Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

This article describes a recent event . The information can therefore change quickly.

Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

The conflict region by 2020

 ruled by Arzach, formerly autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh ruled by Arzach, outside the formerly autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh


 ruled by Azerbaijan, but claimed by Artsakh

date	July 12 to 16 Since September 27, 2020
place	Nagorno Karabakh
output

Parties to the conflict
Armenia ( Armed Forces of Armenia )  Artsakh Republic ( Armed Forces of the Artsakh Republic )	Azerbaijan ( Azerbaijani Armed Forces ) Supported by  Turkey with Syrian mercenaries (including Hamza Brigade and Sultan Murad Division ) (denies direct involvement)
Commander
Poor Sarkissjan Arajik Harutjunjan	İlham Əliyev
Troop strength
Unknown number of Armenian soldiers	Unknown number of Azerbaijani soldiers 2050 Syrian mercenaries (according to SOHR , as of October 18)
losses
5 dead Armenian soldiers (own data, in July 2020) ______________________ 1302 dead Armenian soldiers (own data, September 27 - November 10)	12 dead Azerbaijani soldiers (own information, in July 2020) ______________________ No own information on the number of dead Azerbaijani soldiers in autumn 2020. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 250 dead Syrian mercenaries (according to SOHR, as of November 6)
92 dead and 404 injured Azerbaijani civilians (September 27 - November 5) at least 46 dead and 146 injured Armenian civilians (September 27 - November 3) 90,000 refugees from the Republic of Artsakh 40,000 Azerbaijani refugees

The Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020 is a war between the armed forces of Armenia and those of the Artsakh Republic on the one hand and the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the other, which has been going on since July 2020. It is part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict . The fighting began on the joint state border between the Tovuz province in northwest Azerbaijan and the Tavush region in northeast Armenia . This was followed by further fighting and incidents on the common border and on the armistice line between Azerbaijan and the Republic of Artsakh . Artsakh or the Nagorno-Karabakh region unilaterally declared itself independent from Azerbaijan in 1991 and was able to assert itself with Armenian support in the war that lasted until 1994.

On the ceasefire line between Azerbaijan and Artsakh, the fighting escalated into a large-scale armed conflict on September 27, 2020, which continues. Cities near the front as well as places further away were bombed and shot at. Both sides accuse each other of causing the escalation through fire or ground offensives.

background

Main article: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Topography of Arzach, initial situation of the conflict.

The main point of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh region , which was occupied by Armenian forces together with surrounding areas in the course of the military conflict between 1992 and 1994. By then, it is estimated that between 20,000 and 40,000 people had been killed in the conflict since 1988. Around 750,000 Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighboring Azerbaijani regions conquered by Armenia became refugees or internally displaced persons . About 200,000 Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, 300,000 Armenians from the unoccupied rest of Azerbaijan. Under international law, Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited by the majority of Armenians and which had formed an autonomous oblast in the Association of the Azerbaijani SSR since the time of the Soviet Union , belongs to Azerbaijan.

Fighting has been repeated since the 1994 ceasefire. Most recently, Azerbaijan captured a few square kilometers of land on the armistice line in 2016 and took some positions in Nakhichevan on the border with Armenia in 2018. While Turkey always stands on the side of Azerbaijan in the conflict, the close relationship between the two states emphasizes the cultural similarities of both Turkic states , while its northern neighbor Russia maintains good relations with both states. While Turkey also cooperates militarily with Azerbaijan, Russia supplies large numbers of weapons to both countries - albeit at a preferential price to Armenia, where a Russian military base is also maintained. According to analyst Stefan Meister, Russia is trying to keep both states dependent without actually being Armenia's protective power. Since the 1990s, Russia has been active as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict several times, albeit unsuccessfully. Like Russia, its western neighbor Georgia plays an ambivalent role in the conflict, but has little influence. The Iran , which borders the Republic of Artsakh, Armenia is rather close because he fears the growing influence of Turkey in the region, as well as possibly separatism promoting effect of a successful Azerbaijan to the Azerbaijani minority in northwestern Iran. On the other hand, Azerbaijan now sources many of its weapons from Israel : between 2015 and 2019, 60% of Azerbaijani arms imports came from there, including state-of-the-art weapons such as drones and air and missile defense technology. The European Union has little direct influence in the region, but is interested in calming the conflict.

According to an analysis by regional expert Thomas de Waal , Azerbaijan alone was interested in escalation, as the Armenian side had already achieved its goals in the war in the early 1990s and now only wanted to defend them. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has set itself the goal of bringing the territory under its own control again. Since the last war, both sides have armed themselves and, since the conflict flared up in July, also intensified their mutual rhetoric. The recent change of government in the Republic of Artsakh and its changed policy, such as the announced move of the parliament to the traditional Azerbaijani city of Shusha , could also have been viewed as a provocation by the government in Baku. The Azerbaijani ally Turkey is now, unlike in the past, ready to engage in international military action, while the politics of the United States is preoccupied with the presidential election campaign and Russia is already preoccupied with other conflicts. Azerbaijan therefore wants to take advantage of the international situation and improve its own position in the conflict in the period up to winter. According to de Waal, the burden of the corona pandemic in the western countries , the disagreement in the European Union regarding its policy towards Turkey, such as was shown in the gas dispute in the Mediterranean Sea , and the resulting restricted diplomatic capacity for the European Union to act are favorable conditions for Azerbaijan, with Turkish support to start the war right now. Analyst James Palmer added that relations between the conflicting parties had already deteriorated in 2019 and are under domestic political pressure this year due to the corona pandemic and its economic effects. As a reason for the Azerbaijani approach, Stefan Meister adds that the Armenian side is creating facts through construction projects and the settlement of Armenians in Arzach, which from the Azerbaijani point of view are internationally ignored, but no longer want to be accepted. In the weeks leading up to the first fighting, İlham Əliyev criticized the OSCE's Minsk Group for being inactive in this matter.

development

Fight from July 2020

The Armenian-Azerbaijani border sections (marked with red squares) where the fighting took place from July 12-16, 2020.

At the beginning of July 2020 there was increased fighting on the ceasefire line in Nagorno-Karabakh. Several dozen soldiers on both sides were killed in the bombardment and, according to some information, several tanks were destroyed. A new ceasefire agreement was therefore concluded at noon on July 12th. Towards the evening of the same day, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported a "gross violation of the ceasefire" in the Tovuz border region north of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian units who had fired heavy artillery in the area. The Armenian military went on the offensive in order to take up combat positions of the Azerbaijani army. On the same day, Armenia claimed that Azerbaijani troops attempted to approach Armenian positions in a " UAZ-469 military vehicle". After the intervention of the Armenian troops, the Azerbaijani soldiers left the vehicle and withdrew. Azerbaijan then fired artillery at the border posts in Armenia, but was thrown back after counter-attacks. During the four-day battles that followed, both military sites and civilian objects were targeted on both sides. The fighting on the border did not lead to territorial gains on either side. In the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, up to 30,000 people took to the streets and demanded the reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. The protests, some of which were violent, were broken up by the police.

After the clashes at the border, Russian-Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises took place. In Azerbaijan, the threat of an Armenian military strike against the Mingəçevir Reservoir , which had been threatened in the past, was discussed. A rocket attack on the Armenian nuclear power plant in Mezamor was considered as a counter-attack . The Azerbaijani presidential administration later stated that the Armenian civil infrastructure was not a target of the Azerbaijani armed forces . Parallel to the fighting on the border sections between Armenia and Azerbaijan, violations of the fragile ceasefire between Azerbaijan and the breakaway, internationally unrecognized republic of Arzach , which was only inhabited by Armenians, occurred after July 27th. Artsakh accused Azerbaijan of 260 ceasefire violations in the week from July 18 to 25, and slightly fewer from July 25 to August 3. Azerbaijan accused Armenia and Artsakh of attacks by shelling even after July 27th, 49 attacks from July 30th to 31st or on its positions in Azerbaijani villages in the Tovuz Rayon on August 15th, 30 shells, on August 16th and 37 times on the following day 31. On August 24, Azerbaijan again reported several dozen attacks on border villages by the Armenian side. In the course of September there were repeated reports of exchanges of fire and shelling of settlements and positions on both sides, until the week before large-scale fighting began on September 27. On September 21, the presidents of both countries appealed to the UN to interfere in the conflict and accused the other side of promoting an escalation. At the same time, more extensive war preparations became known: the drawing in of vehicles and special forces in Azerbaijan and the increased recruitment of women in Armenia.

As a result of the fighting in July, Elmar Məmmədyarov was released from the post of Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan. Məmmədyarov, who has held this post since 2004, was accused by President İlham Əliyev of being inactive during the days of the military confrontation. Under his leadership, Azerbaijani diplomacy had been passive and instead had "senseless negotiations" with Armenia and the like. a. on the Covid-19 situation in the region. After the border fighting, tensions arose between Azerbaijan and Serbia over Serbian arms deliveries to Armenia. It described Azerbaijan as an "unfriendly move" that undermined the strategic relationship between Baku and Belgrade . The Azerbaijani media also reported on Russian arms shipments that on July 4, July 17 and August 4 - before, during and after the Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes - from Russia via the Rostov - Mineralnye Vody - Aqtau - Turkmenbaşy - Rasht - route Meghri - Yerevan were transported. During a telephone conversation between Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin , the Azerbaijani head of state expressed his concern and dissatisfaction with the intensive Russian arms deliveries to Armenia totaling over 400 tons.

Open war from September 27, 2020

September and October

Territory of the former NKAO , controlled by the Artsakh Republic

Under Armenian control

Shahumyan Province , claimed by Rep. Arzach, but controlled by Azerbaijan

Under Azerbaijani control

Area that was captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces (according to own reports) in autumn 2020

On September 27, 2020, new fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Artsakh or Armenia, which represents the most serious and bloodiest escalation of the conflict since the 1990s. Both the Artsakh Republic and Armenia announced a state of emergency and called for general mobilization , as did Azerbaijan for some of its regions. Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of starting the aggression. Especially near the front line were frequent mutual artillery shelling of positions as well as close to the border villages and near cities like Martuni ( Azerbaijani Xocavənd ), Martakert ( Azerbaijani Ağdərə ) and Hadrut on arzachischer page Barda District , Goranboy , Tərtər and Aghjabadi District on Azerbaijani . Besides, a bombardment with drones and missiles particularly capital of Artsakh, Stepanakert , shows Armenian missiles struck in distant cities like Ganja (Ganja) and mingachevir (Mingatschaur) one, even one each in the districts xizi and Absheron in Baku. There were also reports of artillery fire on Armenian territory and Armenia said a Sukhoi-25 fighter jet had been shot down by Turkey.

Remains of the old bus stop in Cəbrayıl (2014)

The mutual shelling was followed by an Azerbaijani ground offensive against Artsakh in the northern valley of the Tartar and especially in the south on the Aras on the Iranian border between September 28 and October 5 . In the south, the city of Cəbrayıl (Jäbrajyl) and over a dozen eastern and south-eastern neighboring villages have been taken, but like the city itself, as places formerly inhabited by Azerbaijanis, have been destroyed and abandoned since 1994. In addition, the first forays into the city of Fizüli , which was abandoned like Cəbrayıl, were made. In the north, both the majority (Armenian) inhabited villages Talis (Talysh) and Madaghis were (Azerbaijani: Suqovuşan, Eastern Armenian actually: Mataghis) taken by Azerbaijani messages. While the capture of Talysh was confirmed by film recordings, Arzach denied the capture of the southern Madaghi and later stated that it had been recaptured after a short time. Not all information provided by the warring parties is reliable without independent verification. Azerbaijani reports did not confirm that they had taken Hadrut on October 7 ; later reports only reported activities of Azerbaijani sabotage fighters active behind the front in the area. Even the capture of the Murovdağ Mountains, reported by the army at the end of September , from which Azerbaijan claims to have interrupted the M11 road from Wardenis (Eastern Armenia) to Martakert ( Ağdərə in Azerbaijani ) in Arzach, could not be confirmed 14 days later by video evidence or independent reports will. Hardly any further income was reported in the following days, and the Azerbaijani and Arzachian troops apparently repositioned themselves. From the 7th / 8th In October, the shelling of almost all towns and villages in Artsakh was intensified, and the Ghazanchezoz Cathedral in Shushi, which was used as a shelter, was hit. Azerbaijan denies having shelled the church. The shelling of Azerbaijani places near the front also increased, which also repeatedly claimed civilian casualties.

After more than 10 hours of mediation by Russia, the two foreign ministers Jeyhun Bayramov and Sohrab Mnazakanjan agreed a ceasefire for Saturday, October 10th, starting at 10 a.m. Actual peace negotiations should then take place under the leadership of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Just hours after the ceasefire went into effect, both sides accused each other of breaking it. As the Azerbaijani side announced, there was a rocket attack on Gəncə (Gändschä) almost 100 kilometers north of the combat area on the night of October 11, 2020 . Seven civilians (ten in the end) were killed, 35 (including children) were injured, Armenia and Arzach deny responsibility. In the first rocket attack on the city on October 5, one civilian was killed and 32 others were wounded.

View over Hadrut

The medieval bridges and the Choda Afarin dam, completed in 2010. On the right the abandoned village of Choda Afarin ( Azerbaijani Xudafərin ), on the left and in the foreground Iranian territory

A video released by the Azerbaijani army on October 11 shows that Madaghis / Suqovuşan has been captured. According to another video, the abandoned village of Suleymanli, southeast of Hadrut , is controlled by Azerbaijan. A video of the city’s own control of the city published by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense on October 13 described residents of the region as fake, the close-ups were from a neighboring Armenian village. Another video from October 16 shows no signs of Azerbaijani sovereignty. A video showing the capture and shooting of two Armenian men around October 14th could be located in the north and south-east of Hadrut, but that does not prove Azerbaijani control over the whole of Hadrut, because the perpetrators belonged to Azerbaijani special forces, which also behind operate the front. Armenian pictures shortly before the beginning of the armistice on 17/18 October mention a repulsed Azerbaijani attack from 11.10. and show that Hadrut is still largely controlled by Armenians. A few, often empty, villages east of Füzuli ( Armenian Waranda ), near Armenian rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns, were captured by Azerbaijan, although it is unconfirmed which. Both warring parties reported unanimously on October 15 that the tactics of Azerbaijani sabotage units behind the front were pushing back the Armenian army here. The capture of the Murovdağ is not confirmed, the Armenian army generally speaks in a Telegram message of "heavy fighting in northern direction". The Azerbaijani army reported on the nights of October 12-14 of Armenian counter-offensives and a tense situation in the south and east. On October 15-17, the Armenian side reported heavy fighting, particularly in the north around Madaghis and on the Iranian border in the south, and renewed attacks on larger cities in Arzach, as well as the Azerbaijani side reported new shelling of villages and small towns near the border . In the early morning hours of October 17, rockets hit residential areas in the second largest Azerbaijani city of Gəncə , killing 13 people and injuring over 52. In a statement on October 18, UN Secretary-General António Guterres described attacks on civilians, such as those in Gəncə or Stepanakert, as completely unacceptable and called on the warring parties to stop shelling civilian residential areas inside and outside the conflict zone. Peter Stano, General Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, made a similar statement . Both sides reported unanimously that the Azerbaijani army was advancing upstream on the southern border river Aras and reached the medieval bridges of Choda Afarin on the afternoon of October 17 and that fighting broke out at the nearby Choda Afarin reservoir. A temporary tactical-humanitarian ceasefire was agreed for October 18 at midnight, also for the exchange of captured and killed soldiers, which is fragile, but the mutual shelling decreased significantly.

On October 19, Azerbaijan reported 13 more villages in the vicinity of Cəbrayıl as captured, bringing the total number of places according to Azerbaijani captured to 74. Most places have been abandoned settlements since 1994, including the small town of Füzuli , which Azerbaijan reported as captured on October 17th. However, there could be some Armenian villages south and east of Hadrut under Azerbaijan's control, from which the offensive against the city was launched from October 11th, although independent sources have not clarified which ones. On the morning of October 20, Artsakh reported new fighting on all fronts and a successful Armenian counter-offensive from the north towards the Choda Afarin reservoir. Around noon, the President of Arzach, Arajik Harutjunjan, reported on Telegram that the main fighting was now taking place 30–40 km southwest of the reservoir in the cities of Kowsakan ( Azerbaijani Zəngilan ) and Mincivan and a neighboring village, which Azerbaijani President İlham Əliyev claimed to be five places shortly afterwards Region, including Zəngilan, as captured. As both sides unanimously report, Azerbaijani troops broke through to the south-west during the Armenian counter-offensive, reaching settlements between Armenia and old Nagorno-Karabakh , which were also abandoned in 1994, but afterwards at least partially with Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan in recent years were also repopulated with Armenian-Syrian civil war refugees and some Armenian Lebanese . On October 21 and 22, Azerbaijan and Armenia reported fierce fighting on all, especially the southern fronts. Azerbaijan reported other villages up west to Ağbnd on the border with Armenia as captured, Armenia denies this complete conquest of the Arzachian-Iranian border, as well as the Azerbaijani control over Zəngilan. Arzach and Armenia, on the other hand, report a “stable-serious” and “mixed” situation, some offensives to the north in the mountains could have been repulsed at night and areas could have been regained in a counter-offensive in the direction of Aras. On both days, Azerbaijan also posted recordings of Azerbaijani troops at Hakari in the Qubadlı region (pronunciation and outdated transcription Gubadly / Gubadli) online. Because Azerbaijan did not report any income from localities, however, it could be special forces operating behind the front trying to disrupt the main route between Armenia and Artsakh through the Lachin Corridor and perhaps Arzach's supply of macaws. Azerbaijan confirmed that on both days there had been serious Armenian counter-offensives in the north around Martakert / Ağdərə, in the south around Füzuli-Cəbrayıl and also in the Qubadlı region, after which the Azerbaijani army would have recaptured 22 places.

The Armenian village of Sheker north of Hadrut

At the same time, both sides reported an Azerbaijani offensive from Füzuli to the north, in which some empty villages nearby were captured. There was also fighting in the Armenian villages around Sheker ( Armenian Շեխեր , Azerbaijani Şəkər ) and Jiwani, about 15 km north of Hadrut (as the crow flies, two valleys further) and 15 km northwest of Füzuli. The Azerbaijani units involved are special forces, referred to by the Armenian side as reconnaissance and sabotage units. The northern village of Gerger ( Armenian Հերհեր (Herher), Azerbaijani Qarqar ) and the city of Martuni ( Azerbaijani Xocavənd ) were also shot at. Martuni and Martakert , the two eastern towns near the front , were bombed frequently, Martakert on 23/24. October also with regular air force, on the night of the 24th after four quiet nights again with Stepanakert . Nearby Azerbaijani villages were also fired upon again.

The Hakari River Valley near Laçın (poor Berdsor)

Qubadlı (poor. Kashunik)

On the night of October 23rd to 24th, an Azerbaijani offensive against the Lachin Corridor began with regular troops with tank and artillery units and air support in three formations: 1. up the lower Hakari , 2. parallel to the east through the mountain villages, around the to protect the eastern flank, 3. from Cəbrayıl over the mountains towards central Hakari, which could also enclose the defenders leading counter-offensives in the direction of the reservoir. The data from Arzach correspond to the Azerbaijani data about captured villages on the lower Hakari and west of Cəbrayıl. The heaviest fighting took place in this region, Armenia posted photos of destroyed Azerbaijani tanks and artillery positions, and Azerbaijan posted photos of captured villages on social networks. Azerbaijan accused the defenders of attacking offensive troops from the territory of Armenia; Armenia is protected by a military assistance agreement with Russia and its border troops come from Russia. In addition, the situation maps presented for the first time on October 24th by Artsakh and Armenia again reported fighting in the villages north of Hadrut to Sheker and the Woghdschi / Keren river near Zngilan / Kowsakan up to the vicinity of the Armenian border. In contrast, the front in the north (Armenian photos show a trenched trench warfare) remained almost unchanged, according to Arzachian information, Mataghis is again controlled by Armenians. The occupation of the Murovdağ Mountains, which threatened the second, northern connection between Armenia and Arzach at the beginning of the war, was no longer mentioned, but the long-fought and controversial cities of Hadrut , Zəngilan and Mincivan have been on October 24th, according to Arzach controlled by the Azerbaijani army for a few days. On the evening of October 25, Azerbaijan announced that it had captured the small town of Qubadlı ( Armenian Kashunik ) in the southwest and some neighboring villages, which the Armenian side confirmed on October 27. The warring parties agreed on a third humanitarian ceasefire on October 26 at 8 a.m. through the mediation of the United States, and after a few minutes they accused each other of having broken it.

The Armenian village of Avetaranoz (Azerbaijan Çanaqçı)

On October 26th the Azerbaijani shelling of Martakert, Martuni and also of Askeran in the east increased significantly. According to Azerbaijani sources, Arzach fired around 200 artillery projectiles into the villages east of the front on that day alone. On October 27, Artsakh and Armenia also reported fighting from the Armenian village Avetaranoz, about 30 km northwest of Scheker on the road to Shushi (Shusha), while in the southwest they reported successful counter-offensives. Azerbaijani troops stood on October 27 at Hakari near Xanlıq ( Armenian Ischkanadsor ), more south than three days earlier and more south than Qubadlı on Bazarçay . On the night of October 27-28, the Azerbaijani side reported Armenian counter-offensives in all combat areas from the northeast to the southwest, which could only be stopped with great losses on both sides, which the Armenian side reported by reporting the deaths of 59 Armenians Soldiers confirmed more than any night before. On the afternoon of the 28th, Əliyev reported the Azerbaijani capture of villages after a long break, but in the evening the Armenian Defense Ministry announced that another Azerbaijani attack on the Lachin Corridor had been repulsed and reported on October 29th, the opposing side in the To have pushed the Qubadlı region south again. The intensification of the fighting was linked to increasing mutual shelling. On the afternoon of October 28, a street in Bərdə (Bärdä / Barda) was destroyed by Armenian Smerch rockets, killing 21 people, injuring around 70 and more shelling to villages in the region of Tərtər and Goranboy and from Armenia also Tovuz and Gədəbəy . One day earlier, a residential building in the village of Qarayusifli (Garajusifli) was fired at by Bərdə with Armenian BM-30 rockets (Smertsch). As a result, 5 people (including a small child) were killed and 17 others were injured. In Arzach, a street in Shuschi was destroyed on the 28th and nearby villages were shot at, in Stepanakert the maternity hospital and the surrounding urban area. In the evening, the Armenian side reported fighting against Azerbaijani reconnaissance and sabotage units in Awetaranoz and the western neighboring village of Sghnach (in Azerbaijani Siğnax ), and the next morning they claimed the two villages had been " cleared of divers, " but fighting from Awetaranoz was reported again in the evening. Also on the night of the 30th and in the morning, the Armenian side reported an "unsuccessful" Azerbaijani offensive in the north, whereupon the Armenian side accused Azerbaijan of setting fire to the forests around Mataghis and Talis and shortly afterwards in the southern combat area with phosphorus bombs , The warring parties accused each other, but a Sentinel satellite imagery check of the source of the fire revealed that they are all on the Armenian side of the frontline, in one case in an Armenian village, making it more likely that it was caused by the Azerbaijani army. On October 30th, fighting in the direction of the Lachin Corridor was reported again, with artillery shelling across the Armenian border. Russia declared that it would give Armenia “all necessary support” in protecting its territory. Əliyev announced some income from the village at noon, which then ended.

On October 30, 2020, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed, with the mediation of the OSCE in Geneva, to at least end the mutual targeted fire at civilian populations. On October 31, 7:10 a.m. local time, the Stepanakert market and the surrounding area were shelled. There were no victims because most of the civilians who had not escaped were still in air raid shelters at this time. Azerbaijan denied responsibility and accused the Armenian side of again shooting at border villages.

November

The Armenian village Karin Tak below the plateau (Azerbaijani Cıdır Düzü ), on which Shuschi is also located

According to the Abkhaz- Russian news agency ANNA News, Azerbaijani special forces abandoned an attempted attack south of Shushi ( Azerbaijani Șușa ) after October 31 . On November 2, the Armenian side reported another Azerbaijani attack in the direction of the Lachin Corridor, the Azerbaijani side reported the villages of Muradxanlı and İşıqlı on Hakari and Milanlı to the east in the mountains, all about 40 km south of Lachin as captured. According to the Armenian media, the Azerbaijani army was thrown back to its original positions the following night. In addition, Azerbaijan again carried out an offensive in the southeast around Scheker between Füzuli and Schuschi, whereby it was able to take some positions near the town of Tschartar ( Azerbaijani Çartar / Güneyçartar ) southeast of Martuni. Attack attempts were also made in the direction of Karmir Schuka ( Azerbaijani Qırmızı Bazar ), a neighboring village to the west of Scheker, and in the north in the direction of Martakert. On November 3, an Azerbaijani offensive followed on the Füzuli-Shuschi road near Sheker, Karmir Schuka and the neighboring village of Taghaward, this time not with special units but with regular army units, according to pictures published by Arzach, with Azerbaijani positions in Füzuli also being shot at from the Armenian side . According to Armenian information, the offensive was repulsed. During the fighting with Azerbaijani special forces / divers / saboteurs south of Shushi, which reached as far as Karin Tak ( Azerbaijani Daşaltı , Armenian Քարին տակ ), Stepanakert and especially Shushi were again bombed by Azerbaijan, and some Azerbaijani villages to the east were shot again through Arzach. On October 4, the authorities of Arzach blocked parts of the road from Shushi to Goris in Armenia after Azerbaijani special forces that were still active around the Great Kirs had been discovered near Karin Tak the night before . On the evening of November 5, they reported that the stretch of road at the Lisagorski Pass had been "cleared". Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani army attempted a new, fifth attack on the Lachin Corridor with the support of the Air Force, the Armenian side published photographs of destroyed tanks and confirmed their failure in the following days. The towns reported as captured by the Azerbaijani president on October 7th are again south of the Hakari, including Bala Soltanlı and Mərdanlı, which were already reported in October. Also on November 4, the Azerbaijani side reported the infiltration of Armenian sabotage units in the western southern region of Zəngilan, which had been driven off with heavy losses.

View over Schuschi / Şuşa (2013), on the left the Ghasantschezoz Cathedral ( Cathedral of the Holy Savior)

After 5 November Artsakh reported significantly increased attacks by the Azerbaijani army special forces, tanks, air force, artillery and drones and fierce fighting to Karin Tak and the significant in the historical Azerbaijani and Armenian Remembrance ancient capital of Karabakh, Shusha / Shusha / Shushi at the southern end of the central area of ​​Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in the direction of Stepanakert, which is only 10 km from Shushi below in the river valley of the Qarqarçay . On November 8th at 9:51 am, Azerbaijan reported that Shusha had been "released from the occupation". The Armenian side denied that the fighting for the city had been decided and repeated in the evening, heavy fighting continued, the next day would bring more clarity about the course of this decisive battle. On the same day, an evacuation of civilians, journalists and soldiers began. The next morning, Armenia claimed that it had succeeded in pushing back the opponents in the Karin Tak-Shushi region during the night; after further fighting, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan and the army spokesman for Armenia reported that the fighting for Shushi would continue. In the afternoon, the government spokesman for Arzach, Wahram Pogossjan, contradicted that Shushi had completely lost control of the Armenians, the Azerbaijani attacks would now continue against Stepanakert, and Arzach's President Arajik Harutjunjan presented himself with the headquarters of the Arzach army as the "defender of Stepanakert". Also in the course of November 9th, the Azerbaijani President reported a growing number of villages as captured, including Karin Tag, Taghaward, Awetaranoz, Sghnach, other villages between Hadrut and Sheker and numerous other villages on all fronts, the Armenian side only reported successes in Karmir Schuka. On the same day, a Mil Mi-24 attack helicopter of the Russian armed forces was shot down near the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic . The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan said in a statement that Azerbaijani forces accidentally shot down the helicopter. Azerbaijan apologized and offered Russia compensation.

On the evening of November 9th, the Presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia (with the consent of Arzakh) signed an agreement at around 9:00 a.m. to end the war on November 10th at 1:00 a.m. It includes the timely withdrawal of Armenian troops from large parts of the conflict region. According to the agreement, a Russian border force comprised of 1960 people takes control of the Lachin corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, which would now again lead through Azerbaijani-controlled territory. In return, Azerbaijan received the promise of free traffic routes to its exclave, the autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan and Armenia also committed themselves in the agreement to freeze their current positions.

Destruction and number of victims

July

According to media reports, house damaged by Armenian artillery in Tovuz province (Azerbaijan)

According to Azerbaijani sources, 12 military personnel, including a major general , a colonel and a 76-year-old civilian, were killed. Among the neighboring housing estates in Tovuz province, the villages of Ağdam (not to be confused with the city of Ağdam in Karabakh), Dondar Quşçu and Vahidli came under intense artillery and mortar fire by the Armenian armed forces and were hardest hit by destruction. The Armenian Defense Ministry said a total of five military personnel were killed and 36 injured. Several houses in the border villages Mowses, Tschinari and Ajgepar in the province of Tavush were damaged as a result of the attacks with mortar shells. No civilian casualties except for one injured person were recorded. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 72 Syrian fighters supported by the Turkish government were killed in the fighting against Armenian soldiers.

September and October

The authorities of the Artsakh Republic announced that between 70,000 and 75,000 people (around 90% of whom were women and children) in the Nagorno-Karabakh region have fled. An unknown number of Azerbaijani civilians also had to flee from villages near the front. In the last days of September, 114 soldiers and civilians were killed on the Armenian side, according to their statements. Azerbaijan did not report numbers of soldiers killed, but 10 civilians killed. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights , 119 Syrian mercenaries were killed in the conflict on the Azerbaijani side by October 13. According to the Azerbaijani news agency Azeri Press Agency , as of October 8, 31 civilians have been killed and 154 civilians have been injured in Armenian attacks. The Armenian news agency Armenpress reported 22 civilians dead and 95 civilians injured in attacks from the Azerbaijani side on October 9.

Play media file

Footage of the use of outlawed cluster munitions on October 4, 2020 against Stepanakert

On October 5, the human rights organization Amnesty International published a report condemning attacks on the civilian population. In the publication, Amnesty International confirmed that the Armenian-inhabited capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, had been bombarded with banned cluster munitions . On October 8, the historic Armenian Ghazanchezoz Cathedral in Shushi was hit by bombs and damaged in two attacks. Journalists were also seriously injured. Research published by Amnesty International on October 29, 2020 confirmed that the Armenian side also used prohibited cluster munitions in the attack on Bərdə the previous day, with 21 dead and 70 injured.

Involvement of mercenaries

According to French President Macron and the Russian government, the Turkish government under Recep Erdoğan has sent mercenaries from Syria and Libya on the Azerbaijani side to the area. The Russian Foreign Ministry demanded the withdrawal of all irregular units from the region in early October. Various other sources also indicated that Turkey recruited between 850 and 4000 mercenaries in Syria and may have transported them, along with drones, to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh area from the end of September 2020. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights also confirmed the involvement of Syrian mercenaries and reported the deaths of over 100 of them. The ARD reports on people from the Idlib region who are deployed in dangerous positions at the front in Nagorno-Karabakh. When they were recruited, they were promised high wages and only to be used for guarding and outside of combat operations. After arriving in Baku, cell phones were taken from them and sent straight to the front. Turkey does not comment on reports of mercenaries. Estimates of the total number of Syrian mercenaries go up to 2,000.

Explanatory approaches of the conflicting parties

The Azerbaijani side assumes that Armenia's advances were aimed at hitting the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline in Tovuz, which are of international importance and energy resources of the Caspian Basin via Georgia and Turkey transport to Europe . The Kars – Akhalkalaki – Tbilisi – Baku railway line also crosses the area as part of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. Yerevan was aiming to impair the aforementioned lines by taking up strategic positions. Azerbaijani officials accused the Armenian leadership of using their actions to turn the public away from the process of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to want to open a second front line. In addition, one suspects behind the Armenian “provocation” the intention of Russia and the organization of the Treaty on Collective Security (CSTO), which Armenia is a member of, to draw into the conflict. Furthermore, Armenia aimed to downplay the difficult social and economic situation in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic . According to the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan , the Azerbaijani government wanted to demonstrate strength with massive military strikes and divert attention from domestic political problems. The Azerbaijani attacks were concentrated in a region in which such would be least expected for Armenia. Foreign Minister Sohrab Mnazakanjan took a similar point of view in an interview with Sky News Arabia . He also accused Turkey of trying to destabilize the situation in the region.

International reactions

In July there were mixed reactions from the international community to the worsening security situation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border. Turkey, as its closest ally, sided with Azerbaijan and gave Baku full support. Shortly after the clashes at the border, scheduled joint and large-scale Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises with the participation of ground and air forces from both countries took place in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic . Moldova , Pakistan and Ukraine , among others , expressed their support for Azerbaijan . The Coordination Office of the Movement of Non-Aligned States adopted a communiqué in which the "military provocations of Armenia" were strongly condemned. Criticism of Armenia's actions also came from the Organization for Islamic Cooperation . Observers, including the Caucasus expert Thomas de Waal and French President Emmanuel Macron , speak of a war of aggression on the part of Azerbaijan. Armenia also received support from the Republic of Cyprus , which criticized Azerbaijan as well as the “destructive steps taken by Turkey”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation called on both parties to restrain and stop the fighting immediately. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also called on Baku and Yerevan to de-escalate. The Congress -Abgeordneten Brad Sherman , Frank Pallone , Adam Schiff and Ed Markey expressed their solidarity with Armenia. At the request of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), an influential Armenian diaspora organization, Sherman and Pallone tabled two amendments to the US defense budget for 2021, which included a ban on the sale of US weapons to Azerbaijan. These were rejected by Congress on July 21. In return, Congressmen Steve Cohen and Steve Chabot initiated two amendments, coordinated with US State and Defense Departments, on the displaced and killed citizens in some post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan). These were approved by the United States House of Representatives and hailed in Azerbaijan as a "great political victory over the Armenian lobby in the US ". António Guterres , Secretary General of the UN, appealed to the conflicting parties and demanded that the "provocative rhetoric" be abandoned and that the negotiation process be returned to. The Co- Chairs of the OSCE- Minsk Group, who mediate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to renounce violence and to initiate substantive negotiations for the purpose of a comprehensive conflict resolution. Attempts to unilaterally change the existing negotiation format were also condemned in the statement.

The use of drones, which creates facts before the regulation of autonomous weapon systems , is highlighted separately in the media in many places and is sometimes associated with high proportions of civilian sacrifices . Max Tegmark commented as follows: "The civilians killed by drones in the new Nagorno-Karabakh War are testimony to the fact that [“ Killer AI ”] is not a science fiction spectulation of a distant future, but is already happening."

Russia and Iran, which are on friendly terms with Armenia, are also responding to Azerbaijan's territorial gains with military threatening gestures. On October 17, the Russian Navy held a naval maneuver in international waters off the Apsheron Peninsula , during which the shooting of unmanned drones was demonstrated. According to pictures of the TASS, Russian troops moved up on the eastern border of Armenia .

After a civilian was killed and three injured on October 21, according to controversial reports during the fighting on the Aras border on the Iranian side, Iran called for heavy artillery to be withdrawn from the river or to ensure its border security itself. In the following days, Iran moved larger units of the army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to the Aras border and began large-scale maneuvers on the Aras on October 25 with the participation of infantry, artillery and drones.

Reactions in the Diaspora

What happened at the front also increased tensions between representatives of the Armenian and Azerbaijani diaspora in European and US cities. Solidarity rallies were held on both sides in London , Brussels , Los Angeles , New York , Berlin , Düsseldorf , Warsaw, etc. Violent clashes broke out, injuring several demonstrators. In Los Angeles, the Armenian National Congress of America (ANCA), which is affiliated with the nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation , organized a large protest in front of the Consulate General of the Republic of Azerbaijan on July 22, 2020, for which, according to police, around 500 Armenian demonstrators gathered. In contrast, there were 30 to 50 Azerbaijani counter-protestors. The situation quickly spiraled out of control as the numerically superior Armenian demonstrators attacked the Azerbaijanis present and captured the whole thing on cameras. As a result, seven Azerbaijanis suffered injuries (four of them had to be hospitalized). A US police officer was also injured and the attacker was arrested. In at least three cases, the police are investigating the Azerbaijanis concerned for hate crime and the attackers are wanted. In his letter addressed to the Consulate General of Azerbaijan, Eric Garcetti , Mayor of Los Angeles, sharply condemned the use of violence against members of the Azerbaijani community. The Simon Wiesenthal Center and the Los Angeles Office of the American Jewish Committee , two leading Jewish organizations in the USA, also described the act of violence by the Armenian demonstrators as disturbing and unacceptable. Another incident occurred outside the Azerbaijani embassy in Brussels when Armenian protesters threw stones at the embassy building. Four Azerbaijanis, including a reporter, were seriously injured in the head. The Belgian police used water cannons to push the protesting Armenians away from the embassy premises. Police later arrested 17 Armenian suspects. On the sidelines of the rally, an Azerbaijani youth was beaten up by a group of Armenian attackers. The office building of the Azerbaijan diplomatic mission in Paris was also damaged. On July 23, 2020, a company vehicle of the Armenian embassy in Berlin was set on fire. The AGBU, a diaspora organization of the Armenians, suspects an anti-Armenian motive behind this. The official police investigations have not yet confirmed this. On July 24th, a group of 20 to 30 masked men smashed the windows of a shisha bar in the Cologne district of Mülheim . According to the statements of the Armenian bar operator, the attackers were allegedly Azerbaijanis who tried to break into the building. The police speak of significant property damage. The Central Council of Armenians in Germany also reports on the devastation of other Armenian businesses in Hamburg . In all of the cases mentioned, no police investigation results are yet available. The Russian capital Moscow was also the scene of numerous mutual excesses of violence. These tensions were accompanied by the so-called "Apricot War", when Armenian fruit traders were not allowed to sell their goods in the "Food City", the largest supermarket in Moscow, "because of safety concerns". This belongs to God Nissanov and Sarach Ilijew , two Russian businessmen from Azerbaijan. A day later, a representative from the Russian Ministry of Commerce announced that the conflict had been resolved and that Armenian items were being offered again in the “Food City”.

Since the outbreak of widespread fighting at the end of September, members of the Armenian diaspora , particularly in the USA, have been calling for support for Armenia and Artsakh. This ranges from calls for recognition and international support to diaspora Armenians who travel to the war zone themselves to participate in the fighting or to support them on the ground. In Germany, hundreds of Armenian demonstrators blocked the A1 to draw attention to the war. In Turkey, the Armenian minority living there comes under social pressure and is exposed to threats because large sections of society and politics have sided with Azerbaijan.

On October 27, 2020 there were numerous protests by Armenian Lebanese in Beirut against the Azerbaijani offensive with the help of Turkey, with clashes with Lebanese police and security forces in front of the Turkish embassy in the suburb of Rabieh. During a blockade of the A 7 Lyon-Marseille motorway by Armenian-French demonstrators demanding international recognition of the Artsakh Republic , some demonstrators were attacked by five Turkish-French men with hammers and knives, injuring four Armenian demonstrators, one of whom was life-threatening .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ SOHR NEWS from October 18th
2. ↑ Եվս 2 զինծառայող է զոհվել - Հրապարակ. July 14, 2020, accessed October 20, 2020 . 
3. ↑ Reuters, November 10th
4. ↑ Border fight heats up in South Caucasus. July 17, 2020, accessed on October 20, 2020 . 
5. ↑ SOHR NEWS from November 6th
6. ↑ Report from November 5th to Kawkaski Usel
7. ↑ Report from November 3rd to Kawkaski Usel
8. ↑ Nearly 90,000 people displaced, lost homes and property in Nagorno Karabakh. Retrieved October 25, 2020 (English). 
9. ↑ ACNUDH | Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Bachelet warns of possible war crimes as attacks continue in populated areas. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
10. ↑ Michael Reinhard Hess: tanks in paradise. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan . Publishing house Dr. Köster, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-89574-906-3 , pp. 127-128 .
11. ^ Azerbaijan: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). (PDF) In: UNHCR / European Commission Humanitarian Aid. October 2009, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
12. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh's Gathering War Clouds. International Crisis Group, June 1, 2017, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
13. ↑ Emil Sanamyan: Azerbaijan makes a move in Nakhichevan amide change of guard in Armenia. In: Civilnet. 2018, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
14. ↑ ^{a b} Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com): Caucasus: Who wants what in Nagorno-Karabakh? | DW | 07.10.2020. Retrieved October 25, 2020 (German). 
15. ^ Andranik Eduard Aslanyan: Energy and geopolitical actors in the South Caucasus. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in an area of ​​tension between interests (1991–2015). Springer-Verlag, 2019, p. 116.
16. ↑ Alexander Sarovic: These countries sell the most weapons. Spiegel-Online, March 9, 2020, accessed October 1, 2020 . 
17. ↑ ^{a b} 'Armenia lacks incentives to launch military action now, Azerbaijan moved in first' - Thomas de Waal. In: Ahval. September 27, 2020, accessed on November 1, 2020 . 
18. ^ ^{A b} Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Aliyev and Pashinyan appeal to the UN. In: Caucasus Watch. September 24, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
19. ^ Thomas de Waal : The Caucasus Burns While Europe Struggles. Carnegie Europe , October 8, 2020.
20. ↑ James Palmer: Why Are Armenia and Azerbaijan Heading to War? In: Foreign Policy. September 28, 2020, Retrieved November 1, 2020 (American English). 
21. ↑ ^{a b c d} tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan continues offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. September 29, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
22. ↑ ^{a b} tagesschau.de: Armenia and Azerbaijan: "Black Rock" focus of conflict. July 18, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
23. ↑ tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh agree ceasefire. July 12, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
24. ↑ tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh agree ceasefire. July 12, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
25. ^ Armenian armed forces committed provocation in Tovuz direction of the front. In: Azertag. July 12, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
26. ↑ ВС Армении возобновили интенсивный огонь по населенным пунктам Товузского района. In: Sputniknews. July 14, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
27. ↑ Азербайджанские ВС отброшены при попытке занять армянский опорный пункт - Минобороны. In: Sputnik Armenia. July 12, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
28. ↑ Армения призналась: информация о взятии азербайджанской высоты - ложь. In: Осетинский информационный портал. July 19, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
29. ^ Azerbaijan protesters demand was after Armenia clashes. In: BBC. July 15, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
30. ↑ Мингечаурская ГЭС как цель включена в тактические планы Армии обороны НКР. In: Yerkramas. July 24, 2018, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
31. ↑ Азербайджан пригрозил Армении ответным ракетным ударом по АЭС. In: Kommersant.ru. July 16, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
32. ↑ В Баку заявили, что гражданские объекты Армении не были целью Азербайджана. In: Gazeta.ru. July 21, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
33. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh accuses Azerbaijan of 170 shelling attacks during a week. In: Caucasian Knot. July 27, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
34. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh accuses Azerbaijan of 170 shelling attacks during a week. In: Caucasian Knot. August 3, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
35. ^ Azerbaijan and Armenia exchange accusations of shelling 11 border villages. In: Caucasian Knot. July 31, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
36. ^ Report from August 17th to Kawkaski Usel
37. ↑ Azerbaijan claims 45 shelling attacks in conflict zone. In: Caucasian Knot. August 25, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
38. ^ Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: new victims in the Towus region. In: Caucasus Watch. September 22, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
39. ↑ Azerbaijan claims machine gun and sniper attacks in conflict zone. In: Caucasian Knot. September 7, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
40. ↑ Azerbaijan counts 61 shelling attacks committed by Armenia. In: Caucasian Knot. September 25, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
41. ↑ In one week the enemy violated the ceasefire 310 times, firing 3,200 shots. In: 1news (ArmTV). September 12, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
42. ↑ Joshua Kucera: Azerbaijan Fires Foreign Minister. In: Eurasianet. July 16, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
43. ↑ "Где ты был?" - Алиев подверг резкой критике работу главы МИД Эльмара Мамедъярова. In: Newsarmenia. July 15, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
44. ↑ Affair over arms deliveries: Tensions between Baku and Belgrade. In: Caucasuswatch. July 20, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 . 
45. ↑ Хроника лавирующего ИЛ-76. In: Minval.az. August 6, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
46. ↑ Ильхам Алиев позвонил Президенту Российской Федерации Владимиру Путину. In: President.az. August 13, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
47. ^ Armenia announces general mobilization after heavy fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Die Welt, September 27, 2020, accessed on September 27, 2020 . 
48. ^ Report from October 6th to Kawkaski Usel
49. ^ Message from October 5th to Kawkaski Usel
50. ↑ Der Spiegel: Nagorno Karabakh: Armenia accuses Turkey of shooting down a fighter jet - Ankara denies - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. September 29, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
51. ↑ News from October 4th by Kawkaski Usel and summary by Caucasus Watch of October 5th
52. ↑ See current satellite image of Cəbrayıl on Google Maps Satellite , the other villages to the east and south-east are almost all destroyed as well
53. ↑ News from October 4th by Kawkaski Usel and summary by Caucasus Watch of October 5th
54. ↑ BBC report from October 6th (photos at the beginning of the report)
55. ^ Message from October 4th to Kawkaski Usel
56. ↑ z. B. This message from October 11th at Kawkaski Usel (mentioned below with Russian name as "Gadrut", according to which two civilians of the city fell victim to these units)
57. ↑ Summary of the day at Caucasus Watch from October 8th.
58. ^ Report from October 8th to Kawkaski Usel
59. ^ Report from October 8th to Kawkaski Usel
60. ^ Message from October 9th to Kawkaski Usel
61. ↑ BBC report of 10 October
62. ↑ tagesschau.de - Brittle fire break in Nagorno-Karabakh , accessed on October 10, 2020
63. ↑ Peter Forster - Karabakh 1: Russia forces ceasefire , accessed on October 10, 2020
64. ↑ Report from October 12th to Kawkaski Usel
65. ↑ Despite the ceasefire. Attack on Azerbaijani city. In: Tagesschau. October 11, 2020, accessed October 11, 2020 . 
66. ↑ Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of missile attacks on districts near Baku. In: Caucasian Knot. October 11, 2020, accessed on October 11, 2020 . 
67. ↑ Evidence video
68. ↑ Video
69. ↑ Video
70. ^ Message from October 14th to Kawkaski Usel
71. ↑ Video
72. ↑ Video analysis by Tim Waters at Bellingcat
73. ^ Report from BARS Media from October 17th
74. ↑ Message from October 15 to Kawkaski Usel
75. ↑ Telegram announcement of October 13th (Russian)
76. ↑ Report of 12 October , from October 13 , October 14 at Caucasian Knot and Oct. 14 at Caucasus Watch
77. ↑ Example of an Armenian Telegram message from October 16
78. ↑ Report from October 17 to Kawkaski Usel and also from October 17 from Deutsche Welle
79. ↑ Both sides obliged to 'spare and protect civilians' over Nagorno-Karabakh fighting declares UN's Guterres. In: UN News. October 18, 2020, accessed on October 19, 2020 . 
80. ↑ Azerbaijan: Statement by the Spokesperson on the strikes on the city of Ganja. In: European Union External Action (eeas). October 17, 2020, accessed on October 19, 2020 . 
81. ^ Message from October 18 to Kawkaski Usel
82. ^ Article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung about MSN
83. ^ Message from October 19 to Kawkaski Usel
84. ^ Message from October 19 to Kawkaski Usel
85. ↑ Caucasus Watch daily report on October 29th.
86. ↑ Telegram message from Harutjunjan (Russian)
87. ↑ Telegram message from Əliyev (Azerbaijani)
88. ^ Message from October 20 to Kawkaski Usel
89. ^ Telegram report from the army from October 22nd. 5:08 p.m., Caucasus Watch daily report from 22.10 .
90. ↑ Report at gazeta.ru from October 22nd.
91. ↑ z. B. World News from October 20, the information was similar in the following days.
92. ↑ Message from Arm TV1 NEWS from October 22nd. and
93. ↑ On the morning of the 21st several, e.g. B. this at Bala Soltanlı on the middle Hakari, the following day z. B. this at Külbird almost 30 km to the north.
94. ^ Message from October 22nd to Kawkaski Usel
95. ^ Telegram message from the press spokesman for the President of Artsakh, Wagram Pogossjan
96. ^ Message from October 22nd to Kawkaski Usel
97. ↑ Report from October 21 to Kawkaski Usel , regular reports in the following days
98. ↑ E.g. report from October 21 to Kawkaski Usel
99. ↑ On October 24th Cards issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
100. ↑ E.g. these Armenian photos of destroyed tanks
101. ^ Message from October 25th to Kawkaski Usel
102. ↑ On October 24th Cards issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
103. ↑ Voice of Armenia pictures from October 18.
104. ↑ On October 24th Cards issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
105. ↑ Report from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
106. ↑ Report from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
107. ↑ Report from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
108. ↑ Report from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
109. ^ Caucasus Watch report on the 30th day of the war
110. ^ Public situation maps of Arzach from October 27th
111. ^ Message from October 27th to Kawkaski Usel
112. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from 29.19. , Caucasus Watch recap on October 28th
113. ↑ Telegram display of the 59 killed soldiers
114. ↑ Telegram message from October 28. 7:00 p.m.
115. ^ Message from October 29th to Kawkaski Usel
116. ↑ Caucasus Watch summary on October 28th
117. ↑ "Смерчи" посеяли смерть в Гараюсифли. In: Кавказский Узел. October 28, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 (Russian). 
118. ↑ Report from October 28 to Kawkaski Usel , with one dead and three injured, see report from the afternoon
119. ↑ Message from October 28th to Kawkaski Usel
120. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 29th. 19:29 , the Russian abbreviation ДРГ used there stands for Диверсионно -разведывательная группа (= sabotage and reconnaissance groups)
121. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 30th. 11:13 am , the message says “2 villages east of Karintag”, a village south of Shuschi . The next eastern neighboring village is Sghnach, east of it follows Awetaranoz.
122. ↑ Telegram report from an Azerbaijani user from the evening, who refers to the Armenian side (mistakenly uses the incorrect spelling of the Azerbaijani village name as "Çanaxçı")
123. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 30th. 8:02 a.m.
124. ↑ News of ArmTV 1 of 31 October
125. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel announcement from 01.11.
126. ↑ Localization of the source of the fire
127. ↑ Telegram message from Sputnik Armenia
128. ↑ Telegram message from Karabakh News 10/30. 09:05 am
129. ↑ Agency report (dpa / Reuters / AFP) at Deutsche Welle
130. ^ Telegram message from Media Post Azerbaycan October 30th. 12:01 p.m.
131. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
132. ↑ ArmTV1 report from October 31.
133. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
134. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
135. ↑ Pictures from ANNA News (Russian) from the Armenian side at Shuschi on October 31st, also with remote shots of the "divers" , according to the description, the attack was then abandoned
136. ↑ Telegram message from Army spokesman Howanissian
137. ↑ Message (in addition to other villages in other regions)
138. ^ Message from Armenia News from November 3rd.
139. ↑ message from army spokesman Howanissian
140. ↑ message from army spokesman Howanissian
141. ↑ Armenian situation map from October 3rd. in the evening for the public
142. ↑ Telegram images of Azerbaijani army vehicles, uploaded by Artsakh
143. ↑ Telegram message from Azerbaijani journalists
144. ↑ Information provided by the Armenian army spokesman Howanissian at the briefing on November 3rd.
145. ↑ Pictures of the Armenian station Bars Media on November 3rd. or a few days earlier , the village is Karin Tak.
146. ↑ Report from November 4th to Kawkaski Usel
147. ↑ Report from November 4th to Kawkaski Usel ; ANNA News shot these pictures first from the shot at Shuschi, then from the fighting on the street
148. ↑ News of Howanissians deputy Mkrtitschjan
149. ^ Telegram report from an Armenian reporter
150. ↑ Telegram pictures from Arzach
151. ↑ Briefing with army spokesman Howanissian on November 8th.
152. ↑ Telegram message from the Azerbaijani media service from November 7th. 9:32 am
153. ↑ Telegram message from Azerbaijan from November 4. 6:12 pm
154. ↑ Telegram message from the Azerbaijani media service dated November 8th. 9:51 a.m. , Spiegel report by Christian Esch, November 8th .
155. ^ BBC news from October 8th.
156. ↑ briefing with army spokesman Howanissian on the evening of 8/11.
157. ↑ Tagesschau report on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh on November 8th. by Silvia Stöber
158. ↑ Telegram message from the Armenian government of November 9th. 7:25 am
159. ↑ here from army spokesman Howanissian , there were similar reports from his deputy Stepanjan and from the prime minister
160. ↑ Report on his statement with a clear swipe at the Armenian information policy
161. ↑ e.g. here at 5:04 pm and here at 10:47 am
162. ^ TASS Telegram rendering of the Armenian declaration
163. ↑ Nagorno Karabakh: Russian military helicopter shot down in Armenia. In: DER SPIEGEL. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
164. ↑ Armenia PM says he signed agreement to end Nagorno-Karabakh war. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
165. ↑ ^{a b} tagesschau.de: War for Nagorno-Karabakh: A historic day in the South Caucasus. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
166. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan and Armenia agree on a ceasefire. In: DER SPIEGEL. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
167. ↑ На устранение ущерба в результате обстрела армянами Товузского района выделен 1 млн. манатов. In: Apa.az. August 6, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
168. ↑ Скончался тяжело раненный в боях в Тавуше армянский военнослужащий. In: Sputnik Armenia. July 25, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
169. ↑ Armenian forces confidently repel all attacks: Pashinyan on border clashes with Azerbaijan. In: Armenia in the News. July 16, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
170. ↑ Life of Armenia village resident wounded in Azerbaijani drone strike not in danger. In: Armenpress. July 17, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
171. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh battles - 72 Syrian mercenaries killed since Turkey threw them into raging conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia • The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. In: The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. October 4, 2020, Retrieved October 5, 2020 (American English). 
172. ↑ Half of Nagorno-Karabakh's population displaced by fighting. Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), October 7, 2020, accessed October 9, 2020 (British English). 
173. ↑ Report of October 10 by Deutsche Welle (English)
174. ↑ ^{a b} Nagorno-Karabakh conflict | New batch of mercenaries' bodies arrives in Syria, and Turkish intelligence struggles to recruit fighters and send them to Azerbaijan. In: The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights. October 13, 2020, accessed October 14, 2020 (American English). 
175. ↑ 31 civilians killed, 154 injured as a result of Armenian provocations. APA.az, October 8, 2020, accessed October 9, 2020 (Azerbaijani). 
176. ↑ 22 civilians killed, 95 injured from the Armenian side as a result of Azerbaijani aggression. Retrieved October 9, 2020 . 
177. ↑ Armenia / Azerbaijan: Civilians must be protected from use of banned cluster bombs . Amnesty International . October 5, 2020, accessed October 14, 2020
178. ↑ Reporters in a coma after church bombardment! . IMAGE. October 9, 2020, accessed October 13, 2020
179. ↑ Dead and injured in new fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh . The mirror . October 8, 2020, accessed October 14, 2020
180. ^ Caucasus Watch report of October 29th (fourth paragraph), Amnesty International report of October 29th
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182. ↑ Der Spiegel: Russia demands the withdrawal of mercenaries from Nagorno-Karabakh - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. October 1, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
183. ↑ Maximilian Popp, Guillaume Perrier, Daham Alasaad: Syrian mercenaries in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Erdogan's shadow warriors . In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved October 5, 2020 . 
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185. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia accuses Turkey of sending 4,000 fighters from Syria. In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved October 5, 2020 . 
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192. ↑ Fahri Aksüt: 'Turkey will continue to stand with Azerbaijan'. In: Anadolu Agency. July 20, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
193. ↑ Mushvig Mehdiyev: Azerbaijan, Turkey Team Up For Large-Scale Military Drills. In: Caspiannews. July 29, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
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195. ↑ OIC General Secretariat condemns Armenia's Attack On The Tovuz region in Azerbaijan. In: OIC. July 14, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
196. ↑ Armenia lacks incentives to launch military action now, Azerbaijan moved in first '- Thomas de Waal . Ahval. September 27, 2020, accessed October 10, 2020
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200. ↑ Mike Pompeo: USA urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to immediately deescalate situation, resume peace talks. In: Aysor.am. July 15, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
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203. ^ Azerbaijan's great success in the US Congress. In: Azertag. July 22, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 . 
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205. ↑ Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. In: osce.org. July 24, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
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209. ↑ The civilians killed by drones in the new Nagorno-Karabach <sic!> War are testimony to the fact that this isn't far-future sci-fi speculation, but something already happening. Max Tegmark on [1] , October 16, 2020
210. ^ Article by Deutsche Welle on October 16.
211. ↑ Pictures by Sergej Bobylew from TASS on Twitter
212. ↑ Message from Almasdar News ( October 4th )
213. ↑ Brief message from RIA Novosti from 25.10. on Telegram
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227. ↑ tagesschau.de: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Armenians in Turkey under pressure. October 12, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
228. ^ Short report by Ya Libnan
229. ↑ Message from October 28th to Kawkaski Usel