Zbigniew Brzeziński

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Zbigniew Brzeziński (2014)

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński ( listen ? / I ) [ ˈzbiɡɲɛf kaˈʑimjɛʐ bʐɛˈʑij̃skʲi ] (born March 28, 1928 in Warsaw ; † May 26, 2017 in Falls Church , Virginia ) was a Polish - American political scientist and political advisor . Audio file / audio sample

He was 1966-1968 campaign consultant Lyndon B. Johnson and 1,977 to 1,981 security adviser of US President Jimmy Carter . He was Professor of US Foreign Policy at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC , Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, and author of renowned political analyzes. In addition, he worked as a management consultant for several large US and international companies.

Brzeziński is counted as part of the realistic school of international politics and is geopolitically in the tradition of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykmans . Brzeziński was closer to the Democrats . He was often demarcated from his conservative "rival" Kissinger , although the similarities were greater than the differences.

Brzeziński was ascribed a consistent unilateralism . With regard to this unilateralism, Brzeziński is compared with the following theorists: Francis Fukuyama , Robert Kagan , William Kristol , Richard Perle , Charles Krauthammer , Edward Luttwak , Samuel P. Huntington and Paul Wolfowitz .

Life

Origin and early years

Brzeziński was born in Warsaw in 1928 as the son of the Polish diplomat Tadeusz Brzeziński and Leonia Roman. His family, who belong to the Polish nobility , came from Brzeżany in today's Ukraine . The name of the city of Brzeżany is the origin of the family name.

His father Tadeusz Brzeziński worked as a diplomat in Germany from 1931 to 1935 , then from 1936 to 1938 in the Soviet Union , at the time of the Great Purges of Josef Stalin . In 1938 he was transferred to Canada . After Poland was given the Soviet sphere of influence at the Yalta Conference at the end of World War II , the family could not safely return to their homeland. The Second World War had a profound effect on Brzeziński, who stated in an interview that the extraordinary brutality towards the Poles had shaped his view of the world. This experience made him aware of the fact that world politics is largely a fundamental struggle.

Zbigniew Brzeziński spent part of his childhood in Lille (France), Leipzig and Charkow in the Ukrainian SSR before moving with his family to Montreal , Canada.

Growing influence

After attending Loyola High School in Montreal, he studied at McGill University in 1945 to obtain his bachelor's degree in 1949 and his master's degree in political science in 1950. In his master's thesis he examined the different ethnicities and nationalities within the Soviet Union.

Brzeziński's plan to study in Great Britain in preparation for a diplomatic career in Canada could not be realized. This was also due to the fact that only British citizens were eligible for the scholarship. Brzeziński then studied at Harvard University under Merle Fainsod and received his doctorate in 1953 on the Soviet Union and the connections between the October Revolution , Lenin's model of the state and the politics of Josef Stalin .

In the same year he traveled to Munich and met Jan Nowak-Jeziorański , the head of the Polish department of Radio Free Europe .

He later also worked with Carl J. Friedrich to develop a concept of totalitarianism . This helped him in 1956 to present and criticize Soviet politics more accurately and effectively.

For background information:

As a Harvard professor, he criticized Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles ' policy of rollback : the antagonism would push Eastern Europe more towards the Soviet Union. The uprising of December 1970 in Poland with the Polish October and the Hungarian people's uprising in 1956 confirmed Brzeziński's idea of ​​a gradual weakening of Soviet supremacy by the Eastern Europeans. In 1957 he visited Poland for the first time since childhood. The visit confirmed his judgment on the deep divisions within the Eastern Bloc . From this he developed his program of “peaceful engagement”, by which he understood a peaceful competition for influence in Eastern Europe, which he demarcated from the Soviet understanding of “peaceful coexistence”.

In 1958 he became a US citizen. Despite staying in Canada for decades and having family members there, he never became a Canadian citizen.

When Brzeziński did not get a professorship at Harvard in 1959, he moved to New York City to teach at Columbia University . Here he wrote his work Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict , which has been the theme of Eastern Europe since the beginning of the Cold War . He was also the university professor of the future US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright , who like his wife is of Czech descent. He was also Albright's mentor during her early years in Washington. He became a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and joined the Bilderberg Conference .

During the 1960 presidential election, Brzeziński was an advisor on John F. Kennedy's campaign team . He pushed for a non-antagonistic policy towards Eastern European governments. In view of the political and economic stagnation, he correctly foresaw the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union along ethnic fault lines, with which he further expanded the approach of his master's thesis.

Brzeziński supported the détente policy during the following years. He published his program publication Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe in Foreign Affairs and supported a non-antagonistic policy after the Cuban Missile Crisis . He justified this with the fact that this policy could take the fear of an aggressive Germany away from the Eastern European countries and also placate Western Europeans who were concerned about possible compromises by the superpowers in the sense of the Yalta Conference .

Advisor to Lyndon B. Johnsons

In 1964, Brzeziński supported Lyndon B. Johnson's " Great Society " program and the proposed legislation of the civil rights movement , while on the other hand, after Khrushchev's forced resignation, he noted the complete loss of creativity on the part of the political leadership of the Soviet Union. Through the mediation of Jan Nowak-Jeziorański , Brzeziński met Adam Michnik , the then communist and future activist of the Polish trade union movement.

Brzeziński supported ties with the Eastern European governments, but warned against de Gaulle's vision of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals ”. He advocated the Vietnam War . From 1966 to 1968 Brzeziński served as a member of the State Department's planning staff . President Johnson's "Bridge Building" speech on October 7, 1966 was the result of Brzeziński's influence.

For historical background information:

The events in Czechoslovakia reinforced Brzeziński's critical attitude towards the aggressive stance of the Republicans against Eastern European governments. His services for the Lyndon B. Johnson administration during the Vietnam War made him an enemy of the US New Left , although he advocated de-escalation of the US military operation.

In 1968 Brzeziński supported the election campaign of the Democrats as chairman of the Hubert H. Humphreys foreign policy working group . He advised Humphrey to break with some points in President Johnson's program, particularly on Vietnam, the Middle East and relations with the Soviet Union.

Brzeziński called for a pan-European conference. This idea finally came true in 1973 with the CSCE . In the meantime, he has become the leading critic of Nixon's and Kissinger's concept of relaxation, as well as McGovern's pacifism .

Foundation and management of the Trilateral Commission

In 1970 he wrote in his work " Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era " that a coordinated policy among the industrialized countries was necessary to counter the global instability that resulted from of increasing economic inequality.

On the basis of this demand, Brzeziński founded the Trilateral Commission on the initiative of David Rockefeller in 1973 , of which he was first director from 1973 to 1976. Brzezinski suggested the governor of Georgia , Jimmy Carter , as a member before. Brzeziński returned to the Commission in 1981 and played a leading role until 2009.

Advisor to the Carter Administration

Brzeziński as government advisor (1977)

Jimmy Carter described himself as an "avid student" of Brzeziński during the election campaign and later developed a close "symbiotic" relationship with him, in which he took almost every thought of Brzeziskis.

Brzeziński became Carter's advisor on foreign policy issues in the election campaign team. He was a staunch critic of the foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger, who relied too much on détente policies that the Soviet Union would like. Instead, he relied more on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and emphasized human rights , international law and peaceful measures in Eastern Europe. Brzeziński was seen as the Democratic response to the Republican-minded Henry Kissinger. Carter attacked Ford in debates by comparing the trilateral vision with Ford's détente. In the following years Brzeziński acquired the reputation of a " hardliner " in terms of his policy towards the Soviet Union .

After his victory in 1976, Carter made Brzeziński the official security advisor. In the same year major labor disputes broke out in Poland, which formed the basis for the Polish trade union movement Solidarność . Brzeziński began with the emphasis on human rights in the Helsinki Final Act , which shortly afterwards inspired Charter 77 of Czechoslovakia .

Brzeziński was involved in drafting parts of the government address on Carter's inauguration, which was in line with his intention to send a positive message to dissidents in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union as well as leading politicians in Western Europe complained that this type of rhetoric contradicted the “code of détente” established by Nixon and Kissinger.

Brzeziński turned against members of the Democratic Party who opposed his view of detente, which included Foreign Minister Cyrus Vance . Vance spoke out in favor of a reduced emphasis on human rights in order to win the Soviet Union's approval for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), while Brzeziński wanted to achieve both at the same time. Brzeziński ordered Radio Free Europe to expand the performance and reach of its programming, which was a provocative reversal of Nixon and Kissinger's policies. Helmut Schmidt rejected Brzeziński's plans and even called for Radio Free Europe to be removed from German soil.

The State Department was concerned by Brzeziński's support for East German dissidents and rejected his suggestion that Carter's first visit across the Atlantic should be to Poland. He and Carter visited Warsaw , they met with Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (against the concerns of the US Ambassador to Poland). In doing so, they recognized the Roman Catholic Church as a legitimate opposition to communist rule in Poland.

In 1978 Brzeziński and Vance were increasingly at odds over the direction of Carter's foreign policy. Vance wanted to continue the style of détente policy of Nixon and Kissinger, with an emphasis on disarmament. Brzeziński believed that the détente policy had encouraged the Soviet Union in Angola and the Middle East. He therefore advocated increasing military strength and an emphasis on human rights. Vance, the State Department and the media publicly criticized Brzeziński for wanting to revive the Cold War.

Brzeziński advised Carter in 1978 to turn to the People's Republic of China and traveled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for normalizing relations between the two countries. This led to a loosening of ties with the longstanding anti-communist ally, the Republic of China on Taiwan .

Historical background:

1979 was the year of two major, strategically important events: the disempowerment of the friend of the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Islamic Revolution sparked the Iranian hostage-taking crisis that lasted for the remainder of Carter's term in office. Brzeziński was a staunch supporter of support for the fundamentalist mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 and awaited the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With the support of Saudi Arabia , Pakistan and the People's Republic of China, he created a strategy to undermine the influence of the Soviet Union. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, he led the United States to a new armament effort and the development of rapid reaction forces. Both policies are more likely to be associated with Ronald Reagan today.

Brzeziński worked under Carter's “lame duck” presidency but, encouraged by the fact that the Polish union had affirmed his style of dealing with Eastern Europe, he took an uncompromising stance on what appeared to be an imminent invasion of Poland. At midnight he telephoned Pope John Paul II , whose visit to Poland in 1979 preceded the formation of the trade union movement, and gave him a warning. This US attitude was a marked change from previous reactions to Soviet repression in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In 1981 President Carter presented Brzeziński with the Presidential Medal of Freedom .

Served during the Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations

After his tenure, Brzeziński was concerned about the internal split in the Democratic Party. In his opinion, the pacifist ("dovish") wing around George McGovern was responsible for ensuring that the Democrats were permanently a minority.

His relationship with the Ronald Reagan administration was mixed. On the one hand he supported them as an alternative to the pacifism of the Democrats, on the other hand he criticized them for exaggerating black and white painting when assessing foreign policy issues.

He remained involved in the events in Poland, criticizing the introduction of martial law in 1981, but above all the devotion to fate of Western Europe in the name of stability. Brzeziński advised US Vice President George Bush in 1987 before his trip to Poland, which supported the revival of the trade union movement.

In 1985, during the Ronald Reagan administration, he was a member of the President's Chemical Warfare Commission. From 1987 to 1988 he worked on the National Security Council of the Ministry of Defense in a commission for "Integrated Long-Term Strategy". From 1987 to 1989 he worked as an advisor to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), which "... advises the President on the quality and accuracy of intelligence gathering, analysis and assessments, counter-espionage and other intelligence activities."

In 1988 Brzeziński was vice chairman of the National Security Advisory Task Force of George Bush and supported Bush's presidency, which meant a break with the Democrats. In the same year Brzeziński published his work " The Grand Failure" , in which he predicted the failure of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the following decades. He explained that there were five possibilities for the future development of the Soviet Union: successful pluralization, ongoing crisis, new stagnation, coup d'état by the KGB or the military, or the collapse of the communist regime. At this stage of development, he thought collapse was far less likely than a prolonged crisis. He predicted that the likelihood of communism continuing to exist in the Soviet Union in 2017 was only a little over 50%, and that the end, if it came, would be very likely to be turbulent.

The system finally collapsed in 1991 after Moscow cracked down on Lithuania's aspirations for independence, the Nagorno-Karabakh war in the late 1980s and the occasional bloodshed in other republics. This result was less violent than Brzeziński and other observers had expected.

In 1989 the communists failed to mobilize their support in Poland and the union won the elections with an overwhelming majority. In the same year Brzeziński made a tour of Russia and visited the memorial for the Katyn massacre . This gave him the opportunity to ask the Soviet government to acknowledge the truth of the massacre, for which he received standing applause at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. Ten days later the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union-backed governments in Eastern Europe began to falter.

One of Brzeziński's longtime critics, Strobe Talbott , conducted an interview with Brzeziński for Time magazine entitled Justifying a Hardliner .

In 1990 Brzeziński warned of euphoria about the end of the Cold War. He publicly refused to be used in the Second Gulf War because the USA was thereby gambling away the international goodwill it had won by defeating the Soviet Union and which could arouse strong reluctance in the entire Arab world. He developed this view of things further in Out of Control (1992).

Positions and Debates During the Clinton, Bush Jun. and Obama

Clinton term in office 1993-2001 - Balkan Wars and Russia

Brzeziński was particularly critical of the reluctance of Bill Clinton's government to intervene against the Serbian army in the Bosnian War. He also spoke out against Russia's first war in Chechnya and formed the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Concerned about a possible resurgence in Russia, he viewed Vladimir Putin's assumption of office after Boris Yeltsin with suspicion. Because of this, he became one of the strongest supporters of NATO enlargement.

He also advocated the 1999 bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo war .

Term of office of Bush Jr. 2001–2009 - War on Terror and Iran

After September 11, 2001, Brzeziński was heavily criticized because the support he had promoted for the fundamentalist mujahideen in Afghanistan from 1979 onwards was seen as one of the causes of the development of Islamist terrorism.

Brzeziński was a prominent opponent of George W. Bush's War on Terror . In 2004 he wrote his work The Choice , which expanded the subject of The Grand Chessboard but sharply criticized Bush's foreign policy. He defended the book The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy by political scientists John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (2006) and was an outspoken critic of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Since 2006 Brzeziński emerged as a critic of US policy towards Iran's nuclear program and the Iraq war . Brzeziński believed that the US strategy had failed. In early 2007 he warned that the US would seek an excuse to initiate a war against Iran.

Presidential election campaign 2007–2008

In August 2007, Brzeziński said in a television interview that he would support the candidacy of Barack Obama , who was then relatively young and inexperienced in foreign policy . He noted that Obama recognized “America's role in the world needs a new face, a new direction, and a new definition” - and noted, “What I like about Obama is that he understands that we are in a completely different world live in which we have to have relationships with very different cultures and peoples ”. He also defended Obama's position that the US should also talk to geostrategic opponents such as Iran and Syria. It was generally seen as an advantage for Obama's campaign that he had the support of one of the best-known and most influential foreign policy experts, especially on questions of foreign policy - his alleged weak point.

In September 2007, during the primary campaign, Brzeziński and Obama - both staunch opponents of the Iraq war - appeared at an event on the Iraq war in Iowa. Brzeziński introduced Obama and he thanked him by praising Brzeziński's contribution to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1978 and calling him "one of our most important thinkers". At the time, some pro-Israel commentators questioned Brzeziński's criticism of the Israeli lobby in the US. When Obama was asked six months later about his relationship with Brzeziński, he said that Brzeziński was not one of his main ideas, that he disagreed on various things and that he had only "eaten with him once and maybe exchanged emails three times", where he called the Iraq War event in Iowa.

Obama's first term 2009–2013 - Foreign policy cooperation and Libya

In a September 2009 interview with The Daily Beast , Brzeziński responded to the question of how insistent Obama should insist that Israel should not launch an air strike on Iran: “We are not really powerless little babies. You have to fly over our airspace in Iraq. Are we just going to sit and watch? ”This has been interpreted by some supporters of Israel as an endorsement of the US shooting down Israeli planes to prevent an attack on Iran. Brzeziński drove the development of political relations between the US and the People's Republic of China and advocated a new arms control agreement with Russia . He also shared the President's view that the United States should pursue a diplomatic policy of international cooperation instead of going it alone . In 2011 Brzeziński supported the military intervention in Libya , describing the non-intervention as "morally dubious" and "politically questionable". Brzeziński also frequently publicly criticized Obama on various issues. So he criticized u. a. the too soft policy towards Israel and a lack of a foreign policy strategy.

Obama's second term 2013–2017 - Syria and the Ukraine crisis

In an interview with The National Interest magazine on June 24, 2013, Brzeziński harshly criticized Obama's Syria policy: “At the end of 2011, the riots broke out in Syria; that was a consequence of the drought; two despotic governments in the Middle East fueled the unrest, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar. US President Obama then backed the unrest and suddenly announced that Assad would have to leave; Obviously, Obama has not made any preparations for this ... Was that a strategic policy? Why was it suddenly decided to destabilize Syria and ultimately overthrow the government there? Has the US population been informed about it? ”He criticized the work of the CIA and its former director David Petraeus in particular .

Brzeziński emphasized in February 2014 that “without Ukraine, Russia could never become a superpower again. Only in this context does Russia's bitter political struggle over Ukraine become understandable. "

On March 3, 2014, between the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych and the Crimean referendum, Brzeziński wrote a guest commentary for the Washington Post : “What needs to be done? Putin's aggression in Ukraine needs an answer ”. He compared Putin's “gangster tactics” and “barely camouflaged invasion” of Crimea with Adolf Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and characterized Putin as a cartoon Mussolini , but he was reluctant to recommend the United States join the war. Instead, he recommended that NATO should be put on high alert and "prevent calculation errors". On the other hand, he explicitly stated that Russia must be assured that the West does not want to drag Ukraine into NATO or to join in against Russia. (" The West should reassure Russia that it is not seeking to draw Ukraine into NATO or to turn it against Russia. ")

He also called the subsequent Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine "barely veiled".

Tittytainment

The term " tittytainment " is said to come from him, which means that in the future 80% of the - then unemployed - world population will have to be kept happy by a modern form of bread and games.

Personal

Brzeziński was married to the Czech-American sculptor Emilie Benes, a great niece of the former Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš . They have three children: Ian, Mark and Mika. Mika Brzezinski is a presenter for the US news channel MSNBC . Mark Brzeziński is a diplomat and has been the US ambassador to Sweden since 2011. Ian Brzeziński is an expert on foreign policy and military issues. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration (2001-2005). Ian is also the head of Brzeziński Group, LLC in Alexandria, Virginia, a consulting firm serving international clients in the finance, energy and defense sectors. The writer Matthew Brzeziński is a nephew of Brzeziński.

Brzeziński's participation in "Operation Cyclone": the "Russia trap"

Brzeziński's policy was aimed at strengthening the radical Islamist and anti-communist forces in Afghanistan, including the fundamentalist mujahideen , in order to overthrow the secular , communist -oriented government. This was part of Operation Cyclone .

In 1998, Brzeziński gave an interview to journalist Vincent Jauvert from the French news magazine Le Nouvel Observateur , in which he stated that support for the Afghan resistance against the communist Soviet-backed government was backed up on July 3, 1979 - around half a year before the Soviet one Intervention in late December 1979 - had been approved by US President Jimmy Carter. This fact was already known at that time through a book publication by the former CIA director Robert Gates . In addition, Brzeziński was quoted as saying in the interview that he had sent a message to Carter on the same day stating that he believed this support would trigger Soviet intervention and that the United States lured the Soviet Union into the "Afghan trap" be. Only parts of the interview were published, according to Brzeziński in a distorted version, which, contrary to the agreement, he would never have authorized himself. Jauvert stated that he had reproduced the interview correctly, but confirmed that the quotation in quotation marks in the title of the interview was from the editor and not from Brzeziński. Brzeziński denied having sent a message to Carter that day in July 1979, and no such document has been found in the archives. Existing archive material does not support the thesis that Brzeziński's aim was to provoke a Soviet intervention.

Political science works

Totalitarian dictatorship and autocracy 1956

In the study “Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy” in 1956, Brzeziński and Carl Joachim Friedrich developed a model of totalitarianism that is still important for political science today : totalitarian regimes are something fundamentally new and similar. The goal is total control, which is characterized by an ideology that encompasses all important areas of life and wants to create a new society. A single hierarchically organized party possesses all political power and is led by a dictator. Only a small part of the population is politically active and really adheres to the ideology. A terror system controls the population and the party. A secret police fight actual and potential enemies. Mass communication is monopolized. The economy is bureaucratically controlled and directed.

Between Two Ages, America's Role in the Technetronic Era 1970

"Between two ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era" (1970) was one of the earliest depictions of the change in communication and computer technology, which was later associated with the term globalization .

According to Brzeziński, the thesis of his book is that the USA catapulted itself into a new post-industrial age, while the Soviet Union got stuck in the middle of industrialization. He saw the reason for this lagging behind the Soviet Union in the inability to renew society on the basis of communist doctrine. As a result he expected widespread political instability in the entire Soviet and Eastern European area.

Brzeziński predicted a race between superpowers in the field of communications technology. The system of the Soviet Union is economically and politically too weak to adapt to the new technological development of the world and will consequently perish. He considers the “technetronic system” that is being completed in the USA to dominate the world. Brzeziński foresees developments that endanger humanity and a threat to democracy through the emergence of a society that is monitored and controlled by an elite. The crowds would be organized and their thoughts, feelings and decisions would be manipulated using communication technology and media. For Brzeziński it is also important to transform depersonalized economic power into political power and the associated endangerment of the individual:

“The tendency toward depersonalization (of) economic power is stimulated in the next stage by the appearance of a highly complex interdependence between governmental institutions (including the military), scientific establishments, and industrial organizations. As economic power becomes inseparably linked with political power, it becomes more invisible and the sense of individual futility increases. "

“The development towards depersonalized economic power will intensify in the next phase, as a highly complex interdependence of state institutions (including the military), scientific institutions and commercial enterprises will arise. Insofar as economic power is inextricably linked with political power, it becomes increasingly invisible and the perception of individual powerlessness and superfluity [and / or futility ] grows. "

Brzeziński foresees manipulation techniques also in the field of biology and chemistry:

“Man is increasingly acquiring the capacity to determine the sex of his children, to affect through drugs the extent of their intelligence, and to modify and control their personalities. Speaking of a future at most only decades away, an experimenter in intelligence control asserted, 'I foresee the time when we shall have the means and therefore, inevitably, the temptation to manipulate the behavior and intellectual functioning of all the people through environmental and biochemical manipulation of the brain. '”

“Humans are increasingly able to determine the gender of children, to modify and control the degree of their intelligence and personality through drugs [(English. Drugs )]. A neuroscientist [(footnote: David Krech , editor's note)] assured us of developments in the near future: 'I foresee a time when we have the means and will inevitably be exposed to the temptation to To influence the behavior and the mental functions of all people by changing the environment and by biochemical manipulation of the brain. '"

The failed experiment: the fall of the communist system in 1989

The Grand Failure (1989) aims to provide a comprehensive overview of all forms of communism, but focuses on the Gorbachev era. Brzeziński predicts that Gorbachev's policy of economic decentralization will lead to loosening of social control and eventually political pluralism. Leninism will be given up. The successful pluralization of the Soviet Union appears to Brzeziński less likely than protracted domestic political crises, a return to Brezhnev stagnation, a military or KGB coup, or the fragmentation of the Soviet Union along nationalistic lines.

The only world power in 1997

In his book The Only World Power (1997), Brzeziński explains the geopolitical strategy that he  believes the USA should adopt as the first, only and last world power - after the collapse of the Soviet Union -: to keep the Eurasian continent under its control and to pursue rival efforts that could endanger the power of the USA:

“The extent to which the USA can assert its global supremacy depends on how a globally active America can cope with the complex power relations on the Eurasian continent - and whether it can prevent the emergence of a dominant, opposing power there. (…) American politics should ultimately be based on the vision of a better world: the vision of creating a world community based on effective cooperation in harmony with long-term trends and the fundamental interests of humanity. But until then, the imperative is not to allow any Eurasian challenger to emerge who could bring the Eurasian continent under his rule and thus pose a threat to America as well. The aim of this book is therefore to develop a comprehensive and self-contained geostrategy with regard to Eurasia. "

The United States' global military presence is one factor in its status as a superpower.

Brzeziński sees the status of the USA not as a goal worth striving for, but as a fact. This state of affairs is represented by various factors such as the global military presence, economic potential, technological advantage and a global affinity for American culture. It is important to maintain this lead - but not as an end in itself - in order to maintain global stability. The goal should be to keep potential competitors at a distance until a worldwide set of rules has been established and institutionalized and before one's own power is on the wane. Ultimately, the United States will have been the "last and only real superpower".

The main arena for the clashes will be Brzeziński's opinion on Eurasia . All potential challengers from the USA would come from the area between Lisbon and Vladivostok . A large part of the book is a comprehensive analysis of the region.

From this he developed various recommendations for action for the United States. A Franco-German leadership role in the European Union is to be promoted in order to consolidate its expansion . Russia should be encouraged to clearly define its own role in terms of a democratic and western orientation. This is intended to prevent Balkanization in Central Asia and to establish increased security and stability awareness in the region. In addition, a consensus must be found with the People's Republic of China that is not at the expense of Japan , which Brzeziński sees as its main ally - but not as a regional power.

In his review, Volker Rühe sees Brzeziński's aim in establishing and institutionalizing a worldwide set of rules before one's own power is on the wane.

The second chance 2007

In Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower , Brzeziński analyzes the previous 15 years of US foreign policy, in which the US emerged victorious from the Cold War and was the only superpower. It shows how the last three presidents, George H. W. Bush , Bill Clinton and George W. Bush realized their leadership roles and exercised their power as leaders of an invulnerable world power. The book begins with an outline of the history of the Cold War. The overthrow of the Soviet system is seen not as the work of Ronald Reagan alone , but as the result of the policies of three presidents in the context of international events.

In his presentation he differentiates between two views of the world, that of globalization advocates and that of neoconservatives .

In the first three chapters, he introduces the presidents and their foreign policy team. He discusses the events and people who shaped foreign policy. He focuses on three main factors: the Atlantic Alliance, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict . He also discusses environmental policy , emerging South American nationalism and the rise of China and India.

In the chapters "Original Sin" (Bush I), "The Impotence of Good Intentions" (Clinton) and "Catastrophic Leadership" (Bush II) he compares the presidents and their decisions. He criticizes Bush I and Clinton and rates them similarly negatively, but with different strengths and weaknesses. He is the toughest with the Bush II administration, particularly with regard to the treatment of the Alliance, the Middle East, and environmental policy.

In the “After 2008” chapter, Brzeziński demands that the future president should strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. He must reform lobbyism , demonstrate leadership in the Middle East, primarily towards Israel, strengthen consensus in environmental policy and formulate a strategy for China as a emerging world power and power factor in the Middle East.

He warned that the US would get a second chance after 2008, but that there would undoubtedly not be a third chance afterwards.

Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power 2012

In Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power Brzeziński presents his geopolitical vision for the USA, with which it can cope with the challenges of the changed global political situation, which is characterized by the diffusion of power. In four chapters Brzeziński deals with four sets of questions:

  1. What are the consequences of the shift in power from West to East and how is this influenced by the new fact of a politically awake humanity?
  2. Why is the USA becoming less attractive in the world? How fatal are the symptoms of the US domestic and international decline? How did the US come to waste its unique opportunities after the peaceful end of the Cold War? What power for renewal does the USA have and what reorientation of geopolitics is necessary to fill America's role in the world with new life?
  3. What would be the likely geopolitical consequences of further US decline by 2025? Who would be the almost immediate victims? What impact would this have on global problems in the 21st century? Could China take over the dominant role of the US in world politics by 2025?
  4. What long-term geopolitical goals should a resurgent USA set itself for the period after 2025? How could the US involve Turkey and Russia with the traditional European allies in order to build an even bigger and stronger West? How could the US simultaneously strike a balance in the east between the need for closer cooperation with China and the fact that constructive policies should neither be China-centered nor entangled in conflicts in Asia?

Comparison with Henry Kissinger

Brzeziński is often compared to Henry Kissinger . Differences are mainly evident in the Cold War phase. While Kissinger pursued more of a status quo policy and strived for a balance of power, Brzeziński wanted to undermine the Soviet system, which, due to communist ideology and lack of freedom, he did not trust inherent stability. Therefore Brzeziński stood up for the observance of human rights and supported dissidents, while Kissinger considered this to be more destabilizing. As an expert on the Soviet Union, Brzeziński had a better understanding of the weaknesses of the communist system and recognized the nationalist tensions behind the uniform facade. With his support for the Polish trade union movement, he took advantage of these tensions and intensified them, which ultimately led to the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Honors

Brzeziński (2010)

1963 it chose the US Chamber of Commerce to an outstanding of America's ten men (one of America's Ten Outstanding Men) . In 1969 he became an honorary member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1981 he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in normalizing the political relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States and for his contribution to human rights and national security policies in the United States. In 1995 he was awarded the “ Order of the White Eagle ”, Poland's highest civilian honor, for his contributions to regaining independence . In 1998 he became an honorary citizen of Lviv, in 2002 of Gdansk and 2003 of Vilnius .

He has received honorary academic doctorates from Georgetown University , Williams College, Fordham University , College of Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic University of Dublin and the University of Warsaw .

Other awards include the “Centennial Medal of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences” from Harvard University, the “Hubert Humphry Award for Public Service” from the American Political Science Association and the “U Thant Award”. Brzeziński is also an honorary member of various foundations, including the Guggenheim Foundation and the Ford Foundation .

Fonts

literature

Web links

Commons : Zbigniew Brzeziński  - collection of images, videos and audio files
Wikiquote: Zbigniew Brzeziński  - Quotes

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, Dies at 89 . In: The New York Times . May 26, 2017
  2. ↑ csis.org
  3. ↑ Sabine Feiner: World Order through US Leadership? The conception of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. West German Publishing House, Wiesbaden 2001.
  4. ↑ globalgage.org ( Memento of the original from August 28, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / globalgage.org
  5. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013.
  6. ↑ Jonathan Freedland: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Kagan on the State of America . In: The New York Times . April 5, 2012, ISSN  0362-4331 ( nytimes.com [accessed December 23, 2016]).
  7. ^ Sabine Feiner: World Order through US Leadership ?: the conception of Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden 2000, p. 52, diss.fu-berlin.de (PDF)
  8. ↑ One on One - Zbigniew Brzezinski. In: Al Jazeera English. December 11, 2010, accessed June 10, 2018 .
  9. ↑ Kristian Gravenor: Zbigniew Brzezinski's Montreal recollections. In: Coolopolis. February 13, 2007, accessed August 22, 2008 .
  10. ^ A b Tang Yong: "Agenda for constructive American-Chinese dialogue huge": Brzezinski. In: People's Daily Online. March 20, 2006, accessed December 30, 2010 .
  11. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013, p. 208.
  12. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013, p. Xxi
  13. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013, p. Xxi
  14. ↑ jhupressblog.com
  15. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013, p. 208.
  16. ↑ Madeleine Albright: Madam Secretary . Hyperion, 2003, p. 57 .
  17. ^ Charles Gati: The Strategy And Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. 2013, p. 12.
  18. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski, William Griffith: Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe . In: Foreign Affairs . tape 39 , no. 4 , 1961, pp. 647 .
  19. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: "Détente in the '70s" In: The New Republic. January 3, 1970, p. 18.
  20. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: Meeting Moscow's Limited Coexistence. In: The New Leader. 51:24, December 16, 1968, pp. 11-13.
  21. ^ Founding Members of the Trilateral Commission
  22. ↑ Carl Brauer: Lost In Transition . In: The Atlantic . Atlantic Media, Washington, DC November 1, 1988 ( theatlantic.com [accessed March 27, 2014]). John P. Burke: Honest Broker? The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making . Texas A&M University Press, 2009, ISBN 978-1-60344-102-5 , pp.
     324 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  23. ^ Betty Glad: An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy . Cornell University Press, 2009, ISBN 0-8014-4815-8 , pp. 36 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  24. ^ John Maclean: Advisers Key to Foreign Policy Views. In: The Boston Evening Globe. 5th October 1976.
  25. ↑ Patrick G. Vaughan: The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 . Ed .: Leopoldo Nuti. Taylor & Francis, 2008, ISBN 0-415-46051-4 , Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Helsinki Final Act, pp. 11-25 .
  26. ↑ Michael Getler: Dissidents Challenge Prague - Tension Builds Following Demand for Freedom and Democracy. In: The Washington Post . January 21, 1977.
  27. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981. New York 1983, p. 123.
  28. ↑ Seyom Brown: Faces of Power. New York 1983, p. 539.
  29. ^ Giscard, Schmidt on Détente. In: The Washington Post. July 19, 1977.
  30. ↑ David Binder: Carter Requests Funds for Big Increase in Broadcasts to Soviet Bloc. In: The New York Times. March 23, 1977.
  31. ^ Brzezinski: Power and Principle. P. 293.
  32. ^ David A. Andelman: Brzezinski and Mrs. Carter Hold Discussion with Polish Cardinal. In: The New York Times. December 29, 1977.
  33. ↑ PIAB Official Website. ( Memento from March 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  34. ↑ content.time.com
  35. ↑ Brzezinski on isolation: former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski warns of the failures of Clinton foreign policy ( Memento from July 15, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ), Insight on the News, August 21, 1995.
  36. ^ A conversation about Kosovo with Zbigniew Brzezinski. In: Charlie Rose . March 25, 1999, accessed on August 9, 2016 (video with transcript, English).
  37. ↑ a b Obama advisor raises concerns . Ynet, September 15, 2007.
  38. ↑ Kleine-Brockhoff: Some want war in Iran . In: Die Zeit , No. 3/2007
  39. ^ Barry Gray: Zbigniew Brzezinski drops political bomb. World Socialist Web Site, February 3, 2007.
  40. ↑ a b Alec MacGillis: Brzezinski Backs Obama. In: Washington Post. August 25, 2007.
  41. ↑ Eric Walberg: The real power behind the throne-to-be. In: Al-Ahram. July 24, 2008, accessed August 9, 2016.
  42. ↑ BarackObamadotcom: Barack Obama Endorsed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. August 25, 2007. Retrieved February 9, 2017 .
  43. ^ A b In Cleveland, Obama Speaks on Jewish Issues. In: The New York Sun. Retrieved February 9, 2017 .
  44. ^ Despite Criticism, Obama Stands By Adviser Brzezinski. In: The New York Sun. Retrieved February 9, 2017 .
  45. ↑ Gerald Posner: How Obama Flubbed His Missile Message. In: The Daily Beast. undated.
  46. ^ Brzezinski: US must deny Israel airspace. Jewish Telegraphic Agency , September 21, 2009, accessed August 9, 2016.
  47. ↑ Jake Tapper: Zbig Brzezinski: Obama Administration Should Tell Israel US Will Attack Israeli Jets if They Try to Attack Iran. ( Memento from October 18, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: ABC News. September 20, 2009.
  48. ↑ PBS: Turmoil in Arab World: Deepening Divisions or Turning a New Page?
  49. ↑ Brzezinski: "There is an Obama doctrine but no Obama strategy". In: euronews.com. January 20, 2013, accessed February 9, 2017 .
  50. ^ Brzezinski on the Syria Crisis, An interview with the former national-security adviser on the US role. In: The National Interest . June 24, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014 .
  51. ^ CJ Chivers, Eric Schmitt: Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From CIA In: The New York Times . March 24, 2013, accessed July 8, 2014 .
  52. ↑ What Putin plans to do with Ukraine. Zeit Online , February 17, 2014.
  53. ↑ a b Zbigniew Brzezinski: What is to be done? Putin's aggression in Ukraine needs a response. In: Washington Post. March 3, 2014, accessed July 8, 2014 .
  54. ↑ Putin's three choices on Ukraine. In: The Washington Post. July 8, 2014.
  55. ^ Profile of Ian Brzeziński. In: linkedin.com. Retrieved August 9, 2016 .
  56. ^ William Blum: How the US provoked the Soviet Union into invading Afghanistan and starting the whole mess. Retrieved January 13, 2020 . For a German translation of the interview see Michael Lüders: Who sows the wind. What western politics does in the Orient . CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67749-6 , pp.
     19-20 ( limited preview in Google Book Search).
  57. ^ Robert M. Gates: From the Shadows. The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. Simon & Schuster, New York 1996, ISBN 0-684-81081-6 , p. 146: “The meeting was finally held on July 3, 1979, and — almost six months before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan — Jimmy Carter signed the first finding to help the Mujahideen covertly. It authorized support for insurgent propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan; establishment of radio access to the Afghan population through third-country facilities; and the provision either unilaterally or through third countries of support to the Afghan insurgents, in the form of either cash or nonmilitary supplies. "
  58. ^ Justin Vaïsse: Zbigniew Brzezinski. America's Grand Strategist. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2018, ISBN 978-0-674-97563-7 , pp. 307-308 (French: Zbigniew Brzezinski. Stratège de l'empire. 2016.).
  59. ^ Conor Tobin: The Myth of the “Afghan Trap”: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979 . In: Diplomatic History . January 9, 2020, p. 3 , doi : 10.1093 / dh / dhz065 . Brzezinski's Afghan War and the Grand Chessboard (2/3). The Real News Network, January 15, 2010, accessed January 13, 2020 .
  60. ↑ Steve Coll: Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Books, New York 2005, ISBN 978-0-14-303466-7 , p. 593: “Years later Brzezinski would tell an interviewer from Le Nouvel Observateur [...] that he had 'knowingly increased the probability' that the Soviets would intervene in Afghanistan by authorizing the secret aid. Brzezinski implied that he had slyly lured the Soviets into a trap in Afghanistan. But his contemporary memos— particularly those written in the first days after the Soviet invasion — make clear that while Brzezinski was determined to confront the Soviets in Afghanistan through covert action, he was also very worried that the Soviets would prevail. Those early memos show no hint of satisfaction that the Soviets had taken some sort of Afghan bait. Given this evidence and the enormous political and security costs that the invasion imposed on the Carter administration, any claim that Brzezinski lured the Soviets into Afghanistan warrants deep skepticism. "
    Conor Tobin: The Myth of the “Afghan Trap”: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Afghanistan, 1978–1979 . In: Diplomatic History . January 9, 2020, p. 3–4 , doi : 10.1093 / dh / dhz065 : “Third, a Soviet invasion was not something desired or welcomed by the administration as it clashed with other priorities in 1979, having strategic implications and political consequences for Carter's upcoming re-election campaign. Brzezinski's actions through 1979 exhibited a meaningful effort to dissuade Moscow from intervening through publicizing the Sovietization of Afghanistan and warning of the adverse effects of military involvement. His post-invasion memos reveal concern, not opportunity, which belies the claim that inducing an invasion was his objective. [...] In sum, a Soviet military intervention was neither sought nor desired by the Carter administration, and the covert program initiated in the summer of 1979 is insufficient to charge Carter and Brzezinski with actively attempting to ensnare Moscow in the 'Afghan trap '. ” Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter. Foreign Relations of the United States, December 26, 1979, accessed January 13, 2020 .
  61. ↑ Zbigniew Brzezinski: Between two ages: America's role in the technetronic era . Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn 1982, ISBN 0-313-23498-1 .
  62. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: Brzezinski's thesis . In: The New York Review of Books . April 29, 2004, ISSN  0028-7504 ( nybooks.com [accessed June 10, 2018]).
  63. ↑ p. 96: "Another threat, less overt but no less basic, confronts liberal democracy. More directly linked to the impact of technology, it involves the gradual appearance of a more controlled and directed society. Such a society would be dominated by an elite whose claim to political power would rest on allegedly superior scientific know-how. Unhindered by the restraints of traditional liberal values, this elite would not hesitate to achieve its political ends by using the latest modern techniques for influencing public behavior and keeping society under close surveillance and control. Under such circumstances, the scientific and technological momentum of the country would not be reversed but would actually feed on the situation it exploits. " Another threat, less overt but no less fundamental, concerns liberal democracy . Even more closely related to the influence of technology, this threat includes the gradual emergence of a more controlled and directed society. Such a society would be ruled by an elite whose claim to political power would be based on supposedly superior scientific expertise. Unhindered by the liberal values ​​of tradition, this elite would without hesitation realize its political goals by employing the most modern techniques of influencing public opinion and closely monitor and control society. Under these circumstances, the country's scientific and technological dynamism would not suffer a setback, but would draw strength from the situation it exploited.
  64. ^ P. 10: "The newly enfranchized masses are organized in the industrial society by trade unions and political parties and unified by relatively simple and somewhat ideological programs. Moreover, political attitudes are influenced by appeals to nationalist sentiments, communicated through the massive increase of newspapers employing, naturally, the readers' national language. In the technetronic society the trend seems to be toward aggregating the individual support of millions of unorganized citizens, who are easily within the reach of magnetic and attractive personalities, and effectively exploiting the latest communication techniques to manipulate emotions and control reason. Reliance on television - and hence the tendency to replace language with imagery, which is international rather than national, and to include war coverage or scenes of hunger in places as distant as, for example, India - creates a somewhat more cosmopolitan, though highly impressionistic, involvement in global affairs. The recently liberated / enfranchised masses are organized in industrial society by trade unions and political parties and united by relatively simple and somewhat ideological programs [( unified )]. In addition, political attitudes are influenced by appeals to national sentiments conveyed by the massive growth of newspapers, which of course use the national language of the readers. In the technetronic society, the trend seems to be towards the aggregation of the individual support of millions of unorganized citizens who are easily accessible through charismatic [( magnetic and attractive )] personalities, and towards the efficient use of the most modern communication technologies to manipulate emotions and control thoughts [(engl. control )]. Recourse to the television, so the tendency Language [(Engl. By imagery imagery )] to replace the slightly more cosmopolitan than those more internationally than nationally, and the consideration of war reports or hunger Scenes from distant places such as India, , albeit producing highly impressionistic participation in world politics.
  65. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Role in the Technetronic Era . New York 1970, p. 10
  66. ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski: America's Role in the Technetronic Era . New York 1970, p. 11
  67. ^ Zbigniew Brzeziński: The only world power: America's strategy of domination. 8th edition. translated by Angelika Beck. S. Fischer Verlag, 2004, ISBN 3-596-14358-6 , introduction 1997, p. 14/15.
  68. ↑ a b c d Volker Rühe : Stability through a new balance. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. November 6, 1997, accessed December 11, 2013 .
  69. ^ Shlomo Avineri: Foreword. In: Zbig, the man who cracked the-Kremlin.
  70. ^ American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Book of Members . amacad.org (PDF) accessed April 15, 2016
personal data
SURNAME Brzeziński, Zbigniew
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Brzeziński, Zbigniew Kazimierz (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION Polish-American political scientist
DATE OF BIRTH March 28, 1928
PLACE OF BIRTH Warsaw
DATE OF DEATH May 26, 2017
Place of death Falls Church , Virginia