Bartholomew Night

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The Bartholomew's Night (also called Parisian Blood Wedding , French Massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy ) was a pogrom against French Protestants, the Huguenots , that took place on the night of August 23-24, 1572, Bartholomew's Day. Admiral Gaspard de Coligny and other Huguenot leaders were murdered. They were gathered in Paris on the occasion of the (supposedly reconciliation) wedding of the Protestant Henry of Navarre (later King Henry IV ) with Margaret of Valois . That same night, thousands more Protestants were murdered in Paris and throughout France in the following days.

The pogrom is a central event of the Huguenot Wars . It is linked to four events: a first failed assassination attempt on Admiral de Coligny on August 22, 1572, the assassination of the Huguenot leaders including de Coligny two days later, the pogrom that followed in the streets of Paris and a wave of violence that broke out shortly afterwards spread over almost all of France.

Bartholomew's Night is a central date in the history of France in the 16th century and deeply anchored in the collective memory of the French. It is a subject often dealt with in literature and the visual arts.

Paris during Bartholomew's Night, contemporary painting by François Dubois : Le massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy

France and Europe in the 16th century

France and the nascent conflict

Under Louis XII. and Francis I was able to achieve its greatest development of power in France. In the interior of the country there was calm, the crown was recognized and the monarchy was able to expand its authority in the ruling districts, some of which were still independent. In terms of foreign policy, France was still in constant conflict with the Habsburgs (see Habsburg-French opposition ) and thus with Spain , Austria and the Holy Roman Empire .

However, it was only the spread of Protestantism and the domestic political conflicts that led to a crisis in the royal family and thus to the shaking of the monarchy. The French kings recognized the threat posed by the Reformed early on, because the Protestant movement, which initially caught on in the southern provinces, soon also took hold of the (rival) royal houses, on whose loyalty and support the crown was dependent and through the it was only possible to maintain the monarchical state. Protestants were burned for the first time in Paris under Francis I in 1535. Even under Heinrich II and later under his son Franz II there were riots and bans against the new religion in 1549 and 1559. But this did not stop the influx: in 1555 Protestant churches emerged in Paris, Meaux , Poitiers , Angers and Orléans , the number of Protestant parishes was probably 1,200 and France was probably home to over 1 million people who professed their support for the Reformed Church.

In addition to these religious problems, there was a constant weakening of the monarchy from 1559 due to the rivalries between the authorities and the influence and pressure on politics in the country that penetrated from outside. The death of Henry II in 1559, the one-year reign of his son Franz and that of the only ten-year-old Karl IX. shook the previously established monarchy of France. The increasing rivalry between the authorities, who now had to deal with political issues as well as religious ones, and their struggle for power at court weakened the state, which was also in danger of going bankrupt. Through this dissolution of the established political structure, Spain then tried to intervene in politics. The wedding of Elisabeth of Valois to the Spanish King Philip II in 1559 was supposed to seal the friendship between France and Spain as part of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis , but it enabled strict Catholic Spain, which was itself also under the influence of the Pope , to put pressure with regard to French politics and dealing with the new religion. Philip intervened in the battle of the authorities for power at court and supported the party of radical Catholics in order to prevent the influence of Protestants in French politics. In March 1560, the Huguenots tried to counter it. In the so-called conspiracy of Amboise , the king was to be deposed, the House of Guise , which belonged to the strict Catholics, was to be deposed and the Prince of Condé was to be put on the throne. After this seizure of power failed in the early stages, the House of Guise, which was involved in lifting the plot, was able to increase its reputation and expand its influence on the young Francis II. His early demise in 1560 again meant that the roles in politics shifted again: Katharina von Medici , who now ruled together with or for her son Karl, was able to expand her own political position enormously; the House of Guise, which had long controlled the affairs of state under Henry II and Francis II, accordingly lost power and competed at court with the House of Bourbon .

Question of religion between 1560 and 1570

From 1560 onwards, three major issues dominated politics at court and in the state: the crown, Catholics and Protestants. Katharina and the moderate Chancelier de France Michel de l'Hôpital therefore worked on a decree that should include the religious toleration of the Huguenots. The edict of Romorantin came into being and now gave the heretic question into the hands of the church. The “Religious Discussion in Poissy” also shows the efforts of the Crown for peace and unity. The strict Catholics, who resolutely rejected a royal tolerance policy, tried again to build a counterweight to Katharina's politics: The religious-political alliance concluded in 1561 between Franz Guise , Anne de Montmorency and Saint-André , which was known as the triumvirate , therefore aimed at the Maintenance of the Catholic faith in France with the associated monarchical constitution. Spain also supported such agreements in order to prevent the presence of moderate politicians like Chancellor l'Hôpital and Protestants at the center of power. How far Philip's efforts in France went, was illustrated by his offer in March and September 1560 to send aid to France in the fight against the Huguenots. For Katharina, however, any connections between the extreme Catholics who sought power at court meant a threat to their politics and the authority of the Crown. On the other hand, she could hope for a concession from the Huguenots, as only through the French government could they achieve a tolerance of their faith and thus security for life and limb.

In order to maintain the independence of the government and to maintain peace and order in the state, the edict of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was written in 1562 . This so-called crisis of 1562 then led to ten years of tension between France and Spain. The granting of restricted freedom of belief sparked protests among Catholics and ultimately led to the Vassy bloodbath in March 1562 . The outbreak of civil war brought steadily growing internationalization at an early stage: Admiral Gaspard de Coligny, a publicly avowed Protestant and military-political leader of the Huguenots since 1561, was supported by 9,000 German warriors and the Duke of Guise by 3,000 Spaniards from the Netherlands. The Pope, the Catholic princes, Spain with the Netherlands, England and Germany intervened in the French conflict. In addition to this internationalization of the conflict, the First Huguenot War also included another feature that was to exacerbate the antagonism between Huguenots and Catholics, especially between the House of Guise and the Admiral Coligny, over the next ten years: François de Lorraine, Duke of Guise , was in fatally wounded by a Protestant at the Battle of Dreux in 1563. During the interrogation, the murderer was forced to testify that the admiral was to be blamed for the attack. The feud of the two Houses allowed Catholics to ignore the Edict of Amboise and the Edict of Saint-Germain-en-Laye , as they were now acting out of personal motives. The Guises received support from Spain. Philip II could not accept a treaty between the French royal house and the Huguenots, who were still a threat to the Catholic religion and the state; he sent admonishing appeals to Katharina. In 1563 the 14-year-old Karl IX. declared of age. A year later, the "Declarations" on the Edict of Amboise appeared, in which the freedom of the Huguenots was further restricted and a stricter tone was struck against the Huguenots with threats of punishment. This tightening could have been a possible reaction to the unrest in the Netherlands , ruled by the Spanish crown since 1555 . Since the French Protestants were in close contact with their fellow believers, a renewed rise of violence in France would have been possible.

The Franco-Spanish relationship also improved: In June 1565 there was a meeting between Catherine and her daughter Elisabeth von Valois, Queen of Spain, and other Spanish and French nobles. The participation of the Huguenots was refused. Katharina assured the Duke of Alba, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo , later governor of the Netherlands, that the Huguenots would proceed more strictly. The fact that this promise was not kept by the French government shows Katharina's attempt to prevent any interference with and dependency on Spain. The crown had to behave neutrally as France was threatened inside and outside the empire - internally by the growing number of Huguenots and externally by Catholic Spain, the Pope and England - and France did not have the necessary financial resources to support itself to defend against any of these threats. However, a policy of neutrality could not lead to the longed-for peace, since Europe was in a state of upheaval and political and religious decisions had to be made. Shortly afterwards the political relationship with Spain deteriorated again: Coligny maintained relations with the Turks in order to disrupt Spanish Turkish policy, whereupon the Spanish king demanded his removal; a Huguenot expedition on the way to America, which had belonged to the Spanish sphere of influence by a papal decision since 1493 , was driven out by a fleet sent by Philip, whereupon France was again injured. The increasing number of Protestant preachers sent to Flanders also disrupted Franco-Spanish relations. In France, however, the relationship with the Huguenots deteriorated. Since these saw no possibility of exercising their influence and their participation in the state, a coup d'état was to take place on September 28, 1567 under the direction of Admiral Coligny and the Prince of Condé. The plan was betrayed, the king escaped and called for the support of the kingship. However, the edict and thus the freedom of conscience of the Huguenots should remain untouched. Even during the Second Huguenot War , Katharina stuck to her policy of tolerance and mediation. The war did not last long; Both sides lacked the financial means and Katharina feared that she would become too dependent on the Spanish; therefore, in March 1568, the Peace of Longjumeau was passed.

The reactions that came from Madrid and Rome after the peace treaty was clear: the Pope and Philip were outraged and upset. In order to get a financial basis for the fight against the Huguenots, Pius V allowed the confiscation of church property up to an annual sum of 150,000 livres . However, the funds made available could only be used for the defense of the French kingdom and the associated Catholic religion. At the beginning of 1568, Michel de l'Hôpital voluntarily resigned from the service. In July of the same year, Protestants were required to take an oath of allegiance, armament was forbidden and denunciation was encouraged. The rights that were guaranteed to Protestants in peacetime were again restricted by other edicts that affected Protestant worship, their clergy and the laity.

This change in Katharina's politics from mediation to oppression clearly shows how pragmatic the reaction to events was and how little religion actually played a role. Because although the Reformed appeared as a second France, Catherine negotiated with them and granted - with the help of l'Hôpital which should not be underestimated - a certain freedom. But after acceptable outside support was offered, Katharina again took up the prospect of acting in her own interests - the authority and independence of the crown - and effectively using the opportunities that arose. However, this policy changed again in 1570. In the Third Huguenot War that followed, the Prince of Condé, Louis I de Bourbon and François de Coligny-d'Andelot , the admiral's brother, were to be eliminated. However, the two escaped, and the prince only died a year later in the Battle of Jarnac . His only 17-year-old son Heinrich I of Bourbon and 16-year-old Heinrich von Navarra became the new leaders of the Protestant movement and gave it a legitimate character through their noble origins. However, Coligny remained the military and political head, which is why the royal eight was imposed on him in 1569 . However, exhaustion and lack of money soon returned. In addition, there was the disappointment in the royal camp about the outstanding help from Spain: The 4,000 Spaniards promised by Philip never arrived and Alba was only able to support the French troops reasonably. In 1570 the acts of war were gradually stopped. Philip II, who had become restless because of this breakup, sent his envoy Don Francisco de Alava to Katharina to prevent an imminent peace. Katharina replied: “[...] my son and I have to perceive how everyone thinks about it, hers To arrange matters; we also want to put ours in order, and since we have not been able to do it with four battles won, we must now arrange ourselves as well as possible without weapons. The catholic king only tries to look after his interests; we want that too! "

Desire for peace, order and unity from 1570

Katharina soon got her affairs in order. In 1570 the regent was at a crossroads: if she had continued the fight against the Huguenots in France, the country would have sunk into civil war again, the long-run financial resources would have had to be raised by outside help, so France would have herself probably went into a foreign dependency, and then one would have tried to control the policy at court and to align it with the respective objectives. Even then, however, the end of the civil war would not have been in sight, as the previous wars had shown that the Huguenots could not be dissuaded from their goals even by severe defeats. On the other hand, a peace with the Huguenots could have overcome the politically unstable situation and the civil war would have ended, France would not have been dependent on any foreign power and the religious question could have been resolved internally and the Huguenots could have been returned to the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church as Forquevaulx, the French ambassador in Madrid, had reported to the King of Spain. At the same time, however, it would have had to forego good political relations with Spain and Rome. In 1570 Katharina decided on the lesser evil. On August 8, the peace was made in Saint-Germain , which the Huguenots clearly accommodated in their demand for freedom of belief and tolerance. They were granted amnesty, all convictions pronounced since 1559 were lifted, civil and religious equality were granted to them, and the Protestant nobility could once again hold church services on their property with their families, subjects and other believers. Reinstatements were permitted, four security posts were created in La Rochelle , Montauban , Cognac and La Charité , and each governorate had to provide two cities for worship; on the other hand, Paris and the royal camp remained Catholic and the king took over the backward pay of the troops recruited by the Protestants. This beneficial peace expresses the regent's desire to restore peace, order and unity to the French state and the crown and to reconcile the country with the Huguenots. However, only the bankruptcy of the state led to the conclusion of the peace: As Giovanni Maria Petrucci , the envoy to Florence, reported on January 24th, February 26th and July 15th, 1570, the lack of money in the French army caused discontent and disobedience. Hence, this peace was different from those made since the first two Huguenot Wars. Unlike before, the Huguenots did not remain a minority in the Catholic country, but their role as a military and political community was strengthened. The situation at court had also fundamentally changed: the Catholic party now supported royal policy after the Guises had fallen out of favor, and the Huguenots were able to expand their influence at court.

The Franco-Spanish relationship, on the other hand, had seriously deteriorated: Elisabeth von Valois died in October 1568. At that time Katharina immediately offered her daughter Margarethe for marriage in order to maintain the close family ties between the two houses. But King Philip had plans of his own: he wanted to have Anna of Austria , daughter of Emperor Maximilian II , for Charles IX. was Elisabeth of Austria provided and Margaret of Valois should Sebastian, the king of Portugal married. Philip's intentions were, however, bitterly disappointed, as the King of Spain wanted to keep Anna of Austria, whom Catherine had chosen as his own daughter-in-law, to himself. Sebastian of Portugal also refused to marry Margarethe, for which in turn Philipp was blamed. The Guisen, too, had distanced themselves from him, since the promised aid had not arrived during the last war and the Spanish king rejected plans to liberate Maria Stuart , the niece of the Guisen's house, in order not to challenge the English queen. Nevertheless, the House of Guise sought an excommunication of Elizabeth I in 1570 , which in turn further impaired the relationship between the Catholics of France and their previous protector.

Developments in Paris from 1571 to 1572

Coligny's return

Count Charles de Téligny improved the relationship between the crown and the Huguenots in the long term. By going to the king to tell him about the violations of the peace treaty that had occurred in the empire, a diplomatic relationship was gradually established between Protestants and Catholics, which served as a basis for reconciling the warring parties. For at first the mood was subdued on both sides, as the turmoil of the civil war with its bitter mood had not yet been forgotten, but mainly because the Huguenots did not yet trust the king and his mother. Too often people had broken the promised peace, swore vengeance and failed to keep promises made. Coligny therefore initially declined all invitations from the court.

Relationships had so improved for the time being that Coligny thought it appropriate to return to the court in September 1571. The court tried to assert its sincerity by various means: The Prince of Condé was supposed to marry the sister of the Duke of Nevers, Henry of Navarra the royal princess Margarethe of Valois and Coligny was promised a governorship of Béarn and Guyenne , his Friends should also hold governor posts, the King, Catherine, the Duke of Anjou and Alençon assured the admiral of their favor in a letter. That Madrid and Rome reacted disgruntled to such plans is shown by the statement of the Nuncio in France, Anton Maria Salviati : "This queen no longer believes in God, not even one of those who are now in her or the king's environment." The royal policy had now focused on the Huguenots and freed themselves from the Catholic power pressure.

On September 12, 1571 Coligny arrived in Blois : he was reinstated in his old offices, now also held new positions and received a sum of 10,000 livres. He took part in the king's private council, and the latter drew him in for one-on-one discussions. The fact that a close relationship developed between the two and that Karl even called the admiral father is described everywhere. However, Coligny stayed at the royal court for only about five weeks in 1571 and did not return until June 6, 1572. The fact that he was able to exercise enormous influence over the king or even - as the Spanish ambassador reports - seize the king cannot be proven and is also very unlikely, especially since urgent deliberations on the planned Flanders campaign were rejected in June 1572. Nevertheless, his return and the supposed influence on the king aroused displeasure among Catholics.

Planned alliance through the wedding

It is difficult to clarify who initiated the marriage of Heinrich of Navarra and Margaret of Valois. Although Margarethe ascribed the suggestion for such a connection in her memoirs to Montmorency, Katharina's role as the initiator is more likely. The attempt to marry her youngest daughter in order to establish a favorable political connection was not far off. This also made it possible to continue consolidating the Huguenot-friendly policy that had started in 1570 and, in turn, to exert influence on the young King of Navarre and thus on the question of religion. The wedding should symbolize and seal the new politics of peace and reconciliation.

However, these plans were also disapproved: The strict Catholics at court and in the army rejected this policy; After Alava first reported to the Spanish king on July 3, 1571 that the two were to be married, the latter saw hopes of good Franco-Spanish relations waning and the popes (both Pius V and, from 1572, Gregory XIII ) refused their permission for this marriage across the denominational barrier ( dispensation ).

The Flanders Campaign

As early as August 1568, a treaty had been drawn up between William of Orange , the leader of the Reformed in the Netherlands, and the Huguenot leaders Coligny and the Prince of Condé, which guaranteed mutual aid to the parties. For Coligny, this alliance was part of an even more far-reaching plan, because its aim was to free France from the Catholic sphere of influence, to disempower Spain and to bring together all nations independent of Rome and Madrid. Therefore, in 1570, he also supported the Franco-English marriage plans between Elizabeth I and the Duke of Anjou. Karl and Katharina also tried to establish such a connection at the time in order to free France from the influence of Spain.

Therefore, at the end of July 1571, the plans of Ludwig von Nassau , the brother of William of Orange, were not averse: On behalf of the Netherlands, he asked the king for protection and help and promised Flanders and Artois in a successful enterprise . The German Protestant princes and England would also support such an enterprise. However, these plans were not new, because Téligny and the Florentine ambassador Petrucci had already submitted these ideas to the king, which is why Kasper von Schomberg , the ambassador of France to the German Empire, sought a defensive alliance with the Protestants since the spring of 1571 . The armament of Orange and Alba's predicament in the Netherlands would have favored such a project. However, both the Kingdom of England and the Protestants in Germany failed to help. Without the foreign support, however, the company could not be realized, so it was put on hold for the first time, but Coligny continued to promote the Protestant current in the Netherlands.

With the conquest of the city of Brielle on April 1, 1572, support for William of Orange began to grow within the Netherlands, and the fight against Alba was now continued. Charles IX largely assured the King of Spain of his friendship, but also encouraged the Geusen to continue their struggle for freedom. On April 19, 1572, a defensive alliance was established between England and France, in which the two states undertake to support each other if an attack by a third power - presumably Spain - should come about. However, when the Spanish troops marched on Valenciennes to drive out the rebels, the war opponents at court reacted with dismay, but Coligny was allowed to send new troops to the Dutch. However, when England also behaved neutrally, the mood at court changed in favor of the strict Catholics with their pro-Spanish position.

Foreign countries also reacted to the conditions in France: Venice sent the ambassador extraordinary Giovanni Michiel to support Johann Cavalli and to avoid an approaching war with Spain. In Paris itself rumors of an imminent war increased. Michiel and Cavalli reported on August 6, 1572: “At the time when the Queen Mother of Paris was absent, there were strong rumors of war, and not without cause, because of a council which the King alone had with the Admiral and Montmorency and had held the 4 state secretaries, whereupon they talked about war preparations. "The Nuncio Salviati also confirmed this and added that" [...] everyone believed that it had been decided to start the war. But when the Queen appeared unexpectedly, she overturned everything. "However, the Florentine Petrucci sees both Katharina and Karl, averse to war:" There is a dispute here as to whether one should make war in Flanders or not. Many are passionate about it; but the king and queen don't want it, because they are already tired of the drums and trumpets. ”The fact that Katharina shrank from a war in the Netherlands and thus from a war with Spain is understandable, because she still recognized France as one divided state, in which the fronts between Catholics and Protestants could harden again at any time and a war would be hopeless. She was also aware of the consequences of a defeat against Spain and had not forgotten the efforts to achieve the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. Only through an alliance with England and the Protestant principalities would the war have had any prospect of success. In addition, the independence of the state and the safeguarding of the dynasty were still in the foreground for Katharina.

However, she wasn't the greatest opponent of war. It was rather the politically strict Catholics who behaved loyally to the Pope and the King of Spain and were led by the Duke of Anjou and the Cardinal of Lorraine . On August 6th and 9th, 1572, the council discussed the war in Flanders. Coligny had no way of defending his plan against the overwhelming power of the war opponents. The war was rejected. On August 9, Charles wrote to the French ambassador to England, Bertrand de Calignac de la Mothe-Fénélon:

“It is believed that the war in Flanders will break out very strongly, but I will not take part in it unless the Spaniards attack my empire first. It would be very good for my interests if the Queen of England, who has so many resources, should go in hand and foot and practice her practices in Zealand. Then Orange, which is marching on Mons, would be secure and strong in a completely different way; for from my Huguenot subjects he will only get those who can secretly get away. "

Karl wanted war, for whatever reason, but events hadn't worked out in his favor.

On August 18, 1572, Henry of Navarre married Margaret of Valois. Coligny wrote to his wife on the same day that he wanted to meet with the king in the Louvre after the festivities, which were to last three to four days . Although he only stated that the conversation concerned violations of the edict, the war in Flanders could also have been an issue.

Bartholomew's Night on August 24, 1572

The wall paintings by Giorgio Vasari depict the assassination of Gaspard de Coligny .

Attempted attack on Coligny (August 22)

There are various reports on the circumstances of the attack on Coligny in the late morning of August 22, 1572 on the way back from the Louvre. However, the fact remains that his life was saved by a happy coincidence - it is unclear whether he tied his shoes, opened a letter or spat on the street. Maurevert was quickly identified as the assassin, who had murdered the Huguenot leader Mouy on behalf of the king in 1569 and who, immediately after firing the shot, was staying at the house of a close friend of the Guise family. All reporters described the king as indignant and angry about the attack. An appointed commission should investigate the circumstances. As is clear from a letter from Charles to La Mothe dated August 22, 1572, he saw the Guisen guilty of the assassination attempt. The client can never be identified, but what is certain is that this is not a long-term plan, but that it arose from the personal motives of an individual or a group. The theory that Katharina had undertaken the attack to facilitate the "[...] unification of the victims in a city district [...]" has been refuted. It would have been absurd and illogical of the regent if she had attempted an assassination attempt on the admiral, since this would have endangered the peace in France enormously and would have caused a fire in the center of power and in her vicinity. It also seems unlikely that she acted out of maternal jealousy, which would not have been justified since Coligny only stayed at court for a short period of time. At that time, Katharina and Karl had no motive to kill the admiral. Even if there had been a more extensive plan to kill all Huguenots - for which there is no evidence - the attack on Coligny would have warned the remaining Huguenots and the civil war would have started all over again. However, the old Guisen feud is heavily based on this event: They had a motive, and their connection to the murderer also made them suspects. It is therefore more of a stand-alone incident that triggered a chain of further events, but was not related to a massacre.

Preparations for Elimination (August 23)

After the failed attack on Coligny, there was probably an uproar in Paris, as revenge and thus a retaliatory strike by the Huguenots were suspected within the city walls. It is not unlikely that the admiral's supporters made a similar statement, as both Salviati and the Spanish ambassador Zúñiga report the "presumptuous" behavior of the Huguenots, who had brought charges and - out of need, fear and anger - made threats. In addition, about 4,000 Huguenot troops stood very close to Paris. The rumors and fears developed a momentum of their own and also reached the Louvre.

It is documented once by the minutes of the Paris city authorities and by Michiel and the Seigneur de Brantôme that the Prévôt des Marchands , Jean Le Charron , was called to the King in the evening on August 23rd . In the records of the city of Paris it is said that the king declared, in the presence of his mother and brother, the Duke of Anjou, among others, that Huguenots (followers of the "New Religion") had planned a conspiracy against the king and the state and disturbed the calm of the Parisians:

"  Sa Majesté auroit declaré en la presence de la Royne, sa Mere, et de Monseigneur le duc D'Anjou, son Frère, et autres Princes et Seigneurs, avoir esté adverty que ceulx de la Nouvelle Religion se voulloient eslever par conspiration against Sad. Majesté et contre son Estat, et troubler le repos de ses subjectz et de sad. ville de Paris.  »

The Prévôt was also given the task of setting up guards outside and inside Paris - probably a reaction to an alleged Protestant retaliation - to lock the gates of the city of Paris, to remove the boats from the Seine and to distribute weapons to the city militia. However, they received no order to kill; only artillery was to be set up in front of the Hôtel de Ville , possibly to cope with popular uprisings at an early stage. The visit of the Prévôt to the Louvre on August 24th, who informed the king that some members of the royal bodyguard had been involved in the looting and murder, clearly shows that an order was not available, otherwise such a report would have been unnecessary. Another entry confirms that a council «  […] ordonne le massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy.  "- this massacre mentioned, however, presumably only relates to the elimination of Admiral Coligny and the other Huguenot leaders, as it is also explained later in the royal reports. That the order for general killing came from the king cannot be proven; he had also gone to great lengths to stop the killing and reacted with horror to what had happened.

The murders in Paris

After apparently a force consisting of the King's Swiss Guard and the personal bodyguards of the Duke of Anjou, under the leadership of the Duke of Guise , murdered the Admiral in his house, the remaining Huguenot leaders were killed. Many reports contain the exclamation “The King wants it!”, Which probably came from the Duke of Guise and was interpreted by the people as a call for mass execution. A wave of violence was unleashed, presumably the result of religious tensions in recent years, and particularly the Edict of Saint-Germain , and spread across France. The unrest during the dispute over the Croix des Gâtinais already shows the explosive atmosphere that prevailed in Paris. The murder was done for religious, not political. What was evident in Paris and other cities in France was uncontrolled anger and violence directed more or less by chance against people; but it was not a massacre controlled and planned from above. The violence of St. Bartholomew's Night was also a product of the ecstasy and frustration of those affected.

A citizen of Strasbourg testified: "There was a slaughter everywhere in Paris that soon there was no more alley, not even the smallest one where no one was killed, and the blood flowed over the streets as if it had rained heavily" and "The river was already covered with corpses and completely red with blood [...]."

Royal opinion

Catherine de Medici bends over corpses (detail from the painting by Dubois)

While the atrocities were taking place in the streets of Paris, the first letters referring to the events were written. It was not until August 26 that King Charles IX spoke . in front of parliament and took responsibility for the murders, because the Huguenot leaders had conspired and thus forced the king to intervene. Zúñiga and Petruzzi also confirmed this. Nevertheless, there are several versions of this first statement, on the one hand those that speak of a company that has been planned for years, on the other hand those that plead for spontaneous action.

The commemorative medal with the image of Pope Gregory XIII. shows on the reverse the inscription “UGONOTTORUM STRAGES 1572” (“The defeat of the Huguenots 1572”) and an angel carrying a cross and sword next to slain Protestants

In the letters that emerged in the weeks and months after Bartholomew's Night, a general consensus was nevertheless clear: the king had indeed regretted the attack on Coligny; However, since the Huguenots conspired against the king, he had to defend himself and so gave the order to kill the admiral and his followers - the general killing, however, was a spontaneous pogrom of the population. Basically, this explanation perhaps offers a consistent course of events that were based on suspicion, anger, hopelessness and fear. However, a Huguenot conspiracy is very unlikely and, above all, unprovable. However, the king could have believed in such a situation, especially since the Huguenots had already planned an attack on him in 1567 and carried out an assassination attempt on Francis II in 1560. Thus the order was given for the first strike to kill Admiral Coligny and a good two to three dozen of the Protestant nobles. Unfortunately, no precise information about the origin of the plan can be given here either, only that the decision was probably made by the royal family and some members of the court. Nor can it be proven that the king was persuaded by his mother or other persons. There is also no secured data on the point in time. The sources only state that exact orders to kill the Huguenot leaders were not issued until August 23. The general killing in Paris and in many French cities can be traced back to the initiative of the masses.

After St. Bartholomew's Night, the king, and especially Catherine, stuck to the old policy: the edict of Saint-Germain was to remain in force, meetings of the Huguenots were only forbidden to prevent arming, and under no circumstances did the crown want the ones in Spain Seated Habsburgs bow down, and an alliance with Philip II was still rejected.

Reaction of the Pope

Pope Gregory XIII When the massacre became known, had a Te Deum sung and a commemorative coin minted in thanks . The painter Giorgio Vasari was commissioned to make three wall paintings in the Sala Regia to commemorate the event. On September 11, 1572, at the instigation of the Pope, a joint celebration was held on the occasion of the victory at Lepanto and the assassination of Colignys.

Summary

France had become a powder keg. International, personal, national, political and religious interests and conflicts caused a permanent state crisis since 1559. Europe itself was also changing; the spread of the reformed faith forced all states to grapple with the question of religion. In the Holy Roman Empire , cuius regio, eius religio could be found a satisfactory solution after the Peace of Augsburg. However, the centralized state structure in France caused a conflict with the new religion from the start. The Spanish striving for hegemony, which not only influenced the French government politically but also religiously, made this dispute a problem. The crown - and especially Katharina - was careful to protect their domestic interests and thus to prevent Spain and therefore also Rome and the German Empire from exerting influence. This internationalization of the conflict and France's endeavor to keep any power out of it, however, led to a further weakening of the empire.

Since 1560, Katharina tried to maintain a balance between the parties competing at court, to restore the authority of the crown and to secure the dynasty. However, the French monarchy was too weak, too indebted and too debilitated by the ongoing conflicts of the authorities to be able to find a long-term solution. The efforts to reconcile the Huguenots with the state by having a royal wedding and bringing Coligny back to court, however, led to incomprehension and anger on the Catholic side. The problem of religion could never have been solved, because a compromise would have rekindled the other party. However, since the edict of Saint-Germain in 1570 decided to move closer to the Huguenots, the conflict that had developed for decades and through the civil war could not be resolved. Suspicion, fear and fragmentary decisions then led to royal intervention and the murder of the Huguenot leaders, which in turn sparked a wave of violence across France. Bartholomew's Night of 1572 was a direct result of a "[...] profound wilderness of human and state behavior [...]" that began in 1559.

On Bartholomew's Night and the days after, around 3,000 people were murdered in Paris (several thousand in the provinces), the vast majority of them Huguenots. Similar massacres took place from August to October in other cities, including Toulouse , Bordeaux , Lyon , Bourges , Rouen and Orléans, killing between 5,000 and 15,000 people. Prominent victims of the massacre were the composer Claude Goudimel and the philosopher and humanist Petrus Ramus .

consequences

For the Protestants, Bartholomew's Night was a heavy defeat, and they lost a large part of their political leaders. In the following years it became clear that the majority of Paris and France could not be won over to the Reformation, as the majority of the population remained in the Roman Catholic faith and the political forces of the Protestant party were insufficient to enforce the new Reformed faith by force. On the other hand, the Catholic party was not strong enough to completely defeat the Protestants. The religious struggles in France therefore continued after the events of Bartholomew's Night until the Huguenots were guaranteed legal security by the French King Henry IV in the Edict of Nantes in 1598 . The special political rights of Protestants guaranteed in the Edict of Nantes were, however, gradually revoked again in the 17th century with the development of absolutism, especially under the reign of Cardinal Richelieu . After the pressure on the Protestants had steadily increased, in 1685 Louis XIV finally abolished freedom of religion in the Edict of Fontainebleau . Despite severe threats of punishment and a ban on emigration, around 200,000 Huguenots fled to neighboring countries and around the world (in particular England , the Netherlands , Prussia , Hesse , Switzerland and South Africa ). France suffered great economic damage from the emigration of many capable Huguenots, and conversely the immigrant countries profited greatly from the skills of the emigrants.

literature

Essays
  • Jean P. Barbier-Mueller: La Parole et les Armes. Chronique des Guerres de religion en France (1562–1598) . Musée internationale de la reforme, Geneva 2006, ISBN 2-7541-0094-6 , pp. 103–125.
  • Julien Coudy (ed.): The Huguenot Wars in eyewitness accounts ("La guerres de religion"). Dtv, Munich 1980, ISBN 3-423-02707-X , pp. 166-217. (Reprint of the Düsseldorf 1965 edition)
  • Barbara B. Diefendorf: Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris . University Press, Oxford 1991, ISBN 0-19-506554-9 , pp. 93-106.
  • Ernst Hinrichs (ed.): Little history of France (RUB; 9333). New edition Reclam, Stuttgart 2008, ISBN 978-3-15-017057-1 , pp. 125f. and pp. 153–156 (together with Heinz-Gerhard Haupt , Stefan Martens , Heribert Müller , Bernd Schneidmüller and Charlotte Tacke ).
  • Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629 (= New approaches to European history. 8). University Press, Cambridge 1995, ISBN 0-521-35873-6 , pp. 50-97.
Books
  • Hermann Baumgarten : Before the Bartholomew Night . Truebner, Strasbourg 1882.
  • Jean-Louis Bourgeon: L'assassinat de Coligny (= Travaux d'histoire éthico-politique. 51). Droz, Geneva 1992.
  • Denis Crouzet: La nuit de la Saint-Barthélemy. Un rêve perdu de la Renaissance . Fayard, Paris 1994, ISBN 2-213-59216-0 .
  • Barbara B. Diefendorf: The Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre. A Brief History with Documents. (= The Bedford Series in History and Culture ). Boston / New York 2009, ISBN 978-0-312-41360-6 .
  • Philippe Erlanger : Bartholomew Night. The Parisian Blood Wedding on August 24, 1572 ("Le massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy"). Laokoon-Verlag, Munich 1966.
  • Janine Estebe: Tocsin pour un massacre. La Saison des Saint-Barthélemy. (= Les introuvables ). 2nd Edition. Edition Le Centurion, Paris 1975.
  • Robert M. Kingdon: Myths about the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacres 1572-1576 . Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1988, ISBN 0-674-59831-8 .
  • Karl Kupisch : Coligny. A historical study . 2nd, modified edition. Lettner publishing house, Berlin 1951.
  • Ilja Mieck (ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572 (= historical texts / modern times. 8). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1969.
  • Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents (= International archives of the history of ideas. 75). Kluwer, Amsterdam 2002, ISBN 90-247-1652-7 . (Reprint of The Hague 1974 edition)
  • Nicola M. Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572 . Macmillan, London 1973.
  • Johann Friedrich Ludwig Wachler : The Parisian Blood Wedding . Barth Verlag, Leipzig 1826.
  • Simon P. Widmann: The Bartholomew Night of the year 1572 . Melchior, Wolfenbüttel 2006, ISBN 3-939102-84-9 .
  • Heinrich Wuttke : To the prehistory of the Bartholomeusnacht. Historical-critical study . Weigel Verlag, Leipzig 1879 (edited from his estate by Dr. Georg Müller-Frauenstein).
Illustrations
  • Illustration by Frans Hogenberg from 1576: Here you can see in what form, Lose the life young and old, At a wedding in Paris, So there must be judgment, Since the landlord murdered the admiral, With his nobility all the time, ... ( digitized )

Adaptations

Movies
literature
music
  • Giacomo Meyerbeer : The Huguenots . Great opera in five acts ("Les Huguenots"). Verlag Schröder, Markranstädt 2004 (reprint of the Leipzig edition 1836).

Web links

Commons : St. Bartholomew's Day massacre  - album with pictures, videos and audio files
Wikisource: Bartholomäusnacht  - Sources and full texts

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. (= New approaches to European history , Vol. 8.) Cambridge 1995, p. 82.
  2. ↑ Ernst Hinrichs (ed.): Small history of France. By Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Ernst Hinrichs, Stefan Martens, Heribert Müller, Bernd Schneidmüller, Charlotte Tacke (= Reclam. 9333). Stuttgart 2003, p. 125.
  3. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 19f.
  4. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 21.
  5. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 3 f.
  6. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 10f.
  7. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 23.
  8. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 10.
  9. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 24.
  10. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 27.
  11. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 15.
  12. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 24.
  13. ↑ See Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 31.
  14. ^ Jean-Louis Bourgeon: L'assassinant de Coligny. (= Travaux d'histoire éthico-politique. 51). Genève 1992, p. 128
    N. M. Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559-1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 27.
  15. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 149.
  16. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 155.
  17. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 156f.
  18. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 168.
  19. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 41
    Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd revised edition, Berlin undated, p. 169.
  20. ↑ Janine Estebe: Tocsin pour un massacre. La Saison des Saint-Barthélemy. Paris 1968, p. 59ff.
  21. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Problem of Spain. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, p. 18.
  22. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 6.
  23. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd revised edition, Berlin undated, p. 182.
  24. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 9.
  25. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 9 and p. 24.
  26. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 182f.
    Ilja Mieck (ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572. Introduced and edited by Ilja Mieck. (= Historical Texts / Modern Times 8. Edited by Reinhart Koselleck and Rudolf Vierhaus ) Göttingen 1969, p. 9ff.
  27. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 21f.
  28. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. (= New approaches to European history. 8). Cambridge 1995, p. 77.
  29. ↑ Baumgarten sees it differently, who argues that the king's participation in the Guise wedding on October 3, 1571 is proof of the king's favor. See Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 33.
  30. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 180f.
    Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 18.
  31. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 12
    Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd revised edition, Berlin undated, pp. 180ff.
  32. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 186.
  33. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 185.
  34. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd revised edition. Berlin undated, p. 186.
  35. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 198.
  36. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, pp. 312 and 316.
  37. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 199.
  38. ↑ See NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 316.
  39. ↑ Julien Coudy (ed.): The Huguenot Wars in eyewitness reports. Edited by Julien Coudy. Forewords by Pastor Henry Bosc and A.-M. Roguet OP Historical outline by Ernst Mengin. Düsseldorf 1965, p. 169.
  40. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler. Leipzig 1826, p. 55.
  41. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 17f.
  42. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 193f.
  43. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 194 f.
  44. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 193.
  45. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 200 and Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, pp. 193f.
  46. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 210.
  47. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 208.
  48. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 208.
  49. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd revised edition. Berlin undated, p. 213.
  50. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Problem of Spain. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, p. 20.
  51. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Problem of Spain. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, pp. 20f.
  52. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 218 f.
  53. ↑ See Sutherland's statement that war can perhaps be seen as an alternative to hunting . See NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the Problem of Spain. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, p. 23.
  54. ↑ Hermann Baumgarten: Before the Bartholomew Night. Strasbourg 1882, p. 223.
  55. ^ Letter from Charles to the Duke of Alençon of October 10, 1569, in: Julien Coudy (Ed.): The Huguenot Wars in Eyewitness Reports , Düsseldorf 1965, p. 178.
  56. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 339.
  57. ↑ Ludwig Wachler: The Paris blood wedding. Portrayed by Dr. Ludwig Wachler . Leipzig 1826, p. 68.
  58. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572 . London, Basingstoke 1973.
  59. ↑ Janine Estebe: Tocsin pour un massacre. La Saison des Saint-Barthélemy . Paris 1968, p. 183.
  60. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. (= New approaches to European history. 8). Cambridge 1995, p. 84.
    Hermann Baumgarten: Before the night of Bartholomew. Strasbourg 1882, p. 240.
    NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 341.
  61. ↑ Julien Coudy (ed.): The Huguenot Wars in eyewitness reports. Düsseldorf 1965, pp. 184f.
  62. ↑ Ilja Mieck (Ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew's Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572. (= Historical texts / modern times. 8). Göttingen 1969, p. 38
    Barbara B. Diefendorf: Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris . New York / Oxford 1991, p. 95.
  63. ↑ Ilja Mieck (Ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew's Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572. (= Historical texts / modern times. 8). Göttingen 1969, p. 38
  64. ^ Barbara B. Diefendorf: Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris . New York, Oxford 1991, p. 98.
  65. ^ NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572 . London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 339.
  66. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. In: New approaches to European history 8. Cambridge 1995, p. 90
    NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 340.
  67. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. In: New approaches to European history 8. Cambridge 1995, p. 85.
  68. ^ Barbara B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris. New York, Oxford 1991, p. 99. Also quoted.
  69. ↑ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. In: New approaches to European history 8. Cambridge 1995, pp. 85ff.
    Natalie Zemon Davis: The Rites of Voilence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, pp. 203-242.
  70. ^ Natalie Zemon Davis: The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, p. 240.
    Janine Estebe: Tocsin pour un massacre. La Saison des Saint-Barthélemy. Paris 1968, pp. 194, 197.
  71. ↑ Julien Coudy (ed.): The Huguenot Wars in eyewitness reports . Düsseldorf 1965, pp. 199 and 201.
  72. ^ Heinrich Wuttke: On the prehistory of the Bartholomeusnacht . Edited from his estate by Dr. Georg Müller-Frauenstein. Leipzig 1879, p. 19ff.
  73. ↑ Janine Estebe: Tocsin pour un massacre. La Saison des Saint-Barthélemy. Paris 1968, p. 180.
  74. ^ Mack P. Holt: The French Wars of Religion. 1562–1629, in: New approaches to European history 8. Cambridge 1995, p. 84.
  75. ^ Barbara B. Diefendorf: Beneath the Cross. Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris. New York, Oxford 1991, p. 96.
  76. ^ Natalie Zemon Davis: The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France. In: Alfred Soman (Ed.): The Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Reappraisals and Documents. The Hague 1974, pp. 203-242.
  77. ^ Karl Kupisch: Coligny. A historical study. 2nd, modified edition. Berlin undated, p. 232.
  78. ^ E. Howe: Architecture in Vasari's 'Massacre of the Huguenots' . In: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes . tape 39 , 1976, ISSN  0075-4390 , pp. 258-261 , doi : 10.2307 / 751147 , JSTOR : 751147 .
  79. ↑ Cf. Ilja Mieck (Ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572. Introduced and edited by Ilja Mieck (= historical texts / modern times. 8). Göttingen 1969, p. 7.
  80. ↑ See NM Sutherland: The Massacre of St Bartholomew and the European Conflict 1559–1572. London / Basingstoke 1973, p. 22.
  81. ↑ Ilja Mieck (Ed.): Edict of Tolerance and Bartholomew's Night. French politics and European diplomacy 1570–1572. Introduced and edited by Ilja Mieck (= historical texts / modern times. 8). Göttingen 1969, p. 7.