Theories of justice

The justice fountain in Frankfurt / Main. The representation of "justice" in the western culture is the judging Justitia , with scales (weighing), sword (punishing) and a bandage in front of the eyes (without looking at the person).

Theories of justice are used to systematically determine what justice is and to justify how justice should be effective in a social order. Philosophy , economics and sociology deal with theories of justice . Theories of justice are normative in character. Empirical statements on justice, on the other hand, are derived from the results of justice research .

overview

The question of the nature of justice has been the subject of philosophical discussion since ancient Greece . Early explanations relied on metaphysical reasons. Justice was understood as an order in nature or as a divine origin. At first, justice was not primarily measured against codified law, but viewed as an expression of a personal way of life. Both Socrates and Plato and Aristotle saw happiness as the highest value to be striven for . Justice was the first virtue for them to achieve that bliss. Justice was such a fundamental quality of character .

In Roman society, the codified laws gradually developed. Justice was still associated with a personal attitude, but with Cicero, for example, it was more oriented towards the social order. The legal collection of Emperor Justinian I (527-565), the Corpus Juris Civilis , begins with the definition of law from general principles:

"The precepts of law are these: live honorably, do not offend others, grant each his own."

Starting in late antiquity and extending into the late Middle Ages , Christian ideas subsequently dominated the debate. The righteousness of God took precedence and consequently man could obtain righteousness only through the grace of God.

With the modern era , the idea of ​​a God-given order was gradually being removed. Thomas Hobbes established justice as a necessary principle from human nature. As a result of the new worldview, various concepts of the social contract emerged from Hobbes to John Locke to Jean-Jacques Rousseau , which also shaped the new social systems such as the constitution of the United States .

The empiricists David Hume and Immanuel Kant took a further step, referring to the impossibility of linking being with ought ( Hume's law ). Kant rejected natural law as metaphysical and developed the idea of the law of reason . Following on from Hume, utilitarianism emerged in the English-speaking world as a dominant ethical principle that placed general welfare (the benefit to society as a whole) at the center of values ​​and referred justice to the level of a framework.

The realization that justice cannot be derived from a higher principle led to a criticism of the bourgeois-liberal conceptions of justice, which ranges from Karl Marx to Friedrich Nietzsche , Walter Benjamin to Jacques Derrida .

A new approach in the discussion arose with the theory of justice by John Rawls , which offers general principles for the just design of society in the further development of Kantian ideas. The discourse ethics of Habermas starting points to solve questions of justice rational. Amartya Sen points a way away from the sole dominance of economic criteria , who takes into account the very different needs of people with the principle of participation in his empowerment approach and, above all, also includes the problem of international justice in his concept.

Classifications

A classic distinction between theories of justice is whether their justification is based on natural law or the law of reason . The doctrines of natural law say that justice as a standard is conditioned by something that is valid independently of people, but also independent of space and time. Such an overarching principle is a divinely determined or cosmologically anchored order. This view is found above all in the philosophy of antiquity (Plato, Aristotle) ​​and in the Christian Middle Ages (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas up to Martin Luther). With the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance , natural law was understood more anthropocentrically than inherent in the essence of man. Appropriate ideas can be found in Jean Bodin , Thomas Hobbes , John Locke , Hugo Grotius and Friedrich Pufendorf . In the course of the Enlightenment , reason came more and more to the fore as a formative factor for the conception of justice up to the critical right of reason in Immanuel Kant.

Another level of division of theories of justice is that of empirical and normative theories. Empirical theories are based on justice research . These do not offer principles derived from logical arguments, but practical justifications that already exist in societies. Normative theories are further divided into deontological and teleological theories. The first is based on the principle of action (required, permitted, forbidden) as in Kant's ethics of duty or religious commandments. In teleological ethics, on the other hand, the success of action is the benchmark.

In the contemporary debate , a distinction is made primarily between utilitarianism , liberalism , communitarianism and discourse ethics as opposing philosophical positions. These collective terms characterize certain aspects of the respective theories of justice. However, they are not suitable for making a systematic distinction, since the principles associated with these terms do not allow for consistently comparable standards. This is how one can imagine a liberal communitarian who advocates a discourse ethic as the principle of procedural justice .

In legal philosophy there are efforts to work out a systematic classification of theories of justice. The aim is to create a comparative basis for an analytical comparison of theories. Axel Tschentscher makes a possible distinction based on Robert Alexy , naming the respective position after an outstanding representative of the respective characteristic

Basic positions of the theories of justice

skepticism	Concept of good	rationality	Universal morality
	Plato / Aristotle	Epicurus	Cicero
Hume	Rousseau	Hobbes	Curl
Nietzsche	Hegel	utilitarianism	Kant
Kelsen	Communitarianism	Nozick	Rawls
Hayek	walnut	Buchanan	Dworkin / Nagel
Topitsch	Sen	Gauthier	Habermas / Alexy
Luhmann	Honneth	Court	Ackerman

1. The Nietzschean basic position

Tschentscher characterizes positions that reject the justifiability of ethical values ​​as Nietzschean. This includes all views of skepticism about justice, noncognitivism and pure legal positivism .

2. The Aristotelian basic position

For representatives of the basic Aristotelian position, a material determination of the good is possible. Correct action can be judged against the standard of justice. This position includes all doctrines of virtue and value realism.

3. The Hobbesian Position

All Hobbesian views have in common that they base their theories of justice on a criterion of rationality . The yardstick of these theories is whether right action turns out to be beneficial for humans. Actions associated with positive benefit are just.

4. The Kantian basic position

In a Kantian position, rationality is contrasted with practical reason, which contains a general motive for moral action. A representative of the Kantian position takes into account what is universal and therefore also just for the other. The Kantian position includes the idea of ​​autonomous self-legislation.

Tschentscher's classification is not identical, but similar to Jürgen Habermas's distinction between pragmatic, ethical and moral use of reason. Pragmatic use of reason is the pursuit of the rules of prudence. This can happen on the individual level (egoism) or as a social pragmatism aimed at the common good (utilitarianism). The pragmatic use of reason corresponds roughly to the Hobbesean position. The ethical use of reason is based on a conception of the good, i.e. a set of values that must be pursued and implemented. The principle to be followed corresponds primarily to the Aristotelian basic position. The measure of the moral use of reason is the morality of action. The individual follows general rules of action and puts his individual inclinations and goals behind them. This largely corresponds to the position of the Kantian type.

Single items

Socrates

Socrates himself left nothing in writing. According to the tradition of his students Plato and Xenophon , the question of justice was in the foreground of his ethics. He saw just action as a prerequisite for the good to be striven for , which he equated with happiness. This concerned both the individual and the democratic polis , which was based on law and order established by free citizens. Right action is the result of right insight. To do injustice, as Plato quotes him approvingly, is worse than to suffer injustice. Whoever does wrong, hurts himself. The is a recognition man will avoid the injustice voluntarily.

Socrates developed his insights in public - in the agora with his students or opponents, in the popular assembly and in court - with his dialogical philosophical method of maeutics (obstetrics): starting from a practical topic such as occupation, warfare or other politics, he tried to convince the respective interlocutor through clever questions to revise their own positions. Gradually, common views are achieved, ideally the knowledge to do the good, but not to do the bad and to pursue the question of what the good is.

Not every traditional conversation produced results. Dialogues are ended without result by the opponent, questions often remain open, doubts persist, according to Socrates' principle inherited from Plato: I know that I do not know . However, this ignorance is superior to apparent knowledge, because it contains the awareness that absolute knowledge is not available to humans. Nevertheless, the free citizen should approach insight through as much (self) knowledge as possible as the basis for good, above all fair action. In this way he will not only serve the community, but also become happy and achieve salvation .

In the dialogues, as Plato and Xenophon want to show, Socrates always shows himself to be morally superior to his addressees. It is therefore reported that he was often referred to as a sophist and viewed as a know-it-all and word-twister ( Aristophanes ), who cornered his interlocutors and was therefore avoided by many.

During his trial for blasphemy and the dissemination of doctrines that corrupt the youth, and on his death - there are partly divergent texts about both events by Plato ( Apology ) and Xenophons ( Apology ) - he demanded a judgment according to law. Although he sharply criticized the unjust death sentence that was finally passed, he nevertheless accepted it on the grounds that he was subject to the existing law. Accordingly, a false law must be obeyed and an unjust conviction accepted until the law is democratically changed in the polis. This is served by the freedom of speech of the free citizens in the popular assembly. However, this loyalty does not apply to tyranny , which is based on injustice and restricts the citizen's freedom. According to Plato's apology, after the conquest of Athens by Sparta, Socrates had turned against the violations of the law during the rule of the thirty tyrants who had temporarily destroyed Attic democracy.

Information about the person and the thinking of Socrates is only possible indirectly, the testimonies range between apology and resentment , so that Socratic positions can no longer be fully reconstructed.

Plato

Plato in the Museo Pio-Clementino

At various points in his works, Plato deals with the question of the definition of justice. In doing so, he initially discusses and rejects definitions of justice by individual sophists who appear as literary interlocutors in his dialogues .

In Gorgias' dialogue ( 482c-481b ), the politician Kallikles takes the view that the laws primarily serve the weak and the broad masses. What is just by nature ( to tēs physeos dikaion ), on the other hand, consists of privileges for the strongest and best. He thereby criticizes Plato's famous thesis that suffering injustice is better than doing injustice (469b – c), since doing injustice damages the soul. For Thrasymachos, on the other hand, justice is an instrument of the powerful, through which they set the rules in the state and thus enforce their interests ( Politeia I, 338c – 339b, 343b – 344c). Socrates counters this with his conviction that justice belongs to “the most beautiful”, namely to “that which must be loved by everyone who wants to be happy, both for its own sake and because of the consequences arising from it” ( Politeia II, 358a ). An anonymous sophist sees justice as an agreement for the good of all concerned ( Politeia II, 358e – 362c). Hippias of Elis is said to have called the law a tyrant through whom the natural relationship of the wise is destroyed ( Protagoras 337c-e). According to Protagoras , respect for the other ( aidōs ) and the sense of justice ( dikē ) are the compensation given by Zeus to people for their deficient nature ( Protagoras 320c – 328d). In the Crito dialogue , Socrates , who is waiting in prison for his death sentence to be carried out, refuses to flee because it is not fair to break the laws of the state with which one identifies. In the Nomoi (VI 5, 757b-758a), Plato differentiated between arithmetic justice, the equal distribution of freedoms, the right to vote and the remuneration of members of parliament, as well as geometric justice, the distribution in an appropriate proportion, without which the necessary hierarchies in a state cannot be justified ( similar in Sophistes 236dff and 255cff and Parmenides 139bff).

Against the background of the obviously intense debate about justice at the time, Plato developed his own conception of justice as a faculty of the soul in his work Politeia . Justice is a function of the soul , just as eyes and ears have the function of seeing and hearing for the body. Therefore righteousness consists in “doing what is one's own and not doing many things” ( to ta hautou prattein kai mē polypragmonein dikaiosynē , Politeia IV 433a). Everyone should do his own thing (for the community, for the state), in the way and extent that corresponds to his nature, his possibilities and the individual circumstances (so-called idiopragy ). Whoever interferes in someone else's area of ​​responsibility acts injustice. For Plato, the soul has the three basic faculties desire ( epithymētikon ), courage ( thymoeides ) and reason ( logistikon ), which correspond to the three virtues prudence, bravery and wisdom. In order to be able to use these virtues correctly, justice is required as the fourth cardinal virtue, which is the highest virtue because of its regulatory function. For Plato, the righteous achieve greater happiness than the unjust.

Plato shares the general belief that in the event of legal disputes everyone should get their own and that nobody should be deprived of their own ( Politeia 433e). But he emphatically rejects this principle ( suum cuique ), according to which everyone should get what he deserves and good should be rewarded with good, evil with evil, as a defining feature of justice. Among other things, this is countered by his conviction that justice is an inner attitude of the soul and, as an inner soul matter, cannot be inferred from a relationship to other people towards whom one behaves fairly. For Plato, justice is an eternal, immutable, transcendent idea in which the soul participates.

Structure of the just state according to Plato's Politeia

Soul faculty :	Desire	courage	reason
Virtue :	Prudence	bravery	wisdom
Action :	Acquisition art	Courage	Curiosity
Task in the state :	Craftsman farmer, merchant	Guardian	Philosopher ruler

The philosopher explains his concept of justice, which is related to the individual, in connection with the model of an ideal just state. Justice in the state is analogous to that in the individual soul. There are three classes of citizens in the state, each with different skills and qualifications. In a just state everyone takes on a role that corresponds to their capabilities. Those in whom desire predominates should devote themselves to the art of gain and become craftsmen, farmers or merchants. The brave should train their bravery and take on the role of guardian. Those who have sufficient reason and are curious to find wisdom are apt to belong to the philosopher rulers who run the state. He should orientate himself on the idea of ​​the good ( Politeia 505a). "The most excellent, most just and at the same time happiest person is the one who is most royally minded and who rules himself royally" ( Politeia IX, 580b – c).

Aristotle

Structure of justice in Aristotle

Aristotle presented a systematic analysis on the subject of justice in the 5th book of Nicomachean Ethics , his main ethical work. He understands justice to be virtue in its perfect form. Because it is related not only to the individual himself, but to the fellow citizen. “And that is why justice is considered to be the highest among the virtues of character , and 'neither evening nor morning stars are so wonderful.' And the proverb says: 'In righteousness every privilege is decided.' ”(NE V 3, 1129b ) In this determination of righteousness as comprehensive personal righteousness, Aristotle agreed with Plato. He called the violator of the law, the insatiable ( pleonektēs ) or the unequal ( anisos ) unjust . Those who want more than they deserve and thus create inequality are against justice. However, in contrast to Plato, justice is not an abstract idea that cannot be fully achieved in the end, but for Aristotle “what is just is something human” (NE 1137a 30), which results from the concrete relationships between people. The intersubjectivity is an essential element of justice.

Accordingly, Aristotle placed next

• the general (legal) moral concept of justice ( Latin iustitia generalis / universalis ), yet another one that refers to
• what needs to be regulated in special situations of interpersonal relationships (gr. hē kata meros dikaiosynē , lat. iustitia specialis / particularis ). For the latter, he made a distinction (see NE 1131b 25-28) between
  • "Distribution justice" (gr. To dianemētikon (dikaion) , lat. Iustitia distributiva ) and
  • "Exchange justice or equalizing justice" (gr. To diorthotikon (dikaion) , lat. Iustitia commutativa / correctiva ).

Distributive justice concerns goods such as honor, money or offices. The distribution of these goods is based on earnings, so it can be unequal between people. Aristotle called his distribution principle with regard to distributive justice a "geometric method", according to which someone with high earnings also gets a high share. This method is fair as long as the owner has not violated the law when purchasing it. The geometric method also includes the requirement of every free citizen of the Pólis to make their contribution to the community.

Aristotle bust

In the case of exchange justice or compensatory justice, Aristotle separated the voluntary (civil law) exchange justice that exists in economic life (purchase, rent, wages) from the involuntary corrective justice (Latin iustitia correctiva ) of criminal law, which serves for reparation and compensation . He describes the principle of exchange or equalizing justice as the "arithmetic method", i. H. Performance or damage correspond directly to the consideration or compensation. Injustice always arises here when someone wants more than what is actually due to him according to fair standards.

In addition, Aristotle referred to other aspects that, in his opinion, belong to justice. In order to achieve as much justice as possible, the “best form of government” is necessary. By this he understands a state in which "free" and "equal" citizens alternately rule and allow themselves to be governed. Compared to Plato's philosopher aristocracy, Aristotle developed a form of rule that tended to be participatory . Even if the laws are the yardstick and basis of particular (partial) justice, they are sometimes badly applied. Then they stand in contrast to “natural justice” ( dikaion physikon ), which does not require the consent of people and which cannot be rejected by rejection. So Aristotle rejected a contract theory as the basis of justice, but recognized that the concrete form of law is based on human determinations.

The concept of equity ( epieikeia ), which he contrasted with justice (1137a-1138a), is significant for Aristotle's position . Accordingly, laws are general regulations, the observance of which can lead to unsatisfactory results in specific individual cases. If you add the special justice z. B. with kindness , the general justice can be realized more comprehensively than if one merely adheres formally to the laws. Like Plato, Aristotle noted that “doing injustice” is even worse than “suffering injustice”, since the former is of inferior value.

Epicurus

Epicurus (Louvre)

Epicurus represented a very different conception of justice to Aristotle and Plato. The most important source are his central tenets ( kyriai doxai ), according to Epicurus justice is based on agreement between people:

"33. Justice is not something that exists in and of itself , but a contract concluded in dealing with one another at any location, not to harm one another and not to be harmed. "

The binding to the law occurs exclusively through the danger of being discovered in the event of a violation. The purpose of this agreement lies above all in the social benefit. The content of the law is relative to the group of people involved:

"36. With regard to the community, the law is the same for all; for there is something useful in mutual fellowship. With regard to the particular characteristics of a country and the other conditions, the same thing does not prove to be legally binding for all. "

On the basis of these theses, Epicurus can be seen as an early representative of utilitarianism and ethical relativism , as well as contractualism.

Cicero

Cicero described justice as the rational behavior that is best suited to promoting the togetherness of people and the preservation of the community. He associated this with goodness.

"The first task of justice, however, is that no one harms the other [nemo neminem laede] unless challenged by injustice, then that he treats the common good as his common good, the private as his own." (De officiis, 20)

Cicero also advocated the demand “To each his own” (suum cuique, De officiis 1, § 15). For him, however, justice was more than just social compensation and the avoidance of injustice.

Because people “are created for the sake of their fellow human beings, so that they can benefit each other from one another, we must follow nature as a guide, focus on the common benefit (communis utilitates) and through mutuality Achievements - through giving and taking - strengthening the bond of interpersonal togetherness through specialist knowledge, willingness to make sacrifices and means. "( De officiis , 22)

The new aspect that Cicero brought in is the responsibility towards the community and the duty to help promote it. Cicero saw reliability (fides), i.e. truthfulness and keeping promises, as another basic requirement of justice. According to Cicero, justice as a virtue goes beyond formal compliance with laws. He also notes that compliance with the law can be harmful in individual cases. A natural law overrides man-made law :

“The true law is right reason in harmony with nature. It applies everywhere, is unchangeable and eternal. Its rules call for duty and its prohibitions discourage doing evil. In Rome and Athens, today and at all times, the same, ever-valid and unchangeable laws will apply. "( De re publica III, 23)

Augustine

Augustine was the philosopher who systematically brought together the philosophical ideas of Platonism with the basic ideas of Christianity in the tradition of the Church Fathers . Perfect justice in the Judeo-Christian sense is the justice that man receives solely through the grace of God ( Rom 3.25  EU , Rom 4.5  EU , Gal 2.16  EU ). In relation to divine justice, human justice is always imperfect through the fall of man ( De civitate Dei , XIX 27). Nevertheless, the virtues, and here in particular the cardinal virtues, are important for earthly life, because only then does it receive a natural order.

"Justice, whose task it is to give everyone his own, whereby a certain order of nature is established in man himself, so that the soul is subjected to God and the flesh of the soul [...]." ("Iustitia, cuius munus est sua cuique tribuere - unde fit in ipso homine quidam iustus ordo naturae, ut anima subdatur deo et animae caro “De civitate dei XIX 4)

Augustine also sees justice as a requirement for worldly rule, which without justice is only a great piracy (“Iustitia remota quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia!” De civitate Dei IV, 4, 1).

Thomas Aquinas

The doctrine of the perfection and primacy of God's righteousness as the predominant determinant of righteousness extends into the high scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas linked them with mercy :

"The work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy and is based on it." ( Summa theologica I, 21, 4 c)

In treating justice as a moral virtue, Thomas took up Aristotle. On the one hand, he mentions the iustitia generalis as a cardinal virtue , which is primarily directed towards the other ( iustitia ad alterum ). This is the iustitia legalis , which has the common good in view. From this he distinguished the iustitia particularis , the special virtue that relates to the individual. According to Thomas, there are two special virtues, the iustitia commutativa for contractual relationships and the iustitia distributiva , which he regards as “distributing justice”, a gift of a ruler.

Like Aristotle, Thomas also emphasized the importance of equity as an individual compensation for the naturally general and thus rigid legal regulations.

Martin Luther

For Martin Luther it was the central Reformation realization (his so-called tower experience) that one has to understand the genitive "Justice of God" (Rom 1.17) very differently than it was understood for a long time. Not distributive (punitive), but effective: The person who trusts in God is just in God's eyes, although he does not deserve it. As much as Luther hated the expression “righteousness of God” before, he loved it afterwards.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes

By Thomas Hobbes a new perspective was introduced to the question of justice. Hobbes broke away from the idea of ​​a God-given order and looked at humans in a (fictitious) state of nature in a thought model. In this there is neither property nor justice nor a legislative authority with the possibility of coercion. Man is man's wolf ( Homo homini lupus est , De Cive : Dedication). There is a war of all against all ( Bellum omnium contra omnes , Leviathan chap. 13) The only natural right ( ius naturale ) of man is that of self-preservation. He is himself his own judge who is guided by his own ends ( De Cive , 9). This necessarily brings him into conflict with others. Man can only free himself from this state of fear through sensible intelligence ( recta ratio ), which leads him to obey natural commandments ( leges naturae ). These are

1. Search for peace
2. Willingness to limit one's natural rights in favor of peace
3. Compliance with contracts
4. Gratitude and courtesy instead of revenge and resentment

The own reasonable will demands the recognition of a rule that enforces peace with coercive force. As a consequence, natural law is transferred to a sovereign by way of a social contract - a typical “thought experiment for legitimizing purposes” of the time.

"From the law of nature, which obliges us to transfer to another such rights, the maintenance of which prevents the peace of mankind, follows a third, namely: 'Agreed contracts are to be kept.'" ( Leviathan , 15)

The consequence of these considerations is an absolute legal positivism . Through the irrevocable transfer of natural rights to the state, people are unreservedly bound by compliance with existing laws. On the other hand, there is no injustice that is not justified by a violation of the law or a breach of contract.

“In the same way, in the state, he who harms another with whom he has not concluded a contract, does harm to him; but he only perpetrates an injustice against those who have state authority; because if the person who was harmed complained about the injustice, the perpetrator could say: What is that to me? "( De Cive , 4)

"Where there is no general violence, there is no law, and where there is no law, no injustice" ( Leviathan , 13)

At Hobbes, the concept of the social contract is constructed in such a way that everyone surrenders his or her civil liberties to the state. This does not oblige the state to do anything, as it is not directly involved in the contract. The state itself cannot commit an injustice, since it has unlimited power to legislate. The state or the holder of power is its own sovereign. Hobbes thus legitimized the absolute ruler to whom the citizens and even the church are subject without restriction. This view is understandable against the background that Hobbes sided with the monarchists in the English Civil War (1642–1649). De Cive was created in 1642 and the Leviathan was published in 1651 during the reign of Oliver Cromwell .

In the relationship between citizens, the contract is the standard that determines justice because it is based on the voluntary nature of those involved.

"The value of all objects in a contract is measured according to the request of the contracting parties, and therefore the fair value is what they are willing to pay."

John Locke

John Locke

In contrast to Hobbes, John Locke assumed a divine natural law. As the Creator, God alone has a right to life. The human being must therefore neither impair his own life nor the life of another. Accordingly, the state of nature is "a state of perfect freedom". Man is entitled

"To direct one's actions within the limits of natural law and to dispose of one's property and one's person as it seems best - without obtaining anyone's permission and without being dependent on the will of another." ( Two Treatises of Government , vol , 4)

Ownership comes from work . Nobody is allowed to acquire more than he can use himself. Money, however, is an abstract object that can be accumulated as much as you want, as it is not perishable. Life, freedom and property are the elementary natural rights of man. Unlike Hobbes, they already exist pre-state. Each individual is responsible for the enforcement of the natural law and "entitled to punish those who violate this law to the extent necessary to prevent a new violation." (II, 7) Since the state of nature is uncertain and natural rights are not secured, man concludes a social contract.

“The only way someone can give up this natural freedom and put on the shackles of civil society is to agree with others to unite and unite in a community with the aim of a comfortable, safe and peaceful coexistence, in the safe enjoyment of their property and in greater security towards all who do not belong to this community. "(II, 95)

State authority is for Locke

"Nothing but the combined power of all the members of society entrusted to that person or assembly who is the legislature" (II, 135)

The special thing about Locke's conception is that the laws and the state constitution are justified by the act of will of the citizens. The state is no longer founded by God or an absolute ruler (as with Hobbes), but represents the will of its citizens. From this arises the right of the citizens to abolish state power and to change it if it no longer corresponds to their will. The power of the state serves the realization of human existence and must not be directed against humans.

For Locke, the separation of powers is not based on natural law, but rather a command of prudence. The legislature is established by the people and is bound by existing laws, a constitution. For its part, the executive is bound by the law.

“Whoever therefore has the legislative or supreme power of a state is obliged to rule according to established, standing laws that have been promulgated and made known to the people - and not by ordinances - by impartial and upright judges, the disputes according to those laws must decide, and use the power of the community domestically only to enforce these laws and externally to prevent or retaliate injustice to others and to protect the community from assault and assault. And with all this no other goal must be pursued than peace, security and the public good of the people. "(II, 131)

David Hume

David Hume (1766; portrait by Allan Ramsay )

David Hume distinguished between natural virtues such as benevolence, kindness or friendship towards children and artificial virtues ( artificial virtues ) such as loyalty, honesty and justice. All virtues are based on inclinations. Artificial virtues (also in the sense of artistry), in contrast to natural virtues, are an expression of the intellectual activity of man, which, however, in the sense of his radical empiricism , can ultimately be traced back to sensory perception like the whole of being .

From this “being” there is no “ought”. Judgments with regard to justice are value judgments that cannot be related to any moral basis, rather, contrary to appearances, cannot be logically inferred, but are to be assigned to habit through repeated experiences. Nevertheless, he regarded justice as an extremely important virtue, the purpose and use of which is to ensure order in human coexistence. According to Hume, the highest principle of justice is the protection of human property, which can be ensured by the principle of contract. In the distribution of property, Hume advocated the performance principle, because this would best promote the overall welfare of society.

Hume justified his skepticism with the human life situation, which is characterized by scarcity, but not by an extreme lack of goods. If man were to live in the land of milk and honey, there would be no need for justice, since everyone gets what they want. Even pure love, which can partly be found in marriage and the family, is not suitable as a substitute for justice, as people cannot endure this in larger groups. Hume criticized the idea of ​​a state of nature without a treaty as a fiction, since the first human community is the family, in which there were already rules and education when no states existed. States are only formed when social orders already exist. From Hume's point of view, extreme deficiency also leads to the absence of justice, because in such a situation only those who act selfishly can survive.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated his justification for a social contract also on the basis of a natural human condition. In contrast to Hobbes, his considerations are also hypothetical, but strongly anthropologically based, i.e. not a pure thought model.

“So what exactly is this discourse about? It is about marking the moment in the progress of things when the law took the place of force and nature was thus subjected to the law. "

In particular, Rousseau did not see the original state of man as war, but, like Seneca before him, developed the archetype of a peaceful, self-sufficient and compassionate person. In this state the person is free, without social ties and has no language. He knows neither good nor bad, neither yours nor mine, nor does he have any idea of ​​justice. Reason as the ability to reflect arises only in the human development process. Man gradually comes to language and thus to general terms. This creates an essential difference to animals. First the hut construction and the first social unit the family. Natural self-love ( amour de soi ) gradually changes into self-love ( amour propre ), also egoism. Envy and cruelty arise. Only by entering a society does a person become angry, and this is followed by the “fight of all against all”. A fundamental step in this development process is the transition to agriculture. Agriculture creates assignments and ownership. But as soon as property exists, the first rules of law emerge, through which inequalities are codified and intensified.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pastel by Maurice Quentin de La Tour , 1753

“The first person to fence in a piece of land had the idea of ​​saying: This is mine; finding people limited enough to believe him, he became the true founder of the societe civile . How much crime, war, murder and misery would have been spared the human race if one had torn out the stakes, filled the ditch and shouted at his own kind: 'Beware of this deceiver, you are lost if you forget that the fruits belong to everyone and that the floor does not belong to anyone '"

"This transition from the state of nature to the civil class brings about a very remarkable change in man, in that he sets justice instead of instinct in his behavior and impresses on his actions the morality that he had previously lacked."

Property is not a bad thing for Rousseau as long as it is based on one's own labor. Only when it comes to social inequalities and the rich increase their property through the work of the poor, freedom and equality of the citizens are lost. Only then do greed and domination dominate. Rousseau saw the way out of the contradictions of such a depraved society as a state in which the citizens are free and treated equally. This requires a articles of association ( Contrat sociale ). This includes "the total transfer of ownership of every participant with all his rights to the entire community". Because everyone in the state transfers his rights without restriction, equality within the community is guaranteed and, because no one has rights to another, freedom, at least in the form of civil liberty. Through this act, the state becomes the embodiment of the common will ( volonté générale ).

“Together we all, each of us, put his person and all his strength under the highest guideline of the common will; and we take in, as a body, every member as an inseparable whole. "

Because the state, as sovereign, represents the common will of its citizens, it is under no obligation to the individual. Citizens as individuals, on the other hand, are subjects and bound by the common will. Therefore the state has the right to enforce the common will even with coercion. The sum of the will of the individual is not identical to the common will, because the citizens pursue their private interests. But the common will is geared towards the good of all. It is then expressed “when the whole people issues a regulation about the whole people.” Laws must be universal and apply to every citizen. Laws made in this way cannot be unjust because they express the common will. The citizens become a community of law. Like Hobbes, Rousseau represented a positivist legal conception. A government set up by the people only has the task of executing the passed laws. Parties or representation systems disrupt the immediate public will. In contrast to the British empiricists , with Rousseau the realization of the social contract is only conceivable in a republic. He explicitly rejected England's parliamentary system with a monarch at its head.

From his postulate of equality, Rousseau concluded that “no citizen may be so rich to be able to buy another, no matter how poor as to have to sell himself.” The concept of the social contract was also based on the principle of social justice. Where individual advantages become too great, the legislature must intervene to compensate.

“However, if the abuse is inevitable, does it mean that it doesn't at least need to be contained? Because the course of things always aims at the destruction of equality, therefore the power of legislation must always aim to maintain it. "

With the demand for social legislation, Rousseau stood in opposition to liberal views such as Locke's, for which the protection and unrestricted guarantee of property were fundamental.

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant

For Immanuel Kant, justice is an indispensable value, "because when justice perishes, it is no longer of any value that people live on earth" (MdS RL, AA VI, 332). He replaced the idea of ​​natural law with a law of reason . Human beings cannot recognize a natural right as an over-positive right, for example a divine right. With the means of reason, for every knowledge man is dependent on empirical intuition, on his senses. The only fact left for him is practical reason , which answers the theoretically irrelevant question of whether there is freedom in such a way that there is freedom.

From the command of practical reason to accept human freedom as a regulative idea, Kant inferred human autonomy . The self-determination of the human being makes him the fundamental purpose of his actions. The categorical imperative (human rights formula) forbids violating this :

"Act in such a way that you use humanity, both in your person and in the person of everyone else, at all times as an end, never just as a means." (GMS, AA IV, 429)

Out of reason, man is obliged to respect personality and in it the dignity of man. This applies to everyone and is therefore a requirement of equality. The freedom of man is not only an inner freedom in which man is responsible to himself to his reason and from this has the (inner) duty of morality, but it also applies in the external relationship of people to one another.

As an instrument for the practical implementation of justice, Kant viewed law, in which the principle of freedom is guaranteed by mutual commitment. To this end, he formulated the "categorical legal imperative" ( Otfried Höffe ).

"The right is therefore the epitome of the conditions under which the arbitrariness of the one can be combined with the arbitrariness of the other according to a general law of freedom." The freedom of the individual and his autonomy is guaranteed by law; but freedom is also restricted by the binding of law which applies to all. The freedoms of action guaranteed by law are mutually related: the freedoms of each find their limits on the freedoms of others. The law as a whole is a system of rational order of freedom. This determination of (iuridic) justice is purely formal. However, freedom has not only formal, but also material components and also requires real opportunities for development. According to Kant, empirical experience is required for material justice. According to Fichte (who agrees with Kant with regard to the interrelationship of freedoms), everyone must be given the chance to acquire something through personal performance, and it should "only be up to them if someone lives more uncomfortably".

Karl Marx

Karl Marx (1861)

For Karl Marx (1818–1883) there is no timeless or absolute justice; rather, like other ideological forms, it is always tied to certain historical and economic conditions.

Marx had received his doctorate on Epicurus' philosophy and got to know his theory of the contract as the legal form appropriate to human nature.

Since his early political writings, he has criticized law as a category of civil society and at the same time pursues the normative goal of human emancipation .

During the pre- march in 1844 he recognized a special situation in Germany compared to other nations such as France and England, in which bourgeois revolutions and subsequent restorations had already taken place. For him, the confrontation with the German philosophy of state and law, which was essentially developed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , was “both a critical analysis of the modern state and the reality connected with it, as well as the resolute denial of the entire previous manner of German political and legal consciousness the noblest, most universal expression raised to science is precisely speculative legal philosophy itself ”.

He sees the positive possibility of emancipation in Germany in the proletariat as “a class with radical chains, a class of bourgeois society which is not a class of bourgeois society, a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere that has a universal character possesses through her universal suffering and does not claim any special right, because no special injustice, but the injustice as such, is perpetrated on her, which can no longer provoke on a historical, but only on the human title, which in no one-sided opposition to the consequences, but is in all-round opposition to the prerequisites of the German state, finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thus all other spheres of society, which in a word the complete one Loss of man is, therefore, only through the complete recovery of man can win himself ”.

In the more general theoretical framework of the historical materialism formulated by Marx in collaboration with Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) , the law of a society, together with the state, religion, science and art, forms the superstructure over the basis of material production and traffic.

As a result, society appears fair from the bourgeois standpoint:

"As long as one is a Bourgois, one cannot avoid seeing in this [ class ] opposition a state of harmony and eternal justice."

The necessary prerequisite for a change is the development of the productive forces, "because without them only the deficiency generalizes, that is, with the necessity the dispute about what is necessary would have to start again and the whole old shit would have to be restored, because furthermore only with this universal development Productive forces a universal intercourse of human beings is set, hence on the one hand the phenomenon of the 'propertyless' masses produced in all peoples at the same time (general competition), making each of them dependent on the upheavals of the others, and finally world-historical, empirically universal individuals in the place of the local ones has set".

In place of this bourgeois society there should be “an association in which the free development of everyone is the condition for the free development of all”.

In his studies from 1850 onwards on the criticism of political economy , Marx came to a more precise clarification of private property as the legal form of goods, an approach that was further developed by Eugen Paschukanis in the 1920s .

Marx praises Aristotle, who already recognized that the exchange of goods presupposes their equality and that this presupposes their commensurability. However, Aristotle considers the commensurability of the values ​​of different commodities to be in truth impossible and a merely practical stopgap measure. Marx explains this view from the ancient state of development of the relations of production:

"But that in the form of commodity values ​​all labor is expressed as equal human labor and therefore as equally valid, Aristotle could not read from the value form itself, because Greek society was based on slave labor and therefore had the inequality of people and their labor as its natural basis . "

In capitalism, the exchange of goods is fair according to their value:

“The fairness of the transactions that take place between the agents of production rests on the fact that these transactions arise as a natural consequence of the relations of production. The legal forms in which these economic transactions appear as acts of will of the participants, as expressions of their common will and as contracts enforceable by the state towards the individual party, cannot, as mere forms, determine this content themselves. You just express it. This content is just as soon as it corresponds to the mode of production, is adequate to it. He is unjust as soon as he contradicts her. Slavery, based on the capitalist mode of production, is unjust; likewise the cheating on the quality of the goods. "

Marx distinguishes between the revolutionary and reformist path to communism. When the leadership of the Social Democratic Party propagated the introduction of cooperatives in the draft of the Gotha program in 1875 , Marx pointed out in his criticism that the individual emancipation of workers in cooperatives is still severely restricted by the necessary legal relationships. He writes:

“In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaved subordination of individuals to the division of labor, so that the opposition between mental and physical labor has also disappeared; after work has become not only a means to life but the first necessity of life; After the all-round development of individuals, their productive forces have also grown and all springs of cooperative wealth flow more fully - only then can the narrow bourgeois legal horizon be completely exceeded and society can write on its banner: Everyone according to his abilities, everyone according to his needs! "

Communism has often been criticized as unrealisable because the assumed development of the productive forces is not possible.

Early German Socialists , who fled to France and advocated the ideals of freedom, equality and justice, organized in the League of the Just since the 1830s . After Marx and Engels had taken a leading position there, it was renamed the Bund der Kommunisten in 1847 .

The renaming marked a new accent. Whether justice is an independent central value or - in accordance with Marx's postulate - exclusively an expression of objective relationships and thus a derived one, this controversy still exists in socialist contexts today. One example is the history of the SPD , in which both positions were represented until 1918.

In almost all political, social and cultural movements that have dealt with questions of justice, such as the labor movement , the anti-colonialist movement and the women's emancipation movement , Marxist currents - with different orientations - played a role. Up to the present day there are Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches to the justice debate, for example in liberation theology .

utilitarianism

The Utilitarianism is a consequentialist , that is an ethical position that evaluates the unintended consequences of actions (consistency principle). It is in contrast to a deontological ethic like Kant's, the standards of which are purposes of action. The utilitarians tie in with Hume's view that ethical values ​​do not exist by themselves, but explain them from human practice. The standard for what is ethically good is solely the benefit that an action creates (value principle). In this respect, like in Hume, justice only plays a secondary role in utilitarianism, namely insofar as it leads to a positive benefit. For utilitarianism, whatever increases the benefit and diminishes the harm is just. Distributions of goods and actions are made based on their utility.

Often utilitarianism is equated with an egoistic ethic in which an individual maximization of utility is pursued. However, this is not the case. Already Jeremy Bentham , who is considered the founder of utilitarianism, formulated as a goal "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." The main goal of utilitarians is to maximize the benefit to society as a whole (maximum principle). This gives rise to duties towards the community to which the individual must orient himself. Problems arise when the pursuit of utility collides with ethical values ​​such as justice. In the course of history, the utilitarians have refined the formulation and justification of their theory more and more and taken objections into account.

John Stuart Mill

While Bentham still understood the benefit purely quantitatively according to the extent, duration and intensity of a feeling of happiness, i.e. purely hedonistic , John Stuart Mill already introduced qualitative standards. He determined the level of benefit based on the preferences an individual attaches to an object or a fact. He rated spiritual pleasure higher than sensual pleasure. “It is better to be a dissatisfied person than a satisfied pig; rather be a dissatisfied Socrates than a satisfied fool. "

Henry Sidgwick , a later classic of utilitarianism, turned against the purely hedonistic views of Bentham and also against Mill's modified form. With regard to everyday morality, the pure pleasure principle is unsuitable because the normal citizen does not relate it to society but to his own person. Instead, he developed rule utilitarianism . Accordingly, generally recognized moral values ​​and virtues are secondary principles for orientation, compliance with which leads to the “normal behavior” of the individual serving to maximize the benefit of society. A modern version of the "two-level theory" can be found in Richard Mervyn Hare .

Another variant is average utilitarianism , which was represented, for example, by John Harsanyi . The benchmark is the benefit per capita and no longer the absolute benefit amount for society. Above all, this also makes qualitative growth in a shrinking society assessable for the utilitarian. Harsanyi pointed out that there are no rational considerations of benefits in unreflected situations. Only when you create an ideal situation can you determine the actual (true) benefit. These include

1. complete empirical knowledge of the facts
2. the greatest possible care in the evaluation
3. rational, mentally undisturbed decisions.

All versions of utilitarianism cannot completely resolve the possible conflict between justice and utility calculation. In principle, a utilitarian cannot say whether a certain social condition is fair or not, but only whether this condition is fair to another (comparison dependency).

Benefit calculations could not capture individual values. The concept of benefit is also difficult to quantify and, above all, utilitarians cannot guarantee fundamental values ​​such as the realization of human rights . In extreme cases, this could lead to the justification of slavery on the basis of benefit considerations.

Mill and Sidgwick tried to integrate the question of justice into their concept. Mill attributed the difference between various justice concepts to the fact that they are based on different benefit assessments (preferences). The same applies to questions of remuneration, criminal law or taxation. Mill identified justice as a perfect duty because it can be demanded. Other virtues like generosity and benevolence are imperfect because they are not mandatory. Compliance with the full duty can be sanctioned by penalties. The evaluation of the penalties resulted in a direct connection to the benefit issue for Mill. In the current debate, Rainer Trapp has developed an immediate utilitarianism for justice. It complements the maximization of the volume of utility with an equality of utility distribution and establishes a relationship between utility level and moral merit.

Walter benjamin

In 1921 Walter Benjamin wrote the essay On the Critique of Violence (KdG), in which he dealt with the relationship between violence , law and justice. Benjamin asked how violence can be legitimized. Following Kant, he distinguished ends and means. Just ends can "be achieved by justified means, justified means can be turned to just ends." (KdG 180) Violence can only serve as a means, but not as an end in itself determined by reason. Unlawful violence threatens every legal system. It follows that, paradoxically, the law must contain the power to use force in order to enforce the law by force. At the same time, violence outside of the law cannot be allowed to anyone. The sanctioning of violence in law for Benjamin therefore the "historic recognition of their purposes" (KdG 182).

Generally speaking, violence is either law-making or law-preserving. Law-making is on the one hand the violence of the aggressor in war and on the other hand the general strike , which either wants to create new law as a political strike or as a proletarian strike wants to dissolve law and thus lead to the desired anarchy . Because every piece of legislation strives to exist in the long term, it creates the preservation of law in itself. This is a confirmation and thus a repetition of the legislation.

Justice cannot arise from (established) law, since otherwise its validity would depend on the paradox of established and sustaining violence. But justice is transcendent in relation to law . To grasp this, Benjamin distinguished between mythical and divine violence. Positive law is a human achievement. It springs from power and is therefore based on myth . In myth, violence manifests itself spontaneously , but still legislatively. Justice is beyond human power. It can therefore only result from violence that overcomes guilt and atonement. Divine violence is Benjamin's symbol of the power in justice to evade human violence. The function of divine power is to “put a stop” to the law-making power.

“If the mythical power is law-setting, the divine power destroys the law, it sets those limits, so it destroys them without limits, the mythical power is guilty and expiatory at the same time, the divine atonement, the other is threatening, so this is striking, the other is bloody, so this is bloodless lethal. "(KdG 199)

For Benjamin, justice has a moral dimension that lies outside the law, without the “ dialectical ups and downs” (KdG 202) of the law determined by violence. It is the "principle of all divine purposes". (KdG 198)

Friedrich August von Hayek

For Friedrich August von Hayek , the law of societies arose in a complex evolutionary process of living together. Accordingly, one cannot recognize a moral order, but only learn it. A society becomes more stable, the more the moral order is reflected in the legal order. The legal system provides the framework for social coexistence in which individual people spontaneously organize themselves according to their own ideas, whether primarily selfish or altruistic. The more freedom the legal order grants, the more man can realize himself. Freedom is therefore the fundamental value of living together. In a free society, the creativity and initiative of individuals create prosperity and progress in the market. Because individuals can never even come close to combining all of the existing knowledge, the market is always superior to a managed economy.

An assessment of the distribution results of the market with the yardstick of equity is a misunderstanding. Like a game, the market is a system of rules. A result is fair if the rules of the game are observed. In this sense, a 1: 1 in football is just as fair as a 6: 0. Redistribution is tantamount to retrospectively correcting a game result if it is done in the name of justice. What someone has acquired in a free market under existing rules is legitimate property. Undoing by politics is, in Hayek's understanding, unfair.

Accordingly, the talk of social justice and the goal of income equality based on earnings are a category error . The term social justice “does not belong in the category of error, but in that of nonsense, like the expression 'a moral stone'.” This understanding does not mean that Hayek rejected a social policy and called for a night watchman state. Rather, he saw “emergency aid” as a “community duty”. Since the market is not only based on performance and skill, but is also largely determined by luck and bad luck, compensation against poverty is justified if the market fails. Politics can only be an adequate life, not distributive justice.

“All modern governments have cared for the needy, adversely affected and the incapacitated, and have addressed health issues and knowledge diffusion. There is no reason why the scope of these pure services should not be expanded with general growth [...] It can hardly be denied that with increasing wealth, the subsistence level that the community for those who cannot support themselves always and that it can be offered outside of the market, that it will gradually increase, or that the government can usefully, and without causing harm, be helpful or even leading in such endeavors. "

What Hayek resisted massively is the intervention of the state in the market itself. A controlled economy, that is his main argument, prevents creativity and initiative and is therefore necessarily less productive, generates less progress and thus leads to less prosperity than the market can . That is why he rejected any form of subsidy in principle. In relation to the market, there can only be procedural justice through the establishment of rules of the game. A social policy in line with the market, on the other hand, can promote security and satisfaction and thus in turn contribute to the development of the productivity of the market.

Against this background, Hayek considers the demand for equality of income to be illegitimate. All that needs to be respected is the legal and political equality of every person. In this sense, politics must not instrumentalize the law, but must act according to principles. Legislation should not be based on a balance of interests, but should be based on general convictions of justice.

John Rawls

With the Theory of Justice (TG) in 1971 John Rawls sparked a fundamental discussion on the question of justice in political philosophy . His theory of justice is a contract theory, the basic idea of ​​which is linked to Locke and Kant, but at the same time incorporates the question of social justice and modern methods of decision-making and game theory . According to Rawls, a society has two basic functions: promoting the harmony of interests and dealing with conflicts. In order to solve these tasks, justice is required. This is "the first virtue of social institutions" (TG 19). Rawls cites the constitution, freedom of thought and conscience, competitive markets, private ownership of means of production, and the monogamous family as examples of such institutions.

“Principles are necessary in order to decide between different social regulations for the distribution of goods and to reach an agreement on them. These are the principles of social justice: they enable the allocation of rights and duties in the basic institutions of society, and they determine the proper distribution of the fruits and burdens of social cooperation. " (TG 21/22)

“For me, the concept of justice is defined by its principles for the allocation of rights and duties and the correct distribution of social goods. A concept of justice is an interpretation of this function. "(TG 26)

Rawls was critical of the basic idea of utilitarianism , namely to maximize the overall benefit of society without regard to the concerns and sensitivities of the individual. Above all, utilitarianism does not take into account the diversity of individuals. He defined society as a system of cooperation from which every individual who takes part can derive the greatest possible benefit. Such a system will be joined by free and reasonable people when the principles of justice are established in a starting point of equality. "I call this view of the principles of justice the theory of justice as fairness." (TG 28)

Rawls sketched this theory using a fictitious initial situation as the original state with the following elements:

• Equality: Everyone has the same rights in the choice of principles.
• Commitment: Everyone agrees that agreed principles must be adhered to.

• Veil of ignorance: Nobody knows what role they will play in the new order after the principles have been adopted.
• Neutrality: Everyone behaves neutrally in relation to all other parties involved in establishing the principles.
• Recognition of basic social goods: These include, in particular, rights, freedoms and opportunities, income and assets as well as the social foundations of self-respect.

If these basics are given, according to Rawls, those involved can agree on two basic principles:

1. Every person has an equal right to the comprehensive system of equal fundamental freedoms, which is compatible with the same system of freedoms for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are permissible if they

a) are associated with positions and offices that are available to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity .

b) lead to a greater expected benefit for the least beneficiaries (difference principle).

Rawls formulated two rules of precedence as constraints:

1. Priority of freedom: The principles of justice are in lexical order (apply in sequence), which means that freedom can only be restricted if this restriction strengthens freedom in the overall system and everyone can agree to this restriction.
2. Priority of justice: Equal opportunities have priority over the principle of difference as long as the inequality of opportunities does not improve the situation of those who are worse off.

Rawls's concept of justice is based on the principle of freedom and equality for all those involved in a society. It is therefore also referred to as egalitarian liberalism . Rawls' unrestricted basic rights include the right to vote and to hold public office, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of conscience and thought, personal freedom, as well as protection against psychological oppression and physical abuse and protection against arbitrary arrest and Custody as well as the right to property (TG 82). For Rawls, inequality can only be justified by the principle of difference. It is permissible if the less beneficiaries also benefit from it.

“Whoever is favored by nature, be it whoever wants it, can only enjoy the fruits as much as it improves the situation of the disadvantaged. Those favored by nature must have no advantages simply because they are more talented, but only to cover the costs of their training and to use their gifts in such a way that the less fortunate are also helped. Nobody deserves their better natural abilities or a better starting place in society. "(TG 122)

With this argument Rawls advocated a welfare state in which a correction of the distribution in favor of the less fortunate, for example in the area of ​​education, is legitimate. Above all, he demanded an appropriate savings rate in order to guarantee the chances of future generations to shape their lives. Demands for intergenerational justice and environmental ethics are partly justified by Rawls' considerations.

Ronald Dworkin

Like Rawls, Ronald Dworkin represents an egalitarian liberalism . His ajar to Kant's basic thesis is that every citizen the right to equal consideration and equal respect ( equal concern and respect ) has. A government must be neutral to different, often conflicting beliefs of its citizens about the right way to live. From the principle of equality, Dworkin concludes that it is the state's task to actively create equality through social equality.

The recognition of the autonomy of the person is expressed in equality . Specifically, Dworkin names two principles that are a prerequisite for a just society:

1. Everyone should be able to lead a successful, not wasted life.
2. The responsibility for the success of one's own life cannot be delegated.

Liberalism based on equality recognizes that people in a society have different preferences . The best place to realize these preferences is in the market and a representative democracy with majority voting. However, in practice these institutions lead to discrimination and inequalities.

“Thus, in relation to the economic market and political democracy, for various reasons, the liberal finds that these institutions produce unequal results as long as he does not add different kinds of individual rights to his system (scheme). These rights serve as a trump card for the individual; they enable the individual to resist certain decisions, contrary to the fact that these decisions are made by the normal functioning of general institutions, which are not ends in themselves. "

The introduction of protective rights serves to guarantee equal consideration and respect for everyone. The state may only be morally neutral if it ensures equality. Since people are responsible for their actions, compensation by the state cannot take place on the level of welfare, because this is also essentially dependent on the actions of those affected. Rather, the balance has to take place at the level of the resources, because these determine what a person can do with his life.

To justify the criteria according to which the compensation should be made, Dworkin, like other theorists of justice, developed a fictitious thought model in which shipwrecked people on an island share the available resources among themselves. He proposes an auction as the procedure because this is the best way to take preferences into account. The auction leads to an equilibrium when he so called "envy test" ( envy test ) is negative, this is the moment in which none of the parties more prefer to take of another party's position.

To compensate for natural disadvantages as well as the influence of strokes of fate, Dworkin developed a multi-level concept of insurance in the thought model. Since nobody takes out such insurance in practice, he proposes a differentiated taxation system for the real world that takes the corresponding risks into account.

Robert Nozick

Soon after Rawls' theory of justice appeared in 1974 as a work of the political philosophy Anarchy, State and Utopia (English translation: Anarchie, Staat, Utopie), (ASU) by the American Robert Nozick . It is considered the radical - liberal ( libertarian ) answer to Rawls. Nozick based his considerations on the least possible intervention by the state in society. He considers man to be a rational being, whose natural rights , the right to life, freedom and property, must be guaranteed and not restricted by too many binding regulations. Above all, Rawls does not take into account the inequality of people's interests. Nozick considers his assumption that all people were the same in a fictitious initial state to be wrong due to the different interests of individuals. He also rejects the thesis that people make neutral decisions under the “veil of ignorance” and allow themselves to be motivated to distribute goods equally. He justified this with the different willingness to take risks of the actors, who always follow their own divergent preferences (ASU 206ff). As a contrary concept, Nozick put forward a claim theory based on the basic idea of ​​inviolable just property. This is given when the possession

a) was created or appropriated without having previously been owned by anyone,

b) was acquired through a lawful transaction , i.e. through voluntary and fair commercial transactions, a gift or the like or

c) was caused by the correction of an incorrect transaction (ASU 144)

Any distribution is justified as long as it is based on voluntary action by all concerned. Nozick rejected a forced redistribution by a welfare state because it lacked the consent of all those involved. The state may only intervene if the process of voluntary exchange is disturbed. The critics of the libertarian view criticize the fact that in the case of unequal distributions no fair and equitable exchange can take place. Due to unequal positions of power, the market fails which it cannot correct itself and for the same reason human rights cannot be protected.

Communitarianism

Representatives of the social-philosophical current of communitarianism argue against liberal positions that they lead to an overemphasis on self-interest and neglect the values ​​of the various social communities. But justice can only be achieved if society takes diverse cultural and religious structures into account. According to this view, it only arises through social acceptance in the community. The book After Virtue (title of the German translation: The loss of virtue ) by the Scottish-American moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre from 1981 is considered a major work of communitarianism .

Michael Walzer is also widely regarded as a main proponent of this school of thought. In particular through one of his main works, Spheres of Justice (German: Sphären der Gerechtigkeit ), he has given decisive impetus to the liberalism-communitarianism debate that emerged as a reaction to John Rawls' theory of justice. In this work, he divides society into eleven sections. Each social sub-area (also called sphere) is characterized by its own dominance and monopoly , from which very specific justice arrangements emerge. These arrangements of justice immanent in the spheres cannot be generalized. In the sphere of “membership and affiliation” (for example to neighborhoods, families and associations), it becomes particularly clear that only the type of affiliation to a certain community determines whether and how many goods you are allocated. It should be noted, however, that Walzer himself always protested against being called a communitarian.

Bruce Ackerman

Bruce Ackerman formulated another version of political liberalism in his book "Social Justice in a Liberal State" (SJ). Ackerman also uses a thought experiment to clarify his ideas. In a spaceship, discussions are held on how the colonists for a planet should be equipped with the general resource “manna”. The only convincing distribution for Ackerman is equal distribution. Manna stands as a symbol for money in the real world and the thought experiment serves to justify the permissibility of a redistribution. The aim of the distribution is to ensure an “independent diversity” (undominated diversity, SJ 116). If someone pursues a life project that is generally considered to be good, he has a right to have disabilities in the natural equipment compensated for.

In order to regulate conflicts, Ackerman developed his own concept of the discourse for the legitimation of power in society. Everyone who exercises power, not just the government, has to legitimize it to their fellow citizens. Such a legitimation is at all acceptable if it fulfills three principles:

• Rationality : There must be objective reasons. (SJ 4)
• Consistency : The reasons must not be contradicting themselves. (SJ 7)
• Neutrality : The reasons must not be based on a set of values ​​(religion, worldview) (SJ 10)

If these standards are used as a basis for liberal dialogue (liberal conversation), according to Ackerman, for example, the state must not interfere in religion (SJ 111), abortions are legitimate (SJ 126/127), censorship is not permitted (SJ 153) or private schools are not entitled to public funding (SJ 160). It is also justified if a society only allows immigration as long as political stability is not endangered (SJ 95). Ackerman sees the possibility of resolving conflicts on such topics in the orientation of the participants in the context of the liberal dialogue towards pragmatic solutions. He rejects Habermas' ideal speech situation as counterfactual .

Ackerman and Anne Alstott initiated a new discussion under the heading of participation society when both of them took up Thomas Paine 's proposal for a basic pension in the book "The Stakeholder Society" and an unconditional one-time payment of 80,000 for each of a fund to be created USD (the usual cost of studying) at the age of 18. In this way, social emergencies can at least partially be avoided from the outset and everyone gets a greater chance to realize themselves. The fund is to be financed initially from inheritance and wealth taxes and, in a second step, from repayments by the beneficiaries at the end of life, i.e. H. then by paying the basic amount including interest from the property to be inherited (citizens' inheritance). Ackerman / Alstott regard wage subsidies as pure charity that has no direct relation to the required equal opportunities. It is the task of the state to correct market failures, but not to intervene in individual life plans. The one-off payment and its free use is therefore also directed against an increasingly increasing welfare mentality. With the one-off payment, the individual receives greater responsibility for their own life.

David Gauthier

In his book Morals by Agreement , David Gauthier developed a contract-theoretical approach based on the principle of rationality . His theory is limited to economic rationality, so only applies to questions of distributive justice. Similar to utilitarianism, it regards justice as the realization of a mutual individual benefit. Morality is based on rational decisions. Gauthier excludes assumptions about objective values ​​or individual affects from his consideration. The instrument of his theory of justice is game theory , because it examines solutions for strategic dependencies. In doing so, he tries to show that moral behavior is fundamentally advantageous compared to a strategy geared exclusively to self-interest, because the result leads to greater benefit for all parties involved .

In the prisoner's dilemma , cooperation is fundamentally more advantageous than non-cooperation. This is especially true if the question of cooperation occurs several times in a row (iterated). However, the prerequisite for cooperative behavior is that there is mutual trust in a cooperative attitude on the other side in a negotiated solution. Otherwise everyone would withdraw to the minimal solution of non-cooperation. People must also be ready to replace imperfect market conditions with fair negotiated solutions, to create fair starting conditions for their negotiations and to be able to refrain from maximizing interests. The cooperation negotiation must not fail because of (unrealistic) maximum demands and everyone involved must be able to benefit from the negotiation, i.e. be better off than without cooperation. Gauthier describes the optimum as a compromise in which all those involved make the same concession compared to a maximum solution that they can realistically achieve (minimax principle). According to Gauthier, a just solution is achieved precisely through the same high concession.

Thomas M. Scanlon

The starting point for Thomas M. Scanlon is an intuitionistic and individualistic moral philosophy . An action is acceptable to him when no one can reasonably reject it. This differs from the conception of contracts by John Rawls, since his theory does not focus on the individual , but exclusively on the design of social institutions. At the same time, Scanlon's view is also contrary to David Gauthier, because he is based on a different concept of reason. For Gauthier, selfish reason, the idea that the individual only pursues his or her individual interests, is decisive for moral decisions. Moral principles are accepted if they serve self-interest in the long term. Scanlon sets against the benefit calculating reason (ratio) the concept of a universal rationality (reason), according to which values ​​other than self-interest also give reasons for action. These reasons arise in self-reflection from weighing various factors and their weight is largely influenced by the social framework and the recognition of moral rules such as tolerance.

Because of the concept of reason alone, Scanlons is very close to Rawls. Scanlon calls his conception contractualism , because on the one hand it is based on the principle of justifiability, which presupposes the willingness to accept reasons. On the other hand, this means that these reasons do not refer to an abstract principle, but must (at least hypothetically) be recognized by other people as not rejectable. It depends on the substantive argumentation.

Scanlon believes the reasons with which Rawls rejects utilitarianism are plausible. Scanlon is also a proponent of egalitarianism. As a justification, he cites five arguments that speak against inequality:

1. Redistribution improves the situation of people in great need. This argument is more about humanism than egalitarianism.
2. Great inequality creates humiliating differences in status. These humiliations can be lessened by improving equality.
3. Economic betterment leads to unacceptable power. By promoting economic freedom, power is also limited.
4. Without equal opportunities, there are unequal starting conditions for the possibilities of society.
5. A hierarchical order in a production system caused by power leads to unequal wages and thus to unequal shares in a common added value.

"The idea of ​​equality thus draws its power of persuasion from various other moral ideas, not all of which are specifically egalitarian in nature."

Although Scanlon has a different justification approach, the result comes very close to the position of Rawls. He even considers Dworkin's argument that natural disadvantages must also be compensated for in terms of resource equality, and Sens's demand that compensation should take place in order to create equal opportunities for realization can be represented in Rawls' theory.

"Rawls' list of basic social goods includes" the social foundations of self-respect "and his theory includes the idea of" equal opportunities "as a separate requirement. The two points on which I attach importance would consequently have a basis in his overall theory. "

A just structure of a society does not depend on the goals of the people, but on whether the society provides the basis for the realization of the goals. But people have to shape their own lives and are responsible for the quality of their lives.

Jürgen Habermas

Habermas 2007 at the University of Philosophy in Munich

Jürgen Habermas did not develop an independent legal philosophy, but rather embedded his fundamental considerations on this topic in his theory of communicative action and discourse ethics . These are summarized in the work facticity and validity (FuG). The title of this work already indicates that Habermas is assuming a factual historical legal reality. Habermas rejects metaphysical justifications of law such as a God-given right, a natural law, recourse to the essence of man, but also a higher understanding of reason.

In contrast to historicism and legal positivism, which in turn relate to the investigation of empirically existing law, Habermas also points out that the law requires legitimation in order to be valid . A reduction to facticity is not enough. Without legitimation, the law lacks the acceptance of the addressees and thus their willingness to comply with it. He understands legal communities as "associations of equal and free legal comrades whose cohesion is based at the same time on the threat of external sanctions and on the assumption of a rationally motivated consent." (FuG 23) Not only objective reality contributes to the validity of the law, but also that subjective attitude that the citizen takes on the law. Law not only encompasses the limits of freedom of action, but also requirements for a scope for the self-determined development of freedom.

In contrast to Niklas Luhmann's system-theoretical positivism, for Habermas law is not just a subsystem of society that the individual perceives from an observer's perspective and that for him represents an external element of his environment. Rather, as a participant, the individual is in an interaction with the applicable norms and only accepts them if he can derive a meaning from them and is convinced of their correctness. Positive law is therefore not an empty formalism, but its claim to validity depends on its design; "Positive law must also be legitimate." (FuG 49)

In history there are numerous examples of insufficient acceptance of existing legal relationships, for example in states with slavery , in absolutism , but also in the liberal capitalism of the 19th century.

“As a look at the European labor movement and the class struggles of the 19th century shows, the political systems that come closest to the model calculations of a formally and legally rationalized rule are by no means per se legitimate - but at most from the side the beneficial social classes and their liberal ideologies . "(FuG 546)

Since social developments are dynamic and complex , it does not seem possible for Habermas to philosophically identify certain legal relationships as ideal . Natural law and contract theories can not depict the living conditions or the mobility and plurality of modern society.

“It soon became clear that the dynamics of a society integrated through markets could no longer be captured in the normative terms of law and even more so could not be ensured within the framework of an a priori legal system. Every attempt to theoretically derive the foundations of private and public law once and for all from the highest principles had to fail because of the complexity of society. "(FuG 592)

However, according to Habermas, one can not do without the connection between law and morality to legitimize the law, “without taking away from the law its essential inherent moment of inaccessibility.” (FuG 594) The way out for Habermas is a legitimation through the process of one democratic discourse. Recourse to positive law alone is not enough. Because, in extreme cases, positive law is also functional in totalitarianism . A democratic constitution is required for legitimation. This means that the legislative power itself is bound to legal procedures and those affected by the laws participate in their creation.

"Because without religious or metaphysical backing, the coercive law tailored to legal behavior can only retain its socially integrative power if the individual addressees of the legal norm are at the same time allowed to understand themselves as sensible authors of these norms in their entirety."

The requirement is met if the definition of the legal norms is ultimately based on the discourse principle. Their validity can be justified through the discourse. In a version that is neutral towards "law and morality" (FuG 138) it reads:

"Exactly the norms of action to which all those possibly affected as participants in rational discourse could agree are valid." (FuG 138)

As a result of the modern differentiation between law and morality (cf. FuG 137), the discourse principle splits into two forms, which - complement each other - apply to different types of discourse. As a moral principle , it refers to all norms of action and discourses, "in which moral reasons alone are decisive" (FuG 677). It functions as a rule of argument and means a universalization principle (FuG 140), according to which “valid norms are in the equal interest of all [possibly affected] persons” (FuG 676 f.). As a principle of democracy , it applies to legal norms and "states [...] that only those laws may claim legitimate validity that can find the approval of all legal comrades in a legally constituted discursive legislative process" (FuG 141). As a prerequisite for such a discourse, Habermas (FuG 157-160)

• for everyone the greatest possible amount of equal subjective freedom of action
• the certainty of the legal counterparts affected
• guaranteed legal channels to enforce claims.

These general legal principles serve as a guide and must be substantiated by concrete regulations. For the theory of justice, the split between law and morality results in a specialization of (reason) morality on questions of justice from a universalistic point of view (FuG 145). Legal norms, on the other hand, apply to a specific community (FuG 190 f.), The underlying discourse therefore additionally concerns questions of expediency, the balance of interests and cultural forms of life / identities (FuG 196 ff.).

Habermas' approach to discourse ethics as a pure formal principle of procedural justice assumes an ideal situation of knowledgeable and sensible participants in the discourse ( ideal speech situation ). Due to the actual living conditions, the practical feasibility is doubted. In discursive practice, which often differs greatly in terms of its conditions from the conditions of an ideal speech situation , it is not guaranteed that consensus means justice and dissent means injustice. In his Theory of Legal Argumentation (1st edition 1978), the legal philosopher Robert Alexy tried to transfer the principles of Habermas' discourse-theoretical conception of justice to the situation of the judicial decision-making process.

Jacques Derrida

Jacques Derrida advocates in his work Law Force the thesis “that one cannot speak directly, in a direct way, of justice: one cannot address or objectify justice, one cannot say 'this is just' and even less' I am just 'without betraying justice, yes, the law. "

In this work he deconstructs Walter Benjamin's On the Critique of Violence . Derrida's concept includes the statement that philosophy cannot set up a general normative theory. Therefore, when talking about justice, one must distinguish “infinite justice” from linguistic inquiry as a codified system. Derrida tries to prove his thesis with three aporias .

• In contrast to justice, positive law consists of general rules. When applied to individual cases, it can never fully capture them.
• Due to its general validity, the law always acts as repression on the individual case, to varying degrees. The presence of the law already determines the individual case.
• Although justice is given in individual cases, it remains dependent on general law.

Because of these aporias, all theories of justice are inadequate for Derrida. The aim of his deconstruction is to show “that one not only shows the theoretical limits, but also denounces concrete injustices, such injustices that happen there and the effects of which are particularly evident where the good and calm conscience is dogmatically inherited from one or the other Determination of justice remains. "(41) It is all about the" questioning of the foundations and the limits of our conceptual, theoretical, normative apparatus that revolves around justice. "(41)

For Derrida, violence has a " differential character" (15). He shows this by comparing the German word with the terms violence and force from French and English. One points to unjust violence, the other to legitimate violence. This distinction leads to the question of when violence can be described as just. Benjamin's distinction between law-making and law-preservation contains a similarly differential dichotomy. Legislation already contains the promise of preservation and is therefore of the same origin.

Derrida does not interpret justice as divine power, like Benjamin, but as a deconstruction of law. It has no origin itself. It is itself something "undeconstructable" (31). Justice is always contained in the law, but it does not appear immediately. Justice is immanent and therefore a condition of the possibility of right.

Axel Honneth

Axel Honneth , like the advocates of communitarianism, criticizes the fact that the liberal theories of justice are based on a premise according to which those involved want to realize their life plans on the basis of isolated individual ideas of freedom. With reference to Hegel , on the other hand, he develops an image of social justice that is determined by the fact that those involved take into account the fact that they can only realize their freedom in interaction with others and their scope for freedom. For Honneth, this means that justice is not to be determined on the basis of goods to be guaranteed, but rather on the basis of mutual obligations.

Honneth explains that the image of the veil of ignorance, which Rawls uses to portray the demand for impartiality, "makes the fact of human intersubjectivity disappear:" If the participants in their original state "had an elementary knowledge of their need for recognition, [... ] then they would presumably agree on principles of justice that, in contrast to Rawl's proposal, would take account of this social need. "

"The endowment of individuals with 'subjective rights' is not the result of fair distribution, but arises from the fact that the members of society recognize themselves as free and equal." Intersubjective relationships thus become necessary conditions of individual autonomy. Lack of recognition leads to a feeling of injustice. According to Honneth, this is confirmed by empirical results from sociological and historical research as well as by developmental psychology.

For Honneth, this shifts the conception of justice from a question of distribution to principles “which relate to the state guarantee of social conditions for mutual recognition.” The prerequisite for a stable relationship is the recognition of common moral norms that are habitual in a practiced practical action such as friendship is acquired. For Honneth, self-esteem, which is a basic good at Rawls, arises “as the result of graduated inclusion in different spheres of communication, all of which are shaped by a specific form of mutual recognition.” Justice is not the granting of individual basic freedoms, but the egalitarian enabling of recognition relationships. In this respect, in addition to the distributive justice based on the law, there is also the need justice, derived from the principle of love, as well as the performance justice, which is based on a fair division of labor and is an expression of social appreciation.

Amartya Sen

Amartya Sen during a lecture at the University of Cologne in 2007 on the occasion of the award of the Meister Eckhart Prize

A more detailed description of the approach can be found in the main article Capability Approach .

The Indian economist Amartya Sen bases his concept of justice on a differentiated concept of freedom. Freedom is therefore an intrinsic value because it enables people to live independently. In addition to the absence of obstacles (passive freedom), it also includes the possibility of acting according to one's own wishes (active freedom). Freedom is therefore a normative goal, an end in itself. A society is all the more just, the more its members have “ capabilities ” .

Its instrumental functions are to be distinguished from the constitutive (fundamental) function of freedom. The latter serve the people as a means to ensure the basic value of freedom and thus the chances of realization. Sen is one of the instrumental freedoms

1. political freedoms (criticism, objection, right to vote, etc.)
2. economic institutions (resources, conditions of exchange, distribution)
3. social opportunities (education, health)
4. Transparency guarantees (freedom of the press, information obligations, e.g. against corruption)
5. social security (unemployment insurance, social assistance, minimum wages)

Life expectancy and income of
selected countries in 1994

country	Income in US dollars	Age in years
Kerala	400	73
China	500	71
Sri Lanka	600	73
Namibia	1,900	60
Brazil	2,800	65
South Africa	3,000	65
Gabon	3,900	55

According to Sen, constitutive freedom depends on the extent of instrumental freedom. Based on empirical studies , he shows that there are interrelationships and complementarities between the instrumental freedoms. Accordingly, income is a fundamental factor for prosperity and thus for chances of realization. However, other factors are also important. So correlates the life expectancy ambiguous with income. Because there are countries with a comparatively high average life expectancy, whose average per capita income is significantly lower than that in other countries with lower life expectancy.

In order to evaluate justice in a specific constellation, Sen suggests measuring the degree of the "objective possibility" of the chances of realization (capability approach). Sen describes a realization opportunity (possibility of action) as a function ( functioning ). Since people have prerequisites tied to the person, are in different situations, are involved in a different social context and each have different personal preferences, the chances of realization are different for each individual. A bundle of objectively available options for action ( agencies ) that are available to the individual is measured . So the person fasting in a rich society has different options for action compared to the starving person in a poor society.

In order to determine which chances of realization are seen as valuable in a society and which constitute well-being , participatory social decisions based on a democratic discourse are required . In this way, the chances of realization that can only be determined for the individual are integrated into the social context. Real freedom therefore also demands active citizens who take advantage of their opportunities by participating. Sen thus formulates a "republican-liberal understanding of politics". The participatory discourse ensures that the capability approach is constantly renewed and updated as society continues to develop.

Sen, whose starting point is reflections on development policy and justice in a globalized world , examines justice under the aspect of whether it is seen as universal for all people or only in particular in relation to individual nations .

Different political approaches emerge depending on the perspective. Universalistic , Sen argues, is utilitarianism or the rational ethics of Kant. On the other hand, particularistic is communitarianism, which still focuses on the different perspectives of social communities and social groups within a nation. Even if universalism seems to enable a clear conception of global justice that cannot be dismissed, it is confronted with the problem that a global institution, such as a world government , with the appropriate power and resources is required for its implementation . However, the United Nations in question do not have adequate facilities.

Instead, Sen proposes a concept that he calls "plural integration". All transnational institutions should contribute to the further development of global justice, from intergovernmental agreements to multinational companies (for example in questions of fair pay) to social groups and non-governmental organizations .

Sen's capability approach has gained wide international recognition. The report emphasizes “Living conditions in Germany. The 2nd Poverty and Wealth Report of the Federal Government, “that the concept has found an essential part in the report.

Reinhold Zippelius

Reinhold Zippelius suggests looking for the final justification of justice in a rational conscience and in consensus:

His considerations are based on historical experience: at the beginning of the modern era, the confessional civil wars in particular had shaken trust in authoritatively given ideological and moral orientations. Out of the resulting skepticism against such heteronomous morals arose in particular Kant's demand to use one's own understanding (“sapere aude!”). In ethical questions this has to be done with moral autonomy. Reason-based decisions made by the individual conscience appear to be the final instance to which the effort for moral insight can advance.

According to Zippelius, this also applies to decisions based on a sense of justice , i.e. H. of conscientious decisions, which are won in a rational , often legally trained search for justice. However, there is no "penetration" of the "sense of right", that is, of the content of consciousness, on an "inherently" existing justice (as little as there is no penetration of the sense of value on an absolute value system, as assumed by the "material ethics of values") . "In short: what our conscience deems to be just according to the best possible use of reason, forms the final basis on which our efforts for justice can advance." What the judgment guided by conscience finds to be just or unjust depends not only on the formal criteria mentioned by Kant, but also on individual valuation dispositions, which are partly natural (as “inclinationes naturales”) , partly through personal experience, through traditions and are influenced by the zeitgeist . In these questions each individual is a moral authority to be respected equally to the other. This leads "in the area of ​​the state and the law to the democratic claim that everyone should participate in a free competition of convictions on questions of law and justice".

Even if insights into the content of justice have a subjective basis, one can communicate with others about the agreement of such insights and ascertain. This agreement does not have to claim general validity, but will often only achieve a lower degree of consensus. So in questions of justice, as in other ethical questions, one has to be modest with the degree of certainty that the given matter allows.

Under these conditions, according to Zippelius, there is only a rationally structured, “experimental” search for justice, in which decisions are to be found for the concrete situations of everyday life that can be borne by the conscience of the decision-makers and approved by the consensus of the legal community. The case law development of Roman and Anglo-Saxon law followed this path . In legal philosophy it corresponds to the method of critical rationalism . This path leads to a rational understanding of legal and justice issues and thus also to their rational structuring. Numerous key terms serve it (e.g. principles of interpretation and weighing up), which in the end, however, often lead to the insurmountable limits of the knowledge of justice.

literature

Philosophy Bibliography : Justice - Additional references on the topic

Classic (historical)

• Plato : Politeia , Insel, Frankfurt / Main 1991 ISBN 3-458-33105-0
• Aristoteles : Nikomachische Ethik , dtv, 7th edition Munich 2006, ISBN 978-3-423-30126-8 online
• Epicurus : philosophy of joy. Letters. Main tenets. Collection of sayings. Fragments , Insel, 10th edition Frankfurt 2004, ISBN 978-3-458-32757-8
• Cicero : Of dutiful action (De officiis). Reclam, Stuttgart 1992, ISBN 978-3-15-001889-7
• Augustine : About the God state . Book 1-10. Dtv. 1997, ISBN 3-423-30123-6
• Thomas Aquinas : About moral action. Summa theologiae I-II q. 18-21 . Reclam, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 978-3-15-018162-1
• Thomas Hobbes : Leviathan , trans. by Jutta Schlösser, ed. v. Hermann Klenner. Meiner, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 978-3-7873-1303-7
• John Locke : Two Treatises on Government , trans. by Hans Jörn Hoffmann, ed. and introduced by Walter Euchner . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / M. 1977, ISBN 3-518-27813-4
• David Hume : About morality . Commented by Herlinde Pauer-Studer. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27006-6
• Jean-Jacques Rousseau : On Inequality , translated and commented by Heinrich Meier . Schöningh, Paderborn, 5th edition 2001, ISBN 978-3-8252-0725-0
• Immanuel Kant : Metaphysical foundations of legal theory . Meiner, Hamburg 1998, ISBN 978-3-7873-1360-0
• John Stuart Mill : Utilitarianism . 5th chapter. Reclam, Ditzingen 1976, ISBN 3-15-009821-1
• Walter Benjamin , On the Critique of Violence . (1921), Suhrkamp, ​​10th edition Frankfurt 1965, ISBN 978-3-518-10103-2
• Josef Pieper : About the virtues. Wisdom, justice, valor, moderation . Kösel, Munich 2004, ISBN 978-3-466-40172-7 (contains the writings “Vom Sinn der Bravkeit” (1935), “Treatise on Klugheit” (1937), “Zucht und Maß” (1939) “About the Justice "(1953))
• Hans Kelsen : What is justice? , Reclam, Stuttgart 2000 (first edition: Verlag Franz Deuticke, Vienna 1953). ISBN 3-15-018076-7 .
• Gustav Radbruch : Legal Philosophy , reprint of the third edition in 1932, with supplementary essays and an introduction by Ralf Dreier and Stanley L. Paulson, Müller, 2nd edition Heidelberg 2003, ISBN 3-8252-2043-5
• HLA Hart : The concept of law . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1973, ISBN 3-518-06379-0
• John Rawls : A Theory of Justice . Frankfurt am Main 1975 (Original: A Theory of Justice , 1971)
• Robert Nozick : Anarchy, State, Utopia . mvg, Munich 1976 (Original: Anarchy, State, and Utopia . 1974; New edition Olzog 2006, ISBN 978-3-7892-8098-6 )
• David Gauthier : Morals by Agreement . Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986
• Jacques Derrida : Force of Law. The "mystical ground of authority" . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991
• Jürgen Habermas : factuality and validity. Contributions to the discourse theory of law and the democratic constitutional state . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, ISBN 3-518-28961-6
• Alasdair MacIntyre : The Loss of Virtue . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1995, ISBN 3-518-28793-1
• Otfried Höffe : Political Justice. Foundation of a critical philosophy of law and state . Suhrkamp, ​​4th edition Frankfurt 2003, ISBN 978-3-518-28400-1
• Michael Walzer : Spheres of Justice. A plea for plurality and equality. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt / New York 2006, ISBN 3-593-38035-8
• Reinhold Zippelius : Legal Philosophy , 6th, revised edition, CH Beck, Munich, 2011, ISBN 978-3-406-61191-9 .

Annotated text collections

• Norbert Hoerster (Ed.): Law and Moral. Texts on the philosophy of law , Reclam, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-15-008389-3
• Christoph Horn and Nico Scarano (eds.): Philosophy of Justice. Texts from antiquity to the present , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2002, ISBN 3-518-29163-7
• Angelika Krebs (Ed.): Justice or Equality. Texts of the new egalitarian criticism , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2nd edition 2002, ISBN 978-3-518-29095-8
• Dietmar von der Pfordten: Legal Philosophy , Alber, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-495-48012-9

Introductions

• Norbert Blüm : Justice. A criticism of Homo oeconomicus. Herder, Freiburg, 2nd edition 2006, ISBN 978-3-451-05789-2
• Otfried Höffe : Justice. A philosophical introduction. Beck, 2nd edition Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-44768-6
• Bernd Ladwig : Theories of justice as an introduction. Junius, Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-88506-693-4
• Thomas Ebert : Social Justice . Ideas, history, controversies (= publication series of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, Volume 1088), Federal Agency for Civic Education , Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-8389-0088-9 . FAZ review (PDF)
• Gisbert Roloff, Barbara Zoeke (Ed.): 10 × Justice. On the way with Sisyphus . Pabst Science, Lengerich u. a. 2007, ISBN 978-3-89967-348-7 (collection of articles).
• Uwe Wesel : Right, wrong, justice. From the Weimar Republic to today. Beck, Munich 2003, ISBN 978-3-406-50354-2

deepening

• Michel Balinski: The Mathematics of Justice . In: Spektrum der Wissenschaft , March 2004, pp. 90-97, ISSN  0170-2971
• Felix Ekardt: The principle of sustainability. Intergenerational justice and global justice . Beck, Munich, ISBN 978-3-406-52798-2
• Arthur Kaufmann , Winfried Hassemer and Ulfried Neumann (eds.): Introduction to legal philosophy and the legal theory of the present . 7th edition. Müller (utb), Heidelberg 2004, ISBN 3-8252-0593-2
• Jürgen Maes, Manfred Schmitt: Justice and justice psychology . In: Gert Sommer, Albert Fuchs (Ed.): War and Peace. Handbook of Conflict and Peace Psychology . Beltz Verlag, Weinheim / Basel / Berlin 2004, pp. 182–194 (with an overview of the literature on justice psychology ) ISBN 3-621-27536-3
• Thomas Pogge : Justice in the One World (= culture in discussion, volume 15). Klartext Verlag, Essen 2009, ISBN 978-3-8375-0153-7
• John Rawls: Justice as Fairness. a redesign . 2nd Edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-29404-8
• Jörg Reitzig: Social contract, justice, work . Westfälisches Dampfboot Verlag, Münster 2005 ISBN 3-89691-611-4
• Judith N. Shklar: About injustice. Explorations to a Moral Feeling. Rotbuch, Berlin 1992 ISBN 3-88022-780-2

Web links

Wikiquote: Justice  Quotes

Wikiversity: Project: Practices of Justice  - Course Materials

• Wayne P. Pomerleau:  Western Theories of Justice. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• International Justice. Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Distibutive Justice Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Justice as a Virtue Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Intergenerational Justice Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Justice and Bad Luck. Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Christoph Lumer: Justice . (PDF) In: HJ Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy , Vol. 1, Hamburg 1999 (PDF; 58 kB)
• Thomas Ebert: What is social justice? Bonn 2010
• Michael Sandel : Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? - 12-part lecture series at Harvard University
• Amartya Sen : Global Justice. More than international fairness
• Gunther Teubner : Self-subversive justice: contingency or transcendence formula of law? (PDF) In: Zeitschrift für Rechtsssoziologie , 1/2008 (on Derrida and Luhmann)
• Social justice. Voices from the south (positions of philosophers from countries of the south)

Individual evidence

1. ^ “Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribure”, Digest 1, 1, 10, Höffe, Gerechtigkeit, 49.
2. ↑ Axel Tschentscher: Procedural theories of justice . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2000, 80
3. ↑ Axel Tschentscher: Procedural theories of justice . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2000, 82-83
4. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: On the pragmatic, ethical and moral use of practical reason, in: Explanations for Discourse Ethics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 100-118
5. ↑ Xenophon: Memorabilia, German: Memories of Sokrates , Leipzig 1973.
6. ↑ see below: Plato . The conceptions of Plato and Socrates cannot be sharply delimited from one another.
7. ↑ On Plato's argument, see Christian Schäfer: Gerechtigkeit . In: Christian Schäfer: Platon-Lexikon , Darmstadt 2007, p. 132f.
8. ↑ Cf. introductory Günther Bien : Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles , in: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Aristoteles, Die Nikomachische Ethik , Berlin 1995, pp. 135-164. Otfried Höffe : Aristoteles , CH Beck, Munich 3rd edition 2006, p. 228 ff. Further reading: R. Bambrough: Aristotle on Justice . A Paradigm of Philosophy. In the S. (Ed.): New Essays on Plato and Aristotle , London 1965, pp. 159-174. Friedo Ricken : Aristotle on justice and equality , in: Theologie und Philosophie 73 (1998), 161-172. Peter Trude: The concept of justice in the Aristotelian legal and state philosophy , de Gruyter, Berlin 1955. W. Von Leyden: Aristotle on Equality and Justice . His Political Argument, London 1985. Bernard Williams : Justice as Virtue . In: Amélie Oksenberg-Rorty (Ed.): Essays on Aristotle's Ethics , University of California Press, Berkeley 1980, pp. 189-199.
9. ↑ On the terminological and factual modifications of Thomas Aquinas cf. z. B. Wolfgang Huber : Justice and Law. Basic lines of Christian legal ethics . Chr. Kaiser / Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gütersloh 1996, p. 151 ff.
10. ↑ Epicurus: Letters - Proverbs - Work Fragments, ed. by H.-W. Kraus, Reclam, Stuttgart 1980
11. ^ Cicero: De officiis - From dutiful action, Reclam, Stuttgart 1992, 21.
12. ↑ Cf. on the background and conveyance of the formula, in particular about Panaitios of Rhodes : Wolfgang Waldstein: Decision-making bases of the classical Roman jurists , in: Hildegard Temporini , Wolfgang Haase (Ed.): Rise and decline of the Roman world, vol. 2 [Principat] / 15: History and culture of Rome as reflected in recent research . de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1976, pp. 3-100, especially VI. Zur Gerechtigkeit , pp. 89–98, here p. 91 p. 91 at Google Books .
13. ↑ Augustine: De libero arbitrio, I 27: Der frei Wille, Schöningh, Paderborn 2006.
14. ↑ U. Schöndorfer, E. Latzke, W. Kantner: Introduction to Philosophy . 3rd part; 2nd Edition; Wilhelm Braumüller Universitäts-Verlagbuchhandlung, Vienna 1975, p. 67.
15. ↑ Summa Theologiae, 2, 2-1, q. 11, a. 3, answer: "sive sit particularis iustitia, quae ordinat actum hominis secundum rectitudinem in comparatione ad alium singularem hominem; sive sit iustitia legalis, quae ordinat secundum rectitudinem actum hominis in comparatione ad bonum commune multitudinis".
16. ↑ Reinhard Schwarz: Luther . Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, Stuttgart, 1st edition 1986, p. 30 f. (meanwhile 3rd edition 2006, ISBN 978-3-8252-1926-0 )
17. ↑ Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan . 9th edition. Frankfurt 1999, 96.
18. ^ Otfried Höffe: Justice , 63
19. ↑ Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan (1651). Frankfurt 1984, 115
20. ↑ John Rawls: History of Moral Philosophy . Frankfurt 2004, 89
21. ↑ David Hume: Treatise on human nature , III book, 2nd part, section 1 and study on the principles of morality , 3rd section.
22. ^ Jean-Jacques Rousseau: On Inequality , 68.
23. ^ Rousseau: On Inequality , 74.
24. ↑ Rousseau: Social Contract , I.8.
25. ^ Rousseau: Social Contract , 18.
26. ^ Rousseau: Social Contract , 18.
27. ^ Rousseau: Social Contract , 41.
28. ^ Rousseau: Social Contract , 59.
29. ^ Rousseau: Social Contract , 59.
30. ↑ Immanuel Kant: About the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but not suitable for practice , AA VIII, 289.
31. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Metaphysical Beginnings of Legal Doctrine , Introduction to Legal Doctrine, § B (final sentence).
32. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius , Philosophy of Law , § 26
33. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius, Philosophy of Law , § 26 II 2, 3, Philosophy of Law , § 26
34. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte , Basis of Natural Law, § 8
35. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte : The closed commercial state , 1800, I. Book, chap. 1 II; Zippelius: Philosophy of Law , § 26 II 2, 3
36. ↑ Justice . ( Memento of the original from November 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 397 kB; 25 pages), In: Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism (English edition). Volume 3, p. 351 
37. ↑ K. Marx: On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law , Introduction, 1844. In: MEW , Vol. 1, pp. 383-384
38. ^ K. Marx: On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law , Introduction, 1844. In: MEW , Vol. 1, p. 390
39. ^ K. Marx et al .: Die deutsche Ideologie , 1845. In: MEW , Bd. 3
40. ↑ Karl Marx: The misery of philosophy . In: MEW , Vol. 4, Dietz, Berlin 1972, p. 104.
41. ↑ K. Marx et al .: Die Deutsche Ideologie , 1845. In: MEW , Bd. 3, S. 34f.
42. ^ Communist Manifesto , 1848
43. ↑ Capital (1872). In: MEW , vol. 23, p. 74
44. ↑ Chapter III . In: MEW , Vol. 25, pp. 351-352
45. ^ Karl Marx: Marginal glosses on the program of the German workers' party . In: MEW , Vol. 19, Dietz, Berlin 1972, 15–32, here 31.
46. ^ Richard M. Hare: Moral Thought . Frankfurt 1972.
47. ^ John C. Harsanyi: Morality and the theory of rational behavior . In: Amartya Sen, Bernad Williams (ed.): Utilitarism and Beyond , Cambridge / Paris 1982, 39–62.
48. ^ Harsanyi: Morality and the theory of rational behavior , 55.
49. ↑ John Stuart Mill: Utilitarism , Chapter 5, Reclam, Stuttgart 1976, 72-112 and Henry Sidgwick: The methods of ethics , III. Book, 5th chapter, Klinkhardt, Leipzig 1909, 75-108.
50. ^ Rainer W. Trapp: "Non-Classical" Utilitarianism. A theory of justice . Klostermann, Frankfurt 1988.
51. ↑ Walter Benjamin: On the criticism of violence and other essays , with an afterword by Herbert Marcuse . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1965; also in the other: Language and History , Reclam, Stuttgart 1992, 104–131; cited here from Collected Writings Volume II / 1, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt sciacchitano.it (PDF)
52. ↑ Reinhard Zintl: Friedrich A. von Hayek, the constitution of freedom . In: Manfred Brocker (Ed.): History of political thinking . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2007, pp. 635–650, here p. 642
53. ^ Friedrich August von Hayek: The Illusion of Social Justice, Landsberg 1981, 112
54. ^ Friedrich August Hayek: The constitution of freedom . Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen 1971, 361
55. ^ Friedrich August Hayek: The constitution of freedom . Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen 1971, 328/329
56. ^ Friedrich August Hayek: The constitution of freedom . Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen 1971, 100 ff.
57. ^ Friedrich August Hayek: The constitution of freedom . Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen 1971, 299 ff.
58. ↑ Ronald Dworkin: Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality . Cambridge MA 2002, 240
59. ↑ Ronald Dworkin: A Matter of Principle . Cambridge MA 1985, here 198, quoted from Wolfgang Kersting: Theories of social justice . Metzler, Paderborn 2000, 179 (own translation)
60. ^ Ronald Dworkin: What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources . In: Philosophy and Public Affairs , 1981, 194-206
61. ↑ Mattias Proske: Annotated Bibliography ( Memento of the original from October 5, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) on communitarianism ( PDF ). 
62. ↑ 2nd edition 1984.
63. ↑ Bruce Ackerman: Social Justice in a Liberal State . Yale University Press, New Haven 1980
64. ↑ Bruce Ackerman: Why Dialogue? In: Bert van den Brink, Willen van Reijen (Ed.): Citizenship, Law and Democracy . Frankfurt 1995, pp. 385-410
65. ^ Bruce Ackerman, Anne Alstott: The Stakeholder Society . Yale University Press, New Haven 1999; German: The stakeholder society. A model for more equal opportunities . Frankfurt / Main 2001; see also the article: Bruce Ackerman: Arguments for Stakeholding ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 73 kB) 
66. ↑ Capitalism for everyone! (No longer available online.) In: brand eins edition 02/2005. brand eins Verlag GmbH & Co. oHG, archived from the original on December 15, 2013 ; accessed on December 14, 2013 (interview). Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
67. ^ Thomas M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other . Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1998
68. ^ Thomas M. Scanlon: What We Owe to Each Other . Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1998, 6
69. ↑ Thomas Scanlon: Contractualism and What We Owe Each Other . Interview in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Ed.): Constructions of practical reason . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, pp. 67-96, here p. 92
70. ^ The Diversity of Objections to Inequality . The Lindley Lectures, University of Kansas 1997
71. ↑ Thomas Scanlon: Contractualism and What We Owe Each Other . Interview in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Ed.): Constructions of practical reason . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, pp. 67-96, here p. 91
72. ↑ Thomas Scanlon: Contractualism and What We Owe Each Other . Interview in: Herlinde Pauer-Studer (Ed.): Constructions of practical reason . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, pp. 67-96, here p. 96
73. ^ Vittorio Hösle : The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy , Beck, Munich 3rd ed. 1997, 248f., And Johann Braun: Rechtssphilosophie im 20. Jahrhundert , Beck, Munich 2001, 254–264.
74. ↑ Jacques Derrida: Force of Law. The 'mystical ground of authority' . Frankfurt 1991, 21.
75. ↑ Axel Honneth: Justice and communicative freedom. Considerations following Hegel . ( Memento of the original from January 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 53 kB), p. 5/6, first published in: Barbara Merker, Georg Mohr, Michael Quante (Hrsg.): Subjectivity and Recognition . mentis, Paderborn 2004 
76. ↑ Axel Honneth: Justice and communicative freedom. Considerations following Hegel . ( Memento of the original from January 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 53 kB), p. 4 
77. ↑ Axel Honneth: Justice and communicative freedom. Considerations following Hegel . ( Memento of the original from January 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 53 kB), p. 7 
78. ↑ Axel Honneth: Justice and communicative freedom. Considerations following Hegel . ( Memento of the original from January 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 53 kB), p. 7 
79. ↑ Amartya Sen: Economy for the people. Paths to Justice and Solidarity in the Market Economy . Hanser, Munich 2000; on the concept of freedom in particular the first two chapters (24–70).
80. ↑ Sen: Economics , 52.
81. ↑ Sen: Economics , 63
82. ^ Peter Ulrich : Integrative Business Ethics . Haupt, Bern 2001, p. 296. Similar to Hannah Arendt with regard to purely political participation.
83. ↑ Sen: Global Justice No. 20-21 .
84. ↑ Life situations in Germany .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) p. 9, footnote 17 = PDF – S. 61  
85. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius: Paths and wrong ways to justice . Academy treatise, Mainz 2003, ISBN 3-515-08357-X .
86. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Answering the question: What is Enlightenment? 1784
87. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals . 2nd ed. 1786, p. 87.
88. ^ Similar to Immanuel Kant: Metaphysik der Sitten, Tugendlehre , 1797, Einl. XII b and § 13.
89. ↑ In detail Zippelius: Philosophy of Law , 6th edition, §§ 18 ff.
90. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius: Ways and Irrwege zur Gerechtigkeit , 2003 ( ISBN 3-515-08357-X ), p. 6 ff .; ders .: The essence of law , 6th edition, 2012, chap. 7 b
91. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason , 1788, p. 48 f.
92. ↑ Zippelius: Philosophy of Law , 6th edition, §§ 15 II, 17, 19 IV, 21 III
93. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius: Ways and Irrwege zur Gerechtigkeit , p. 6 ff; see. also dens .: The essence of law , 6th edition, chap. 7 b, c; Philosophy of Law , 6th edition, § 18.
94. ↑ So already Aristotle , Nicomachean Ethics , 1094b; Topic , 100b, 104a.
95. ↑ Reinhold Zippelius: Philosophy of Law , § 18 II