Company Citadel

Company Citadel

Part of: Second World War

date	July 5-16, 1943
place	Kursk arch
output	Defensive success of the Red Army: termination of the German attack and initiation of a counter-offensive.
consequences	Final transfer of the initiative from the Wehrmacht to the Red Army

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union	German Empire
Commander
Konstantin Rokossowski , Iwan Konew , Nikolai Watutin	Erich von Manstein , Walter Model , Hermann Hoth , Günther von Kluge , Werner Kempf
Troop strength
1,910,361 soldiers, 4,938 tanks and assault guns, 3,648 aircraft, approx.31,415 guns	778,907 soldiers, 2,465 operational tanks and assault guns, 1,372 operational aircraft, approx. 7,417 guns
losses
177,847 men 1,614 –1,956 tanks and StuG 459–1,961 aircraft 3,929 guns Total battle by August 23: 863,000 men 6,064-7,000 tanks 3,000 aircraft	54,182 men 252 –323 tanks and StuG total, 1,612 damaged 159 aircraft ~ 500 guns Total battle by August 23: 203,000 men 1,200 tanks 650 aircraft

Company Citadel (Russian name: Курская битва 'Battle of Kursk' ) was the German code name for the attack on the Soviet front arc around the Russian city ​​of Kursk during the Second World War in the summer of 1943. The company is considered the last major German offensive in the war against the Soviet Union and took place from July 5 to 16, 1943.

It is also known as the Battle of Kursk , the Tank Battle of Kursk or the Battle of the Kursk Arch . On the Soviet side, the following operations were also summarized under this name, which were more long-term and on a larger scale than the German offensive efforts ( Oryoler and the Belgorod-Kharkov operation ). It was the greatest land battle and one of the greatest air battles in history . As part of the “Citadel Enterprise”, a tank battle took place near the village of Prokhorovka , which is considered the largest in history.

Location and planning

Military situation in spring 1943

The turn of the year and spring 1943 on the German Eastern Front were marked by the heavy defeat of Stalingrad and the subsequent victory of Kharkov . Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht was already on the defensive. Its almost 160, sometimes very weakened, divisions faced almost 400 Red Army units on the 2500-kilometer front after the winter fighting had come to a standstill . There was a risk of losing the initiative and thus the danger of getting into an attrition battle with the personnel and material superior Red Army, which had suffered losses of around 11 million men in the previous years of the war, but was nonetheless steadily growing in strength.

Fig. 1, front line April – July 1943 . The Soviet promontory around the city of Kursk can be clearly seen.
 It was created after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad and the German reconquest of Kharkov. After this limited victory of the Wehrmacht, the front froze and the Red Army concentrated strong forces in the "Kursk Arc".

The Soviet Union had mobilized all the forces in the previous two years of the war after the initial setbacks. The whole country worked - centrally managed - for the front. Almost all industry had been converted to the war economy . The armaments factories that were successfully evacuated to the hinterland in the first months of the war also produced a steadily increasing number of tanks , aircraft and artillery . In addition, there were significant arms and equipment deliveries by the United States and Great Britain under the Lending and Lease Act . From the spring of 1943, the USA in particular had completed important routes such as the one via Iran , and large quantities of goods could be delivered. The direct weapons were less important than secondary goods such as trucks, high-octane aircraft fuel and food.

In contrast to Germany, the Soviet Union had large reserves of raw materials, including important raw materials such as manganese and chrome ores, which were required for the production of high-strength steels, and the Soviet Union had virtually inexhaustible oil sources. While on the German side the supply had to be ensured with horse-drawn carts, as once under Napoleon, the Red Army was increasingly better motorized with trucks and had enough fuel to operate them.

In addition, despite the previous enormous losses, there were millions of potential recruits of conscription age available. It was only a question of time when the resources, which are greater than those of Germany, and above all the ever-growing war industry, would tip the balance in favor of the Soviet Union.

As material strength grew, so too had the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces on the battlefield, particularly with regard to strategic operations. Powerful armored and air armies were created, which at that time were still well-equipped and experienced armed forces. The quality of the management staff had increased significantly. The bloody prewar purges in the officer corps of the Red Army were partly responsible for the devastating defeats at the beginning of the war, but had cleared the way for a younger generation brought up as a communist. In the higher management levels in particular, officers and generals were deployed who were on average almost twenty years younger than their German counterparts. They had learned their craft in practice, using the example of successful Wehrmacht operations. Now they are increasingly relying on active, dynamic warfare and extensive deception of the enemy. In addition, the practice of uncoordinated frontal attacks , which was common in many places in 1941/42 and which had led to enormous losses for the Red Army, was finally abandoned .

The German high command of the Wehrmacht largely misunderstood this dramatic development; First and foremost Hitler , who saw himself strengthened in the assessment of his own possibilities by the previous success of the SS divisions in the reconquest of Kharkov and still underestimated the enemy. Although some voices advocated a wait-and-see attitude and the preparation of a counter-offensive against a major attack by the Red Army that would sooner or later inevitably take place, the supporters of a German summer offensive of their own finally prevailed. Hitler in particular, who urgently needed a convincing victory in view of the political and military developments, supported an aggressive approach. He said several times that in view of the impending developments in other theaters of war he had no time to wait for Stalin .

An obvious target of a limited German summer offensive was the "Kursker Bogen". This was a frontal projection of the Red Army, which had arisen from the fighting in early 1943 and reached deep into the German lines (see also the course of the front).

The aim of the company Citadel was therefore to encircle the strong Soviet forces that were in this large area in a quick pincer movement . This would have taken the strength of a major offensive from the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the aim was to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front if possible. Therefore, although the company was an offensive, it was used for its own defense and should prevent the Soviet Union from advancing. The Red Army was to suffer such great losses that at least no major attacks on the German front were to be expected in the following months. The German high command also hoped to be able to free at least ten armored units by shortening the front . These troops were to be deployed in other theaters of war, especially against the impending invasion of Italy and Western Europe. This was the first time that a real strategic reserve should be created. The aim of the Wehrmacht leadership was now to resist the Allies so successfully that they would be ready for a peace that would leave at least part of the previously conquered areas with Germany. The battle was also a matter of prestige. It was supposed to demonstrate the ability of the German army to force a great victory. Hitler wrote in the operational order for the battle:

“The best units, the best weapons, the best leaders, large quantities of ammunition are to be used at the focal points. Every leader, every man must be imbued with the vital importance of this attack. The Kursk victory must act like a beacon to the world. "

The aim was also to arrest soldiers and civilians for use as slave labor .

German offensive plan

Fig. 2, The German plan of attack

The plan of operations was based on an idea of ​​the commander of Army Group South , Field Marshal Erich von Manstein , which he had developed immediately after the successful operation to retake Kharkov, and was worked out by the Army High Command under the direction of Chief of Staff Kurt Zeitzler . The plan was given the code name "Operation Citadel" and was laid down in the OKH's orders No. 5 of March 13, 1943 and No. 6 of April 15, 1943.

The "Kursk Arch" in the front line had an approximate side length of 200 kilometers and a depth of up to 150 kilometers. The plan provided for an offensive on both sides at the foot of the arch that would cut off all the Soviet troops assembled in the promontory from their main front. The operational target was the city of Kursk , in which the two attack peaks met on 5./6. Day of the offensive should hit. After the breakthrough, the encircled Soviet troops and their reserves - a total of eight to ten armies - were to be destroyed in the second phase . The plan was conventional, aimed at bringing about a classic cauldron battle and thus corresponded to the approach known under the synonym " Blitzkrieg " in the past. A moment of surprise could therefore hardly be expected. Success was to be enforced primarily through the concentrated use of armored troops and new weapon systems in both directions.

For the company was in the north near the Army Group Center under Field Marshal Günther von Kluge , the 9th Army (General Walter Model ) with 22  divisions , including eight armored and mechanized infantry divisions provided. The Army Group South under von Manstein concentrated the 4th Panzer Army and an Army Division (" Kempf ") with a total of 19 divisions in the southern section , including nine Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. The 4th Panzer Army under Hermann Hoth included the II. SS Panzer Corps under Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser with the three Panzer Grenadier divisions " Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler ", " Das Reich " and " Totenkopf ". The also provided air fleets 4  and  6 , which were to work closely with the ground forces, were reinforced by air forces from other front sections. Almost 2,000 aircraft, including improved He 111 ( bomber ), Focke-Wulf Fw 190 ( fighter / fighter-bomber ) and Hs 129 ( ground attack aircraft ) types , were intended to support the attack by the ground forces.

In spite of this enormous concentration of troops, the plan suffered from a crucial flaw that had already led to the failure of the large-scale offensives of 1942 in the Caucasus and Stalingrad : it simply lacked the resources and resources necessary to implement it successfully. In particular, there was a lack of troops that, according to Operation Order No. 6 of April 15, 1943, were to be brought in to cover the flanks of the attack wedges. The defensive battle on the sides of the attacking units following the advance, according to the planning, was therefore out of the question, so that these troops would have to devote themselves to this task instead of the essential advance. As a result, these decisive forces had to lose their clout and get into attrition, which ultimately actually led to the failure of the company.

Some of those responsible in the high command and at the front were aware of this discrepancy between plan and reality. Some were convinced that the time window for the success of the company, which had already been postponed several times, had already closed in the face of the enemy who had grown stronger and who waited for the attack in well-developed and deeply tiered defense systems, but were able to oppose the supporters and especially Hitler as Commander in chief of the Wehrmacht did not enforce. Hitler saw the tank weapon as a decisive factor on the battlefield. He therefore expected that success would be achieved in any case through the massive use of the new tank models. The basis for this was the Adolf Hitler tank program that he had issued in January 1943.

Suspected information leaks

According to some sources, the attack plans of the company were prematurely known to the Soviets through the spy Werther from the ranks of the OKW . It is believed that the reports from the OKW reached Moscow via Switzerland through Rudolf Rößler . Who was actually hiding behind the code name Werther remains unclear to this day, there is speculation about an anti-Nazi officer group in the Fuehrer's headquarters , etc. a. Wilhelm Scheidt , employee of the special commissioner for military historiography at the Fuehrer's headquarters, and Walter Scherff . In his book Die Augen Moskaus, Bernd Ruland suspects the employees of the Wehrmacht's telegraph headquarters in Berlin and the British secret service by deciphering the Enigma encryption . Information about John Cairncross from Bletchley Park, England, was also supplied to the Soviet Union. Alfred Jodl , the head of the Wehrmacht command staff at the time, testified at the Nuremberg trial that the news got to Moscow faster than it was on his desk.

delay

Opponents and supporters

General Guderian on the flight to the Eastern Front, 1943

Generals after a meeting on June 21, 1943, field marshal General Erich von Manstein in front left

In the original order of operations for the Citadel , the earliest and at the same time ideal attack date was mentioned as May 3rd. A start as early as April was not seriously considered from the outset due to the spring mud period ( Rasputiza ), in which all operations on the eastern front on the impassable roads and paths were impossible. During the inability to move due to the weather, which lasted longer than expected in the spring of 1943, resistance to the original plan of operations developed. In particular, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian , as inspector of the armored troops, commissioner for the introduction of the new tank models into the troops, and von Manstein later claimed opposition in their memoirs: It was recognized that the time was working against the German troops. It is unclear to what extent this information applies, which primarily blames Hitler for the ultimate defeat and exculpates the generals with a few exceptions .

The main author of the plan of operations, Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler , Chief of Staff of the Army, relied on Hitler's support to silence the increasing number of critics. Hitler himself seemed to have swayed after Model showed him aerial photographs showing that the Soviet side was expecting a German attack in exactly this form, setting up extensive defensive positions and concentrating strong forces. The date of May 3 was postponed on April 29 by Hitler's instructions, as the tank equipment seemed insufficient to him. A quick penetration through the position system as a prerequisite for a later boiler formation appeared questionable to him. To clarify the questions that arose, Hitler called a meeting on May 4, 1943 in Munich.

The plan's critics pointed to the enemy’s defensive efforts being far too advanced. In view of the preparations that had not yet been completed at this point in time, an offensive in this form had little chance of success. Zeitzler, supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Kluge , was of the opinion that the Soviet defense could ultimately not withstand the new tanks that were to form the tips of the attack wedges. In return, Guderian and the Armaments Minister Albert Speer , who was also present, apparently tried to clarify the real situation: In addition to the difficulties in production and the insufficient technical reliability of the new models, there was the time necessary to convert the troops, which not only included the new technology, but also had to master changed operational principles. Since his return to active service in early 1943, Guderian had been involved in the restructuring and partial rebuilding of the German armored forces. This was in a bad state due to the losses at the front, but above all due to poor management in development, the conflict of competence between the armed forces and an ineffective operational doctrine. According to his later presentation, the troops were practically unable to carry out major attack operations in the spring. The renovation had only just started at the end of April 1943. Regardless of the accelerated restructuring of the core units, the Wehrmacht was not yet ready to carry out far-reaching attack operations again after the heavy fighting at the beginning of May. This fact was already due to the stop of the fighting after the successful reconquest of Kharkov , in which the SS Panzer Grenadier Division LSSAH lost almost half of its combat strength in heavy street fighting. Guderian took the position that it would make more sense to use the new tanks in the upcoming clashes on the Western Front, or at least to concentrate the limited forces only in one place for a breakthrough on Kursk, than to use them in a frontal attack on the Soviet defense, which is precisely that Procedure expected to be wasted.

Zeitzler and von Kluge opposed this view and apparently speculated in their argument on Hitler's enthusiasm for technology. Von Kluge in particular downplayed the production difficulties and emphasized the advantages of the new tanks that would arise on the battlefield. Guderian, who had long had a personal dislike for von Kluge, was vigorously opposed. The tensions between the two opponents even escalated in a duel demand made by Kluge against Guderian, in which he asked Hitler to serve him as a second. Those present only managed to calm the two opponents with difficulty.

As is often the case, Hitler initially stayed out of the disputes and took no sides. Although he understood the objections and took the production difficulties for granted, given the anticipated benefits of a successful operation, he was unwilling to cancel Citadel or determine a definitive start until a sufficient number of the new tanks were available. The plan remained in effect. Operational preparations, troop concentrations and the supply of new weapons continued over the next few weeks. June 12th was named as the new date.

Influence of the strategic location and the fight against partisans in the Oryol region

After the fall of Tunisia to Allied troops and the complete loss of Army Group Africa - a military catastrophe that was numerically comparable to that of Stalingrad - Hitler postponed or even postponed on May 13 in view of the now real threat to German-occupied Greece Italy's Allied landing operation launched the Citadel at the end of June. Hitler first wanted to be certain whether fascist Italy would continue the war after losing its North African colonies and in the face of a real threat, before approving a massive deployment of troops on the Eastern Front.

The development in North Africa was not the only factor, however: The main decisive factors were the massive logistical difficulties in the area of ​​Army Group Center, which were caused by extensive partisan activities in the area around Oryol , as well as further demands for reinforcements. In particular, the commander of the 9th Army and commander of the northern attack wing Walter Model excelled in this regard. Although Model repeatedly spoke out in favor of Citadel to Hitler , this behavior was often interpreted in retrospect as an indication of hidden opposition.

The partisan units operating in the dense forests east of the Desna River and in the rear area behind the 9th Army and 2nd Panzer Army were centrally led by the Soviet high command and supported massively from the air with weapons, equipment and personnel. According to current estimates, they comprised more than 100,000 men in the spring. Their attacks and sabotages had reached such proportions that the already inadequate railway capacities were further restricted. The railway lines Brjansk-Konotop and Brjansk-Shirekina and all roads south of Brjansk had to be completely closed to traffic at times. This even affected the main road from Bryansk to Oryol, which could only be used in closed convoys. This posed a real risk to the implementation of the citadel , for which not only connecting roads on the north-south axis had to be expanded, but even the bridge system had to be expanded in order to transport the new heavy Ferdinand tank destroyers to the front. In May, the Germans started large-scale operations lasting several weeks against the partisans. Several front units intended for the citadel - including the 4th Panzer Division, a particularly powerful unit - were involved. These units later needed time for repatriation and refreshment after the completion of the largely unsuccessful operation under the code name Company Gypsy Baron . The 9th Army finally gave the 19th of July as the earliest possible time for the start of the offensive.

The Army Group South was also being refreshed and restructured, so that its readiness to attack in June had to appear questionable.

Recent evidence (see, especially Roman Töppel ) suggest that mainly the strategic location, the real difficulties of the frontline troops, and especially the logistical problems in the preparation and not the later much criticized Wait Hitler to new tank models, the delay of Citadel caused . However, the last postponement took place at the end of June, in order to equip the Panzer Grenadier Division Greater Germany with a larger contingent of Panthers .

Comparison of armies

Participating associations of the Wehrmacht

Red Army units involved

Citadel company: Strength information from David M. Glantz and Karl-Heinz Frieser

citadel	soldiers			tank			artillery
	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship
Frieser	1,426,352	518.271	2.8: 1	4,938	2,465	2: 1	31,415	7,417	4: 1
Glantz	1,910,361	780,900	2.5: 1	5,128	2,928	1.7: 1
↑ Frieser uses daily strength of the fighting troops ↑ Frieser only counts ready-to-use tanks ↑ Frieser only counts ready-to-use tanks. Töppel counts 570 tank destroyers (including Marder II ) and 260 self-propelled artillery guns (including Sturmpanzer IV ) and has 3,150 tanks. ↑ Glantz uses food strength

The Wehrmacht had three armies and a large part of the tanks stationed on the Eastern Front available for the attack. The 9th Army under Model had 335,000 men (including 223,000 fighting troops), the 4th Panzer Army under Hoth had 223,907 men (including 149,271 fighting troops) and the Kempf Army Division had around 100,000 men (including 66,000 fighting troops). Altogether there were 778,907 men, of which 518,271 belonged to the fighting troops.

The Red Army had two fronts (comparable to German army groups) in position for defense and another behind as a reserve. The central front under Konstantin Rokossowski had 711,575 men (of which 510,983 fighting troops), Watutin's Voronezh Front had 625,591 men (of which 446,236 fighting troops) and the steppe front under Ivan Konev had 573,195 men (of which 449,133 fighting troops). These three fronts together had 1,910,361 men, 1,426,352 of whom belonged to the fighting troops.

Battle of Kursk: strengths information from David M. Glantz and Karl Heinz Frieser

Kursk	soldiers			tank			artillery
	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship	Soviet	German	relationship
Frieser	1,987,463	625.271	3.2: 1	8,200	2,699	3: 1	47,416	9,467	5: 1
Glantz	2,500,000	940.900	2.7: 1	7,360	3,253	2.3: 1
↑ Frieser uses daily strength of the fighting troops ↑ Frieser only counts ready-to-use tanks ↑ Glantz uses food strength. ↑ Glantz does not count reinforcements

At the beginning of the Soviet counterattack in the Oryol area, the German 2nd Panzer Army was attacked from two other fronts. The Bryansk - and West Front increased the man strength of the Red Army to 2,629,458. With the now four armies, the Wehrmacht units had a total of around 950,000 men in the Kursk area.

Wehrmacht tanks

The Citadel Company marked a turning point in terms of the technical superiority of Soviet tank models. With the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht realized that they had underestimated the Red Army. The newer Soviet tank models were far superior to the German ones at the time. The new T-34 with its modern inclined armor was almost indestructible for the German tanks of the time and most of the anti-tank guns. This technical dominance of the Soviet models persisted for a long time. While the leadership of the Red Army had hardly any new tanks developed in the following period, the Wehrmacht, on the other hand, attached great importance to the development of new tank models and the improvement of existing ones, and so the failure of the Soviet leadership to further develop its armored weapons led to Citadel during the enterprise a strong technical superiority of the German tank units. This was particularly evident in duel situations and subsequently led to increased Soviet research in the area of ​​their armored weapons. According to Steven Zaloga , the Soviet leadership froze the further development of the T-34 at the end of 1941 and decided not to build new tank models in order not to reduce production output.

Panzer III / Panzer IV - the standard tanks

Panzer III in action, photo taken by the propaganda company on June 21, 1943

At the beginning of the offensive near Kursk, the German armored divisions were still equipped with the Panzerkampfwagen IV as standard. However, only a few of these vehicles were the improved F2 model with the 75 mm L / 43 tank cannon, which was effective enough to destroy the standard Soviet model T-34/76 and the heavy KW-1 at greater distances. For the most part, the F1 version, armed with the 75 mm stub KwK, was used, which was almost ineffective against the new Soviet tanks.

The Panzerkampfwagen III with its 50 mm L / 60 cannon was also used in large numbers . Despite constant improvements since the beginning of the war, this tank was still inferior to the Soviet T-34.

Panzer V Panther

Loading of Panzer V "Panther" for transport to the Eastern Front

Developed in response to the T-34, the medium tank V (Panther) was a good synthesis of armament, armor and mobility. The 80 mm thick front armor, inclined at 55 degrees, offered good protection. The Soviet standard T-34 medium tank, for example, was unable to penetrate the Panther's frontal armor. The panthers of the type "D", which were hastily brought to the attack units, were maneuverable and equipped with powerful radio equipment, but easily caught fire. All 200 Panthers were combined in the two divisions of Panzer Brigade 10, which was subordinate to the Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany" . According to Guderian (Memories of a soldier) but the biggest problem was the high stress sides countershaft (reduction gear behind the drive wheels forward), which as a simple spur gear were carried out. How immature the new tanks were became apparent even before the actual battle began, when 45 Panthers were canceled due to technical problems on their march into the staging area. In battle, panthers were constantly falling out, even without enemy influence, and had to be dragged into workshops. So it came about that almost the entire time of the battle never more than 40 of these tanks were in use at the same time. Panzerbrigade 10 was the association with the highest number of lost tanks on the German side. Despite its lack of reliability, the Panzer V showed its potential and, according to German reports, was responsible for 267 enemy tanks destroyed. After the initial problems were resolved, this tank became one of the, if not the, best tanks of World War II.

Panzer VI Tiger

Ammunition of a Panzer VI "Tiger"

The Pz-VI (Tiger) , which was designed as a heavy (around 55 tons) breakthrough tank , had an 88 mm tank cannon ( KwK  36), which in the summer of 1943 could effectively fight all enemy tanks at great distances (penetration: 90 mm to 2300 m). In addition, there was strong frontal armor, which at that time, regardless of the classic, right-angled construction, could hardly be penetrated. The side and rear armor could only be penetrated from a very short distance.

In addition, there was a psychological effect on opposing troops, which led to a strong focus on this type of tank in many subsequent reports on the Citadel Company . In the Soviet memoir literature, Tiger tanks are always mentioned in this context - obviously the improved Pz-IV was also identified as a Tiger due to its similar silhouette. One of the reasons for this was probably the large chain guard ( apron ) attached to the side of the latest Pz-IV models (Ausf. G / H ). If you read Soviet battle reports, the battlefield in front of Kursk was teeming with tigers and panthers. In fact, in the south the Panzer Grenadier Division “Greater Germany” and the three divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps had only one Tiger company each with 13 to 15 tanks. In addition there was the heavy Army Panzer Division 503 with 45 tigers. On the north side only two Tiger companies were available in the heavy Army Division 505. In total, only 146 Tigers were used in the context of the Citadel , around 5% of the German armored forces. The few tigers were continuously deployed in the main attack areas to force a breakthrough and to ward off counterattacks, almost always at the tip of the armored wedges , and proved to be particularly powerful. Once isolated, however, a tiger could hardly do anything on its own against the overwhelming odds of Soviet infantry and T-34s.

More German tanks

In addition to Panther and Tiger, 90 heavy tank destroyers " Elefant / Ferdinand ", some Sturmpanzer IV ("Brummbär"), Sturmgeschütz III and tank destroyers of the " Hornisse " model were used in small numbers in the independent departments of the 9th Army. The 653rd  and 654th heavy tank destroyer divisions each received 45 copies of the "Ferdinand". This tank destroyer was created as an emergency solution on the chassis of the Porsche design of the Tiger. It had enormous armor and was almost impossible to destroy by enemy tanks or PaK . This increased armor led to a stately weight of 65 tons. However, the lack of a machine gun made this cumbersome tank destroyer very vulnerable to enemy infantry. Furthermore, the improvised tank suffered from its lack of mobility and suffered many temporary failures due to its complicated drive. In the tank battle, however, the "Ferdinand" was extremely effective. It was equipped with the long 8.8 cm KwK 43 , the same cannon that was used in the later Tiger II . This cannon was 1.5 meters longer than that of the "Tiger" and could destroy enemy T-34s up to 3.6 km away. The two departments reported around 500 enemy tanks destroyed.

In addition, there were a few Panzer II in the tank units' holdings, which were now used as reconnaissance tanks .

Soviet tank models

T-34 - standard tank of the Red Army

T-34 shot down during the Battle of Prokhorovka

In the summer of 1943, the vast majority of the Soviet armored forces were equipped with the T-34 , which was built in huge numbers. The T-34/76 was a successful combination of armor, mobility and armament. At the beginning of the war it had shown itself to be superior to the German battle tanks, but had lost this superiority in the summer of 1943 to the improved Pz-IV with its 75-mm cannon and the new Panther and Tiger. Decisive disadvantages at this time were the double workload of the commander, who also acted as a gunner, and the lack of radio equipment that was standard equipment on German tanks. This reduced the operational effectiveness.

More Red Army tanks and armament

The light T-70, which was also available in larger numbers, was intended to support the infantry and could not compete with the current German models.

The heavy Soviet tank KW-1 had strong armor, but was now outdated by the developments in tank technology. In particular, it was too slow and could therefore easily be outmaneuvered and shot at its sides. The English Churchills or the American Shermans and Lees , which were used by the Soviet troops as a consequence of the Allied arms deliveries, also showed themselves to be inferior to the German models in direct combat.

Only a few copies of the KW-2 were left, which were made available at strategically important points. In contrast, the heavy Jagd- / Assurmpanzer gained in importance: The 30 t heavy SU-122 (122 mm cannon) and the 45 t heavy SU-152 were used for the first time in smaller numbers, especially since the latter, also Sweroboj ("Bestiendrescher") called, could put even the strongest German tanks out of action with its 152 mm cannon.

The Soviet PTAB bombs used for the first time were a novelty in the war . These cluster bombs with a shaped charge were dropped by attack aircraft Il-2 and were able to cover a large area with massively small but lethal projectiles for tanks. The German side had to react by loosening their tank formations.

The La-5FN fighter and the 57-mm anti-tank gun M1941 (SiS-2) were also used for the first time. This had been taken out of production in 1941, as the weaker 76 mm Sis-3 division cannon was sufficient for fighting tanks, and was now being produced again against the stronger German tanks.

Combat tactics

However, the purely technical advantages and disadvantages of the designs on both sides were by no means decisive. Much more important were the experience and good teamwork between the tank crews and their operational management.

Unlike in the past, the Soviet troops benefited from the experience they had gained over two years of war and, after the successes of the last few months, they also had the hope of being able to defeat the previously invincible enemy. In addition, by dispensing with rigid defense, Soviet units were able to compensate for the lack of training and experience compared to the German units, which were superior in mobile warfare. In later war reports on the German side, the great bravery and unbelievable willingness to make sacrifices of the Soviet tank crews - even in the face of an impending defeat - are very often emphasized. The psychological component, which in the past was responsible for the success of the "Blitzkrieg" breakthrough tactics and the regular collapse of the resistance of overrun and encircled units, was almost devalued by the time the Citadel began .

Planning and goals of the Soviet side

The front arc around Kursk had just as much escaped the Soviet leadership as the Germans. Intensive use of aerial reconnaissance and the deployment of agents in the German deployment area soon revealed the enemy's intentions.

As early as March 1943, the Stawka , the Soviet high command under the direct leadership of Stalin , laid down the basic intention. After that, the defense of the Kursk front projection had the goal of significantly weakening the opponent's attacking forces, which were still assessed as enormously strong, in order to then add the main forces of the defending Central and Voronezh fronts , which were to be reinforced by fresh reserves, to the main German group destroy. The key to this goal should be a deep defense system and the concentration of strong mobile reserves in the hinterland.

In order to ward off the German offensive, the civilian population and pioneers were initially massively involved in securing the particularly threatened areas with a deeply staggered positioning system with a total of 5,000 kilometers of trenches, countless bunkers and fire positions and laying half a million landmines . Up to 2,500 mines were laid per front kilometer. Due to the rapidly growing vegetation, especially extensive sunflower and corn fields, the mines were barely visible in summer when the attack began.

The Central and Voronezh Fronts were brought to full strength in a very short time and preferably equipped with new weapon systems, in particular with anti-tank equipment and pioneer material. At the same time, large mobile reserves were created behind the static defense system, which was up to 30 kilometers deep, primarily from newly established or expanded tank units, which were intended to intercept possible breakthroughs by German troops. According to the latest investigations, the two Soviet fronts "Voronezh" and "Central" had around 1.336 million soldiers, 3,444 tanks and around 19,000 artillery pieces at the beginning of the battle.

In addition, extensive reserves were concentrated in the rear of the Kursk bridgehead. With the formation of the new steppe front under Marshal Ivan Konev , a strategic reserve was available which, after the expected wear and tear of the opponent's forces in defense, was to go over to a counterattack. These forces included the 5th Guards Tank Army, one of the five tank armies newly created in the spring of 1943. The commander was Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrow , who played a key role in the conception and restructuring of the Soviet armored troops into strategic operational and offensive units.

Knowledge of the attack plan was a decisive advantage. To this day it is unclear whether this advantage was provided by classic reconnaissance in the enemy hinterland, by a Soviet spy ring in Switzerland or by the British secret service, which deciphered the code key of an army version of the German Enigma radio cipher machine has been. Presumably there were several sources, whereby the inadequate German secrecy, which was trying to concentrate the enemy in the "Kursk Bogen" in order to destroy as many troops as possible in the planned Kesselschlacht, played its part.

In contrast to the German offensive plan, which provided for a concentration of forces in the attack sections, but could not ensure the important defense in the sections next to the attack wedges in practice and had no real operational reserves, the Soviet side relied on the quantitative in its planning Superiority with strong reserves. Vigorous efforts have been made to improve the quality of the troops, especially the leadership of the lower levels. The multiple postponement of the start of the "Citadel" company resulted in significant improvements in this area. In addition to the pure quantity, the focus was also on the quality of weapons and equipment. For example, the troops were increasingly equipped with radios , which were standard equipment on every German tank. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the battle, there was still a clear quality difference to the German offensive forces, especially to the elite divisions of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS deployed in the south. The inferiority of the T-34/76 compared to almost all German models, especially the upgraded Panzer IV and the new Panther and Tiger, led to sometimes desperate and extreme operational principles in the course of the fighting. The tanks were forced to be buried as stationary fire points and thus robbed of their strongest ability, mobility, or were supposed to try to bridge the distance to the enemy with his far-reaching and powerful weapons and to get into his vulnerable flank at maximum speed. In contrast to the former, the latter tactic had only limited prospects of success, as leadership and coordination were lost due to the massive deployment and the lack of communication between the tanks. Nonetheless, it was an attempt, born out of the awareness of inferiority, to compensate for the weakness identified by sacrifice in connection with numerical superiority.

With the improvement of military capabilities, great efforts were made in preparation for the attack to provide ideological training and increase the motivation and morale of the defending troops. In particular, attempts were made to convey to every officer and soldier the importance of the coming battle and his very personal commitment to the outcome of the war and to strengthen patriotic feelings. Soviet publications in particular repeatedly emphasize the importance of this factor for subsequent success. What is undisputed: When the German attack began, it met a highly motivated opponent.

The decisive difference to the German goals is made clear by the strategic structure of the Stawka plans: the military plans of the Soviet side were much more far-reaching. In contrast to the "Citadel" operational plan, the interception of the German attack in the "Kursk Arch" was only intended to be the prelude to the extensive strategic summer operation of the Soviet army, which intended the subsequent liberation of large areas in the north and south of the promontory and the advance over the Dnepr .

In summary, however, it can be said that the Soviet plan, which intended the extensive annihilation of German forces, overestimated its own possibilities, especially in the qualitative area. The German plan of attack therefore had the prospect of local success, but even with benevolent consideration could not undo the final transfer of the strategic initiative to the Soviet army on the entire eastern front.

course

German and Soviet troops in the Kursk Arch

On the morning of July 5, 1943 at 1:20 a.m., the Red Army began an extensive artillery bombardment of the presumed staging area of ​​the German troops. A pioneer of the 6th Infantry Division had been captured clearing a mine lane and had given the time of attack as 2:00 a.m. during interrogation. In fact, the attack began at 3:30 a.m., so the troops were not yet in their staging rooms. From this fact and the fact that the artillery strike is hardly or only incidentally mentioned in the war diaries, more recent studies draw the conclusion that the artillery strike remained largely ineffective and thus contradict the view of a sometimes even decisive effect in the Soviet and in some cases also in Western literature of artillery strike. On the south side, for example, the destruction of a bridge delayed the attack of the III. Panzer Corps.

Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft during the Battle of Kursk

The Soviet air force attacked a few minutes before the scheduled start of the German planes whose airfields with all tangible bombers and fighter planes. Since the Soviet planes were located by a long-range Freya radar device , the German Air Force was able to react in good time. In contrast to the plan, the German fighters were able to take off before the bombers. There was a huge air battle. Around 120 Soviet planes were shot down.

However, there were no significant failures on the German side during the two Soviet preventive strikes on the morning of July 5.

On July 5, German troops shot down 425 enemy aircraft in the combat area. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, only lost 36 machines. The last time the German air force was able to gain control of the air was during the Second World War at the Citadel.

North side

The attack of the 9th Army under Colonel General Model on the up to 30 kilometers deep staggered defense of the Central Front under Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski began at 3:30 a.m. The XXXXVI., XXXXVII. and XXXXI. Panzer corps started to break through. Engineers, infantry and artillery tried to cut a breach in the defense, into which the tanks would then advance. From the start, the attack met unexpectedly tough and dogged resistance and unprecedented artillery fire. On the north side, the Soviet central front took the risk of losing huge stocks of ammunition in the event of a breakthrough and stored up to 5 combat sets right next to the guns. A combat kit for an army weighed 20,000 tons. According to Soviet information, there has never been such a high use of ammunition in the history of the war as the 13th Army, which fired 4 combat sets.

Tiger tanks in combat

Dense clouds and rain impede the troops' ability to move

Vehicle type Tracked tractors East during the advance

On the evening of July 5, the German attack spikes broke into the first line of defense over a width of 15 kilometers and up to eight kilometers. Both sides recorded heavy losses. Rokossowski immediately decided to launch a massive counterattack, which took place on the morning of July 6th in the interaction of artillery, air forces and ground troops against the German XXXXVI. Panzer Corps began and showed initial success. Model in turn deployed the 2nd  and 9th Panzer Divisions and the 505 Heavy Panzer Division , which resulted in a concentration of more than 1000 tanks on the German side in the area between Ponyri and Soborowka. Nevertheless, the German attack only progressed at walking pace, as Rokossovsky, whose forces were now in danger of falling behind, also threw further reserves into the battle.

When the fighting came to a provisional end on the evening of July 6th, both sides prepared their action for the next day. Rokossovsky ordered his forces to go over to the defense. He also ordered a large part of the tanks to be buried and used as fixed fire points after two tank brigades had lost the mass of their tanks in a very short time during the heavy fighting with tigers of heavy tank division 505. In the meantime he added more reserves and strengthened his lines. Model's staff was surprised by the slow progress and resistance of the Soviet troops. It was therefore decided already now to strengthen the combat formations of the first strike with forces that were actually intended for the phase after the planned breakthrough in the direction of Kursk. In addition to the 18th Panzer Division and the 4th Panzer Division , which were already concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front, marching orders were issued to the 12th Panzer Division , the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 36th Motorized Division, which were located in the area south of Oryol. Despite the experiences of the first two days of the attack, the High Command of the 9th Army hoped to be able to penetrate the second line of defense held by the Soviet 13th Army on July 7th. He missed the continuing concentration of forces of the Red Army on this section of the front, which wanted to prevent a breakthrough at any cost.

Soviet infantry with Maxim machine gun

On the morning of July 7th, the XXXXI's massed attack began. and XXXXVII. Panzer Corps. More than 400 tanks and four infantry divisions advanced along the railway line between Ponyri and Olchowatka. The target of the attack was the Ponyri train station, a crucial transport hub in the region for both sides. The attack met tough resistance and was again only progressing gradually. The German troops, slowly groping their way through the staggered minefields, often remained in the multiple overlapping fields of fire of Soviet anti-tank troops and in heavy artillery fire in front of the second line of defense of the central front. In the afternoon the attackers approached Ponyri from three sides, but could not yet break the resistance of the defenders on the outskirts. Both sides now brought in further reinforcements. After heavy fighting and heavy losses, German troops controlled half of Ponyri. Within the town - in retrospect of witnesses has been referred to as the "Stalingrad" of Kursk - developed hard and dogged struggle for every house, every wall and every ditch. Despite heavy losses, neither side thought of a retreat.

Model's main focus was Olchowatka. The higher area offered favorable terrain for the superior German tanks. The conquest should enable the final breakthrough in the direction of Kursk and the planned unification with the forces attacking on the southern flank of Mansteins . The XXXXVII. Panzer Corps with the 2nd  and 20th Panzer Divisions in the lead advanced in this direction. Rokossowski had recognized this approach and strengthened his forces on this section, among other things, with two further tank corps of the 2nd Panzer Army, which now carried out counterattacks. After fierce fighting, countless attacks and counter-attacks, the German attack got stuck. Even the use of the 505 heavy tank division did not bring the hoped-for success.

On the evening of July 7th, the German attackers had gained space with heavy losses, but were again unable to achieve a breakthrough. What is more, the divisions that had advanced found themselves exposed to constant counterattacks, with the Soviet artillery massively concentrated behind the defenders causing constant losses. Above all, unlike on the first two days of the offensive, there was a lack of air superiority, which was lost to the Red Army in the course of July 7th. The 9th Army recorded 10,000 sorties in the first three days. The fighting troops only reached 5000 replacement men. The replacement situation for the destroyed and failed tanks looked similarly bad.

Regardless of this, the leadership of the 9th Army planned another attack for July 8th and brought in further reserves. Three infantry divisions and 400 tanks were concentrated west of Ponyri. The Soviet side also regrouped their forces and reinforced their positions with additional reserves.

The morning of July 8th began with massive artillery preparation and the targeted use of dive bombers against Soviet artillery positions. However, these efforts met with little success against the well-buried Soviet defenders. The German tanks advancing immediately afterwards met again with fierce resistance. Despite the regained air dominance, the attackers achieved no significant success. Often hours of loss-making battles raged over individual terrain points, which changed hands several times. A small success for the Germans was looming at Teploe. After heavy fighting and attacks with waves of 60 to 80 tanks, the tank divisions captured the city. However, the Soviet central front immediately closed the looming gap in the front. Violent infantry fighting raged again in Ponyri. After the Soviet troops were able to recapture the place temporarily, both sides shared control again on the evening of July 8th.

Model recognized the deadlock after the failed breakthrough attempts. It was not possible for his troops to achieve their goals without further reserves. The forces of the 9th Army were already excessively strained. Replacement was not available. Nevertheless, after consulting the High Command of Army Group Center , which refused to accept failure , he planned to resume the attack the next day. The Diary of XXXXVI. Panzer Corps attributed "the slow advance of the attack divisions and their sometimes heavy losses" to "the unusually high use of enemy artillery and grenade launchers as well as the use of enemy tanks".

On July 9, models' associations paused to regroup. After violent counter-attacks by the Red Army on all sections of the northern shock group, the attackers often saw themselves in the role of defenders. The originally planned rapid breakthrough through the defense of the central front, which was necessary for the success of the Citadel enterprise, was not in sight. There was a threat of a positional war and thus a battle of wear and tear that was costly for both sides, in which the German forces inevitably had to succumb to the numerically stronger troops of the Red Army.

July 10th did not change the situation either. The German troops remained in the well-staggered defense. They had to fend off permanent counter-attacks by the Soviet side, which in turn was now acting more offensively. Model's request for more troops was rejected by Hitler in view of the events in other theaters of war, in particular the Allied landing in Sicily on the night of July 10th .

Model was in the process of regrouping his forces for a continuation of the attack when on July 11th the Red Army in turn attacked the disrupted divisions of the 9th Army. Contrary to what had been hoped, however, it did not achieve any success either, despite losing many disputes. In view of the high casualties and the tense power situation on the central front, Rokossowski, after consulting the Stawka, contented himself with the successfully thwarted attack and, in turn, ordered major counter-attacks to be stopped.

The High Command of the Red Army now triggered the long-term prepared Operation Kutuzov in the northern promontory around Oryol. In addition to the penetration through the weak German forces in this area, there was also the danger of a large-scale encirclement for the forces of the 9th Army who had advanced. The operations on the north side of the Kursker Bogen had obviously failed even for the last optimists in the OKW, who still believed in a success.

South side

Advance of the German troops in the south of Kursk

Field Marshal Manstein , commander of Army Group South , concentrated a strong attack force in the Belgorod area in the southern section of the front projection . This included the strongest unit in the Kursk front arc, the 4th Panzer Army under Colonel General Hoth . It united three corps: The LII. Army Corps ( 57th , 255th and 332nd Infantry Divisions ), the XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps (167th Infantry Division, Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany" , 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions , Panzer Brigade 10 [the only unit with "Panthers"], Panzer Regiment 39, Assault Gun Division 911) and the II. SS Panzer Corps (SS divisions “ Totenkopf ”, “ Das Reich ” and “ Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler ”).

The Kempf Army Group , consisting of three corps , operated on the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army : The III. Panzer Corps (168th Infantry Division, 6th, 7th  and 19th Panzer Division , Heavy Panzer Division 503, Sturmgeschützabteilung 228), Corps Raus (106th and 320th Infantry Division, Sturmgeschützabteilung 905, later reinforced by the 198th Infantry Division) Division ) and the XVII. Army Corps (282nd, 39th and 161st Infantry Divisions, Heavy Tank Hunting Division 560).

Soldiers from the Waffen SS division “Das Reich” accompanied by a Tiger tank

Manstein had these forces attacked in cooperation with Luftflotte 4 on July 5 at around 5:00 a.m. The already posted III. Panzer Corps and Corps Out got stuck on the right flank in constant artillery and anti-tank gun fire in the defense of the enemy and were then so heavily counterattacked that they fell short of their plans. The forces of the 4th Panzer Army, especially the II SS Panzer Corps, had more success.

The Soviet position system turned out to be weaker on the south side compared to the concentrated attack than on the north side, since the focus of the German attack had been expected in the north. The massive air raids carried out by the Soviet side were also largely unsuccessful. The situation was different with the German air forces, which worked closely with the advancing shock formations on the battlefield and played a decisive role in the rapid breakthrough. In addition to the coordinated air support, which was largely missing on the north side, the massive use of artillery and the consistent use of forces, which were among the most experienced German units, were decisive.

The units of the 4th Panzer Army under Colonel General Hoth penetrated the first Soviet defensive positions of the Soviet 6th Guards Army and also destroyed the artillery departments of the 1st Panzer Army advanced to support them . The subordinate II SS Panzer Corps overcame the multiple staggered defensive positions and fought back counterattacks from Soviet reserves. Although the SS Panzer Corps on the right flank due to the lack of cover by the remaining III. Panzer Corps was constantly attacked, it was already on 10 July before the supposed breakthrough to its target Kursk and on 11 July it advanced up to three kilometers from Prokhorovka. The XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps, on the other hand, had to fend off repeated flank attacks and shift forces backwards against the direction of attack. The planned counterattacks by the defenders in the deep flanks of the attacking armored wedges were not ineffective, but could not decisively weaken the German attack peaks as planned. According to the memories of the Chief of Staff of the XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin realized on the 5th day of the attack that “the backbone of the German attack had been broken and its momentum lost”.

In view of the unexpectedly rapid breakthrough through the 1st and 2nd defense system, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Voronezh Front, Colonel General Watutin, presented a plan on July 9 to cut off and destroy the German attack wedge by thrusting into its deep flanks. The 1st Panzer Army, which had been in defense since the start of the offensive and had suffered heavy losses in the process, was to come from the west, which hurriedly brought in from the reserve over a longer distance and was reinforced by another two armored corps 5th Guards Panzer Army from Attack east.

Waffen SS tigers and assault guns with mounted infantry

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

German motorcyclists take cover near Prokhorovka

Map showing the positions of Soviet and German units on the eve of the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943.

Vehicles of the II SS Panzer Corps on the advance towards Prokhorovka on July 11, 1943

Exhausted German soldiers during a break in combat near Prokhorovka

The II. SS Panzer Corps with its Panzergrenadier divisions Leibstandarte , Totenkopf and Das Reich had thrown back the fiercely defending Soviet 5th Guard Army to the outskirts of Prokhorovka. In view of this development, the commander of the 5th Guards Panzer Army, Lieutenant General Rotmistrow, decided on the evening of July 11 to launch a counterattack the next morning in order to prevent the threatened enclosure of Prokhorovka and the ultimate breakthrough of the German divisions into the unprotected depths. At that time he had 793 tanks and 57  assault guns , including many outdated T-70s. Knowing the superior armor and armament of the new German tanks, the order was issued to attack at high speed in order to reach a firing range of 500 m and less. In addition, several tanks as a group should attack an enemy, especially the dreaded tigers, at close range.

On the morning of July 12th, the violent counterattack on the positions of the II SS Panzer Corps in front of Prokhorovka began . The ensuing battle is considered the scene of the greatest tank battle in history. Here 900 Soviet tanks of the Soviet 5th Guards Panzer Army are said to have met 600 German tanks. In retrospect, the battle was glorified as a decisive victory , in particular by Soviet propaganda as well as in war and memoir literature. However, more recent findings suggest that it was only a matter of several smaller tank battles, if only because on the German side there were far fewer tanks available in this section than the claimed 600 tanks. However, the high losses of the armored troops of the 5th Guards Panzer Army compared to the German tanks, which, contrary to what was later claimed, were mostly in stationary positions, were unusual.

The Soviet tanks attacked at high speed and mounted infantry in order to undermine the higher penetration rates of the German tank guns and to get into close combat. The largest meeting took place in front of the positions of the 2nd Panzer Division of the Leibstandarte Division . According to reports from German combatants, a large number of Soviet tanks are said to have been shot down in the area favorable to the defenders as they approached. Many of the attacking tanks would also have hindered each other and even rammed each other in the confines. A decisive factor to the disadvantage of the Soviet troops was a previously abandoned tank trench located in a depression, which obviously had not been taken into account when planning the attack by the Soviet 29th Panzer Corps and behind which the German Leibstandarte tanks had lined up. In the unsuccessful attempt to overcome this obstacle at the only crossing, the attacking Soviet tanks became easy targets. Many even fell into the ditch and rolled over. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting developed, in which, according to the memories of the SS grenadier of Leibstandarte Kurt Pfötsch, the tanks turned around each other in a very confined space. He also reports that Soviet tanks, often on fire, tried to ram the Tigers in order to blow them up.

Rotmistrow then constantly threw new forces into the front section, but these suffered high losses due to their unconditional commitment and did not gain any terrain. Around noon on July 12th, he broke off the attack and went with his remaining strength to the starting positions for defense. The 5th Guards Panzer Army lost more than 200 tanks in the fighting that day and reported 3,597 dead on July 16. In addition, there were so many wounded. The SS Panzer Corps reported 120 enemy tanks shot down that day. In contrast, there were comparatively low German losses. German archive data indicate 3 total losses and 143 damaged tanks, including 25 damaged Tigers, for the SS Panzer Corps for July 12th. Since the German side dominated the battlefield after the battle, this number gives a distorted impression of the immediate outcome of the battle. The number of destroyed tanks was so low on the German side because the tanks that were shot down could be towed away and repaired, in contrast to the Soviet side. David M. Glantz states the losses of the SS Panzer Corps with 60 to 70 tanks. More recent Russian investigations state that the 5th Guards Panzer Army was unable to fulfill its mandate despite high losses. After the battle, according to the Russian historian Sverdlov, Stalin is said to have considered removing Panzer General Rotmistrov and bringing him to justice, since the high losses endangered the plans for the subsequent offensive on Kharkov. The propagandistic glorification of the battle of Prokhorovka to the victory of the Soviet armored troops saved Rotmistrov from this fate. For internal business use, a specially convened commission of inquiry only found the poor planning and implementation of the company. The attacks of the Soviet 1st Panzer Army in the area of ​​XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps on July 12 also remained unsuccessful, so that these forces had to go over to the defense instead of cutting off and destroying the German divisions with deep attack operations as planned.

The German offensive forces initially maintained the battlefield at this point and had not lost their ability to attack decisively. The violent Soviet counterattack, however, had failed with great losses. With the use of all forces, the breakthrough on the south side to the Kursk operational target could probably have taken place. For this purpose, Manstein wanted more troops from the reserve of Army Group South, which was under “Führer's reservation” - the XXIV Panzer Corps with the SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Wiking” and the 17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions - to break through against the battered ones Deploy defenders. However, in view of the precarious development on the northern section of the front, in which the Red Army's Oryol counter-offensive threatened to encircle the advanced forces of Army Group Center, Hitler forbade him to do so. In his memoirs Manstein later took the view that with these troops, partial success would have been possible, at least on the south side. However, it must be doubted whether a breakthrough into free space would have had a decisive effect in operational or even strategic terms. Even if it had succeeded in encircling and destroying the Soviet troops stricken at this point - a success that should not be underestimated, if one considers the subsequent deployments of the two Soviet armored armies (1st and 5th Guards) - there was a threat of a confrontation with other troops of the strategic Stawka reserve. Ultimately, however, regardless of potential successes, the German units that had advanced should have been withdrawn sooner rather than later because of the major offensive that the Red Army had launched. Manstein was nevertheless allowed to carry out a limited attack operation ("Roland") on the right wing. After slight gains in terrain, the III. Panzer Corps up to II. SS Panzer Corps; however, the orders to detach the core units made it impossible to continue attacking operations.

End of the citadel enterprise and the furthest advance of German troops, summer 1943

Legend of the demolition due to the landing in Sicily

The historian Roman Töppel doubts Manstein's account in his memoirs that Hitler called off the Kursk battle on July 13 because of the Allied landing on Sicily on July 10 in order to be able to transfer troops there, and describes this as a legend. To this end, he cites a number of contradicting sources. The Chief of Staff Kurt Zeitzler , who was also present on July 13, wrote in a study for the US Army that was written before Manstein's book that Hitler, on the contrary, wanted to continue attacking furiously and furiously when Field Marshal Kluge wanted to stop the attack of the Soviet offensive on the Orelbogen. In a radio message from Manstein on July 22, 1943 to Colonel-General Eberhard von Mackensen, the development of the situation at Army Group Center was named as the reason for the termination. Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg's diary entries contradict this. The war diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht notices the termination of the battle only for July 19 and in order to create reserves by shortening the front in view of the fierce Soviet offensives. In addition, not a single association was initially relocated to Italy. Goebbels even noted: "Just as the British and Americans are now cranking up their business, we don't need to take a single soldier away from the East." Contrary to the relocation of the SS Panzer Corps to Italy, which has been repeatedly claimed in the literature, this was used to defend against the am On July 17, the Soviet Donets-Mius offensive started and relocated to the Stalino area. It was not until July 26th that the divisions “Das Reich” and the Leibstandarte were ordered to be relocated, of which only the Leibstandarte was relocated, and that after all their tanks had been surrendered. In reality, according to Töppel, the Soviet counter offensives led to the termination of the Kursk battle.

During the Soviet offensive in the Oryol area, which began on July 12, Soviet offensive forces on the Brjansk Front, in coordinated cooperation with large partisan formations that had been preparing for this day for months , penetrated the weak German lines of the 2nd Panzer Army and achieved an immediate penetration of around 20 kilometers deep. There was thus the danger of a breakthrough in the direction of Oryol and the encircling of the advanced 9th Army. Army Group South had to oppose the Rumyantsev Soviet offensive that began on August 3 .

For the Soviet side, the battle of Kursk was by no means over. They saw their own attacks as a reaction to the Citadel operation as a prelude to their extensive attack efforts in the summer of 1943. From August 3, the Belgorod-Kharkov operation began to recapture the area around Kharkov. By the end of September, the Red Army had crossed the Dnieper and pushed Army Group South far back.

Soviet historiography attributed the victory in the Kursk battle primarily to the “mass heroism” of the Soviet soldiers. German files speak of tough, fanatical resistance to the point of death. The XXXXI. Panzer Corps reported: “The enemy defended themselves extremely tenaciously with infantry and defended themselves to the last.” In the war diary of the 9th Army it was said: “It remains a hard fact that the enemy has fought with fanatical doggedness so far. Intercepted radio commands consistently contain the demand: 'No change of position, hold off until you die.' ”The war diary of the Kempf Army Department noted:“ The enemy can be killed there in his well-developed positions. ”And the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army wrote: "The enemy infantryman fights well, contrary to the previous assumption that the enemy is a bad position division, it must be established that this enemy also knows how to fight and die."

During the Kursk battle, the silver lining was running , in which Red Army soldiers were to be overflowed by the massive dropping of leaflets. It turned out to be a complete failure.

Use of materials

According to documents from the General Quartermaster of the OKH, the 37 German divisions involved fired 49,662 tons of ammunition between July 5 and July 14. In comparison, 141 divisions fired 88,460 tons in 43 days in the western campaign . According to Soviet archival documents, 3 fronts fired 10,640 wagons of ammunition in the 50 days of the Kursk battle, of which 5,590 were for artillery and 3,370 for mines. And 204,000 tons of fuel were used.

losses

Grave of Corporal Heinz Kühl, who died at the Citadel Company (summer 1943)

Funeral of Major General Walther von Hünersdorff , Commander of the 6th Panzer Division, fell on July 17, 1943

An exact determination of the losses on both sides is difficult and has long been controversial. Since the Soviet units counterattacked immediately after the Citadel operation, in the north during this time, it is difficult to define a time limit.

For the losses of the Red Army, the work of Grigory Krivoschejew is considered the standard work. Much of the books on this battle accept its numbers for Soviet losses. Accordingly, the Red Army lost 177,847 men during the Kursk defense operation (July 5-23), of which 70,330 were dead or missing. Furthermore, the Red Army units lost 1,614 tanks, with estimates going up to almost 2,000. 3,929 artillery pieces were reported as destroyed. Some historians give higher figures for the Soviet losses and argue with the then poor Soviet reporting system. Furthermore, Russian scouts have found the remains of 5,000 Red Army soldiers in recent years. Of these, around 30 percent were not recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and could therefore not be included in the loss statistics. Not undisputed historians such as Solukov therefore suffered personnel losses of over 300,000 men. However, these figures should be viewed with caution.

The General Inspector for Panzer Weapons Heinz Guderian wrote in his memoirs:

“We had suffered a decisive defeat by the failure of the 'Citadelle'. The armored forces, which had been refreshed with great difficulty, were unusable for a long time due to the heavy losses in people and equipment. Their timely restoration for the defense of the Eastern Front, but especially for the defense against the threatened landing of the Allies on the Western Front next spring, was called into question. "

For the Chief of Staff of the XXXXVIII. Panzer Corps Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin , the German tank divisions were "almost bled white" and in the Kursk battle "the heyday of the German army finally and decisively withered away".

The latest factories give figures between 49,000 and 54,182 for German personnel losses. Of these, 11,043 were dead or missing. According to David M. Glantz's estimate, 350 of the 2,699 German tanks used were destroyed. German archives, interpreted by Karl-Heinz Frieser , show the total loss of 252 tanks. On the morning of July 20, of the originally 2,500 ready-to-use tanks and assault guns, only 285 were still ready for use with the "Army Group Center" and 543 with the "Army Group South" and 198 assault guns on the entire Eastern Front. The difference is explained by recovered and repaired vehicles. A study by the US Army states that for every totally destroyed German tank there were 5.6 damaged, while on the Soviet side the ratio was 1: 0.8; where the apparent benefit of relatively fewer damaged vehicles is actually due to more vehicles being irreparably damaged.

Post-war Soviet plants in particular give much higher figures for both German tank losses and personnel losses. These numbers, however, contradict the archives and current investigations and are in all probability inflated for propaganda purposes.

However, the numbers cannot always be checked exactly. According to Frieser, there were seven Soviet tanks for every destroyed German tank. However, many of them did not fall victim to the direct duel on the ground, but to the tank destroyers of the German Air Force, which were still effectively operating at the time. The Soviet side was also able to recover and repair many tanks after the retreat of the German shock wedges to their starting positions.

Memorials

Monument on the battlefield of the tank battle of Prokhorovka (2012)

On October 17, 2009 one of the last large war cemeteries of the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge e. V. inaugurated. Up to 40,000 dead are buried in Besedino, 18 km east of Kursk.

Russian and German soldiers worked together as a companion to rescue the dead. The Russian veterans and the Kursk regional administration supported the project.

See also

• Donets-Mius offensive
• Third Ladoga battle

literature

• Roland G. Foerster : Change of Tide in World War II? The battles of Kharkov and Kursk in the spring and summer of 1943 in terms of operational structure, course and political significance. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-8132-0507-X .
• Karl-Heinz Frieser , Klaus Schmider , Klaus Schönherr : The German Empire and the Second World War . Volume 8: The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. Ed .: Military History Research Office . DVA , Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 .
• David M. Glantz , Jonathan M. House: The Battle of Kursk. University of Kansas Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7006-1335-8 .
• David M. Glantz, Harold Steven Orenstein (Eds.): The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. Routledge, 1999, ISBN 0-7146-4933-3 .
• Ernst Klink: The law of action. Operation “Citadel” in 1943 . Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1966, DNB 457232005 .
• Burkhart Müller-Hillebrand : The Army 1933-1945. Volume III. Mittler & Sohn, Frankfurt am Main 1969, p. 274.
• Bright Easter Day: The greatest tank battle in world history. In: Troop Practice . Ed. Federal Ministry of Defense, 4/1993, pp. 420–424.
• Janusz Piekałkiewicz : Citadel company. Kursk and Orel: The greatest tank battle of World War II . Bechtermünz Verlag, Augsburg 1998, ISBN 3-86047-910-5 .
• GK Zhukov: memories and thoughts . Novosti Press Agency publishing house, 1974.
• Roman Töppel: Legends in historiography - The battle for Kursk. In: Military History Journal . Ed. Military History Research Office, 61 (2002) Issue 2, pp. 369–401.
• Roman Töppel: Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War . Schöningh, Paderborn 2017, ISBN 978-3-506-78867-2 .
• Ludger Tewes : The Panzergrenadierdivision Grossdeutschland in the campaign against the Soviet Union 1942 to 1945 , Klartext Verlag Essen 2020, ISBN 978-3-8375-2089-7 , pp. 335 to 360, pp. 1147 to 1163.
• Niklas Zetterling, Anders Frankson: Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. Frank Cass, London 2000, ISBN 0-7146-5052-8 .
• Ilya Ivanovich Markin: The Kursk battle . Berlin 1960.
• B. Soloviev: turning point of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk . Cologne 1984.

Web links

Commons : Battle of Kursk  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Literature on the Citadel company in the catalog of the German National Library
• Bogislaw von Bonin : The battle of Kursk - a model for the defense of the Federal Republic . In: Der Spiegel, issue 48 of November 21, 1966, pp. 42-53. Facsimile (PDF).
• Dieter Brand: Prochorowka Austrian military magazine, issue 5/2003
• Andrew Remson, Debbie Anderson: Mine and countermine operations in the Battle of Kursk ( Memento of December 8, 2007 in the Internet Archive ). April 25, 2000. (English). Comprehensive detailed report
• Valerij and Viktor Zamulin, The End of the Battle of Kursk , Military History Working Group

Remarks

1. ↑ ^{a b c d} Frieser, p. 100.
2. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser, p. 154. Quoted here: Grif sekretnoski snjat p. 187 f.
3. ↑ ^{a b c d} Frieser, p. 150.
4. ↑ ^{a b} Töppel, Kursk, p. 203.
5. ^ Glantz & House, p. 345.
6. ↑ Except 2nd Army.
7. ^ OKW sources.
8. ↑ ^{a b} Glantz & House, p. 276.
9. ↑ It is unclear to what extent “no landing reports” are taken into account here. Helmut Heiber writes that an astonishing number of machines and crews have disappeared without a trace and to this day it is not known where they have gone. 85-90% of these reports must be reckoned as a total loss after him. On November 6, 1944, Hitler complained that not even Goering knew how high the real losses were, "because those cursed 'non-landing reports' botched the whole picture". See Helmut Heiber: Hitler's Situation Meetings : The Minutes of His Military Conferences 1942–1945 . Stuttgart 1962, p. 683 f.
10. ↑ Ernst Klink : The law of action. Operation “Citadel” in 1943 . Stuttgart 1966, p. 96.
11. ↑ Operation order No. 6, printed by: Klink: Law of Action . P. 292 ff.
12. ↑ Klink: Law of Action . P. 95.
13. ↑ "Werther never lived" . In: Der Spiegel . No. 29 , 1972 ( online ).
14. ↑ Karl-Heinz Frieser, pp. 90–92.
15. ↑ ^{a b c} Frieser, p. 91.
16. ^ Roman Töppel: Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War. Paderborn 2017, p. 100.
17. ↑ Glantz & House, p. 338.
18. ↑ Glantz & House 2004, p. 346.
19. ↑ Glantz & House 2004, p. 342.
20. ↑ Steven Zaloga : T-34-85 Medium Tank 1944-94. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013, p. 3 f.
21. ↑ cf. Catherine Merridale : Ivan's War - The Red Army 1939-1945 , Augsburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-8289-0831-4 , p. 269.
22. ↑ Frieser, p. 113.
23. ↑ Frieser, p. 152. A total of 42 panthers were completely lost.
24. ^ Frieser, p. 159. Frieser refers here to Zetterling / Frankson: Kursk .
25. ↑ ^{a b c d} Frieser, p. 112.
26. ^ Frieser, p. 162. Frieser refers to Zetterling / Frankson: Kursk.
27. ↑ Glantz, p. 20.
28. ↑ According to Fritz Hahn there were 181 tigers. Fritz Hahn: Weapons and Secret Weapons of the German Army 1933–1945 . Koblenz 1987, Volume 2, p. 237.
29. ↑ Catherine Merridale: Ivan's War - The Red Army 1939-1945. Augsburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-8289-0831-4 , pp. 271 f.
30. ^ Christer Bergström: Kursk. The Air Battle: July 1943 . Hersham 2007, p. 41.
31. ↑ Catherine Merridale: Ivan's War - The Red Army 1939-1945. Augsburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-8289-0831-4 , p. 259: “In fact, more than 5000 km of trenches were dug on the Soviet side, which crisscrossed, so that the defenders switch effortlessly between the firing positions and more than 400,000 mines were laid. "
32. ↑ Töppel, Kursk 1943, p. 108 ff.
33. ↑ Frieser, p. 106.
34. ↑ NA Antipenko: In the main direction . Berlin 1973, p. 109 ff.
35. ↑ ^{a b} Frieser, p. 108.
36. ↑ Frieser, p. 109.
37. ↑ ^{a b c} Frieser, p. 110.
38. ↑ Walter Bussmann : Kurk-Orel-Dnejpr. Experiences and experiences in the staff of the XXXXVI. Panzer Corps during the "Operation Citadel" . Quarterly issues for contemporary history 1993 issue 4, p. 510.
39. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin : tank battles. A study of the use of tank units in World War II . Neckargemünd 1963, p. 156.
40. ↑ Sven Kellerhoff: Stalin's tanks launched a kamikaze attack , Welt, July 15, 2013, interview with Frieser on the Kursk tank battle.
41. ↑ Frieser, p. 126.
42. ↑ Kurt Pfötsch: The hell of Kursk. SS Grenadier in action in 1943 . Selent 2008, p. 224.
43. ^ War diary of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Printed in: Sylvester Stadler: Offensive gegen Kursk , Selent 2016, p. 123.
44. ↑ Federal Archives: Holdings: General Inspector of Armored Troops . RH 10/64. Sheet 48. (online) . The 3 total losses were reported later. See Frieser, p. 130.
45. ↑ Frieser, p. 130.
46. ↑ Glantz, p. 212.
47. ↑ Frieser, p. 112. Frieser quotes the current edition of the "Great Patriotic War".
48. ↑ Erich von Manstein : Lost victories. Memories 1939–1944 . Bonn 1993, p. 501 f.
49. ↑ Roman Töppel: Kursk - Myths and Reality of a Battle. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 3/2009, p. 378 ff. (Online)
50. ↑ Kurt Zeitzler : The struggle for the big decisions. In: BA-MA , ZA 1/1734 (Study D-406).
51. ^ Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg : Remarks by a contemporary witness on the battles of Charkov and Kursk from the point of view of the then General Staff Officer Ia in the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Army. In: Roland G. Foerster (Ed.): Changing tides in the Second World War? Hamburg 1996, p. 146.
52. ↑ Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn undated volume III / 2, p. 804.
53. ↑ Elke Fröhlich (ed.): The diaries of Joseph Goebbels . Munich 1993, part 2, volume 9, p. 96.
54. ^ Sylvester Stadler: Offensive against Kursk. Selent 2016, p. 211.
55. ↑ So z. B. Ilya Ivanovich Markin: The Kursk battle . Berlin 1960. Introduction and conclusion.
56. ^ Roman Töppel: Kursk 1943. The greatest battle of the Second World War. Paderborn 2017, pp. 130, 142, 157, 159.
57. ↑ Gerhart Donat: The ammunition consumption in the Second World War in the operational and tactical framework . Osnabrück 1992, pp. 23 and 53.
58. ↑ Igor N. Vekov: archival holdings in Russia to the operations in the spring and summer of 1943 . In: Foerster: Tide change in the Second World War , p. 239.
59. ↑ Heinz Guderian : memories of a soldier . Stuttgart 1994, p. 283.
60. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin : tank battles. A study of the use of tank units in World War II . Neckargemünd 1963, pp. 165 and 171.
61. ↑ Wolfgang Schumann: Germany in the Second World War. Berlin 1982, volume 3, p. 566.
62. ↑ US Army Concepts Analysis Agency: Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise - Phase III (KOSAVE II). Bethesda 1998, pp. 5–13 ( dtic.mil ( memento of the original from June 20, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice . ). 
63. ↑ Memorial (PDF; 662 kB).
64. ↑ Press release of the Volksbund on the occasion of the inauguration of Kursk - Besedino .
65. ↑ description war cemetery Kursk - Besedino .
66. ↑ Christoph Blase: Torch of Reconciliation. Inauguration of the Kursk war cemetery. In: Voice & Way, January 2010, pp. 6-7.