Saparmyrat Niyazov

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Saparmyrat Nyýazow (2000)

Saparmurat Niyazov Ataýewiç [ θɑːpɑːrmyːrɑːt niːjɑːðɒv ] ( Russian Сапармурат Атаевич Ниязов Saparmurat Niyazov Atajewitsch * 19th February 1940 in Gypjak in Ashgabat , Turkmen SSR , USSR ; † 21st December 2006 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan ) was a Turkmen politician and from 1992 until on his death the first president of the independent state of Turkmenistan. During this time he called himself Türkmenbaşy (also Turkmenbaschi, German : leader of the Turkmen ).

Niyazov grew up as an orphan after his father in World War II and his mother during the earthquake in Ashgabat in 1948 had died. During his studies in what was then Leningrad , he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and rose quickly in the party hierarchy after his return to the Turkmen SSR . In 1985 he became general secretary of the local Communist Party, and in 1990 he was elected as a candidate of the Communist Party for president in the first presidential election in the Turkmen SSR. Based on the existing power apparatus, Nyýazow was able to assert himself as head of state after the independence of Turkmenistan in 1991. In the presidential election in 1992 he was elected president of Turkmenistan unopposed. In a referendum in January 1994, the president's term of office was extended from five to ten years, and in 1999 he was finally appointed president for life by the Turkmen parliament.

Under Nyýazow, Turkmenistan developed into one of the most repressive states in the world, where human rights were systematically violated. The authoritarian rule of the president was marked by an extravagant personality cult around Niyazov and his family, and any form of opposition to the president was suppressed by the state security apparatus. The education, health and social system in Turkmenistan was weakened during the Niyazov presidency by savings and a strong centralization on the capital Ashgabat, which resulted in increased poverty and reduced life expectancy for the Turkmen rural population. In foreign policy, Nyýazow pursued the concept of permanent neutrality , which should prevent external influence on political developments in Turkmenistan.

Family and origin

Nyýazow was born on February 19, 1940 in the city of Gypjak near Ashgabat , the capital of Turkmenistan. His family and especially his parents were also glorified as part of the personality cult around Nyýazow, so that only little reliable information is available on the family circumstances of Nyýazow. The family belonged to the Tekke tribe, the numerically largest and most influential tribe in the Turkmen tribal system. Nyýazov's grandfather was a wealthy landowner in Gypjak, but lost his property during the collectivizations under the rule of Joseph Stalin .

According to official reports, his father Atamurat Nyýazow served in the Red Army during World War II . He fell in 1942 in the Caucasus fighting against Army Group A of the Wehrmacht , which was advancing towards Baku as part of the Edelweiss company , but was stopped by the Soviet Army. Due to a lack of evidence for this representation, Atamurat Nyýazow's behavior during World War II is repeatedly the subject of speculation, ranging from desertion to cooperation with the Wehrmacht.

Memorial to the victims of the 1948 earthquake in the Halk Hakydasy memorial complex , depiction of a woman
holding up her golden child as a glorification of Gurbansoltan-eje

Saparmyrat Nyýazow's mother is known as Gurbansoltan-eje and took a prominent position in the personality cult around the family of the future president. She gave birth to three sons, the two brothers Saparmyrat Nyýazows were born in 1938 and 1942. His mother and two brothers fell victim to the Ashgabat earthquake on October 6, 1948, so that Saparmyrat Nyýazow was orphaned at the age of eight.

Youth and Studies (1948–1970)

After his mother's death, Nyýazow grew up in an orphanage and later lived with distant relatives. In 1957 Nyýazow finished his school career and then went to Moscow , where he studied at the Moscow Energy Institute in the field of energy technology . After the first semester , however, he returned to the Turkmen SSR in early 1958 . There he worked as a trainer for the trade union union for mineral exploration work before starting a second degree in Russia in 1960, this time at the Polytechnic Institute in what was then Leningrad . During his engineering studies he met his future wife Muza Melnikowa, a Russian from a Jewish family. He also joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1962 . In 1967 he graduated from Leningrad with a degree in engineering and then returned to Ashgabat. From 1967 to 1970 he worked in a power station in the town of Büzmeýin, northwest of the Turkmen capital. At the same time he continued his engagement in the Communist Party in Turkmenistan.

Career in the Communist Party (1970-1992)

In 1970 Nyýazow gave up his previous position and was increasingly active in the Communist Party. As one of the few ethnic Turkmens with a degree in a technical field who wanted to pursue a career in the Turkmen Communist Party, Nyýazow was able to move up quickly into the party's leadership cadre. In addition to his origins and his studies, his reputation as an efficient apparatchik and his ability to form political alliances favored his rapid rise in the party. From 1970 to 1975 he worked as a trainer for the Turkmen CP in the field of transport and industry, before he was promoted to deputy head of the department for industry in the Turkmen CP in 1975. After attending the Higher Party School in Tashkent in 1976, he returned to Ashgabat, became head of the same department in 1979 and chairman of the CP Party Committee in Ashgabat in 1980. From 1984 Nyýazow was a trainer for organization and party work in the CPSU . In August 1985, an article in the party newspaper Pravda described shortcomings in the Turkmen cotton industry and criticized the leadership of the Communist Party in Turkmenistan. This article gave Mikhail Gorbachev , General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU since March 1985 , the opportunity to reorganize the party leadership around General Secretary Muchamednasar Gapurov , which is considered corrupt and inefficient . On December 21, 1985 Gapurow was officially ousted, as his successor Nyýazow was chairman of the Turkmen party organization. From 1986 to 1991 Nyýazow was also a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and from 1990 to 1991 a member of the Politburo of the CPSU .

In the first presidential election in the Turkmen SSR on October 27, 1990, Nyýazow was the only candidate with more than 98% of the vote, the first president of the Turkmen SSR. Niyazov was critical of Gorbachev's reforms and responded with a strictly structurally conservative course in the Turkmen SSR. He supported the August coup in Moscow in 1991, but quickly adapted to the political situation after the failure of the coup and the increasing collapse of the Soviet Union and pushed Turkmenistan's independence forward. With the official independence on October 27, 1991 Nyýazow became the first head of state of the independent state of Turkmenistan. On December 16, 1991, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan dissolved and became part of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), which was founded on March 3, 1992 under the leadership of Nyýazows .

Presidency (1992-2006)

Elections and Political System

1992 Constitution

After the independence of Turkmenistan, Nyýazow was able to maintain his position at the head of the state, supported by the power apparatus of the Soviet era. On May 18, 1992, the new constitution of Turkmenistan came into force, which gave the President, as head of the executive branch, far-reaching powers. This could appoint judges without the consent of the legislature , which Nyýazow was able to exert direct influence on the judiciary and thus establish a controlled, government-loyal judiciary. The legislature was formally formed by a bicameral system consisting of the Assembly of Turkmenistan and a People's Council. The 50 members of the Turkmenistan Assembly were elected by direct majority for five years, while the delegates in the People's Council were partially elected and partially appointed by the President. With the entry into force of the new constitution, the office of prime minister also passed to the president, so that the former prime minister Han Ahmedow had to give up his office in favor of Niyazov.

Presidential and parliamentary elections

In the presidential election in 1992 , the first presidential election in the history of the independent state of Turkmenistan, Nyýazow ran for the newly created Democratic Party of Turkmenistan. As the only candidate he achieved an official result of 99.5% of the votes cast and was thus legitimized for a five-year term as President of Turkmenistan.

The president took key steps towards authoritarian rule in 1994. In a referendum on January 15, 1994, Nyýazow had his term of office formally extended from five to ten years, which corresponded to a deletion of the presidential election scheduled for 1997. The official result of the referendum showed a voter turnout of 100% and an approval of 99.9% for the extension of the term of office. On December 11th of the same year the first parliamentary election took place, in which the Turkmenistan Assembly of 50 persons was elected according to the Turkmen constitution. The election took place without any opposition; 51 DPT candidates applied for the 50 mandates. As a result, only members of the DPT were elected in the election, in which, according to official information, 99.77% of the eligible voters took part. In the following legislative period, the parliament exercised no political influence. The following parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004 were also held without any opposition parties or candidates and always ended with MPs from the DPT winning all seats. During Niyazov's term in office, the Turkmen parliament became a purely formal supervisory body that de facto supported every decision made by the president. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did not send any election observers to Turkmenistan during this period, but in November 1999 a mission to analyze the political situation on the occasion of the parliamentary elections in December 1999. The final report stated that “minimum requirements for democratic elections [...] do not exist in Turkmenistan ”and that“ the upcoming election will not be competitive ”. The OSCE then decided not to send an observation mission on election day.

President for life

Saparmyrat Nyýazow in January 2002

On December 11, 1999, one day before the parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan in 1999 and three years before the next presidential election, Nyýazow was elected president for life by the members of the Turkmenistan Assembly, so that he could remain in office without further elections. On the same day he announced that the DPT would remain the only party in Turkmenistan as the country was not ready for a multi-party system . In 2003, Nyýazow reformed the Turkmen bicameral system by considerably expanding the powers of the People's Council vis-à-vis the Assembly of Turkmenistan. In addition, Nyýazow became chairman of both chambers of the Turkmen parliament as part of the reform and thus further expanded his control over the legislature. During his presidency, Nyýazow announced several times that he would not hold the office of president until his death, but rather to build a successor beforehand. He mentioned his 70th birthday in 2010 as the time horizon for a possible handover, and on other occasions he announced a presidential election for 2008 or 2009. The president's death in December 2006 thwarted these plans and Nyýazow died as the incumbent president of Turkmenistan without having built a clear successor.

Domestic politics

Maintaining power and dealing with members of the opposition

Domestic politics, Nyýazow used his almost unlimited power in Turkmenistan to build one of the most repressive systems in the world. His regime was characterized by combating all forms of opposition , controlling the media and religion, and restricting constitutional rights such as freedom of religion , expression and assembly .

In the course of Gorbachev's reform efforts and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, numerous religious and political organizations had formed in Turkmenistan that rejected a continuation of the Soviet tradition by the former Communist Party leader Nyýazow and a democratization or a stronger influence of Islam on society and Policy of Turkmenistan aspired. Nyýazow began fighting these organizations soon after independence. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkmen president was able to integrate numerous leading opposition figures into the state apparatus through financial incentives and bonuses, including, above all, dachas , vehicles and cash payments. If this did not succeed, opposition members were criminalized and often sentenced to long prison terms. The loyalty of the judiciary to Nyýazow led to numerous judgments against members of the opposition, who were thus silenced.

In addition to the judiciary, the state security apparatus around the Committee for National Security (Russian: Komitet Natsionalnoi Bezopastnosti , KNB for short) also controlled the opposition. The KNB is the Turkmen successor organization of the Soviet secret service KGB and was equipped with extensive competencies in the Nyýazow era. The organization employed around 3,000 people and maintained an extensive network of informants for comprehensive surveillance of the Turkmen population. The methods used by the KNB included kidnapping , blackmail , enforced disappearance , torture and murder , with the victims mostly being alleged opposition members and critics of the regime. Dozens of political prisoners were either detained in prisons or taken to labor camps, in both cases with systematic violations of human rights and high mortality among prisoners. According to foreign estimates, around 20,000 people, including criminals and political prisoners, lived in Turkmen labor camps in the early 2000s. Former inmates who fled Turkmenistan as part of amnesties or after their sentences ended, reported torture and assault in Turkmen prisons and penal camps, and numerous other opposition members disappeared into prisons without any information about their health being leaked.

In the course of Niyazov's presidency, the criminalization of the opposition continued to increase, especially after a failed assassination attempt on Niyazov on November 25, 2002 in Ashgabat. According to official reports, several shots were fired at the president's motorcade, but he was unharmed. While leading opposition leaders denied responsibility for the act and spoke of a staging, Niyazov accused the opposition of planning the assassination attempt and spoke of an attempted coup. The president's political response was the law against the “traitors of the fatherland”, which classified any form of opposition to Niyazov as treason and provided opposition members with life imprisonment and complete isolation from the outside world. On this basis, numerous opposition activists were arrested and then disappeared in prisons, other regime critics fled abroad and built an opposition in exile that denounces human rights violations in Turkmenistan, but has little outside influence on developments in Turkmenistan.

Even the right to found political parties, which is laid down in Article 30 of the Turkmen constitution, was only formally available in the Niyazov era; there was no de facto legal basis for founding parties critical of the regime. The opposition party Agzybirlik, founded in 1989, was banned in 1990, the successor organization Party for Democratic Development was banned in 1991. One of the most prominent opposition leaders in Turkmenistan was the former Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan (1995-2000), Boris Orazowiç Şyhmyradow , who officially joined the Opposition to Niyazov went and founded the People's Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan. After the assassination attempt on Nyýazow, Şyhmyradow was arrested as an alleged mastermind and sentenced on December 30, 2002 to 25 years in prison. Since then, there has been no information about the whereabouts of the most prominent Niyazov opponent.

Economic policy

Development of the Turkmen oil production after independence

In terms of economic policy, Nyýazow announced in 1992 that he wanted to make Turkmenistan the " Kuwait of Central Asia" through the country's rich oil and natural gas reserves . In 1993 the Soviet ruble was replaced by the newly introduced Turkmenistan manat , which was characterized by pronounced inflation in the following years. Furthermore, Nyýazow relied on foreign direct investments in the Turkmen energy sector, which however remained at a low level in the 1990s due to the economic uncertainty and the lack of reforms after independence. In fact, in Turkmenistan there was positive growth in real gross domestic product only in 1998 and thus later than in the other Central Asian countries. This was mainly due to an expansion of oil production in Turkmenistan, which initially fell significantly after independence, after the country's energy sector continued to be dependent on Russia, as natural gas and oil could be exported to Russia almost exclusively via the infrastructure established during the Soviet era. The 1998/1999 Russian crisis made economic recovery in Turkmenistan even more difficult. In addition, Turkmen’s foreign trade was limited to a few state-owned companies , so that foreign currencies and economic impulses from foreign trade largely failed to materialize. Overall, the private sector under Nyýazow developed only slowly. At the end of the 1990s, the World Bank estimated the contribution of private companies to the gross domestic product of Turkmenistan at 10 to 15%, a remarkably low value even compared to the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Health and social system

The Turkmen health system , deteriorated during the Niyazov presidency due to savings and strong centralization on the capital, Ashgabat, became part of the state apparatus, which was largely geared towards stabilizing the authoritarian system and establishing the personality cult around Niyazov. Against this background, Nyýazow replaced Hippocrates' oath with a declaration of loyalty to the Turkmen president. In 2004, by order of Nyýazov, the diagnosis of infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis , which had previously spread in Turkmenistan, was banned. Throughout Nyazov's presidency, government spending on the health system was subject to significant cuts. In 2001 several thousand employees in the Turkmen health sector were laid off for financial reasons, and in January 2004, with the layoff of 15,000 employees, the workforce in the Turkmen health sector was reduced by a third in one fell swoop. In February 2005, Nyýazow announced the closure of all hospitals outside Ashgabat, with the exception of one diagnostic center in each of the district capitals. Despite the incomplete implementation of this measure, health care in areas outside the capital has been largely neglected. The poor condition of the health system in Turkmenistan led to an increase in health tourism, especially to Uzbekistan, and increased illegal offers of medicines on the black market . Nyýazow, meanwhile, used the crisis in the public health system as an incentive for the regime-loyal elite, who in Ashgabat benefited from a comparatively good health system. The President himself trusted foreign, especially German, doctors who were flown to Turkmenistan to treat Niyazov to treat his heart condition.

The social system in Turkmenistan was largely financed during Nyýazow's term of office by the income from the export of natural gas and oil and included extensive state subsidies for numerous everyday goods. The prices for water, salt, flour, natural gas and electricity could be significantly reduced by the state subsidies, but the goal of providing these goods free of charge, which Nyýazow had set out in 1992 as part of the Ten Years of Prosperity program, was never fully achieved . In the area of ​​the social system, too, the supply situation in the capital and in the neighboring Ahal welaýaty was significantly better than in the rest of the country, where there were regular power outages and food shortages. Under Nyýazow, men were entitled to pension payments from the age of 62 or after 25 years of employment, women from the age of 57 or after 20 years of employment. In early 2006, Nyýazow announced the cancellation or reduction of pension payments for more than 100,000 pensioners in Turkmenistan, which led to isolated protests from pensioners who were deprived of their livelihoods by the cuts. Nyýazow justified the measure with a mistake in a previous census , which led to incorrect pension entitlements.

Educational policy

The Turkmen education system formed one of the central pillars for the Niyazov regime and the development of the personality cult around the president. Above all, the desired understanding of society, history and politics was conveyed and the veneration of the president was indoctrinated . The state's complete monopoly on information did not allow any education apart from state propaganda. Against this background, Nyýazow ordered the closure of all public libraries in April 2005 , since, according to the President, they are “no longer needed” because “the Turkmens already have the books they need”. The Ruhnama published in September 2001 (see also section Ruhnama ) played a central role in the Turkmen education system. It became compulsory reading for all students and was a regular part of the curriculum in schools and universities. Under Nyýazow, the Ruhnama course took up about a third of the curriculum . The shortening of school time from eleven to nine years and the ban on Russian teaching materials without an equivalent substitute in the Turkmen language further restricted the educational opportunities of the Turkmen population. Children and young people were also repeatedly subjected to state propaganda stagings by taking part in mass events or praising the president and his regime.

Studying at Turkmen universities was reserved for young people from families loyal to the regime. An observation of family members by the Turkmen secret service led to their exclusion from higher education in Turkmenistan, which was significantly reduced under Nyýazow. Before independence, around 30,000 people went to university in Turkmenistan each year; in 2001 and 2002 the figure was only around 3,000. The Ruhnama was also taught compulsorily at universities, and there was no freedom in choosing a course of study, and the forced change of subject was common in Turkmenistan. In 1997 Nyýazow completely abolished the opportunity to do a doctorate at Turkmen universities, the higher education then comprised only two theoretical and two practical years.

Religious politics

The religious life of the predominantly Muslim Turkmens had already been severely restricted in the Soviet Union by the closure of numerous mosques and a far-reaching ban on public religious practice. After the independence of Turkmenistan, Nyýazow continued this religious-political course as far as possible. The re-Islamization that took place in other former Soviet republics such as Tajikistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not materialize in Turkmenistan. In the first few years of his presidency, Nyýazow paid little attention to Islam and described the likelihood of Islamization in Turkmenistan as low.

The Türkmenbaşy Ruhi Mosque in Gypjak

In the mid-1990s, the president made a turn in his religious policy. He recognized Sunni Islam as an important element of Turkmen society and promoted the building of mosques and the training of imams . State funding for Sunni Islam in Turkmenistan went hand in hand with further restrictions on private religious practice. In December 1996, Nyýazow issued a decree requiring religious communities to register with the Ministry of Justice; all unregistered religious communities were declared illegal. Registration was slow after the decree was issued, and in numerous cases it was completely refused. In March 2004, according to state data, 152 religious communities were registered, including 140 Muslim communities and 12 Russian Orthodox communities . Other religious communities that were not granted registration were thus driven into illegality and hindered in their religious practice. Despite the formal state recognition, Muslim life in Turkmenistan was severely restricted, all Islamic educational institutions except for the theological faculty at the State University in Ashgabat were closed and only a few hundred Turkmen Muslims were allowed to take the Hajj to Mecca each year.

The reason for Nyýazow's change of course in religious policy was on the one hand economic interests, since Nyýazow hoped for closer relations with the Islamic world and the associated investments in Turkmenistan, and on the other hand the intention of a religious legitimation of his rule. Nyýazow achieved this legitimation through the synthesis of Islamic elements with the personality cult around himself. He was praised in Islamic prayers and sermons, and his book Ruhnama found its way into Islamic religious practice. Representatives of the Islamic clergy in Turkmenistan who were critical of Niyazov's plan were severely sanctioned and deprived of their influence, as happened, for example, in the case of the top mufti of Turkmenistan, Nasrulla ibn Ibadulla, who criticized the excessive veneration of the president and was subsequently sentenced to imprisonment . The office of the Supreme Mufti of Turkmenistan was subordinate to Nyýazow, who could dismiss the Mufti at any time and did so regularly during his presidency. When selecting religious dignitaries, what counted was primarily the candidates' loyalty to the president and less their training and suitability. As a result, Nasrulla ibn Ibadulla's successors were predominantly young Turkmen clergy who were indoctrinated into the Turkmen educational system, but had little knowledge of the Arabic language and the Islamic religion as a whole. In this way, Nyýazov exercised complete control over the practice of religion in Turkmenistan and established Islam as one of the pillars of his presidency.

Media and culture

The free development of the cultural and media landscape in Turkmenistan was strictly prevented under Nyýazow, and the freedom of the press and freedom of expression enshrined in the constitution was systematically disregarded. Niyazov did not tolerate independent media; instead, state media loyal to the regime controlled all information channels in Turkmenistan. The publication and distribution of printed matter was subject to strict regulations and was only permitted to state-licensed publishers and media. The radio was also completely under state control during the Niyazov era; all available stations belonged to the Turkmen radio . In order to expand the media isolation of Turkmenistan and the government's monopoly on information , Niyazov also severely restricted the work of foreign media and placed journalists under the supervision of state authorities. In particular, the initially influential Russian media were steadily restricted by Nyýazow and finally banned. Expressing criticism of the president was generally forbidden in the country's media; Voices critical of the regime or members of the opposition did not have their say in the Turkmen media. The reporting in the state media was characterized by propaganda and focused on the person of Nyýazov, whose presidency was presented unilaterally in a positive light. In this way, the state media made a targeted and significant contribution to the establishment of the personality cult around the Turkmen president. In international comparison, Turkmenistan ranked among Niyazov after the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders always among the countries with the lowest level of press freedom. In 2006, Turkmenistan was ranked 167th and penultimate place in the list of 168 countries, immediately behind Eritrea and only ahead of North Korea .

The president's influence in culture was also extensive. During his presidency, Nyýazow gradually banned cinemas , opera , ballet , theater and circus . He justified the decree to close all theaters from April 2001 with the alleged contradiction between the theater and the political culture in Turkmenistan. Instead, Nyýazow paid tribute to other forms of culture that “correspond to the national mentality”. During his reign the new National Museum of Turkmenistan was built , which opened in 1998 and primarily served to glorify the president and convey an idealized understanding of history, as well as to promote Turkmen carpet manufacture. Turkmen carpets were a recurring element of state staging. Carpets with a portrait of Nyýazov were produced, including a motif carpet entitled Golden Age , which is dedicated to Nyýazov's tenure and was included in the Guinness World Records book in 2011 as the largest carpet in the world . The establishment of the Turkmen Carpet Museum , the introduction of the Day of the Turkmen Carpet and the establishment of a carpet authority all fell during Niyazov's term of office. In addition to the carpets, Nyýazow emphasized the importance of the Akhal-Teke horses for the tradition and culture of the Turkmen. In the Ruhnama he described the horse breed as a "role model in endurance, beauty and purity"; his horse Ýanardag also adorns the Turkmen national coat of arms. The Day of the Turkmen Horse and its own Ministry for Horses came into being on the orders of Nyýazow.

Foreign policy

Establishment after independence

Nyýazow (third from right) among the CIS heads of state

In a first foreign policy position paper dated October 1, 1991, a few weeks before Turkmenistan's official independence, Niyazov described a non-aggressive foreign policy and the establishment of peaceful relations with other nations as primary tasks of Turkmen foreign policy. On October 28, 1991, the Supreme Soviet, the then legislative organ of Turkmenistan, passed a law on the fundamental structures of the state of Turkmenistan, with a commitment to international law and multilateralism . As a result of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by Russia , Ukraine and Belarus on December 8, 1991, Nyýazow made his first international appearance as head of state of the independent state of Turkmenistan. Under his chairmanship, the heads of state of the Central Asian republics met in Ashgabat and agreed to join the CIS, which took place on December 21, 1991.

After efforts towards closer cooperation between the former Soviet republics in early 1992 did not produce any concrete results, Turkmenistan under Nyýazow developed an independent foreign policy with the aim of stabilizing the young state of Turkmenistan and preserving its sovereignty by rejecting external influence. In February 1992 Turkmenistan officially established diplomatic relations with Iran and Turkey . At the same time, Nyýazov stressed that neither state had any influence on the development of the political, economic and religious system in Turkmenistan. On March 2, 1992, Turkmenistan officially joined the United Nations ; A UN resolution to this effect had already been passed on February 7, 1992.

Permanent neutrality

The central model of Turkmen foreign policy in the Nyýazow era was the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. On December 12, 1995, the United Nations officially recognized the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan in a resolution, whereupon Nyýazow declared December 12th as a holiday of neutrality.

The neutrality of Turkmenistan was shown, among other things, in the mediating role of the Niyazov government during the Tajik civil war , which raged from 1992 to 1997. The then Secretary General of the United Nations , Kofi Annan , explicitly praised the Turkmen government's mediation in the peace process for Tajikistan, which had been significantly advanced through several rounds of negotiations in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat. During the war in Afghanistan and the war on terror proclaimed by US President George W. Bush , Turkmenistan under Niyazov remained largely neutral and only allowed the US-led coalition to refuel aircraft in Turkmen territory in the Afghan war. Nyýazow himself announced with regard to the war in Afghanistan that the Turkmen government had “no ideological preferences” but acted according to “trust and mutual benefit”.

Diplomatic relations

Nyýazow at a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin (2000)

The relationship with Russia continued to be based on the close economic ties from the Soviet era, although the dependence of the Turkmen economy on Russia in the energy sector remained even after independence. Tensions in the Turkmen-Russian relations arose from the dealings with the numerous Turkmen opposition members in Russian exile and from the pronounced surveillance and restriction of the Russian minority in Turkmenistan. Niyazov was anxious during his presidency, to reduce dependence on Russia, and so ended the full membership of Turkmenistan in the dominated by Russia CIS in August 2005. At the same time Niyazov sought to cooperate with other partners to open up new markets for fossil fuels from Turkmenistan. Turkmen foreign policy focused on diplomatic relations with Iran, Turkey and the People's Republic of China .

Turkmen postage stamp with Nyýazow, Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni and Suleyman Demirel

After Turkmenistan's independence, close diplomatic relations developed with its southern neighbor, Iran, based on cultural and historical similarities and increased economic cooperation. During Niyazov's term in office, Iran rose to become the second largest buyer of Turkmen gas and supported the Turkmen government on several occasions with humanitarian aid in the event of food shortages that recurred in Turkmenistan. President Nyýazow maintained a close relationship with Iranian President Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni (1989-1997) and referred to him as "Brother Hāschemi". The Turkmen President also emphasized the good relations between Turkmenistan and Iran and mutual respect on numerous occasions.

Relations with Turkey also developed rapidly after Turkmenistan's independence. The cooperation extends over cultural, economic and military projects. In particular, the Turkmen banking and construction sector was largely shaped and promoted by Turkish companies after independence. During the Niyazov presidency, the two countries also worked closely together in the area of ​​security policy, carrying out joint military maneuvers and exchanging intelligence information. However, the efforts of the Turkish side to influence the development of the political system in Turkmenistan were unsuccessful. The implementation of the so-called Turkish model , which is based on market economy reforms, secularization and further democratization, was strictly rejected by the Turkish government .

Intensifying relations with the People's Republic of China was one of the most important foreign policy projects during the last few years of Niyazov's presidency. Between 2000 and 2006 the volume of trade between the two countries increased sevenfold and the People's Republic rose to become one of Turkmenistan's most important trading partners. Political rapprochement also took place during this period, which Nyýazow actively supported through three state visits to China. In April 2006 he traveled to the People's Republic for six days and met the then Chinese President Hu Jintao . Both sides announced their intention to expand economic cooperation, including the planned construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the People's Republic. Nyýazow himself spoke of "good chances for Turkmenistan" in connection with the Turkmen-Chinese relations.

The Niyazov mausoleum in Gypjak, here on the state visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2015

Death and succession

Saparmyrat Nyýazow died on the morning of December 21, 2006 of heart failure . At the time, observers feared that Turkmenistan could plunge into chaos after Niyazov's death. The Turkmen state elite endeavored to put an end to any unrest and external interference during the succession process. For this purpose, the military and the police were put on alert and the border with Uzbekistan was closed, as there was fear that the regional power of Uzbekistan might intervene. Immediately after Niyazov's death, Vice Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow convened a meeting of the National Security Council for the morning of December 22nd, at which he himself was appointed acting president. Parliamentary President Öwezgeldi Ataýew , who according to the constitution should have taken office, had previously been deprived of his political immunity and imprisoned a few hours after the president's death. Berdimuhamedov's presidency began with a wave of arrests and dismissals. Numerous high-ranking officials and officers in the Department of Defense and the Army have been replaced. The new Turkmen president announced cautious reforms, brought about the release of some political prisoners and withdrew some of the laws from the Niyazov era, but overall he continued the authoritarian tradition established by Niyazov.

Nyýazov's funeral took place on December 24, 2006 in his native Gypjak, where he was buried in a mausoleum next to the monumental Turkmenbaşy Ruhi mosque. The funeral turned into a state-staged mass event with thousands of attendees paying their final respects to the late president.

Personality cult

Internationally, Nyýazow caused a sensation mainly because of a personality cult that was omnipresent in Turkmenistan.

The Ruhnama on a 1,000 manat coin

Ruhnama

The Ruhnama, translated Book of the Soul , was published in two volumes by Nyýazow in 2001 and 2004 and formed an important ideological basis of the personality cult around the president. The five sections of the Ruhnama cover a wide range of topics, including autobiographical sections, philosophical and ethical elements, theses on the history of the Turkmen, information on the design of everyday life in modern Turkmenistan and perspectives for Turkmenistan and its inhabitants in the future. The book glorifies the person of Nyýazov and establishes a Turkmen nationalism based on partly fabricated claims. One reads here that Turkmenistan was the most developed country in the world thousands of years ago, that the wheel was originally invented in Turkmenistan and that Turkmen scholars are largely responsible for technological and cultural progress in Europe.

Regular study of the Ruhnama became a compulsory program at schools and universities, regular readings from the President's book were broadcast on state television and the test subjects' knowledge of Ruhnama was also tested during the driver's license test. At events and in public spaces, the Ruhnama was omnipresent through quotes or images on posters and banners. At military parades in the Turkmen capital, numerous soldiers presented copies of the Ruhnama. In addition, the President's work was also given religious significance. In March 2006, Nyýazov claimed that any careful reader of the Ruhnama would go to heaven immediately after death. The Ruhnama found its way into the mosques in Turkmenistan, where it was venerated as a holy book alongside the Koran .

Honorary title

After the presidential election in 1992, Nyýazow gave himself the official nickname Türkmenbaşy (German spelling mostly Turkmenbaschi ), which translates as the leader of the Turkmen . This title has since been used as a designation for Nyýazow both in Turkmenistan and in foreign media. The title Turkmenbashi refers to his function as the leader of the Turkmen and as the founder and chairman of the Humanitarian Association of the Turkmen of the World , which was founded in 1991 and aims to unite ethnic Turkmen from different countries, including the important Turkmen minorities in Iraq , Afghanistan and Iran. The slogan Halq, Watan, Turkmenbaşy , which translates as people, fatherland, and leader of the Turkmen , which was widespread in the Nyýazow era , contributed to the establishment of this honorary title. Another frequently used honorary title of the president was the diamond wreath of the people, and the designations father or teacher were also used in the state media. At the regular appearances of the president in the two chambers of the Turkmen parliament, the deputies also praised the president, who was hailed as the embodiment of justice , a great visionary or a beloved father .

Construction project

The Ruhnama Monument in Ashgabat
The golden statue of Niyazov on the Arch of Neutrality
The flag of Turkmenistan after 1997

The personality cult around Nyýazow was also evident in the erection of numerous statues of the president across the country, as well as in several monumental buildings in the Ashgabat region, which served to worship the president and his deeds. During Niyazov's presidency, Ashgabat became known as the city ​​of white marble , from which numerous magnificent buildings were built in the Turkmen capital, including the neutrality arch with a golden statue of Niyazov on top that rotates with the position of the sun, the new terminal of Ashgabat Airport , the Independence Monument and the Ruhnama Monument , a nine-meter-high representation of the book that opened mechanically every evening. In the mid-1990s, Nyýazow also ordered the construction of new buildings for all ministries and several luxury hotels in the capital, but only about 30% of them were then used. Overall, the expensive construction policy of the president was in stark contrast to government savings in social and health policy: Immediately after the layoff of 15,000 workers in the state health sector, Nyýazow announced the construction of a new building for the Ministry of Health, which would cost US $ 12 million from the Ministry budget was funded. Another project of the Turkmen President was the construction of the Ashgabat Health Trail in the Kopet Dag Mountains , which should help improve the physical condition of the Turkmen people and, once completed, had to be tackled by all cabinet members under the supervision of the President. Outside the capital, the Awaza tourism zone on the shores of the Caspian Sea and the Türkmenbaşy-Ruhi Mosque in Nyýazow's native town of Gypjak were among his largest construction projects.

A 1,000 manat note with the portrait of the President and the coat of arms of Turkmenistan

National symbolism and naming

As the first president of independent Turkmenistan, Nyýazow had a decisive influence on the design of the country's national symbols. The flag of Turkmenistan was introduced in its original form in 1992 and is considered to be the most intricate flag in the world due to its traditional carpet patterns. After its introduction, the design of the flag was slightly changed in design and dimensions at the suggestion of the President. In 1997, the two olive branches in the lower area of ​​the flag were added as a symbol of the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. The coat of arms of Turkmenistan has existed in its current form since 2003 and shows in the middle the Akhal-Teke stallion Ýanardag from the personal possession of Nyýazov. The national anthem of Turkmenistan in its original form was shaped by the personality cult around Nyýazow, in which Turkmenistan was praised as the “great creation of Turkmenbashi”. The national symbolism shaped by Nyýazow has largely been preserved to this day. Only the text of the national anthem was changed in 2008, since then it has been called "great creation of the people". Public holidays established by Nyýazow, such as the Day of Neutrality and the Day of the Turkmen Melon , will also last beyond his presidency.

Numerous buildings, facilities and places were renamed during Niyazov's presidency. The city of Türkmenbaşy , the airport of Ashgabat ( airport of the Turkmen leader Saparmyrat ), a meteorite and the month of January are named after the president himself . The month of April, meanwhile, was named after his mother, who was known as Gurbansoltan-eje, on Nyýazow's orders . It was also Gurbansoltan as a new term for bread in the Turkmen language introduced. Other months and days of the week were also renamed by Nyýazow: September became Ruhnama , and December was now called neutrality . The new names of the months and days were repealed in 2008 by Niyazov's successor Berdimuhamedow.

Perception abroad

The assessment of Nyýazow abroad was generally critical. While the People's Republic of China and Russia maintained close diplomatic contact with Turkmenistan and the Chinese and Russian presidents had regular meetings with their Turkmen counterparts, the European Union and the United States were more distant from the Turkmen regime. In the United States under George W. Bush , the strategic and economic interests of Turkmenistan were initially in the foreground. As a result of the intensified action against the opposition and increased reports of human rights violations in Turkmenistan, there was a significant cooling of Turkmen-American relations in 2003. On May 1, 2003, the United States Senate passed a resolution calling on the Turkmen government around Nyýazow to improve the human rights situation in Turkmenistan, to initiate a democratization process and to release political prisoners such as former Foreign Minister Şyhmyradov. In cooperation with Russia, the US government also supported a UN resolution on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan, which was passed in December 2004 and which expressed "serious concern about the significant and persistent human rights violations occurring in Turkmenistan".

In its strategy paper for Central Asia from 2002, the European Union also defined strategic interests in the region and in Turkmenistan, but at the same time criticized developments in Turkmenistan. Securing peace in the region, promoting democratization and stronger economic cooperation in the energy sector were defined as interests in Central Asia. However, cooperation with Turkmenistan has been restricted due to the human rights situation in Turkmenistan. In the strategy paper, Nyýazow was described as the “worst example” of the development of authoritarian systems in Central Asia, and restrictions on religious freedom and the suppression of the opposition were also explicitly criticized. The then German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier , who visited Turkmenistan on November 2, 2006, also expressed himself in this spirit . During the visit there was a conversation between Steinmeier and Nyýazow, after which the Foreign Minister spoke of “major differences”. Nyýazow, on the other hand, accused the EU of “subversive activities” after the European Union increased its criticism of the human rights situation in Turkmenistan.

During Niyazov's presidency, various non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International , Human Rights Watch and the Helsinki International Federation for Human Rights tried to generate awareness of the issue through regular reports on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan. In addition to human rights violations, Nyýazow's style of government was occasionally a topic in German-language media, with Nyýazow being referred to as a “strange dictator”, “eccentric despot” and “world's most bizarre dictator”. Due to the authoritarian rule and the extravagant personality cult, the Nyýazov regime was regularly compared with the rule of the then North Korean head of state Kim Jong-il , but media and public attention regarding the situation in Turkmenistan lagged far behind that of the situation in North Korea.

Aftermath

In Turkmenistan

The Nyýazow era has shaped the development of Turkmenistan to this day. The political and social structures created under Nyýazow were largely retained, so that Turkmenistan continues to be one of the most isolated countries in the world. Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, the second president in the history of Turkmenistan, is still in office today, building on the style of government of his predecessor. Despite some political reforms, including the first candidacy of opposing candidates in the 2007 presidential election and the establishment of several registered parties that could run for the first time in the 2013 parliamentary election, the political situation has in fact changed little. The president continues to have almost unlimited power, opposition members are persecuted and fundamental rights are severely restricted. Before the 2007 presidential election, Berdimuhamedow announced reforms in the areas of digitization, higher education, health and pensions. In the course of these reform efforts, the significant savings in the health and education system were partially revised, but there was no comprehensive political realignment.

A clearer development can be seen in the perception of Nyýazov in Turkmenistan. Soon after Berdimuhamedow came to power, he began to severely restrict the personality cult around his predecessor and gradually replace it with a cult around his own person. Symbolic steps on this path included moving the arch of neutrality with the golden statue of Nyýazov to the edge of Ashgabat , the abolition of the obligatory Ruhnama reading in schools and universities, the change of the text of the national anthem and the construction of the new Oguz-han- Presidential palace , which clearly exceeded the old Nyýazow palace in size and pomp. The positive appreciation of Nyýazov as a central figure in Turkmen history remains unbroken, only the ubiquitous and sometimes religious cult around the first President of Turkmenistan has been largely abolished.

Abroad

In expressing condolences after Niyazov's death, foreign authorities hoped for an intensification of economic and political cooperation with Turkmenistan, but also feared a destabilization of the state. The then President of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao , called Nyýazow a "trusted friend" and emphasized the People's Republic's intention to further strengthen relations with Turkmenistan. US President Bush announced through his spokesman that he was aiming to "further develop relations with Turkmenistan" that could contribute to a "bright future" for Turkmenistan. Russian President Putin made a similar statement when he sought to “strengthen our partnership in the real interest of the people of Russia and Turkmenistan”. The then Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan , Qassym-Shomart Toqayev , emphasized after the death of Niyazov that “Kazakhstan will not be involved in any military conflict in Turkmenistan”, referring to the threatened destabilization of Turkmenistan.

Overall, the diplomatic activities of foreign states in Turkmenistan increased with the death of Niyazov, and the Turkmen opposition in exile also tried to exert greater influence on developments in Turkmenistan. At the diplomatic level, Russia in particular was interested in a quick clarification of the question of power and political constancy in Turkmenistan in order to guarantee Turkmen gas and oil supplies to Russia and to avoid destabilization in the Russian sphere of influence. At the regional level, Nyýazov's foreign policy was characterized by isolation and the rejection of increased regional cooperation. As a result, the government of Kazakhstan pushed for the country to be opened up and trade relations to be improved, while the Uzbek government called for a peaceful solution to the question of the succession, also due to the long Uzbek-Turkmen border. Relations with the USA and the European Union had reached a low point with the intensification of state repression from 2002, to which the USA and the EU had reacted with sanctions and the exclusion of development aid. Following the announcement of reforms by Berdimuhamedov, the west cautiously moved closer to Turkmenistan.

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow receives US Secretary of State John Kerry in front of the Oguz-han Presidential Palace

With the stabilization of the new regime around President Berdimuhamedow, the possibilities of external influence were again severely restricted. In terms of foreign policy, Berdimuhamedow tied in with the neutrality policy of his predecessor and promoted projects to diversify the sales markets for Turkmen resources such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline . The perception of Turkmenistan abroad is still strongly influenced by the term of office of the first President of Turkmenistan due to this connection to the foreign policy principles and the political system from the Nyýazow era.

Foreign accounts

After Niyazov's death, a debate developed about how to deal with Turkmen state money stored in foreign accounts. The British nongovernmental organization Global Witness published research that the accounts of Deutsche Bank contained amounts of two to three billion US dollars from the export of natural gas, oil and cotton from Turkmenistan, which were under Nyýazov's personal control. According to research by Global Witness, Deutsche Bank had acted as the "regime's banker" since 1995 and managed the income from Turkmen exports on behalf of Nyýazov. As early as October 2006, at the request of Global Witness, Deutsche Bank confirmed that there was an account with the Turkmen Central Bank for processing international payments at Deutsche Bank. At the same time, Deutsche Bank denied any violation of the guidelines for dealing with politically exposed persons . The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin) confirmed after a random examination of the transactions that Deutsche Bank had acted in accordance with German banking law. After Niyazov's death, Global Witness requested the bank to disclose and freeze the deceased's deposits. The Frankfurt money house rejected the claim with reference to banking secrecy and in July 2007 denied managing a personal fund of the former Turkmen president. All deposits are under the control of the Turkmen Central Bank. The former president of the Turkmen central bank Orazow confirmed that he had formally had control over the deposits, but he had required the approval of the president for every transaction, who thus de facto controlled the deposits. Leading representatives of the Republican Party of Turkmenistan , one of the most important groups of the Turkmen opposition in exile, called on Chancellor Angela Merkel to conduct an official investigation into the relationship between Deutsche Bank and Niyazov. An explanation of the flow of money was largely lacking, however, the whereabouts of Nyýazow's foreign balances has not been clarified. Further research revealed that the foreign currency reserves rose sharply under President Berdimuhamedow to around 20 billion US dollars in 2009. The cooperation between the Turkmen government and Deutsche Bank continued under the new president. So far, however, it is unclear whether accounts at Deutsche Bank were used by Nyýazov for money laundering and embezzlement of state funds.

literature

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  • Cracks in the marble: Turkmenistan's failing dictatorship. In: International Crisis Group (Ed.): Asia Report , number 44, Osch / Brussels, January 17, 2003.
  • Steven Sabol: Turkmenistan: Permanent Transition or Elusive Stability? . In: Niklas Swanström (Ed.): The China and Eurasia Forum quarterly , Volume 8, Number 3, Fall 2010.
  • Mehwish Hassan Sara: Changing dynamics of Turkmenistan's political system . In: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ed.): Strategic Studies , Volume 27, No. 3, Islamabad 2007.

Web links

Commons : Saparmyrat Nyýazow  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

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