Neckar-Enz position
The Neckar-Enz position was a line of fortresses in Baden and Württemberg built by the German Reich between 1935 and 1938 . It ran from Eberbach to Besigheim along the Neckar and from Besigheim to Enzweihingen along the Enz , stretched over 86 km and comprised 450 bunkers . The construction costs were 12 to 15 million Reichsmarks .
It was supposed to stop an attack by French troops across the Kraichgau and block their way into the German hinterland. After the contractual consolidation of a French and Czechoslovak alliance in 1935, this building, the Wetterau-Main-Tauber-position and the Bavarian-Czech border position Selb - Eslarn were supposed to prevent the opposing troops from being quickly united and thus cut off in the course of a military conflict Southern Germany succeeds.
With the construction of the much larger western wall in 1938–1940, the position became a second line of fortifications. At the end of the Second World War , the position fulfilled its function to a limited extent and enabled the Wehrmacht to postpone the Allied conquest of southern Germany by twelve days.
prehistory
Versailles Peace Treaty
The Versailles Peace Treaty , which the German Reich signed on June 28, 1919, after the First World War, severely curtailed Germany's ability to defend itself. He limited the army of the Reichswehr to a strength of 100,000 men and prohibited the procurement and maintenance of heavy weapons such as tanks or airplanes. In addition, the treaty prohibited the establishment and maintenance of military formations and fortifications west and 50 kilometers east of the Rhine. The fortresses of Cologne and Germersheim and the Isteiner Klotz had to be razed . French armed forces occupied the left bank of the Rhine. France achieved military security through these measures: the occupation of the Rhineland and the demilitarized zone east of the Rhine were intended to create a buffer zone on German soil in the event of a military conflict.
Weimar Republic
Soon after the establishment of the Weimar Republic , the German military began considering a strategy to protect the German Empire. By the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 at the latest , the threat potential for an attack from the West became apparent, and the conflict also strengthened the power of the military within German politics. The Reichswehr Ministry came to the conclusion that the new German borders - due to the changes to the border line and the demilitarized zones - were much more difficult to defend than the old ones. In addition, because of the limitations of the Versailles Treaty, a material and personal superiority of the opponent had to be assumed; France, Poland and Czechoslovakia were considered strong military powers at the time.
Therefore, the view matured within the Reichswehr that national defense for the German Reich had to be based on the given boundary conditions, instead of following traditional concepts, such as the then head of the army command, General von Seeckt , represented. One of the masterminds was the then head of the army organization management in the troop office , Lieutenant Colonel Joachim von Stülpnagel , author of the memorandum Thoughts on the War of the Future of February 26, 1924.
With this in mind, the T 1 IB Army Department of the Troop Office planned resistance zones along the 50 km zone in 1924 and 1925. In the event of an attack, the battles should be directed strategically and operationally into these prepared areas in order to involve the enemy in loss-making battles as early as possible. With this “strategic defensive” or “operational and strategic holding back”, the army considered it possible at that time to be able to offer resistance to a superior enemy over a longer period of time. The army also had extensive experience with the concept of the position from the wars of position in the First World War . By December 1925, the army had completed the planning with specifications for tactics, organization, technology and operations: The resistance zones in the front line were to be defended from reinforced concrete shelters for machine guns and artillery . In the depth of the zones, obstacles, barriers and other fortifications should prevent the attacker from advancing. Such a resistance zone should start at Coesfeld , west and south of Munster and continue via Fritzlar , Gießen , Nidda , Gelnhausen , Mosbach , Heilbronn , Pforzheim , Rottweil to Fützen . An additional zone should be set up further inland. The first line thus anticipated the course of the Wetterau- Main-Tauber and Neckar-Enz positions.
Since the government of the Reich, namely Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann , tried to reach an understanding with France and to revise the Versailles Treaty, the politicians in the period after 1925 tried to avoid any military provocation. So the resistance zones did not leave the planning stage for the time being. The Paris Agreement of January 31, 1927, an additional protocol to the Versailles Treaty, allowed Germany to build light fortresses for the first time. Previously, the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission (IMKK) carefully monitored compliance with the prohibitions. During the grand coalition under Chancellor Müller, the emancipation led to the Weimar Republic's first armaments program from 1929 to 1932. In the context of this program, simple swamp and water obstacles arose on the eastern borders at the end of the 1920s. In 1931 the Heilsberger Triangle was fortified southwest of Königsberg . Only simple measures were implemented along the western borders, for example important thoroughfares were equipped with explosive chambers, barriers were reinforced and border guards were formed.
The Geneva Disarmament Conference began in February 1932 . The German Reich demanded military equality and the repeal of the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty.
Nazi Germany
From October 14, 1933, the representatives of the German Reich no longer took part in the negotiations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and Germany also left the League of Nations five days later . After the " seizure of power " it was now Hitler's goal to achieve military equality single-handedly. The Second Armaments Program from 1933 to 1938 formed the basis for the new military policy far removed from international agreements . Among other things, it provided for the construction of state fortifications.
With the Franco-Soviet assistance treaty signed on May 2, 1935 and the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the USSR , the troops and armed forces office saw the danger of southern Germany being cut off from the heartland through a French advance to the Main and a rapid union with the Czechoslovak army. There was still great political tension with France. The French army was considered very modern and far superior to the German. The threat scenario was a surprise attack covered by the Maginot Line . At the beginning of his rule, Adolf Hitler did not want to provoke a conflict with the Western powers by breaking the Versailles Treaty and fortifying the Franco-German border. The still weak army would have emerged as a loser from a military conflict.
Establishment
Planning and exploration
In 1933, the inspection of the pioneers and fortresses (InFest) at the head of the army command, from 1935 the Army High Command (OKH) began work on a general plan for the fortification of the German Reich. InFest considered a breakthrough over the Rhine-Main plain or through the Kraichgau, the Jagsttal and the Hohenlohe plain to be likely in the event of a crisis . Via the Wetterau-Main-Tauber-position (WMTS) between Büdingen and Klingenberg am Main and the Neckar-Enz position between Eberbach and Enzweihingen, both directly east of the 50 km zone of the Versailles Treaty, which is still respected by Hitler, these two historical gateways should be secured by locking positions. A French attack over the Black Forest or the Odenwald was considered less plausible. In addition, the Bavarian-Czech border position should block all through roads in the Bavarian Forest against a march from the east.
On October 9, 1934, the head of the InFest, Inspector Otto-Wilhelm Förster , issued the order to explore the Neckar-Enz position. The task was:
“... to strengthen the defenses of the troops deployed in order to enable them to defend themselves against a superior enemy for as long and as effectively as possible. The positions outside the demilitarized zone are to be constantly expanded in the operationally important sections, whereby the enemy is forced to use correspondingly stronger means of attack. "
From October 1934, the Neckar-Enz position was explored over its full length. Since the northern and southern foothills between the Michaelsberg and Eberbach and between Unterriexingen and Enzweihingen were within the 50 km zone, this already represented a breach of the Versailles Treaty. With the order for the security expansion of the Neckar-Enz position from January 18, 1935, InFest ordered the first expansion of the position and released funds totaling 15 million Reichsmarks for the entire expansion, but this was reduced to 13 million from March 16. As a result, 10 percent of the planned buildings could not be realized. The fortress inspection V was created with the fortress assemblies Heilbronn I (responsible for the Jagstfeld - Schozach estuary section), Heilbronn II (Schozach estuary - Besigheim) and Ludwigsburg (Besigheim - Unterriexingen), the later fortress pioneer staffs 10, 11 and 12. They explored the locations for bunkers, determined the details of the system and coordinated and monitored the construction.
construction
Outside the 50 km zone
In 1935, construction work began on construction section I, 45 kilometers wide, between Jagstfeld and Unterriexingen, which was completely outside the 50 km zone of the Versailles Treaty. The security expansion, which lasted until 1936, comprised the construction of two thirds of all planned bunkers, a continuous flat wire barrier, tank barriers and the construction and equipping of reinforcement sheds . Three to four bunkers per kilometer were built along the rivers in order to be ready for defense at an early stage. From 1936 to 1937 and from 1937 to 1938 the reinforcement was expanded: two to three bunkers per kilometer were built in the depth of the position, and the communication network was expanded. The subsequent reinforcement expansion included the intermediate field and the completion of the obstacles.
Within the 50 km zone
Although Gundelsheim was within the 50 km zone, an extensive bunker system with a crew of 26 men was set up as early as 1935 when the barrage there was built for the Neckar canal . These combat bunkers were officially declared as civil air raid shelters. In a letter it said at the time: “… The resulting crossing of the 50 km limit by about 1000 m is harmless in the opinion of the Reichswehr Minister, who has still reserved the decision for himself. ... "
After the Versailles Treaty was further broken by the occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, further construction was ordered to the north and south-west: First, the position with section II was extended by eight kilometers along the Neckar to Gundelsheim, as was section III by three kilometers along the Enz to Oberriexingen . In 1937, section II from Gundelsheim to Neckargerach was extended, and section III from Oberriexingen to Enzweihingen was expanded to include security. The northern section Neckargerach – Eberbach was expanded in 1937 like a base. The Neckar-Enz position thus reached its full length of 86 kilometers. At the end of the expansion in early 1938, it comprised a total of 450 buildings. Apart from a subsequently approved system of cavities under the Hohberg near Unterriexingen and five six-notch armored towers, all structures largely corresponded to the original plans.
In 1936 the construction of the WMTS and the Bavarian-Czech border position began. As a link between the WMTS and the Neckar-Enz position, the poorly developed Odenwald – Miltenberg barrier line was explored for reinforcement. The plans for the location and construction were prepared but not carried out. As a mobilization position, it should be set up quickly in the event of a defense. To the south, the security position of Stuttgart followed as a mobilization position , which reached crescent-shaped over Weil der Stadt around Stuttgart to Waldenbuch . In 1937 a field position from Enzweihingen along the Enz to the Black Forest ridge position near Neuenbürg was explored.
Construction logistics
Before the construction of a bunker could begin, InFest first had to acquire the required land. Since planning, exploration and construction were a secret matter of command, a purchase or expropriation was out of the question, as the change of ownership would have been visible in the land register . Therefore, the owners had to tolerate the construction of the facilities according to the Protection Area Act and the Act on Land Procurement for the purposes of the Wehrmacht and received compensation for this. The fortress inspectors awarded the construction work in lots to various construction companies who were obliged to maintain confidentiality. The structures of the position were built behind privacy screens until the camouflage was completed. The airspace was monitored against aerial reconnaissance .
The quality requirements were very high, concrete samples were taken and examined regularly. Each sub-construction section (such as the foundation , formwork , reinforcement or concreting) was individually checked and approved before work could continue. Concreting had to be done in one go in order to avoid later weak spots and fractures.
The biggest problem in production was the heavy armor parts such as armor plates and domes , for which there were no production methods yet. This initially led to delays in the completion of the bunkers. For the local farmers, the transport of building materials to the bunkers gave them the opportunity to earn additional income. For reasons of secrecy, the heavy tank parts could only be transported to the construction sites at night.
Despite all secrecy, the emergence of the Neckar-Enz position did not go unnoticed by the population, as Wilhelm Keil , who later became President of the Württemberg-Baden state parliament, wrote in his memoirs:
“On October 10th [1935] I noticed a construction site camouflaged with foliage on a day's hike near Besigheim. Unsuspectingly, without noticing the prohibition sign, I step closer and through the cracks in the wooden shed I see a massive concrete building in the making. A building supervisor means that he can arrest me immediately. But I don't look alike to any spy and I get away with it without harm. From now on I will pay more attention to the numerous bunkers on the Neckar and Enz slopes. "
Tactical concept
The Neckar-Enz position was based on the concept of the blocked position. According to the plans of the 1920s, a zone of resistance was to be created by expanding it deeper. With the reinforcement and reinforcement expansion, which was only partially implemented, the Neckar-Enz position only partially achieved the originally planned strength of a "fortress battlefield".
Under the circumstances at the time, a blocked position had the advantage over a classic fortress with a fortress crew that it could be quickly occupied and defended by regular field troops. The army, which was limited to 100,000 men by the Versailles Treaty, did not require any special training and could be deployed flexibly. In addition, the army had experience with relevant combat situations from the First World War.
All of the position's important combat positions were housed in self-sufficient bunkers. Troops in prepared field positions completed the defense; bunkered shelters were provided for their protection. There was no fixed armament, instead the position was to be defended with the regular armament of the infantry, such as the light and heavy machine guns (IMG and SMG). Since the Neckar-Enz position was only ready for action as part of a mobilization , it was considered a "non-armored skeleton position of permanent construction". The skeleton was formed by the combat bunkers: machine-gun positions with notch plates or armored domes, company command posts and artillery observation posts. In addition to the combat bunkers, there were barriers and barracks as other types of structures.
The task of the position was to stop a breakthrough by enemy infantry and mobile field artillery. The rivers Neckar and Enz served as natural tank obstacles . Directly behind it was the main battle line (HKL) as the front line of defense. InFest influenced the shipping authorities during the canalization of the Neckar, which was running in parallel at that time, in order to be able to include the canals and quays in the defense, which had to be designed with vertical and bullet-proof sheet pile walls .
In front of the main battle line, an infantry obstacle was created from a wire entanglement in dangerous places. The levels of the fight HKL were so arranged and aligned that the this-side bank continuously by gun fire coated could be created and thus a closed fire front along the main line. The planning provided that the bunkers could cover each other. Where this was not possible, combat groups should move out to prepared field positions. The flanking fire could be opened from combat stands with machine gun notches , while stands with armored domes enabled frontal fire. The smallest possible bunkers were hidden around the area in order to divert enemy fire from specific targets due to the small attack surface. MG loopholes located behind the HKL fulfilled cover functions.
For the observation of the battlefield and the opposite bank, observation points were explored at strategically favorable places. The artillery observation was usually carried out openly from a field position with a rear shelter. Artillery observation posts with armored domes and periscopes were created when there was a particular threat . At the same time they also served as observation posts for the own artillery to be stationed at the rear. Behind wooded areas, up to 11 m high observation posts were prepared for observation so that one could see over trees. For the infantry observation, combat bunkers and shelters were partially equipped with tiny bells.
Some of the command posts necessary for commanding the troops were located in the combat bunkers, while the company command posts were located in the hinterland. Higher command posts should be stationed in civilian or field accommodation in the hinterland. All the stands were connected by a telecommunications network.
Reinforcement sheds were built in order to store the fortification material with which the position was to be made ready for defense in the event of mobilization. Barbed wires and tripwires, stakes and Spanish horsemen were stored here . There were prepared instructions for setting up the material in the event of a defense.
At various points along the Neckar-Enz position, the main battle line had to be set back from the river bank, for example when the opposite terrain was elevated so that the enemy could easily see and control the terrain on this side. This was the case, for example, between Gundelsheim and the Jagst estuary, on the Neckarbogen near Horkheim and on the Enz between Bissingen and Unterriexingen. Here barriers (battle outposts) were created along the river obstacle to observe the enemy and in front of the main battle line there were stake obstacles and, in some cases , anti- tank ditches , walls or tapping as additional anti-tank obstacles. The pile obstacles were 2.5 m long and 20 to 30 cm thick piles that were driven into the ground in four rows. In addition, anti-tank guns ( anti-tank guns ) should flank such areas. To accommodate the anti-tank guns, special bunkers were built as shelters; they were to be used in the open area for the benefit of flexibility.
In order to simulate a stronger expansion and thus divert attacks from more difficult-to-defend sections, the fortress builders erected shanks. These structures were hardly camouflaged in order to deceive the enemy about the location of the correct bunkers. They had only simple wall notches and could be used as battle outposts, changing positions or for observation. Occasionally they were also used as storage rooms.
structure
For the fully developed part of the Neckar-Enz position from Gundelsheim to Enzweihingen, an occupation with three infantry divisions was planned in the event of a defense, the division borders being north of Neckarsulm and south of Lauffen am Neckar. Each division was composed of three battalions , with two battalions each having to occupy the position and one serving as a reserve. Depending on the hazard potential, the width of the division sections was between 15 and 23 kilometers, the width of the battalion sections between 2 (near Jagstfeld) and 8 kilometers (near Besigheim).
The fortress builders assigned an abbreviation for each battalion section. Within a section, the buildings were numbered from north to south: This is how Ba 2 referred to the second building in the “ Bachenau ” section. In total, the 60 km wide front between Gundelsheim and Enzweihingen was to be defended by 5220 men (4512 men and 708 NCOs and officers). This section comprised 386 bunkers, which corresponded to a density of 6.4 bunkers and a crew of 87 men per kilometer.
Du ( Duttenberg ) was the most developed section of the Neckar-Enz position, it ran from Obergriesheimer Berg to the Hägle forest. Since the InFest considered a march from Gundelsheim through the Lohgraben into the Jagsttal to be possible, 30 bunkers were built over a width of 3.5 kilometers. Another example of an intensely secured section was Ro ( Rotenacker Forest ) between Bissingen and the mouth of the Leudelsbach . Since the opposite area on the other side of the Enz was banked, the main battle line was withdrawn there. 38 bunkers at a depth of up to 2 kilometers were created over a width of 3 kilometers. For bunkers and obstacles, InFest used 60 plots with a total area of 4.5 hectares .
Construction
Standard buildings
InFest developed so-called standard structures and standardized armored parts in order to keep costs as low as possible and to advance planning and construction quickly . Standard structures were also used for the other blocking positions of the time, including in a more developed form for the western and Atlantic walls . If no types from the standard building program were available for special terrain situations, InFest also allowed special buildings. Depending on the type, the costs for a standard building were between 21,000 and 220,000 Reichsmarks, with around 10–20% of the heavy steel armored parts.
MG loopholes
The most commonly built type was the MG-Schartenstand. It had a 7.5-tonne notch plate for the heavy machine gun (sMG) and a crew of 5 men. One variant was the Schartenstand with a ceiling plate, which was better integrated into flat terrain thanks to its lower lift . Scharten stands were vulnerable to frontal fire and were therefore always used as a flank. The variant of the double loop stand comprised two sMG fighting stands in one structure.
Armored turrets
Frontal fire should be opened from the more complex armored turrets. Such buildings had a dome weighing around 16 t, which deflected frontal fire with its arching. In addition to three-notch armored stands, five six-notch armored stands were built. An all-round field of fire could be covered with two SMGs from the domes of these powerful bunkers.
Shelters and combinations
In addition to the fighting stalls, the shelters for reserves , unit groups, artillery observers and command posts were largely built as standard buildings. Often the types were combined with one another in one structure: For example, in the type program there was the MG-Schartenstand with a group with a crew of 18 men. About two thirds of the bunkers were fighting stalls or fighting stalls with groups. 69 bunkers were shelters.
observer
A separate observation room was provided in each of the loop stands or shelters for the tiny bells for infantry observation. Under the two-ton steel dome with four viewing slits there were optics through which the observer could see the field from a stool below. The heaviest armored part of the standard construction program was the artillery observation armored bell with a weight of 16 tons. Directly under the 16 centimeter thick dome were both a periscope and angled optics, underneath which the observer could take a position on a rotating platform.
Construction
A very strong cubic reinforcement of the standard buildings was intended to prevent cracks in ceilings and walls from artillery fire. The ceiling of the buildings consisted of parallel I-beams with sheet steel between them. This continuous steel cover saved the need for shuttering the ceiling during construction.
The range of standard structures provided for various expansion levels. Combat stalls and shelters were mostly built with a thickness of B1: the one meter thick outer walls and the 80 centimeter thick ceiling were safe against weapons with a 21 cm caliber . Barriers had the strength C (wall thickness 60 cm, thickness of the ceiling: 50 cm, safe against 15 cm caliber). Since the maximum caliber of mobile field artillery in the mid-1930s was 5 centimeters, the Neckar-Enz position was remarkably strong.
The finishing thickness D was only used for shear settings, the wall and ceiling thickness was 30 cm. Since no permanent manning was planned, the quality requirements were lower, and rubble stones were used as building material in addition to concrete .
camouflage
During the construction and maintenance of the bunkers, great attention was paid to camouflage . The bunkers were often located behind an embankment and were also camouflaged by leaves or bushes. Veneering with typical natural stone walls was particularly useful in vineyards . Occasionally, structures were built on the bunkers to camouflage them, for example a gas station in Lauffen am Neckar .
The appearance of the buildings had to be adapted to the surroundings so that the visible parts were not recognizable as new buildings. Therefore, for example, old wood and old stones had to be used as facing. Due to the camouflage, further air defense measures could be dispensed with.
Floor plans
In a few exceptional cases hollow passages were built to or between the bunkers. In addition to the system at the Gundelsheim barrage, there was a tunnel between the Böttinger tunnel of the Neckar Valley Railway and a bunker at the Neckarspitze of the Michaelsberg and a tunnel system under the Hohberg near Unterriexingen - this was the only system that had a water supply and sanitary facilities.
Depending on the function of the buildings, the floor plan provided for different rooms within the bunker: The crew entered an anteroom from the entrance opening. If it consisted of more than eight men, two entrance openings, as far apart as possible, were provided for safety reasons. In this case the anteroom was around 5 m². The ready room could be reached from the anteroom. This room, the largest with an area of around 20 square meters, served as a lounge for the teams. If the crew of a bunker also included higher ranks, they found their accommodation in separate, small train driver's rooms. From the ready room - if it was a combat bunker - the approximately four square meter combat rooms, each with a gun, could be reached. If there was an observation bell in a bunker, its room was also connected to the standby room.
Armament
The crew of the Neckar-Enz position should fight the attacker with the usual weapons of the infantry. Therefore, the bunker fighting stands were prepared for the heavy machine gun (sMG): Carriages - undercases behind the notch plates and swivel carriages under the armored cupolas enabled short-term assembly. The groups were to advance to the field positions with the light machine gun. There were prepared combat instructions for every bunker and every field position.
There were notches in the entrance openings of the bunkers through which the crew could defend the bunker themselves with their infantry weapons. If an attacker had penetrated as far as the gas lock , the defenders could still use notches to sweep the gas lock from the rooms behind it. From 1936 onwards, most of the bunkers were also provided with a "flanking system". It was a small fighting stand from which the bunker yard could be painted.
care
The soldiers in the bunkers had to take care of themselves from outside. There was only an emergency ration and water supplies in the buildings to provide food for the teams. Drinking water had to be fetched with canisters from springs explored in advance. There were simple wash basins for personal hygiene. The only toilets available were simple compost toilets filled with peat waste .
Since, with a few exceptions, no electricity was available, the bunkers had to be lit with petroleum or carbide lamps. For this purpose niches were provided in the walls.
The bunkers had to be heated due to the high humidity and mostly low temperatures. The solution was hardly satisfactory: the heating was provided by gas-tight coal stoves and hoods in the walls. Since the column of smoke was able to reveal the bunker, the stove had to be removed and taken outside when an attack was approaching.
Further equipment
The bunkers were furnished with simple beds, hammocks, folding tables, and folding chairs. The beds were simple tubular steel constructions with up to three lying surfaces on top of each other. During the day the beds could be folded up against the wall. If they weren't enough, additional hammocks could be put up. Rolled wallpaper patterns on the interior walls concealed the concrete in the ready rooms.
Due to the devastating experiences from the gas war during the First World War , measures were taken against gas attacks for the bunkers of the Neckar-Enz position . All openings (entrances and notches) could be sealed gas-tight. A ventilation system, in which the outside air would have been sucked in by means of a hand-operated fan and passed through cardboard and activated carbon filters , would have additionally ensured that no gas could penetrate through an overpressure . The entrance rooms of the bunkers were designed as gas locks. A soldier should have put his contaminated clothing in a closet and only then was allowed to enter the ready room. There were also small gas locks in the passages between the fighting rooms and the ready room.
The emergency exit was a novelty in the standard structures of the Neckar-Enz position . If the entrances were buried in an attack, the crew could still leave the facility using this escape route . To do this, the soldiers in the bunker had to open a 60 by 80 cm door that opened inwards, remove two rows of I-beams and break through a brick wall plastered from the outside. Therefore there was a semicircular concrete pipe on the outer wall, which led perpendicular to the surface. The crew had to shovel the sand filling inside the bunker and could then step outside via steps inside the tube. In addition, there was an emergency opening the size of a manhole in every regular entrance opening , which could be opened inwards if the entrances were buried.
Communications engineering
After experience with inadequate communications technology, especially in the first phase of the previous World War, but also during exercises in those years, great importance was attached to reliable communications technology that was sufficiently dimensioned for communication, as was the case with the Neckar-Enz position its own communications network was laid and switched. As in the past decades and later also with the Bundeswehr , this was done in close cooperation with the state telecommunications service, at that time the Deutsche Reichspost (DRP). Post construction teams laid a telephone line made up of a multi-core telephone cable with a steel jacket about one to two kilometers behind the line, preferably through wooded areas. It was laid in a steel pipe at least two meters deep in endangered places and led through the floor slab into the bunker. Cables ran from the bunkers to cable pillars, which - made of solid concrete - can still be found in the vicinity of the position today. There they were connected to the network. So each bunker could keep in contact with the neighboring bunkers and command posts. Field cables were kept in the armoring sheds for field positions to be created in the event of exercises and war. In the event that higher command posts were set up behind the Neckar-Enz position for training and war purposes, the Reichspost had to interconnect this network with the civil telephone network and other military networks. Such switching was practiced across the Reich, especially from 1934 onwards.
Historical significance from 1938
Construction of the west wall
In the wake of the Sudeten crisis , the National Socialist government came to the conclusion that an attack against Germany from the West was now more likely than previously assumed. In addition, after the Versailles Treaty was terminated by the invasion of the Rhineland, it made sense to defend the German Empire directly along its borders. So from 1936 the Ettlinger Riegel was built and from 1937 as part of a gigantic project the Westwall over its full length of around 630 kilometers with around 18,000 buildings.
For the Neckar-Enz position, this meant the end of further expansion and the strategic task just three years after construction began. The pioneer staffs 11 and 12 came to the Siegfried Line in 1937. The entire position was looked after by Staff 10 in Heilbronn, in 1938 he too came to the Westwall, and a fortress office in Heilbronn took over the further maintenance. In the summer of 1938 the reinforcement sheds were dismantled, the stored material and all interior fittings of the bunkers had to be transferred to the Siegfried Line within three days. When the Second World War broke out, the Neckar-Enz position was not occupied.
After the end of the western campaign, the High Command of the Army (OKH) gave up the Siegfried Line and the Neckar-Enz position as defenses along the previous western border by order of July 25, 1940. All remaining furnishings had to be removed by the end of 1942 in favor of the Atlantic Wall. By spring 1941, all tank and wire obstacles had to be dismantled in order to free up urgently needed agricultural land. In addition to the staff of the fortress inspections, prisoners of war and private companies were also deployed.
In January 1943 the authority in Heilbronn was also dissolved, making the position orphaned. In view of the shortage of raw materials during the war, around 80% of the telephone cables were excavated from 1943 to 1944, which further decreased the potential use of the Neckar-Enz position.
Second World War
The bunkers were not used for military purposes for almost four years, but they offered protection to the civilian population during air raids . The use as an air raid shelter had to be applied for separately and was usually approved. The small entrance openings of the bunkers prevented that large quantities of goods could be stored.
Approaching the front
When towards the end of 1944 it was foreseeable that the front would reach the German heartland in the foreseeable future, the Army High Command ordered the restoration of the Neckar-Enz position with its full defensive readiness by April 10, 1945 on October 23, 1944. Previously employed Considerations for using the northern section and building a new position along the western slope of the Heuchelberg turned out to be unfeasible in view of the circumstances. According to a report dated December 14, 1944, numerous problems arose when trying to get the bunkers ready for use again: The undercounter boxes were only compatible with the MG34 machine gun , but the troops now had the MG 42 . The optics of the observation domes had to be reinstalled, there were no more suitable beds, fans and stoves for the bunkers, and other furniture had to be made provisionally. In addition, the delivery of the required material stalled due to the acute transport and personnel bottlenecks.
On the other hand, the High Command of the Army and InFest in March 1945, after an assessment of the position, attested a good structural condition and a good camouflage. The readiness for defense was given by April 10th to 50 to 60%.
The Neckar-Enz position came within range of the front when American troops on 22/23. On March 25th they crossed the Rhine near Oppenheim and were able to quickly expand their bridgehead : On March 25th they took Darmstadt , crossed the Wetterau-Main-Tauber position near Aschaffenburg and fell into the rear of the Neckar-Enz position. The German leadership initially planned to build a new line of defense along the expanded positions, using the Neckar-Enz position and the Odenwald – Miltenberg barrier line. On March 30, Heidelberg fell into American hands.
In the north, these plans became irrelevant due to the enemy's rapid advance in the Odenwald: Already in the last days of March the Americans crossed the Odenwald in an easterly direction without much resistance, the northern part of Baden as far as the Tauber fell into their hands on the 30th and 31st. The Americans could now advance further south east of the Neckar, that is, in the rear of the Neckar-Enz position. Because of this development, the entire northern section of the position up to the Jagst estuary had to be abandoned. Gundelsheim was abandoned by the defenders after heavy artillery fire and on 2/3. April occupied from the north. Also on April 3, the attackers on the other side of the Neckar, coming from Kraichgau, reached Neckargartach across from Heilbronn. The rest of the area west of the Neckar and north of the Enz was relatively quickly up to 8/9. Occupied April, south of the Heuchelberg by French troops who had crossed the Rhine at Germersheim and Speyer on March 31 , with the aim of taking Karlsruhe and Stuttgart and thus securing France an equal position in the division of the German Empire into zones of occupation.
Combat operations along the Neckar-Enz position
If the advance for the Allies from the Rhine to there went quite smoothly, it came to a standstill along a line along the Enz, Neckar and Jagst. The German troops had taken up a new position along these rivers, including the Neckar-Enz line, and defended them mainly with infantry and a few assault guns , which were occasionally supported by artillery. The bunkers in the Neckar-Enz position were only used occasionally:
"[...] Neckar and Enz [...] have been fortified by a linear bunker front, the 'Neckar-Enz position' with machine-gun slots and some command bunkers. These stands no longer meet the requirements in view of the modern effects of weapons. Most soldiers are unaware of the existence of this line. It is only used in rare cases. [...] "
In the battle for Heilbronn, the enemy could hardly use his large majority of tanks due to the blown bridges. When the Americans saw this, they sent the 10th US Panzer Division from Heilbronn to the Tauberg area, which made an advance to Crailsheim , from which they had to withdraw after a few days ( Battle of Crailsheim ).
There were major fighting along the Neckar-Enz position in three sections: at the Kocher-Jagst estuary, in Heilbronn and around Nussdorf above Enzweihingen.
Jagst and Kocher estuaries
The mouths of Kocher and Jagst were defended by parts of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Götz von Berlichingen" , which were faced with the American 63rd Infantry Division attacking from the north and parts of the 100th Infantry Division. The defenders initially took up positions in Jagstfeld and on the heights between Jagst and Kocher, and they also occupied the bunkers there. Although the Americans were clearly outnumbered, could use tanks, and hit the place with heavy artillery fire and air raids, it cost them four days and considerable losses to take Jagstfeld in house-to-house combat; the fighting lasted from April 6th to April 9th. Kochendorf was captured four days later after the defenders withdrew as a result of the situation in Heilbronn.
Heilbronn
Heilbronn, which had already been largely destroyed by the air raid on December 4th , was defended against parts of the 100th Infantry Division by ragged remnants of the Wehrmacht; the fighting there lasted from April 3rd to 13th. The attackers first formed a bridgehead at the salt works in the north of the city, where they were able to break the resistance on April 6th. By shelling from the heights of the vineyards and from the bunkers of the Neckar-Enz position, German troops were initially able to prevent progress. A second bridgehead was built on April 5 further south near the city center and at the Knorr works; Particularly tough and bitter house-to-house fights took place in this area . Only after the Americans had succeeded on April 8 in building a pontoon bridge over the Neckar (this had previously been prevented by the German artillery on the heights around Heilbronn), tanks could intervene in the fight. This led to the unification of the bridgeheads and ultimately decided the battle. The last fighting took place on April 12th around the barracks in the south of the city.
After the conquest of Heilbronn, the Americans advanced south through the Schozach Valley to Talheim . In a battle in front of Talheim on April 13th, the German soldiers were able to stop them again, probably using the bunkers at the exit of the Schozach valley. The positions there were given up the following night. In the further course of the game, the defenders mainly carried out retreating skirmishes until the Americans had reached the Bottwartal on April 20 . From here they were able to advance to Bad Cannstatt within two days .
Along the Enz
On the southwestern edge of the Neckar-Enz position, Germans and French faced each other. The latter had on 7./8. April fought for the transition over the Enz in Mühlacker . Still on 8./9. In April Großglattbach, Aurich and Pinache were occupied, but the infantry attacks on the higher parts of the Platte (especially Serres, Nussdorf, Wiernsheim ) failed with heavy losses. The attackers were therefore initially content with occupying these places with artillery and air raids, which caused severe damage, especially in Nussdorf, three quarters of which was destroyed. Only after the fall of Pforzheim did the attackers make progress again on this section of the front, and they finally took Nussdorf on the evening of April 19. This process led to the abandonment of the Enzlinie. Just three days later, the French were able to enter Stuttgart without a fight, at the same time as the Americans on the other bank of the Neckar.
Between Heilbronn and Nussdorf it was largely calm during this time. In Besigheim and Bietigheim , the French occupied the western half of the city on April 9, the Germans withdrew to the eastern half after the bridges had been blown up. The fighting was largely limited to artillery duels, in which the German side fired from positions that had been measured for the Neckar-Enz position. When the French transported the male population of Bietigheim to Kleinsachsenheim on April 12th, the German soldiers on the other side of the Enz took them to be a French column and shot them with artillery. According to various sources, 19 to 25 civilians were killed.
Summary
The positions along the Neckar and Enz were the last serious obstacle for the Allied troops in the conquest of southern Germany and resulted in the Allies being held up in their sector for twelve days. By April 20, they had already conquered Nuremberg further northeast and reached the Saale, but needed 19 days for the relatively short distance from Heilbronn to Stuttgart. The rest of Württemberg and Bavaria , on the other hand, were occupied in just a few days, and Munich was reached on April 30, just eight days to Stuttgart. However, given the material inferiority of the German troops at that time, these battles could only delay the final end by a few days.
After the end of the war
The remaining bunkers were razed by the Allies from 1947 onwards, mostly by placing and detonating an explosive device inside the bunker on a stable corner of the outer wall. The result was that the bunker ceiling was torn down, mostly turned in the air and then fell back on parts of the bunker system with the inside up, often bent or folded. A complete blast was often not possible within localities, so that only a partial blast was possible. Nevertheless, there was damage because the population was often not adequately informed. Some bunkers near houses were filled in or filled with concrete if blasting seemed too dangerous. Occasionally, bunkers were forgotten, not found, or the attempt to detonate them was unsuccessful.
Bunker 44 near Gundelsheim
Remains of bunker 65 near Gundelsheim, the passage in the middle connected the group room (in front) with the machine-gun positions. (Dec 2007)
Ruins of Bunker 153 at Bad Friedrichshall Central Station (Sept. 2008)
Vineyard house with the rest of the bunker 244 as a base near Horkheim (Sept. 2007)
The bunker ruins provided the population with valuable material for reconstruction, and steel was especially popular: doors, notch plates, domes and steel girders were removed and mostly found their way to the scrap dealer. From 1950, the Federal Property Administration , now the owner of the Neckar-Enz position, had the armored parts that were still in existence, such as notch plates or domes, removed and scrapped. In 1952 she began to transfer the land with the remains of the bunker back to the old owners. Occasionally these better preserved bunkers were converted into storage rooms or the like.
Accidents often occurred due to poor protection of the remains of the bunker. Many ruins gradually disappeared during construction work or land consolidations . However, numerous remains of former bunkers can still be found along the eastern slopes of the Neckar and Enz. Today they are considered part of the “Westwall as a whole” as cultural monuments .
A building on the steep slope of the Enz in Bissingen could not be blown up because it was on a railroad track. It was uncovered by the Bunker Research Working Group of the Bietigheim-Bissingen History Association from 1999 and today documents the history of the Neckar-Enz position as a museum bunker. Bunker 302, located in the Enzwiesen north of Bietigheim, was near a well for the Bietigheim water supply and was therefore also preserved. It was leased by a private group from the city of Bietigheim-Bissingen and can be viewed as part of public tours.
literature
- Götz Arnold: The Neckar-Enz position. Military protective wall after the First World War . In: Ludwigsburg history sheets . No. 57 , 2003, ISSN 0179-1842 , p. 115-144 .
- Friedrich Blumenstock: The invasion of the Americans and French in northern Württemberg in April 1945 . In: Representations from the history of Württemberg . tape 41 . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1957 (reprinted in: Publications on local history and local history in Württembergisch Franken , Volume 8, Gerabronn / Crailsheim 1994. 264 pages, ISBN 3-87354-225-0 ).
- Hans Georg Kampe: Army intelligence and German Reichspost . Meißler, Waldesruh near Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-932566-31-9 .
- Till Kiener: The Neckar-Enz position. Gundelsheimer Bunker Worlds . 1st edition. L. Kiener, Nürtingen 2002, ISBN 3-00-010420-8 (With local history contributions by Leo Achtziger).
- Till Kiener: The Neckar-Enz position. Introduction to history and technology . 2nd Edition. L. Kiener, Nürtingen 2003 (booklet for visiting the museum bunker Ro 1 in Bissingen).
- Till Kiener: The Neckar-Enz position and the end of the war in 1945. Vaihingen / Enz in sight . Explorate-Verlag, Königsfeld 2016.
- Wilhelm Schrode: The Neckar-Enz position. A line of fortifications from the time of the Reichswehr as the first attempt at a western defense of the German Reich . Ludwigsburg 1977 (manuscript, 52 pages).
Web links
- Museum bunker Ro1 in Bissingen on the website of the Bunker Research Working Group
- Website for bunker 302 of the Neckar-Enz position in Bietigheim
- Tour of the Ro1 museum bunker and the Gaishalde air raid shelter in Bietigheim-Bissingen
Individual evidence
- ^ Arnold, p. 143
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Till Kiener: The Neckar-Enz position. Gundelsheimer Bunker Worlds . 1st edition. L. Kiener, Nürtingen 2002, ISBN 3-00-010420-8 , p. 9 .
- ↑ a b c d Götz Arnold: The Neckar-Enz position. Military protective wall after the First World War . In: Ludwigsburg history sheets . No. 57 , 2003, ISSN 0179-1842 , p. 124 .
- ^ Arnold, p. 115
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 116
- ↑ a b c Wilhelm Schrode: The Neckar-Enz position. A line of fortifications from the time of the Reichswehr as the first attempt at a western defense of the German Reich . Ludwigsburg 1977, p. 1 .
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 8
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 119
- ↑ a b c d e f g Arnold, p. 120
- ↑ a b c d e Schrode, p. 5
- ↑ a b c d Arnold, p. 121
- ↑ a b Arnold, p. 122
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 123
- ↑ a b Schrode, p. 2
- ↑ a b c d e f g Schrode, p. 52
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 126
- ↑ a b Schrode, p. 10
- ↑ a b c d e Schrode, p. 7
- ↑ a b c Schrode, p. 9
- ↑ a b c d e f Schrode, p. 12
- ↑ a b Till Kiener: The Neckar-Enz position. Introduction to history and technology . 2nd Edition. L. Kiener, Nürtingen 2003, p. 7 .
- ↑ a b c d e f Kiener (2002), p. 24
- ↑ a b c d Schrode, p. 13
- ↑ a b c d Kiener (2002), p. 13
- ↑ Schrode, p. 4
- ↑ a b Arnold, p. 128
- ↑ a b c d e f Kiener (2002), p. 14
- ↑ a b c d Arnold, p. 129
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 12
- ↑ a b Kiener (2003), p. 8
- ↑ a b c d e f g h Kiener (2002), p. 10
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 132
- ↑ a b Arnold, p. 131
- ↑ a b c Schrode, p. 6
- ↑ a b c d Kiener (2002), p. 64
- ↑ a b Kiener (2003), p. 13
- ↑ Schrode, p. 30
- ↑ a b c Schrode, p. 25
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 11
- ↑ a b Schrode, p. 31
- ↑ Schrode, p. 34
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2003), p. 17
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2003), p. 12
- ↑ Schrode, p. 11
- ↑ a b c Schrode, p. 15
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2002), p. 20
- ↑ a b Schrode, pp. 33–34
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 21
- ↑ a b Arnold, p. 133
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 36
- ↑ Schrode, p. 50
- ↑ a b c d e f Kiener (2002), p. 30
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2002), p. 28
- ↑ Schrode, p. 19
- ↑ Kiener (2002), pp. 78–79
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 59
- ↑ a b c d Kiener (2002), p. 33
- ↑ Kiener (2003), p. 10
- ↑ Schrode, p. 47
- ↑ Schrode, p. 16
- ↑ a b Schrode, p. 17
- ↑ Schrode, p. 18
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 15
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 41ff
- ↑ Schrode, p. 31f
- ↑ a b c Schrode, p. 35
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Kiener (2002), p. 25
- ↑ a b Kiener (2003), p. 22
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2003), p. 24
- ↑ Kiener (2003), p. 28
- ↑ Schrode, p. 33
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k Kiener (2002), p. 26
- ↑ a b c Kiener (2003), p. 29
- ↑ Unless otherwise indicated, the communications technology chapter follows the work of von Kampe.
- ^ Arnold, p. 136
- ↑ a b c d Schrode, p. 37
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 66
- ↑ Schrode, p. 38
- ↑ Unless otherwise stated, the Second World War chapter follows the work of the Blumenstock.
- ↑ a b c d Kiener (2002), p. 67
- ↑ a b c Arnold, p. 137
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 69
- ^ Arnold, p. 138
- ↑ a b Kiener (2003), p. 20
- ↑ a b Arnold, p. 139
- ↑ a b c d Schrode, p. 46
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 71
- ↑ a b Kiener (2002), p. 72
- ↑ Kiener (2002), p. 73
- ^ List of cultural monuments in Baden-Württemberg. Directory of immovable architectural and art monuments and objects to be examined . Regional Council Stuttgart, November 7, 2011, p. 17 ( PDF; 33 kB ). PDF; 33 kB ( Memento of the original dated December 2, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ Preservation of monuments in Baden-Württemberg . No. 4 . State Office for Monument Preservation in the Stuttgart Regional Council, 2010, p. 251 f . ( PDF; 6.1 MB ). PDF; 6.1 MB ( Memento of the original from October 20, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.
- ↑ Kiener (2003), p. 30
- ↑ Hilke Lorenz: Roland Essig lets the bunker walls speak . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . April 1, 2013 ( online offer of the Stuttgarter Zeitung [accessed on November 27, 2013]).
- ↑ Current. In: Website for bunker 302 of the Neckar-Enz position. Retrieved November 27, 2013 .
