Grande Armée
La Grande Armée ( French for the Great Army ) is the name that the Imperial French Army temporarily led between 1805 and 1815 during the period of the French Empire under Emperor Napoleon I. Since there was no specific "army" - or army group - with this name between the end of 1808 and the beginning of 1812, a distinction is often made in France between the "Grande Army of 1805" ( première grande armée ) and the "Grande Army of 1812" ( deuxième grande armée ). Analogous to this, the army, which Napoleon practically re-established in the spring of 1813 after the catastrophic Russian campaign in 1812 , is also referred to as the “grand army of 1813”. The army that the emperor reformed after his return from Elba and after his accession to the throne again in 1815 is called the grand army of 1815 .
Not belonging to the Grande Armée, however, were those parts that were not personally commanded by the emperor, e.g. B. the Armée d'Espagne (the French invasion forces in Spain and Portugal) or the occupation forces in Tyrol.
The Grande Army of 1805
On August 30, 1805, Emperor Napoleon I ordered that L'Armée des côtes de l'Océan (French for "the army on the coast of the ocean"), which he from 1803 for the planned invasion of England on the French coast , especially at Boulogne-sur-Mer , was to be referred to in future as the "Grande Armée". The "Grande Armée" was also assigned to the French troops in Holland and northern Germany (in the occupied Electorate of Hanover ), so it initially had a strength of six army corps ( corps d'armée ). Only a few days later, the army was supplemented by another, newly founded army corps under Marshal Augereau , so that the Grande Armée opened the campaign in southern Germany at the end of September 1805 against Austria with seven army corps.
Breakdown
soldiers
More than a quarter of the soldiers of the "Army on the Coast", which Napoleon had carefully put together over three years for his planned landing in England, had already served and trained in several campaigns during the time of the monarchy or in the first years of the republic the core of the Grande Armée. In the early years of the Revolutionary Army, numerous soldiers were quickly promoted to NCOs and officers without at the same time receiving theoretical training. Although these promotions initially had a positive effect on the morale of the troops, they also had the consequence that in the Grande Armée of 1805 the average age of subaltern officers was higher than that of their generals and corps commanders. In May 1805, for example, the emperor reintroduced formal promotion in the army by decree according to seniority (i.e. according to seniority). As a long-term effect of the "revolutionary" practice that had been in effect until then, the lack of well-trained staff officers and commanders with sufficient tactical training became noticeable in the late period of Napoleon's reign (around 1812).
According to the current conscription law of September 5, 1798, which provided for compulsory military service for all unmarried men between the ages of 20 and 25, the number of recruits in the event of war was limited to 60,000 men a year. On the basis of this law, a total of 200,000 men were called up between 1802 and 1805 (i.e. 20,000 more than was actually provided by the law). Moreover, in 1805 the Senate approved an additional 80,000 men. However, since there were far more young men per year in France, including the newly acquired areas, than should be drafted for military service under the Conscription Act , the drafted recruits were selected by lot. Since the law permitted both the sale of tickets and the position of a deputy, many members of the wealthy and the educated classes withdrew from service in the army, which many of those who were actually drafted found unjust. Not least for this reason, between 1802 and 1805, an average of eight to ten percent of soldiers deserted each year, mostly newly drafted recruits. In some units, more than a quarter of the drafted soldiers evaded armed service by deserting.
This degree of desertion, which was higher than in the days of the professional armies during the 18th century, increased the importance of long-serving volunteers in the army, who inevitably formed the core of the units. This problem led to the (then) First Consul Bonaparte ordering the establishment of a dozen punitive battalions for the réfractaires as early as the autumn of 1803.
The French army was nominally a conscription army. To combat the reluctance to do military service, the army leadership relied not only on long-term volunteers, but also on the recruitment of foreigners who, mostly separated according to nationalities (especially German, Swiss, Italian, Poles and Irish) in several "foreign regiments" or "Legions" ("régiments d'étrangers" or "légions d'étrangers") were grouped together (see also " Grande Armée of 1812 ").
Tactical units
During the establishment of the "Grande Armée", Napoleon introduced numerous organizational innovations in the structure and composition of the tactical units, which later became trend-setting for the establishment of the armies of other European states. These organizational changes, which he ordered individually by decree, were by no means systematic, they were spread over several years and always had so many exceptions or additions that they can only be briefly indicated here. During this time (1804) Napoleon also abolished the half-brigades (French demi-brigades ) founded after the revolution and reintroduced the term “regiment”, which initially (with a few exceptions) consisted of three battalions.
Until 1808, despite the various reforms by General Carnot in 1793/94, the drill regulations of 1791 still applied in the Grande Armée, which were still based heavily on the old royal regulations from the time of linear tactics . Since Emperor Napoleon paid relatively little attention to this point and contented himself with general instructions, in practice it was left to each corps commander himself to train his units tactically, but in the camp of Boulogne between 1803 and 1805 he left the movements and interaction all the more intense of the army corps.
Army Corps
The biggest tactical units were newly introduced by Napoleon Army Corps , at whose head he as commander (French for "général en chef") is usually a Maréchal de France presented (the re-introduced as early as May 1804 title was after the accession of Napoleon soon Maréchal d'Empire ). The army corps can be viewed as permanent army divisions made up of units from all branches of the armed forces so that they can operate largely independently. Each army corps consisted of a general staff , which, apart from the servants and carters, comprised about 160 to 170 people (including a company of about 100 gendarmerie), two to five infantry divisions , a light cavalry division and an additional artillery reserve of two (before 1808) or three to six (after 1808) companies, a pioneer company and a few other support troops.
Already during the first campaigns the division into permanently divided army corps, introduced by Napoleon, proved its worth. Since all the necessary support troops were permanently assigned to them, they could operate completely independently of the respective main army and provide for themselves. Thanks to the fixed composition of the units, they could immediately operate independently on secondary theaters of war if necessary. The emperor only gave the corps commanders a general goal and time; he left the details to them. The advantage of the new formation and the generally prescribed rules were all the more noticeable at the time when their opponents ( Austria and Russia in 1805 and, to a limited extent, Prussia in 1806) did not yet have any permanent higher formations above the regiment level, but instead to " Columns ”,“ Departments ”or“ Corps ”formed. During the war of 1805, the Austrian army continuously changed the composition of its "columns" and their commanders changed "almost every day" so that the commanders could hardly get to know their units better and could not develop a feeling of togetherness. Very surprising for the Allies in 1805 were the “quick marches” of the individual army corps. However, these were generally based less on particularly extraordinary marching performance of the troops, but more on the fact that their commanders simply foregone regular rest days, which were otherwise usual for long marches (at that time a rest day was usually taken every third day). This brought the Grande Army to their locations unexpectedly quickly for the opponents, but they also demanded very high marching losses, which did not have a serious effect in the first years of the Grande Army only because Napoleon usually succeeded in the campaigns very quickly Time to finish again.
Divisions
The “ divisions ” (derived from the Latin for “department”) in the current meaning of the word had already been introduced in the revolutionary army as semi-permanent mixed units, but were usually disbanded after each campaign. It was Napoleon who made them permanent and gave them the composition that was later adopted by most armies of the 19th century.
According to the budget of 1805, the infantry divisions were to consist of ten battalions. In addition, each division had one or two artillery companies with six guns each. Together with the general staff, other support troops, which also included the “Divisions-Park” (French “petit parc de division”) with the division's numerous ammunition and other supply wagons, the field blacksmiths and the craftsmen, the division should be according to the budget around 7,800 men. The budgetary division strength was seldom reached. Even at the beginning of the 1805 campaign, most of the divisions were barely more than 6,000 to 6,400 men. For the war with Austria in 1809, the Kaiser increased the budget of the infantry divisions to (at least) 8,000 men in April 1809. Some of the divisions should in future have 15 instead of the previous 12 cannons ; three brigade generals were permanently assigned to these somewhat stronger divisions .
The cavalry divisions should consist of eight to twelve esquadrons and two companies of mounted artillery (French artillerie à cheval or artillerie volante) and usually numbered between 2000 and 3000 men. The Esquadron roughly corresponded to a Prussian-German squadron. However, the French esquadrons of that time were still divided into two companies. In 1805 they had either around 180 riders in the heavy cavalry or around 205 to 220 riders in the various types of light cavalry, and after the reform of the regulations in 1808 even 250 to 260 riders. They were almost twice as strong as the corresponding Prussian and Russian units, which no longer had such a subdivision into companies. According to the budget of 1805, the cavalry regiments should have four esquadrons in the field.
The companies and battalions only very rarely reached their nominal strength in 1805. For this reason, the strengths of the individual regiments and the number of battalions can vary. The division commander was assigned two or three brigade generals, depending on the number of battalions available, to support him in the tactical leadership of the battalions during the battle.
Battalions
The battalions of light infantry were divided into seven companies Chasseurs ( hunter ) and one each company Carabiniers and Voltigeurs as elite companies , with a budget thickness from 80 to 125 man, depending on type - therefore, in simplistic representations often only a calculated (average) company strength to about 100 men stated. The "voltigeurs" armed with a light carbine (fusil léger, modèle de dragons) were introduced by decree on March 13, 1804 at the request of Napoleon for each battalion of light infantry. The minimum size of the soldiers for these 126-man companies was reduced to about 1.60 meters (4 Paris feet and 11 inches), which meant that men of below average height could also be used for service.
Each battalion of the line infantry had nine companies in peacetime. It consisted of eight fusilier and, since 1792, an additional grenadier company, which, however, should be grouped into reserve grenadier battalions during a war. Since France had been at war with England since May 1803, all line battalions normally consisted of eight companies in early 1805. During the campaign of 1805, the grenadier battalions were placed alongside the Imperial Guard as an additional elite division under General Oudinot. On September 24, 1805, Napoleon also ordered that the line regiments should also be expanded with a company of voltigeurs in the future.
Imperial Guard 1804–1809
precursor
The Imperial Guard (French Garde impériale ) was an integral part of the Grande Army. Guard units, such as the Roman Praetorians , the Turkish-Ottoman Janissaries or the Strelts of the Russian tsars, generally served primarily as bodyguards for the personal protection of monarchs or institutions and were also often used for ceremonial honorary services until the end of the 18th century used in the state. Even though guard units were occasionally used as reserves in battle during the 18th century, it was Napoleon who systematically developed his guard into a decisive reserve and elite unit .
The imperial guard, which Napoleon established after his accession to the throne in 1804, emerged directly from the guard of the convent founded in 1792 (from 1796 “garde constitutionnelle”). This was renamed after the coup d'état of 18th Brumaire VIII (November 9th 1799) by General Bonaparte and his appointment as First Consul in " Consular Guard " (French: Garde des Consuls, after the appointment of Bonaparte as Consul for life: Garde Consulaire) and initially reinforced with soldiers who had returned from the Egyptian campaign together with the then General Bonaparte . The "Consular Guard", which was placed under the command of General Jean Lannes , initially consisted of only two battalions of grenadiers on foot, a company of light infantry, two escadrons of grenadiers on horseback, an escadron of hunters on horseback and a company of artillery and counted a year the battle of Marengo (1800) 2100 men. This small force, supplemented by selected soldiers from the entire army, was placed under four generals shortly after the battle of Marengo , who received their orders exclusively from the First Consul. These four commanders were Davoust: Grenadiers, Soult: Chasseurs (Jäger), Bessières: Cavalry and Mortier: Artillery and Train as well as the sailors. In 1802 the guard was assigned its own military hospital in Paris (Hôpital du Gros Caillou).
Privileges
The Guard recruited (especially in the first few years) from selected soldiers from the entire army and navy who had to meet certain requirements: this included an impeccable leadership in their previous units, a certain minimum size (between 1.70 and 1.76 Meters, depending on the type of weapon ). an already completed service period of at least six years and participation in at least two campaigns. For the strict discipline that the emperor expected from his guard at all times, he granted them numerous special rights. Every soldier in the Guard had at least the rank of sergeant. The guardsmen received double wages and their rank was each ranked one rank higher than the line troops; moreover, the guardsmen were only allowed to issue orders from their own commanders and the emperor himself. At the end of their service life, the soldiers could be accepted into the civilian service and in old age in government homes for the disabled.
Veliten
The regiments of the Imperial Guard consisted of three battalions, the third battalion initially consisted of "Veliten" (French Vélite, from Lat. Veles, velites , the light infantry of the Roman Republic). Originally, these battalions were to serve primarily as training units for NCOs. Therefore, the young soldiers received not only military training, but also lessons in reading and writing, arithmetic and sports (gymnastics). The state paid half of the costs for additional lessons in higher mathematics or (technical) drawing. Since the autumn of 1806, conscripted soldiers of the middle class could also join the Velites of the guard cavalry directly if they (or their parents) paid for the necessary equipment themselves. After successfully completing their training with the Velites, they could either be accepted into the guard or serve as a lieutenant (French Sous-lieutenant ) in a line regiment until their regular service expired . However, two fusilier regiments were formed from the existing battalion Veliten in December 1806, which were (for the time being informally) referred to as the "Young Guard" (French: jeune garde ). The “old guard” was increasingly understood to mean the grenadier and chasseur regiments on foot that had existed for some time. After these reorganizations, there were only the mounted Velites in the guard, in whose battalions (esquadrons) the sons of better-off families served.
Marines
During the planning for a landing in England, the First Consul Bonaparte issued the order in September 1803 to form five Equipages (i.e. companies) of seamen of the Guard (whereby his main aim was to distinguish and involve the Navy with this special selection). He handed over the command of this battalion under the name "Sailors of the Consular Guard" to the liner captain ( captain of the sea ) Daugier. After his accession to the throne as Emperor Napoleon, the battalion, reinforced by a little more than 800 men, was renamed "Marines of the Imperial Guard". The soldiers served z. Sometimes even as marines on ships of the line to defend French ports against British attacks, but at least one division of the guards marines always accompanied the imperial army on their campaigns together with the rest of the guards. The guards marines were also used as crews of gunboats during the siege of Danzig in the spring of 1807.
In 1808 the battalion was closed and sent to Spain to suppress the uprising. Through further imperial decrees the battalion was expanded to five in 1810 and to six in 1811, and thus numbered almost 1,300 men. Two of the equipages (meanwhile mostly called "companies") marched together with the Guard Corps to Russia in the summer of 1812, two more were drawn there in the autumn. Few of these four companies were to return. The remnants of the battalion, mainly soldiers who had been in Spain in 1812, took part in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 together with the rest of the guards.
Structure and strength of the Guard 1804–1807
With a decree of July 29, 1804, Napoleon raised the " Garde Consulaire " to the " Garde Impériale ". This initially comprised the general staff, a regiment of grenadiers on foot and a regiment of chasseurs a pied ( hunters as light infantry). Their cavalry consisted of a regiment of grenadiers on horseback ( Grenadiers à cheval de la Garde impériale ) and a regiment of chasseurs on horseback ( Chasseurs à cheval de la Garde impériale ) and a company of Mamelukes . The artillery consisted of a light artillery squadron , a section of artillery craftsmen and four artillery train companies (a total of 730 men). The Guard also included a legion of elite gendarmes, two squadrons on horseback and two companies on foot ( Gendarmerie d'élite de la Garde impériale ). This was supplemented by a battalion of 800 sailors and a company of veterans of the guard (primarily for honorary services). Her active military service was limited to one watch for six hours a week. At the end of 1804 the Imperial Guard had a combined division of 9,800 men. At the beginning of the campaign against Austria in 1805, in which the guard was rarely used, this increased to 12,200 men. In the following year (1806), the imperial guard was initially only used little. Nevertheless, their numbers continued to grow. The number of infantry regiments was increased by two at the end of 1806 ( fusilier grenadiers and fusilier hunters) and the cavalry by one regiment ( Dragons de la Garde impériale ) for a total of 15,500 men. The first major deployment of the Guard during the war with Prussia took place in a battle in December 1805 near Warsaw and when the French center was then repulsed during the Battle of Prussian-Eylau , Napoleon had to restore the situation with the Guard Grenadiers. In June 1807, the young guard came into action for the first time in the Battle of Friedland . Impressed by the great zeal and good attitude of the Polish soldiers, Napoleon set up a regiment of Uhlans ( 1st regiment de chevau-légers lanciers polonais ) from volunteers in the capital of the Duchy of Warsaw in March 1807 , which he served as a foreign regiment of the French army of his " old guard ”.
The Imperial Guard 1809
After the experiences of the wars from 1805 to 1808, especially in the battles of Friedland and Preussisch-Eylau, Napoleon considered a massive reinforcement of his guard as an elite reserve to be essential; All the more so when in 1807 the Prussian grenadiers and the Russian guard had shown themselves to be reliable support in the battles. As a counterweight to such elite corps, the emperor ordered a further reinforcement of his guard in 1808. This had largely made up for the losses of 1807 and had reached a strength of 15,300 men.
In April 1808 Napoleon ordered the reinforcement of the artillery of the guards to a whole regiment, which now had a (heavy) foot artillery in addition to the (light) mounted artillery. In August 1808 he increased the budget of the guards regiments to 2,000 men and then increased the guards infantry in several individual decrees by mid-April 1809 by a further eight regiments. For the first time there were also four regiments, which consisted exclusively of recruits (conscripts). These were two regiments each of Conscrits-grenadiers and Conscrits-chasseurs . This was supplemented by two regiments " Tirailleur-Grenadiers " and " Tirailleur-Chasseur ". These eight new regiments, altogether around 16,000 men, now formed the corps of the “Young Guard” into two divisions, which was equipped with its own artillery, its own train and its own hospital in the further course of the year. The organization of the previous "old" guard was initially retained, even if it was also strengthened. After extensive reinforcements, at the beginning of the war with Austria in the spring of 1809, the Imperial Guard finally comprised 13 infantry regiments (if you count the marines and the veterans together as one regiment) with a total of almost 25,000 men. The guards cavalry, now supplemented by a regiment of dragoons and Polish lancers, comprised a total of five cavalry regiments with a total of around 5,300 riders, including the Velites on horseback (3 Esquadrons), Mamelukes and elite gendarmes. The Imperial Guard was supplemented by an artillery regiment of 950 men. In total it numbered 31,200 men (including the general staff, administration and hospital) and was thus twice as strong as before the war against Prussia in 1806.
During the war against Austria, the guards were also supplemented by mounted Velite battalions from Turin and Florence. After the experience of the Battle of Wagram, Napoleon reinforced his guards again. However, even then the increasing concentration of the best and most willing soldiers in the Guard began to drain the substance of the line regiments.
artillery
Although Napoleon had started his career with artillery , the Grande Armée of 1805 was noticeably poorly equipped with artillery compared to other armies of the time. But at that time Napoleon considered about two to three guns per 1000 men to be quite sufficient, which is particularly noticeable when compared with the Prussian army, which at the beginning of the coalition wars was even equipped with seven guns per 1000 men. After the opening of the campaign in autumn 1805, the French army, including the Bavarian auxiliary corps, had only 396 guns. Even at the beginning of the war with Prussia in 1806, the French artillery had fewer guns than the Prussian army at the time. However, the French artillery was much better organized and drawn than the Prussian, which is why the French cannons could almost always be brought into position at the crucial points faster than the guns of their opponents, so that their minority was practically never noticeable. In the course of the next few years, however, the proportion of artillery in the total army increased again. During the campaign of 1814, for example, the French artillery was more than twice as strong as in 1805, although the French army was smaller overall than in the year the Grande Armée was founded.
The new artillery tactics can largely be traced back to Napoleon's reorganization of the French artillery. Shortly after his appointment as First Consul in 1799, he declared artillery to be the third “main weapon” (that is, a branch of arms) and thus placed it on an equal footing with infantry and cavalry. In order to do justice to the new position of the artillery, a little later (in 1800) he appointed a special "General Inspector of Artillery". After extensive attempts, which General (later Marshal) Marmont carried out as General Inspector of the Artillery in 1802, a commission agreed in 1803 to procure new, lighter guns. With the introduction of the "Guns of the Year XI" (French "Système de l'an XI" - named after the year of introduction in the then valid revolution calendar ) the number of calibers used in the guns was also to be reduced, which should facilitate the supply of ammunition . In the autumn of 1805, when the war with Austria began, the Grande Army was still largely dependent on the old guns of the Gribeauval system, which were considered excellent, but which originated from the time of the kingdom, which they had introduced in 1774 .
According to the budget, the artillery companies had only 100 gunners each from 1802. However, each company also had a special crew unit for the guns, which were unmanned in peacetime. These units were only converted into regular military units (companies) between 1800 and 1802. Therefore, a "battery" of six guns actually comprised between 140 and 175 soldiers (gunners and train soldiers), depending on the composition of the assigned stringing unit, the strength of which was dependent on the type of gun. As a rule, in 1805 a company of artillery had six pieces of artillery, four of which were cannons and the remaining two howitzers (the former were designed for direct and the latter for indirect archery and the firing of grenades). The artillery also included the extensive artillery train and the numerous heavy wagons of the ammunition columns. For each gun, there were on average two to three ammunition and equipment wagons, each with four to six horses. Together with the various craftsmen organized in companies (such as blacksmiths, armourers, wagon builders, crockery makers, saddlers etc.) and the pontonniers (who were responsible for building bridges over streams and building ship bridges over rivers), the field artillery of the French army 35,500 men (including troops in Italy and on the coast).
The firepower of the tirailleurs of the revolutionary army fighting in a loose chain and the soldiers behind them in close columns was naturally much lower than that of the fully developed line infantry in the time of the Seven Years' War in the middle of the 18th century. The fragmentation of the firepower of the French army and the attacks by the infantry columns always resulted in disproportionate losses. A first but essential step towards the reorganization of the artillery was the abolition of the light battalion artillery enforced by Napoleon in 1799 and the concentration of the artillery at division level (and later also the army corps). This enabled the number of guns in the army to be significantly reduced without significantly reducing the firepower of the artillery. With this measure, the infantry lost control of the artillery in their area at battalion level, but at the same time the management of the artillery fire could now be better centralized and thus directed more quickly to the respective focus of the battle.
After the abolition of the light “regimental artillery”, the French divisional artillery consisted mainly of “four” and “eight pounder cannons”. The few existing "twelve-pound cannons", which fired up to 1700 meters (with an elevation of the barrel of only 6 °) but weighed more than one and a half tons, accompanied the emperor's headquarters during the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 as a so-called "artillery reserve" or the army corps to serve the respective commander during a battle for (so-called) controlled “focus formation”. Their effective range in the battle with full spheres was not much more than about 800 to 1000 meters. For this reason, Napoleon used not only the heavy, long-range guns to prepare for an attack, but also preferred the so-called "mounted artillery" (i.e. light guns whose gunners were mounted), which Lafayette had only introduced into France in 1792 based on the Prussian model. Since they could be used very quickly due to their light weight according to the changing course of the battle, they were successful in both attack and defense despite their shorter effective range of 600 to 700 meters. During the campaign of 1805 the Great Artillery and Genius Park numbered around 3,900 men.
In the course of the Battle of Friedland, the artillery commander of the 1st Army Corps, General Alexandre de Sénarmont, on his own initiative and responsibility, combined the entire artillery of the Army Corps for the first time in June 1807, concentrated them in a uniformly managed "battery" and thereby provided support with great success the attack of the infantry. After Sénarmont had used the artillery subordinate to him several times with similar success during the war in Spain in 1808/09, Napoleon completely took over this concentrated use of artillery under unified management during the campaign of 1809 against Austria and for this purpose he led a "large artillery reserve" of at least 60 guns, which - like the Guard - were considered to be the army's main reserve (hence its French name, "L'artillerie de réserve de l'armée"). During the campaigns from 1812 to 1815, the use of very large batteries of up to a hundred guns was a special feature of Napoleon's warfare.
logistics
Following the example of the revolutionary army, the entourage of the Grande Army was kept to a minimum. At the beginning of the campaign, the emperor ordered 1000 four-horse wagons to be requisitioned for the transport of food. Nevertheless, there was already a lack of food during the march from the sites to the border, so that the troops in eastern France began to procure a large number of carts from the farms on their own initiative. In the autumn of 1805, however, Napoleon entrusted the transport of supplies to the private forwarding company "Compagnie Breidt", which, however, was only able to provide 163 transport vehicles by the end of the campaign after the battle of Austerlitz . Although Napoleon marched with only part of his army corps to Moravia in December 1805, the army in the relatively sparsely populated country had very serious supply problems. For this reason, in 1806, each battalion and cavalry regiment received two heavy supply wagons that could supply their unit with food for ten days. However, these vehicles also proved to be insufficient in Poland and East Prussia in the winter of 1806/07, so there was a great lack of food in the entire army and one was grateful that the Russian army moved into winter quarters after the battle of Prussian Eylau . In the spring of 1807, in order to improve the supply of the army, Napoleon ordered eight equipage battalions ( bataillons d'équipages militaires ) with 140 carts each (a total of a little over 3,000 men), which were carried by a company of craftsmen, to transport food, medicine and the sick were added.
Medical supplies
For the basic medical care of the soldiers, every battalion and every esquadron of the Imperial French Army had a doctor (French surgery major ), who usually had one or two assistants ( surgery aides ) and who worked in the higher-level associations (regiment, division, army corps) further doctors and pharmacists were added. In addition to the medical doctor, there was also a veterinarian per battalion and for each Esquadron to take care of the horses. For the further medical care of sick and wounded soldiers, the French army also owned thirty permanent military hospitals distributed over the entire empire in 1805. These were, like the entire military medical service (French service de santé militaire), supervised by a five-member central directorate (French directoire centrale) under a doctor general. According to the requirements of this central directorate that were passed in 1800, the army should always carry two wagons per 1000 soldiers to transport the sick and wounded. Since this requirement had turned out to be insufficient in practice, at the beginning of the campaign against Austria in 1805, each infantry and each cavalry regiment was equipped with a four-horse ambulance specially built for this purpose, each with six berths, so that now each division about three to five vehicles for the transport of wounded came (the number was successively increased after 1806 and 1809).
As a regular reinforcement, in 1809 each division was equipped with a company of ambulance carriers (French compagnies de service de l'ambulance ) who took the wounded (mostly with light wagons) to the nearest field hospital ( dépôts de l'ambulance , then often also "flying" [ie mobile] hospital called) had to transport. During the campaigns, these companies were sometimes accompanied by doctors on horseback or in very light wagons (especially among the avant-garde) in order to secure temporary emergency care, and thus formed the "flying ambulances" (l'ambulance "volante"), as introduced by the military doctor Dominique-Jean Larrey . When the “flying ambulance” was first introduced in 1798, it was put together into a special “legion”, which was subdivided into three companies of around 110 men each (doctors, patient carriers, drivers, etc.). This “legion” was initially responsible for the supply of the entire army, but in practice, given their small number, it often resulted in the preferential treatment of high-ranking wounded and was later often criticized: The few doctors could do the first one in the event of severe internal injuries require careful investigation, but not help on the battlefield, they would only endanger themselves unnecessarily during their deployment, but are absent in the still operable cases in the field hospital. This criticism later led to a better trained medical support staff who could take over the emergency care on the battlefield, and to a rapid transport of the wounded to a better equipped field hospital outside the firing range of the enemy guns. Regardless of later criticism, the appearance of the doctors on the battlefield alone meant a great moral encouragement for the soldiers around 1800.
In addition, according to a decree of April 13, 1809, ten companies of medical attendants (compagnies d'infirmieres d'hospiteaux) were formed and handed over to the military administration as the basic equipment of war hospitals (i.e. field hospitals). Most of the temporary hospitals behind the battlefield were set up in public buildings, monasteries or churches. Despite good care of the injuries, many wounded there died after a short time of tetanus and other secondary wound infections or gangrene. In order to counteract these secondary consequences of combat injuries, Larrey, as general physician, relied primarily on a rapid, quasi-prophylactic, amputation of injured limbs. Due to the mostly catastrophic hygienic conditions in the military hospitals, contagious diseases such as typhus , which, because they often spread to the surrounding towns, often claimed more lives than the actual acts of war, often spread in the military hospitals .
General Staff and Great Headquarters
The commander-in-chief of the Grande Armée was Emperor Napoleon; his deputy was (until 1813) Prince Murat , the Grand Duke of Berg and later King of Naples . Although the emperor was in fact his own chief of staff, he gave all instructions to his army indirectly through the Grand État-Major Général (chief of the general staff) Marshal Berthier and followed, as in many other points, the strict French court ritual modeled on King Ludwig XIV. (Which, however, did not prevent Napoleon from lively correspondence with his marshals, in which he informed them of his intentions and wishes). The Grand État-Major Général was formally given a position that roughly corresponded to the Chief of Staff of the later Prussian-German Army. The extensive staff of the Grand État-Major Général converted the generally formulated instructions of the emperor into concrete orders for the individual units, which were then delivered by selected orderly officers . The orderly officers who delivered the imperial orders had the rank of captain and were initially assigned to the guard cavalry, but were under the direct command of the imperial court master. In January 1809 they were also formally incorporated into the imperial court; This did not change their rank or their subordination under the orders of the Grand Court stable master.
To manage the seven assigned "bureaux" (ie the departments for [1] movement and distribution of troops, [2] internal administration, [3] accommodation, [4] daily orders and correspondence, [5] contact with the navy, [6] "Journeaux" (diaries) and reports as well as the [7] Topographical Service) were assigned to Berthier by three division generals as early as 1805, the number of which grew over time. In addition, belonged to the "Great Headquarters", which was also under the direction of the "Grand État-Major Générals", the general artillery inspector, the general engineer inspector, the general manager, the general pattern inspector and the general coach master, the chief physician, the chief surgeon and chief pharmacist, the Paymaster General, the heads of the various branches of administration (for example for the supply of bread, meat, feed, etc.), the telegraph director, the general director of the post office and a mobile printing press.
The "Great Headquarters" were also assigned many high functionaries from the immediate court of the emperor who, in addition to nine adjutants in the rank of general, always had General Henri Clarke d'Hunebourg , who later became Minister of War, with him, who in 1805 only played the role of " first secretary ”played. In addition, there were the Grand Stable Master Caulaincourt and Oberhofmarschall Duroc , each with five adjutants, and the first general manager Daru. In addition, the emperor was usually accompanied by other high functionaries and officials of the imperial court, who in turn carried numerous auxiliary officials, servants, horses and wagons with them, so that the "Great Headquarters" needed around 2000 horses as early as 1805. At the beginning of the war of 1805, the "Great Headquarters" comprised only 356 combatants, but in the summer of 1812 this number should finally increase to more than 4,000 people.
The Grande Army from 1805 to 1807
The army corps of the newly created "Grande Army" were founded by Marshals Bernadotte (1st), Marmont (2nd), Davout (3rd), Soult (4th), Lannes (5th), Ney (6th) and Augereau (7th). Their strength varied, depending on the number of the assigned divisions, between 18,000 and 40,000 men. Half of the 2nd Army Corps consisted of troops from the Batavian Republic (i.e., Dutch). Outside of these seven army corps, the entire heavy cavalry remained. Napoleon placed the seven "heavy" cavalry divisions that were available at that time as "reserve cavalry" (around 22,000 riders) under the command of Marshal Prince Murat. The imperial guard was under the command of Marshal Bessières . In 1805 it had the strength of a division. At the beginning of the Third Coalition War on the Main and the Rhine , Napoleon thus had a mobile field army of around 190,000 men. In the late summer of 1805, the French field army had a total strength of around 450,000 men. According to the official documents, however, not all troops belonged to the “grande armée”. This included both the army in Italy and the troops inside France, which consisted mainly of soldiers from the National Guard.
Shortly after the outbreak of war with Austria and Russia in September 1805, the French army was reinforced - more or less voluntarily - by contingents of troops from Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria (30,000 men in 1805), who were placed under the command of the French high command. Altogether, at the beginning of the hostilities in September 1805, Napoleon commanded an army of 205,000 men in southern Germany (initially without the Baden and Württembergians, who only joined the French army some time after the campaign began). The 7th Army Corps, which was actually still in the formation phase at the time, was only deployed after the outbreak of war, which resulted in an army of around 215,000 to 220,000 men.
1805
In anticipation of a war with Austria, which formally joined the third coalition of Great Britain, Russia and Sweden on August 9, Napoleon had 60,000 soldiers drafted in mid-August 1805 and, a little later, in anticipation of the next year's conscriptions, he ordered the raising of another 80,000 men. Shortly afterwards he ordered the transfer of the army from Boulogne to the Rhine. At the same time, Marmont von Holland and Bernadotte had to set off from Hanover in the direction of the Main. From August 27, the Grande Army marched in forced marches to the south and east and came in a surprisingly short time to the Danube, which it crossed between Donauwörth and Ingolstadt, before the expected Russian army had reached the Inn. As a result, the Austrian army deployed on the Iller, but only around a third as strong (ratio of 75,000: 205,000 men at the beginning of October 1805), which had invaded Bavaria on September 8, had already been bypassed by the Grande Army before the first shot was fired. For this reason, the Austrians were pushed back to Ulm and locked in after a short time. With the surrender of a considerable part of the Austrian army under Field Marshal Lieutenant Mack on October 20 in Ulm, the campaign was practically decided (→ Battle of Ulm ). At the same time, the Allies had lost the chance of winning Prussia to their side, which after the violation of neutral Prussian territory by French troops seemed ready to openly take the side of the Alliance. The secret alliance treaty between Prussia and Russia of November 3rd remained ineffective.
On the other hand, in anticipation of the assured Russian troops, Austria had concentrated the greater part of its own army in northern Italy and southern Tyrol, so that the campaign north of the Alps after Mack's surprising surrender was only a pursuit of the demoralized remnants of the Austrian - and the retreating Russian army under General Kutuzov in the direction of Vienna. To cover against the Austrian troops in Tyrol and northern Italy, Napoleon sent the army corps from Marmont to Styria and from Ney to Tyrol, which were operating independently in the remote theaters of war. After the swift capture of Vienna on November 13, the rapid advance of the French troops ended at Brno (in Moravia), which was intended as a rallying point for the Allied (i.e. Austrian and Russian) forces. Since the Russian Emperor Alexander was unwilling to wait patiently in Moravia until the incoming Allied army (i.e. the Russian and Austrian armies) had assembled and Prussia had fully mobilized, it came east of on December 2, 1805 Brno finally prematurely for the Battle of Austerlitz . With the overwhelming victory won there, Napoleon once again achieved a quick end to the campaign.
The French troops in the Kingdom of Italy, which belongs to France, were under the command of Marshal Masséna in September 1805 . This army corps, known as the "Italian Army" (French: Armée d'Italie), was made up of five infantry divisions, a combined grenadier division and two cavalry divisions and, together with the artillery and other auxiliary troops, was about 53,000 men strong. At the beginning of the war she was deployed on the Adige and had the task of proceeding in the direction of Klagenfurt. Further south, about in the middle of the Italian peninsula, there was another army corps under General Gouvion Saint-Cyr (18,000 men), which was supposed to march into the Kingdom of Naples under the name "Armée de Naples" (Army of Naples) , which was supposed to be had declared neutral. There it was supposed to occupy the country's ports in order to prevent Allied troops from landing. However, when it became apparent that the Austrian army would shift its focus to northern Italy, Napoleon called Gouvion Saint-Cyr back to reinforce Marshal Masséna. Naples was therefore not conquered until 1806, when a stronger French army marched into the kingdom from the end of January: two army corps under the command of Generals Duhesme and Reynier with four divisions and a total of around 40,000 men under the command of Joseph Bonaparte. The city of Naples was captured on February 15th. A little later, on March 30, 1806, Napoleon declared his brother Joseph King of Naples by decree, which was subsequently treated by Napoleon as a conquered province, all the more since the popular uprising in Calabria continued to require the presence of French troops .
1806-1807
After Prussia had demobilized its army again at the beginning of 1806, Napoleon let it be known on February 15 that he no longer felt bound by the Treaty of Schönbrunn with Prussia (after that Prussia was supposed to be in the Jura ( Neuchâtel ), on the Rhine and in Franconia, which France had occupied in 1805, to be “compensated” with Hanover). The declaration of war by Great Britain (because of Hanover) and the establishment of the Rhine Confederation in July completely isolated Berlin. In addition, contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Pressburg with Austria , Napoleon left most of his "Grande Armée" in Germany. Only the Imperial Guard returned across the Rhine after the war and the 2nd Army Corps (Marmont) was relocated to the newly acquired Dalmatia (→ Illyrian Provinces ). The remaining six army corps remained in southern Germany in quarters between Darmstadt and Passau. The Major-Général of the Grande Armée, Marshal Berthier, moved his headquarters to Munich. The 1st Army Corps under Marshal Bernadotte was in the (formerly) Prussian Principality of Ansbach , which the French Emperor gave to Bavaria , which was felt to be particularly provocative in Berlin . In the course of the summer the Kaiser expanded the six army corps remaining in Germany to a strength of 192,000 men, including 32,000 riders for the cavalry. Although all recruit depots were well filled and the battalions had been brought back to their budgetary strength, Napoleon had the conscriptions for the year 1806 increased to 50,000 men in the summer.
Due to the indecisive "rocking policy" of the Prussian court, which did not dare to speak out unreservedly for nor openly against Napoleon, tensions with France intensified in the course of the summer of 1806. Long before the Prussian ultimatum of October 1st calling for the withdrawal of all French troops from Germany, Napoleon began to assemble his army from the quarters of the Grande Armée in southern Germany in Upper Franconia. From there, just as in the previous year, at the beginning of the hostilities, he was able to lead his army into the flank of the enemy, who in turn was spread out from Westphalia via North Hesse to Thuringia, his eyes primarily turned to the Rhine. When the war broke out, Napoleon marched with his “Grand Armée” in three columns on streets that he had already explored before the war, coming from Amberg and Bamberg to the Saale and Elster in the direction of Halle and Merseburg. This army, including the Bavarian division, had a total strength of about 200,000 men; in addition there was the 8th Army Corps (Mortier) of around 20,000 men, which at that time was in reserve near Mainz. Ultimately, the emperor's goal was Berlin, which he hoped to reach as quickly as possible. With this move he forced the Prussian army to give up their own plans and to orient themselves only to his advance.
During the rapid advance of the Grande Army in October 1806, the deep hierarchical structure of the "Grande Armée" introduced by Napoleon into several separate command levels ( army corps , divisions and brigades ), in which the respective commander only general orders ("orders"), proved its worth again issued to the next lower command level. Their task was then to fulfill the respective order and to work out the necessary commands. With the "flat hierarchy" that was common up until then, the respective high command had to plan and calculate the movements for all units up to (partially) the battalion level , which often took several days. This procedure was repeated as soon as the planned plan was changed even partially. Attempts to change the complicated marching plans at short intervals in order to react quickly to surprising changes in the situation usually led to great confusion. All the more so since the then still quite small Prussian quartermaster staff did not work with the precision as from 1813 after the reforms of Scharnhorst, like the French general staff under Marshal Berthier.
With the concentrated attack, which aimed at the rear of the enemy army, Napoleon succeeded again in threatening the enemy's vital rear supply routes immediately after the fighting broke out. While the emperor was already gathering his entire disposable army at the border in a small area at the beginning of October, his opponents, primarily Prussia and Saxony, left more than half of their armed forces at home in their quarters. Without uniform leadership, without a uniform goal, divided into four almost autonomous "armies", under the Duke of Braunschweig, Prince of Hohenlohe, Rüchel and Duke of Württemberg (also called " Reserve Corps "; it was partly the battles of Jena and Auerstädt between Magdeburg and Halle). The young king, Friedrich Wilhelm III., Was in the army of the Duke of Braunschweig. The personal presence of the king did not increase Braunschweig's authority as commander-in-chief, but rather inhibited it. This became clear when the Duke of Braunschweig was fatally wounded right at the beginning of the Battle of Auerstedt and the king felt unable to either take over the command himself or at least temporarily appoint another commander in chief, so that at times nobody Army led. Therefore, with the Allies, all important decisions were made by a “council of war”, which not all then adhered to. Just a few days after the start of the war, two of the four parts of the insecure acting Allies west of the Saale near Jena and Auerstedt were attacked individually and defeated. With that the war of 1806 was almost over.
For this war, the French Emperor asked the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine , who were now dependent on him, for the first time to provide troop contingents for France, which through the treaties became part of the Grande Armée (see below " Contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine and foreign regiments "). The Princes of the Rhine Confederation, Switzerland and Holland, which was dependent on France and had been a kingdom under Napoleon's brother Louis Bonaparte since June 1806 , had almost 90,000 men to provide. In spring 1807 these troops were supplemented by Saxon , Anhalt and Spanish soldiers. With the help of these additional troops, Napoleon was able to expand the Grande Army at the beginning of the war to include the 8th Army Corps under Marshal Mortier and later by the 9th under Prince Jérôme . The 8th Army Corps of Mortier, which was founded shortly before the start of the hostilities, initially consisted of only two French infantry divisions (approx. 18,000-20,000 men). In the course of the war, the Italian, Polish and the troops of the Rhine Confederation were combined in the two new army corps, which in September and October 1806 initially came mainly from Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg. The Bavarian Division Wrede followed at the beginning of the war at first independent of the French right column under the two marshals Soult and Ney (4th and 6th Army Corps).
At the beginning of November Prussia was ready to accept the peace conditions set by Napoleon (cession of the areas west of the Elbe, with the exception of Magdeburg and the Altmark), but the French Emperor now tightened his conditions again, not only demanding more land, but even a participation in the war against Russia. In addition, however, was King Friedrich Wilhelm III. not ready. In the winter of 1807, when the war shifted to Poland and East Prussia due to Russia's entry into the war, Napoleon temporarily established a 10th Army Corps under Marshal Lefebvre (which consisted of Polish, Saxon and Anhalt troops). The army corps was disbanded in May 1807, and its troops were used to garrison Danzig. Almost simultaneously, Napoleon ordered the establishment of three more army corps: the reserve corps under Marshal Lannes, the Polish corps under Prince Poniatowski and the corps d'observation under Marshal Brune . With this, the Grande Army reached a total strength of around 325,000 men at the beginning of June 1807, shortly before the Battle of Friedland , which brought the end of the war with Russia as well.
The Grande Army from 1808
After the end of the war with Prussia and Russia and the conclusion of the Tilsit Peace Treaty on July 9, 1807, the Grande Armée and its army corps remained stationed as an army of occupation in northern Germany and Prussia.
1808
Shortly after the congress in Erfurt , Napoleon formally dissolved the "Grande Army" by decree on October 12, 1808, as a demonstrative sign of his will for peace. However, their units were transferred to three regional army commands in Germany immediately after the dissolution. The 1st command commanded all troops in the "Grande duché Varsovie" (in German "Duchy of Warsaw"). It was subordinate to Marshal Davout, based in Warsaw. This command was also responsible for the French occupation forces in the Prussian province of Silesia. The 2nd command included the occupation troops in the Prussian provinces of Prussia, Pomerania and Brandenburg and was under the command of Marshal Soult in Berlin. The 3rd command was assigned to Prince Bernadotte in Altona and was responsible for the French troops in northern Germany from Oldenburg to Lübeck as well as those in the (then) Danish provinces of Holstein and Schleswig. According to the inventory, the troops of the three army commands in Germany and Warsaw had a strength of 162,000 men in the autumn of 1808 (of which around 19,000 were Poles and 7,000 Dutch). After a short time, however, the emperor dissolved the three commandos and sent most of their troops to Spain to suppress the uprising that had broken out there.
The subsequent war on the Iberian Peninsula took place on the territory of the Kingdom of Spain , which had been ruled by King Joseph , Napoleon's eldest brother , since July 1808 . The country was therefore not considered a hostile country by France. The history of this war is therefore not part of the history of the “Grande Army” (→ Napoleonic Wars on the Iberian Peninsula ).
In place of the three dissolved army commands, Napoleon put the " Armée du Rhin " (French for Rhine Army) under the command of Marshal Davout. The seat of the commander-in-chief was Erfurt, which as an imperial domain did not belong to the Rhine Confederation, but to France (→ Principality of Erfurt ). This occupation army in Germany, reduced by about half, had a strength of about 80,000 men. In addition there were the occupation troops in the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg and Lübeck (around 12,000 men). At the same time, to calm the princes of the Rhine Confederation, he released a large part of the troops of the Rhine Confederation states, which had been grouped in field camps, to their home barracks.
1809
In the spring of 1809, the Imperial French Army consisted of no fewer than 149 infantry regiments with 548 field and 137 depot battalions with a total of a little over 500,000 men. There were also 93 cavalry regiments with 72,000 riders, the imperial guard with around 25,000 and the army of the Kingdom of Italy with around 65,000 men. Added to this are the 115,000 men that the princes of the Rhine Confederation had to provide for France in the event of war, so that Napoleon - together with the extensive artillery and the other support troops - had a force of more than 800,000 men. At this time, however, seven complete army corps with their auxiliary troops, the reserve cavalry corps, a considerable part of the imperial guard and numerous troops of the Confederation of the Rhine were involved in a bitter war with the Spanish insurgents on the other side of the Pyrenees . In total, almost 240,000 men were already at war and therefore could not be planned for another conflict.
When the long latent tensions with Austria became apparent in Central Europe at the beginning of 1809, Napoleon ordered the founding of the " armée d'Allemagne " (Army of Germany) from the troops east of the Rhine and officially appointed it on April 8th Prince of Neuchâtel (Berthier) as their major-general (chief of staff), who in fact had held the office since the beginning of March. As early as March 7th, Napoleon had asked the princes of the Rhine Confederation to (again) completely move their troops from peacetime to warfare and concentrate them at predetermined assembly points. Four divisions that were already on the march to Spain had to turn back (25,000 men). At the same time as the formal appointment of Berthier, the emperor laid down the “ordre de bataille” of the new “armée d'Allemagne” in detail. According to this, at the latest at the beginning of the war with Austria (→ Fifth Coalition War ), his army should consist of the 1st Army Corps under General Oudinot, the 2nd under Marshal Lannes, the 3rd under Marshal Davout (including a division of the small Princes of the Rhine), the 4th . under Marshal Masséna (including the Baden , Nassau and Hessian contingents), the 7th under Marshal Lefebvre (composed of the three Bavarian divisions), the 8th under Marshal Augereau (later under General Vandamme) from the troops of the small Princes of the Rhine and a Wuerttemberg division (of which only the Wuerttembergians were able to mobilize completely until the beginning of the war), and the 9th under Prince Bernadotte, consisting of the three Saxon and two Polish divisions from the Duchy of Warsaw. In addition, a 10th Army Corps was to be formed as a reserve in northern Germany, which was to be formed from the Westphalian and Dutch troops and placed under the command of Jerôme, King of Westphalia . During April another army corps was assembled near Hanau, which shortly afterwards under General Junot took over the cover of the Kingdom of Westphalia against Prussia as the "Observation Corps on the Elbe" (French: " corps d'observation de l'Elbe ") (approx. 15,000 men). In addition, there was the imperial guard, which only later joined the army in southern Germany (22,000 men were actually planned, of which only about 6000 came to southern Germany in time at the beginning of the war). Finally, there was also the cavalry reserve consisting of 5 cavalry divisions (approx. 10,000 riders) under the leadership of Marshal Bessières.
But since Napoleon was general, chief of staff, organizer and legislator of the army in one person, he changed this division several times during the campaign at short notice. The great lack of cavalry, but also of artillery, led u. a. to the fact that the establishment of the 1st Army Corps could not be completed in time until the outbreak of war, so that the divisions that were to be subordinate to Oudinot were incorporated into the 2nd Army Corps. Since Marshal Lannes came late from the Spanish theater of war to southern Germany, Oudinot led his two combined grenadier divisions largely independently, so that they are often referred to as "grenadier corps". After Marshal Lannes was fatally wounded in the Battle of Aspern , Oudinot was formally given command of the 2nd Army Corps. Although there had been a good personal relationship between Emperors Napoleon and Alexander since the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit, people in Paris feared Russia's well-known ambitions for Poland. To cover Poland, Napoleon renounced the planned unification of all divisions in Poland with the 9th Army Corps and left them as an independent "corps de Varsovie" (German "Army Corps of Warsaw", in the dispatches also as "armée de Varsovie" or "corps" de duché de Varsovie ”) under the command of Prince Poniatowski in Warsaw. Without the troops in northern Germany (9th and 10th Army Corps) and in the Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon had an operational army of 198,000 men with 330 guns in southern Germany on April 9, 1809, the day Austria declared war. At that time, other troops were still on the march to southern Germany and only reached their ordered targets after the outbreak of hostilities.
As with almost all of his campaigns, Napoleon tried to assemble as many of his army as possible in the designated area of operations, so that when hostilities broke out, the campaign could be ended quickly with a direct attack on the enemy army. At the beginning of April 1809 he concentrated his army from Allgäu to Saxony with Regensburg as the center. Due to the Austrian declaration of war on April 9, which was too early for Napoleon, he was forced to fight the first skirmishes and battles south of the Danube, largely with troops of the Rhine Confederation. Nevertheless, the Austrian army that had advanced to Bavaria under Archduke Karl soon had to retreat again via Bohemia towards Vienna (→ Battle of Regensburg ). Afterwards Napoleon increased the pressure on the princes of the Rhine Confederation and asked them to increase their contingent beyond the contractually agreed provisions by mobilizing their reserves. Therefore, the Imperial French Army was not fully assembled until mid-May, shortly before Napoleon had reached Vienna along the Danube. In mid-May, shortly before the Battle of Aspern, an army of around 115,000 men stood ready near Vienna under the direct command of the Emperor (General Staff and Headquarters, Imperial Guard, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Army Corps, cavalry reserve and large artillery park). Of these, however, part of the 3rd Army Corps was still encamped near St. Pölten.
The other army corps operated largely independently at this time, i. H. independent of the main army under Napoleon. The 7th Army Corps (with the Bavarian divisions) was in North Tyrol and Salzburg and tried to suppress the uprising against the Bavarian - and the French - rule there. The 8th Army Corps (with the Württemberg division) was on the right bank of the Danube near Linz and Enns, and the 9th Army Corps (the Saxon divisions) was assembled on the left bank of the Danube near Linz. Behind the actual operational area in Austria, a new "observation corps" under Marshal Kellermann around Hanau am Main was just being formed. The provisional reserve division (approx. 5000 men) under General Beaumont, advancing from France, reached Augsburg. The 10th Army Corps under King Jerôme (Westphalian and Dutch troops) still had to shield the coast between the Ems and the Baltic Sea against English landings.
Somewhat isolated from the rest of the army, the “Warsaw Army Corps” stood on the Vistula under the command of Prince Poniatowski. The troops of Warsaw, which in January 1809 had only a strength of about 19,000 men, comprised over 26,500 men at the beginning of April (without taking into account the three infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment that the Duchy of Warsaw had as a contingent at the end of 1808 to suppress the Spanish uprising against the Iberian Peninsula had to send). It consisted of the three Polish "legions" and a weak Saxon brigade. The so-called "Legions" (Polish "Legia") were associations of about the strength of a French division; they are therefore often referred to in the literature as "divisions" (Polish "Dywizja"), but they were structured differently. Their structure can be compared with the semi-permanent mixed divisions of the French revolutionary army and thus corresponds more to a smaller army corps of the German Empire. They consisted of four regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and some support troops, including two to three batteries of artillery. According to the budget of 1809, they each numbered a little over 10,000 men. In addition, there was the just founded 4th Legion, which at the beginning of April only had one battalion. However, some of the troops served as a garrison for the fortresses of Danzig, Thorn and Küstrin, while another was used as border guards along the Prussian border. Therefore, Prince Poniastowski was only able to oppose the attack of the VII Austrian Army Corps of a little over 30,000 men in the Battle of Raszyn on April 19, 1809, only a weak corps of 14,000 to 15,000 men. With this approach, it was hoped in Vienna to persuade Prussia to join the coalition.On May 5, Russia declared war on Austria and, according to the treaty, sent an army corps of 32,000 men to the duchy, with whose help the Austrian troops are repelled until the armistice could (for the history of this campaign → Austrian campaign against the Duchy of Warsaw 1809 ).
South of the Alps, Napoleon ordered the creation of the " Armée d'Italie " (Army of Italy) to protect Italy and the Adriatic Sea , which he placed under the command of his stepson Prince Eugène , the viceroy of Italy. It consisted of the 5th (under Marshal Macdonald), 6th (under General Grenier and General Baraguey d'Hilliers ) and the 11th Army Corps, of which only the 11th Army Corps under General Marmot in Dalmatia around the city of Ragusa (today Dubrovnik) operated independently as a corps unit. The rest of the army, under the direct supreme command of the viceroy, sought to establish direct contact with the "Army of Germany" by invading Austria. At the end of May, a large part of the Italian army was in Styria and the Pustertal. In total, the Italian army in northern Italy and Dalmatia had a strength of 70,000 men with 6,500 riders. In addition, to protect Rome and the southern part of the peninsula, there was also the small army of the Kingdom of Naples, which was under the command of its king Joachim (Murat), but half of which consisted of French troops (to compensate for the Neapolitans, the fought in Spain or Germany).
The armies with which Napoleon waged the war against Austria in 1809 were officially called " Armée d'Italie " (Army of Italy) and " Armée d'Allemagne " (Army of Germany), the first south and the second north of the Alpen operated, even if the "Grande Army" was often mentioned unofficially in the contemporary press.
The Grande Armée of 1812
With the appointment of Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel and Prince of Wagram, whom Napoleon had used in the diplomatic service for over two years, as "grand état-major général de la grande armée" (ie Chief of Staff of the Great Army) on January 16, 1812 the (designation) "Grande Armée" was officially renewed. A little later, on January 27th, the states “allied” with France received the instruction to put the contingents that they had to provide in the event of war on war footing and to make them available from February 15th. The guard and the Italian army received orders to march to Germany. However, even before that, in August 1811, Marshal Davout had received the order to be ready with an army of around 150,000 French and 50,000 Poles between the Elbe and Danzig so that they could cross the Vistula at any time. This army was given the (provisional) designation "Observation Army on the Elbe" (" corps d'observation de l'Elbe ") on November 14, 1811 .
structure
The tactical units
After the Kaiser had ordered a uniform form of attack for the divisions in November 1805, shortly before the Battle of Austerlitz , in which linear and column tactics were to be combined, he issued new uniform regulations on training and tactics on February 18, 1808 of the troops, according to which the elementary building blocks of the units, the battalion for the infantry and the esquadron for the cavalry, were reorganized and reorganized.
Battalions
In 1808, the battalion was strengthened and divided into six companies for the systematic development of column tactics, which also increased the average company strength to around 140 men. Two of the companies (the so-called Grenadier and Voltigeur Companies) of the battalion were to consist of specially selected soldiers. These were regarded as elite soldiers who were also specially trained in order to be able to independently conduct a rifle battle as tirailleurs in front of the (actual) battle line ( tiraillement ). The other four (fusilier) companies formed the actual attack column closely behind them. The Guard Infantry was considered an elite overall, so their battalions did not contain any additional elite companies and consisted of only four companies. Since the guard regiments were complemented by selection from the entire army, they also had no depot battalions and consisted of two battalions each.
After the reform of the regulations of 1808, a third of each line battalion could be used as " light infantry ". The previous light infantry, which until then had been specially trained and deployed for the whole army for this purpose, lost its previous importance. Their regiments were therefore converted into regular infantry units and used as such. However, the previous light infantry units all retained their names, their own traditions, and their special badges and uniforms. Therefore, in 1812 there was only a nominal difference between the light and line infantry regiments of the French army. In the summer of 1811, the punitive battalions composed of "réfractaires" were combined into several infantry regiments named after the penal islands. They were structured in the same way as regular infantry regiments and battalions, except that they (inevitably) did not have any “elite companies”. The regulations of 1808 were adopted with various amendments by most armies of the Confederation of the Rhine.
Brigades
After the reform of the regulations of 1808, the budget for the infantry regiment provided for a staff of 50 men, as well as four "field battalions" (French "bataillon de guerre") and a so-called depôt battalion (French "bataillon de dépôt"). This 5th battalion was organized and structured in the same way as the first four battalions, but it was not allowed to be detached from the regiment's peacetime location without the express permission of the Kaiser. There it always had “5. Bataillon “called Depotbataillon to take over the security of the location as well as the equipment and training of the recruits. With the rapidly growing army and the insufficient number of trained officers and the cities suitable as regimental locations, it soon became more convenient to increase the number of "field battalions" in existing regiments than to establish new ones with all the associated administrative facilities. In the war of 1809 against Austria, the problem of these "surplus" battalions was countered by amalgamating them into provisional "half-brigades" (French demi-brigades ) during the campaign . In the summer of 1812, however, there were a number of regiments with six or even seven field battalions, which were no longer necessarily concentrated in a single division. As a result, the regiment became a purely administrative unit, which was only responsible for equipping, training and supplying the soldiers. Their previous role as the middle tactical unit within the divisions was now taken over by the “ brigades ”, which only now became practically permanent tactical units.
Divisions
The infantry divisions , which were now regularly subdivided into two to three brigades, should, according to the budget after the 1808 reform, consist of twelve battalions. Together with the artillery companies and other support troops, they should have at least a strength of about 10,000 to 10,500 men. After the "ordre de bataille" of the summer of 1812, however, the number of battalions assigned to the divisions fluctuated from nine (21st division) to twenty (5th division), so that their actual strength was even at the beginning of the campaign without additional information can hardly be estimated about the respective internal composition.
composition
On March 3, 1812, the detailed " ordre de bataille " (French for order of battle; but means here the intended organizational structure) of the "Grande Army" appeared, according to which the individual units, i.e. the battalions and squadrons ( squadrons ), the larger Associations were assigned. According to this, the Grande Army should consist of the Grand Headquarters, eleven army corps with a total of 34 divisions and 22 light cavalry brigades, the imperial guard (the strength of a strong army corps), the cavalry reserve (divided into four cavalry corps with eleven cavalry divisions) and the three " Large parks ”(artillery park, equipage park with 26 equipage battalions, genius park with a large bridge park of six ship bridges). According to the “ordre de bataille”, neither the French troops in Spain (300,000 men), nor in Italy (50,000 men), nor in the interior of France belonged to the Grand Army.
Contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine and "foreign regiments"
The "Grande Army" set up in the spring of 1812 can be seen as the common army of the French Empire and the areas dependent on it. One of these was the Confederation of the Rhine (officially: “la Confédération du Rhin”), whose “protector” was always the Emperor of the French and King of Italy. The princes of the Rhine Confederation were largely sovereign inside their country, but always had to provide troops for France in the event of war. In the event of war, the troop contingents were integrated into the French army and were under the command of the French emperor. In the spring of 1812, they were sometimes distributed in battalions or esquadrons over the entire imperial army. Each division, each army corps of the Grande Army, even the Guard and the Great Headquarters, therefore contained units from the areas dependent on Napoleon - from Portugal to Dalmatia [Illyria] and from Rügen to Calabria.
A special military alliance of September 27, 1803 granted France the right to recruit four regiments with a total strength of 16,000 men in the Swiss cantons. But that number was never reached. In a supplementary contract dated March 28, 1812, Switzerland undertook to provide four infantry regiments with four artillery companies with at least 12,000 men, which, however, were not allowed to be deployed overseas but only in Europe. In addition, the country was obliged to provide 2,000 replacement men every year, to train them and to replace all deserters at its own expense. The emperor had the right to appoint the commander and all senior officers. The four Swiss regiments, which were thus part of the French and not the Swiss army, formed the 9th Division in the 2nd Army Corps (Oudinot) in the summer of 1812, together with a Croatian and a French regiment. The Principality of Neufchâtel (Neuchâtel), which became independent in 1806, had to provide a battalion, which - like the Swiss regiments - was considered a unit of the French army. The Polish troops in the Grand Army were either part of the contingent of the Duchy of Warsaw , which belonged to the Confederation of the Rhine, or they were volunteers of the Polish Legion (s) (légions Polonaises) founded in 1797 and recruited in all of Poland or in Lithuania, or the im Vistula Legion ( Légion de la Vistule ) founded in October 1808 . The Vistula Legion, which in 1812 comprised nine infantry regiments and two cavalry regiments, was thus an integral part of the French army and did not belong to the contingent of the Duchy of Warsaw, the 17 infantry and 17 cavalry regiments (with around 50,000 men ) included. A total of around 95,000 Poles belonged to the Great Army, making them the third largest group after the “Imperial French” (ie the inhabitants of the French Empire) and the Germans from the states of the Rhine Confederation. The 5th Army Corps under Prince Poniatowski consisted exclusively of Polish troops.
An integral part of the French army were the "Légion of Portugaise" (the Portuguese Legion), the five regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry included, as well as the "Regiment Joseph Napoléon", which in 1809 of Spanish and the squadron Mamelukes , the 1798 from Egyptian prisoners of war. The entire army of the Kingdom of Italy (around 25,000 men), which was ruled in personal union by the French Emperor, as well as soldiers from the so-called "Illyrian Provinces" (i.e. from Carinthia, Slovenia, Istria and Dalmatia) were also firmly integrated into the Grand Army. who were part of the French Empire. The Italian army under Viceroy Eugène largely provided the 4th Army Corps, which also included numerous Illyrian units. The Neapolitan Army, whose King Joachim (Murat) was called up by Napoleon as commander of the French heavy cavalry, provided the 33rd Division in the 9th Army Corps (three infantry regiments - the Neapolitan Guard, a Cavalry Brigade and an Artillery Company).
The strength of the individual troop contingents that the Rhine Confederation states had to provide was determined in 1806 by the Rhine Confederation Act (without the participation of the states concerned). While in peacetime France was satisfied with some of the permitted soldiers (e.g. as garrisons for the Prussian fortresses), in the event of war the states of the Rhine Confederation had to provide troops that corresponded to about one percent of their respective population. According to this, the larger states had to provide at least the following contingents in the spring of 1812: Bavaria 30,000, Kingdom of Westphalia 25,000, Saxony 20,000, Württemberg 12,000, Baden 8,000, Berg 5000, Hessen (-Darmstadt) 4,000, Frankfurt 2,800, Saxon duchies (jointly ) 2,800, Würzburg 2000, Mecklenburg-Schwerin 1,900 and Nassau 3,800, which includes the so-called smaller (less powerful) states of the Rhine Confederation (e.g. Isenburg , Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen , Hohenzollern-Hechingen , von der Leyen , Liechtenstein ) military ( co-organized. In total, the Rhine Confederation had almost 130,000 men for France. B. from the Principality of Liechtenstein 40 and von der Leyen 29 men. Such troop strengths could not be achieved through voluntary recruitment alone, so that in these countries the conscription ( conscription ) had to be expanded more and more. At this time, troops from the Confederation of the Rhine were already fighting in Spain (e.g. Nassau ) or serving France as garrisons. In order to cover the enormous need for troops, in the spring of 1812, under strong pressure from the French government, almost all states had to provide France with a somewhat larger contingent than was actually provided for in the treaty. Even the newly drafted soldiers were not all immediately transferred to the Grand Army, some remained in Prussia and Poland as occupation troops or were only later sent to Russia as replacement troops. The contingents of the largest federal states were largely grouped into special army corps, the Bavarians in the 6th (19th and 20th division), the Westphalia in the 8th (23rd and 24th division) and the Saxons in the 7th army corps (21st and 20th divisions) 22nd division); the Württemberger formed the 25th Division in the 3rd Army Corps, the Berger (1st Brigade), Badener (2nd Brigade) and Hesse (3rd Brigade) together the 26th Division in the 9th Army Corps. However, other battalions, especially the cavalry and artillery of these contingents, were scattered over the whole army.
Allied troops
The King of Prussia did not become a member of the Rhine Confederation after the defeat of 1806/07. Nevertheless, according to the alliance treaty concluded on February 24, 1812 under French pressure, he not only had to provide, pay and supplement 20,000 soldiers himself, but he also had to grant the entire French army of around 400,000 men free passage and all fortresses (except in Silesia) and the facility it needed for the warfare with Russia. Most of the Prussian contingent was integrated into the "Great Army" as the 27th division and assigned to the 10th Army Corps.
On March 14, 1812, France concluded a special military alliance treaty with the Austrian Empire . After this Austria provided the French Empire with an army corps of 30,000 men for a war with Russia, which it paid and supplemented itself and over which Vienna reserved the supreme command. It was, to which Vienna had placed great importance in the treaty negotiations, not a “contingent” that was assigned to the French “Great Army” like the troops of the Rhine Confederation states, but the “auxiliary corps” of an ally, which was always undivided to be under the orders of an Austrian general and who had to receive his orders exclusively from the French headquarters. Emperor Franz appointed General Fürst Schwarzenberg as the “commanding general” of the Austrian “auxiliary corps” . Despite these diplomatic restrictions, it was still part of the great army with which Napoleon invaded Russia, and it was under the orders of the French headquarters during this time.
In a further alliance agreement signed on March 7, 1812, the Kingdom of Denmark undertook to provide a division of 10,000 men to protect the North Sea and Baltic coasts between the Zuiderzee in the west and the mouth of the Oder in the east. In return, France undertook to keep a division ready at all times for the same purpose, which could also enter Danish territory in the event of an enemy attack on Holstein, Jutland or the Zeeland islands. The treaty not only secured France against a surprise attack from the north, it also made it possible to release additional troops from the North Sea departments for the planned war with Russia.
Troops of the French Empire
Although the “Grande Armée” had numerous “non-French” troops, it was at its core a French army. With the exception of the Austrian auxiliary corps, all army corps were commanded by a French. In the case of the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine, the larger formations were either commanded by a French officer or the chief of staff of the association was a French, so that the French headquarters kept constant control of all operations and movements of the units. The Great Headquarters, the Imperial Guard, the 1st, the 2nd and the 3rd Army Corps consisted predominantly of "Imperial French" troops, the 4th Army Corps still about half (the rest came from the Kingdom of Italy, which belongs to France). These troops were undisputedly regarded as the “core of the Grande Armée”, although even these had a number of “foreign” troops (the largest units here were the “Vistula Legion” in the Guard and the Württemberg Division in the 3rd Army Corps). The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps also contained numerous foreign regiments. However, these were mixed up with the Imperial French units in such a way that these cavalry corps were considered "predominantly French" (the small 4th Cavalry Corps, which was founded shortly before the start of the war, on the other hand, consisted almost exclusively of Saxon, Polish and Westphalian riders). In addition to these core troops, there was only a French division (the 12th division) in the 9th Army Corps under Marshal Victor and the 11th Army Corps of Marshal Augereau, which later moved up in the third line, consisted about half of French units, but among them were numerous " isolated battalions "that had been recalled from Spain, as well as a number of" punitive units ", which were composed of" refractaires "(30th and 31st divisions; the 32nd and 34th divisions also had some French units). In this compilation, however, it is not taken into account that many of the "Imperial French" soldiers were conscripted in areas that were only annexed by France after the revolution (such as Catalonia, Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria, Umbria including Rome, Illyria, Wallis, Rhineland, Holland , Northwest Germany) whose residents usually do not feel like "French". A total of about 300,000 men in the army were considered "Imperial French". This means that far more than half of the soldiers in the Grande Army were “non-French”.
Strength and structure of the Grande Army
The army that Napoleon deployed in the Kingdom of Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw on the western border of Russia in June 1812 numbered a little over 420,000 men - excluding the Austrian auxiliary corps. It was composed of the Great Headquarters, 1st (Davout), 2nd (Oudinot), 3rd (Ney), 4th (Eugène, Viceroy of Italy), 5th (Prince Poniatowski), 6th (Gouvion Saint -Cyr, later Wrede), 7th (Reynier), 8th (King Jerôme, later Vandamme, then Junot) and the 10th Army Corps (Macdonald). It consisted of 25 infantry and eight light cavalry divisions.
The imperial guard was about the size and composition of an army corps. In the summer of 1812 it comprised a total of more than 56,000 men, of which only about 47,000 were deployed to the "Grande Army". During the campaign in Russia, she was temporarily assigned to the (about 2000 strong) Italian Guard. Their infantry comprised four infantry divisions (including the “Vistula Legion” in the strongest division). It was supplemented by a heavy cavalry division and a strong artillery reserve as well as other support troops. The leadership of the guard was divided between three marshals: Marshal Lefebvre led the "Old Guard" (one division), Marshal Mortier the "Young Guard" (two divisions) and the Vistula Legion. The Guard Cavalry Division was under Marshal Bessieres, the Guards artillery reserve was commanded by General Sorbier.
The entire heavy cavalry of the army was summarized as the "cavalry reserve" under King Joachim of Naples (Murat). It was divided into four cavalry corps, which were under the command of Nansouty (1st), Montbrun (2nd), Grouchy (3rd) and Latour-Maubourg (4th). The cavalry corps consisted of a total of eleven cavalry divisions with a total of just over 40,000 riders.
With the involvement of the Austrian auxiliary corps under Prince Schwarzenberg, which was more than 30,000 strong, Napoleon had a field army of just over 450,000 men.
These troops also included the three "Great Parks" (Artillery Park, Genius Park and Equipage Park), which immediately followed the army corps as army troops. The parks had a combined strength of over 22,000 men and 16,000 horses. They are to be added to the actual combat troops, so that together with them there is an army strength (in round numbers) of around 475,000 men. Under the leadership of the emperor, these first line troops crossed the then Russian border on June 24, 1812, thereby opening the Russian campaign of 1812 .
The Great Headquarters, which comprised a total of around 4,000 people, was divided into three groups. The first consisted of the entourage of the emperor, the kings of Naples (Murat) and Westphalia ( Jerôme ) and the viceroy of Italy ( Eugène ). This included their grand officials and other senior officers and officials who were essential as a connection for the continuation of state affairs in the absence of the monarchs. A total of 108 people and almost 400 servants and train soldiers and 1300 horses. The second group, the actual General Staff of the Army, was under the Prince of Neufchâtel (Marshal Berthier). It comprised all eleven departments or “bureaux” of the land and naval forces of the Empire with 252 officers and 273 servants and train soldiers as well as 650 horses. In addition, there was the general staff of the army corps, which included all the officers assigned to the individual army corps, from commanders and chiefs of staff to their adjutants: 1,114 officers and almost 700 servants and train soldiers as well as around 4,000 horses. The last group was the military escort: the Neufchâtel battalion and an Esquadron mounted gendarmerie. This group was reinforced with detached battalions, including the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Baden Infantry Regiment.
Behind these troops of the first line there soon followed reserve and replacement units for the main army, additional engineer units, further bridge columns, horse depots, the siege park for Riga and other fortresses, supply and supply troops, field war commissariat with 3700 officers and civil servants, gendarmerie (here as Field police) around 900 men, field post offices, general offices and several battalions of craftsmen. The units were supplemented by newly formed troops from volunteers in Lithuania (including numerous Polish deserters from the Russian army). Overall, these additional troops had a strength of about 35,000 to 40,000 men.
The 9th Army Corps under Marshal Victor (39,000 men) was responsible for covering the base of operations and the main army's base. Their main task was initially to secure Berlin - and thus also Prussia - and the supply routes over the Oder bridges. During the campaign against Russia, the army corps gradually moved its operational area to the east as far as the area around Smolensk. In the third line followed from the Rhine, so to speak as a reserve army, the 11th Army Corps under Marshal Augereau with 35,000 (later 55,000) men. This army corps, which was formally re-established on July 4th from already existing reserve divisions, which were merely renamed, was thus still in its formation phase in June. During the war with Russia, one part of the army corps took over the security of the supply lines to the area beyond Vilna and Minsk, the other the protection of the Pomeranian and Prussian Baltic coasts against British or Swedish landings. However, this army corps consisted mainly of provisional marching regiments and penal regiments of "réfractaires", which at best could be used as occupation forces. These were supplemented by a division of Neapolitans (33rd division) and a division of soldiers from the small states of the Rhine Confederation (34th division). In December 1812 his divisions took over the cover of the remnants of the main army. If these associations are added together, the total strength of the “Grande Army of 1812” is more than 610,000 men.
Occupation and support troops between Memel and Elbe
In addition, there were still numerous occupation, replacement and supply troops between Tilsit and Hamburg. One of these was the Danish division, which stood near Hamburg. How nearly 1812 the number of soldiers available to France had become is shown by the fact that with these rear troops numerous secondary posts could only be filled with invalids and convalescents. Another part of the occupation army consisted of national guards born in 1809 to 1812, who were mainly concentrated in the (then) Département des Bouches de l'Elbe (French for mouth of the Elbe), which stretched from Cuxhaven to Lübeck. The total number of the occupation army in northern Germany changed continuously due to the arrival and departure from France and the states of the Rhine Confederation. Initially, they were often provided by units of the "Grande Army" that had been left behind, such as the 2nd Baden Infantry Regiment, the Hessian Brigade or troops of the 11th Army Corps, which advanced to Russia in the course of late summer and autumn. A simple overview of these advancing units, which marched off to Russia in separate columns, is difficult, since they did not always return to the unit to which they actually belonged after the “ordre de bataille” of June 1812, but in Lithuania or Belarus often in battalions to secure the supply roads and intermediate stores as garrisons of cities. After they left for Russia, they were usually replaced by substitute formations from home. Despite these changes, the total strength of the troops in northern Germany fluctuated mostly by about 70,000 men. If you include these indispensable rear security and supply troops, then the total strength of the French army east of the Rhine in 1812 (including the replacement formations that had moved up from home by the end of the year) was around 660,000 to 680,000 men.
Campaign in Russia
Planning and deployment
When planning the war with Russia, Napoleon was well aware that such a large army would be difficult to supply. Therefore, from the summer of 1811, he began to gradually expand the previously rudimentary supply system of the Grande Army. In eastern Prussia, in the Duchy of Warsaw and in Danzig, he had numerous large magazines set up, from which the “Grande Army” should be supplied in the event of war. However, the additional 26 Equipage Battalions, including a Guard Equipage Battalion, which the Grande Army finally owned in the summer of 1812, were still insufficient to support the almost half a million men and a total of almost 200,000 horses that the Grande Army in June 1812 included supplying even approximately. Therefore, during the campaign, the Grande Army continued to be very dependent on the requisition of food and fodder from the country it passed. In view of the low population density of western Russia, which at that time was only 16 inhabitants per square kilometer, the analysis of the requisition options available in St. Petersburg came to the conclusion that Napoleon could only march into Russia with an army of 250,000 men if he ensured their supplies wanted, and adjusted accordingly in the planning.
As early as the end of 1811, Napoleon began to "inconspicuously" move individual units from Spain to Central Europe (which, however, did not go unnoticed). From the beginning of 1812 he slowly moved most of his troops in Germany as far as the Vistula, until they were finally deployed between Tilsit in East Prussia and Lublin in the Duchy of Warsaw. After the emperor learned the formation of the Russian army , he divided his grand army into five groups. The left group under Marshal Macdonald was to act as the northern flank of the main army against the Russian troops in the Baltic States and if possible also conquer Riga in order to keep the mouth of the Daugava free for French supply ships on this river. The southern wing group, the Austrian auxiliary corps under Prince Schwarzenberg, was supposed to cover the grand army against the Russian troops in the Ukraine. The emperor, in turn, had divided the main army into three groups, which were to attack the two Russian armies in Lithuania (including Belarus) at different times. He himself had taken over the leadership of the largest group (190,000 men) with which he opened the campaign over Kovno on June 24th to attack the 1st Russian Western Army near Vilna. Four to six days' march back, at Suwalki, the second group stood under his stepson Prince Eugène, the viceroy of Italy (approx. 70,000 men). A few marches back, at Pultusk on the Narew, the third group was assembled to cross the Nyemen at Grodno from June 30th, under the leadership of Jerôme, King of Westphalia (approx. 80,000 men) and to attack the 2nd Russian Western Army .
The Russian campaign of 1812 can be divided into three sections:
- from crossing the Russian border to the fighting for Smolensk;
- the march from Smolensk to Moscow ;
- the retreat from Moscow to the Prussian and Polish borders.
The road to Smolensk
On June 24, 1812, the French army crossed the Russian border without declaring war, thus opening the campaign. The first phase of the war was primarily characterized by the fact that the Grande Army was three times as strong as the Russian army that faced it on the western border. This gave Napoleon (initially) the freedom to operate at will. Nevertheless, in view of the enormous expansion of Russia, he had to try to defeat the Russian army decisively even near the border in order to be able to end the war as quickly as possible. Since - as one in the French headquarters u. a. knew through spies - the Russian army was divided into three groups, it was important for Napoleon to defeat these armies quickly one by one and thus prevent them from uniting. Faced with the enormous French superiority, the Russian armies had no choice but to evade as quickly as possible. The 1st Western Army under Barclay de Tolly marched, according to a plan laid down before the war, first in a north-east direction to the fortified camp of Drissa. There, too, General Barclay de Tolly saw no chance to withstand the far superior French, and ordered the march on via Vitebsk to Smolensk. The 2nd Western Army under Prince Bagration evaded the pressure of the Grande Army first to the southeast and then to the Dnieper near Mohilew. Since Napoleon defeated the two armies at the same time, wanted to keep them permanently separated from each other and, on top of that, cut them off the way into the interior of Russia, the French troops were forced to walk very long distances every day in the pursuit at increased speed. The following supply troops of the Grande Army, which theoretically should have provided the army with food for two months, could not follow the fast-marching troops on the mostly unpaved country roads in Lithuania, so that they suffered from hunger after a short time, which is why the Grande Armée lost nearly 140,000 men in the first six weeks, most of them to exhaustion, illness and at least 50,000 to desertion. Tens of thousands of horses died from exhaustion and overexertion during this time and could not be replaced later. The situation for the Grande Armée was exacerbated by the fact that the 1st Russian Army under General Barclay de Tolly made several preparations to face a battle, so that Napoleon was each time forced to concentrate his army closely, which was their supply situation extremely deteriorated. After the Russian army withdrew again, the French army corps first had to be redistributed in the room in order to give the troops previously untouched territory to requisition. Finally, on July 28, in Vitebsk, Napoleon was forced to take a longer break so that the Grande Armée could recover.
Despite all the efforts of Napoleon and the Grande Armée, the Russian armies successfully evaded the encirclement attempts on several occasions, so that they were finally able to unite at Smolensk on August 2nd. When the Russian army began to advance from there in the direction of Vitebsk, Napoleon tried to cut them off from their rear connections with a quick bypass maneuver on the left bank of the Dnieper in order to destroy them with his vastly superior forces. At that time, the French "main army" under the immediate command of the emperor was still around 180,000 strong; the two united Russian armies had only about 120,000 men. The ratio of strengths was still 3: 2 and therefore offered Napoleon sufficient operational leeway. General Barclay de Tolly and the Russian army, who feared such an encirclement, had, however, set up adequate flank protection south of the river, so that the great encircling maneuver only led to a battle at Krasnoi (August 14/15) and then to the storm with heavy losses led the fortified city of Smolensk (August 16-18). In view of the still very great superiority of the French army, General Barclay de Tolly, who feared further encirclement south of the river, ordered the retreat of the Russian army towards Moscow. With the practically undecided battle at Valutina or Walutina Gora on August 19, a few kilometers east of Smolensk, which ensured the unhindered withdrawal of the Russian army, Napoleon's original plan to destroy the Russian army close to the border had finally failed.
The way to Moscow
After the loss-making battles for Smolensk, Napoleon had "the choice" of securing the territory he had won so far, militarily or politically, and putting up magazines there, or continuing to bet on defeating the Russian army as quickly as possible in order to then "dictate" peace. to be able to. Although Napoleon had already told his entourage in Vitebsk that it would be crazy to penetrate even deeper into Russia, on August 20 in Smolensk he ordered the Russian army to be pursued in the direction of Moscow.
At this time, however, Napoleon had already deployed seven of his thirteen army corps - if the imperial guard is counted as an army corps - to cover against the Russian troops in the Baltic States, on the Daugava, Volhynia and in the Ukraine, as well as to secure the conquered areas. As a result, he lost his decisive advantage in the pursuit of the main Russian army, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Grande Armée. In doing so, he also took the opportunity to maneuver the Russian army in any direction he wanted. The six army corps remaining under the direct command of the emperor (the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th army corps and the guard, as well as the four cavalry corps) were therefore more or less “forced” to pursue them directly march past the Russian army. While the Russian army was being supplied to the magazines it had set up there before the war on the road it had freely chosen and reinforced by replacement crews at previously planned assembly points, the pursuing Grande Armée had to live off what the retreating enemy had left. The Russian army, which naturally tried to destroy as much as it could when leaving every place, withdrew without further resistance to Dorogobusch , where there was a rearguard battle for the first time. While the Grande Armée gradually weakened on its way to the east due to the growing need, the dissatisfaction in the Russian army about the almost non-fighting retreat grew more and more, which is why Emperor Alexander finally Prince Kutuzov as commander in chief for the 1st and 2nd appointed Russian army and practically at the same time elevated him to the rank of prince.
Shortly after Prince Kutuzov had assumed the supreme command on August 29, he presented himself to battle on September 6 at Borodino . The initially overwhelming numerical superiority of the Grande Armée of 3: 1 at the beginning of the campaign had been reduced to a moderate overweight of about 130,000 against 110,000 men by that day. This deprived Napoleon of practically every opportunity for complicated maneuvers or for sufficient reserve formation at the beginning of the battle. Hence a simple frontal battle developed. After a long battle between the two armies in a confined space, the Grande Armée had pushed the Russian army back by around 1,500 to 2,000 meters, but lost a fifth to a quarter of the soldiers involved in the battle. Since Kutuzov cleared the battlefield during the night and slowly retreated to Moscow, the battle is generally regarded as a French victory, but militarily it was a Pyrrhic victory from which the Grande Armée would never recover.
On September 14, the Grande Armée, at that time only about 90,000 men strong, marched into the largely deserted city of Moscow, and Napoleon entered the Kremlin . The real decision of the campaign was made when the Russian Emperor Alexander, even after four weeks, persistently refused to enter into negotiations with the French Emperor. Although some reinforcements had reached Moscow by then, the Grande Army was no longer strong enough to be able to force a military decision this year. Nevertheless, Napoleon could not decide for a long time whether he should spend the winter in Moscow or retreat to Smolensk. A partial armistice for the Moscow area, concluded while trying to establish contact with the St. Petersburg court, maintained Napoleon's hopes for a victorious peace.
The retreat to the border
With the surprise Russian attack and the defeat of the King of Naples (Murat) in the Battle of Tarutino on October 18, hostilities near Moscow were reopened. The late season of the year and the poor supply situation for the main French army, which up to this point had not yet managed to set up larger magazines east of Smolensk, forced Napoleon to issue an order to retreat on October 19. After reinforcements arrived and the wounded recovered, the strength of the French army around Moscow was again just over 100,000 men. With a march to Kaluga , southwest of Moscow, Napoleon tried not only to open up areas for requisitions that had previously been spared by the war, but also to push the grand army between the main Russian army and Smolensk. From Moscow it was four days more to Smolensk than from Tarutino, so the Grande Army had to sit in front of the Russian army first. Compared to this elementary point, reaching Kaluga was more of a secondary goal. With the battle of Malo-Yaroslavs, Napoleon had definitely achieved his strategic goal. The attempt failed, however, because of stubborn Russian resistance in the battle of Malojaroslavz on October 24th. In view of the Russian army deployed there, Napoleon was forced to return his troops to the direct road to Smolensk and thus to an area that had been searched for food by requisitioning commands of the Grande Army for weeks.
With the Battle of Vyazma (November 2-3), which was fought before the first snowfall, the advancing dissolution of the Grande Army became apparent for the first time. The permanent pressure that the pursuing Russian troops then exerted on the retreating Grande Army not only accelerated its retreat, but never gave it time to regenerate in between. The lack of food, the snowfall that began and the falling temperatures made the situation of the Grande Army even worse. More and more horses collapsed, exhausted, so that the number of carts and artillery stopped increased. Numerous soldiers threw away their weapons and the discipline of the troops dissolved. However, not only the French army suffered from the winter, but also the Russian. The persecution of the Grande Army also forced the Russian soldiers to march day after day and they too often had to bivouac in the open air, although at least now and then they found shelter in villages. The number of exhausted left behind grew in both armies.
When Napoleon finally reached Smolensk and the warehouses there on November 9th, his army barely numbered more than 60,000 men, of which only about 40,000 were under arms, the rest were unarmed stragglers. Therefore the emperor tried to stay there over the winter, to reorganize his army and to call in fresh troops. In the meantime, however, not only Vitebsk and Polotsk were lost on the Daugava, but also Minsk (on November 16) with its large magazines. In addition, the main Russian army under Kutuzov marched past him south of Smolensk, thereby making arrangements to cut off all connections to the west of the grand army. As a result, Napoleon was again forced to withdraw. Since the Russian main army had already reached the great road at Krasnoi west of Smolensk, the French army had to fight their way there on November 16-18. After the heavy fighting between Smolensk and Krasnoi, the “Grande Army” was shaken to its core. Marshal Ney's 3rd Army Corps, which had been completely cut off at Krasnoi, had (practically) ceased to exist.
Shortly afterwards, on November 21, the French troops at Borisov also lost the bridges over the Berezina to Russian troops under Admiral Chichagov , who had advanced north from the Ukraine. Since the weather had become a little milder these days, the ice on the rivers had broken and could no longer be crossed, so that the Grande Army no longer had a direct connection to the west. Without the arrival of the army corps of Victor (9th), Oudinot (2) and Wrede - in place of the wounded Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr - (6th) and the previous crew, which at that time was still largely orderly and operational, between Smolensk and the Beresina von Mohilew (Dombrowski's division), Napoleon and the remnants of the Moscow army would not have been able to cross this river under the given circumstances.
Under the protection of the fresh troops who fought off the advancing Russian army, French pioneers built two bridges at Studjanka from November 26th over the approximately 100 meters wide, half-frozen Berezina, over which on November 27th / 28th. November the remnants of the grand army withdrew towards Vilna. When the last troops withdrew from the west bank on November 29 and the bridges went up in flames, there were still at least 10,000 stragglers and civilians on the east bank who fell into the hands of the Cossacks.
On the way between the Beresina crossing at Studjanka and the Russian border, the Grande Armée effectively dissolved. Their retreat finally turned into a disorderly escape. Even bandages that had been halfway intact up to this point joined this escape. It was accelerated by the fact that Napoleon left his army before arriving in Vilnius on December 5, in order to rush almost alone to Paris, where he intended to raise a new army. Shortly afterwards, the thermometer dropped below −20 ° C. The King of Naples (Murat), whom the Emperor had given supreme command of the Grande Army in his absence, was unable to hold Vilna, which was occupied by Russian troops on December 10th, despite fresh troops. On December 13th, the last French soldiers, led by Marshal Ney, finally reached the Nyemen again. The campaign of 1812 came to an end, the Grande Armée had effectively ceased to exist.
The Grande Armée of 1813
The term "Grande Army of 1813" is often used in French literature as an unofficial term for the army that Emperor Napoleon reorganized in 1813.
Spring 1813
On December 19, 1812, Napoleon, who had set out against Russia with a large army in the summer, returned to Paris alone. Of the more than 600,000 men with whom he set out on the campaign in June 1812, hardly more than 70,000 to 80,000 had returned from Russia by the beginning of January 1813. These were mainly troops who had been in the secondary theaters of war on the Daugava or the Bug or were only on the march to Russia (a total of around 50,000 to 55,000 men). Hardly 10,000 to 12,000 armed men from the main army had come back via the Berezina (plus at least about the same number of unarmed stragglers). Even the imperial guard, which had fought little and was always best looked after, numbered just 2,000 men after the conversion to Prussian territory.
Of the nearly 40,000 men of the 3rd Army Corps with whom Marshal Ney had crossed the Nyemen in the summer of 1812, only ten returned to this river with him. The rest were dead, in Russian captivity or scattered among the unarmed "stragglers". The Poles under Prince Poniatowski, still around 8,000 to 9,000 strong, withdrew to Krakow together with Schwarzenberg. There they were "neutralized" by Austria and were only able to rejoin the French army during the armistice in the summer of 1813. The French fortress garrisons in Prussia and Poland, which had been reinforced by parts of the army returning from Russia, were besieged by Russian and Prussian troops. In Danzig alone, 30,000 men were trapped under General Rapp.
Overall, the Grande Armée had lost around half a million people, almost 200,000 horses, over 1,000 artillery pieces and around 25,000 army carts between June 1812 and mid-January 1813. Shortly after his return, however, Napoleon set about raising an army again. On January 10, 1813, he enforced a Senate resolution that allowed him to raise another 350,000 young men. Even before that, in September 1812, he had obtained an early call-up from Moscow for the 1813 class. Most of the 137,000 recruits called up in autumn 1812 had undergone brief basic training at the beginning of 1813 and reached the depots (replacement troops) and were thus available for further use. He formed four new divisions from the remnants of the "Grande Army" that had sunk in Russia and ordered the soldiers who were not used and the stragglers who were reunited at assembly points back to France (around 20,000 men) to create a new army from them and the recruits from autumn 1812 to accomplish. To make up for the great shortage of officers, numerous corporals had to be appointed lieutenants .
At the same time he recalled his best troops from Spain (over 40,000 men), mostly cavalry, to use them as tribes for new cavalry regiments. Laws on the transfer of mounted police troops (gendarmerie and municipal guards) into the army served the same purpose. For the formation of new artillery he took permanent personnel from the navy and fortresses, and he turned excess naval artillerymen into infantrymen. That produced another 20,000 men. With such radical measures he eventually won over 100,000 experienced soldiers for the new army. Another Senate resolution turned the first line-up of the National Guard (78,000 men) into line troops. After the Prussian declaration of war on March 27, the Senate decided on April 3, 1813 that the class 1814 should be called up early and, in order to reduce the shortage of cavalry, the transfer of the "garde d'honneur à Cheval" to the army, and more 180,000 men resulted. Together with the troops still available in Germany (around 100,000 men) and the recruits from autumn 1812, Napoleon had more than 750,000 men at his disposal after a relatively short time to create a new "grand army".
At the beginning of 1813 there were around 20,000 men in the (replacement) depots in the states of the Rhine Confederation . After the debacle that had suffered the Grande Armée in Russia became known, their princes hesitated. Since there was also a lack of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, the formation of new armies was slow here. Only in the two states of the Rhine Confederation, which were (in fact) under French administration, the Grand Duchy of Berg and the Kingdom of Westphalia, was the formation of the army advanced with greater vigor. However, the administration of both states had to struggle more and more under the growing anti-French mood in Germany. Since Russian patrol corps repeatedly invaded the Kingdom of Westphalia in the spring, King Jerôme had to ask his brother to be allowed to keep some of his troops temporarily.
In the “ordre de bataille” of April 25, 1813, shortly before the start of the campaign in Saxony, the new army was divided into twelve army corps, the cavalry reserve and the imperial guard. The army corps were led by Davout (1st), Victor (2nd), Ney (3rd), Bertrand (4th), Lauriston (5th), Marmont (6th), Reynier (7th), MacDonald (11th) .) and Oudinot (12th), Marshal Mortier's guard and the two cavalry corps of La Tour-Maubourg (1st) and Sebastiani (2nd). A third cavalry corps under Arrighi was still formed in Metz, but was no longer used in the spring. Of the army corps, only the first two and the seventh and eleventh contained significant remnants of the army from 1812. The 7th Army Corps was supposed to be composed of the Saxon troops, but at the beginning of the campaign these were practically neutral, so General Reynier initially only the weak division Durutte (32nd Division) could dispose of (about 4,000 men). The Polish troops under Prince Poniatowski , planned by Napoleon as the 8th Army Corps, had been "neutralized" by Austria. The Bavarian contingent was planned as the 9th Army Corps, but the largest of the Rhine Confederation states delayed the re-formation of its army until it was finally dispatched by the looming French defeat in autumn 1813. To compensate for this, a weak Bavarian division under Raglovich (29th Division) was temporarily assigned to the 12th Army Corps. In order to compensate for the loss of the Bavarian contingent, Marshal Augereau was commissioned to assemble an "observation corps" near Würzburg, which was supposed to not only observe Austria, but also put Bavaria under pressure. The 10th Army Corps included the troops enclosed in Danzig under General Rapp .
Despite all efforts, the formation of the new guard was not yet fully completed at the beginning of May, so that Napoleon initially only had a very weak Old Guard division, consisting of survivors of the Russian campaign and a newly formed Young Guard division, a total of 12,000 men. When he finally took the initiative again at the end of April / beginning of May, an army of around 380,000 men was under his command on German soil together with the troops in northern Germany and the fortress garrisons (almost 80,000 men). At that time there was only an army of 180,000 men left on the Iberian Peninsula, which, having been "robbed" of its best troops, was hardly able to defend itself against the attacks of the British and Spanish armed forces. In the interior of France, however, there were still 220,000 men in training, so that when Napoleon started the wars of liberation with his offensive on the Saale at the end of April , he still had the prospect of being able to strengthen his army further in the next weeks and months.
After the armistice ended in August 1813
The armistice from June 2nd to August 10th separated the spring and autumn campaigns of 1813. After the conclusion of the armistice, Napoleon continued his efforts to reorganize his Grande Armée. Although the spring campaign lasted barely six weeks, the losses were particularly high among the young, mostly 18 to 20-year-old conscripts. Often half of them collapsed from exhaustion during the long, arduous marches. The inadequate diet, combined with the constant overexertion, led to a high mortality rate among the young men, who are often still growing. Even shortly before the end of the armistice, around 90,000 men were still on the army's sick list, many of whom were supposed to die of infectious diseases because of the catastrophic hygienic conditions in the auxiliary hospitals. Therefore, a considerable part of the replacement teams coming from France had to be used to compensate for the high losses, which were not so much due to the two big battles ( Großgörschen on May 2nd and Bautzen on May 20/21) as to the inadequate logistics and due to the French emperor's manner of waging war.
For this reason, Napoleon was again forced to have conscriptions approved by the Senate. On August 24, October 9, and November 15, he received permission to raise a total of 660,000 more men. In no other year, apart from 1793, had more people been called to arms in France than in 1813. Although the French press repeatedly branded the Treaty of Tauroggen and Prussia's declaration of war as “underhand betrayal” and thus initially also major national ones The heavy levies in France caused increasing unrest. As the conscription lists of 1813 show, no fewer than 160,000 young men had evaded conscription in the spring, even before the campaign began in Germany, by living with distant relatives under false names or by taking refuge in the woods. Overall, more than 20% of those called up in 1813 refused to flee the army. Therefore, in the summer of 1813, entire battalions of the army and national guard were only busy “hunting” for “refractaires” in the remote regions of the empire.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in the interior of France and the complaints of his marshals and generals because of the poor supply, Napoleon continued with the greatest vigor to rebuild his Grande Armée and summoned numerous newly formed associations and replacement units from France. The observation corps formed by Marshal Augereau near Würzburg, made up of six new divisions, was split up at the beginning of August. The larger part was assigned to the new 14th Army Corps under Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, while Augereau was to form another 9th Army Corps from the rest. The 1st Army Corps, enlarged by new divisions, was also divided. One part was sent to Saxony as the new 1st Army Corps under Vandamme, the rest remained as the 13th Army Corps under Davout in Northern Germany to take over the security of the Hanseatic cities and the mouth of the Elbe. During the armistice, the Polish troops remaining near Kraków under Prince Poniatowski rejoined the French army, as they formed the 8th Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps under General Kellermann with some additions.
After the French victories in May, Napoleon increased the pressure on the courts of the Princes of the Confederation of Rhine, so that they brought their contingents back to the established strength. The Saxon divisions rejoined the 7th Army Corps and the Bavarian contingent, although it had not yet completed its reorganization, took up position on the Inn under General Wrede in order to "observe" Austria, which at that time was still officially neutral. Württemberg again provided a whole division (38th Division), Baden, Hesse and Frankfurt together another (39th Division), and the contingents of the smaller princes were distributed over the entire army.
Together with the new formations, the Grande Armée comprised 14 army corps, five cavalry corps, the imperial guard and the artillery reserve, the pioneer park and the equipage park after the armistice expired on August 10. The army corps were led by Vandamme (1st), Victor (2nd), Ney (3rd), Bertrand (4th), Lauriston (5th), Marmont (6th), Reynier (7th), Poniatowski ( 8th), Augereau (9th), Rapp (10th), Macdonald (11th), Oudinot (12th), Davout (13th) and Gouvion St. Cyr (14th). The fourteen army corps had a strength of about 270,000 men, excluding the corps of Augereau, which was only used later. The guard had been brought back to 30,000 men, including the cavalry under Nansouty. In addition, there were four cavalry corps under La Tour-Maubourg (1st), Sebastiani (2nd), Arrighi (3) and Kellermann, Count von Valmy (4th), a total of around 25,000 men. The formation of a 5th Cavalry Corps was almost complete.
During the campaign, the King of Naples (Murat) was to take over the leadership of the cavalry reserve. The connection between the main army, which was under Napoleon east of Dresden (in Lusatia and Lower Silesia), and the troops under Davout in Hamburg was maintained by an "observation corps" under General Margaron near Leipzig and the "intermediate corps" under the governor of Magdeburg, Girard, between Wittenberg and Magdeburg. At the end of the armistice on August 10, the French field army in Germany had a total of 559 battalions, 295 Esquadrons and 1,284 artillery pieces and thus, including the reserve parks, a strength of around 450,000 soldiers. There are also 70,000 to 80,000 men as crews in the fortresses.
Despite the enormous tension of all forces, during the autumn campaign of 1813 the French armed forces were numerically weaker than their opponents, which at the beginning of the campaign had around 510,000 men for the first time since the beginning of the revolutionary wars. Due to the concentric formation of the Allies in three large armies, Napoleon was forced to divide the Grande Armée as well, so that he was on the defensive for the first time at the beginning of a campaign. The autumn campaign of 1813 finally culminated in the Battle of Leipzig , which ended with the decisive defeat of Napoleon. It was only with great difficulty that the French Emperor once again escaped the grasp of the united Allied forces. After a hasty retreat, he finally reached the Rhine near Mainz on November 2, 1813 with just 60,000 largely disbanded troops and thus had almost completely lost his Grande Armée within a year for the second time. The renewed defeat of the army not only resulted in the defection of the Rhine Confederation, but also brought the loss of control over Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
Spring 1814
On November 9, 1813, Napoleon returned to Paris for the second time in a year without an army. The campaigns in Germany in 1813 "cost" him and France 400,000 soldiers. The typhoid and other infectious diseases that were rampant in the hospitals on the Rhine and in eastern France called for further 80,000 in November and December. In some units, half the people died from the epidemic. Nevertheless, Napoleon set about reorganizing the army one more time. The leading politicians of the Allies gave him time to do this, since their only common ground was to push the French emperor back across the Rhine. After this was achieved, their various goals blocked the troops' further action. It was not until the turn of the year 1814 that the Allied troops hesitantly crossed the Rhine.
At the beginning of the autumn campaign in 1813, Napoleon still had a “Grande Armée”, which consisted of 14 army corps, the guard and four cavalry corps; a fifth cavalry corps had been added during the campaign. After the heavy losses in the Battle of Dennewitz , the 12th Army Corps (Oudinot) had to be disbanded. In December 1813 the 1st and 14th Army Corps were included in Dresden, the 10th Army Corps in Danzig and the 13th Army Corps in Hamburg. After the Battle of Leipzig, the (Polish) 8th Army Corps disbanded, as did the (Polish) 4th Cavalry Corps. The remaining eight army corps and the guards barely had the strength of a division. The four remaining cavalry corps hardly reached the strength of a regiment. Despite considerable additions from the recruit depots in December, the effective strength of the "Grande Armée" sank to barely 50,000 men capable of weapons by the turn of the year, as the large number of people leaving due to illness and death continued. Only then did the French army begin to recover.
After the disintegration of the Rhine Confederation, which had already started before the Battle of Leipzig, France lacked the German auxiliary troops. The troops in Spain (approx. 100,000 men) under Soult and Souchet had to defend themselves. The armed forces of Italy under the Viceroy had to defend themselves against the Austrians and the Neapolitans, since Napoleon's brother-in-law, the King of Naples (Murat), was only anxious to preserve his kingdom. The northern German departments - with the exception of Hamburg - were already lost. Holland was in an uproar and had already declared itself independent. So there was no support from there either. Napoleon could now only count on the support of France itself. The new levies demanded by the emperor in the senate - and also enforced - are no longer relevant here, since the war ended with the emperor's abdication in April before they took effect.
Napoleon's intention to rebuild the Grande Armée in eight army corps of three divisions each was no longer possible, not only because of a lack of time. Although there were still numerous recruits in the depots after the ruthless evictions in the summer and autumn of 1813, many of them were eighteen to nineteen year olds. However, there was now even a lack of weapons and clothing, as France was no longer supplied by the other countries. Therefore, only a part of the recruits in the depot battalions could be equipped for the time being.
When the fighting resumed with the invasion of the Allies in January 1814, the French army, which had not yet been fully reorganized, was provisionally divided into eight "army groups", which were usually named after the area in which they were located at the time, e.g. B. "Corps of the Vosges" or "Corps of the Rhone". The guard units and their supplements were collected in the "Corps de Morvan". The core of the groups, which were between about 10,000 and 20,000 men strong, mostly formed one of the eight "old" army corps to which some other troops had been added. Thus Napoleon temporarily had an army of around 115,000 men (20,000 of which belonged to the cavalry). By mid-March he expected a further 90,000 to 100,000 men from the depots and then, together with the troops recalled from Spain, could again have an army of 220,000 to 230,000 men.
The resumption of fighting in the east of France prevented a further reorganization of the remaining "Grande Armée". Despite all efforts, Napoleon's army grew weaker and weaker over the next three months. After the last division of the “Grande Armée” at the end of February / beginning of March 1814, the Imperial Guard under Marshal Mortier had been brought back to 28,000, but Napoleon's five army corps under Victor (2nd), Ney (3rd), Marmont ( 6th), Oudinot (7th), Macdonald (11th) did not even have divisions any more (54,000 men in total) despite the reinforcements from Spain, the cavalry corps still reached 15,000 men. The army under the direct command of the Emperor was hardly much stronger than 70,000 men. In the Netherlands, in the area around Antwerp , the 1st Army Corps under General Maison tried to keep (20,000 men) and in southern France Marshal Augereau was again building a new army (30,000-40,000 men). At that time, however, there were still 200,000 to 210,000 men in the fortresses in France, Germany, Holland and the Netherlands.
The conquest of Paris by the Allies finally brought the end of the war of liberation from 1813 to 1814. With the abdication of Emperor Napoleon on April 6, 1814 in Fontainebleau , the history of the “Grande Armée of 1812” also ended.
1815
On March 1, 1815, Napoleon returned to France from his exile on the island of Elba and took over the government in Paris again on March 20. On the way from the Mediterranean to Paris, it was above all the soldiers and the younger officers who joined Napoleon as one and who helped him to regain power. However, fear of Napoleon's rule was still so great in Europe that Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia renewed their alliance on March 25th. They promised each other to provide an army of 150,000 men and not to dismiss them before the danger, ie. H. Napoleon, had not been eliminated. Most of the European states soon joined the alliance of the four great powers.
When the inventory was taken shortly after the seizure of power, the French army was nominally 240,000 strong. Of these, however, around 40,000 men were on long-term leave and no fewer than 85,000 were "absent without leave" (i.e. they had deserted), so that in fact there were not even 120,000 men. In order to counter the external and internal threat to his reign, Napoleon now had to reorganize the army to which he owed his power. Since King Louis XVIII. only shortly beforehand had abolished the generally hated conscription, the emperor contented himself with calling up veteran soldiers again. On March 26th, he ordered eight provisional "observation corps" to be set up to monitor the borders, which were to be "expanded" into regular army corps as soon as possible. But instead of the hoped-for 250,000 former imperial soldiers, whose service term had actually not yet expired, barely 60,000 reported for duty again by June 15. Instead of the expected 100,000, only 25,000 of the soldiers who had passed regularly came back to the barracks. The attempt to set up “foreign regiments” (French: régiments d'étrangers ) made up of Poles, Swiss, former Rheinbündlers or Italians also failed.
When, to his disappointment, the large influx of volunteers failed to materialize, Napoleon looked for ways to indirectly reintroduce conscription. Since, according to the new constitution, evictions could not be carried out without the consent of the two chambers of parliament, he changed the law on the National Guard so that in future they also had to serve as garrisons for domestic fortresses. In this way he was able to transfer numerous regular soldiers into the field army. On April 10, he issued a decree stating that all French between the ages of 20 and 60 were to serve in the National Guard. This measure yielded - at least in theory - 2.25 million conscripts. 417 battalions were to be formed from the younger generation, which had to be called up immediately. Of the 410,000 young men who were called up on the basis of the decree within the next two months, around 200,000 could be enlisted in the National Guard, mostly to serve as garrisons for the border fortresses. In addition, five reserve divisions were formed from the “mobile” National Guard. As in the previous year, however, almost half of the conscripts withdrew from service (although there were large regional differences). However, some of the soldiers who joined the army were fanatical supporters of the emperor who fought for him to the end.
Therefore, on June 1st, shortly before the start of the campaign, the reorganization of the army was not completed. Instead of the 800,000 expected by Napoleon, only about 550,000 men were under arms that day. According to the strengthists, only 363,000 men belonged to the line troops, 112,000 men to the National Guard and about 45,000 men to the Navy and Coast Guard. Of the existing line troops, only 230,000 men could be used for the war; Around 150,000 men, poorly trained and equipped, were in the depots (i.e. with the replacement battalions). Most of the line regiments that were included in the army corps had only two battalions. Even clothing and equipment were not available for all soldiers in the field army. Above all, there was a lack of rifles in the depots, so that the emperor tried to buy firearms in Switzerland and even in England. The whole army also lacked suitable riding and draft horses, which were particularly difficult to obtain. Therefore, not only was there too little cavalry, but there was also a lack of draft horses for the artillery.
When Napoleon opened the campaign against the Allies in the Netherlands in mid-June 1815, the mobile troops of the French army were structured as follows: On the Spanish border stood as the "Pyrenees Army" (8th Army Corps) under Generals Clauzel and Decaën, in the Vendée the “Western Army” under Lamarque, in Provence the “Var Army” under Marshal Brune, on the Italian and Swiss borders the “Alpine Army” (7th Army Corps) under Marshal Suchet, at Belfort the “Jura Army” Army "under Lecourbe and in Alsace was the" Rhine Army "(5th Army Corps) under General Rapp. In total, these observation and cover armies comprised 85,000 men. There were still 20,000 men in the forts and hospitals.
The main army, with which Napoleon planned to forestall a possible attack by the armies of the Alliance from the Netherlands (Belgium), he had concentrated under the designation "Northern Army" (French "armée du nord") in northeastern France. On June 1, 1815 it was divided into the Guard under Marshal Mortier (21,000 men), the 1st Army Corps under Drouet d'Erlon (21,000), the 2nd Army Corps under Reille (25,000), the 3rd Army Corps under Vandamme (18,000 ), the 4th Army Corps under Gérard (15,000) and the 6th Army Corps under Lobau (11,000 men). The heavy cavalry was united in the cavalry reserve under Marshal Grouchy. It was composed of the 1st Cavalry Corps under Pajol, the 2nd Cavalry Corps under Exelmans, the 3rd Cavalry Corps under Kellermann (Count von Valmy) and the 4th Cavalry Corps under Milhaud; a total of around 13,600 riders. In addition, there were around 2500 pioneers and supply troops, etc. The total strength of the "Northern Army" with which Napoleon crossed the French border at Charleroy on June 15 without declaring war was around 124,000 men. With this surprising step he hoped to be able to individually defeat the Anglo-Dutch army under Wellington and the Prussian army under Blücher before they found time to unite. This plan was only partially realized. With the Battle of Ligny on June 16 and the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815, the history of the imperial French "Grande Army" ended.
See also
literature
- Georges Blond: La Grande Armée. Laffont, Paris 1979, ISBN 2-221-50078-4 .
- David Chandler: The Campaigns of Napoleon. 1966.
- Richard Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. Wiley, New York 1991, ISBN 0-471-54302-0 .
- Karl J. Mayer: Napoleon's soldiers. Everyday life in the Grande Armée. Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 2008, ISBN 978-3-89678-366-0 . (= Story told, vol. 12)
- Alain Pigeard: Dictionnaire de la Grande Armée. Tallandier, Paris 2002, ISBN 2-84734-009-2 .
Web links
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Individual evidence
- ^ Charles Rabou: La Grande Armée. 1865, T. I.
- ^ Order printed in full in: Liskenne, Sauvan: Bibliothèque Militaire. T. VII, 1853, p. 11 ff.
- ↑ The average age of the lieutenants was 37 years, that of the captains 39; many of the junior officers were even older than 50 years. The average age of the division generals was 37 years, that of the corps commanders, including the guards and the cavalry reserve, was only 35.5 years (if one ignores the 48-year-old Marshal Augereau).
- ↑ the data after Alombert et Colin: La campagne de 1805 en Allemagne. Tome 1, 1902, quoted in Krauss: 1805. The Ulm campaign. 1912, p. 47ff; also Derrécagaix: Les état-majors de Napoléon. 1909.
- ^ Krauss: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 45ff.
- ↑ French for rebellious or unruly; it was used to describe soldiers who tried to evade their service in the army, i.e. H. in this case also the deserters who were picked up.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T. 2, 1834, p. 361.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T.2, 1834, pp. 336ff.
- ↑ which is why a number of marshals also wrote their own instructions. James, in: Introduction to Marshall Ney. Military Studies, 1833; see. also Ortenburg: Weapons and the use of weapons in the age of the revolutionary wars. 1988, p. 124 ff .; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 147 ff .; also Decker: The tactics of the three weapons: infantry, cavalry and artillery. 1833, Part 1, p. 77 ff.
- ^ Schneidawind : The war in 1805. 1848, p. 29f.
- ↑ corresponds roughly to a battery in the Prussian-German army
- ^ Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's War. 2nd vol., 1845, p. 27.
- ↑ Duffy: The Battle of Austerlitz. 1977, p. 37.
- ↑ General Lossau calculates for 1805 an average daily march of 4 German miles, i.e. around 28 kilometers, even if the days of rest are observed. The marches were thus strong, but not excessive (Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's War. Part 2, 1845, p. 76.).
- ↑ "petit" (small) in contrast to the "parc de armée" in the army corps and the "grande parc de armée" next to the guard in the main army
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Armée. Part 1, 1865, p. 10 ff. (Ordre de bataille 1805)
- ^ Depesche Kaiser Napoleon to Major-General (Berthier), dated April 8, 1809, printed in Pelet: Feldzug in Deutschland 1809. (Campagne en Allemagne 1809), Vol. 2, 1824, pp. 294ff.
- ↑ The battalions, which were combined to form “brigades”, were not permanent units at this point in time, which is why they were almost always named after the respective commander; Krauss: 1805. The Ulm campaign. 1912, pp. 51f; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 419.
- ↑ French for "Springer", originally lightweight foot soldiers who rode as a "second man" on a horse in order to be able to be transported from one place to another faster
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. Part 2, 1834, p. 343.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. Part 2, 1834, p. 354.
- ^ Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. 1878, sv Garde, sv Garde du Corps, sv Garden Napoleon I .; Riistow, History of the Infantry, 1884, 2 vol., Passim
- ↑ this took over a considerable part of the "Gens d'armes de la prévôté de l'hôtel", which before the revolution belonged to the royal household troops (French: Maison militaire du roi de France ), which the Function of garden.
- ↑ the official founding day of the Guard des Consuls was the 7th Frimaire on VIII (November 28, 1799)
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, pp. 6, 39.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 43.
- ↑ The marines' guard battalion was not set up until 1803. The Guard was reorganized several times between 1799 and 1804. Since these changes do not belong to the Imperial Guard, they are not taken into account here.
- ↑ between 1800 and 1814 the individual conditions changed several times. The information is therefore not always valid and can only be used as a guide.
- ↑ from 5 '3 "(hussars) to 5' 5" (cuirassiers, artillery and infantry), (E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: Geschichte der Kaisergarde. 1848, p. 93).
- ↑ d. H. every guardsman accordingly had the rank of lieutenant in the line troops.
- ^ Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. 1878, sv Garden of Napoleon I.
- ^ According to the decree of September 17, 1805; the facility later served as a model for the “one-year volunteers” in the Prussian-German army.
- ^ Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. 1878, sv Garden of Napoleon I.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, pp. 197-201.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, pp. 199-203.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 86.
- ↑ North Africans, most of whom came to France with Napoleon from Egypt
- ↑ d. H. a battery of mounted artillery
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 130.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, pp. 147-149.
- ↑ Decree of March 2, 1805 (E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: Geschichte der Kaisergarde. 1848, p. 173)
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 220 ff.
- ^ E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 252 ff.
- ^ Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. 1878, sv Garde, sv Garde du Corps, sv Garden Napoleon I.
- ^ Krauss: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 59.
- ^ Höpfner: The war of 1806 and 1807. Part 1, 1850, p. 99ff.
- ^ Krauss: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 57; Pascal: Histoire de l'armée de tout les Régiments. Part 3, 1850, pp. 117f.
- ↑ Reitsenstein: history of military events in Belgium 1830-1832.. 1834, Appendix 13, The French Artillery System. P. 36.
- ↑ by shortening the gun barrels; this also reduced their range somewhat, but was of no practical importance when used as field artillery. The light “four” and the medium “eight pounder” should be abolished and replaced by a uniform “six pounder” (Reitzenstein: History of the military events in Belgium 1830–1832. 1834, Supplement 13, The French Artillery System. Pp. 37ff ; Burckhardt (ed.): Memories of Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa. 2nd vol., 1857, p. 158ff.)
- ↑ Reitsenstein: history of military events in Belgium from 1830 to 1832.. 1834, Appendix 13, The French Artillery System. P. 37f; F. Engels: Artillery. In: The New American Cyclopaedia. (1857) in MEW Vol. 14, 1972.
- ↑ Campana: L'Artillerie de Campagne 1792-1901. 1901, p. 28f; Breithaupt: The artillery. Handbook for officers of all branches of service. Vol. 1, 1831, pp. 14-20.
- ^ Kraus: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 57; Pascal: Histoire de l'armée de tout les Régiments. Part 3, 1850.
- ↑ (without naming the author): On the management and use of field artillery. 1851, p. 8.
- ↑ Graeffe: Combat theory of the artillery. 1824, p. 160ff.
- ↑ and from 1806 from the new "six pounders"; the names are derived from the weight of the cast iron bullets that fired the cannons
- ↑ "Twelve pounder cannons" based on the Gribeauval system: caliber 12.1 cm, barrel length 2.29 m, barrel weight 900 kg, bullet weight of the cast-iron bullets: 12 pounds (livres); Total weight of the gun 1700 kg, including the limber: 2100 kg. The information only applies to the "Canons de Campagne" (field cannons) and not to the much heavier ones, i. H. especially longer “twelve-pounder” siege cannons (after Picard et Jouan: L'Artillerie Française au XVIII Siècle. 1906, p. 101ff.).
- ↑ at a greater distance usually only "disruptive fire" was given to large groups of troops (Picard et Jouan: L'Artillerie Française au XVIII Siècle. 1906, pp. 145f.)
- ↑ The light "four-pounder cannons" based on the Gribeauval system weighed just under 600 kg. H. about a third of the "twelve pounders" (Picard et Jouan: L'Artillerie Française au XVIII Siècle. 1906, p. 101ff.)
- ↑ Campana: L'Artillerie de Campagne 1792-1901. 1901, p. 20.
- ^ Schneidawind: The War in 1805. 1848, p. 38.
- ↑ General Sénarmont's complete official report on the Battle of Friedland, printed in (anonymous) About the conduct and use of field artillery. 1851, p. 33ff.
- ↑ Breithaupt: The Artillery. Handbook for officers of all branches of service. Vol. 1, 1831, pp. 206ff.
- ↑ At the beginning there were so few horses that Marshal Davout even had to leave guns and ammunition wagons behind when he marched out. Krauss: 1805. The Ulm campaign. 1912, p. 18f.
- ↑ of which only 60 were left in December 1805; Great General Staff (ed.): Studies on the history of war. Vol. 3, 1903, p. 13 f.
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 147 ff.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. Part 1, 1834, pp. 438-454.
- ↑ Larrey first set up an "ambulance volante" during the campaign of 1792, but at first it was only a "personal facility" that he practiced on his own responsibility in his area (detailed in Larrey: Memoirs. (German translation) , Leipzig, 1813); Werner, Jean Dominique Larrey: A life picture from the history of surgery. 1885, p. 9f.
- ^ Isensee: History of medicine and its auxiliary sciences. 1844, p. 818.
- ↑ See illustration of the development of "war surgery", the field hospitals and the outpatient departments in Fischer: General textbook of war surgery. 1858, pp. 10ff, 194ff.
- ^ Isensee: History of medicine and its auxiliary sciences. 1844, p. 819.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. Part 1, 1834, pp. 438–454 (hospitals) supplemented by further information in Part 2 about the equipment of the various units with medical staff (passim); also Nouveau dictionnaire de médicine et chirurgie pratiques. Part 1, 1864, sv "Ambulance"
- ↑ Werner: Domenique-Jean Larrey. A picture of life. 1885, p. 29.
- ↑ "Prince Joachim" would be more correct, but the phrase "Prince Murat" is generally used in literature for the time before his appointment as "Grand Duke of Berg and Kleve" (1806). In 1805 Napoleon had appointed Murat imperial prince.
- ↑ according to the decrees of September 19, 1806 and January 31, 1809; when promoted to commandant, they also lost their position as orderly officer (E. Marco von Saint-Hilaire: Geschichte der Kaisergarde. 1848, pp. 156–159)
- ^ Krauss: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 64ff.
- ^ Krauss: 1805. The campaign of Ulm. 1912, p. 64ff.
- ^ Schneidawind: The War in 1805. 1848, p. 38.
- ↑ after Bernadotte was wounded in 1807: General Victor
- ^ The army corps was disbanded on February 21, 1807 (Liskenne and Sauvan, T. VII, p. 219)
- ↑ including an unmounted Dragons division ( division dragons à pied ); the division was to be equipped in Germany with captured and requisitioned horses
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Armée. Part 1, 1865, p. 17.
- ↑ Great General Staff (ed.): Studies on the history of war. Vol. 3, 1903, p. 14.
- ^ Conclusion of the alliance treaty with Bavaria on August 24, 1805, in which the elector undertook to provide France with 20,000 men in the event of war. Therefore, shortly after the war began, Bavarian troops sided with the French in the war
- ↑ to Liskenne u. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 17, Baden had 4000, Württemberg 7000 and Bavaria 26,000 men; In the list of the troops actually present in 1805, however, only around 28,000 men are listed (Liskenne and Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 95 ff.).
- ^ Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's War. Part 2, 1845, p. 23f.
- ^ Date of the order to Marmont: August 24; the departure of the troops from the Boulogne camp began on August 27th
- ↑ the first Russian troops under Kutusow (50,000 men) did not reach Braunau am Inn until October 20th
- ↑ Russia had promised an army of 150,000 men to directly support Austria, and another corps of 20,000 men was to land in Swedish-Western Pomerania (Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's War. Part 2, 1845, p. 33.)
- ↑ the current official name is Brno
- ^ Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's War. Part 2, 1845, p. 132.
- ↑ which would have lasted until December 15 (Treitschke: Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Vol. 1, 1909, pp. 224f.)
- ↑ as in the campaigns of 1796, 1797, 1798 and 1800.
- ^ The troops on the Italian peninsula are not included in the order of August 30, 1805; in some representations, however, the “Armée d'Italie” is referred to as “8. Army Corps ”
- ↑ Pascal: Histoire de l'Armée et tout les Régiments. T. III, 1850, p. 140.
- ^ Schneidawind: The war in 1805. 1848, p. 48f.
- ↑ Anonymous [Prince Pignatelli Strangoli?]: History of the Kingdom of Naples from 1800 to 1820. 1828, pp. 12ff, 22ff.
- ^ Secret alliance treaty between France and Prussia, signed on December 15, 1805 in Schönbrunn near Vienna (Braubach: From the French Revolution to the Congress of Vienna. (= Gebhardt: Deutsche Geschichte. Vol. 14), 1974, p. 77.)
- ^ Treitschke: German history in the 19th century. Vol. 1, 1909, pp. 226ff.
- ^ Official dissolution of the Reichstag in Regensburg on August 11, 1806.
- ^ Höpfner: The war of 1806 and 1807. Vol. 1, 1850, p. 191ff; the total strength of the French armed forces in the summer of 1806 is usually given as around 450,000 men (Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's Wars. Vol. 2, 1845, p. 213.)
- ^ Treitschke: German history in the 19th century. Vol. 1, 1909, p. 245.
- ↑ Liskenne: Bibliothèque Historique et Militaire. T. VII, 1853, p. 108; Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 1, 1902, pp. 273ff.
- ↑ Petre: The Conquest of Prussia 1806. 1901 (1907), p. 26ff; Krauss: Moltke, Benedek and Napoleon. 1901, pp. 29-34; Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 1, 1902, pp. 280ff.
- ↑ Anderson: The Campaign of Iena. 1913, p. 18; Prussia mobilized only 142,000 men of its army of more than 250,000 in its western parts of the country; a considerable part of its armed forces in the provinces of (East) Prussia, Warsaw and Silesia were not even mobilized at the beginning of the war, even though the Prussian headquarters expected more than 200,000 French, Bavarian and Württembergians in southern Germany as early as the beginning of September. In addition to these around 140,000 Prussian soldiers, Saxony then provided around 20,000 soldiers (with an army strength of around 50,000 men). (Höpfner: The War of 1806 and 1807. Vol. 1, 1850, pp. 112–127; Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's Wars. Vol. 2, 1845, pp. 213ff.).
- ↑ cf. Petre: The Conquest of Prussia 1806. 1901 (1907), pp. 27-32; (The facts themselves can also be found in the usual Prussian-German descriptions on this subject, but they are not so clearly stated there).
- ^ Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 1, 1902, p. 204; Höpfner: The war of 1806 and 1807. Vol. 1, 1850, pp. 222-265.
- ↑ this association was provisionally put together from parts of other army corps during the campaign in Austria in November 1805 (Großer Generalstab (Ed.): Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte. Vol. 3, 1903, p. 22.)
- ↑ Liskenne et al. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 219 ff.
- ^ Höpfner: The war of 1806 and 1807. Vol. 1, 1850, p. 206; Yorck von Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 1, 1902, p. 275.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Armée. T. I, 1865, p. 79.
- ^ Goltz: From Jena to Preussisch Eylau. 1907, p. 69.
- ↑ Liskenne et al. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 221 ff.
- ^ In his place, Marshal Masséna took over command of the 5th Army Corps
- ↑ Liskenne et al. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 228.
- ^ Pelet: Emperor Napoleon's campaign in Germany 1809. Vol. I, 1824, p. 32.
- ^ Title as a relative of the Bonaparte family (he was brother-in-law of King Joseph of Naples, or since autumn 1808: King of Spain); from June 1806 Bernadotte was also Duke (duc) de Ponte-Corvo in the Kingdom of Naples ( Dictionnaire des Maréchaux du Premier Empire. Paris 1986.)
- ^ Pelet: Emperor Napoleon's campaign in Germany 1809. Vol. I, 1824, p. 32.
- ↑ Liskenne et al. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 235.
- ^ Duke of Auerstädt, duc d'Auerstaedt (since July 2, 1808)
- ↑ cf. Fiedler: Armies of the modern age. Vol. III.2, Age of Revolutionary Wars. 1988, p. 83.
- ^ Pelet: Emperor Napoleon's campaign in Germany 1809. Vol. I, 1824, p. 30; some of the troops from the Rhine Confederation had to march to Spain.
- ↑ the princes had to provide these troops every time the French emperor waged war. Therefore, they can actually only be regarded as "allied troops" to a limited extent, especially since the French Emperor exercised full command over them after the troops were transferred and they thus became an integral part of the Imperial French Army. The expression "vassals", which was often used for this in the 19th century, is frowned upon today, however, as this word has now acquired a somewhat different meaning.
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 1, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1865), p. 155ff (VI.39ff)
- ^ Depesche Kaiser Napoleon to the Major-General (Berthier) of April 8, 1809, printed in Pelet: Kaiser Napoleons Feldzug in Deutschland 1809. Vol. 2, 1824, pp. 296ff.
- ^ Depesche Kaiser Napoleon to the Major-General (Berthier) of April 8, 1809, printed in Pelet: Kaiser Napoleons Feldzug in Deutschland 1809. Vol. 2, 1824, pp. 296ff.
- ↑ previously governor of Hanover and commander of the "Observation Corps of the Baltic Sea and the Hanseatic Cities"
- ↑ after the dispatch to Berthier (one of the divisions should be left behind)
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 1, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1865), p. 232.
- ^ Depesche Kaiser Napoleon to the Major-General (Berthier) of April 8, 1809, printed in Pelet: Kaiser Napoleons Feldzug in Deutschland 1809. Vol. 2, 1824, p. 296ff; KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 1, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1865), p. 233.
- ↑ In fact, Oudinot already led the 2nd Army Corps during the campaign in southern Germany in April 1809.
- ↑ After the conquest of Finland and the overthrow of the Swedish king, Russia had achieved in the north what it wanted according to the statements of Emperor Alexander. That is why there are fears in Paris that Russian ambitions for Poland will be reawakened. All the more so because it was convinced that the court of St. Petersburg was under the influence of London and made secret agreements with Prussia (Pelet: Kaiser Napoleons Feldzug in Deutschland 1809. Vol. I, 1824, p. 24-56; examples there Alison: History of Europe 1789–1815, vol. VII, 1839, pp. 217–240 shows that efforts by Great Britain, Austria and Prussia's Emperors Alexander to change their minds in Paris with increasing Similar fears can be found from the point of view of the French emperor in the Correspondance de Napoléon I, Tome XVIII (autumn 1808 to May 1809)).
- ↑ In a letter to King Friedrich August of Saxony on March 18, 1809, Napoleon promised that he would leave Prince Poniatowsky with all his troops "in Galicia" "to protect against Austrian attacks". After the dispatches to Berthier, he planned to concentrate the troops from Poland near Dresden by April 6 (Correspondance de Napoleon I, Tome XVIII).
- ↑ Premier Bulletin de l'Armée d'Allemagne of April 24, 1809 in Correspondance de Napoléon I , Tome XVIII; Welden: The 1809 war between Austria and France. 1872, p. 33.
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 1, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1865), p. 233; Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's wars. Vol. 3., 1843, pp. 8ff.
- ↑ primarily with the Bavarian divisions under Marshal Lefebvre and the Württemberg division under General Vandamme
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 2, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1864), p. 11 .; Yorck v. Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 2, 1902, p. 31.
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 2, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1864), p. 9ff.
- ↑ the 9th Army Corps also included the Saxon garrison of Danzig and von Glogau. Only a very weak mixed brigade remained in Saxony to cover the kingdom.
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 2, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1864), p. 11f.
- ^ Pelet: Emperor Napoleon's campaign in Germany 1809. Vol. 1, 1824, pp. 133ff.
- ^ Welden: The 1809 war between Austria and France. 1872, p. 310ff.
- ↑ The Vistula Legion, which was also in Spain at the beginning of 1809, was not part of the contingent of the Duchy of Warsaw, but an integral part of the Imperial French Army
- ^ Welden: The 1809 war between Austria and France. 1872, p. 314ff.
- ^ Welden: The 1809 war between Austria and France. 1872, p. 312.
- ↑ according to the detailed Austrian information; According to Pelet: Emperor Napoleon's campaign in Germany 1809. Vol. I, 1824, p. 129 there are said to have been 36,000 men
- ↑ to Delbrück, Schneidawind, etc. a.
- ↑ On the army of the duchy see Alois Veltzé: War Pictures from Poland, Styria and Hungary 1809. Vienna undated (1909) (= Emil von Woinowitch, kuk General of the Infantry, director of the kuk war archive, and kuk captain Alois Veltzé (ed. ): Individual representations of the war year 1809. Volume 11), pp. 7-10; Welden: The 1809 war between Austria and France. 1872, p. 314ff.
- ↑ According to the Russian-French alliance treaty, Russia was only obliged to provide support if France were to be attacked, which was the case after the Austrian declaration of war
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in southern Germany. Vol. 2, ÖMZ 1862/63 (1864), p. 10.
- ^ KK Generalstab (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in Italy. Vol. 2, 1908, pp. 31ff, 37.
- ↑ including the two "German" foreign regiments " Isenburg " and "La Tour d'Auvergne"
- ↑ K. k. General Staff (ed.): The campaign of 1809 in Italy. Vol. 2, 1908, p. 36.
- ↑ Liskenne et al. Sauvan: 1853. T. VII, p. 238 ff .; Rabou: La Grande Army. 1865, during the campaign of 1809 the imperial French army always referred to it as " l'armée française ", ie "the French army".
- ^ Correspondance de Napoléon I, 1867, T. XXIII, No. 18442; Dispatch N. to Berthier; the appointment took place on February 1, 1812 combined with the request that the army should be ready from February 15. In the previous letters, Berthier was always referred to as " major général de armée d'Espagne " (Chief of Staff of the Army of Spain).
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T II., 1865, p. 94; Yorck v. Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 2, 1902, p. 106.
- ^ Correspondance de Napoléon I, 1867, T. XXIII, 656; In his dispatches to “le Maréchal Davout, Prince d'Eckmühl” or to the Minister of War, General Clarke, Napoleon never spoke of a “grande armée” before February 1812. At that time the term was only used occasionally in connection with organizational issues.
- ↑ Great General Staff (ed.): Studies on the history of war. Vol. 3, 1903, p. 23.
- ↑ Strictly speaking, only honorary titles here for the two elite companies of the battalion, which also received higher wages
- ^ Ortenburg: Weapons and the use of weapons in the age of the revolutionary wars. 1988, p. 126 ff .; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 129 ff .; Decker: The tactics of the three weapons: infantry, cavalry and artillery. 1st part, 1833, p. 77 ff.
- ↑ d. H. in the case of the "light infantry", the "grenadiers" were referred to as "carabiniers" and the "fusiliers" as "chasseurs"; with this, however, these terms had finally lost their original meaning. Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 419.
- ↑ 24 officers and 26 NCOs and men; Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T. 2, 1834, p. 359.
- ↑ So even if a regiment only had four battalions at the time
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T. 2, 1834, p. 362.
- ↑ two to six battalions under the leadership of a brigadier general with a very small staff of a few adjutants
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 419 (see above the infantry division of 1805)
- ↑ Chambray: 1823. T.2, Tableaux II (p. 466); Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. 1, 1900 (Ordre de Bataille); Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988 (Ordre de Bataille of August 1812)
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T.2, 1834, p. 141.
- ↑ according to other information only 250,000 men, cf. Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, appendix.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T II, 1865, p. 97.
- ^ Pfister: From the camp of the Rhine Confederation. 1897, p. 18 ff.
- ↑ derived from Latin for "patron"
- ↑ according to Article XII of the Rhine Federation Act
- ↑ according to Article XXXVIII of the Rhine Confederation Act, for every war that France waged
- ^ Only the contingents, but not the rest of the troops in the country concerned
- ↑ Fieffe: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, p. 120.
- ^ Treaty printed in: Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 375 ff.
- ↑ according to Article 18 of the contract; however, he should prefer Swiss officers. The subaltern officers were to be removed from the contingent; the emperor had to confirm it.
- ↑ Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. I 1900 (Ordre de Bataille); Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 468.
- ↑ Fieffe: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, pp. 120 ff, 126 ff.
- ↑ Fieffe: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, pp. 40 ff, 130 ff.
- ↑ Fieffe: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, p. 134 ff., Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T. 2, 1834, p. 360; Foord: Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812. 1915, p. 7; Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 209; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 47, even gives 60,000 men.
- ↑ according to the decree of May 8, 1808, Fieffé: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, p. 141 ff .; Foundation of the Joseph Napoleon Regiment on February 13, 1809, Fieffé, ibid., 145 ff and 55 ff (Mameluken)
- ↑ Hence the official title of Emperor Napoleon "l'empereur et roi" (French for emperor and king)
- ↑ Jochim Murat, since the "transfer" of King Joseph to Spain nominally "sovereign King of Naples", tried to evade the convocation by referring to the affairs of state in his kingdom , but Napoleon briefly pointed out that he was a French general be (Anonymous [Prince Pignatelli Strangoli?]: History of the Kingdom of Naples from 1800 to 1820. 1828, p. 104.)
- ↑ The Grand Duchy originally had to provide 7,000 men, after the cession to France in 1810 the contingent was reduced to 5,000
- ↑ Weimar, Gotha, Meiningen, Hildburghausen, Coburg-Saalfeld
- ^ Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 403.
- ↑ Article 38, sentence 1 [contingents of France, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Baden, Berg, Darmstadt] ... Sentence 2: Your Highnesses the Duke and Prince of Nassau, along with the other allied princes, make up a contingent of 4,000 men.
- ↑ The contingent was almost entirely in Spain from 1809 to 1812 and therefore only a small part of the grand army
- ^ Pfister: From the camp of the Rhine Confederation. 1897, p. 9 f .; Fiedler: Armies of the modern age. 1988, p. 112 ff.
- ^ Fiedler: Armies of the modern age. Vol. III.2, Age of Revolutionary Wars. 1988, p. 114.
- ↑ the Kingdom of Württemberg , for example, had 13,541 men; moreover 867 men had to be replaced because the French doubted their "field suitability"; Pfister: From the camp of the Rhine Confederation. 1897, p. 20 ff.
- ↑ The Hessian troops, which were initially transferred to the garrison of Danzig, only joined the Grande Army in the interior of Russia and were soon assigned to the Young Guard there
- ↑ Chambray: 1823. T.2, Tableaux II (p. 466); Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. 1, 1900, (Ordre de Bataille); Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, Appendix II and Appendix III (orders of Battle 1810–1812.)
- ↑ According to the contract, the contingent should consist of at least 14,000 infantry, 4,000 horsemen (cavalry) and 2,000 artillery and park columns (i.e. trains, engineers, etc.); Seydlitz: Diary of the royal Prussian army corps in the campaign of 1812. Vol. 1, 1823, p. 241.
- ↑ Berlin alone, which was on one of the main roads, had to provide quarters for 240,000 military personnel and 130,000 horses of the "Grande Army" (for one night) between March 29 and September 1, 1812 (Beitzke: History of the Russian War in 1812 . 1862, p. 35.)
- ↑ Beitzke: History of the Russian War in 1812. 1862, p. 25.
- ↑ divided into three infantry divisions (Bianchi, Siegenthal, Trautenberg) and one cavalry division (Frimont)
- ↑ Beitzke: History of the Russian War in 1812. 1862, p. 24; Welden: The Austrian campaign against Russia in 1812. 1870, pp. 2, 5 ff.
- ↑ Helfert: Kaiser Franz and the Wars of Liberation. 1867, p. 19.
- ↑ today's IJsselmeer
- ^ Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 373 ff.
- ↑ Prince Poniatowski became French Reichsmarschall (maréchal d'empire) in 1813
- ↑ The most important exceptions to this rule were the Prussian division, which by virtue of an alliance treaty assumed an intermediate position between a contingent and an allied force, and the Polish units. The latter partly because the Polish soldiers were trusted more than the Germans, but partly because there were only a few French who spoke good Polish.
- ↑ Chambray: 1823. T.2, Tableaux II (p. 466); Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. 1, 1900 (Ordre de Bataille); Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988 (Ordre de Bataille of August 1812)
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1988, p. 81.
- ↑ The two individual cavalry brigades of the 7th and 8th Army Corps are, as usual, counted together as one cavalry division
- ^ E. Marco de St.-Hilaire: History of the Imperial Guard. 1848, p. 296f.
- ↑ D. h. Troops directly assigned to headquarters but not assigned to a specific army corps. Some of the parks, especially the artillery park, were constantly assigned to certain army corps during the campaign, which is why they are counted among these army corps in some depictions, while in other books they are counted among the army troops. The different approaches can lead to different strengths in summarizing tables. This is partly due to the fact that in the artillery company only the guns were united, while the covering and the train belonged to other units. For a detailed presentation, reference can only be made to the special literature. Cf. Sicard: Histoire des Institutiones Militaires des Françaises. 1834.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T I. 1865, p. 96; Chambray: 1823. T.2, Tableaux II (p. 466). The compilation of the Marquis de Chambray based on files and dispatches later became widely accepted in the specialist literature. You will be recognized by the in-depth research conducted under Emperor Napoleon III. and that of the later French General Staff confirmed as reliable (cf. G. Fabry: Campagne de Russie 1812. 1900). The figures are only valid for mid-June 1812.
- ^ Gieße: Kassel - Moscow - Küstrin 1812-1813. 1912, p. 40 ff .; Röder von Diersburg: Memories of the Count of Hochberg (Margrave Wilhelm of Baden). 1864, p. 43.
- ↑ approx. 3000 men (bakers, butchers, saddlers, blacksmiths, tailors, shoemakers, armourers, wagons etc.)
- ↑ including what is now Belarus at that time. The Lithuanians and Poles from Russian-Lithuania formed five infantry regiments, one light infantry regiment and four cavalry regiments, which counted in line with the Polish regiments; Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, pp. 55 ff, 209 ff.
- ↑ Liebert: The armaments of Napoleon for the campaign of 1812. Supplement to the Mil.W.Bl. 1888; Gieße: Kassel - Moscow - Küstrin 1812–1813. 1912, p. 40 ff.
- ^ The 26th Division (Daendels) with troops from the Berg and Baden was still part of the garrison of Danzig on June 24th (Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. 1, 1900, annexe p. 86, Daendels à Berthier)
- ↑ Fabry: Campagne de Russie. T. 1, 1900, p. 102, Napoleon à Berthier; The divisions were only assigned their final numbers on that day: 30th to 34th division
- ↑ French for rebellious or unruly; at that time soldiers were called who tried to evade their service in the army.
- ↑ Rabou speaks in his great history of the Grande Army of about 40,000. Rabou: La Grande Army. T. II, 1865, p. 96.
- ^ Fiedler: Armies of the modern age. Vol. III.2, Age of Revolutionary Wars. 1988, p. 90.
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 468 (Appendix VIII)
- ↑ This is also one of the reasons why the calculation of the total losses of the Grande Army in 1812 is so problematic.
- ↑ however, taking into account the Austrian auxiliary corps; without this there were only around 640,000 to 650,000 men. Cf. on this Chambray: 1823. T.2, Tableaux II.
- ↑ In order to be able to look up the named places in the usual representations and maps of the campaign of 1812, the place names used at that time were retained here. It should be noted that some places in Lithuania had up to five different spellings, some of which may differ from the current official names or have been renamed in the meantime.
- ^ Nafziger: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. 1988, p. 38 ff .; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, pp. 142, 146 ff.
- ↑ not uniformly structured transport units with quite different transport capacities, with up to 252 horse-drawn vehicles; four of the battalions were drawn by oxen
- ↑ including the horses for the private wagons that supplied the army
- ^ Wolzog: Memoirs of the Prussian. General Wolzog . 1851, p. 62 f .; Conaro: Strategic considerations on the war in 1812. 1870, p. 4 f.
- ^ Yorck v. Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 2, 1902, p. 326 ff .; Conaro: Strategic considerations on the war in 1812. 1870, p. 26 ff.
- ↑ Conaro: Strategic Considerations about the war in 1812. 1870, p 29 ff .; Clausewitz: The 1812 campaign in Russia. (Edition of 1912), p. 52 ff.
- ^ Clausewitz: The campaign in Russia in 1812. 1912, p. 61.
- ^ Delbrück: History of the art of war. Vol. IV, 1920, p. 510 ff .; Lossau: Characteristics of Napoleon's wars. Vol. 3, 1843, p. 234.
- ↑ Conaro: Strategic Considerations about the war in 1812. 1870, p 5 f .; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 198 ff.
- ↑ with a similar maneuver, the emperor had initiated the battles near Ulm in 1805 and Jena and Auerstädt in 1806
- ↑ Krasny (Smolensk Oblast)
- ↑ Also called "Battle of Lubina" in Russian representations, for details on the battle see Eugen von Württemberg: Memoirs. Vol. 2, 1862, p. 23 ff.
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 204; see. Ségur: Napoleon and the Great Army in Russia. 1965, p. 68 ff; Metternich later reported that when he declared his war plan in Dresden on May 17th, Emperor Napoleon declared that he did not want to go beyond the Daugava and spend the winter in Wilna (Helfert: Kaiser Franz und die Befreiungskriege. 1867, p. 28f.)
- ↑ 10th Army Corps (Macdonald) off Riga, 2nd (Oudinot) and 6th (Gouvion St. Cyr) Army Corps on the Daugava, 7th (Reynier) and Austrian Army Corps (Prince Schwarzenberg) in Volhynia, 17th Division (Dombrowski) on the Dnieper (from the 5th Army Corps), 9th Army Corps (Victor) in Lithuania, 11th Army Corps (Augereau) still in Prussia
- ↑ This happened with the exception of the 4th and 5th Army Corps, which marched parallel to the main road a few kilometers laterally to protect their flanks.
- ↑ cf. Bogdanowitsch: History of the campaign in 1812. Vol. 2, 1862, p. 12 ff.
- ^ Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 239 ff
- ↑ Bogdanowitsch: History of the campaign in 1812. Vol. 2, 1862, p. 161 ff .; Conaro: Strategic considerations on the war in 1812. 1870, p. 62 ff .; Yorck v. Wartenburg: Napoleon as a General. Vol. 2, 1902, p. 157; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 245 ff.
- ^ Ségur: Napoleon and the Great Army in Russia. 1965, p. 227 ff.
- ↑ the war on the Daugava, in Volhynia and on the Dnieper was not interrupted
- ^ Eugen von Württemberg: Memoirs. Vol. 2, 1862, p. 196; Ségur: Napoleon and the Great Army in Russia. 1965, p. 241; Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 321 (the information mostly fluctuates between 100,000 and 110,000 men)
- ↑ See: Belloc: The Campaign of 1812 and the Retreat of Moscow. 1915, p. 178 ff .; Clausewitz: The 1812 campaign in Russia. 1912, p. 69.
- ^ Belloc: The Campaign of 1812 and the Retreat of Moscow. 1915, p. 186 ff .; Pfuel: The withdrawal of the French from Russia. 1862, p. 14 ff.
- ↑ Conaro: Strategic Considerations about the war in 1812. 1870, p 88; There are, however, deviating information on the figures in the literature, since the number of stragglers can naturally only be estimated.
- ↑ Bogdanowitsch: History of the campaign in 1812. Vol. 3, 1862, p. 101 ff .; Conaro: Strategic considerations on the war in 1812, 1870, p. 88 ff .; Pfuel: The withdrawal of the French from Russia. 1862, p. 20 ff.
- ↑ Since these troops had to endure heavy fighting in the last few days, their strength can no longer be specified exactly, it is usually given between 30,000 and 40,000; see. Riehn: 1812. Napoleon's Russian Campaign. 1991, p. 372 ff.
- ↑ Bogdanowitsch: History of the campaign in 1812. Vol. 3, 1862, p. 266 ff .; Lindenau: Emperor Napoleon's Beresina crossing. 1896, p. 34 ff.
- ↑ C. Rousset: La Grande Army en 1813. (1871): complete overview of the new installations in 1813.
- ↑ In addition, there are the Prussian and Austrian troops (approx. 40,000 men), which in fact changed sides at the beginning of 1813, so that they can be counted as losses for Napoleon.
- ^ Caemmerer: The Wars of Liberation 1813–1815. 1907, p. 5; a total of 30,000 to 40,000 men came from the Beresina to Germany, both armed men in the column and unarmed stragglers. Because of the subsequent complete collapse of the French Empire, there is little reliable material on this point, so these figures are based on various estimates by those involved.
- ↑ Including the Hessian Infantry Brigade, which was originally part of the Div. Daendels had been (Röder: The campaign of Emperor Napoleon against Russia 1812. 1846, p. 530).
- ^ Petre: Napoleons last Campaign in Germany 1813. 1912, p. 6.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 47.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 165.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T. II, 1865, p. 228 f.
- ^ C. Rousset: La Grande Army en 1813. 1871; Petre: Napoleon's last Campaign in Germany 1813. 1912, p. 9.
- ^ Petre: Napoleons last Campaign in Germany 1813. 1912, p. 13; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 165.
- ^ Sicard: Histoire des institutions militaires des Français. T. 2, 1834, p. 365.
- ↑ The mounted honor guards consisted of young men of the "better classes" (nobility and bourgeoisie) who had to provide all their equipment and horses themselves; Like the National Guard, according to the law they were only allowed to be deployed inside the country. They were all taken over into the Guard.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 170.
- ↑ Charras: History of the War of 1813 in Germany. 1867, p. 420.
- ↑ Pascal: Histoire de l'Armée et tous les Régiments. T. III, 1850, p. 375 f.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 175.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 177.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 2, 1913, p. 29.
- ↑ At that time the young republic called 1.1 million men to arms; Pascal: Histoire de l'Armée et tous les Régiments. T. III, 1856, p. 456.
- ^ Bader: Napoleon in the year 1813. 1839, p. 51; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 1, 1913, p. 171.
- ↑ without the Raklovich Division, which remained with the 12th Army Corps
- ^ Plotho: The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814. Vol. 2, 1817, supplement XII.
- ↑ a b the son of Marshal Kellermann
- ↑ Fieffe: Histoire de Troupes étrangères en service au France. T. II, 1854, p. 313.
- ^ Caemmerer: The Wars of Liberation 1813–1815. 1907, p. 36; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 2, 1913, p. 31; Petre: Napoleons last Campaign in Germany 1813. 1912, p. 170.
- ^ Caemmerer: The Wars of Liberation 1813–1815. 1907, p. 40.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 2, 1913, p. 391.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 3, 1913, p. 23.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 3, 1913, p. 31 f.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 3, 1913, p. 27.
- ^ Petre: Napoleon at bay 1814. 1914, p. 1 f.
- ^ Houssaye: Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814. 1914, p. 6 ff.
- ↑ Houssaye: Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814. 1914, pp. 10 ff, 37 ff.
- ↑ Morvan is the old landscape name of today's Saône-et-Loire , Côte-d'Or and Nièvre departments
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 3, 1913, p. 39 ff.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 3, 1913, p. 41 ff.
- ^ Plotho: The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814. Bd. III, 1817, supplement XIII.
- ↑ Belgium did not yet exist in 1814; today's Belgium was then called "Netherlands"
- ^ Plotho: The war in Germany and France in the years 1813 and 1814. Bd. III, 1817, supplement XIII.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, p. 51.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T. II, 1865, p. 316; Liskenne et al. Sauvan: Bibliothèque Militaire. T. VII, 1853, p. 770 ff.
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, p. 68.
- ↑ the attempt to set up five alien regiments from Poles, Italians, Dutch (Belgians), Swiss and Germans only yielded between 300 and 800 men, i.e. H. not even a battalion, Houssaye: 1815. 1905, p. 12 ff .; Lettow-Vorbeck: History of the Wars of Liberation. Napoleon's fall 1815. Vol. 1, 1904, p. 104; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, p. 69.
- ↑ Rabou: La Grande Army. T. II, 1865, p. 316.
- ↑ from younger years, which were practically brought up to the level of line troops and deployed
- ^ Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, pp. 70 ff.
- ^ Lettow-Vorbeck: History of the Wars of Liberation. Napoleon's fall in 1815. Vol. 1, 1904, Appendix III; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, p. 72 ff.
- ↑ Shortly before the beginning of the campaign, Mortier reported sick, so that the position was vacant during the campaign.
- ^ Lettow-Vorbeck: History of the Wars of Liberation. Napoleon's fall in 1815. Vol. 1, 1904, Appendix III; Houssaye: 1815. 1905, p. 24 ff .; Friedrich: The Wars of Liberation 1813-1815. Vol. 4, 1913, pp. 73 f. - since a few insignificant additions were made to this army before the battle of Ligny on June 16, the literature occasionally also contains slightly higher numbers (up to 128,000).