Song Dynasty

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Song Empire in 1111

The Song Dynasty ( Chinese  宋朝 , Pinyin Sòngcháo , W.-G. Sung Ch'ao ) was the ruling dynasty in the Chinese Empire from 960 to 1279 . It is divided into the "Northern" and "Southern" Song dynasties. The “Northern” ( 北宋 , Běi Sòng ) ruled from 960–1126 in Kaifeng , the “Southern” ( 南宋 , Nán Sòng ) from 1126–1279 in Hangzhou .

Northern Song 960–1126

Founding of the state

Song Taizu , founder and first emperor of the Song Dynasty
Conquests of the Song Dynasty from 960 to 979, which ended the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms

The Late Zhou Dynasty was the last in a series of Five Dynasties that ruled northern China after the fall of the Tang Dynasty in 907. With the help of other generals, Zhao Kuangyin overthrew the seven-year-old heir to the throne of the Zhou and then ruled Taizu as the first Song Emperor from 960 to 976. Taizu's first goal after ascending the throne was to overcome the political division of the country. To do this, Nanping , Wu-Yue , the Southern Han , Later Shu, and Southern Tang in the south and the Northern Han and the Sixteen Prefectures in the north had to be defeated. Skilled army leaders like Yang Ye (died 986), Liu Tingrang (929–987), Cao Bin (931–999) and Huyan Zan (died 1000) made the Song military the most powerful in all of China. This was achieved through new tactics such as the management of supply lines across pontoon bridges at the crossing of the Yangtze River in the campaign against the Southern Tang in 974. The famous war elephants in the army of the Southern Han was on January 23, 971 by a massive attack by crossbowmen with fiery arrows defeated, whereupon the Southern Han submitted.

A Qingbai style porcelain teapot from Jingdezhen , Song Dynasty
Porcelain , lacquer carving, and stoneware from the Song Dynasty
The Fisherman's Evening Song , one of Xu Daoning's most famous paintings

With the conquest of the Wuyue Empire , southern China was again placed under a central government from 978. This allowed the forces of Song to concentrate on the north, where in 979 the Northern Han Dynasty was conquered. However, Song failed to annex the Sixteen Prefectures. They became part of the Liao State , the center of which was in Manchuria and subsequently bordered the Song Empire immediately to the north. Northwest of the Song Empire, the Tanguts had been in power since the Tang appointed a Tangut leader military governor ( jiedushi ) in 881 . This privilege was inheritable, from which the Western Xia Dynasty arose. The song achieved several significant military successes against the Western Xia, until these were ended by the Mongols under Genghis Khan in 1227. The balance of power with the Liao dynasty, however, was balanced.

After the military unification of China was over, Emperor Taizu held a famous reception to which he invited many of the army leaders who had contested conquests for him. During the festivities he spoke to them about the possibility of a coup d'état against him, as it had done during the Five Dynasties. Those present protested this view and assured him that none of them was as qualified to run the country as he was. The contemporary Chronicle Song Shi reports that the emperor promised the army leaders a good life on the best lands in the provinces and offered them to join his family with those of the army leaders and ministers by marriage. The next day, all the military are said to have resigned and retired to the country.

Emperor Taizu developed an efficient centralized bureaucracy staffed with civil officials. The military governors and their supporters were replaced with officials appointed directly by the central government. This system led to a greater concentration of power in the imperial central government than was possible in previous dynasties. In the early 11th century about 30 000 men to the year took official checks on prefecture-level part. That number rose steadily to 80,000 at the end of the century and 400,000 candidates in the 13th century. While new administrative units were established at the community level, the number of prefectures and provinces did not change during the Song Dynasty. Thus, the number of civil servants admitted to the government remained constant, which considerably intensified competition among prospective students and scholars.

To consolidate its power, Taizu had updated maps drawn up, which made it easier for the central government to take action in the regions. In 971 Taizu ordered Lu Duosun to update and rewrite all the maps of the world. Lu toured the provinces to collect as much material and data as possible. With the help of Song Zhun , the huge work with 1566 chapters was completed in 1010. In Song Shi it is reported that the director of the imperial grain stores instructed all villages to draw up accurate maps of their fields, mountains, rivers and paths. These maps were put together to create county and county maps so that they could be used to collect taxes or track bandits.

Taizu was very interested in science and technology. In his imperial workshops, for example, Zhang Sixun's project of an armillary sphere with mercury instead of water was carried out. In his governance open to innovations as well as foreigners, for example, he appointed the Arab Muslim Ma Yize as his court astronomer. For the reception of emissaries from the Korean kingdom of Goryeo alone, 1,500 volumes were written, which set out the elaborate rules for dealing with the emissaries. The Song also sent ambassadors such as Wang Yande to other states, who from 981 served as an envoy in the Uighur city of Gaochang , which was then under the control of the Qarakhanids . The 24 dynastic histories also report ambassadors of the Byzantine Empire (known in China as Fu Lin) in the Song Empire were sent . According to the Chronicles of Song Shi and Wenxian Tongkao , the last ambassadors of the Byzantine Empire arrived in 1081 and were probably sent to the court of Emperor Song Shenzong by Michael VII . The Chronicle Yuan Shi tells of a Byzantine who worked as an astronomer and physicist at the court of Kublai Khan in the following dynasty , and even later in the Ming dynasty supposedly a Byzantine merchant (probably Nicolaus de Bentra, Archbishop of Khanbaliq ) to Byzantium Sent to brief the Byzantine ruler John V of the establishment of the new dynasty.

Relations with the northern neighbors

Liao Dynasty

Contemporary depiction of Emperor Song Taizong , National Palace Museum , Taipei

Relations between the Song and the Kitan-founded Liao Dynasty remained peaceful for the first two decades after the Song Dynasty was founded, although both states claimed the territories held by the Northern Han Empire and the Sixteen Prefectures . On New Year's Day in 974, embassies were established in the two capitals. In 979, however, the Song moved against the Northern Han Empire, which had long been under the patronage of the Liao Dynasty. The song initially succeeded in forcing the Northern Han to give up. However, when the Song marched on the Southern Capital in the Sixteen Prefectures, they were defeated in the Battle of the Giaoliang River . After this defeat, Emperor Song Taizong's reputation was so damaged that influential army commanders organized a coup to depose him in favor of his nephew Zhao Dezhao .

Relations between Song and Liao remained hostile and strained afterwards. In 986, Song attacked the Liao Empire three times under a child emperor to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures, but Liao managed to repel all three attacks. Then diplomatic relations were resumed. Relations worsened again in the 990s. From 993 to 1004, Song used Liao's knowledge to build a canal system called the Great Trench , which stretched from the Taihang Mountains to the Bohai Gulf , and was designed to protect Song from attacks from Liao. However, Liao interpreted the work as a measure to be able to quickly send attack troops towards Liao by water. Starting in 999, Liao carried out annual attacks on Song without making any significant progress. Liao would have liked to conquer the Guannan region in what is now northern Hebei, because it had only recently been lost to Song under General Zhou Shizong and had several strategically important mountain passes.

Women processing silk , depiction from the 12th century. As part of the Chanyuan Treaty , Song was required to send 200,000 bales of silk annually to the Liao Kite Dynasty .

In 1004, the Liao Army penetrated deep into Song territory and settled in Chanyuan , about 100 kilometers north of the Song capital, Kaifeng . However, she had already overstretched her strength and supply routes and all routes of retreat could easily have been cut off by Song troops. The completion of the Great trench , the disabled as a defensive measure the progress of the cavalry of the Liao, led the Liao to negotiate a truce: Eventually, the completion of the 'Great Ditch' as to effective defensive blockade Which slowed the advance of Liao cavalry forced the Liao to request a truce. The negotiations led to the Chanyuan Treaty , which was signed in January 1005 (in some works the year 1004 is given because of the Chinese calendar ) and which established the status quo ante between Song and Liao . The Khitan rulers wanted to enter into marriage alliances with the Song ruling family, but the Song refused to do so and suggested symbolic kinship. The contract also included paying tribute from Song to Liao and recognizing the Liao's equivalence. The tribute consisted of 283 kg of silver and 200,000 bales of silk, or 500,000 bales from 1042 onwards. However, even after the 1042 tribute increase, these tribute payments were not a heavy burden for the Song economy. The amount of precious metal owned by the Liao did not grow either because the Liao used the silver from the Song tribute payments to cover their foreign trade deficit with Song; thus the silver came back into the possession of Song State or merchants.

The songs had to maintain good neighborly relations with the Liao. They dispatched capable ambassadors to please the Liao, such as the eminent watchmaker , engineer and minister, Su Song . In anticipation of an armed conflict, the Song also strengthened their military, bringing one million men under arms by 1022. This meant that the army devoured three-quarters of the tax revenue, compared to the two or three percent spent on paying tribute to the Liao. These facts led to intense political disputes at the Song court; the Liao dynasty fell in 1125.

Western Xia Dynasty

Northern Song, Liao, and Xia Dynasty Territories

From the 980s onwards, the Song tried to regain the prefectures on the Ordos Plateau , which had been lost by the Tang , from the Tanguts , who had founded the Western Xia Dynasty . After the death of the Tangut head Li Jiqian in 1004, his successor Li Deming initially continued the attacks against Song. He later sought peaceful relationships and economic benefits.

In 1034, Li Jipeng (also known as Zhao Baozhong) invaded Xia with a few troops, looting villages and destroying some fortified settlements. The Tanguts led Li Yuanhao to take revenge . They raided Qingzhou in Huanqing County on September 12, 1034, but soon released captured officers and soldiers. On January 29, 1035, Li Yuanhao sent tribute of fifty horses to the Song court, asked for a copy of a Buddhist canon , and diplomatic relations were restored. The Tanguts retained some of their customs and their own script , but the state structure followed the Chinese model . Li proclaimed himself the first imperial ruler of the Western Xia Empire and ruled from then on as Emperor Jingzong . On November 10, 1038, he sent an ambassador to the Song capital to obtain recognition as the son of blue skies and to inform that Xia would no longer pay tribute thanks to the new status. The Xia again began attacks on the borders of Song, which were repulsed under Commander Lu Shouqin . On January 9, 1039, Song ordered the closure of the border markets, and a short time later a reward of 100,000 coin strings was offered for whoever captured Emperor Jingzong. Despite impressive successes at the beginning of the war, Xia could not record any territorial gains at the end of the war in 1044, but both sides had lost tens of thousands of soldiers. After the end of the war, Emperor Jingzong had to describe himself as inferior to the Song emperor again and accept that official ceremonies were held at his court by ritualists from Song. During the war, Song set up fortified outposts that stretched as much as 480 kilometers outside the westernmost prefectures of what is now Shaanxi to Hedong in what is now Shanxi . In contrast to the war against Liao, the Song could not build any water obstacles, so in 1043 they maintained around 200 imperial and 900 provincial and militia garrisons along the borders with Xia.

In 1067, Emperor Song Shenzong ascended the throne and again attacked Xia. In the 1070s, Song was able to successfully conquer Xia territories. Shenzong encouraged adventurism along the border with Xia because he wanted to recapture territories that he considered to be his rightful ruler of China. When a Song general attacked a Western Xia border town for no reason, the emperor himself appeared at the border to commend the general concerned. In order to punish the Xia and harm it economically, he had border trade stopped. In 1080 he sent the scientist and statesman Shen Kuo to Yanzhou (now Yan'an ) to fend off a Xia attack. Although he was able to maintain his position, the new Grand Chancellor Cai Que made him responsible for the deaths of a Song officer and the deaths of numerous soldiers and removed him from his office. The area that Shen Kuo successfully defended was abandoned.

After the dowager Empress Gao died in 1093, Song Zhezong overturned the Sima Guang- led conservatives, renewed Wang Anshi's reforms and ended negotiations with the Tanguts. New military clashes between Xia and Song followed. In 1099, the Northern Song advanced towards Xining and Haidong (present-day Qinghai Province ) and annexed areas that the Tibetans had ruled under Gusiluo since the 10th century . By 1116 Song managed to acquire the entire area and incorporate it into its prefectures, thus becoming the westernmost border with the Xia.

Foreign policy and military

At the time of the founding of the dynasty , large parts of northern China were already in the power of the Kitan or Liao dynasty , who claimed the country in several victories (979, 986) and in the peace of Shanyuan in 1004. The Song paid tribute to them in silver and silk, which put a strain on state finances, but was still the cheaper option given the high cost of the military (up to 25% of the budget). The army grew steadily in the 11th century, but it was not of very high quality. B. that the soldiers did not want to carry their luggage themselves; an army of porters had to be employed. The high cost of the army did not mean high strike power.

Furthermore, the existence of the Tangut empire in Gansu and that of the state of Nánzhāo ( Bai , but also Thai, Tibetan, Chinese with capital Dali ) in Yunnan was recorded. Song China also had to pay tribute to the Tangut empire, albeit less than the Kitan. In addition, Vietnam, which had been annexed for centuries, was separated: in 981 the country repulsed an attack by the Song.

economy

Bridge in the capital Kaifeng, Qingming-Rolle

The time of the Song Dynasty ensured rapid economic growth for China (recognizable by the more than doubling of coinage despite the introduction of paper money) and, in connection with it, a unique social heyday.

The individual regions were no longer economically self-sufficient . H. certain regions now stood for certain products (iron, sugar, rice, tea), and this had a positive effect on domestic trade and traffic. In addition, there was the rise of cities regardless of their political importance, triggered by the rural exodus and population growth. Walls separating individual parts of the city disappeared and shops, workshops and markets were no longer tied to prescribed locations. The gentry also allowed social legislation, which favored welfare (e.g. 1089 office for old people's homes, 1102 nursing office). Another requirement for the success of the Chinese economy in the Song era was growing domestic demand. The urban bourgeoisie (landowners, merchants) became wealthy and wanted their share of luxury , regardless of whether it was furniture, clothing or kitchen.

We see an increase in block and letterpress printing , the introduction of 1024 paper money, a further development in shipping (approx. 1090), use of the compass , 984 canal lock , 12th century increased use of the paddle wheel , deep drilling for brine and natural gas (on average up to 900 m), better military technology ( gunpowder dated 1044) and more. Literature flourished in many fields (encyclopedias, technology, medicine , novels, architecture, religion, foreign countries), and by analogy there was an increase in public and private schools and libraries .

One of the prerequisites for the success of the ancient Chinese economy was the surplus of labor created by the migration of peasants to the cities of the 12th century. Up to 7,000 people worked in the state-run factories ; and in private factories - in the field of brick distilleries, lacquer and porcelain production - at least up to 1200 workers worked. However, these private manufacturers always worked alongside the large state manufacturers. If they threatened to become too influential, the state intervened. A further expansion of this early capitalist development was prevented by the state.

Temple of the Holy Mother in Taiyuan

Most artisans were dependent on a publisher in the publishing system (as in England in the 16th century). Larger craftsmen could have up to 40 wage workers. Guilds were responsible for job placement, orphanages and fire brigades, and foundations in general also created various welfare institutions in the cities. There were brokerage offices and port workers' guilds in the ports.

The large increase in population is mainly due to improvements in agricultural production. Between the middle of the Tang period and the 11th century, the population doubled, although the state area had shrunk. The development of new agricultural areas through terracing and irrigation systems contributed to a higher harvest volume as well as higher efficiency, which was achieved through the use of fertilizers , several harvests within one year and the breeding of new rice and wheat varieties.

Trade relations with Japan, Southeast Asia and India became more intensive with the development of economic power and deep-sea shipping . H. the overseas trade, which was previously largely left to the Muslims, had an economic impact. Furthermore, a vague knowledge of European localities was noted for the early 13th century, mediated by Arab seafarers (in the book Chu-fan chih).

The problem of large estates

A problem of the state (ultimately decisive in the 13th century) turned out to be large land ownership, which was increasingly found in the economic centers such as B. expanded on the Huai River . Thanks to their influence on the civil service, large landowners were able to secure their economic base politically at an early stage. The principle of accumulation was as follows: A tax rate was set for each district. The large landowners received the taxes of their tenants (40–50% of each harvest), but passed little of it on to the state. And when the large estates evaded taxes, the free small farmers had to pay, since the quota was fixed and they had no influence over the civil service. Little by little, the free small farmers were ruined. The ruined smallholder could now become the tenant of the large landowner or leave his land to earn money elsewhere, but the latter was forbidden. In addition, the tax differentiation favored the big ones, i. H. the minimum levies were too high.

The problem was much worse in southern China from the beginning, because in the north of China many large landowners had been killed in the 10th century: they were always the first victims in uprisings and wars and in their place were free small farmers.

There was even a differentiation within the large estates: the small gentry and intelligentsia became dependent on the large gentry and stayed out of politics. Never had a time been so rich in poetry as the song. The grand gentry speculated with land and money and dominated the administration (apart from the reform period under Wang Anshi ).

administration

The song time is considered bureaucratic, but relatively liberal. The state relied on the class of the big landowners (close ties with the wholesale trade), and the upper civil servants were recruited almost exclusively from them. The imperial dealings with ministers were more familiar than before, and it could happen that a minister patted the emperor on the shoulder or fell asleep with him. The emperor titled himself only as Kuan-chia, d. H. Administrator, and was allocated a budget and special allowances for celebrations for his expenses (unlike the Ming , for example ). The role of the chancellor has always been important. On the other hand, the central government was more represented than ever in terms of the number and distribution of authorities, and the trend was rising.

At the time of the Song, the central administration was divided into the large departments of a) economy and finance ( offices : state monopolies , budget, population), b) army and c) secretariat (i.e. court and personnel administration). There were even three offices for the independent reception of complaints and suggestions from officials and the population.

Civil servants received 80 days off a year and 50% (and more) of their salary as a pension, and they also received a certain amount of land as a tax-free salary supplement. After 1065, official exams were held every three years and made compulsory. In addition, there were now three levels of official examinations (in the prefecture, capital and before the emperor). The subjects of the civil service examinations (under Wang Anshi ) have also been made more practical, so that we can record: general education, writing and documents, law , mathematics, military and, as always, the classics. Exam papers were treated anonymously.

Under Emperor Shenzong (神宗, ruled 1067-1085), the reforms of Wang Anshi came in 1069 . The main concern of Wang Anshi was to regulate the oppression of the small farmers, who had to bear the brunt of direct taxes and compulsory labor, by enacting laws . The same applied to the small artisans who were dependent on the above-mentioned publishers and trade guilds ( hang行). Wang Anshi could not keep himself at court and was banished in 1076, reinstated in 1078 and again disempowered in 1085. In his place came the conservative Sima Guang , who represented the big landowners and wealthy merchants and repealed the "new laws". After the death of the two rivals in 1086, the struggle of their parties continued, with the Wang-inspired party gaining the upper hand from 1093 (although it is noticeable that the group formation assumed a political and regional character and was less oriented towards the clan structure).

Southern Song 1126 / 27–1279

Jurchen and dynasty change

The Song Empire in 1142: The dynasty lost northern China to the attack of the Jurchen.

Chancellor Cai Jing (1046–1126) led the state in the tradition of Wang Anshi, but that ended in the case of the Northern Song Dynasty, which is why it is badly rated (expansion of the school system, enlargement of bureaucracy). Like Emperor Huizong, he had artistic inclinations, but was not an economist. For example, there was an uprising in Zhejiang around 1123 , fueled by corruption. This happened at an inopportune moment: in the north, new opponents, the Jurchen, had appeared, who replaced the Kitan.

Decisive for the downfall of the northern Song dynasty ( 北宋 , Běi Sòng ) was the capture of Emperor Huizong and his son in January 1127 during the conquest of Kaifeng by the Jurchen ( Jin dynasty ), after the city had been there since February 1126 had been surrounded by an army of Jurchen. The entire court was deported to Manchuria. Gaozong (r. 1127–1162), another prince, escaped and founded south of the Yangtze River , d. H. in Hangzhou, the southern Song Dynasty ( 南宋 , Nán-Sòng ). A victory over the Jurchen general Wu-chu on the Yangtze in 1130 ensured the continued existence of the dynasty.

Domestically, little changed, it was just the continuation of the old state in the south, i. H. with a reduced national territory. In the new state the large estates were at best more strongly represented, and in many districts over 30% of the land belonged directly to the gentry. Under Chancellor Qin Gui it also prevented the attempt to retake the north.

In 1138 the Chinese folk hero Yue Fei was marching on Kaifeng when the war-weary Emperor Gaozong concluded a tribute peace, which also included a vassal position of the Song (until 1165). Yue Fei was arrested and executed analogously by the court (1142). In the future, Song China had the power, but not the will, to drive the Jurchen out of northern China, and instead secured the peace through high tributes (Chancellor Qin Gui; † 1155). In 1161, another Jurchen attack on southern China - this time under Jin Emperor Tikunai (Wanyan Liang) himself - failed on the Yangtze River. During the battles of the imperial troops with the Jurchen and pirates, a fleet of paddle-wheel boats was used on the Yangtze and its tributaries, as were gas and explosive weapons, forerunners of cannons .

Fall of the dynasty

Embezzlement and nepotism in the Mandarin administration were the downside of Song State in the 12th and 13th centuries. There were various ways of doing this; They ranged from the simple embezzlement of taxpayers' money to the entrepreneurial activities of officials via straw men, taking advantage of their position. The tax evasion of the large landowners increased, which resulted in payment difficulties of the treasury. At the same time, failed smallholders from the border regions moved to the agricultural centers as tenants, which worsened the social situation. There was also unbridled inflation .

Around 1263 the domestic political situation in the agricultural centers south of the Yangtze became so precarious that it became difficult to collect taxes: reforms became unavoidable. Coercive measures by the Chancellor Jia Sidao (1213-1275) were the result. The chancellor came from the little gentry, but his sister was an imperial concubine. He wanted to limit the large estates to 27 hectares, buy up the excess land and use the income to cover the tax losses and war costs. Jia Sidao proved to be a ruthless schemer . The resulting clashes in the central administration and the State Council undermined the loyalty of the civil servants and, ultimately, of the army leadership on the eve of the Mongol attack.

The Mongols (from 1271 Yuan dynasty ) had established their rule over northern China, relocated the capital to Beijing, and now the conquest of southern China became the goal. After the fortresses on the Han River fell in 1273 (several years under siege of Xiangyang ), the Mongols advanced into Hangzhou. The capital Hangzhou surrendered in 1276, the last followers of the Song held out until 1279. After losing the Battle of Yamen ( 崖門 戰役  /  崖门 战役 ) on March 19, 1279, one of the greatest sea battles in world history, Prime Minister and Imperial Advisor Lu Xiufu drowned ( 陸秀夫  /  陆秀夫 , 1232–1279) the 8-year-old heir to the throne Bing and jumping into the Pearl River . This ended the Southern Song Dynasty and the rule of the Yuan Dynasty began.

See also

literature

  • Jacques Gernet : The Chinese World. The history of China from the beginning to the present time (= Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch. 1505). 1st edition, reprint. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1994, ISBN 3-518-38005-2 .
  • Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer : History of China up to the Mongol conquest. 250 BC BC – 1279 AD (= Oldenbourg floor plan of history. Vol. 26). Oldenbourg, Munich 1999, ISBN 3-486-56402-1 .
  • Dieter Kuhn : The Age of Confucian Rule. The Song Transformation of China. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 2009.
  • Dieter Kuhn: The Song Dynasty, 960 to 1279: A new society reflected in its culture. Acta Humaniora, Weinheim 1987, ISBN 3-527-17562-8 .
  • The Sung Period: Bureaucratic China (10th – 13th centuries). In: Herbert Franke , Rolf Wedding note : The Chinese Empire (= Fischer World History . Vol. 19). Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1968, pp. 187–222.
  • Frederick W. Mote: Imperial China 900-1800. HUP, Cambridge (Mass.) 1999, p. 92ff.
  • Denis Twitchett , Paul Jakov Smith (eds.): The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279 (= The Cambridge History of China . Vol. 5, Part 1). Part 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2009, ISBN 978-0-521-81248-1 .
  • Kai Vogelsang : History of China. 3rd revised and updated edition. Reclam, Stuttgart 2013, p. 303ff.

Web links

Commons : Song Dynasty  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files
Commons : Art of the Song Dynasty  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. ^ Peter Lorge: The Reunification of China: Peace through War under the Song Dynasty . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, ISBN 978-1-107-08475-9 , pp. 4-5 .
  2. ^ David Andrew Graff, Robin Higham: A Military History of China . Westview Press, Boulder 2002, ISBN 0-8133-3990-1 , pp. 87 .
  3. ^ Edward H. Schafer: War Elephants in Ancient and Medieval China . In: Oriens . tape 10 , no. 2 , 1957, p. 291 .
  4. ^ A b c d e Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, James B. Palais: East Asia: a cultural, social, and political history . Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 2006, ISBN 0-618-13384-4 , pp. 154 .
  5. ↑ Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, James B. Palais: East Asia: a cultural, social, and political history . Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 2006, ISBN 0-618-13384-4 , pp. 155 .
  6. ^ Joseph Needham: Science and Civilization in China: Volume 1, Introductory Orientations . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1954, pp. 133 .
  7. ^ Joseph Needham: Science and Civilization in China: Volume 1, Introductory Orientations . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1954, pp. 132 .
  8. ↑ Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Anne Walthall, James B. Palais: East Asia: a cultural, social, and political history . Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 2006, ISBN 0-618-13384-4 , pp. 160 .
  9. ^ A b c Joseph Needham: Science and Civilization in China: Volume 3, Mathematics and the Sciences of the Heavens and the Earth . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1959, pp. 518 .
  10. ↑ James M. Hargett: Song Dynasty Local Gazetteers and Their Place in The History of Difangzhi Writing . In: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies . tape 56 , no. 2 , 1996, p. 413 , doi : 10.2307 / 2719404 .
  11. ^ Joseph Needham: Science and Civilization in China: Volume 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part 2: Mechanical Engineering . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1965, pp. 469-471 .
  12. ↑ Patricia Buckley Ebrey: The Cambridge Illustrated History of China . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, ISBN 0-521-66991-X , pp. 138 .
  13. ^ Michael C. Brose: People in the Middle: Uyghurs in the Northwest Frontier Zone . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 258 .
  14. ^ A b c Paul Halsall: East Asian History Sourcebook: Chinese Accounts of Rome, Byzantium and the Middle East, c. 91 BCE - 1643 CE . Fordham University . 2000. Retrieved September 14, 2016.
  15. ^ Fuat Sezgin, Carl Ehrig-Eggert, Amawi Mazen, E. Neubauer: The Islamic World in Foreign Travel Accounts . Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Sciences, Frankfurt (Main) 1996, p. 25 .
  16. ^ Emil Bretschneider: Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources: Fragments Towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from the 13th to the 17th Century, Vol. 1, reprint 2000 . Abingdon, Routledge 1888, pp. 144 .
  17. ^ Edward N. Luttwak: The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire . The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 2009, ISBN 978-0-674-03519-5 , pp. 169 f .
  18. ^ A b Frederick W. Mote: Imperial China . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1999, ISBN 0-674-44515-5 , pp. 69 .
  19. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 67 .
  20. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 60 .
  21. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 59-61 .
  22. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 60-62 .
  23. ^ A b Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 65 .
  24. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 70 .
  25. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 71 .
  26. ^ Peter Lorge: The Great Ditch of China and the Song-Liao Border . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 66 .
  27. ^ Frederick W. Mote: Imperial China . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1999, ISBN 0-674-44515-5 , pp. 70 f .
  28. ↑ Joseph Needham: Science and Civilization in China: Volume 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part 3: Civil Engineering and Nautics . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1971, ISBN 0-521-07060-0 , pp. 446 .
  29. ^ Ruth W. Dunnell, The Great State of White and High: Buddhism and State Formation in Eleventh-Century Xia . University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1996, ISBN 0-8248-1719-2 , pp. xxi, 13, 91 .
  30. ^ Peter Lorge: War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795 . 1st edition. Routledge, New York 2005, ISBN 978-0-415-31690-3 , pp. 44 .
  31. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 152 .
  32. ↑ a b Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 155 .
  33. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 154 ff .
  34. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 157 .
  35. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 157 ff .
  36. ^ Peter Lorge: War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795 . 1st edition. Routledge, New York 2005, ISBN 978-0-415-31690-3 , pp. 44 f .
  37. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 152, 157 f .
  38. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 157 f .
  39. ↑ a b Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 153 .
  40. ↑ Michael McGrath: Frustrated Empires: The Song-Tangut Xia War of 1038-1044 . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 158 .
  41. ↑ a b James A. Anderson: 'Treacherous Factions': Shifting Frontier Alliances in the Breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese Relations on the Eve of the 1075 Border War . In: Don J. Wyatt (Ed.): Battlefronts Real and Imagined: War, Border, and Identity in the Chinese Middle Period . Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008, ISBN 978-1-4039-6084-9 , pp. 206 .
  42. ↑ Nathan Sivin: Science in Ancient China . VARIORUM, Ashgate Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont 1995, pp. III, 8 .
  43. ↑ Nathan Sivin: Science in Ancient China . VARIORUM, Ashgate Publishing, Brookfield, Vermont 1995, pp. III, 9 .
  44. ^ Ruth W. Dunnell, The Great State of White and High: Buddhism and State Formation in Eleventh-Century Xia . University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1996, ISBN 0-8248-1719-2 , pp. 75 .
  45. ↑ Wang, Jiawei: The Historical Status of China's Tibet . China Intercontinental Press, Beijing 2001, ISBN 7-80113-304-8 , pp. 15 .
  46. ^ Peter J. Golas: Rural China in the Song. In: The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 39, No. 2, 1980, pp. 291-325, doi : 10.2307 / 2054291 .
  47. ^ Dieter Kuhn: The Age of Confucian Rule. The Song Transformation of China. Cambridge (Mass.) 2009, pp. 67-70; Frederick W. Mote: Imperial China 900-1800. Cambridge (Mass.) 1999, pp. 290f.