any time and the conversations could be overheard. Despite the direction finder, it took 24 hours for Steinmetz and Hogefeld to be located in the apartment because the emergency services with their direction finders were not allowed to move freely in the housing estate for camouflage reasons. The Federal Criminal Police Office observed the apartment from a neighboring house. There was an observation gap during the observation: The forces deployed at a distance only observed the front of the holiday home and did not notice that Hogefeld and Steinmetz were leaving the holiday home via the rear exit, especially since the laptop with the tracking device had remained in the apartment. Their absence was only noticed when Hogefeld and Steinmetz returned through the front entrance.

When no other people had arrived at the holiday home on June 27, 1993 and apparently the departure of Hogefeld and Steinmetz was imminent, the operations management developed the plan to capture Hogefeld on the way between the holiday home and the next bus stop. When leaving the apartment, Hogefeld said to the landlord that they wanted to “meet friends”. Because of this statement, the access that had already started was canceled. The investigators hoped to arrest other RAF members.

execution

On June 27, 1993, Hogefeld and Steinmetz drove back to Bad Kleinen to meet Grams there. At that time, 38 officers from the MEK of the Federal Criminal Police Office , 37 officers from GSG 9 and 22 other officers were on duty at the station there and in the vicinity .

Grams arrived at 2 p.m. and visited the station restaurant with Hogefeld and Steinmetz. The responsible department head and police chief of the Federal Criminal Police Office, Rainer Hofmeyer, ruled out access in the restaurant, on the platform and on the train, as this would have endangered bystanders. Thus, the pedestrian tunnel that led to the track system remained the only possibility of arrest.

At 3:15 p.m. Hogefeld, Grams and Steinmetz left the station restaurant. A GSG-9 official, who observed the restaurant from platform 3/4, informed his colleagues who were posted at the opposite tunnel entrance. The three targets went down the stairs into the tunnel and stopped on a stair landing. Due to a misleading radio message, the observer posted on the platform erroneously assumed that the access had already taken place and, assuming the operation had ended, went ten seconds later into the tunnel, where, to his surprise, he found the unattended Grams saw. Due to this conspicuous behavior of the observer, the officer posted at the staircase assumed that Grams had been warned and gave the signal to access. The seven officers from GSG 9 immediately stormed off, although the distance to the target persons was still more than fifteen meters. Actually, the police officers had been instructed to use a moment of shock when they were overwhelmed and therefore only to start the arrest at a distance of about five meters; Experience shows that the moment of shock can only be exploited at a distance of less than ten meters.

Deaths of Wolfgang Grams and Michael Newrzella

Platform 3/4, on which the exchange of fire took place, with a view of track bed 4 (right) and the exit of the underpass (background center). The fully visible person is roughly in the position from which Grams shot his pursuers (photo summer 2008)
Track 4, on which Wolfgang Grams fell backwards during the exchange of fire, seen from the position of the GSG-9 officers at the time (photo August 2011)

While Hogefeld and Steinmetz were arrested in the tunnel without resistance, Grams fled to platform 3/4 and opened fire on the GSG-9 officers who were chasing him. In the exchange of fire, which probably lasted between 8 and 15 seconds and which the witnesses described as machine gun fire, he injured officer Michael Newrzella so seriously with four shots that he died around 6:00 pm in the Schwerin Clinic. Wolfgang Grams was hit by five bullets from the officers, some of whom shot out of the underpass without visual contact, staggered over the platform and fell onto platform 4, where he lay on his back. Two officers stepped onto the platform and pointed their weapons at Grams. Injured with an additional shot in the head, he was flown to the Lübeck University Hospital , where he also died around 5:30 p.m. Another GSG-9 officer was seriously injured by Grams; these two are the only investigated acts of violence of the third generation of the RAF . A conductress on the opposite platform 5 was injured by gunshots by the officers.

Michael Oskar "Shorty" Newrzella (born on September 15, 1967 in Aachen) was the first GSG-9 officer to die in an operation and at the same time the last victim of the RAF. He had not drawn his service weapon because the tactics of the GSG 9 were basically aimed at access without the use of firearms. In the final report of the federal government it is assumed that Newrzella wanted to physically overwhelm Grams and felt safe in the fire protection of his colleagues. There was speculation, especially in the political left spectrum, that Newrzella was killed by a ricochet from a colleague's weapon, which was not confirmed.

Wolfgang Grams died - insofar as it has been undisputed since the forensic medical report of the Zurich City Police - from a head shot fired from his own gun. It is still controversial to this day whether he inflicted the shot himself in a hopeless situation or - according to Grams' parents and supporters - whether GSG-9 officials were chasing after, possibly in revenge for his dying colleague Michael Newrzella, Grams already lying on the track stole his weapon and shot him. This was suggested by a report by forensic doctor Wolfgang Bonte in June 1994, who interpreted a crescent-shaped skin abrasion on the outside of Grams' hand as a remnant of this unwinding, while other forensic doctors said it was more likely to be an injury to Grams by track gravel when the body was moved during emergency medical treatment to explain.

After submitted in January 1994 determination result of the prosecutor's office Schwerin based on 142 witness statements and several reports Grams has suicide committed by inflicting himself the fatal head shot himself. An expert opinion prepared by Bernd Brinkmann ( University of Münster ) comes to the conclusion that, due to the traces of blood on the weapons and clothing of the police officers, it is “unthinkable” that the shot was fired by them; he considers suicide to be "much more likely ... than homicide". The report published on November 20, 1993 by the Zurich City Police confirms a “typical suicide bullet channel” and “in all probability” assumes that Grams inflicted the fatal injury on himself. These results were confirmed in the final report of the federal government on March 9, 1994.

The termination of the investigations against the police officers and the official results of the investigation attacked the parents of Wolfgang Grams legally in various ways without success, initially through a complaint to the Rostock Public Prosecutor's Office , then a futile enforcement procedure at the Rostock Higher Regional Court with a subsequent constitutional complaint at the Federal Constitutional Court , which - under Chair Jutta Limbach - not accepted for decision. Grams' parents then sued the federal government at the Bonn Regional Court for compensation for the costs they had incurred through the death of their son. The judging court came to the conclusion that the events could not be fully clarified, but that no circumstances speak for an intentional killing of Grams by GSG-9 officials "even after exhausting all possibilities for knowledge". The court pointed out "the fact" that "none of the witnesses noticed a close-up shot by one of the officers and none of the forensic medical reports obtained gave any indication of such an act". The lawsuit was dismissed. The judgment became final; A final review of the various judicial proceedings at the European Court of Human Rights on October 5, 1999 also revealed no legal violations. In 2017 , Petra Terhoeven stated that Grams had committed suicide after being hit by several police bullets; Rumors of an execution persisted for years, but were "ultimately refuted".

aftermath

The hectic first hours, days and weeks after the unsuccessful mission were accompanied by misinformation and omissions by the state authorities, but also by speculation and false conclusions in the media reporting. Various witnesses came forward whose testimony shook public confidence in the official version of the events.

Inadequate forensic evidence

The crime scene work lasted over 9 hours (June 27, 4:00 p.m. to June 28, 1:20 a.m.). After her arrest, Birgit Hogefeld was held in the underpass until 3:55 p.m., lying flat on the floor and first with the hood pulled over her face, then with a black face mask of a GSG-9 officer fastened around her head with adhesive tape so that she could make her own Couldn't recognize people. She heard the exchange of fire and that there was talk of a person who was lying in her blood on the track. She was only searched in the BKA car, where the officers discovered a gun with magazines on her. The search and disarmament should have taken place immediately after their arrest in the tunnel, but was forgotten by the MEK officials. The projectile responsible for the fatal headshot at Grams was not found. On the other hand, even days after the forensic investigation was completed, sleeves and projectile parts were found in the track bed at the crime scene, even at the point where Grams was last.

Before the autopsy on June 28, 1993, among other things, Grams' head was apparently cleaned, some hair cut off and thrown away on the instructions of the BKA. In order to be able to reliably identify Grams, the body was fingerprinted and hand washed for the purpose. That may have Schmauch - destroyed blood and tissue traces the events could be reconstructed. The criminal scientist Wolfgang Lichtenberg described this process as “incorrect”.

State and media affair through testimony

A few days after the deployment,
Klaus Bednarz 's comment in the WDR television magazine Monitor raised doubts about the official version
Shortly afterwards,
Hans Leyendecker's
Spiegel cover story reinforced the impression that Grams had been executed by officials
The then Federal Minister of the Interior, Rudolf Seiters , resigned in connection with these media reports

Contradictory statements from witnesses and government agencies sparked speculation. Some events could not be clarified because members of the GSG 9 involved in the event contradicted their statements and these changed over time. The then Federal Prosecutor General Alexander von Stahl publicly claimed on the evening of the operation that Hogefeld had opened the exchange of fire when she was arrested. On July 1, 1993, the television magazine Monitor broadcast a report created by Philip Siegel , who presented the kiosk saleswoman on the platform where the gunfire had taken place as an eyewitness. It said that Grams was "downright executed", which the monitor moderator Klaus Bednarz commented as follows: "An outrageous process that - at least as far as we know - has no equal in the history of the Federal Republic". The then Federal Minister of the Interior, Rudolf Seiters, resigned on July 4, 1993. He assumes the "political responsibility" for "obvious errors, inadequacies and lack of coordination within federal authorities" during the deployment and its processing.

A day later, the news magazine Der Spiegel made with the title “The death shot. Failure of the terror investigators ”. In the booklet, the investigative author Hans Leyendecker reported on the event and cited an alleged GSG-9 official as an informant, who was present at the crime scene and had revealed himself out of “emotional distress”. According to this, his colleagues had executed Grams “like an execution”, although he was already incapacitated.

The version of an execution spread from the beginning of July 1993, especially in the left spectrum. The RAF command level described the events in a letter to Agence France Presse as a "terrorist act" by "killer troops". There were protest demonstrations in several cities against the police action and the death of Grams, which was described as the murder, including on July 10th with his parents and 2500 participants in Wiesbaden. In October 1993 the book “Bad Kleinen and the shooting of Wolfgang Grams” in the ID archive “full of speculations and new theses” was published, which Butz Peters described as the “bible” of those who assume Grams' murder. Years after the incidents, texts and books attacked the official investigation results. There are also doubts in the public service media. The program Monitor held on to the murder thesis even after the prosecutor's investigation had ended in 1994. In 2013, the ARD documentary Endstation Bad Kleinen by Anne Knauth presented open-ended evidence of murder or suicide.

The Federal Prosecutor General Alexander von Stahl was put into temporary retirement by Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger one day after the publication of the issue of Spiegel 27/1993 due to the "information chaos" . The President of the BKA, Hans-Ludwig Zachert , who had been on vacation during the incidents, also resigned. BKA Vice President Gerhard Köhler was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. Department head Rainer Hofmeyer was transferred within the BKA, his department later closed. In addition to criticism of the organization and coordination, it was also found that the equipment was inadequate. The deployed officers did not wear protective vests because up until then, for reasons of cost, inconspicuous flat jackets had not been purchased and their use should not arouse suspicion in the mobile situation . The GSG 9 also came under increasing criticism because of its obviously headless behavior with many missed shots and later implausible statements about the course of events. There was speculation in the media as to whether the “myth of Mogadishu” prevented the elite unit's own ability to admit mistakes; Members of the Bundestag publicly considered disbanding the elite unit. Chancellor Helmut Kohl then presented himself to the GSG 9 during a public visit on July 22, 1993 and described Grams as a "murderer", whereupon his parents filed a criminal complaint against Kohl "on suspicion of denigrating the memory of the deceased and suspicion of defamation" . In mid-August 1993, Justice Minister Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and the new Interior Minister Manfred Kanther presented an interim report that compiled the omissions and errors of the authorities.

Both the Spiegel informant and the kiosk seller turned out to be implausible in the course of the investigation by the Schwerin public prosecutor's office. In the interrogations of the public prosecutor's office a few days later and in her testimony in the civil proceedings in 1998, the kiosk seller described several contradicting accounts of the incident, but always maintained that she was shot in the head - unlike in her affidavit to Monitor written down by journalist Philip Siegel - Never said anything: “The word 'head' didn't even fall out of my mouth. ... I signed too quickly ”. The report of the Spiegel informant, only known to Leyendecker, was based on information that was superficially incorrect, such as the information about his own observer position and often incorrect information about the course of events, especially since the witness never confided in a competent authority. Hans Leyendecker moved away from his presentation after the results of the investigation. In 2007 he told Deutschlandfunk that he had overestimated the statement made by his informant: “I gave this statement too much importance, put it into perspective too little and inflated the whole thing too much. This gave the impression that what this witness said was correct. You can't say that. ”Later Leyendecker added that he had“ today fundamental doubts about his credibility ”and that the“ killer thesis ... excluded for me ”. This cover story was "devastating in effect" for Der Spiegel : "actually I should have been fired too". A review of Leyendecker's information by the Spiegel -internal "Relotius Commission" in 2019 revealed doubts as to whether the alleged informant from the ranks of the GSG 9 actually existed.

Butz Peters calls these events of the summer of 1993 in his journalistic investigation of the mission a "state crisis of hitherto unknown proportions" for the Federal Republic; BKA boss Zachert later ruled that "the republic" had "wavered" at the time. For Hans Leyendecker, Bad Kleinen was "an event that shook the republic, because the question was whether state officials had shot Grams in the head and then lied to the state." The Germanist Andreas Musolff found the “political damage” to be “immense” in view of the uncertainty among the population and the potential radicalization of the left scene. The then Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl characterized the events in retrospect quite differently : "That was not a state crisis, it was simply a media dirt and disinformation campaign as it had never been before." In 1994, Holger Lösch, a journalist from Bayerischer Rundfunk, wrote a book about the Bad Kleinen media scandal , with a foreword by the dismissed Federal Public Prosecutor Alexander von Stahl , which "described all doubts about the official version as hypocritical", which was taken up again in 2013 in the conservative media . In summary, the political scientist Alexander Straßner spoke in a more differentiated manner of a "partially unobjective media preparation". The journalist Andreas Förster sees the misconduct of the authorities at the time, especially the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as a root of the later failure against the right-wing extremist terror of the NSU .

Effects on the RAF

During the operation, the police became aware of a conspiratorial couple on the station forecourt, of whom there were also video recordings, which were not published. They were not checked in order not to jeopardize the success of the access, but it was suspected that they could be RAF members Ernst Volker Staub and Daniela Klette , even if they could not be identified after the video recordings. According to a report in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , fingerprints also indicate that dust and burdock were present at the location in Bad Kleinen, while according to Butz Peters only dust fingerprints were found on documents in the backpack that Grams carried with him. It remains unclear whether and how burdock and dust made contact with Grams, Hogefeld or Steinmetz. By arresting Hogefeld, the investigators were able to secure their backpack in a locker at Wismar train station . In it they found letters and tapes through which several people could be assigned to the close environment of the command level and provided an insight into the communication and procedures of the until then largely unknown third RAF generation . The finds demonstrated frequent contacts between the command level and family members, which differentiated the third generation of the RAF from their predecessors in the 1970s, who, by going underground, had severed all ties to their earlier bourgeois life.

The presence of the undercover stonemason at the scene was denied for three weeks by order of the Rhineland-Palatinate interior minister, Walter Zuber , because the local intelligence agency wanted to continue to use stonemason as an undercover agent. The officials involved and the Federal Public Prosecutor Stahl were not given any permission to testify; Eyewitnesses from the station restaurant were persuaded that only two people were present there; the Federal Minister of Justice Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger refused to testify to the Interior and Legal Committee of the Bundestag . After the operations management let Steinmetz go from Bad Kleinen and he went into hiding, he claimed in letters to the left-wing scene in Wiesbaden that he had escaped in the chaos of operations, while media reports continued to undermine his credibility: Already on June 28, ARD said Morgenmagazin , a third person present in the train station had been V-Person, the Stern reported on July 1st about “The Secret of the Third Man”, and on July 5th Der Spiegel mentioned the V-Man present “Klaus from Wiesbaden”. Zuber admitted on July 20, 1993 that an undercover agent - whose name was not named - was present in Bad Kleinen. With an open letter printed in the taz on July 22nd, Birgit Hogefeld revealed Steinmetz by name, on July 26th Der Spiegel published a detailed report on Steinmetz and his role. Within the RAF environment, Hogefeld described his contact with Steinmetz in another open letter. After this prevented his return to the left-wing scene, he was accepted into the witness protection program in August 1993 and now lives abroad under a new identity. Since falling for an undercover agent undermined the authority of the command level - which relied on the trust and discretion of those around them for their underground life - the RAF members who were not imprisoned published a detailed one on March 6, 1994 and on November 29, 1996 Another statement about Steinmetz, in which they protested against rumors that Steinmetz had influenced their decisions. For the contemporary historian Petra Terhoeven , the “absolute will” to continue using Steinmetz is “largely jointly responsible” for the errors of the mission and the subsequent investigations.

Birgit Hogefeld repeatedly commented on the events of Bad Kleinen in the course of the trial against her for involvement in terrorist attacks from mid-November 1994 to 1996 at the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt am Main . Even if she remained convinced that Grams had been deliberately killed, she was increasingly critical of her personal past and the present and future of the Red Army Faction. In her closing remarks in the process in October 1996, she stated that the dissolution of the RAF was “long overdue”, which is generally regarded as a major factor in the declaration of dissolution that followed in April 1998.

While the RAF expert for the protection of the constitution, Winfried Ridder, blames this event less for the end of the RAF than “primarily the social isolation of« revolutionary politics »and the fundamental upheaval in the early 1990s”, the journalist Willi Winkler is of the opinion, “ Klaus Steinmetz brought the RAF to its end ”. Political scientist Alexander Straßner also judges that “the twilight of the gods dawned” for the RAF; the discussions that followed Bad Kleinen resulted in “public self-tearing”, namely the split of the RAF in September 1993 into a wing ready to talk to the state around Peter-Jürgen Boock , Birgit Hogefeld and the active command level and a wing that rejects any cooperation Brigitte Mohnhaupt . Heribert Prantl , on the other hand, is of the opinion that the liquidation process was delayed by Bad Kleinen and would not have dragged on for five years without the events there. He calls Bad Kleinen "badly interpreted" the "last success of the RAF: The arrest fiasco gave left-wing terrorism the chance to embed the alleged murder of RAF member Wolfgang Grams by the state in their propaganda of a" state strategy of destruction "" .

The Germanist Sandra Beck sees in Bad Kleinen after the collapse of the stories about the night of death in Stammheim (through the statements of the GDR dropouts from 1990) the "new RAF myth". According to Petra Terhoeven, the RAF kept the construction of a “martyr legend” under discussion. Also Butz Peters looks bath small as a "last myth" and "permanent legend" of the RAF, which was for the remains of their base of supporters over the years the focus of demonstrations and campaigns for the RAF itself but "the Waterloo. A defeat from which she never recovered ”. For Alexander Straßner, the frequent reference to Bad Kleinen in the following statements by active and imprisoned RAF members confirms the meaning as a “profound turning point for the third generation” with “traumatic consequences”. Through the "confrontation of the myths" RAF and GSG 9 both were "demythed".

The Germanist Anne-Kathrin Griese comes to the conclusion: “None of these views, whether those of the planned state murder, those of the media-made scandal or those of the instrumentalization of the events to create legends and myths, is sufficiently convincing. Blind spots mark all perspectives. "

Reception and commemoration

There is no reference to the event on the station premises; a memorial plaque for Michael Newrzella is located in Neustrelitz ; one for Wolfgang Grams was privately installed by supporters in the station tunnel in July 1993, but was removed by Deutsche Bahn the following night.

Rolf Sachsse places the photo of the dying Wolfgang Grams in the "status of icons " of famous pictures in RAF history and interprets it as "the colliery of early death in glory", namely "as a descendant" of the dead from Stammheim . Waltraud Wende called the photos of the Bad Kleinen train station associated with Grams' death an “iconic super sign ”, which superimposed the actual events connected with it in the German collective memory as “overpowering shadows”; “As emotionally charged complexes of signs for the deadly consequences of terror and violence”, these images “became independent”. Without necessarily referring to the context of the history of violence in the Federal Republic of Germany, these train station photos are “archive images to stabilize a collective discourse of concern”.

Andres Veiel's 2001 documentary Black Box BRD about the entangled lives of Wolfgang Grams and the RAF victim Alfred Herrhausen shows in the opening scene how Wolfgang's brother Rainer Grams recreates his last minutes in the train station and speculates about what happened. The provocative wooden sculpture Der Bahnhof von Bad Kleinen by the artist Günter Schumann (2001) shows Grams' death as a shooting by a police officer.

In his novel In his early childhood a garden , published in 2005, Christoph Hein depicts the events and the investigations from the perspective of the family of a fictional killed terrorist, Oliver Zurek. Even though Hein emphasizes that his fictional characters were fictitious, the descriptions of the novel are strong Parallels to the case of Wolfgang Grams; Harald Martenstein spoke of a possibly "literarily alienated documentation". Hein's novel was adapted for the theater stage by Armin Petras and performed in the Maxim-Gorki-Theater in Berlin in 2007 ; A production by Axel Vornam at the Heilbronn Theater followed in 2009 . As a political thriller , the event and its reprocessing treated Wolfgang Schorlau in The Blue List (2003) and Andreas Hoppert in the case Helms (2002), on the relationship between grief and Hogefeld focused Somuncu in his novel Between the tracks (2012).

Several punk bands from the left-wing scene have dealt with Grams' violent death, including Third Choice in the song "Bad K.", WIZO in "Head Shot" and Slime in "Violence". An allusion to the events in Bad Kleinen can also be found in the lyrics of “position gleis 3 | 270693 ”, which was released on the 1994 concept album Music Will Never Slow by Michael Dubach, Max Goldt and Nino Sandow .

The confusion surrounding the reconstruction of the events also inspired satire and cabaret. Wiglaf Droste began his What really happened in Bad Kleinen with the sentence: "On June 27, 1993 at the train station in Bad Kleinen, Mecklenburg, GSG-9 officer Michael Newrzella first shot himself."

When the station was rebuilt between 2016 and 2018, all station buildings and the tunnel were demolished and the track systems completely changed.

literature

Documentaries

To mark the 20th anniversary of the operation, two documentaries were broadcast in 2013 that reconstructed the events with different focuses and perspectives:

  • Anne Kauth: Bad Kleinen terminus: On the failure of German security organs . WDR / NDR / ARTE , 2013.
  • Egmont R. Koch : Access in the tunnel - The fatal drama of Bad Kleinen. SWR / NDR , 2013.

The following documentary was shown on the 25th anniversary:

  • Bernd Reufels, Julia Zipfel: Death in Bad Kleinen - The last battle of the RAF. ZDFinfo , 2018.

Web links

Representations of state institutions

Representations of left initiatives

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f g Egmont R. Koch : Access in the tunnel - The fatal drama of Bad Kleinen. Documentation. In: Das Erste , broadcast on June 27, 2013 (YouTube) .
  2. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 131 f.
  3. A graphic reconstruction can be found in Hans Leyendecker : “Killing like an execution.” In: Der Spiegel , edition 27/1993, pp. 24–29, here p. 28 (PDF) . See also graphic reconstruction. In: Bad Kleinen and the shooting of Wolfgang Grams , Nadir.org , 2003.
  4. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 13 f. and 133 f. On the duration of the exchange of fire, the Federal Government's answer to the minor question from MP Ulla Jelpke and the PDS / Linke Liste group. German Bundestag, 12th electoral term, BT-Drs. 12/7790 , June 6, 1994, p. 14.
  5. ^ Butz Peters: Deadly error. The history of the RAF. Argon, Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-87024-673-1 , p. 738.
  6. Bruno Schrep : Bad Kleinen: The lost sons. In: Der Spiegel , October 11, 1993; Photo of the tombstone at Egmont R. Koch : Access in the tunnel - The fatal drama of Bad Kleinen. Documentation. In: Das Erste , broadcast on June 27, 2013, from 35:32 (YouTube) .
  7. See without reference to the final report Butz Peters: Der last Mythos der RAF , 2006, p. 133.
  8. a b Bad Kleinen: suction. Unwind handle. In: Der Spiegel , June 6, 1994. A discussion of the arguments for and against entangling in the Bonn Regional Court , judgment of September 29, 1998, file number 1 O 274/96 , full text in Openjur , paragraphs 80 to 83.
  9. Kamilla Pfeffer: The fatal shot of Bad Kleinen. The trauma of Hans Leyendecker. In: NR-Werkstatt 22: Tunnelblick. May 2012, pp. 130–136, here p. 135 (PDF) .
  10. ^ Butz Peters: Deadly error. The history of the RAF. Argon, Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-87024-673-1 , p. 699 f.
  11. Landgericht Bonn , judgment of September 29, 1998, file number 1 O 274/96 , full text at Openjur , paragraphs 71 to 73. See paragraphs 75 to 78 for counter- opinions that make no statement about the probability, but at least do not rule out suicide.
  12. Ludger Hinder: Bad Kleinen: Belated acquittal. In: Focus , October 3, 1993.
  13. a b c Andreas Musolff: War against the public. Terrorism and Political Parlance. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1996, ISBN 3-531-12463-3 (also habilitation thesis, University of Düsseldorf), p. 210 .
  14. Butz Peters: The last myth of the RAF , 2006, pp. 167-175.
  15. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, pp. 175-189.
  16. ^ Bonn Regional Court , judgment of September 29, 1998, file number 1 O 274/96 , full text at Openjur . Quotations in paragraphs 136 and 130.
  17. See also Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, pp. 189–200.
  18. a b c Petra Terhoeven: The Red Army faction. A history of terrorist violence (= Beck Wissen. Volume 2878). CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71235-7 , p. 105.
  19. A detailed and reliable chronology of the events can be found in: ID -Archiv im IISG (Ed.): Bad Kleinen and the shooting of Wolfgang Grams. ID archive, Berlin and Amsterdam 1994. Published in: Nadir , December 4, 1996.
  20. Grape harvest campaign. In: Die Zeit , August 20, 1993. See also less precisely Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 151 f.
  21. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, pp. 134 f., 170 f.
  22. ^ Butz Peters: The last myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 171 f .; Regional court Bonn , judgment of September 29, 1998, file number 1 O 274/96 , full text at Openjur , paragraph 119 f.
  23. "That belongs to the deadly sins" - Interview with the forensic scientist Wolfgang Lichtenberg about the securing of evidence in Bad Kleinen. In: Der Spiegel , November 19, 1993.
  24. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 157 f.
  25. Kamilla Pfeffer: The fatal shot of Bad Kleinen. The trauma of Hans Leyendecker. In: NR-Werkstatt 22: Tunnelblick. May 2012, pp. 130–136, here p. 130 (PDF) .
  26. a b In addition Petra Sorge: Bad Kleinen: The repressed media scandal. In: Cicero , June 24, 2013.
  27. Oliver Tolmein : Serious mishaps and political disaster. In: Deutschlandfunk , June 27, 2013.
  28. Der Spiegel , edition 27/1993 .
  29. Hans Leyendecker: Killing like an execution. In: Der Spiegel , July 5, 1993.
  30. ^ Andreas Musolff: War against the public. Terrorism and Political Parlance. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1996, ISBN 3-531-12463-3 (also habilitation thesis, University of Düsseldorf), p. 209 .
  31. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 219.
  32. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 220.
  33. See 2003 the initiative group 10 years after the death of Wolfgang Grams ( memento of August 7, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) and Martin Kröger: Terrorists are shot here. In: Jungle World , June 25, 2003. In 2013 there was 20 Years of Bad Kleinen: Treason, Death, Arrest and the End of the RAF. In: Die Rote Hilfe. Issue 2, 2013, pp. 16-19 (PDF) .
  34. Television: Bednarz remains stubborn. In: Focus , October 17, 1994.
  35. Grape harvest campaign. In: Die Zeit , August 20, 1993; on this also Hans-Ludwig Zachert and Rainer Hofmeyer in Bad Kleinen: On the failure of German security organs. Documentary 2013, minute 23: 15–24: 09.
  36. Chronology of events: Monday, July 5th, 1993. In: ID archive in the IISG (ed.): Bad Kleinen and the shooting of Wolfgang Grams. ID archive, Berlin and Amsterdam 1994. Published in: Nadir , December 4, 1996.
  37. See also the small question of the MP Ulla Jelpke and the group of the PDS / Linke Liste. German Bundestag, 12th electoral term, BT-Drs. 12/5514 , July 28, 1993.
  38. Terrorism: Klaus was a gamer. In: Der Spiegel , July 26, 1993.
  39. Extracts from Aktion Weinlese. In: Die Zeit , August 20, 1993.
  40. Butz Peters: The last myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 159–161, quotation p. 159 and for civil proceedings 1998 p. 191 f.
  41. See the detailed study of the content of the testimony at the Bonn Regional Court , judgment of September 29, 1998, file number 1 O 274/96 , full text at Openjur , paragraphs 25 to 67, summarizing paragraph 25: “Their statements, however, have already appeared for the Chamber not considered believable ”; Paragraphs 27 to 34 on the kiosk seller and 46 to 49 on Leyendecker's informants.
  42. a b Deutschlandfunk interview - Leyendecker: Journalists have to look for corners of the truth. In: Deutschlandfunk , May 25, 2008.
  43. Hans Leyendecker on Bad Kleinen: "We have to justify ourselves for what we do". In: Cicero , June 25, 2013 (pages 1 and 2).
  44. Georg Altrogge : Bad Kleinen's fatal shot: “Spiegel” rolls out 26 years of research anew , WeltN24, December 22, 2019.
  45. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 7.
  46. Quoted from Thorsten Jungholt: Bad Kleinen: The RAF's last shots were fired 20 years ago. In: Die Welt , June 27, 2013.
  47. Kamilla Pfeffer: The fatal shot of Bad Kleinen. The trauma of Hans Leyendecker. In: NR-Werkstatt 22: Tunnelblick. May 2012, pp. 130–136, here p. 133 (PDF) .
  48. ^ Helmut Kohl: Memories: 1990-1994. Droemer Knaur, Munich 2007, p. 597. This statement is discussed by Ingo Juchler: Narrations in Political Education. Vol. 1: Sophocles, Thucydides, Kleist and Hein. Springer, Wiesbaden 2015, p. 118 f.
  49. Holger Lösch: Bad Kleinen. A media scandal and its consequences. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1994, ISBN 3-548-36636-8 .
  50. a b Anne-Kathrin Griese: The family look. Andres Veiel "Black Box BRD" & Christoph Hein "A garden in his early childhood". In: Inge Stephan, Alexandra Tacke (Hrsg.): NachBilder der RAF. Böhlau, Cologne et al. 2008, ISBN 978-3-412-20077-0 , pp. 165–180, here pp. 165 f.
  51. Sven Felix Kellerhoff : Bad Kleinen - the "execution" was a media scandal. In: Die Welt , June 27, 2013; Petra Sorge: Bad Kleinen: The suppressed media scandal. In: Cicero , June 24, 2013.
  52. Alexander Straßner: Perceived world civil war. Red Army faction in Germany. In: ders. (Ed.): Social revolutionary terrorism. Theory, ideology, case studies, future scenarios. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-15578-4 , pp. 209-236, here p. 226, fn. 86.
  53. Andreas Förster: Protection of the Constitution: The NSU failure is rooted in Bad Kleinen. In: Cicero , June 26, 2013.
  54. ^ Butz Peters: Deadly error. The history of the RAF. Argon, Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-87024-673-1 , p. 738.
  55. ^ Rebirth of the Red Army Faction? In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , May 20, 2001.
  56. ^ Butz Peters: The last myth of the RAF , 2006, ISBN 3-550-07865-X , p. 258.
  57. Alexander Straßner: The third generation of the "Red Army Fraction" , 2003, p. 99 ; Terrorists: Field Post from the Underground. In: Der Spiegel , August 30, 1993.
  58. ^ ID archive in the IISG (ed.): Bad Kleinen and the shooting of Wolfgang Grams. ID archive, Berlin and Amsterdam 1994, ISBN 3-89408-043-4 , pp. 21 and 28 (PDF).
  59. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 141.
  60. Hans Leyendecker: "Killing like an execution." In: Der Spiegel , July 5, 1993.
  61. Terrorism: Klaus was a gamer. In: Der Spiegel , July 26, 1993.
  62. Birgit Hogefeld: "The fact itself is now largely known". To expose Klaus Steinmetz. In: For a left current (ed.): Arranca! (Journal) No. 2, September 1993.
  63. On the Steinmetz topic as a whole, see Butz Peters: Der letzte Mythos der RAF , 2006, pp. 114–120 and 141–144; Answer of the federal government to the minor question of the MPs Manfred Such, Volker Beck (Cologne) and the parliamentary group Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. German Bundestag, 13th electoral term, BT-Drs. 13/4812 (to the question “V-Mann Klaus Steinmetz, explosives attack in Weiterstadt and the protection of the constitution”); Research group Infoladen Wiesbaden: Statement from Wiesbaden on the first three weeks after Bad Kleinen and on the informant Klaus Steinmetz. In: SocialHistoryPortal.org (PDF) .
  64. For Steinmetz, April 1992 Declaration and "social counter-power". Declaration of March 6, 1994. Printed by Martin Hoffmann (Ed.): Red Army Fraction. Texts and materials on the history of the RAF. ID-Verlag, Berlin 1997, ISBN 3-89408-065-5 , p. 473.
  65. Explanation of the RAF command level. In: Interim No. 401, December 12, 1996. See also Peters: Tödlicher Errtum , p. 713 f.
  66. See for example Alexander Straßner: The third generation of the “Red Army Fraction” , 2003, p. 213 .
  67. Birgit Hogefeld: “Much in our history can be seen as a wrong path”. The defendant's closing words. In: Hans-Jürgen Wirth (Ed.): Hitler's grandchildren or children of democracy? The 68 generation, the RAF and the Fischer debate. Psychosozial, Giessen 2001, ISBN 3-89806-089-6 , pp. 195-236; Online excerpt on Nadir (Internet portal) .
  68. Gudrun Schwibbe: “We must finally tackle our history ourselves” - justification and responsibility in the context of the “history of the RAF”. In: Rolf Wilhelm Brednich (Ed.): Narrative cultures. Contributions to cultural studies narrative research. Hans-Jörg Uther on his 65th birthday. Campus, Berlin / New York 2009, pp. 85–99, here p. 86.
  69. Winfried Ridder: Constitution without protection. The defeats of the secret services in the fight against terrorism. DTV, Munich 2013, p. 68 .
  70. Alexander Straßner: The third generation of the "Red Army Fraction" , 2003, p. 228 .
  71. See for example Wolfgang Kraushaar : The blind spots of the RAF. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2017, ISBN 978-3-608-98140-7 , p. 346 f. (about the dissolution of the RAF).
  72. ^ Heribert Prantl: RAF disaster in Bad Kleinen. Shocking mission. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 27, 2013.
  73. Sandra Beck: Speeches to the living and to the dead. Memories of the Red Army faction in contemporary German-language literature (= Mannheim studies on literary and cultural studies. Volume 43). Röhrig, St. Ingbert 2008, p. 18 .
  74. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, pp. 222 and 255 f.
  75. Alexander Straßner: The third generation of the "Red Army Fraction" , 2003, pp. 215 and 232 .
  76. Alexander Straßner: The third generation of the "Red Army Fraction" , 2003, p. 224 .
  77. Butz Peters: The Last Myth of the RAF , 2006, p. 242.
  78. ^ Rolf Sachsse: Pentagram behind German machine gun under Russian bread. To the semiosphere of the memory of the Red Army Faction . In: Nicole Colin, Beatrice de Graaf, Jacco Pekelder, Joachim Umlauf (eds.): The "German Autumn" and the RAF in politics, media and art. National and international perspectives. Transcript, Bielefeld 2008, ISBN 978-3-89942-963-3 , pp. 131–140, here p. 135 .
  79. Waltraud Wende: When films tell story (s): film analysis as media culture analysis. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2011, p. 245 .
  80. Jamie H. Trnka: “The Struggle Is Over, the Wounds Are Open”. Cinematic Tropes, History, and the RAF in Recent German Film. In: New German Critique. No. 101, 2007, pp. 1–26, here p. 26; Waltraud Wende: When films tell story (s): film analysis as media culture analysis. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2011, p. 256 .
  81. Gunther Latsch: In flagranti. In: Der Spiegel , August 15, 2005. A picture can be found on Schumann's website .
  82. ^ Rüdiger Bernhardt : Interpretation to Christoph Hein. In his early childhood a garden (= King's Explanations and Materials. Vol. 484). C. Bange, Hollfeld 2010, ISBN 978-3-8044-1889-9 , p. 31.
  83. Harald Martenstein: Hein's RAF novel A garden in his early childhood: “My dear father!” In: Der Tagesspiegel , January 27, 2005.
  84. Armin Petras' production of Christoph Heins “In his early childhood a garden” - Monastery of Wut. In: Berliner Zeitung , March 30, 2007.
  85. Uwe Grosser: In his early childhood a garden: Heilbronn - Axel Vornam stages Heins “In his early childhood a garden” in the large house. In: Heilbronner Voice , June 15, 2009; Otto Paul Burkhardt : Mourning on the long bench. In: Nachtkritik.de , June 2009.
  86. Martin Hostert: The second heart in his chest. Meeting. In: Fechenbach.de , first in: Lippische Landeszeitung , February 21, 2005.
  87. Natasa Pejcinovic: Serdar Somuncu: Between the tracks. Meeting. In: TV-Kult.com , April 22, 2012.
  88. See the text parts related to Grams' death in original quotes : What really happened in Bad Kleinen. In: Junge Welt , June 27, 2013.
  89. Wiglaf Droste: What really happened in Bad Kleinen. Video. In: YouTube . Uploaded May 20, 2010; Original sound: What really happened in Bad Kleinen. In: Junge Welt , June 27, 2013.
  90. Michaela Krohn: Finally! Bad Kleinen station is ready. In: Ostsee-Zeitung , December 9, 2018.
  91. A discussion of both films in Petra Sorge: Bad Kleinen: The repressed media scandal. In: Cicero , June 24, 2013.
  92. "Death in Bad Kleinen": ZDFinfo about the RAF's last battle. In: Press portal , June 22, 2018; Markus Schu: A piece of German criminal history. In: MSN.com , originally at: Heilbronner Voice , June 23, 2018.