Kamenets-Podolsk massacre

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In the Kamenez-Podolsk massacre, members of the German police battalion 320 and members of a “special action staff” of the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) Russia-South murdered SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln , around the end of August 1941 near the western Ukrainian city ​​of Kamenez-Podolsk 23,600 Jews . Before that, the had Nazi German Reich allied Hungary a majority of the victims in the after the attack on the Soviet Union by the Wehrmacht conquered SovietDeported to national territory . The massacre was the largest murder drive in the Holocaust to date . It took place a good month before the mass shootings of Babyn Yar near Kiev and is considered to be a decisive step from the selective murder policy to the desired complete eradication of Judaism .

Map on the deportations of Jews from Hungary to Kamenez-Podolsk (July / August 1941)

context

Anti-Semitism in expanding Hungary

The Hungarian governments under Béla Imrédy and Pál Teleki passed a series of so-called Jewish laws from 1938 onwards, thus intensifying the anti-Semitism that was widespread in Hungary during the interwar period . These legal provisions, based on racist assumptions, restricted the economic and professional freedoms and the right to vote of Jews. At the same time, these laws challenged the Hungarian citizenship of thousands of Hungarian Jews. In April 1941, the Hungarian Parliament finally passed a law banning marriages and extramarital sex between non-Jews and Jews - it came into force in August 1941.

As Hungary succeeded in revising the territorial post-war order laid down in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 , more and more people were discriminated against . Supported by the German Reich and Fascist Italy , Hungarian foreign policy initially achieved with the First Vienna Arbitration Award in early November 1938 that areas with a Hungarian majority in southern Slovakia and western Carpathian Ukraine ( Carpathian -Ruthenia) were separated from Czechoslovakia and granted to Hungary. Around 67,000 Jews lived in these areas. Around 78,000 more Jews came under Hungarian rule after Hungarian troops occupied the parts of Carpathian Ukraine that belonged to Austria-Hungary until 1918 after the so-called smashing of the rest of the Czech Republic with Adolf Hitler's approval . The Second Vienna Arbitration Award of August 30, 1940 finally forced Romania to cede northern Transylvania , where around 164,000 Jews lived, to Hungary.

In addition, between 1939 and 1941 10,000 to 20,000 and 15,000 to 35,000 Jews from Germany, Austria , the former Czech territories and Poland fled to Hungary. Some of these refugees had been granted residence rights by the authorities, while others were officially considered transit refugees en route to Palestine . Quite a few refugees hid their identities with false papers, while others were detained in internment camps run by the Hungarian Aliens Police - the National Central Authority for the Monitoring of Foreigners ( Külföldieket Ellenőrző Országos Központi Hatóság , KEOKH). Although the number of these Jewish refugees was negligible, it reinforced anti-Semitic tendencies within the Hungarian administrative apparatus. In 1941 a total of around 825,000 Jews lived in Hungary according to a census .

Deportation of “foreign” Jews

On November 20, 1940, Hungary joined the Tripartite Pact . As early as April 1941, it had participated in the Balkan campaign as an ally of the German Reich ; In June 1941 Hungary finally took part in the attack on the Soviet Union on the side of Germany. Three Hungarian divisions took part in the conquest of territories of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic . As a result of this advance, Hungarian troops temporarily had military sovereignty over a considerable Ukrainian area northeast of Hungary.

In this situation, Ödön Martinidesz and Árkád Kiss, two anti-Semitic KEOKH executives, planned to settle unwanted, “foreign” Jews in the new, “liberated” areas. Miklós Kozma , a former Hungarian Minister of the Interior and Defense and in 1941 the government plenipotentiary in Carpathian Ruthenia, took up this plan and obtained the approval of the Reich Administrator Miklós Horthy , the Hungarian head of state. The cabinet under Prime Minister László Bárdossy decided on July 12, 1941 to implement this plan. Implementing regulations stipulated that “the Polish and Russian Jews who had recently infiltrated should be deported in as large a number as possible and as quickly as possible”. The euphemistically "repatriated" measure should focus in particular on Carpathian Ruthenia. The target of deportation of the Jews recorded by the Aliens Police and local authorities was Eastern Galicia . Miklós Kozma received the order to carry out the deportation plan.

As planned in the deportation plan, he had the Jews first brought to Kőrösmező , a place on the Hungarian-Ukrainian border. They were only allowed to take the most essential things with them, food for three days and a maximum of 30 pengő . To allay their worries, it was suggested to them that they could take over the apartments of those Jews who had fled eastwards with the Soviet troops after the attack by the Germans. The deportations, some of which were already practically implemented in Hungary before July 12, 1941, affected refugees as well as Jews who had lived in Hungary for a long time - not only in Carpathian Ruthenia, but also, for example, in Transylvania, on Lake Balaton or in Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun county . Roma were also victims of such deportations.

From the Kőrösmező assembly point, the Jews were transported daily in groups of around 1,000 people to Kolomyja in southern Galicia, which was still under Hungarian military sovereignty. By August 10, 1941, around 14,000 Jews gathered there, and by the end of August this number increased by a further 4,000. During the same period, Hungarian units drove the newcomers in groups of 300 to 400 people from Kolomyja across the Dniester to a German one Military administered the area and forbade them to return to Hungary under threat of armed violence. Ukrainian militias robbed the deportees of their last valuables in many cases. The displaced should turn to Kamenets-Podolsk, Buschach , Chortkiv or Stanislaviv .

Most of the Jews expelled from Hungary gathered in Kamenets-Podolsk (South Podolia ). Almost 14,000 Jews had lived there in 1939 (a good 38 percent of the population), of whom around 4,000 to 5,000 had fled further east from the Germans since June 22, 1941. However, Jews expelled from Hungary and the Hungarian-occupied part of southern Galicia increased the Jewish proportion of the population again. Therefore, when the German and Hungarian troops arrived in the city on July 11, 1941, they found about 12,000 to 14,000 Jews there. This number doubled through the further influx to around 26,000 by the end of August 1941.

Appointment of the mass execution

Telex from Security Division 444 / Ia to the commander of the rear Army Area South, Karl von Roques , dated July 28, 1941:
“Jews from Hungary from Hungarian concentration camps with trucks. Deposed in the areas of Buczacz, Czortkow, Kamieniec, Podolski. Ukrainian people worried. These Jews absolutely have to go back. Div. [Sich.Div. 444] asks Hungary to be instructed accordingly. "

The Germans were not prepared for the influx of Jews deported to southern Galicia. Department VII of the regionally responsible Wehrmacht Field Command 183, which is responsible for the “ Jewish question ”, already emphasized on July 31 and again in mid-August 1941 that the Jews could not be fed and that there was a risk of epidemics ; it is therefore necessary to return them to Hungary. However, the armed forces leadership had factored in food problems for the civilian population in their war planning (→ hunger plan ). She was more concerned about the safety of the extensive supply routes, including the already envisaged battle for Kiev . Wehrmacht officers considered the security situation in the rear of the army to be precarious, among other things because, with Police Battalion 320 in Podolia and Volhynia, only a single police unit was available for several weeks. In addition, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was to be set up on September 1, 1941 and the military administration wanted to hand over the area, which was arranged according to their ideas, to the civilian authorities.

The highest ranking police functionary on site, the Higher SS and Police Leader Russia South Friedrich Jeckeln , formulated the idea in view of this situation that the Jews could be murdered . On August 25, 1941, at a conference at the headquarters of the Quartermaster General in the Army High Command , Eduard Wagner , it was announced that he would act:

"Major Wagner explained [...]. The Hungarians pushed around 11,000 Jews across the border near Kamenetz-Podolsk. The negotiations so far had not yet succeeded in bringing these Jews back. However, the Higher SS and Police Leader (SS-Obergruppenführer Jeckeln) hoped to have liquidated these Jews by September 1, 1941. [...] "

According to Klaus-Michael Mallmann , the conference probably took place in Bartenstein , not in Winniza , as previously assumed . Despite the clear announcement, the participants remained unmoved and did not discuss the project any further. According to the minutes of the conference, the following people arranged the massacre:

Other possible participants are:

Jeckeln was also able to propose mass murder because he knew that the leading military in Army Group South were "all of them self-confessed anti-Semites". The racist slogan of " Jewish Bolshevism " was firmly anchored in them. Jews were seen as carriers of the Bolshevik ideology and therefore as security risks and enemies. Karl von Roques, Commander of the Rear Army Area South, to which Jeckeln was assigned, was no exception. He evidently had a harmonious relationship with Jeckeln. There are no known discrepancies or serious arguments between the two. Reports from Division Ic ("Enemy Reconnaissance and Defense; Spiritual Care") of the commander in the rear Army Area South emphasized their smooth cooperation.

Jeckeln himself was a radical anti-Semite. His will to kill ever larger groups of Jews indiscriminately may have been spurred on by a competition for high murder rates. The British defense concluded at least from the decoded radio messages containing information on the number of victims ". The leaders of the three areas [the HSSPF] apparently vying for the, best 'results" Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski , who HSSPF Russia-Mitte, had significantly due to the faster advance of Army Group Center can report far higher numbers than Jeckeln. In addition, Heinrich Himmler was dissatisfied with Jeckeln's performance. The Reichsführer SS reacted indignantly to the slow receipt of Jeckeln's deployment reports. On August 11, Himmler's adjutant Werner Grothmann urged the HSSPF Russia-South to submit an immediate status report and a description of the measures implemented and those planned for the next few days. On August 12, 1941, Jeckeln joined Himmler and reported . Himmler was “very angry” with Jeckeln's approach, which still left something to be desired.

Beginnings of the Holocaust in Ukraine

By the end of August 1941, the Wehrmacht, the SS and the Ordnungspolizei already had some experience of murdering Jews in the Ukraine. The commissar's order and the requirement to liquidate the Jews from among the Soviet functionaries also applied here . After just a few days of the war, the perpetrators widened the circle of murder victims among the Soviet Jews and more and more began to spare only those Jews whose training seemed useful to them, such as doctors, craftsmen or skilled workers. The command leaders of Einsatzgruppe C were informed in the first weeks of August that from now on women and children were to be shot as a matter of principle.

Many mass shootings of Jews took place in Ukraine between June 22 and August 25, 1941. Such mass crimes reached three-digit, sometimes also low four-digit numbers of victims in Czernowitz , Dobromyl , Dubno , Kovel , Lemberg , Lyuboml , Lutsk , Rivne , Shepetivka , Zhytomyr , Sokal , Zolochiv and Tarnopol, among others .

Concrete circumstances

Telex from Jeckeln of August 29, 1941:
"[...] Activities [...] Stabskp. HSSPF Russia South has action under the direction of SS upper class. Jeckling in Kamenets Podolskij, finished. […]
Successes: […] Stabskp. shoots 7,000 Jews again, making the total number of Jews liquidated in Kamenets Podolskij around 20,000. Change to activity report v. 26. and 27.8.41 instead of Pol.Batl. 320 set staff cap. id message v. 27.8. instead of 5 thousand 11 thousand. Pol.Batl. 320 was only used as a barrier. [...] "

Time of crime, crime scene, technology

The information on the time of the offense is not uniform. The corresponding reports on the number of victims were released by Jeckeln in the early morning of August 27, 28 and 29, 1941. According to Klaus Mallmann, they therefore most likely always refer to the day before. Some historians follow him here. Others note that the offense was committed on August 27 and 28, August 27 to 29, and August 28 to 31, 1941, respectively.

The Jews were told that they had to vacate the city and would be relocated. They were led out of the city in long columns. The target was a hilly area outside the city, marked by bomb craters, apparently a few kilometers north and near a former ammunition depot of the Red Army .

Police officers formed a trellis at the scene through which the victims had to walk. Valuables were to be handed in. Some Jews were forced to undress. They then had to go down into the craters and previously dug trenches to lie on the ground or on the corpses of those who had been killed before them. They were executed with a headshot from submachine guns . Some victims were shot standing up. Many were buried alive.

Close perpetrators

Jeckeln was present during the shootings and watched the action from a hill. He commanded the riflemen and is said to have justified the shooting of the Jews on site with a speech.

The perpetrators included close employees of Jeckeln, whom he referred to in his reports on the number of victims as "special action staff" or "task force of the staff company". This included, on the one hand, the members of his bodyguard , with whom he had largely worked for years, and, on the other hand, around 50 to 60 members of his staff from the SS and police with various officer and crew ranks . At that time they did not form a permanent staff company, but were put together by Jeckeln for "Jewish actions" on a case-by-case basis. It is also possible that a guard from the HSSPF participated in the shootings.

Perpetrators also came from the 320 police battalion, which had been set up in Berlin-Spandau in February 1941 . It comprised three companies, the battalion staff and a motor vehicle squadron. Professional police officers occupied the headquarters of the battalion; Volunteers, mostly around 30 years of age, formed the teams. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union at the end of June 1941, it was initially relocated to Jasło , Poland , and from there to Proskurow via Przemyśl , Lemberg and Tarnopol in mid-August . Here it was placed under Jeckeln as a unit "for special use". Members of the 1st Company under Captain Alfred Weber and the 2nd Company under Captain Hans Wiemer led the Jews from Kamenez-Podolsk to the shooting site. There they took on shut-off tasks. The 3rd Company under Captain Heinrich Scharwey reached the scene of the crime on August 28, 1941, and its members also took part in barriers and shootings.

According to later investigation results, around 30 men from the SS and SD as well as 12 members of Police Battalion 320 from all three companies were among the shooters. A member of the 3rd Company of Police Battalion 320 appealed to the Hague Land Warfare Regulations and was released from the action by Scharwey. Some historians assume that Hungarians and Ukrainians also took part in the shootings. Others doubt at least the involvement of Hungarian soldiers. The participation of Ukrainian militias in the shootings is also considered unlikely, since German perpetrators did not make any corresponding statements later.

victim

According to the number of 23,600 victims mentioned by Jeckeln on August 30, 1941, the Kamenez-Podolsk massacre was the largest Nazi mass murder of Soviet Jews since the beginning of the war. For the first time, it also affected all Jews in a region without distinction, regardless of their age and gender, not just certain political functionaries.

The perpetrators not only shot the approximately 14,000 to 16,000 Jews previously deported from Hungary, but also approximately 8,000 to 9,000 (two thirds) of the Jewish citizens of Kamenets-Podolsk and some of the surrounding villages. 4800 to 5000 Jews survived the days of the massacre. They have been ghettoized . When the ghetto was dissolved between August and November 1942, its residents were also murdered.

Confidants and witnesses

Wehrmacht officers from Karl von Roques's staff watched the massacre at Jeckeln's invitation. Ernst-Anton von Krosigk informed the command of Army Group South on September 2, 1941 about the number of murdered. The minutes do not record debates or protests. The British secret service , which eavesdropped on the German police radio, apparently also learned about this massacre and its dimensions. Employees of the Extraordinary State Commission of the Soviet Union (also known as the Schwernik Commission), which from the end of 1942 recorded and investigated the crimes of the “German fascist intruders and their accomplices”, questioned witnesses to the massacre and recorded their statements.

Only a few Jews survived the massacre despite being close to the crime scene, including Lajos Stern, a brother-in-law of Joel Brand . He fled back to Hungary, where he became a member of a delegation from the Welfare Office of Hungarian Jews ( Magyar Izraeliták Pártfogó Irodája - MIPI), which informed Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer , the then Minister of the Interior of Hungary, in detail about the massacre. Bina Tenenblat was an eyewitness to the massacre as a Jewish child and reported about it decades later in an interview. Gyula Spitz, a Hungarian Jew from Budapest who served as a driver in the Hungarian army and was temporarily stationed in Kamenez-Podolsk, was able to secretly photograph the massacre while driving through the city. The recordings are now in the possession of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum . Another driver of the Hungarian army of Jewish origin, Gabor Mermelstein, also witnessed the shootings and reported on them.

Blurring the tracks

During the “ Sonderaktion 1005 ” led by SS-Standartenführer Paul Blobel to cover up the Holocaust, mass graves of Jewish victims had been dug in Ukraine since mid-August 1943 . The Sonderkommando 1005 A met in February 1944 in Kamenetz-Podolsk to where the exhumation to perform and burning of corpses. There was little time left for this work; the conquest of the area by the Red Army on March 26, 1944 put an end to all cover-up attempts.

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Contemporary reactions

The Hungarian Interior Minister Keresztes-Fischer was shocked by reports of the mass shootings in Kamenets-Podolsk. His intervention with the Hungarian Aliens Police led to the halt of further deportations that had already started. Hungarian liberals supported his negative stance. Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky , Margit Slachta and the right-wing liberal lawyer and politician Károly Rassay , in particular, sharply criticized the deportations . The politically regulated press in Hungary remained silent about the massacre.

After a short time the Hungarian government tried to resume the deportations. In November 1941, however, Prime Minister Bárdossy had to inform the Hungarian parliament that the German Reich had warned against continuing such deportations. Himmler intervened personally against another attempt by Hungarian authorities to be deported at the end of 1942, so that no further expulsions were made.

The London newspaper The Jewish Chronicle reported on its front page on October 24, 1941, under the headline Ghastly Pogroms in Ukraine (“Horrible Pogroms in Ukraine”) about the mass murders in Kamenets-Podolsk. The report referred to statements by Hungarian officers about the murder of 15,000 Jews who had previously been deported from Hungary to Galicia. The editors did not comment on the report, possibly because the reports were unconfirmed.

On October 26, 1941, the New York Times reported on a massacre of “German soldiers” and “Ukrainian bandits” of Galician Jews and Jewish deportees from Hungary with 8,000 to 15,000 victims. This crime was reported in letters from Galicia to recipients in Hungary, as well as by Hungarian officers who were eyewitnesses. The report named the Kamenets-Podolsk region as the scene of the crime and August 27 and 28 as the time of the crime.

In early January 1942, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov dealt with the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre, among other things, in a note reported in the Soviet press. Although the information was fragmentary, the victims there and in other Ukrainian cities were mostly defenseless Jewish members of the working class . Here - as was often the case during the entire war period - the Soviet politicians and media reports avoided underlining the importance of the extermination anti-Semitism, the victims of which were the European Jews. Instead, they propagated that the victims of the German extermination policy were the Slav peoples .

Prosecution

Friedrich Jeckeln in Soviet custody

At the end of the war , Jeckeln was captured by the Red Army and, together with other high-ranking officers, was brought before a Soviet court martial in Riga . Essentially, this process was about crimes in the Reichskommissariat Ostland , another area of ​​Jeckeln's activity. In the previous interrogations he had already admitted his responsibility for the murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews in Ukraine. On February 3, 1946, Jeckeln was sentenced to death along with the other defendants and hanged on the same day in Riga in the presence of several thousand soldiers and civilians .

In post-war Hungary, people's tribunals brought legal proceedings against those who had committed politically motivated crimes in previous years. The first important trial began on October 29, 1945. Ex-Prime Minister Bárdossy was accused, during whose tenure Hungary had invaded the Soviet Union alongside the German Reich. The prosecution also accused him of responsibility for the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre. The death sentence was passed on November 3, 1945. A revision process and a pardon were refused, Bárdossy was executed on January 10, 1946 by firing squad.

Ámon Pásztóy headed the Hungarian Aliens Police until July 1, 1941. He then acted as head of department in Internal Security Section VII of the Ministry of the Interior. In this function he had pushed ahead with the administrative preparations for the deportation of “foreign” Jews. He was arrested in the summer of 1945 and released in January 1946 for reasons unknown. He was arrested again 24 months later. A people's tribunal sentenced him to hang up for the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre. The judgment, which had previously been confirmed by the competent revision authority, was carried out on August 10, 1949. Sándor Siménfalvy, another senior official in the Aliens Police, was arrested in 1945. A court sentenced him to five years in prison for his role in the deportations.

Members of Police Battalion 320 were involved in the murder of 66,719 Jews, performed auxiliary services in the case of shootings or participated in the transfer of Jews to extermination camps . Officials of the central office in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia for the processing of National Socialist mass crimes at the Dortmund public prosecutor's office began investigating them from 1961 and heard about 131 of them, mainly because of the mass shootings in Ukraine in 1941. The focus of the public prosecutor's investigations was Hans Wiemer at the time Chief of the 2nd Company. Heinrich Scharwey, former captain of the 3rd Company, committed suicide during the investigation. He had justified the mass murders in a political speech to his company at the end of August 1941.

However, the Dortmund investigators came to the conclusion that the battalion had essentially only taken on barrier services during the shootings. Officials from the Central Office of the State Judicial Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg objected emphatically, but could not prevail. In early 1962, the Dortmund public prosecutor's office stopped investigating 362 former members of the battalion and the so-called Ostland company associated with it . She continued the investigations against 30 accused, but put the focus of the investigative work on the activities of the SD. These investigations were also discontinued in December 1962 on the grounds that there had been an emergency . Despite objections from the central office in Ludwigsburg, the General Prosecutor's Office in Hamm agreed with the Dortmund decisions.

This decision was within the framework of what is customary in West Germany, as judicial proceedings against members of police battalions only occurred in rare cases. Members of Jeckeln's staff were also investigated without being charged.

Commemoration

After the end of the Second World War , the remaining Jews from Kamenez-Podolsk tried several times to remember those who were murdered in the Holocaust. A commemorative event planned for the fifth anniversary of the massacre in August 1946 was banned by the Soviet authorities. In July 1948, local Jews turned unsuccessfully with a petition to Nikolai Schwernik and Nikita Khrushchev , then chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, in order to publicly commemorate the murdered Jews. Despite these setbacks, the Jews of Kamenets-Podolsk managed to erect monuments in the city and at the place of execution. A memorial stone is also in the Holocaust Memorial Park of Brooklyn , New York City .

research

Interpretations in special investigations

The Kamenets-Podolsk massacre went unnoticed by research for decades. It was not until 1973 that the American historian Randolph L. Braham published a treatise on this in Yad Vashem Studies . It has gone almost unchanged into his two-volume work on the extermination of the Jews of Hungary, published in 1981. Braham regards the event as the prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary from 1944.

His colleague Klaus-Michael Mallmann published an essay on the events of Kamenez-Podolsk in 2001 in the yearbook for anti-Semitism research . In it he considers the massacre to be a "qualitative leap" in the Nazi murder of Jews. For the first time in a few days, five-digit numbers of Jews were murdered in one place, regardless of gender, age or political preferences. Mallmann also works out who the perpetrators of Kamenets-Podolsk were. These perpetrators had previously been wrongly assigned to other units, for example Einsatzgruppe C or Einsatzgruppe D. At the same time, he emphasized the openness of the situation. The design options of the German actors on site were used in very different ways. It is noticeable that Einsatzgruppe D - facing similar problems because Romania had deported thousands of Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia across the Dniester into the German occupied area - acted very differently. It drove back 27,500 of these Jews; 1265 Jews were shot in the process. According to Mallmann, the massacre also shows that the road to total annihilation was being taken, although “there was (still) no comprehensive ' Führer 's order ' for the indiscriminate killing of all Jews.” Local actors took the initiative, improvised and experimented, for one by then to set an unprecedented process in motion. It is not enough to look to Berlin alone when looking for the reasons for the extermination policy. The view must also be directed to the processes in the east of the area ruled by the Germans and thus focus on a "system of complex interdependence " as a whole .

Using the example of the Kamenez-Podolsk massacre, Timothy Snyder explains the particular danger faced by Jews who were not only discriminated against before their extermination, but were declared stateless by the Nazi state, its vassal states or allies . He also emphasizes that the high number of victims justified speaking of industrial killing. In addition, Jeckeln had succeeded in establishing joint perpetrators of the SS, regular police forces and the Wehrmacht, a " triumvirate " that was to last throughout the war.

The massacre in an overview of the Holocaust

The massacre is mentioned regularly in overview presentations on the Holocaust, but often only in passing, for example in 1961 with just a short sentence by Raul Hilberg . Peter Longerich stated in 1998 that the massacre had not yet been adequately presented due to a lack of sources. He interprets the mass shooting in Kamenets-Podolsk as the “transition to a policy of area-wide, systematic extermination of the Jewish population.” The new experience of being able to eliminate tens of thousands of victims within a few days should be used for the further planning of the systematic “final solution” in the occupied Areas have been decisive. Saul Friedländer touches on the event in two longer sentences. Christopher Browning and Jürgen Matthäus also mention the massacre in their study of the genesis of the Holocaust; the “threshold to genocide” had been “crossed” with this act.

Wolfgang Benz does not go into the event in his introduction to the Holocaust, neither does Frank McDonough and John Cochrane. In the six-volume collection of essays Holocaust. Critical Concepts in Historical Studies is referred to the massacre with a subordinate clause. In the essay volume The Routledge History of the Holocaust , however, the presentation of the massacre and the prehistory extends over half a page.

Dieter Pohl briefly addresses the subject in his introduction to the Holocaust and calls it the "greatest [...] massacre of this time". In another introductory presentation on the National Socialist practice of persecution and mass murder, he deals with the mass crimes of Kamenets-Podolsk in a broader way. He called it the "turning point in the 'Final Solution'". It has dimensions like that of Babyn Jar , which took place a month later.

Relationship between the Wehrmacht, SS and police

Klaus-Michael Mallmann emphasizes the special role that the HSSPF Russia South, Friedrich Jeckeln, played. In coordination and with the approval of the leading Wehrmacht officers, he had implemented his large-scale plan to murder the Jews in Kamenez-Podolsk. The action in Kamenets-Podolsk was by no means carried out behind the backs of the regional commanders of the Wehrmacht, but in front of their eyes.

The relationship between the armed organs of power also plays a role with other authors. Like Mallmann, Dieter Pohl assumes an agreement between the Wehrmacht leadership and the SS. Andrej Angrick , on the other hand, emphasizes that the initiative for this crime came from the Wehrmacht. Jeckeln and his subordinates were "vicarious agents" of the army. Yitzhak Arad sees it similarly : “The German military administration decided to liquidate the Jews deported from Hungary.” In an analysis of the revised Wehrmacht exhibition, the political scientist and historian Klaus Hesse doubts the thesis that the meeting on August 25, 1941 was one was a decisive meeting in the run-up to the massacre. Corresponding formulations in the Wehrmacht exhibition are characterized by a "conspiratorial style". It is also an overinterpretation of the minutes of the meeting when exhibition texts incriminate “'the Wehrmacht' as actively responsible for the Kamenez-Podolsk massacre” or suggest that the military approved the massacre. Only "the complete passivity of the Wehrmacht representatives towards the fate of the Jewish victims" can be deduced from the protocol. Jörn Hasenclever takes on a mediating position: “Whether it was Jeckeln, the v. Roques suggested the murder or vice versa, can no longer be traced. ”Bert Hoppe and Hildrun Glass take the view that the initiative for the massacre came from the local field command and Jeckeln.

attachment

literature

Special representations

  • Randolph L. Braham : The Kamenets Podolsk and Délvidék Massacres: Prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary. In: Livia Rothkirchen (Ed.): Yad Vashem Studies. No. 9, Yad Vashem, Jerusalem 1973, ISSN  0084-3296 , DNB 368732185 pp. 133-156 (English).
  • Randolph L. Braham: Kamenez-Podolski. In: Israel Gutman , Eberhard Jäckel , Peter Longerich (eds.): Enzyklopädie des Holocaust. The persecution and murder of the European Jews. Piper, Munich & Zurich 1998, ISBN 3-492-22700-7 , Volume 2, pp. 731-732.
  • Klaus-Michael Mallmann : The qualitative leap in the destruction process. The Kamenez-Podolsk massacre at the end of August 1941. In: Yearbook for Research on Antisemitism. Volume 10, Campus, Frankfurt am Main 2001, pp. 239-264 ISSN  0941-8563 .

further reading

  • Andrej Angrick : On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. In: Babette Quinkert (ed.): "We are the masters of this country". Causes, course and consequences of the German attack on the Soviet Union. VSA, Hamburg 2002, ISBN 3-87975-876-X , pp. 104-123.
  • Andrej Angrick: Occupation Policy and Mass Murder. Task Force D in the southern Soviet Union 1941–1943. Hamburger Edition , Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-930908-91-3 .
  • Yitzhak Arad : The Holocaust in the Soviet Union , University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE / Yad Vashem, Jerusalem 2009, ISBN 978-0-8032-2059-1 .
  • GH Bennett: Exploring the World of the Second and Third Tier Men in the Holocaust: The Interrogation of Friedrich Jeckeln: Engineer and Executioner. In: Liverpool Law Review. Vol. 32 (2011), pp. 1-18.
  • Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary. An abbreviated version of the definitive work on the destruction of Hungarian Jewry. 2 volumes, Columbia University Press, New York 1981, ISBN 0-231-05208-1 .
  • Wolfgang Curilla : The German Ordnungspolizei and the Holocaust in the Baltic States and in Belarus 1941-1944 . Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-506-71787-1 .
  • Judit Fejes: On the History of the Mass Deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941. In: Randolph L. Braham and Attila Pók (eds.): The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later ; Columbia University Press, New York, NY 1997, pp. 305-321.
  • Christian Gerlach , Götz Aly : The last chapter. The murder of the Hungarian Jews 1944–1945 , Fischer Taschenbuch 15772, Frankfurt am Main 2004, ISBN 3-596-15772-2 .
  • Hamburg Institute for Social Research (Ed.): Crimes of the Wehrmacht. Dimensions of the War of Extermination 1941–1944. Exhibition catalog , Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2002, ISBN 3-930908-74-3 .
  • Jörn Hasenclever: Wehrmacht and occupation policy in the Soviet Union. The commanders of the rear army areas 1941-1943 (= War in History , Volume 48), Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2010, ISBN 978-3-506-76709-7 (Dissertation University of Münster 2007, 613 pages, under the title: Failed provisional ).
  • Johannes Hürter : Hitler's military leader. The German commanders-in-chief in the war against the Soviet Union in 1941/42. 2nd Edition. Oldenbourg, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-486-58341-0 (Habilitation thesis University Mainz 2006, 719 pages).
  • Stefan Klemp : "Not determined". Police battalions and the post-war justice system. A manual (= historical site Villa ten Hompel Münster : Schriften, Volume 5). Klartext, Essen 2005, ISBN 3-89861-381-X .
  • Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (eds.): German East 1939–1945. The Weltanschauungskrieg in photos and texts , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2003, ISBN 3-534-16023-1 .
  • Dieter Pohl : Scene Ukraine. The mass murder of the Jews in the military administration area and in the Reich Commissariat 1941–1943. In: Christian Hartmann , Johannes Hürter, Peter Lieb , Dieter Pohl: The German War in the East 1941–1944. Facets of a border crossing , Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59138-5 , pp. 155–199 (First in: Norbert Frei , Sybille Steinbacher , Bernd C. Wagner (Eds.): Exploitation, Destruction, Public. New Studies on National Socialist Camp Policy , Oldenbourg, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-598-24033-3 , pp. 135-173.)
  • Dieter Pohl: The rule of the armed forces. German military occupation and native population in the Soviet Union 1941–1944. Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58065-5 ; Fischer Taschenbuch 18858, Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 978-3-596-18858-1 .

Web links

Commons : Kamenets-Podolsk Massacre  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Johannes Hürter: Hitler's Heerführer , 2007, p. 573; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 239; GH Bennett: Exploring the World. 2011, p. 6.
  2. ↑ Briefly on this Christian Gerlach, Götz Aly: Das last Kapitel , 2004, pp. 28–32, pp. 42–50. Comprehensive Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, pp. 118–191 and Rolf Fischer: Development stages of anti-Semitism in Hungary 1867–1939. The destruction of the Magyar-Jewish symbiosis. Oldenbourg, Munich 1988, ISBN 3-486-54731-3 , pp. 124-188.
  3. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 145.Data based on the 1941 census.
  4. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 167. Information based on the 1941 census.
  5. ↑ a b c d e f The First Massacre: Kamenets-Podolsky ( Memento of March 9, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), English-language information on the massacre on a website of the Hungarian organization Deportáltakat Gondozó Országos Bizottság ( accessed : August 14, 2011).
  6. ↑ a b c d Massimo Arico: "Look at this man". Kamenec Podolski August 27–29, 1941 ( Memento from April 15, 2013 in the web archive archive.today ) (accessed: August 14, 2011).
  7. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, volume 1, p. 200 f.
  8. ↑ Saul Friedländer: The Years of Destruction. The Third Reich and the Jews. 1939-194. 2nd Edition. Beck, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-406-54966-7 , p. 259.
  9. ↑ Az 1941. évi kőrösmezői deportálások. In: Betekintő: Online journal of the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security. Archived from the original on May 17, 2014 ; Retrieved May 16, 2014 (Hungarian).
  10. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 201.
  11. ↑ Quoted from Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 243.
  12. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 202.
  13. ↑ For this in detail using the example of Carpatho-Ruthenia Judit Fejes: On the History of the Mass Deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941 . 1997, et al., P. 310.
  14. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 202-204.
  15. ↑ For Roma from Carpathian Ukraine see János Bársony, Ágnes Daróczi (ed.): Pharrajimos. The fate of the Roma during the Holocaust. International Debate Education Association, New York et al. 2008, ISBN 978-1-932716-30-6 , p. 33.
  16. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 204.
  17. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 242 f; Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. P. 80. Braham ( The politics of genocide. Volume 1, p. 204), on the other hand, speaks of the fact that there were only a few Jews there, mainly women and children.
  18. ↑ Document 47 in: The persecution and murder of European Jews by National Socialist Germany 1933–1945 . (Source collection, cited VEJ) Volume 7: Soviet Union with annexed areas I - Occupied Soviet areas under German military administration, the Baltic States and Transnistria. (edited by Bert Hoppe and Hiltrud Glass), Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58911-5 , p. 221.
  19. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. P. 162; Dieter Pohl: The rule of the armed forces. P. 63 f; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 244.
  20. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 245.
  21. ↑ Quoted from the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (ed.): Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. P. 132.
  22. ↑ Klaus Mallmann, The qualitative jump , 2001, p. 239 f.
  23. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 249.
  24. ↑ It was created by Walter Labs . Obviously, by virtue of his office, he was more familiar with the representatives of the civil authorities than with those of the military authorities. See Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. S. 114, footnote 38. Printed as Document 67 in VEJ Volume 7: Soviet Union with annexed areas ... , Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58911-5 , pp. 264-267. An English translation of this protocol can be found as document PS-197 (Concerning the conference that has taken place on the OKH concerning the transfer of a part of the Ukraine to the civil administration) in: Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality (Ed.): Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression , Volume III, United States Government Publishing Office , Washington 1946, pp. 210-213 ( PDF file , accessed September 11, 2011).
  25. ^ Participants according to Andrej Angrick: The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941. p. 23, footnote 65 ( PDF file , accessed August 10, 2011).
  26. ↑ It is possible that this is Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General. See Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. P. 114, footnote 38.
  27. ↑ Whether Eduard Wagner was actually present is judged differently. According to Andrej Angrick: The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941. p. 23 ( PDF file , accessed: August 10, 2011) he has the meeting with Hans Georg Schmidt von Altenstadt. According to Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. P. 114, footnote 38, however, this can be doubted.
  28. ↑ The protocol names the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief Ukraine by his function, but not by name. See Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. P. 114, footnote 38.
  29. ↑ Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. P. 114, footnote 38.
  30. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative jump , 2001, p. 246.
  31. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 247 f For the relationship between Roques-Jeckeln and Karl von Roques' attitude to the murder of Jews, see Jörn Hasenclever: Wehrmacht and Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union. 2010, pp. 522-542.
  32. ↑ On the person now GH Bennett: Exploring the World of the Second and Third Tier Men in the Holocaust. The Interrogation of Friedrich Jeckeln: Engineer and Executioner. (Full text online)
  33. ↑ Quoted from Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 247.
  34. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 247.
  35. ^ Peter Longerich: Heinrich Himmler. Biography. Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-88680-859-5 , p. 551.
  36. ↑ On the beginnings of the murder of Jews in the Ukraine, see Dieter Pohl: National Socialist Persecution of Jews in East Galicia 1941–1944. Organization and execution of a state mass crime. Oldenbourg, 2nd edition. Munich 1997, ISBN 3-486-56233-9 , pp. 54-74; Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. Pp. 158-161; Wolfgang Curilla: The German order police. Pp. 791-817.
  37. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 242.
  38. ↑ For example Jörn Hasenclever: Wehrmacht and occupation policy in the Soviet Union. P. 532; Wolfgang Curilla: The German order police. P. 618.
  39. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide , Volume 1, p. 205; Christian Gerlach, Götz Aly: The last chapter. P. 74; Kinga Frojimovics: The special Characteristics of the Holocaust in Hungary, 1938–45. In: Jonathan C. Friedman (Ed.): The Routledge History of the Holocaust. Taylor & Francis, London, New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-415-77956-2 , p. 251.
  40. ^ So Andrej Angrick: Occupation Policy and Mass Murder. P. 203.
  41. ↑ Stefan Klemp: "Not determined". P. 285; Martin Dean: Collaboration in the Holocaust. Crimes of the local police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-44. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire et al. 2001, ISBN 0-333-68892-9 , p. 42.
  42. ↑ See Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. Volume 1, p. 205; Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. P. 163.
  43. ↑ See Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. Volume 1, p. 205; Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. S. 163. See also the statements of perpetrators in Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (ed.): Deutscher Osten 1939–1945. P. 86 f.
  44. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. P. 163.
  45. ^ Testimony from Hermann K., then a member of the Jeckeln staff, during an interrogation on September 22, 1964. See Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (ed.): Deutscher Osten 1939–1945. P. 86.
  46. ^ Statement by Wilhelm W., then a member of Police Battalion 320, during an interrogation on January 4, 1961. See Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (ed.): Deutscher Osten 1939–1945. P. 87.
  47. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 252.
  48. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative jump , 2001, pp. 242 and 252. Wolfgang Curilla ( Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei. 2006) and Stefan Klemp ( “Not determined”. 2005), however, do not mention the HSSPF's patrol.
  49. ↑ Stefan Klemp: "Not determined". P. 284; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 251.
  50. ↑ Stefan Klemp: "Not determined". P. 285.
  51. ↑ Wolfgang Curilla: Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei , 2006, p. 925; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative jump , 2001, p. 253; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (eds.): Deutscher Osten 1939–1945 , 2003, p. 85 f. There the statement by Herbert H. from January 15, 1960.
  52. ↑ See Stefan Klemp: “Not determined” , 2005, p. 285; Christian Gerlach, Götz Aly: The Last Chapter , 2004, p. 74; Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 2009, p. 165 f. Arad gives, among other things, the confession of a Ukrainian accomplice and claims that Hungarian and German soldiers helped to cordon off the execution site.
  53. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. P. 251, doubts this. For Randolph L. Braham, involvement of Hungarian soldiers has not been proven beyond doubt. See Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. Volume 1, p. 205. Braham does not comment on the involvement of Ukrainian militias.
  54. ↑ Document 70 in: VEJ Volume 7: Soviet Union with annexed areas , Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58911-5 , p. 270 f.
  55. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 242.
  56. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Schauplatz Ukraine , 2009, p. 164; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 254; Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 2009, p. 166 and p. 566, note 13.
  57. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. 2009, p. 164 and p. 182; Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 2009, p. 270 f.
  58. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative jump , 2001, p. 249 f; Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. 2009, p. 163.
  59. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 250.
  60. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. 2009, p. 164.
  61. ↑ See the photographs and comments on corresponding documents on the Yad Vashem website (accessed August 20, 2011).
  62. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 205.
  63. ↑ The video with their descriptions on YouTube (accessed: August 19, 2015).
  64. ↑ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, digital archive (accessed October 18, 2011). Also presented in the web exhibition Holokausztmagyarorszagon.hu (The Holocaust in Hungary, accessed: July 25, 2015).
  65. ^ Further eyewitness accounts recorded in diaries or memoirs are given in Judit Pihurik: Hungarian Soldiers and Jews on the Eastern Front, 1941–1943. In: Yad Vashem Studies. 35 (2007), no. 2, pp. 71-102, here pp. 81-84.
  66. ↑ See Shmuel Spector: Aktion 1005 - Effacing The Murder Of Millions. In: Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Vol. 5 (1990), no. 2, pp. 157-173, here p. 164; Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. 2009, p. 188; Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 2009, p. 350; see also cloud height . In: Der Spiegel No. 40/1968 of September 30, 1968.
  67. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. Volume 1, p. 206.
  68. ↑ See Jessica A. Sheetz: Margit Slachta and the early rescue of Jewish families, 1939–42 ( Memento of October 21, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF file, access : August 21, 2011; 73 kB).
  69. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The Hungarian Press, 1938-1945. In: Why Didn't the Press Shout? American & International Journalism During the Holocaust. A collection of papers originally presented at an international conference sponsored by the Elia and Diana Zborowski Professorial Chair in Interdisciplinary Holocaust Studies, Yeshiva University, October 1995. Edited by Robert Moses Shapiro. Yeshiva University Press in association with KTAV Publishing House, Jersey City 2003, pp. 371-387, here p. 380, ISBN 0-88125-775-3 .
  70. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Scene Ukraine. P. 164.
  71. ↑ Preview of the title page  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. of the Jewish Chronicle of October 24, 1941 (accessed August 22, 2011).@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / archive.thejc.com  
  72. ^ On this, David Cesarani : The Jewish Chronicle and Anglo-Jewry 1841-1991 , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1994, ISBN 0-521-43434-3 , p. 175.
  73. ↑ On this note see also Alison Smale: Germany Confronts, in Unique Exhibit, Its 'Holocaust of the Bullets' . In: The New York Times , October 23, 2016.
  74. ↑ New York Times, October 26, 1941: Slaying of Jews in Galicia depicted; Thousands Living There and Others Sent From Hungary Reported Massacred . See the abstract of the article on the newspaper's website (accessed August 21, 2011). The entire message is shown in Frank Bajohr , Dieter Pohl: The Holocaust as an open secret. The Germans, the Nazi leadership and the allies , Beck, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-406-54978-0 , p. 87. German translation as Doc. 101 in: VEJ Volume 7: Soviet Union with annexed areas , Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-486-58911-5 , pp. 328-329.
  75. ↑ See: Yitshak [Yitzhak] Arad: The Holocaust as Reflected in the Soviet Russian Language Newspapers in the Years 1941–1945 In: Why Didn't the Press Shout? American & International Journalism During the Holocaust. A collection of papers originally presented at an international conference sponsored by the Elia and Diana Zborowski Professorial Chair in Interdisciplinary Holocaust Studies, Yeshiva University, October 1995. Edited by Robert Moses Shapiro. Yeshiva University Press in association with KTAV Publishing House, Jersey City 2003, ISBN 0-88125-775-3 , pp. 199–220, here pp. 201 f. Differentiated on this: Karel C. Berkhoff: “Total Annihilation of the Jewish Population ”: The Holocaust in the Soviet Media, 1941–45. In: Kritika. Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. Volume 10, Number 1, Winter 2009 (New Series), pp. 61-105.
  76. ^ GH Bennett: Exploring the World .
  77. ↑ For the structure and significance of these tribunals, see Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 1163-1168.
  78. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 2, p. 1165. For this process see in particular Karl P. Benziger: The Trial of László Bárdossy. The Second World War and Factional Politics in Contemporary Hungary ( Memento of November 10, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), in: Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 40, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 465-481, (accessed November 9, 2011).
  79. ↑ On Pásztóy see the corresponding entry on the website of the Hungarian Holocaust Remembrance Center (accessed on January 30, 2012).
  80. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 200 and p. 218, note 23.
  81. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide. 1981, Volume 1, p. 218, note 25.
  82. ^ Number after Wolfgang Curilla: The German Ordnungspolizei. P. 831.
  83. ↑ Wolfgang Curilla: The German Ordnungspolizei. P. 925; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 253; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (eds.): German East 1939–1945. 2003, p. 85 f. There the testimony of Herbert H., member of the 3rd Company of the Police Battalion, which he made on January 15, 1960 and with which he incriminated Scharway.
  84. ↑ Stefan Klemp: "Not determined". Pp. 287-289 and p. 376; Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 253.
  85. ↑ To summarize this, Stefan Klemp: "Not determined". Pp. 351-416.
  86. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. passim ; Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (eds.): German East 1939–1945. P. 86 f (statement by Hermann K., member of Jeckeln's staff, from September 22, 1964).
  87. ↑ See the relevant information on the Yad Vashem website (accessed: August 10, 2011) as well as the information in the memorial site portal on places of remembrance in Europe , a project of the Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (accessed: August 10, 2011).
  88. ^ Website of the Holocaust Memorial Park (accessed August 30, 2011).
  89. ↑ Information on the Yad Vashem website (accessed August 10, 2011).
  90. ↑ Randolph L. Braham: The Kamenets Podolsk and Délvidék Massacres. 1973; Randolph L. Braham: The politics of genocide , 1981.
  91. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative jump , 2001, p. 242.
  92. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 255; see also Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Volker Rieß, Wolfram Pyta (eds.): Deutscher Osten 1939–1945. P. 182, note 83. Yitzhak Arad ( The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. P. 165) notes that the shootings were carried out by a 30-man division of Einsatzgruppe C.
  93. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 255. Details on this measure can be found in Andrej Angrick: Occupation policy and mass murder. 2003, pp. 198-203.
  94. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 255.
  95. ↑ Timothy Snyder: Black Earth. The Holocaust and why it can repeat itself , CH Beck, Munich 2015, pp. 192–194, ISBN 978-3-406-68414-2 .
  96. ^ Raul Hilberg: The annihilation of the European Jews . Revised and expanded paperback edition in three volumes, from the English by Christian Seeger et al . S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1990, volume 2, ISBN 3-596-24417-X , p. 311.
  97. ↑ Peter Longerich: Politics of Destruction. An overall representation of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews. Piper Verlag, Munich / Zurich 1998, ISBN 3-492-03755-0 , p. 376 f.
  98. ↑ Saul Friedländer: The Third Reich and the Jews. The years of persecution 1933–1939. The years of annihilation 1939–1945. Translated from English by Martin Pfeiffer. Through Special edition, Beck, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-56681-3 , p. 614 f.
  99. ↑ Christopher R. Browning : Unleashing the "Final Solution". National Socialist Jewish Policy 1939–1942. With a contribution by Jürgen Matthäus. From the American. by Klaus-Dieter Schmidt. Propylaen, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-549-07187-6 , p. 424. The authors name members of Einsatzgruppe C as the perpetrators. They refer (p. 720, note 257) to Randolph L. Braham (The Kamenets Podolsk and Délvidék Massacres) and Andrej Angrick (The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941) ( PDF file ). There is no mention of such a perpetrator in either of the texts. On p. 452 the massacre is described as “the largest single massacre of the war up to this point”.
  100. ↑ Wolfgang Benz: The Holocaust. 3. Edition. Beck, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-406-39822-7 .
  101. ^ Frank McDonough with John Cochrane: The Holocaust. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke et al. 2008, ISBN 978-0-230-20387-7 .
  102. ↑ Thomas Sandkühler : Anti-Jewish Policy and the Murder of the Jews in the District of Galicia, 1941/42. In: Holocaust. Critical Concepts in Historical Studies. Edited by David Cesarani . Editorial Assistant: Sarah Kavanaugh. Vol. III, The 'Final Solution'. Routledge. London, New York 2004, ISBN 0-415-27512-1 , pp. 320–341, here p. 328.
  103. ↑ Jonathan C. Friedman (Ed.): The Routledge History of the Holocaust. Taylor & Francis, London, New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-415-77956-2 , p. 251.
  104. ^ Dieter Pohl: Holocaust. The causes, what happened, the consequences. Herder, Freiburg, Basel, Vienna, 2nd edition. 2000, ISBN 3-451-04835-3 , p. 94 f.
  105. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Persecution and mass murder in the Nazi era 1933–1945. 3., bibliogr. updated edition. WBG, Darmstadt 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24026-5 , p. 76.
  106. ↑ Klaus-Michael Mallmann: The qualitative leap. 2001, p. 250.
  107. ↑ Dieter Pohl: Persecution and mass murder in the Nazi era 1933–1945. 2011, p. 76.
  108. ↑ Andrej Angrick: On the role of the military administration in the murder of the Soviet Jews. 2002, p. 113 f.
  109. ^ Yitzhak Arad: The Holocaust in the Soviet Union. 2009, p. 165: "The German military administration decided to liquidate the Jews deported from Hungary."
  110. ↑ Klaus Hesse: "Crimes of the Wehrmacht - Dimensions of the War of Extermination 1941–1944". Comments on the new version of the "Wehrmachtsausstellung". In: History in Science and Education . 2002, H. 10, pp. 594-611, here pp. 608-610.
  111. ^ Jörn Hasenclever: Wehrmacht and occupation policy in the Soviet Union. 2010, p. 531.
  112. ↑ Bert Hoppe, Hildrun Glass (edit.): The persecution and murder of European Jews by National Socialist Germany 1933-1945, Soviet Union with annexed areas I, occupied Soviet areas under German military administration, Baltic States and Transnistria , published by: Bundesarchiv, Institut für Contemporary history , LMU Freiburg, FU Berlin by S. Heim, U. Herbert, H.-D. Kreikamp, ​​H. Möller, G. Pickhan, D. Pohl, H. Weber, 2011, p. 43.