Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

The conflict region by 2020

 ruled by Arzach, formerly the autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh ruled by Arzach, outside the formerly autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh


 ruled by Azerbaijan, but claimed by Artsakh

date	from July 12, 2020 September 27 to November 10, 2020
place	Nagorno-Karabakh
exit

Parties to the conflict
Armenia ( Armed Forces of Armenia )  Artsakh Republic ( Armed Forces of the Artsakh Republic )	Azerbaijan ( Azerbaijani Armed Forces ) Supported by  Turkey with Syrian mercenaries (including Hamza Brigade and Sultan Murad Division ) (denies direct involvement)
Commander
Poor Sarkissjan Arajik Harutjunjan	İlham Əliyev
Troop strength
Unknown number of Armenian soldiers	Unknown number of Azerbaijani soldiers at least 2580 Syrian mercenaries (according to SOHR , as of November 6th)
losses
5 dead Armenian soldiers (own information, in July 2020) ______________________ 2425 previously confirmed dead Armenian soldiers (own information, as of November 19)	12 dead Azerbaijani soldiers (own information, in July 2020) ______________________ 2783 dead Azerbaijani soldiers in autumn 2020 (own information, December 3, 2020) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 250 dead Syrian mercenaries (according to SOHR, as of November 6)
92 dead and 404 injured Azerbaijani civilians (September 27 - November 5) at least 46 dead and 146 injured Armenian civilians (September 27 - November 3) 90,000 refugees from the Republic of Artsakh 40,000 Azerbaijani refugees

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war is a military clash between the armed forces of Armenia and those of the Artsakh Republic on the one hand and the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the other, which began in July 2020. It is part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Nagorno-Karabakh region, in which the Artsakh Republic declared itself independent in 1991 and won a war against Azerbaijan with Armenian support, but was not recognized internationally.

The fighting began on the joint Armenian-Azerbaijani state border northwest of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides accuse each other of causing the escalation through fire or ground offensives. This was followed by further fighting and incidents on the common border and on the armistice line between Azerbaijan and the Artsakh Republic. On September 27, 2020, the fighting on the ceasefire line escalated into a large-scale armed conflict and an Azerbaijani offensive that advanced far into the Artsakh area. Cities near the front as well as places further away were bombed and shelled. On November 10, 2020, direct combat operations after one of Russia brokered agreement between the conflicting parties ended.

Way to war

Main article: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Topography of Arzach, initial situation of the conflict.

The main point of dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the Nagorno-Karabakh region , which was occupied by Armenian forces together with surrounding areas in the course of the military conflict between 1992 and 1994. By then, it is estimated that between 20,000 and 40,000 people had been killed in the conflict since 1988. Around 750,000 Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and the neighboring Azerbaijani regions conquered by Armenia became refugees or internally displaced persons . About 200,000 Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, 300,000 Armenians from the unoccupied rest of Azerbaijan. According to international law, this belongs to the majority of Armeniansinhabited Nagorno-Karabakh, which had formed an autonomous oblast in the Association of the Azerbaijani SSR since the time of the Soviet Union , to Azerbaijan. Since the war, both states and, to a large extent, members of both peoples have been hostile to each other and have refused to live together.

Fighting has been repeated since the 1994 ceasefire. Most recently, Azerbaijan captured a few square kilometers of land on the armistice line in 2016 and took some positions in Nakhchivan on the border with Armenia in 2018. While Turkey always stands on the side of Azerbaijan in the conflict, the cultural commonalities of both Turkic states become in the close relationship between the two statesstresses that Russia's northern neighbor has good relations with both countries. While Turkey also cooperates militarily with Azerbaijan, Russia supplies large numbers of weapons to both countries - albeit at a preferential price to Armenia, where a Russian military base is also maintained. According to analyst Stefan Meister, Russia is trying to keep both states dependent without actually being Armenia's protective power. For example, Russia has been active as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict several times since the 1990s, but without success. Like Russia, its western neighbor Georgia plays an ambivalent role in the conflict, but has little influence. the Iran, which borders directly on the Republic of Artsakh, is closer to Armenia, as it fears Turkey's growing influence in the region, as well as the possible separatism-promoting effect of a successful Azerbaijan on the Azerbaijani minority in northwestern Iran. On the other hand, Azerbaijan now sources many of its weapons from Israel : between 2015 and 2019, 60% of Azerbaijani arms imports came from there, including state-of-the-art weapons such as drones and air and missile defense technology. The European Union has little direct influence in the region, but is interested in calming the conflict.

On the occasion of the incidents in July, the Azerbaijani side assumed that Armenia was aiming to hit the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline in Tovuz, which are of international importance and energy resources of the Caspian Transport basin to Europe via Georgia and Turkey . The Kars – Akhalkalaki – Tbilisi – Baku railway line also crosses the area as part of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. YerevanI aim to impair the aforementioned lines by taking on the strategic positions. Azerbaijani officials accused the Armenian leadership of using their actions to turn the public away from the process of solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and to want to open a second front line. In addition, one suspects behind the Armenian “provocation” the intention of Russia and the organization of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), to which Armenia is a member, to draw into the conflict. Furthermore, Armenia aimed to downplay the difficult social and economic situation in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic . According to the Armenian Prime MinisterNikol Pashinyan wanted to demonstrate the strength of the Azerbaijani government with massive military strikes and divert attention from domestic political problems. The Azerbaijani attacks were concentrated in a region in which such would be least expected for Armenia. Foreign Minister Sohrab Mnazakanjan took a similar point of view in an interview with Sky News Arabia . He also accused Turkey of trying to destabilize the situation in the region.

According to an analysis by regional expert Thomas de Waal , Azerbaijan alone was interested in escalation, as the Armenian side had already achieved their goals in the war in the early 1990s and now only wanted to defend them. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has set itself the goal of bringing the territory back under its own control. Since the last war, both sides have armed themselves and, since the conflict flared up in July, also intensified their mutual rhetoric. The recent change of government in the Republic of Artsakh and its changed policy, such as the announced move of the parliament to the traditionally Azerbaijani city of Shusha, could also have been viewed as provocation by the government in Baku. The Azerbaijani ally Turkey is now, unlike before, ready to engage in international military action, while the politics of the United States is preoccupied with the presidential election campaign and Russia is already preoccupied with other conflicts. Azerbaijan therefore wants to take advantage of the international situation and improve its own position in the conflict in the period up to winter. According to de Waal, there is also the burden of the corona pandemic in western countries , the disagreement in the European Union regarding its policy towards Turkey, such as the gas dispute in the Mediterranean Seashowed, and the consequent restricted ability of the European Union to act diplomatically, favorable conditions for Azerbaijan to start the war with Turkish support right now. Analyst James Palmer adds that relations between the conflicting parties had already deteriorated in 2019 and are under domestic political pressure this year due to the corona pandemic and its economic effects. As a reason for the Azerbaijani approach, Stefan Meister adds that the Armenian side is creating facts through construction projects and the settlement of Armenians in Artsakh that, from the Azerbaijani point of view, are being ignored internationally, but no longer want to be accepted. Already in the weeks before the first fighting began, İlham Əliyev criticized himthat the OSCE Minsk Group was inactive on this matter. Christian Esch shares the view that only Azerbaijan and not Armenia had an interest in another war. Baku was well prepared for a war and after all these years had lost hope that Armenia would be willing to make concessions, especially after the new Prime Minister Pashinyan emphasized that "Artsakh is Armenia". In addition, the authoritarian ruling Əliyev must pay attention to the mood in the country, which was already directed towards a war against Armenia after the fighting in July and accused his government of being too indulgent.

development

Fight from July 2020

The Armenian-Azerbaijani border sections (marked with red squares) where the fighting took place from July 12-16, 2020.

At the beginning of July 2020, there was increased fighting on the ceasefire line in Nagorno-Karabakh. Several dozen soldiers on both sides were killed in the bombardment and, according to some information, several tanks were destroyed. A new ceasefire agreement was therefore concluded at noon on July 12th. Towards the evening of the same day, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported a "gross violation of the ceasefire" in the Tovuz border region north of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenian units who had fired heavy artillery in the area. The Armenian military went on the offensive in order to take fighting positions of the Azerbaijani army. On the same day, Armenia claimed that Azerbaijani troops attempted to get into a "UAZ-469 military vehicle to approach Armenian positions ”. After the intervention of the Armenian troops, the Azerbaijani soldiers left the vehicle and withdrew. Azerbaijan then fired artillery at the Armenian border guards, but was thrown back after counter-attacks. During the four-day battles that followed, military sites and civilian objects were also targeted on both sides. The fighting on the border did not lead to territorial gains on either side. In the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, up to 30,000 people took to the streets and demanded the reconquest of Nagorno-Karabakh. The partly violent protests were broken up by the police.

After the clashes at the border, Russian-Armenian and Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises took place. In Azerbaijan, the threat of an Armenian military strike against the Mingəçevir reservoir , which had been threatened in the past, was discussed. A rocket attack on the Armenian nuclear power plant in Mezamor was considered as a counter-attack . The Azerbaijani presidential administration later stated that the Armenian civil infrastructure was not a target of the Azerbaijani armed forcesbe. Parallel to the fighting on the border sections between Armenia and Azerbaijan, violations of the fragile ceasefire between Azerbaijan and the breakaway, internationally unrecognized republic of Arzach , which has only been inhabited by Armenians, occurred since 1994which lasted after July 27th. Artsakh accused Azerbaijan of 260 ceasefire violations in the week from July 18 to 25, and slightly fewer from July 25 to August 3. Azerbaijan accused Armenia and Artsakh of attacks by shelling even after July 27th, so 49 attacks from July 30th to 31st or on its positions in Azerbaijani villages in the Tovuz Rayon on August 15th 30 shells, on August 16th 37 times and on the following day 31. For August 24, Azerbaijan again reported several dozen attacks on border villages by the Armenian side. During the course of September there were repeated reports of exchanges of fire and shelling of settlements and positions on both sides, up to the week before large-scale fighting began on September 27. On the 21st On September 30th, the presidents of both states appealed to the UN to interfere in the conflict and accused the other side of promoting an escalation. At the same time, more extensive war preparations became known: the drawing in of vehicles and special forces in Azerbaijan as well as the increased recruitment of women in Armenia.

As a result of the fighting in July, Elmar Məmmədyarov was released from the post of Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan. Məmmədyarov, who has held this post since 2004, was accused by President İlham Əliyev of being inactive during the days of the military confrontation. Under his leadership, the Azerbaijani diplomacy was passive and instead had "senseless negotiations" with Armenia and the like. a. on the Covid-19 situation in the region. After the border fighting, tensions arose between Azerbaijan and Serbia over Serbian arms deliveries to Armenia. This referred to Azerbaijan as an "unfriendly move" that would reduce the strategic relationship between Baku and Belgradeundermine. The Azerbaijani media also reported on Russian arms shipments that on July 4th, July 17th and August 4th - before, during and after the Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes - from Russia via the Rostov - Mineralnye Vody - Aktau - Turkmenbaşy - Rasht - route Meghri - Yerevan were transported. During a phone call between İlham Əliyev and Vladimir Putin , the Azerbaijani head of state expressed his concern and dissatisfaction with the intensive Russian arms deliveries to Armenia totaling over 400 tons.

Open war from September 27 to November 9, 2020

September and October

Play media file

Day-by-day animation of the front development according to the news collections of the Liveuamap page. Red: Arzach; blue: captured by the Azerbaijani army; dotted blue: regions in which Azerbaijani special forces were active.

On September 27, 2020, new fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Artsakh or Armenia. Both the Artsakh Republic and Armenia proclaimed a state of emergency and called for general mobilizationas well as Azerbaijan for some of its regions. Armenia and Azerbaijan mutually accused each other of starting the aggression. While Armenia feared that Azerbaijan would recapture the area, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of having made negotiations pointless through recent demands and of preparing for the conquest of further areas of Azerbaijan with Armenian fire at locations close to the front. In particular, near the front line, there was mutual artillery shelling of positions as well as border villages and nearby cities such as Martuni , Martakert and Hadrut on the Arzachian side, Bərdə , Goranboy , Tərtər andAğcabədi in Azerbaijani. In addition, bombing with drones and rockets, especially in the capital of Arzach, Stepanakert , is documented. Armenian missiles also hit more distant cities such as Gəncə and Mingəçevir , even two near the Azerbaijani capital Baku. There were also reports of artillery fire on Armenian territory and Armenia said a Sukhoi-25 fighter jet had been shot down by Turkey, which the opposing side denied.

Remains of the old bus stop in Cəbrayıl (2014)

The mutual shelling was followed by an Azerbaijani ground offensive against Arzach in the northern valley of the Tartar and especially in the south on the Aras on the Iranian border between September 28 and October 5 . In the south, the city of Cəbrayıl and over a dozen eastern and southeastern neighboring villages were taken, but like the city itself, as places formerly inhabited by Azerbaijanis, have been destroyed and abandoned since 1994. In addition, the first forays into the city of Füzuli , which was abandoned like Cəbrayıl, were made from 29 September . In the north, the two majority (Armenian) inhabited villages of Talış and Madaghis becamecaptured according to Azerbaijani reports. While the capture of Talysh was confirmed by film recordings, Arzach denied the capture of the southern Madaghis. The capture of the Murovdağ Mountains, reported at the end of September , from which Azerbaijan joins the road from Eastern Armenia to Martakert claims to have interrupted in Arzach could never be confirmed. Parallel to the first successes of Azerbaijan, the presidents of both countries made international efforts to promote their side. While Pashinyan proposed the use of Russian peacekeepers and eventually urged the international community to recognize Artsakh, Əliyev insisted on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The shelling of places in all districts of Azerbaijan bordering Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Stepanakert and other cities in Artsakh, increased from October 7th. The Ghazanchezoz Cathedral in Shushi, which was used as a shelter, was hit. Azerbaijan denies firing at the church.

View over Hadrut

On October 9, Azerbaijan announced that it had captured Hadrut in the heart of Nagorno-Karabakh. Later reports only indicated activities by Azerbaijani sabotage fighters in the area. On October 10, after more than 10 hours of mediation by Russia, a ceasefire was agreed from 10 a.m. Actual peace negotiations should then take place under the leadership of the Minsk Group of the OSCE . Just hours after the ceasefire went into effect, both sides accused each other of breaking it. On October 11, 2020, the mutual shelling with artillery and rockets continued, Azerbaijan reported a rocket attack on Gəncəalmost 100 kilometers north of the combat area. Ten civilians were killed and 35 injured, Armenia and Artsakh deny responsibility. The Azerbaijani ground offensive was also resumed and the income from the villages of Mataghis / Suqovuşan in the north and Suleymanlı southeast of Hadrutreported. The Azerbaijani army reported on the nights of October 12-14 of Armenian counter-offensives and a tense situation in the south around Cəbrayıl and Füzuli and in the east around Ağdam and Martakert. When the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense announced the control of the city on October 13, residents of the region described this as fake, the close-ups came from a neighboring Armenian village. While the capture of several villages around Hadrut was reported, the situation in the city remained controversial for days. An Armenian report from around October 14 mentions a repulsed Azerbaijani attack from October 11, and another video from October 16 also shows an Armenian control.

The medieval bridges and the Choda Afarin dam, completed in 2010. On the right the abandoned village of Choda Afarin ( Azerbaijani Xudafərin ), on the left and in the foreground Iranian territory

Both warring parties reported unanimously on October 15 that the tactics of Azerbaijani sabotage units behind the front were pushing back the Armenian army here. The day before, the capture of several villages in the vicinity of Füzuli by Azerbaijan had been reported again. On October 15-17, the Armenian side reported heavy fighting, particularly in the north around Mataghis and on the Iranian border in the south, while on October 15 a further six locations in this region were reported as captured by Azerbaijan. Bombings took place again at places in Artsakh, just as the Azerbaijani side was reported that villages and small towns near the border were fired again. In the early hours of the 17th In October, rockets again hit residential areas in the second largest Azerbaijani city of Gəncə, killing 13 people and injuring over 52. On the same day Azerbaijan reported the capture of further villages near Füzuli and confirmed by the other side that the medieval ones had been reachedChoda Afarin bridges on the nearby Choda Afarin reservoir on the southern border river Aras by the Azerbaijani army. A temporary tactical-humanitarian ceasefire was agreed for October 18 at midnight, also for the exchange of captured and killed soldiers. The mutual shelling of settlements then decreased significantly.

Azerbaijan reported 13 more villages in the vicinity of Cəbrayıl as captured on October 19 , bringing the total number of places according to Azerbaijani captured to 74. Most places have been abandoned settlements since 1994, including the small town of Füzuli , which Azerbaijan reported as captured on October 17th. On the morning of October 20, Artsakh reported new fighting on all fronts and a successful Armenian counter-offensive from the north towards the Choda Afarin reservoir. Around noon, the President of Arzach, Arajik Harutjunjan reported on Telegram that the main fighting had meanwhile been 30–40 km southwest of the reservoir in the cities of Zəngilan ( Armenian Kowsakan) and Mincivan ( Armenian Midschnawan ) and a neighboring village, Azerbaijani President İlham Əliyev shortly afterwards claimed five places in the region, including Zəngilan, as captured. As both sides unanimously report, Azerbaijani troops broke through to the south-west during the Armenian counter-offensive, reaching settlements between Armenia and old Nagorno-Karabakh , which were also abandoned in 1994, but afterwards at least partially with Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan in recent years also with Armenian-Syrian civil war refugees and some Armenian Lebanesewere repopulated. On October 21 and 22, Azerbaijan and Armenia reported fierce fighting on all, especially the southern fronts. Azerbaijan reported other villages as captured by the macaws up west to Ağbənd on the border with Armenia, Armenia initially denied the complete conquest of the Arzachian-Iranian border, as well as the Azerbaijani control over Zəngilan. Arzach and Armenia, on the other hand, report a “stable-serious” and “mixed” situation, some offensives to the north in the mountains could have been repulsed at night and areas could have been regained in a counter-offensive towards Aras. Azerbaijan confirmed that there were serious Armenian counter-offensives in the north around Martakert / Ağdərə,

The Armenian village of Sheker north of Hadrut

At the same time, both sides reported an Azerbaijani offensive from Füzuli to the north, in which some empty villages nearby were captured. There was also fighting in the Armenian villages around Scheker ( Armenian Շեխեր , Azerbaijani Şəkər ) and Jiwani, about 15 km north of Hadrut (as the crow flies, two valleys further) and 15 km northwest of Füzuli. The Azerbaijani units involved are special forces, referred to by the Armenian side as reconnaissance and sabotage units. Also the northern village of Gerger ( Armenian Հերհեր (Herher), Azerbaijani Qarqar ) and the city of Martuni ( Azerbaijani Xocavənd ) were shot at. Martuni and Martakert , the two eastern cities near the front , were bombed frequently, Martakert on 23/24. October also with regular air force, on the night of the 24th after four quiet nights again with Stepanakert . Nearby Azerbaijani villages were also fired at again.

Qubadlı (poor. Kashunik)

On the night of October 23rd to 24th, an Azerbaijani offensive against the Lachin Corridor began with regular troops with tank and artillery units and air support in three formations: 1. The lower Hakariupwards, 2. east parallel through the mountain villages to protect the eastern flank, 3. from Cəbrayıl over the mountains in the direction of central Hakari, which could also enclose the defenders who lead counter-offensives in the direction of the reservoir. The data from Arzach correspond to the Azerbaijani data about captured villages on the lower Hakari and west of Cəbrayıl. The heaviest fighting took place in this region, Armenia posted photos of destroyed Azerbaijani tanks and artillery positions, and Azerbaijan posted photos of captured villages in the social networks. Azerbaijan accused the defenders of attacking offensive troops from the territory of Armenia; Armenia is protected by a military assistance agreement with Russia and its border troops come from Russia. In addition, the situation maps presented for the first time on October 24th by Artsakh and Armenia again reported fighting in the villages north of Hadrut to Sheker and the Woghdschi / Keren river near Z beingilan / Kowsakan up to the vicinity of the Armenian border. In contrast, the front in the north (Armenian photos show a trenched trench warfare) remained almost unchanged, according to Arzachian information, Mataghis was again controlled by Armenians. The long contested and contested cities According to Arzachian information, Mataghis was again controlled by the Armenians. The long contested and contested cities According to Arzachian information, Mataghis was again controlled by the Armenians. The long contested and contested citiesAccording to Arzach, Hadrut , Zəngilan and Mincivan have been controlled by the Azerbaijani army for a few days on October 24th (for Hadrut possibly since October 16th). On the evening of October 25, Azerbaijan announced that it had captured the small town of Qubadlı in the southwest and some neighboring villages, which the Armenian side confirmed on October 27. Through the mediation of the USA, the warring parties agreed a third humanitarian ceasefire for October 26, 8 a.m. after a few minutes they accused each other of breaking it.

The Armenian village of Avetaranoz (aserb. Çanaqçı)

On October 26th, the Azerbaijani shelling of Martakert, Martuni and also of Askeran in the east increased significantly. According to Azerbaijani information, Arzach fired around 200 artillery projectiles into the villages east of the front on that day alone. On October 27, Artsakh and Armenia also reported fighting from the Armenian village Avetaranoz, about 30 km northwest of Scheker on the road to Shushi (Shusha), while in the southwest they reported successful counter offensives. Azerbaijani troops stood on October 27 at Hakari near Xanlıq ( Armenian Ischkanadsor ), more south than three days earlier and more south than Qubadlı on Bazarçay. On the night of October 27-28, the Azerbaijani side reported Armenian counter-offensives in all combat areas from the northeast to the southwest, which could only be stopped with great losses on both sides, which the Armenian side reported by reporting the deaths of 59 Armenians Soldiers confirmed more than any night before. On the afternoon of the 28th, Əliyev reported the Azerbaijani capture of villages again after a long break, but in the evening the Armenian Defense Ministry announced that another Azerbaijani attack on the Lachin corridor had been repulsed and reported on October 29th, the opposing side in the To have pushed the Qubadlı region south again.

The intensification of the fighting was linked to increasing mutual shelling. On the afternoon of October 28, a street in Bərdə was destroyed by Armenian Smerch rockets, killing 21 people and injuring around 70, and shelling further villages in the region Tərtər and Goranboy and from Armenia also Tovuz and Gədəbəy . The day before, a residential building in the village of Qarayusifli near Bərdə was fired at with Armenian BM-30 rockets (Smertsch). As a result, 5 people were killed and 17 others were injured. In Arzach, a street in Shuschi was destroyed on the 28th and nearby villages were shot at, in Stepanakertthe maternity hospital with the surrounding urban area.

In the evening, reported the Armenian side fighting against Azerbaijani reconnaissance and sabotage units in Awetaranoz and western neighboring village Sghnach, the next morning she claimed the two villages as "by saboteurs cleansed", but fighting was reported from Awetaranoz again in the evening. Also on the night of the 30th and in the morning, the Armenian side reported an "unsuccessful" Azerbaijani offensive in the north, whereupon the Armenian side accused Azerbaijan of setting fire to the forests around Mataghis and Talis and shortly afterwards in the southern combat area with phosphorus bombs , the warring parties accused each other, but a check of the source of the fire with Sentinel satellite imagesrevealed that they are all on the Armenian side of the frontline, in one case in an Armenian village, which makes it more likely that it was caused by the Azerbaijani army. On October 30, fighting in the direction of the Lachin Corridor was reported again, with mutual artillery fire across the Armenian border. Russia declared that it would give Armenia "all necessary support" in protecting its territory. Əliyev announced some income from the village at noon.

On October 30, 2020, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan again agreed in Geneva, with the mediation of the OSCE , to end the mutual targeted shelling of civilian populations. On October 31, 7:10 a.m. local time, the Stepanakert market and the surrounding area were shelled. There were no victims because most of the civilians who had not escaped were still in air-raid shelters at this time. Azerbaijan denied responsibility and accused the Armenian side of again shooting at border villages. The shelling of border areas in Azerbaijan as well as in Artsakh and partly in Armenia itself continued until the end of the war.

November

The Armenian village Karin Tak (Azerbaijani Daşaltı ) below the plateau (Aserb. Cıdır Düzü ), on which Shuschi is also located

According to the Abkhaz- Russian news agency ANNA News, Azerbaijani special forces broke an attempted attack south of Shushi ( Azerbaijani Şuşa) from. On November 2, the Armenian side reported another Azerbaijani attack in the direction of the Latschin Corridor, the Azerbaijani side reported the villages of Tschaprand, Haji Isagli and Goscha Bulag in Jäbrail, Dere Giletag and Boyuk Giletag in Zangilan as well as Muradxanlı and Milan Hakıqlı and İşari east in the mountains, all three about 40 km south of Latschin as taken. According to the Armenian media, the Azerbaijani army was thrown back to its starting positions the following night. In addition, Azerbaijan carried out another offensive in the southeast around Sheker between Füzuli and Shuschi, with some positions near the town of Tschartar ( Azerbaijani Çartar / Güneyçartar) southeast of Martuni. Attack attempts were also made in the direction of Karmir Schuka ( Azerbaijani Qırmızı Bazar ), a neighboring village to the west of Scheker, and in the north in the direction of Martakert. On November 3, an Azerbaijani offensive followed on the Füzuli-Shuschi road near Sheker, Karmir Schuka and the neighboring village of Taghaward, this time not with special units, but with regular army units, according to images published by Arzach, with Azerbaijani positions in Füzuli also being shot at from the Armenian side . According to Armenian information, the offensive was repulsed. During the fighting with Azerbaijani special forces / divers / saboteurs south of Shushi, which went to Karin Tak ( Azerbaijani Dașaltı, Armenian Քարին տակ , sometimes also called Karin Tag in Western Armenia ), Stepanakert and especially Shushi were bombed by Azerbaijan again, and some Azerbaijani villages to the east were again shot at by Arzach. On October 4, the authorities of Arzach closed parts of the road from Shushi to Goris in Armenia after Azerbaijani special forces working around the Great Kirs near Karin Tak the night beforeare still active, had been discovered. On the evening of November 5, they reported that the stretch of road at the Lisagorski Pass had been "cleared". Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani army attempted a new, fifth attack on the Lachin Corridor with the support of the Air Force, the Armenian side published photographs of destroyed tanks and confirmed their failure in the following days. The towns reported as captured by the Azerbaijani president on October 7th are again south of the Hakari, including Bala Soltanlı and Mərdanlı, which were already reported in October. Also on November 4, the Azerbaijani side reported the infiltration of Armenian sabotage units in the western southern region of Zəngilan, which had been driven out with heavy losses.

View over Schuschi / Şuşa (2013), on the left the Ghasantschezoz Cathedral ( Cathedral of the Holy Savior)

After November 5th, Artsakh reported significantly increased attacks by the Azerbaijani army with special forces, tanks, air force, artillery and drones and fierce fighting for Karin Tak and the ancient capital of Karabakh, which is important in the historical Azerbaijani and Armenian memory: Şuşa / Shusha / Shuschi. Fighting also broke out in the direction of Stepanakert, which is only 10 km from Shuschi, below in the river valley of the Qarqarçaylies. On the morning of November 8th, Azerbaijan reported that Shusha had been "freed from the occupation". The Armenian side repeated in the evening that heavy fighting was ongoing, the next day would bring more clarity about the course of this decisive battle. On the same day, an evacuation of civilians, journalists and soldiers began. The next morning, Armenia claimed that it had managed to push back opponents in the Karin Tak-Shushi region that night. After further fighting, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, reportedand the army spokesman for Armenia, the fighting for Shushi would continue. This afternoon, the government spokesman for Artsakh, Wahram Pogossjan, contradicted that Shushi had completely lost control of the Armenians, that the Azerbaijani attacks would now continue against Stepanakert, and that Arzach's President Arajik Harutjunjanpresented itself with the headquarters of the Arzachian army as the "defender of Stepanakert". Also in the course of November 9, the Azerbaijani President reported a growing number of villages as captured, including Karin Tag, Taghaward, Awetaranoz, Sghnach, other villages between Hadrut and Sheker and numerous other villages on all front lines, the Armenian side only reported successes in Karmir Schuka. The capture of Shushi in particular was of great strategic value for Azerbaijan: Here the main connection between Armenia and Artsakh can be blocked and the city is located directly above Stepanakert, which can be easily shelled from here. As the President of Arzach, Arajk Harutjunjan, explained in detail on November 10th,

On the same day, a Mil-Mi-24 attack helicopter belonging to the Russian armed forces was shot down near the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic . Two crew members were killed and another injured. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan said in a statement that Azerbaijani forces accidentally shot down the helicopter. Azerbaijan apologized and offered Russia compensation. It was only in the last days of the conflict that Russian armed forces began to use their modern electronic countermeasures from their base near Gyumri , thereby disrupting aerial reconnaissance by Azerbaijani drones over Armenian territory.

Armistice Agreement of 9/10 November

→ Main article : Truce Agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020

Provisions of the ceasefire agreement

On the evening of November 9th, the Presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan and the Prime Minister of Armenia signed an agreement around 9:00 a.m., with the consent of Arzach, to end the fighting on November 10th at 1:00 a.m. It contains nine points on which the opposing parties have agreed: Azerbaijan and Armenia committed to freeze their current positions. Armenia is to withdraw in several steps from the still held areas around Nagorno Karabakh and hand them over to Azerbaijan. According to the agreement, a Russian border force comprising 1960 people will take over the observation of the armistice line and the Lachin corridorwho should continue to connect the rest of Arzach with Armenia. Azerbaijan has received the promise of free traffic routes to its exclave, the autonomous Nakhichevan republic , and the borders between the two states are to be opened. Azerbaijani refugees are allowed to return to Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas. The agreement is valid for 5 years and is automatically extended if none of the parties object. The main features of the agreement - the return of the areas around the core area of ​​Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan and the self-determination of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh - were already part of the failed ceasefire of October 10th.

On the same day, Russia contradicted the statements made by the Azerbaijani President that Turkish units would also be involved in securing the agreement, which was not included in the statement, and ruled out the presence of Turkish troops in the conflict area. Nevertheless, the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of troops on November 17th, but these troops will probably only be deployed to monitor the agreement in Azerbaijani-controlled areas. On November 18, the Federation Council subsequently confirmed the dispatch of Russian troops .

After the agreement, which the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had signed without first consulting with President Armen Sarkissyan and parliament, became known, demonstrators stormed the Armenian seat of government and representatives' offices on Republic Square and beat up parliamentary president Ararat Mirsojan . The demonstrators also broke into Pashinyan's house and wreaked havoc. The President of Artsakh, Arajik Harutjunjan, on the other hand, defended in a speech on November 10, 2020, the acceptance of the ceasefire conditions by the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan shortly after the fall of the city of Shushi, as a further collapse of the front was feared. A conquest of all of Arzach by the enemy was only a matter of days after other new types of drones with devastating effects had finally been used. Similarly, Pashinyan had previously justified the agreement, which his defense minister later agreed to and referred to a consultation of the military leadership prior to the approval of the ceasefire agreement. On November 18, the resigned Chief of the Armenian General Staff, Movses Hakopian, also confirmed the collapse of the defense, he also criticized the Armenian false reports at the end of the war and the decision to only recruit volunteers instead of all conscripts. In Azerbaijan, there were public victory celebrations after the agreement was announced, and in Armenia there were protests against the agreement in the streets that turned into violence. The day after the signing, calls were made not to adhere to the agreement. The chairman of the Arzach Security Council resigned and President Harutjunjan and the Armenian government were asked to resign, both from Artsakh and from all parts of the Armenian opposition. International observers hope the agreement will lay the foundation for lasting peace and balance. In Azerbaijan, there were public victory celebrations after the agreement was announced, and in Armenia there were protests against the agreement in the streets that turned into violence. The day after the signing, calls were made not to adhere to the agreement. The chairman of the Arzach Security Council resigned and President Harutjunjan and the Armenian government were asked to resign, both from Artsakh and from all parts of the Armenian opposition. International observers hope the agreement will lay the foundation for lasting peace and balance. In Azerbaijan, there were public victory celebrations after the agreement was announced, and in Armenia there were protests against the agreement in the streets that turned into violence. The day after the signing, calls were made not to adhere to the agreement. The chairman of the Arzach Security Council resigned and President Harutjunjan and the Armenian government were asked to resign, both from Artsakh and from all parts of the Armenian opposition. International observers hope the agreement will lay the foundation for lasting peace and balance. not to adhere to the agreement. The chairman of the Arzach Security Council resigned and President Harutjunjan and the Armenian government were asked to resign, both from Artsakh and from all parts of the Armenian opposition. International observers hope the agreement will lay the foundation for lasting peace and balance. not to adhere to the agreement. The chairman of the Arzach Security Council resigned and President Harutjunjan and the Armenian government were asked to resign, both from Artsakh and from all parts of the Armenian opposition. International observers hope the agreement will lay the foundation for lasting peace and balance.

The transfer of Russian troops to the conflict region began as early as noon on November 10th. In addition to setting up surveillance posts, they also began clearing mines. The Armenian government plans to open transport links to the Syunik Province and Iran via Azerbaijani Nakhchivan, which the agreement will make possible. In the areas conquered by or surrendered to Azerbaijan, a night curfew was imposed and police stations were gradually set up - initially in Shusha and Hadrut - which initially also serve to administer the areas. On November 17, the Lachin Corridor was opened to Russian peacekeepers. The eviction and surrender of Kəlbəcərswas postponed 10 days to November 25th. On November 19, the Agdam district was the first to be evacuated. On November 23, Armenia published a list of the populated places that Azerbaijan has captured or will hand over under the agreement. Contrary to original reports, the northern supply route Wardenis–Martakert will not be closed to Armenians on November 15, but will at least remain open until the Russian peacekeeping forces have built a bypass around Shusha on the southern Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert supply route over the next three years. The evacuation and handover of Kəlbəcər on November 25th led to Internet and communication failures in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the corresponding cables run through the transferred area. While bus and school operations in Arzach resumed at the end of November, problems in communication, including mobile communications and the power supply, remained. Operation of the Armenian mine near Sotk also had to be stopped, because half of it is located in the area that has now been handed over to Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani army has set up a post in its half. On December 1, the Laçın district was finally handed over to Azerbaijan. As before, almost all of the Armenian residents had fled from this place. The Azerbaijani Army entered the areas on the respective dates and began to set up posts and an administration. On December 2, Azerbaijan began demobilizing its troops. An exchange of prisoners was agreed on December 5, which is to include all prisoners from both sides, including those from the period before September 2020. However, the exchange was still slow afterwards, especially for those captured by Azerbaijan. In December, the Laçın district was finally handed over to Azerbaijan. As before, almost all of the Armenian residents had fled from this place. The Azerbaijani Army entered the areas on the respective dates and began to set up posts and an administration. On December 2, Azerbaijan began demobilizing its troops. An exchange of prisoners was agreed on December 5, which is to include all prisoners from both sides, including those from the period before September 2020. However, the exchange was still slow afterwards, especially for those captured by Azerbaijan. In December, the Laçın district was finally handed over to Azerbaijan. As before, almost all of the Armenian residents had fled from this place. The Azerbaijani Army entered the areas on the respective dates and began to set up posts and an administration. On December 2, Azerbaijan began demobilizing its troops. An exchange of prisoners was agreed on December 5, which is to include all prisoners from both sides, including those from the period before September 2020. However, the exchange was still slow afterwards, especially for those captured by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Army entered the areas on the respective dates and began to set up posts and an administration. On December 2, Azerbaijan began demobilizing its troops. An exchange of prisoners was agreed on December 5, which is to include all prisoners from both sides, including those from the period before September 2020. However, the exchange was still slow afterwards, especially for those captured by Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani Army entered the areas on the respective dates and began to set up posts and an administration. On December 2, Azerbaijan began demobilizing its troops. An exchange of prisoners was agreed on December 5, which is to include all prisoners from both sides, including those from the period before September 2020. However, the exchange was still slow afterwards, especially for those captured by Azerbaijan.

A military parade was held in Baku on December 10, one month after the conclusion of the armistice, to celebrate the victory. In addition to Azerbaijani military equipment, weapons captured from the Armenian army were also on display. Turkish President Erdoğan was also present. At the same time, the regular demonstrations in Armenia against the president and the ceasefire signed by him continue. The first ceasefire violations occurred on December 11th when Azerbaijani units attacked the last Armenian-held villages in Hadrut Province. Until the arrival of the Russian peacekeeping troops a day later, they took the village of Hin Tagher, which was then also occupied by Russian troops. Azerbaijani media previously reported that Karabakh soldiers were provoked in the south of the conflict region. A soldier was wounded on the Azerbaijani side.

Information war and propaganda

The reporting from the Azerbaijani side of the front was always under observation by government officials. However, according to ARD, they did not interfere in the actual research. After observing them, Azerbaijani television often ran propaganda during the war, including pop singers who "fervently recite the nation". Major Azerbaijani media are censored by the government through political or economic pressure, critical journalists are prosecuted and websites can be blocked by the government without a court order. With the beginning of the war, Azerbaijan's President Əliyev was also able to rally the opposition behind his goal of retaking Nagorno-Karabakh. The mood in Armenia was similar. However, a lot of criticism of individual government decisions was expressed here. In the course of the war, however, martial law was tightened in Armenia, so that criticism and doubts about the Armenian defense capability were forbidden and the police were empowered to take action against such publications.

In addition to reports from large media, a lot of information was spread via social networks, in particular propaganda reports, for example about the particular cruelty of the other side. Images of the battles, troop movements, drone images and statements by the military and state representatives quickly spread around the world. Internationally, the reports in these media were determined by prominent members of the Armenian diaspora who campaigned for the support of Armenia. For the diaspora of both conflict parties, the expression of opinion was an expression of solidarity with their compatriots and participation in the conflict. In Azerbaijan, many social networks were blocked by the government at the beginning of the war. The reason given was protection against Armenian provocations. Go aheadTwitter and TelegramAccess was free, so many Azerbaijanis used these services to spread their views on the conflict, usually supporting their government. According to research by journalist Tigran Petrosyan for the daily newspaper taz, many profiles are anonymous and contain profile pictures with Azerbaijani national symbols, but no biographical information. Many accounts were registered immediately after the new fighting broke out. Facebook deleted 589 Facebook accounts spreading Azerbaijani propaganda, as well as 7906 pages and 447 Instagram accounts. Armenians were also increasingly active on Twitter, so that both perspectives met there. According to Katy Pearce in the Washington Post, the Azerbaijani side understood how to make optimal use of the platforms with graphics and videos. Why mainly Twitter is used is not sure. It could be that the platform is particularly suitable for coordinated campaigns and rapid dissemination. Possibly the success of the US president has been seenDonald Trumporiented on Twitter. The Armenian president, who is actually more experienced in social media and who successfully used it on his way to office two years earlier, was too unconventional and uncoordinated with his government to counter the propaganda of the other side. It also played a major role for both sides that the propaganda of the other side could also be seen outside of the intended target group. Especially with the opponent, where it was often used to justify one's own point of view. The heated atmosphere on both sides also fueled the spread of false information - also through bots - and the tendency to believe it.

Destruction and number of victims

July

According to Azerbaijani sources, 12 military personnel, including a major general and a colonel , and a 76-year-old civilian, were killed. Among the adjacent housing estates in Tovuz province, the villages of Ağdam (not to be confused with the city of Ağdam in Karabakh), Dondar Quşçu and Vahidli came under intense artillery and mortar attacksfire from the Armenian armed forces and were hardest hit by the destruction. The Armenian Defense Ministry said a total of five military personnel were killed and 36 injured. Several houses in the border villages of Mowses, Tschinari and Ajgepar in the province of Tavush were damaged as a result of the attacks with mortar shells. No civilian casualties except for one injured person were recorded. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 72 Syrian fighters supported by the Turkish government were killed in the fighting against Armenian soldiers.

September to November

The authorities of the Artsakh Republic announced in early October that between 70,000 and 75,000 people (about 90% women and children) had fled the Nagorno-Karabakh region . An unknown number of Azerbaijani civilians also had to flee from villages close to the front. In the last days of September, 114 soldiers and civilians were killed on the Armenian side, according to their information. Azerbaijan did not report numbers of soldiers killed, but 10 civilians killed. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights , 119 Syrian mercenaries were killed in the conflict on the Azerbaijani side by October 13. The Azerbaijani news agency Azeri Press AgencyAs of October 8, 31 civilians were killed and 154 civilians injured in Armenian attacks, according to the report. The Armenian news agency Armenpress reported 22 civilians dead and 95 civilians injured in attacks by the Azerbaijani side on October 9. On October 8, the historic Armenian Ghazanchezoz Cathedral in Shushi was hit by bombs and damaged in two attacks. Journalists were also seriously injured.

Until November 14, the remains of the soldiers, especially those from the Battle of Shusha, were exchanged between the two warring parties. On December 12, the Artsakh Republic put the number of soldiers killed in its army at 1,815. The relatives and the wounded were promised a pension of over 100,000 euros with payment over the next 20 years. Armenia reported 2,400 soldiers killed and also guaranteed care for the wounded and the bereaved. In addition, over 2,300 soldiers are still missing. On the Armenian side, 49 civilians were also killed and 157 injured. Azerbaijan says 94 civilians were killed and another 414 wounded. 120 larger houses were damaged as well as 3410 small and 512 other civil buildings.

Up until November 23, an Azerbaijani soldier was killed by detonation of land mines, a Russian peacekeeper was life-threateningly injured and four Arzachian paramedics were injured. The clearing of the mines began with the arrival of Russian peacekeepers. Their work is expected to be completed in early 2021.

The armistice also made destruction more visible. In Shushareports of destruction and graffiti on the Armenian churches after they were captured by the Azerbaijani army were reported. The government in Baku accused the Armenian side of having destroyed, damaged or desecrated most of the mosques and Muslim cemeteries in the territories that have been occupied since the 1990s and are now again Azerbaijani. Large parts of the areas reclaimed by Azerbaijan have been destroyed since the 1990s. Reconstruction is estimated to cost at least $ 10 billion over five to ten years. There were again allegations from the Armenian side that the Azerbaijani army was destroying Armenian cultural assets in the areas they had conquered. Videos made and distributed by Azerbaijani soldiers themselves contribute to these concerns. which they show in case of destruction. UNESCO plans to send a mission to Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2020 or early 2021 to document and protect cultural assets there.

Refugees and returnees

In the course of the war from 1992 to 1994, the non-Armenian population, mainly Azerbaijanis, but also many Kurds, fled to Azerbaijan or were expelled from the areas successfully held and conquered by the Armenian army. Outside of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, they made up the vast majority until then, so that these areas were now deserted and many of the settlements and cities were destroyed. In the area between the former oblast and Armenia, several thousand Armenian settlers settled in the following decades, who then made up the sole population of this area.

In the first two weeks of the war, half of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh fled to Armenia: up to 75,000 people, including 90% of the country's women and children. At the time of the armistice, around 100,000 people from Nagorno-Karabakh had fled to Armenia, where they were taken in and - often with the support of donations from the diaspora - looked after. With the implementation of the ceasefire, over 25,000 refugees were able to return. Four days after the end of the war, the mayor of Stepanakert reported that a third of the refugees had already returned from the city. However, many of the returnees do not feel safe this close to the Azerbaijani-controlled Shusha. The same applies to the residents of the Lachin Corridor, which is why many fled from there.

After the ceasefire, the flight continued from other areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular from the Kəlbəcər region to be handed over to Azerbaijan . The Armenian settlers living here moved to Armenia, taking as much as possible with them and destroying what was immobile, such as their houses, in order not to leave them to any Azerbaijanis. The remains of the deceased were of particular concern, so that some of them opened their graves before fleeing and took the contents with them. Works of art and monuments were also brought to Armenia. Similar scenes were repeated before the surrender of the western Ağdam Rayon . Among the Armenian refugees were the residents of the village of Nor Maragha (= "New Maragha", formerly Azerbaijani Qızıl Kəngərli ), whose inhabitants were refugees from the Armenian village of Maragha and their descendants (today the abandoned village of Sıxarx in the front line) who had survived the Maraga massacre . The seven Armenian villages in Agdam Raion that were evacuated on November 19, 2020 were settled by Armenian refugees from villages that had remained under Azerbaijani control after the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. Besides Nor Maragha, these were Nor Haykajur (Boyəhmədli), Nor Karmiravan ( Papravənd), Nor Seysulan (Seysulan), Nor Aygestan (Çaylı), Nor Jraberd (Çiləbörd) and Hovtashen (Aliağalı). Pictures of some of the places cleared by Armenian residents show, however, that houses are not burned down everywhere. Similar scenes as before in Kəlbəcər and Ağdam were repeated during the evacuation of the Laçın district , of which only the corridor on the road between Armenia and Stepanakert remained under Armenian-Russian control.

While some of the refugees stayed with relatives, many find themselves in precarious circumstances with little support. During November, Armenia launched an aid program. Since November 23, refugees from Artsakh have been able to apply for aid payments: 68,000 Dram for those without a home, 15,000 Dram for those who own real estate in Armenia. Nevertheless, there are still complaints about inadequate supplies, many of the refugees are dependent on donations and are therefore returning to the remaining areas of Arzach. For the people displaced within Nagorno-Karabakh, too, the aid provided by Arzach is criticized as inadequate.

While Armenians are fleeing parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijanis are preparing to return, who fled the region during the war until 1994. However, some of them refuse to return because they do not want to give up their newly established life and do not hope for better prospects when they return.

War crimes

Play media file

Footage of the use of outlawed cluster munitions on October 4, 2020 against Stepanakert

Both warring parties accuse each other of war crimes. Units of the Karabakh Armenians repeatedly shot at residential areas in Ggebietencə , Tərt undr and Barda . At the beginning of October, the authorities of the Artsakh Republic pointed out that there was a military airport in Gəncə, which had also been hit. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, took places in Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular the capital Stepanakert, under constant fire and was thus able to cause extensive damage. Both sides accused each other of using cluster munitions against civilians. On October 5th, the human rights organization Amnesty International published ita report and condemned attacks on the civilian population. In the publication, Amnesty International confirmed that the Armenian-inhabited capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, had been bombarded with banned cluster munitions. Human Rights Watch confirmed the use of cluster munitions by Azerbaijan against civilian targets in Stepanakert on October 23, 2020. Research by Amnesty International published on October 29, 2020 confirmed that the Armenian side also used prohibited cluster munitions in the attack on Bərdə the previous day, leaving 21 dead and 70 injured. On October 30, 2020, Human Rights Watch confirmed the use of cluster munitions by arzachian associations.

When fires broke out on the Armenian side of the front from October 30, allegations were made of the use of phosphorus in Azerbaijan, which triggered the fires. An evaluation of the images could not confirm the use of phosphorus, according to military expert Vasily Dandykin.

During the capture of the city of Hadrut around October 14, 2020, Azerbaijani special forces shot and killed two Armenian residents shortly after they had captured them. Two videos showing the capture and the shooting were circulating on social media and could no longer be removed from the network by the Azerbaijani government. Independent analyzes of the images proved their authenticity. Refugees from Hadrut recognized the victims in the pictures, a 73-year-old from Hadrut and a 25-year-old from the neighboring town of Tyaq .

A December 2 report by Human Rights Watch confirmed some of the videos circulating on social networks showing the mistreatment and torture of Armenian soldiers in Azerbaijani prisoners of war as genuine, and it also investigated similar videos from the opposing site. The Azerbaijani public prosecutor and civil society activists are also calling for Azerbaijani perpetrators to be punished, but claim that most of the videos that are circulating are falsified.

Military strategy and equipment

Involvement of mercenaries

According to French President Macron and the Russian government, the Turkish government under Recep Erdoğan has sent mercenaries from Syria and Libya to the area on the Azerbaijani side. The Russian Foreign Ministry demanded the withdrawal of all irregular units from the region in early October. Various other sources also indicated that Turkey recruited between 850 and 4000 mercenaries in Syria and may have transported them, as well as drones, to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh area from the end of September 2020. Also the Syrian Observatory for Human Rightsconfirmed the involvement of Syrian mercenaries and reported the deaths of over 100 of them. The ARD reports on people from the Idlib region who are deployed in dangerous positions at the front in Nagorno-Karabakh. When they were recruited, they were promised high wages and use only for guarding and outside of combat operations. After arriving in Baku, cell phones were taken from them and sent straight to the front. Turkey does not comment on reports of mercenaries. Estimates of the total number of Syrian mercenaries go up to 2,000. The Russian Foreign Ministry also published this estimate at the beginning of November, and in December the allegations were reiterated by the US government, which demanded that Turkey clarify the use and transfer of mercenaries from Syria.

The Azerbaijani government accused the Armenian side that members of the PKK had also been involved in the fighting since the beginning of October. Sergey Naryshkin from the Russian foreign intelligence service also stated that, according to his information, Kurdish fighters were also involved in the war alongside Islamic groups. Videos circulating on the Internet allegedly showing fighters from Chechnya on the Azerbaijani side in Nagorno-Karabakh turned out to be older footage from Crimea.

Use of drones

The use of drones, which creates facts before the regulation of autonomous weapons systems , is highlighted separately in the media in many places and is sometimes associated with high proportions of civilian sacrifices . Max Tegmark commented as follows: "The civilians killed by drones in the new Nagorno-Karabakh War are testimony that [“ Killer-AI ”] is not a science fiction spectulation of a distant future, but is already happening." According to the Austrian military expert Markus Reisner and Gustav Gressel, the drones were decisive for the war, cut off the Armenians' reserves from the battlefield and kept the losses of the Azerbaijanis low with devastating losses of the Armenians at the same time. The President of Arzach,Arajik Harutjunjan , is quoted in a related report of the Tagesschau from November 20, 2020 that the Armenian special forces refused to operate under these conditions and reservists fled. The Russian armed forces had already experienced their shock with these drones in Syria , but learned from them. According to the Austrian experts, the European states would have no chance in an Azerbaijani drone attack, as the air defense systems of France, Poland and Germany would not detect these drones and so the cities would be defenseless against the attacks.

International reactions

In July, the international community responded differently to the worsening security situation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border. Turkey, as its closest ally, sided with Azerbaijan and gave Baku full support. Shortly after the clashes at the border, scheduled joint and large-scale Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises with the participation of ground and air forces from both countries took place in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic . Moldova , Pakistan and Ukraine , among others , expressed their support for Azerbaijan . The coordination office ofMovement of the Non-Aligned States passed a communiqué in which the "military provocations of Armenia" were sharply condemned. Criticism of Armenia's actions also came from the Organization for Islamic Cooperation . In contrast, Armenia received support from the Republic of Cyprus , which criticized Azerbaijan as well as the “destructive steps taken by Turkey”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation called on both parties to restrain and stop the fighting immediately. The US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also called on Baku and Yerevan to de-escalate. The Congress -Abgeordneten Brad Sherman ,Frank Pallone , Adam Schiff and Ed Markey expressed their solidarity with Armenia. At the request of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), an influential Armenian diaspora organization, Sherman and Pallone tabled two amendments to the US defense budget for 2021 that included a ban on the sale of US weapons to Azerbaijan. These were rejected by Congress on July 21. In return, Congressmen Steve Cohen and Steve Chabot initiatedtwo amendments, coordinated with US state and defense departments, on the displaced and killed citizens in some post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan). These were approved by the United States House of Representatives and hailed in Azerbaijan as a "great political victory over the Armenian lobby in the US ". António Guterres , Secretary General of the UN, appealed to the conflicting parties and demanded that the "provocative rhetoric" be abandoned and that the negotiation process be returned to. The OSCE Co- Chairs-Minsk group, which mediate in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to refrain from violence and to initiate substantive negotiations for the purpose of a comprehensive conflict resolution. Attempts to unilaterally change the existing negotiation format were also condemned in the statement.

At the beginning of the war in September, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of having made negotiations pointless through recent demands and of preparing for the conquest of further areas of Azerbaijan with Armenian shelling at locations close to the front, thus justifying its military action. Observers, including the Caucasus expert Thomas de Waal and French President Emmanuel Macron, speak of a war of aggression on the part of Azerbaijan. The escalation of violence was criticized by the UN, Russia, Iran and Western states and called for a return to negotiations. Diplomatic efforts began in September, bilaterally and within the OSCE's Minsk Group, to find a mediation solution and a return to the ceasefire. Turkey, on the other hand, agreed to support Azerbaijan. The Russian Federation, on the other hand, put pressure on Armenia during the fighting not to use its own newly acquired Su-30 fighters from Russian production against Azerbaijani air targets in order to prevent a possible conflict with Turkey. Russia has, concluded Gustav Gressel from the European Council on Foreign Relationsserved " air superiority on a silver platter" to the Turks and Azerbaijanis .

Russia and Iran reacted to the fighting on the Iranian border and Azerbaijan's territorial gains with gestures of military threat. On October 17, the Russian Navy held a naval maneuver in international waters off the Apsheron Peninsula , during which the shooting of unmanned drones was demonstrated. According to pictures of the TASS, Russian troops moved up on the eastern border of Armenia . On October 7, Iran threatened that the conflict could escalate if Iranian territory was shelled. After on October 21 after controversial reports during the fighting on the border at the ArasOn the Iranian side, one civilian allegedly killed and three injured, Iran demanded to withdraw heavy artillery from the river or to ensure its border security itself. In the days that followed, Iran moved larger units of the army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to the Aras border and began large-scale maneuvers on the Aras on October 25 with the participation of infantry, artillery and drones.

In a statement on October 18, UN Secretary General António Guterres described attacks on civilians, such as those in Gəncə or Stepanakert, as completely unacceptable and called on the warring parties to stop shelling civilian residential areas inside and outside the conflict zone. Peter Stano, General Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, made a similar statement .

After the conclusion of the armistice, the French Senate passed a resolution on November 25th calling for the recognition of the Republic of Artsakh. The Azerbaijani government protested and called for France to be excluded from the OSCE . The French government replied that it still does not recognize the independence of Arzach. A resolution by the Dutch parliament followed on December 10th, calling for a peaceful solution to be found as quickly as possible, which would protect the security of citizens and the region.

Reactions in the Diaspora

Separate pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Armenian protesters in Los Angeles (July 21, 2020)

What happened at the front also increased tensions between representatives of the Armenian and Azerbaijani diaspora in European and US cities. Solidarity rallies were held on both sides in London , Brussels , Los Angeles , New York , Berlin , Düsseldorf , Warsaw, etc. Violent clashes ensued, in which several demonstrators were injured. In Los Angeles it organized with the nationalist Armenian Revolutionary FederationThe affiliated Armenian National Congress of America (ANCA) held a large protest in front of the Consulate General of the Republic of Azerbaijan on July 22, 2020, at which, according to police, around 500 Armenian demonstrators gathered. In contrast, there were 30 to 50 Azerbaijani counter-protestors. The situation quickly spiraled out of control with the numerically superior Armenian demonstrators attacking the Azerbaijanis present and filming the whole thing with cameras. As a result, seven Azerbaijanis suffered injuries (four of them had to be hospitalized). A US police officer was also injured and the attacker was arrested. In at least three cases, the police are investigating the Azerbaijanis concerned with hate crime, and the attackers are wanted.Eric Garcetti , Mayor of Los Angeles, sharpened the use of violence against members of the Azerbaijani community. Also Simon Wiesenthal Center and Los Angeles Office of the American Jewish Committee, two leading Jewish organizations in the US, described the violence by the Armenian demonstrators as disturbing and unacceptable. Another incident occurred outside the Azerbaijani embassy in Brussels when Armenian protesters threw stones at the embassy building. Four Azerbaijanis, including a reporter, were seriously injured in the head. The Belgian police used water cannons to push the protesting Armenians away from the embassy premises. Police later arrested 17 Armenian suspects. On the sidelines of the rally, an Azerbaijani youth was beaten by a group of Armenian attackers. Also the office building of the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Pariswas damaged. On July 23, 2020, a company vehicle of the Armenian embassy in Berlin was set on fire. The AGBU, a diaspora organization of the Armenians, suspects an anti-Armenian motive behind this. The official police investigations have not yet confirmed this. On July 24th, a group of 20 to 30 masked men smashed the windows of a shisha bar in the Cologne district of Mülheim . According to the statements of the Armenian bar operator, the attackers were allegedly Azerbaijani who tried to break into the building. The police speak of significant property damage. The Central Council of Armenians in Germany also reports on the devastation of other Armenian businesses inHamburg . In all of the cases mentioned, no police investigation results are yet available. The Russian capital Moscow was also the scene of numerous mutual excesses of violence. These tensions were accompanied by the so-called "Apricot War", when Armenian fruit traders were not allowed to sell their goods in the "Food City", the largest supermarket in Moscow, "because of safety concerns". This belongs to God Nissanov and Sarach Ilijew , two Russian businessmen from Azerbaijan. A day later, a representative from the Russian Ministry of Commerce announced that the conflict had been resolved and that Armenian items were being offered again in the "Food City".

Since the outbreak of far-reaching fighting at the end of September, members of the Armenian diaspora , especially in the USA, have been calling for support for Armenia and Artsakh. This ranges from calls for recognition and international support to diaspora Armenians who travel to the war zone themselves to take part in the fighting or to support them on the ground. Donations were also collected: According to the Artsakh Republic, in the first days of the war 50 million euros were raised from the diaspora. In Germany, hundreds of Armenian demonstrators opened the A1blocked to draw attention to the war. In Turkey, the Armenian minority living there is coming under social pressure and is exposed to threats, as large sections of society and politics have sided with Azerbaijan.

On October 27, 2020 there were numerous protests by Armenian Lebanese in Beirut against the Azerbaijani offensive with the help of Turkey, with clashes with Lebanese police and security forces in front of the Turkish embassy in the suburb of Rabieh. During a blockade of the A 7 Lyon-Marseille motorway by Armenian-French demonstrators demanding international recognition of the Republic of Artsakh , some demonstrators were attacked by five Turkish-French men with hammers and knives, injuring four Armenian demonstrators, one of whom was life-threatening .

Geopolitical classification

The resurgence of the end of the conflict was seen by observers as an expression of the strength of Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey, while Russia, with its close ties to both conflicting parties, had to pursue a balancing act in order not to endanger its own interests. The European states and the USA were asked to be more involved, but too much with a presidential election campaign, Corona pandemic and internal disagreement than that more than appeals to the conflicting parties were made. Thomas de Waal refers to Kosovo, where there was even military intervention because of attacks on an ethnic minority, as a model for action against Azerbaijan, at least at the diplomatic level. But such an intervention did not take place, nor was the OSCE Minsk Group responsible for the conflict, in which the USA and France are represented, active. Only the USA took an initiative for a ceasefire at the end of October, but this failed within a few hours. It was therefore expected that Russia and Turkey, as regional powers, would determine the terms of peace. A growing influence of Turkey was also expected, which supports Azerbaijan militarily and also maintains close ties to the country. Azerbaijan, for example, supplies Turkey with gas, which makes it more independent from Russia. Turkey has been trying for a long time to expand its influence in the region. A loss of influence of Russia was expected, which would prevent increasing influence of Turkey through a defeat of Armenia. With a clear positioning for Armenia, however, it risks its so far good relations with Azerbaijan, which in turn could move closer to Turkey. Correspondingly, the reluctance of Russia is explained, which threatened Russian intervention only in the event that the Azerbaijani offensive encroaches on Armenia itself. Two Russian-brokered ceasefire agreements failed, which shows the limits of Russian influence. Russia's chances of maintaining its own influence are therefore to come to terms with Azerbaijan, keep Turkey out of a peace agreement and station its own troops. So far, the frozen conflict has also been a tool for Russia to influence both parties to the conflict. This could now come to an end with the war.

The ceasefire agreement was seen as a broad surrender of Armenia, as major concessions were made. Arzach lost almost a third of its territory to the fighting and, as a result of the agreement, has to surrender over a third of its territory to Azerbaijan. There are fears of ethnic cleansing in these areas if the Armenian population does not flee first, as well as the destruction of Armenian cultural assets. On the other hand, the ceasefire agreement stipulates a right of return, including the Armenian refugees from these areas, and for the protection of Christian and Islamic cultural assets, first Azerbaijan, then Russia, have the help of UNESCOrequested, and UNESCO then sent observers. However, the ceasefire is also seen as cheaper than expected for Russia. Azerbaijan is regaining large areas, the rest of Arzach will be comparable to South Ossetia and Abkhazia through the stationing of Russian troopsbefore the 2008 war there. After the declaration of independence and the war of independence in the early 1990s, Russian troops were also stationed there. Analysts also emphasize that the deal is cheaper for Armenia than locally perceived. In this way, it stops the Azerbaijani offensive, which otherwise might soon have conquered all of Nagorno-Karabakh, and at least enables a remaining Armenian presence in the region. The explanation for the Azerbaijani readiness for a ceasefire could lie in their fear that Russia would now interfere directly after the shooting down of a Russian helicopter. As recently as November 1st, Azerbaijan's President Əliyev said that Nagorno-Karabakh would be brought under complete control by all means.

In Armenia, at the latest by the end of the war after the armistice of November 9th and 10th, disappointment spread about the lack of international support, especially from Russia but also from the European states. Russia's non-interference was seen as treason, while in Europe only France sided with Armenia. This positioning, which can be traced back to the Armenian diaspora there, was limited to the condemnation of the Turkish support for Azerbaijan without further activities. At the same time, the outcome of the war opens up the possibility of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia, for which the ongoing conflict has so far been the greatest obstacle on the Turkish side.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ SOHR NEWS from November 6th
2. ↑ Եվս 2 զինծառայող է զոհվել - Հրապարակ. July 14, 2020, accessed October 20, 2020 . 
3. ↑ Report from November 24th to Kawkaski Usel
4. ^ Border fight heats up in South Caucasus. July 17, 2020, accessed on October 20, 2020 . 
5. ↑ 2,783 Azerbaijani soldiers martyred in Patriotic War. Azerbaijan`s Ministry of Defense, Azerbaijan.az, December 3, 2020.
6. ↑ SOHR NEWS from November 6th
7. ↑ Report from November 5th to Kawkaski Usel
8. ↑ Report from November 3rd to Kawkaski Usel
9. ↑ Nearly 90,000 people displaced, lost homes and property in Nagorno Karabakh. Retrieved October 25, 2020 (English). 
10. ↑ ACNUDH | Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Bachelet warns of possible war crimes as attacks continue in populated areas. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
11. ↑ Michael Reinhard Hess: tanks in paradise. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan . Publishing house Dr. Köster, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-89574-906-3 , pp. 127-128 .
12. ^ Azerbaijan: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). (PDF) In: UNHCR / European Commission Humanitarian Aid. October 2009, accessed August 15, 2020 . 
13. ↑ Uwe Klussmann, DER SPIEGEL: Armenia and Azerbaijan's struggle for Nagorno-Karabakh: the war that no one can win - DER SPIEGEL - history. September 29, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020 . 
14. ↑ ^{a b} tagesschau.de: War for Nagorno-Karabakh: "We cannot live together". October 27, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020 . 
15. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh's Gathering War Clouds. International Crisis Group, June 1, 2017, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
16. ↑ Emil Sanamyan: Azerbaijan makes a move in Nakhichevan amide change of guard in Armenia. In: Civilnet. 2018, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
17. ↑ ^{a b c} Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com): Caucasus: Who wants what in Nagorno-Karabakh? | DW | 07.10.2020. Accessed on October 25, 2020 (German). 
18. ^ Andranik Eduard Aslanyan: Energy and geopolitical actors in the South Caucasus. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the field of tension between interests (1991–2015). Springer-Verlag, 2019, p. 116.
19. ↑ Alexander Sarovic: These countries sell the most weapons. Spiegel-Online, March 9, 2020, accessed October 1, 2020 . 
20. ↑ ^{a b} 'Armenia lacks incentives to launch military action now, Azerbaijan moved in first' - Thomas de Waal. In: Ahval. September 27, 2020, accessed on November 1, 2020 . 
21. ↑ Seymur Mammadov: What is behind Armenia's military provocation on Azerbaijan's border? In: Dailysabah. July 24, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
22. ↑ Михаил Бушуев / Ашот Газазян: Конфликт Азербайджана и Армении: как страны обвиняют друг друга. In: Deutsche Welle. July 25, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
23. ↑ Azeri official: EU should distinguish between aggressor and subject of aggression. In: Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Czech Republic. July 15, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
24. ↑ Пашинян назвал настоящую цель Азербайджана в боях с Арменией. In: Lenta.ru. July 18, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
25. ^ Armenian FM: “Azerbaijan once again trying to extract unilateral concessions in Karabakh issue”. In: Jam News. July 20, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
26. ↑ ^{a b} Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Aliyev and Pashinyan appeal to the UN. In: Caucasus Watch. September 24, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
27. ^ ^{A b} Thomas de Waal : The Caucasus Burns While Europe Struggles. Carnegie Europe , October 8, 2020.
28. ↑ James Palmer: Why Are Armenia and Azerbaijan Heading to War? In: Foreign Policy. September 28, 2020, accessed November 1, 2020 (American English). 
29. ↑ ^{a b c d} tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan continues offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. September 29, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
30. ↑ ^{a b} tagesschau.de: Armenia and Azerbaijan: "Black Rock" focus of conflict. July 18, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
31. ↑ Christian Esch, DER SPIEGEL: The Eternal War in the Caucasus - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. September 28, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020 . 
32. ↑ tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh agree ceasefire. July 12, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
33. ↑ tagesschau.de: Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh agree ceasefire. July 12, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
34. ^ Armenian armed forces committed provocation in Tovuz direction of the front. In: Azertag. July 12, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
35. ↑ ВС Армении возобновили интенсивный огонь по населенным пунктам Товузского района. In: Sputniknews. July 14, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
36. ↑ Азербайджанские ВС отброшены при попытке занять армянский опорный пункт - Минобороны. In: Sputnik Armenia. July 12, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
37. ↑ Армения призналась: информация о взятии азербайджанской высоты - ложь. In: Осетинский информационный портал. July 19, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
38. ^ Azerbaijan protesters demand was after Armenia clashes. In: BBC. July 15, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
39. ↑ Мингечаурская ГЭС как цель включена в тактические планы Армии обороны НКР. In: Yerkramas. July 24, 2018, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
40. ↑ Азербайджан пригрозил Армении ответным ракетным ударом по АЭС. In: Kommersant.ru. July 16, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
41. ↑ В Баку заявили, что гражданские объекты Армении не были целью Азербайджана. In: Gazeta.ru. July 21, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
42. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh accuses Azerbaijan of 170 shelling attacks during a week. In: Caucasian Knot. July 27, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
43. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh accuses Azerbaijan of 170 shelling attacks during a week. In: Caucasian Knot. August 3, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
44. ^ Azerbaijan and Armenia exchange accusations of shelling 11 border villages. In: Caucasian Knot. July 31, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
45. ^ Message from August 17th to Kawkaski Usel
46. ↑ Azerbaijan claims 45 shelling attacks in conflict zone. In: Caucasian Knot. August 25, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
47. ^ Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: new victims in the Towus region. In: Caucasus Watch. September 22, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 . 
48. ↑ Azerbaijan claims machine gun and sniper attacks in conflict zone. In: Caucasian Knot. September 7, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
49. ↑ Azerbaijan counts 61 shelling attacks committed by Armenia. In: Caucasian Knot. September 25, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
50. ↑ In one week the enemy violated the ceasefire 310 times, firing 3,200 shots. In: 1news (ArmTV). September 12, 2020, accessed on October 31, 2020 . 
51. ↑ Joshua Kucera: Azerbaijan fires foreign minister. In: Eurasianet. July 16, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
52. ↑ "Где ты был?" - Алиев подверг резкой критике работу главы МИД Эльмара Мамедъярова. In: Newsarmenia. July 15, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
53. ↑ Affair over arms deliveries: Tensions between Baku and Belgrade. In: Caucasuswatch. July 20, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 . 
54. ↑ Хроника лавирующего ИЛ-76. In: Minval.az. August 6, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
55. ↑ Ильхам Алиев позвонил Президенту Российской Федерации Владимиру Путину. In: President.az. August 13, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020 (Russian). 
56. ^ Armenia announces general mobilization after heavy fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. Die Welt, September 27, 2020, accessed on September 27, 2020 . 
57. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Third day of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. In: Caucasus Watch. October 1, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020 . 
58. ↑ Military experts treat shelling of cities as attempt to provoke panic in Azerbaijan. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 6, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020 . 
59. ↑ Azerbaijan accuses Armenia of missile attacks on districts near Baku. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 5, 2020, accessed December 10, 2020 . 
60. ↑ Der Spiegel: Nagorno-Karabakh: Armenia accuses Turkey of shooting down a fighter jet - Ankara denies - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. September 29, 2020, accessed November 8, 2020 . 
61. ↑ ^{a b c} Baku claims eight villages occupied by Azerbaijani Army. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 4, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
62. ↑ ^{a b} Nagorno-Karabakh was: developments from 3 through 5 October. In: Caucasus Watch. October 5, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
63. ↑ BBC report from October 6th (photos at the beginning of the report)
64. ↑ ^{a b} Tenth day of the new Nagorno-Karabakh war. In: Caucasus Watch. October 8, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
65. ↑ ^{a b} Twelfth day of the renewed Nagorno-Karabakh was. In: Caucasus Watch. October 8, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
66. ↑ Azerbaijani villagers claim increased shelling. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 9, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
67. ^ Report from October 8th to Kawkaski Usel
68. ↑ z. B. This message from October 11th at Kawkaski Usel (mentioned below with Russian name as "Gadrut", according to which two civilians of the city fell victim to these units)
69. ^ Brittle fire break in Nagorno-Karabakh. In: tagesschau.de. October 10, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
70. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh: New fighting after the ceasefire began - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. In: Spiegel. October 10, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
71. ↑ Despite the ceasefire. Attack on Azerbaijani city. In: Tagesschau. October 11, 2020, accessed October 11, 2020 . 
72. ↑ Number of killed and injured in missile attacks on Ganja reaches 45. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 11, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
73. ↑ ^{a b c} Nagorno-Karabakh War: Developments before and after the Armistice Agreement. In: Caucasus Watch. October 13, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
74. ↑ Video of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan on Youtube
75. ↑ Video of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan from October 11, 2020 on Youtube
76. ↑ Report of 12 October , from October 13 , October 14 at Caucasian Knot and Oct. 14 at Caucasus Watch
77. ↑ Video on Youtube
78. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh residents treat Azerbaijani video about Gadrut as falsification. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 14, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
79. ^ Report from BARS Media from October 17th
80. ↑ Video on Youtube
81. ^ Message from October 15 to Kawkaski Usel
82. ↑ Seventeenth day of the renewed Nagorno-Karabakh was. In: Caucasus Watch. October 14, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
83. ↑ Azerbaijan claims return of control over six villages in conflict zone. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 16, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
84. ^ ^{A b} Nineteenth day of the renewed Nagorno-Karabakh was. In: Caucasus Watch. October 15, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
85. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh reports about shelling attack on six villages. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 16, 2020, accessed on December 13, 2020 . 
86. ^ ^{A b} Twentieth day of the renewed Nagorno-Karabakh was. In: Caucasus Watch. October 16, 2020, accessed on December 13, 2020 . 
87. ↑ Report from October 17 to Kawkaski Usel and also from October 17 from Deutsche Welle
88. ^ Azerbaijan claims capture of three Karabakh villages. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 17, 2020, accessed on December 13, 2020 . 
89. ^ Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on new truce. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 18, 2020, accessed on December 13, 2020 . 
90. ^ After ceasefire, number of shelling attacks on frontline Azerbaijani villages decreased. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 19, 2020, accessed December 13, 2020 . 
91. ↑ Azerbaijan claims capturing 13 villages in the conflict zone. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 19, 2020, accessed December 13, 2020 . 
92. ↑ Caucasus Watch daily report on October 29th.
93. ↑ Telegram message from Harutjunjan (Russian)
94. ↑ Telegram message from Əliyev (Azerbaijani)
95. ^ Message from October 20 to Kawkaski Usel
96. ↑ In these Azerbaijani rayons there has been no significant Armenian minority since 1918-20; for example, at the 1979 census, 49 Armenians in Kelbajar (0.1%), in Latschin 34 (0.1%), in Gubadli 26 (0.1%) ) and in Zengilan 35 Armenians (0.1%), who often fled during the attacks in 1987/88. The (exclusively Armenian) population of the Arzach districts of Shahumyan and Kashatach , the area of ​​which corresponds to these rayons, was settled from Arzach after 1994.
97. ↑ Telegram report from the army from October 22nd. 5:08 p.m., Caucasus Watch daily report from 22.10 .
98. ↑ Report at gazeta.ru from October 22nd.
99. ↑ z. B. World News from October 20, the information was similar in the following days.
100. ↑ Message from Arm TV1 NEWS from October 22nd. and
101. ↑ Message from October 22nd to Kawkaski Usel
102. ^ Telegram message from the spokesman for the President of Arzach, Wahram Pogosyan
103. ↑ Message from October 22nd to Kawkaski Usel
104. ↑ Report from October 21 to Kawkaski Usel , regular reports in the following days
105. ↑ E.g. report from October 21 to Kawkaski Usel
106. ↑ On October 24th Maps issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
107. ↑ E.g. these Armenian photos of destroyed tanks
108. ^ Message from October 25th to Kawkaski Usel
109. ↑ On October 24th Maps issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
110. ↑ Voice of Armenia pictures from October 18.
111. ↑ On October 24th Maps issued by Artsakh in the evening (on Telegram), animated and commented on by the Armenian military spokesman Howanissian.
112. ^ Message from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
113. ^ Message from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
114. ^ Message from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
115. ^ Message from October 26th to Kawkaski Usel
116. ^ Caucasus Watch report on the 30th day of the war
117. ^ Public situation maps of Arzach from October 27th
118. ↑ Report from October 27th to Kawkaski Usel
119. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from 29.19. , Caucasus Watch recap October 28th
120. ↑ Telegram display of the 59 killed soldiers
121. ↑ Telegram message from October 28. 7:00 p.m.
122. ^ Message from October 29th to Kawkaski Usel
123. ↑ Caucasus Watch summary on October 28th
124. ↑ "Смерчи" посеяли смерть в Гараюсифли. In: Кавказский Узел. October 28, 2020, accessed October 31, 2020 (Russian). 
125. ^ Report from October 28th to Kawkaski Usel , with one dead and three injured, see report from the afternoon
126. ^ Report from October 28th to Kawkaski Usel
127. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 29th. 19:29 , the Russian abbreviation ДРГ used there stands for Диверсионно -разведывательная группа (= sabotage and reconnaissance groups)
128. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 30th. 11:13 am , the message says “2 villages east of Karintag”, a village south of Shuschi . The next eastern neighboring village is Sghnach, east of it follows Awetaranoz.
129. ↑ Telegram report from an Azerbaijani user from the evening who refers to the Armenian side (mistakenly uses the misspelling of the Azerbaijani village name as "Çanaxçı")
130. ^ Telegram message from army spokesman Howanissian October 30th. 8:02 a.m.
131. ↑ News of ArmTV 1 of 31 October
132. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel announcement from 01.11.
133. ↑ Localization of the source of the fire
134. ↑ Telegram message from Sputnik Armenia
135. ↑ Telegram message from Karabakh News 10/30. 09:05 am
136. ↑ Agency report (dpa / Reuters / AFP) at Deutsche Welle
137. ^ Telegram message from Media Post Azerbaycan October 30th. 12:01 pm
138. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
139. ↑ ArmTV1 report from October 31.
140. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
141. ↑ Kawkaski-Usel report from October 31.
142. ^ ^{A b} Thirty seventh day of the renewed Nagorno-Karabakh war. In: Caucasus Watch. November 2, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
143. ↑ Pictures from ANNA News (Russian) from the Armenian side at Schuschi on October 31, also with televised shots of the "divers" , according to the description, the attack was then abandoned
144. ↑ Telegram message from Army spokesman Howanissian
145. ↑ Message from Armenia News from November 3rd.
146. ↑ message from army spokesman Howanissian
147. ↑ message from army spokesman Howanissian
148. ↑ Armenian situation map from October 3rd. in the evening for the public
149. ↑ Telegram images of Azerbaijani army vehicles, uploaded by Artsakh
150. ↑ Telegram message from Azerbaijani journalists
151. ↑ details of the Armenian army spokesman Howanissian at the briefing at 3:11.
152. ↑ Pictures of the Armenian station Bars Media on November 3rd. or a few days earlier , the village is Karin Tak.
153. ↑ Report from November 4th to Kawkaski Usel
154. ↑ Report from November 4th to Kawkaski Usel ; ANNA News shot these pictures first from the shot at Shuschi, then from the fighting on the street
155. ↑ News of Howanissians deputy Mkrtitschjan
156. ^ Telegram report from an Armenian reporter
157. ↑ Telegram pictures from Arzach
158. ↑ Briefing with army spokesman Howanissian on the evening of November 8th.
159. ↑ Telegram message from the Azerbaijani media service from November 7th. 9:32 a.m.
160. ↑ Telegram message from Azerbaijan from November 4. 6:12 pm
161. ↑ Telegram message from the Azerbaijani media service from November 8th. 9:51 a.m. , Spiegel report by Christian Esch, November 8th .
162. ↑ Briefing with army spokesman Howanissian on the evening of November 8th.
163. ↑ Tagesschau report on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh on November 8th. by Silvia Stöber
164. ↑ Telegram message from the Armenian government of November 9th. 7:25 am
165. ↑ here from army spokesman Howanissian , there were similar reports from his deputy Stepanjan and from the prime minister
166. ↑ Report on his statement with a clear swipe at the Armenian information policy
167. ↑ e.g. here at 5:04 pm and here at 10:47 am
168. ^ TASS Telegram rendering of the Armenian declaration
169. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Analysts clarify value of Shushi in war for Nagorno-Karabakh. November 9, 2020, accessed November 22, 2020 . 
170. ↑ Ron Synovitz: Technology, Tactics, And Turkish Advice Lead To Victory In Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh. at Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe. Analysis of the tactics of the use of special commands / sabotage units and the technologically superior use, especially of unmanned drones, which were apparently adopted by NATO by Turkish military advisers.
171. ↑ ^{a b} Paul Antonopoulos: The bitter truth from the president of Artsakh. Greek City Times, November 10, 2020.
172. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh: Russian military helicopter shot down in Armenia. In: DER SPIEGEL. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
173. ^ ^{A b} Gustav Gressel: "Military lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh: Reason for Europe to worry" ecfr.eu of November 24, 2020, accessed on November 27, 2020
174. ↑ Armenia PM says he signed agreement to end Nagorno-Karabakh war. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
175. ^ What did Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia leaders agree on? Retrieved November 14, 2020 . 
176. ↑ ^{a b c} Agreement on ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. In: ZDF. November 10, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
177. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Kremlin rules out presence of Turkish peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. November 10, 2020, accessed on November 14, 2020 . 
178. ↑ Jürgen Gottschlich: Ankara can now send troops. In: taz.de. November 18, 2020, accessed November 21, 2020 . 
179. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Russian authorities retroactively approve sending peacekeepers to Karabakh. November 18, 2020, accessed on November 21, 2020 . 
180. ↑ Thore Schröder: A people in pain and anger: Armenia after the armistice in Nagorno-Karabakh. In: DER SPIEGEL. Retrieved November 10, 2020 . 
181. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Yerevan protesters break into government and parliament buildings. November 10, 2020, accessed on November 14, 2020 . 
182. ↑ ^{a b c d e} tagesschau.de: After the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Armenia on the brink of collapse. November 11, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
183. ^ Message from October 20 to Kawkaski Usel
184. ↑ Orla Guerin: Jubilant scenes in Azerbaijan. In: BBC. November 10, 2020, accessed November 15, 2020 . 
185. ↑ "The people are ready to fight" - Protests against agreements. In: Euronews. November 10, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
186. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Babayan quits post of Security Council Secretary of Nagorno-Karabakh. November 11, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
187. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Nagorno-Karabakh MPs demand president's resignation. November 11, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
188. ↑ ^{a b c} Кавказский Узел: Truce prevents Azerbaijan from developing its military success. November 10, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
189. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Russia starts deploying peacemakers in Nagorno-Karabakh. November 10, 2020, accessed on November 14, 2020 . 
190. ↑ ^{a b} Кавказский Узел: Russian militaries report road demining in Nagorno-Karabakh. November 30, 2020, accessed December 5, 2020 . 
191. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Nakhichevan becomes a transport priority for Armenia amid loss of road from Vardenis. November 13, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
192. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Azerbaijani authorities impose curfew in regained territories. November 13, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
193. ↑ Murad Gazdiev: We just filmed Azerbaijani and Armenia troops ... In: Twitter. RussiaToday, November 17, 2020, accessed November 21, 2020 . 
194. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Russian MoD reports delivery of group of peacemakers to Armenia. November 16, 2020, accessed on November 21, 2020 . 
195. ↑ ^{a b} Tigran Petrosyan: Only the ashes of their houses remain. In: taz.de. November 15, 2020, accessed November 21, 2020 . 
196. ↑ List at Sputnik Armenia with map (Russian, only the transcriptions of the Armenian names, sorted according to the Rajonen of the administrative division of Arzach)
197. ↑ News from November 15th at Kawkaski Usel
198. ↑ Кавказский Узел: After Azerbaijani troops' entry to Kelbadjar, Karabakh residents lost Internet. November 26, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
199. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Public transport in Stepanakert resumes work. November 26, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
200. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Stepanakert townspeople left without stable cellular telephony. November 27, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
201. ↑ Кавказский Узел: School work resumed in Stepanakert. November 28, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
202. ↑ Internet users criticize authorities for energy shortages in Nagorno-Karabakh. December 10, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
203. ↑ Stepanakert residents report everyday power outages. December 11, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
204. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Operation of Sotk Mine suspended. November 28, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
205. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Azerbaijani authorities begin setting up posts in Lachin District. December 1, 2020, accessed December 5, 2020 . 
206. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Partial demobilization announced in Azerbaijan. December 2, 2020, accessed December 5, 2020 . 
207. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Azerbaijan and Armenia agree to exchange POWs. December 5, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
208. ↑ ^{a b c} Barbara Oertel: Military parade in Azerbaijan: humiliate the enemy a second time . In: The daily newspaper: taz . December 10, 2020, ISSN  0931-9085 ( taz.de [accessed December 12, 2020]).
209. ↑ ^{a b} Tigran Petrosyan: Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: Flatbread against despair . In: The daily newspaper: taz . December 11, 2020, ISSN  0931-9085 ( taz.de [accessed December 12, 2020]).
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221. ↑ Report of October 10 by Deutsche Welle (English)
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237. ↑ Tigran Petrosyan: Azerbaijan destroys Armenian culture: Farewell to the Dadivank monastery . In: The daily newspaper: taz . November 23, 2020, ISSN  0931-9085 ( taz.de [accessed December 6, 2020]).
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239. ↑ Кавказский Узел: UNESCO announces terms for sending mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. November 27, 2020, accessed December 6, 2020 . 
240. ↑ In these Azerbaijani Rayonen west of the old Nagorno-Karabakh, there were no significant since 1918-20 Armenian minority more so for Census 1979 in Kelbadjar 49 Armenians (0.1%), in Lachin 34 (0.1%), in Gubadli 26 ( 0.1%) and in Zengilan 35 Armenians (0.1%), who often fled during the attacks in 1987/88. The (exclusively Armenian) population of the Arzach districts of Shahumyan and Kashatach , the area of ​​which corresponds to these rayons, was settled from Arzach after 1994.
241. ↑ Nagorno-Karabakh: Women and children on the run. In: Deutsche Welle. October 7, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
242. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Arutyunyan reports 25,000 returns to Nagorno-Karabakh. November 23, 2020, accessed on November 23, 2020 . 
243. ↑ Report from November 14th to Kawkaski Usel
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245. ↑ Berdzor residents express distrust of local policemen. December 10, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
246. ↑ Almost 650 people returned to Stepanakert during last 24 hours. December 10, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
247. ↑ Steve Rosenberg: Report on the escape from Kalbajar. BBC, November 12, 2020, accessed November 14, 2020 . 
248. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Road to Vardenis demanded by Karabakh residents before transferring it to Azerbaijan. November 12, 2020, accessed on November 14, 2020 . 
249. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Karvachar residents express fears of desecrating relatives' graves. November 18, 2020, accessed on November 21, 2020 . 
250. ↑ Google Satellite Images by Name
251. ↑ current Google Satellite images
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254. ↑ For example, the houses in Gülablı / poor village. Washed ash , Agdam Rayon, intact on delivery
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256. ↑ Кавказский Узел: In Armenia, migrants from Karabakh experience problems with job and housing. November 20, 2020, accessed on November 21, 2020 . 
257. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Nagorno-Karabakh residents complain about the absence of social help. Retrieved December 5, 2020 . 
258. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Nagorno-Karabakh: rights defenders criticize measures to support refugees. November 21, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
259. ↑ Кавказский Узел: In Azerbaijan, IDPs await return to their homeland after fighting in Karabakh. November 12, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
260. ↑ Dead and injured in an Armenian air raid. Die Zeit , October 28, 2020.
261. ^ Attacks on large cities in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Die Zeit , October 4, 2020.
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264. ^ Caucasus Watch report of October 29 (fourth paragraph), Amnesty International report of October 29
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266. ↑ Кавказский Узел: Military experts find use of phosphorus shells in Karabakh unproved. November 4, 2020, accessed on November 22, 2020 . 
267. ↑ Grigor Atanesian, Benjamin Strick: Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: 'Execution' video prompts war crime probe. BBC News, October 24, 2020.
268. ↑ Ron Synovitz, Harutyun Mansuryan: 'This Is A Different War': Nagorno-Karabakh Refugee Shudders At Video Showing Neighbors' Execution. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, October 30, 2020.
269. ↑ Human Rights Watch: Azerbaijan: Armenian Prisoners of War Badly Mistreated.
270. ↑ Alexander Chernyshev; Christian Esch (Spiegel online): Interview with the employee Tanja Lokschina from December 3rd. announcing a similar report on Azerbaijani prisoners of war.
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281. ↑ Exact location where video was filmed about sending Chechens to Karabakh found. In: Kawkaski Usel. October 7, 2020, accessed December 12, 2020 . 
282. ↑ Bethan McKernan: Trench warfare, drones and cowering civilians: on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh. In: The Guardian. October 13, 2020, accessed on October 22, 2020 . 
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285. ↑ The civilians killed by drones in the new Nagorno-Karabach <sic!> War are testimony to the fact that this isn't far-future sci-fi speculation, but something already happening. Max Tegmark on [1] , October 16, 2020
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290. ↑ OIC General Secretariat condemns Armenia's Attack On The Tovuz region in Azerbaijan. In: OIC. July 14, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
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298. ↑ Press Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group and Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. In: osce.org. July 24, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
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301. ^ Article by Deutsche Welle on October 16.
302. ↑ photos by Sergei Bobylev from the TASS on Twitter
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304. ↑ Message from Almasdar News ( October 4th )
305. ↑ Brief message from RIA Novosti from 25.10. on Telegram
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324. ↑ Short report by Ya Libnan
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332. ↑ Thomas de Waal: Now comes a Karabakh war over cultural heritage - Fears are growing in particular for Armenian monuments being handed over. Eurasianet, November 16, 2020.
333. ↑ Report from November 24th to Kawkaski Usel
334. ↑ Report from November 27th to Kawkaski Usel
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