Pál Prónay

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Portrait from Foto Kossak, Budapest

Identification card as captain and commander of the 1st Jäger Battalion in 1920

Pál Prónay Tóth-Prona and Blatnicza ( Hungarian : tótprónai és blatniczai Prónay Pál Sándor István Gábor ., * 2 November 1874 in Romhány , county Rétság , Nógrád county , Northern Hungary , †  1947 or 1948 probably in a Siberian gulag , after previous acceptance between December 1944 and February 1945 ) was a Hungarian officer , politician and self-proclaimed president of the Lajtabánság ("Leitha-Banat") separate state, which he proclaimed in 1921, on the territory of the Austrian state of Burgenland, established after the First World War (see also the Landquisition of Burgenland ). As the commander of guerrilla troops and death squads , he is charged with numerous crimes. Prónay is considered to be the epitome of white terror in Hungary.

Life

Childhood and youth

origin

Baron Pál Prónay came from a northern Hungarian, liberal and culturally interested family from one of the oldest noble families in Hungary . Pál Prónays family branch consisted of wealthy landowners. His parents were the former officer, landowner and hobby composer István Prónay and Maria Almásy von Zsadány and Törökszentmiklós. He claimed, probably not wrongly, to be largely related to the later imperial administrator Miklós Horthy . He attended elementary school in his birthplace. He had five or six brothers and two or three sisters and was the youngest child to reach old age. No abnormalities are known from his childhood.

schooldays

He has been attending the renowned Lähne Institute in Sopron since he was twelve . The school had a modern curriculum, the language of instruction was predominantly German. In addition to one hour of religion per week, the principal gathered all students in the morning and evening for prayer. The students were predominantly Catholic and too small, roughly equal proportions, Protestant and Jewish. Most of the students belonged to the middle class, few of the lower nobility like the Horthys, aristocrats like Prónay were rare. What is striking is the varied curriculum, the small class size of a maximum of ten per class and that only swimming lessons were held in the last two weeks of school. The discipline was strict; the schoolchildren were not allowed to enter the city during their free time, contacts with non-school students were undesirable. The more talented and more ambitious could study at the best universities in Austria-Hungary and Germany and at the military academies , although a regular Matura was not yet possible at the school; the others easily found a position in civil service. Prónay, who later appeared provincial and at best semi-educated, was proud all his life to have attended this school. Two brothers Miklós Horthys were his schoolmates, which promoted his later career.

Bodó concludes from Prónay's diary entries (he did not report anything about his school days, but at least one volume was missing) that he - except in sports - did not perform well; the knowledge of Hungarian and German was poor and the knowledge of French was insufficient. The school had a reputation for being a reformatory for difficult upper-class students. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the parents chose the school not only because of its profile, the affordable costs and career opportunities compared to, say, the noble Vienna Theresianum , but that it may have had behavioral problems. According to Bodó, he should have entered in 1886, but is not listed in the school's bulletin of 1890/91. It is possible that he only attended the four year old Reáliskola and not the seven year high school.

The sources on his youth are very poor. According to Ildikó Németh, the school's matriculations have probably been lost, and the Prónays archive in Romhány has also been lost. Information on school performance, behavior, school branch and qualification - as a later one-year volunteer he must have at least passed the Matura - is not known.

Military career until the end of the First World War

Training and work as a reserve officer

Prónay took up the military career in 1892; what he had done since leaving the Laehne Institute (probably 1890) is not known. According to his origins and family tradition, P. initially served in the 11th Austro-Hungarian hussar regiment in Szombathely until 1911 or 1912, like his two brothers Gyula and Mihály . From 1912 P. served with interruptions in the more prestigious 13th kuk Jaszkún Hussar Regiment in Kecskemét until its dissolution. The commandant of the regiment in Kecskemét was Horthy's eldest brother, whom Prónay valued and who in turn was apparently well-disposed towards him. In the confirmation of his first release in 1921, he was referred to as a hussar. He attended the Franz Josef Military Institute or the Ludovika Academy in Budapest.

He did military service from 1892 or 1893 to 1896; as a one-year volunteer, he was trained as a reserve officer and then spent three years in actual military service. The coveted completion of training to become a reserve officer was a prerequisite for rapid advancement as a civil servant; for well-connected candidates, mainly aristocrats like Prónay, it was an alternative entry into a military career. Bodó concluded from his diary entries that he did not take his duties very seriously, since - unusual for such diaries - he only reported on his leisure activities.

On the occasion of the Christmas advance in 1894, the one-year-old volunteer and sergeant of the cavalry was appointed lieutenant of the reserve by the emperor. According to the 1896 military schematic, the deadline was January 1st, 1895. He stayed with his regiment.

In 1898 or 1899 - according to other sources as early as 1896 - he left the army and tried for one or two years to help one of his brothers on his estate in Kis Zellő northeast of Balassagyarmat, later Alsózellő (now Malé Zlievce in Slovakia). Bodó suspects that at that time he lacked goal and direction in life. It is also possible that his labor was needed by his family after his father's death on July 29, 1898.

In 1900 or 1901 he rejoined the army. In the issues of the military schematism for 1900 and 1901 he is entered as a lieutenant in the reserve. According to Haberman, he joined the 11th Hussar Regiment as a lieutenant on November 1, 1902. In 1909, at the age of almost 35, he was promoted to first lieutenant / föhadnagy of the cavalry, which others achieved at the age of 26. In the following years he made several trips and was sent to Vienna for further training in 1913, in the same year he traveled to England and Belgium on an official basis.

First World War

He started the First World War as a first lieutenant; in November 1914 he was promoted to captain of the cavalry or Rittmeister (Hungarian százados ). In his application for promotion to lieutenant colonel (alezredes) made in August 1919 , he stated that he had been at the front for 36 months, which contradicts the information in his diaries at least in part.

On August 1, 1914, he came with his regiment to the Serbian front and, according to Fogarassy, ​​was shot in the lung near Šabac . According to Schlag, he fought in Russia and Bessarabia from 1915 . In March 1915 he received the Military Merit Cross 3rd Class with the war decoration for bravery before the enemy from the Kaiser. The Jászkun memorial documents a serious wound on May 11, 1915. According to his own statements, he was wounded in the left arm in Galicia at the beginning of 1915 and spent the rest of the year at home and in health resorts such as Baden near Vienna to recover . In August 1915 he received the highest commendable recognition from the Kaiser for brave behavior in front of the enemy. After his recovery he returned to the Russian front on March 5, 1916, where he took part in the Bessarabian front breakthrough. On August 2, 1916, he fell ill and remained in the hospital until January 2, 1917. In October 1916 he again received the highest commendation from the emperor. According to Haberman, he was said to have been wounded in 1916.

He asked for a transfer to the mostly Romanian-speaking 64th kuk infantry regiment, probably because of the declining importance of the cavalry. With this regiment he was on the Russian and Italian fronts. In the spring of 1918 he attended a course for infantry officers. He spent the last months of the war on the Italian front (according to Schlag am Piave ), where he witnessed some of the bloodiest battles. According to Fogarassy, ​​he took part in the second Piave offensive . After his 40th birthday he was no longer promoted, he remained captain / Rittmeister.

Assessment of career

Bodó judged his career to be respectable, but anything but outstanding, neither in the cavalry nor in the infantry. Prónay did not receive any of the higher honors awards, only a few medals. Unlike the majority of Austro-Hungarian officers, he survived the war relatively unscathed. He was loyal and committed to his country and its king or emperor of Austria.

According to Bodó, Prónay's career barely progressed, even though rapid advancement was possible in the First World War. Bodó rules out a lack of personal courage as a reason. In the Jászkun memorial he is described as courageous, prudent, independent and that he has repeatedly distinguished himself as an officer; Prónay loved to fight and risked his life in duels when he was over sixty. Bodó considers the lack of interest in military technology and science and his image as a brutal Jew hater as possible reasons, but he suspects Pronáy's character deficits as the main reason, which also emerge from his diary entries (constant disputes with foreign officers, in 1918 he denounced alleged traitors to the War Ministry in Vienna) . In reports and assessments he is described as energetic and dynamic in line with his job, but also as a hot-headed, bad-tempered, dismissive man with whom it was difficult to work with, especially in the last phase of the First World War. He acted extremely brutal and cruel against soldiers under his control and abused them regularly. He received warnings for repeatedly hitting a reserve officer and had to be prevented at least twice from shooting subordinates for minor mistakes. As a result, his superiors were hesitant about promotions.

After the end of the First World War

When the Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed in October / November 1918, Prónay stayed in Vienna. He couldn't come to terms with the defeat of his country. At the beginning of November he returned to his old hussar regiment in Kecskemét. Like many officers, he had an ambivalent attitude towards the upheavals and, like the majority of officers, he was initially prepared to tolerate the new, democratic regime . On November 1, 1918, he was nominated Major / Örnagy, but the act was not signed because of the upheavals in Vienna. His promotion to major and then to lieutenant colonel / alezredes only took place later as a counter-revolutionary against the Béla Kuns regime .

When the revolutionary soldiers chose their new commanders, he failed when a personally known officer accused him of unusual cruelty (whom he had executed in the fall of 1919 as an alleged communist). Prónay then had to leave the base and move into an apartment. In December, after the dissolution of his unit, he left Kecskemét and increasingly turned away from democracy, while Schlag - to whom the diary entries were not yet available - described him as a staunch opponent of revolutionary currents, especially the " Red Vienna " from the start. Prónay toyed with the idea of ​​going to Mexico or Argentina as a rancher, or becoming the manager of a cousin in his place of birth, but the family decided on two other unemployed relatives.

Thanks to his connections, he soon received a post at the Federal Inspectorate for Horses, which was under the military command in Budapest, where he requisitioned horses from agriculture for the army, preferably from Jewish landlords. Although he already had connections to counter-revolutionary circles at that time, he continued his work in the Soviet Republic and was not an enemy of the Kun regime. He was clearly visible wearing a red badge, supposedly to deceive the left. He also used the position for personal enrichment; At the beginning of 1919 he sent two horses to his brother Mihály as “replacements” for two horses lost in the war. His main concern during the early Soviet republic was exposed, especially since he was a gambler and obtained alcohol despite prohibition.

His savings of over 60,000 kroner in a Jewish bank, a small fortune, were confiscated. The fear of further decline, the probably unfounded fear of being monitored by the police and that he had no future as a baron in a red Hungary made him leave Budapest on May 6, 1919. He presented a doctor's certificate stating that he had to undergo a spa treatment and left for Vienna. Instead of hastily leaving Kun's sphere of control, he visited friends on his way out. At that time he did not endeavor to fight the regime and had previously obtained a medical certificate to certify his invalidity.

In Vienna, Prónay was one of many unemployed officers who sold their services to the highest bidder, and found connections with counter-revolutionary Hungarian émigré circles. He was thinking of going to Latin America again when an anti-Semitic former comrade drew his attention to the counterrevolutionary officers assembled in Szeged (White National Army under Horthy and Gömbös, who operated under the protection of the French occupation forces) and traveled there via Yugoslavia .

Rise to the militant commander

Right-wing extremists were formed in Hungary at this time, and their supporters were fanatical university students, disarmed professional officers like Prónay and refugees from the surrounding countries.

Many officers were or became members of professional organizations or patriotic associations such as ÉME or MOVE, these had armed gangs that were responsible for many anti-Semitic unrest in Budapest or were linked to paramilitary units.

During the White Terror, as the commander of the most important officers' division, he became the most important free army leader.

However, Prónay was initially just a stranger who sought contact with well-known politicians and military leaders.

On June 4, 1919, veterans of the National Defense Association (Hungarian: Magyar Országos Véderő Egylet ; MOVE), nominally directed against the Soviet Republic, entrusted him with the organization of the first officers' division on the grounds of his talent, his determination, his uncompromising heroism and courage he would have proven in many bloody battles. It was more likely that Gömbös had arranged the election; very few knew him or his war files before his arrival in Szeged. It is possible that his ancestry or family name, his masculine charisma , his anti-Semitism and his known ruthlessness also played a role. But it can also be that the election was made due to the absence of another candidate.

The order for the establishment of such a unit by the Ministry of Defense was issued on June 14th.

The construction was arduous, as few resources were available, despite his commitment and energy in the construction and his undeniable charisma, he would not have mastered this task without the support of the elites and the MOVE boss Gömbös. The construction took place with the support or at least the tolerance of the French occupation in the region of Szeged.

He increased his unit from 160 men in June 1919 to 1500 at the beginning of 1920 (peak of his police power), according to Schlag he quickly built a unit of considerable strength. But it remained part of the regular armed forces until January 1921. It was later called the White Guard. One of the official designations is Gendarmerie Reserve Battalion.

It attracted young aristocrats and fanatical young men willing to sacrifice their lives for the survival of the Hungarian nation and historical Hungary. The recruiting success was based in important parts on similarities in the personality structure, and corresponding, shared ideas and goals. His department and later his officer corps were decidedly elitist. Around 30% of his officers were aristocrats with connections to the military and political elite, twice as many as in the other departments. The majority of his people were made up of members of the lower and middle middle class . Members of the elitist hussar regiments who took part in the First World War, however, formed only a small minority.

However, many of his officers had entries in the criminal records. By his own admission, criminals were welcome in his unit, which earned him allegations from his superiors. He replied that neither priests nor academics had applied to him. Through his reputation as a sadist and fanatic and the acts of violence he committed, he attracted like-minded people and through the attractiveness of his unit for sadists, criminals and psychopaths, he created an antipole to the traditional armies, which tended to weed out such men due to their strict hierarchies and established codes of honor or, more importantly, not to include them at all, especially in the case of units that were supposed to pacify the population. He and his people did not know how to obey orders and refused to be part of any hierarchy. Like other militias, he not only attracted the usual criminals, but more importantly, he removed normal soldiers from the unit. He did not regret their departure. For him, deserters were unpatriotic, cowardly, undisciplined and proved their uselessness by their actions. Only a few left, the majority stayed. For those who stayed and, in his opinion, showed weaknesses, he found hard words (see Wikiquote Pál Prónay). He demanded that his men consider murder and torture as part of their job. The majority needed little or no drive from Prónay himself, the others only adapted by strictly obeying his orders and a short time later they themselves took the initiative. Torture was fun not only for him, but also for his men. With this, and with primitive jokes, Prónay appealed to cadets and young officers who saw their lives as a game. He and his men incited one another to greater and greater cruelty in order to impress one another. Physical strength and threatening gestures were also central values.

He even got his subordinates to separate from their partners if he so wished.

Even in Szeged, Prónay refused to share his command with anyone, he only accepted those who submitted to his command and shared his ideals until their death.

In himself he was less of a leader than a father figure and ideologue; he had the ability to express diffuse feelings in clear words and to give form and meaning to group feelings. Like other paramilitary leaders of the time, he was as much a product as the founder of his unit. His leadership style was primarily charismatic as opposed to today, when armies prefer bureaucratic leaders. What set him apart from the other volunteer corps leaders was his advanced age and descent from an old, highly respected aristocratic family, and that he was a baron. Six companies were founded in Szeged, each with a noble commander, but not of the rank of Prónays. He was also politically more ambitious.

High professional standards, marks of quality for modern armies, played a minor role in the battalion's recruiting of officers. He did not name any criteria for their selection. He also attracted soldiers through his disregard for traditional army discipline. He and his men had little respect for traditional military discipline. The young recruits in particular were fanatically devoted to him and Horthy as leaders of the National Army. Because of this unconditional obedience and idealism, the battalion was ideal for carrying out "special tasks", so its commanders were promoted like Ranzenberger.

He saw himself as a good father who often brought sacrifices as gifts to his men. In return, his officers and men would have been very happy about his visits and even met at night to greet him. He also held Christmas parties for his people, where he distributed gifts and sang Christmas carols with them. He also used his links in the army and society to secure posts for his people.

On the other hand, he also acted like a top manager in the private sector (he had several years of professional experience as an estate manager). He made it clear to his potential readers that he had to procure food, clothing, and weapons for his men. He therefore asked for them to be made available, especially in cities and larger communities, immediately after his arrival there. Since Hungary was shaken by war at this time and its men had to survive, he hired them out as temporary workers or they had to do agricultural and manual work. In order to get himself and his people good food, he abused the police powers granted to him and his people. Theft and extortion became so important to the unit that Prónay had to hire a professional accountant to keep track of things. Most of the stolen goods became the property of the battalion and seldom turned over to the official authorities, even if they were officially confiscated.

The unit was not specialized either by branches of service or by any other criteria, it used all kinds of equipment, unlike the pre-war units of comparable size.

The battalion was held together by the memory of atrocities committed and the hope for more. When he had to cancel an attack on Czechoslovakia in 1921, he feared a rebellion by his subordinates.

The dependence of the soldiers on Prónay went so far that after the dissolution of the unit they had difficulties to fit into society after the dissolution, in some cases they were arrested for robbery and murder, which showed how dangerous these men were to civilians.

The battalion's own nature, characterized by Prónay's narcissism and the extremely close relationship between him and his people, prevented active cooperation with other militias and the military elite.

His free corps, nominally directed against the communists, became the most important representative of violence in the summer and autumn of 1919. Jews, including counter-revolutionaries, had been persecuted since June, even before the end of the communist regime. Prónay wrote in his diary that Prime Minister Karoly and several of his aristocratic ministers not only tolerated this but also actively promoted it.

Iván Héjjas and other volunteer corps leaders recognize him as their leader. 3000 of his supporters fought from the Hungarian lowlands in western Hungary / Burgenland. Like other paramilitary groups, his battalion posed no serious threat to neighboring states. Like Héjjas and Ostenburg , Prónay kept switching sides. Not only his, but also the other militias differed from the regular army in the way they were recruited; they were highly ideological, had different command structures, the high level of personal ties between the commander and his men, the violence against civilians had different roots and different functions although they did not behave more violently than regular troops.

Prónay's department did not speak for all paramilitary units.

Originally, ethnic Germans and Jews were also overrepresented in the paramilitary groups.

Gömbös informed the local political and military leaders that in June 1919 he had set up the Prónay Company as a model for the allegedly disorganized and politically unreliable local units. He noted that the Prónay strike force was formed as bodyguard for Admiral Horthy and members of the government, which did not go unchallenged. The formation of the Prónay Company and its preferential treatment angered the other less fortunate officers. They complained that the Prónay battalion were allowed to do things that were forbidden to them themselves. Conservative members saw the company as a powerful instrument for their struggle for power (defeating their domestic opponents, terrorizing potential opponents, impressing neutrals). Like the Lenin-fiúk / Lenin Boys during the Red Terror, the Prónay Company mainly had functions at home, fighting with foreign forces never had priority, and politically it was very closely linked to the Gömbös-Kozma-Toókos group. Gömbös was in many ways similar to Mussolini, who wanted Prónay and his people to be law enforcers. He was a great organizational talent who shared Prónay's radical anti-Semitism. But he was a social outcast. The Baron Prónay saw him as an upstart and often refused to obey him. The relationship between the most important paramilitary leader and the Hungarian Mussolini began in Szeged.

Prónay was considered an unreliable and rebellious ally of Gömbös. The relationship between the two was tense and lacked structure. In the eyes of Prónay Gömbös was a careerist, parvenu, busybody and a coward, his ambitions did not match his origins, he had “his fingers everywhere” and his organizational talent was inadequate. On the other hand, Prónay lacked the intellect and sensitivity of Gömbös. The rivalries were personal and professional (rivalry for Horthy's favor).

Prónay was among those who amassed positions that normally professional and public servants did. His company acted as a bodyguard for Horthy and members of the government, guardians of public buildings and larger facilities, in Szeged and later in Siófok and Budapest as a kind of political police. Prónays "criminal police officers" were young reserve officers without police training.

This unit

- organized pogroms

- Infiltrated competing troops and social organizations

- arrested and tortured political opponents and innocent Jews and locked them up in the basement of the convent on Madách Street, which was assigned to her as her headquarters.

- spied in areas still controlled by the Soviet regime

- sent regular reports to the Army High Command and the Ministry of Defense.

Prónay soldiers were allowed to continue

- act as border guards

- arrest real or alleged smugglers or black marketeers and often confiscate their property

- raided prisons and murdered prisoners

The terrorist acts lasted for weeks and angered domestic workers and poor peasants and attracted international attention.

The unprecedented power possessed primarily by the Prónay battalion was established in Szeged in late 1919 / early 1920. He owed his power to the military elite, which the fanatics used to strengthen the influence of the counterrevolution. Horthy and others put the paramilitary groups on the unsuspecting population in the provincial town.

As power increased, the Prónay battalion began to pose a threat to law and order in the city. Counterrevolutionary officers who were angry with the world saw enemies everywhere. Prónay in particular had paranoid traits that emerged from his diary entries. Prónay planned several murders that could be prevented by last minute interventions.

Nobody was safe from Prónay and his people, but apart from anything he was interested in the Jews of the middle and upper classes, many of whom, incidentally, supported the counterrevolution with weapons and money. His soldiers regularly attacked Jewish guests in coffee houses and restaurants, and entire families had to withdraw from public life. According to Prónay, Horthy and those around him approved of these actions, or at least they did nothing. Conservatives only stepped in when the murders increased and corpses washed up on the banks of the Tisza. Traditionalist officers were also concerned. They respected the military merits of many members of the Prónay unit, but doubted their military value and were annoyed by their preferential treatment. High-ranking old-school officers and politicians feared that their reputation would suffer and distanced themselves from Prónay.

Only a few politicians were present at the flag consecration of the Prónay department on July 17, 1919; only young MOVE officers came in large numbers. Gömbös made it clear that he viewed the unit as his private army. The absence of high-ranking politicians at an event of this kind was very unusual and a sign that these circles were distancing themselves from Prónay, Prónay, for his part, also avoided them.

In the same month he founded the organization KKVSZ in Szeged with the military bishop, the Franciscan István Zadravecz OFM. Prónay worked with this, although he came from a Protestant family and himself belonged to the Evangelical Church AB, also later together in the Leithabanat. The clergyman was one of his closest allies and military chaplain in the unit.

The counterrevolutionary officer Kálmán Shvoy, an opponent of such troops and of Prónay himself, wrote that Prónay and Horthy got along very well and criticized that this fact damaged the reputation of the armed forces.

Prónay also overestimated his position within MOVE. Politically, he was far too untalented to recognize that real power is not just based on violence or threats. This also includes the fact that at the end of July he proposed to cross the demarcation line, to destroy the Hungarian Soviet Republic and to organize a pogrom in Budapest without the approval of the French army which controls southern Hungary. This was rejected because they did not want to risk a conflict with the Entente.

Prónay certainly amassed considerable power as the head of the secret service and head of the Horthy bodyguard in Szeged, but even now he had only limited influence on Hungarian domestic and foreign policy.

At the beginning of August the communist regime collapsed in Budapest and the French allowed the national army to leave Szeged. The exact orders that Prónay received are unclear. Horthy denied having given Prónay a general killing order, on the other hand he openly showed sympathy for officers who wanted revenge for the torture and humiliation of their relatives by the communists and who vented their disappointment on Jews and liberals, who they were responsible for the "mutilation" of Hungary did. Also within MOVE a part denied a corresponding order, Prónay claimed to have received a corresponding order in response to his question. He further claimed that he had received the following orders:

- Crossing the demarcation line

- Relocation of the troops to the area between the Danube and Tisza

- Put down resistance

- To arrest and punish officials of the communist regime

- To reinstate the pre-revolutionary administrative forces or to set up a local government

- Red Army units that were reliable to incorporate and disarm others

- To commandeer: weapons, trucks, trains, wagons, horses, food, equipment and money for the National Army

- The department should reach Budapest and report to the Ministry of Defense upon arrival.

Leading man of counter-revolutionary terror and the culmination of Prónay's power in Hungary

By now, at the latest, Pronay's unit has become the most murderous paramilitary unit in Hungary. As early as the fall of 1919, he damaged his reputation with his approach (robbery of large estates, robbing houses, kidnapping , extorting money from merchants and Jewish communities).

Shortly after the march, he had ten people murdered, and on the way he had numerous people captured and executed.

On the way, he and his troops anxiously avoided any direct contact with the invading Romanian army.

In his diary he claimed that the campaign was very dangerous. In reality, it met with little resistance from the supporters of the Soviet Republic, Jews and rural poor, while they were warmly received by the local middle and upper classes.

Through the riots against communists, social democrats and Jews, he and his unit acquired an extremely bad reputation. Not only Prónay himself, but also a number of his men had previously worked for the Hungarian Red Army.

The unit also had similar torture methods and jargon as the Red Terror units. However, there were also differences, such as violence against women or tattooing of the victims, which the communists did not practice or did not practice to this extent.

However, the Romanians were faster in Budapest and Prónay could therefore not invade. He therefore set up a new headquarters in Siófok , a place preferred by the Jewish middle class. On the way there, the Prónay unit, among others, committed ongoing war crimes, some of which are among the greatest atrocities against Jews in Hungarian history.

During his stay in Siófok he treated villages, small towns and isolated farmsteads as foreign territory.

The militias extended their activities to the whole of Transdanubia as far as the areas under Serbian control, particularly the areas along the Danube and Lake Balaton . Among their victims were functionaries of the Soviet republic or communists, and of democracy and social democracy, peasants, farm workers who demanded land reforms or higher wages, apolitical and conservative Jews, and to a lesser extent legitimists who threatened, tortured and murdered them. In many places they also incited the population.

In Transdanubia , aristocrats and his unit often invited him to their estates in order to punish servants and farm workers who sided with democrats and left regimes in order to refer them to their places in exchange for food, protection and entertainment. However, recent studies show a more differentiated picture. The majority even stayed away from the militia from the start, while others kept their distance after reports of atrocities.

They found most support from the rural middle class. In many municipalities, especially in the Hungarian Plain, they were even supported by rural administrators. In Transdanubia people were more moderate, which Prónay interpreted as a weakness. In the south of the Hungarian lowlands he also helped to set up militias in many villages and small towns.

Prónay's units alone killed between 1,500 and 2,000 people, especially during the autumn and winter of 1919. Thousands took the units to military prisons and detention camps with the help of the police and authorities. Hundreds were brutally tortured and killed between 1919 and early 1920. Thousands died of malnutrition, overcrowding, poor sanitation and abuse in military prisons and detention centers over the next two years. Their victims were not only executed by the Prónay and Héjjas militias, but also skinned, drowned, cut in two, the stomach slit open and the bellies filled with stones, ears (which served as trophies or good luck charms ) cut off and chemically preserved, among other things in the oven of their armored train, many burned alive, beaten and then sprinkled with icing sugar on their swollen and bruised faces (to attract the largest possible number of flies), genitals tied with straps and then the victims with beating Forced to run in circles like horses and they were led as if on the riding arena, others locked in stables and forced to eat hay, and Jewish women and peasants' breasts chopped off or tattooed. Farm workers were hung up either by the neck or by the feet, and men's bodies were mutilated. At times, however, they behaved like school bullies, e.g. B. Tattooing of discriminatory words, see chap. u. The wording of several sources suggests that he was partly personally involved in the tortures and murders.

There were also kidnappings and extortions.

As such, they were soldiers of the National Army, but he did not follow the standard official channels. He demanded and received suicidal loyalty from his people, who, as sadists and cold-blooded murderers, were to become an exact copy of himself. He expected to obey the most brutal orders without hesitation; if you didn't have the brutality, you would be expelled from the unit. He was surprised, albeit positively, by the fanaticism of new recruits himself. Some were cruel from the start, others became so by simply executing, the result was always the identification of the officers and men with Prónay. The atrocities created an unusually strong bond between him and his people that could not always be clarified in detail. They took place either on the basis of orders or on their own initiative. The violence he encouraged was one of the strongest ties that held unity together.

On the other hand, the unit was also part of MOVE, the power base of Gömbös, whereby Prónay regarded himself as Gömbös equal. He later accused Gömbös of intriguing against him and wanting to destroy him and he did not allow himself to be ordered around by him. Prónay not only rejected orders from Gömbös, but also questions from the interior minister, some legitimists and “cheeky journalists”.

He wasn't the only cruel leader of the White Terror, but probably the cruelest and most fanatical.

The Prónay Department endeavored to settle old scores with their enemies during the counterrevolution. She also had numerous opportunities to enrich herself.

In November 1919 he planned a pogrom across Budapest, which was stopped by Horthy. The Prónay never forgave that Horthy stopped the pogrom. At that time his unit reached battalion size and the newspaper Népszava reported dozens of cases of robbery and extortion, among other things for the procurement of gasoline, in which his officers were involved.

In autumn 1919 he gave the order to rob the headquarters of the Hungarian Freemasons because of the valuable facility.

From the end of 1919 the terror was intensified for about 12 months. Pressure on the government, especially on Horthy, from foreign diplomats, wealthy Hungarian-Jewish businessmen and trade unionists, did not produce sufficient results.

In 1919/20 he was also a co-founder of the right-wing extremist secret society Etelközi Szövetség.

Prónay himself lived in luxury hotels from 1920, even when he had a room available in the Nándor barracks. After his wedding, he moved into a house (according to newspaper reports, only one apartment in it) at 38 Szentkirály Street. In the summer of 1921 he and his wife moved to Bicske , where his cavalry unit was stationed, as his officers were based in Budapest and from November 1919 guarded the royal palace in Gödöllő.

They were bodyguards of Horthy, Bethlen and other members of the elite, as well as foreign dignitaries at large receptions and other major events. They were still secret service officers and border guards until 1921, when they continued to control the main military prison.

After the Romanians withdrew in November 1919, they patrolled districts with a particularly high Jewish population. They expanded their skills to pressure neutral people, blackmail business owners, and kidnapped wealthy Jewish businessmen and experts. As border guards and criminal police officers, they were allowed to arrest alleged spies, smugglers and black marketeers from September 1919.

Most important to them, however, was stealing cars, motorcycles, gasoline, jewels, food, and other valuables. Torturing Jews was more important to them than fighting corruption.

In the end, Prónay had access to Horthy and other members of the elite, he continued to play the role of political advisor, albeit with less and less success, to undermine the position of conservative rivals, such as Bethlen, and to steer foreign policy in a more radical direction.

Due to his functions and his easy access to Horthy, Prónay remained a power factor until 1921. His political influence remained marginal. The reports of his officers (abundantly provided with Prónay's comments, which typically contained nasty rumors and gossip stories about the people concerned and their environment) were read less and less. In contrast to the Cheka or SS, the Prónay Battalion never became a state within a state, it never controlled the state apparatus, not even at the height of its police power in early 1920. Its decline began with the political consolidation in 1920, its power came to an end with it its marginalization in the summer of 1921.

In foreign policy, especially in the fight against international communism and the restoration of the old borders, Prónay was on the side of the radical right. With the knowledge and approval of his superiors, including Horthy, he tried to kidnap or poison Kun and his closest advisers, who had been given asylum by the social democratic government of Austria. It failed because of poor organization and details leaked to Austrian newspapers, which continued to embarrass and isolate Hungary. His people successfully crossed the Hungarian borders and kidnapped representatives of the Soviet Republic.

Schlag writes, however, that the new government would have been able to dissolve his unit only with great difficulty, as Prónay still had very influential friends in the highest circles at that time.

About two weeks before Horthy was elected as imperial administrator, two editors of the social democratic daily Népszava (Volksstimme) were murdered and thrown mutilated into the Danube. The perpetrators were officers from the Prónays and Ostenburg units.

On March 1, 1920, he joined the 1st Jäger Battalion as a cavalry captain and battalion commander.

On the same day, Horthy was elected as imperial administrator. On this day Prónay, Ostenburg formed a trellis with their officers and they continued to enter the meeting room with open pistol cases and hand grenades on their belts, whereupon Horthy received 131 of 141 votes cast.

In the spring of 1920 he was summoned to court for allegedly violating a Jewish flag during the war.

Also in the spring of 1920 Prónay and Gömbös supported the establishment of an Austrian legion in Zalaegerszeg made up of former Austrian officers, who were small but not without danger and who were involved in the attack on the weapons depot in Fürstenfeld , see below.

At the same time, Liberals, Christian Socialists and the Small Farmers' Party led a large-scale campaign in parliament against paramilitary violence and called for the dissolution of these units and the patriotic association of the Alliance of Awakening Hungarians (ÉME). Horthy and his advisors continued to count on the units, especially the more professional ones like the Prónays against Social Democrats and workers' organizations, to demonstrate power, as border guards, to regain lost areas by taking advantage of international crises. The legitimists did not want to break up their paramilitary groups either. Paramilitary groups and patriotic associations had many friends and supporters, and during the counterrevolution they made many enemies.

Since the beginning of 1920, warnings have been issued against a negative impact on the peace negotiations. In August the government announced that it would punish the perpetrators.

In 1920 Prónay was also involved in contacts with the German radical right.

On March 12-17, the putsch by Wolfgang Kapp took place in Germany , supported by Hungary, but failed.

On May 17, 1920, Horthy received a delegation from Erich Ludendorff to plan a White International in Budapest, Prónay was responsible for its security. According to Schlag, Hungarian government agencies were only marginally involved, but more important were ÉME and Move and Prónay and Gömbös were among those who played a key role. A close alliance and cooperation between Hungarian, Austrian and Bavarian Freikorps was planned for the purpose of annulment of the peace treaties and liquidation of the left in Austria and Prussia. Austria, Hungary and Bavaria were supposed to smash Czechoslovakia through military operations. In Austria, the Renner government was to be overthrown by a right-wing coup and a conservative regime was to be installed. Hungary provides financial support and training facilities, and for its key role it is to get its pre-war borders back as a reward. After that, a massive crusade against Bolshevism is to take place in Russia, financed by counterfeit rubles made in Hungary. The negotiations were continued by Gömbös and Prónay, who gave his approval on June 1, 1920, three days before the Trianon Treaty was signed. Prónay himself was in favor of alliances with the German radical right, strengthening contacts with Austrian conservatives and Polish nationalists. He agreed with Horthy that it was not in Hungary's interest to join Austria with Germany.

If Prónay's career had hardly progressed until the end of the war ( captain (százados) only after the beginning of the First World War, at the age of around 40), it was now all the steeper. In March 1920 he was already a major (örnagy). In October or November 1920 he was promoted from Horthy to lieutenant colonel (alezredes). According to the OSZK, this was only made in 1921, but the appointment can only then have become effective. At the latest at his wedding, however, he was allowed to use the title.

The appointment as lieutenant colonel by Horthy took place, although the international press, including the bourgeois press, announced on the basis of documents the extortion and murder of a wine merchant. The promotion was a reward, the announced judicial investigation of this case was just an announcement or an alibony by the government.

On June 8, 1920, Iván Héjjas threatened Parliament in an interview given to a nationalist magazine at Prónay's instigation. Although there is no evidence that the two would carry out their threat, the government feared repercussions like the Kapp Putsch and the Council of Ministers disbanded all militias with the exception of the battalions of Prónay and Ostenburg. A few days later, the government limited their powers to the arrest, interrogation and prolonged detention of civilians. The defense minister also tried to downsize the Prónay battalion by sacking reserve officers. With the help of Horthy, however, Prónay was able to delay implementation.

Its decline began in mid-1920 when a police officer was murdered and many of his officers were implicated in the case.

In July 1920, a unit of his battalion fought, including Prónay himself and Lieutenant Iván Héjjas, who took action against Austrian gendarmes and army units, and on July 30th, together with other Hungarian and Austrian irregulars, robbed an arms depot in Fürstenfeld . Even then, Hungary was building up organizations that could be used as militants or insurgents against an Austrian conquest in Burgenland. The weapons from Fürstenfeld were used in early autumn 1921 by insurgents to move to western Hungary / Burgenland and wanted to reverse the assignment to Austria. Rash remarks by Héjjas were picked up by the liberal press, stating that he or Prónay were planning a coup, primarily about restoring the old borders; an attack was planned in Czechoslovakia in December. In the end, Prónay had to abandon the project after talking to Horthy.

In the aftermath there was an increase in violence in Budapest. Legitimists feared that Prónay would prevent the return of King Charles and launched a campaign against Héjjas in the summer of 1920.

In the same year Prónay supported the candidacy of Archduke Albrecht for the Hungarian royal throne (see under Other).

Around 1920 the international press began to take an interest in him as one of the leading figures in White Terrorism. At least until the end of the First World War it was described as neutral (promotions) or positively (commendations or awards of medals by the emperor), and from around this point onwards it was only noticed negatively by the press, sometimes even in the same newspapers.

First descent as an officer

At the same time, the government decided to investigate the activities of ÉME, the most violent patriotic association, and contemplated its dissolution. In mid-June she promised to investigate the atrocities against Jews in Kecskemét and the surrounding area since August 1919.

To defuse the announcement, Horthy made Prónay chairman of the commission of inquiry. Local officials, many of whom were directly involved in the atrocities, welcomed him and his commission with open arms, knowing that nothing would happen to them. The results were correspondingly meager. Only 54 people were held responsible for murders, kidnappings and robbery by the regular army and police. Lieutenant Héjjas and many of his subordinates worked closely with Prónay and later became members of his battalion. Shvoy criticized this farce.

But Prónay could not reverse the political development. In 1920 Teleki became Prime Minister; although he was a radical anti-Semite, he was an opponent of pogroms and violence.

Prónay and his people were supposed to be removed from the public eye, as they represented chaos that did not fit the established regime (anymore), but Horthy and Bethlen did this only half-heartedly. Prónay proposed endless pogroms and purges to Horthy, from the Jews to the elimination of other groups. Only a dynamic regime, obsessed with military conquest and permanent purges, could use such individuals and military units. Prónay's removal was not based on personal disagreements; in the second half of the 1930s, Horthy did the same with Ferenc Szálasi and other fascists. The discrediting of the militias and the removal of people like Prónay began with the reconquest of Budapest by Hungarian troops in mid-November 1919 and lasted two years.

This made Budapest attractive to a large number of foreigners.

In addition, an active, politically conscious and well organized working class developed. The Jewish elite was economically and culturally influential. Both exerted heavy pressure on the political elite to curb the militias.

In December 1919 an attack was carried out on the socialist Népszava and the liberal magazine Az Est / Am Abend.

In February 1920 the editor of Népszava Somogyi and one of his colleagues were murdered. This offended the working class and in June 1920 international unions called for a trade embargo against Hungary. In the spring and summer of 1920 there were constant reports in the international press about pogroms and the persecution of socialists. At the same time, delegations visiting Hungary also published reports. Both of these diminished the credibility of the Hungarian elite in the delicate months leading up to the final negotiations for the Trianon Peace Treaty, which was signed on June 4, 1920.

The boycott forced the Hungarian government to take stricter measures, and government troops were ordered in mid-June to clear the Great Hungarian Plain of people who were abusing the uniform of the national army. At the same time, the government issued a new decree strictly separating police and military units and banning soldiers from ill-treating and detaining civilians.

In mid-1920, Héjjas had 1,400 men stationed in what is now Burgenland in the north, and Prónay himself 1,200 in the south.

From July 1920 there were again excesses of violence. Héjjas men, thugs in military uniforms, murdered one policeman on November 10 and injured a second one; the political and military elite were outraged. These men were under Prónay's protection. A pogrom-like event occurred in late July in which a bank manager and a lawyer were killed and a number of people were injured. The chairman of the Association of Banks and Savings Banks demanded that the judiciary work quickly to restore confidence in business life.

The detectives and government troops, who were supposed to keep the lowlands and the Kecskemét region safe and remove troublemakers, were terrified and feared for their lives as the militias were better equipped. After returning to Budapest in 1920, they quit their activities without any results.

Before the planned government raid, Horthy had Prónay ask if there would be any resistance. Prónay promised to remain neutral, but he was personally present and he was allowed to vouch for 12 people, including Héjjas, who was allowed to go as a free man. However, the raid continued and hundreds were arrested in Budapest alone. The offensive meant a heavy blow to Prónay's prestige, it weakened his power base, and doubts arose about his ability to hold the free crowd movement together.

In November 1920 the Budapest Public Prosecutor's Office was on record with 500 unlawful executions, most of which Prónay was responsible for.

In mid-November 1920, the Vorarlberger Wacht reported that even the Berliner Tagblatt, which was also a bourgeois newspaper, was interested in the terrorist terror, including Prónay. He had recently been promoted to lieutenant colonel by Horthy, although Prónay was accused by the National Assembly of having extorted millions from a wine merchant from Kecskemét and then hanged the merchant. The government promised a judicial investigation, but the promotion rewarded Prónay instead of punishing him. Prónay was also considered to be one of the greatest terrorists, if not the greatest terrorist in terrorism. There was press censorship in Hungary regarding the terrorism. The Hungarian parliament only carried out alibi actions against Prónay and other false terrorists. The USA has played down calls for help from those affected. The British mission received a document from the relatives of the Kecskeméter wine merchant, who had been blackmailed and murdered by Prónay, which they would pass on and were otherwise disinterested in those affected by the terrorist terror.

In the same month information was leaked to the public that Prónay and his men wanted to use the rest of the volunteer corps to invade Czechoslovakia on Christmas Eve . Prónay was involved in the planning together with the Hungarian and Bavarian Freikorps. An invasion of Slovakia and the Sudetenland was planned in order to provoke the collapse of Czechoslovakia through a rebellion. First, Horthy pledges his support for the White International. However, Horthy later ordered Prónay to stop preparations immediately. Ultimately, the relationship between Horthy and the political elite on the one hand and the militias and irredentist organizations on the other deteriorated.

At the beginning of 1921, the days of paramilitary groups were over. After February 1921, among other things, his battalion was no longer under military surveillance, but it was re-established as a gendarmerie unit for reasons of foreign policy. Rumors surfaced that the regime would reorganize or dissolve it. The militias did not beat foreign enemies. The Kun regime failed because of its own mistakes and the military defeat against Romania. They did not restore order, but rather prolonged the turmoil and created additional resentment.

Prónay, who was very talented at picking up rumors, had no illusions about the intentions of the elite. The appointment of Bethlen as prime minister made him even more suspicious. Bethlen often spoke like a right-wing radical, but was conservative-liberal. Prónay realized that Bethlen wanted to marginalize him. A sign of this was that neither Horthy nor the political elite were present at Prónay's wedding shortly after Bethlen was appointed.

His legitimist wife was hugely influential on the increasingly frustrated Prónay, so rumors arose that he had connections with the legitimists who may not be voting, but they show the Freischarführer's alienation from the elite. Bethlen clearly wanted to get rid of him, but was faced with a dilemma: he wanted to fire Prónay, but keep his troops and not provoke a military uprising.

On March 24, 1921, King Charles IV (Emperor Karl I) made the first attempt at restoration in Hungary. Prónay responded to this by stationing troops in western Hungary. He himself belonged to the anti-Habsburg Free Kingmakers. These are a militant minority who want a national king as a sign of independence from Austria .

First retirement from the army

In 1921 a claim regarding a lease for a lime works in Alsópetény was disputed between the Jewish timber merchant Lajos Kornhauser and the community or the largest landowner in town, Prónay's older brother, senior clerk Mihály Prónay . In some cases it cannot be ruled out that Kornhauser was unaware of any accumulated liabilities. However, there are in some cases not inconsiderable differences in the description of the matter, which also attracted attention abroad:

Bodó based on Pál Prónay's diaries: The brother was childless and ill and Prónay hoped to inherit his property and his share in the lime works and therefore decided to “do something”. He had Kornhauser arrested, interrogated and physically abused by officers in the Nádor barracks in Budapest in July 1921. Kornhauser's wife looked for her husband and turned to the Liberal leader Vilmos Vázsonyi with her relatives , who immediately informed Prime Minister Bethlen. In the end, Kornhauser had to be released immediately and Prónay was given a month's leave of absence; command was transferred to his deputy captain Viktor Ranzenberger .

Pál Prónay's own version in the generally accessible abbreviated version of his diaries: his brother, with whom he had a close relationship (which seems implausible due to the text, but he uses the short form of the first name differently than with another brother, Gyula Prónay ), commissioned him to collect the amount in the public interest and in the interest of his own family, he would also have promised to bequeath the listed property to him (according to the Internet, he did not inherit the castle after his brother's death in 1925). The brother then went on a spa stay in Styria. He then contacted Kornhauser and informed him that he was acting on behalf of his brother. Kornhauser claimed that he had become insolvent and could therefore not make any payments. That doesn't seem credible since Kornhauser was a wealthy businessman. Prónay apparently just wanted to extort money. In addition, Prónay never published the memoir, Mihály died in 1925 and was therefore unable to comment on the statements that if he had actually hired Pál as the debt collector instead of suing Kornhauser or a claim that also affected the community, to assign to one of his relatives, even made a criminal offense. Prónay further claimed that he went away immediately afterwards and had forgotten the matter and therefore had nothing to do with the torture.

The newspaper “Arbeiterwille” reported as follows: Obergespan Prónay and Kornhauser argued about the amount of the claim, the Obergespan demanded 70,000 crowns, of which Kornhauser only recognized 2,000 crowns as justified. The chief appointee assigned this demand to Lieutenant Colonel Pál Pronay. Thereupon Kornhauser, according to his own statements, received a request on August 28th (this statement by the newspaper is wrong, that is the day he left the army, mainly because of the Kornhauser affair, it was more likely to be July 28th) to report to Pál Prónay in the barracks. An officer met him there and asked if he had brought the money with him. When Kornhauser denied this, the officer threatened not to let him go until the money was paid. Soon afterwards, Lieutenant Colonel Prónay himself appeared and said, “Where's the money, Jew, Jews always have money. Get it here, otherwise you will feel bad ”. Kornhauser was imprisoned for three days, but said in court that he was not treated roughly. However, the officer said that Lieutenant Colonel Prónay was very angry with him and would have him shot and thrown into the Danube. During the interrogation, Prónay stated that he had only said that Kornhauser was not allowed to go because he was very angry, but that this was interpreted as an order and Kornhauser was only detained for it. Prónay took all the guilt on himself and asked the court not to punish his officer.

The Arbeiter Zeitung (Social Democratic Party of Austria) deviates from the representation of the “will of the workers”: Prónay had Kornhauser brought to the barracks, where Prónay asked Kornhauser to pay the required amount. Vilmos Vázsonyi classified the incident as typical blackmail. If the accuracy of the allegations is confirmed, then Prónay must be released from the army immediately. Bethlen said so. Prónay has not denied anything. Therefore, the opposition assumed that Prónay will be released from the army.

The AZ also provides another version: The timber merchant Kornhauser argued with Prónay's brother over 70,000 kroner, which Kornhauser refused to pay. Suddenly Kornhauser received a request from Pál to pay the 70,000 kroner. Kornhauser refused, whereupon he was taken to the barracks. Kornhauser was severely mistreated there with a whip by Lieutenant Colonel Prónay himself. In the meantime, the Kornhausers family notified opposition politicians and filed a complaint. In this version Prónay is said to have said: “Jew, where is the money? The Jews have money, picks it up, because if you don't pay you will die like a dog. ”An officer subordinate to Prónay often asked him whether he wanted to grow old in his cell and that Prónay was very angry because the ministers were his Demand release from liability. Kornhauser then asked several times that he should be taken into town and that he would get the money. On the third day Kornhauser was brought to his apartment, but there was already a detective there who freed Kornhauser. Regarding the trial, it was written that Prónay's defense lawyer wanted to prevent Kornhauser from being sworn in because he was not a Christian. Even the prosecutor was on Prónay's side, calling him a genius of vengeance and a selfless, generous soldier. The Budapest Criminal Court sentenced Prónay to 10 days in prison, while it sentenced ordinary workers to long prison terms or even had them executed for political reasons. Obergespan Prónay is criticized here at least indirectly, if not by name. It must also be added that the AZ used an anti-Jewish diction elsewhere in connection with Pál Prónay itself and later judged him much more benevolently and mainly criticized the Horthy regime, especially when Prónay, as a fascist leader, also approached social democracy.

It is also noticeable that the amount demanded from him would roughly correspond to his lost savings plus interest, he might want to keep himself harmless. Possibly because of his marriage in April and the two residences he had moved into in the previous months, he had an increased need for funds. Apparently Kornhauser was not insolvent, as Pál Prónay claimed, but Prónay himself must have been heavily in debt or even insolvent, because (almost) at the same time a procedure for extortion and torture of a main creditor was running, so that he waived his claim against Prónay and one Issues confirmation that Prónay has paid his debt (see below). He must therefore have had larger debts with at least one other person and smaller ones with others.

Prónay had committed several serious crimes, but Horthy kept him avoiding prosecution, but the situation had since changed.

The case dragged on for two months, during which time Prónay maneuvered himself into ever greater difficulties. He behaved impossibly during meetings with Bethlen and other members of the government, he would accuse the members of the government of all sorts of crimes; if contradicted, he would just get up and run out of the room and slam the door behind him, a behavior he would do with similar things Occasions, including at court hearings, again and again.

In the summer of 1921, he lost his battalion command, which Prónay was deeply upset about. But instead of trying to resolve his disagreements with the political elite, he rejected a very reasonable and contemplative offer to take command of a hussar regiment in western Hungary. He and his men were forced to hold the battalion together. He and his men therefore demanded a series of audiences with Horthy and Bethlen, but could not convince the two that the survival of the unit with Prónay as commanding officer was in their interests. The battalion took part in the Lajtabánság adventure under the new commandant, Captain Viktor Ranzenberger. Even after Prónay's dismissal as commanding officer, the men were more loyal to him than the Hungarian government. Bethlen was upset about this and kept it in an administrative gray area after the end of Lajtabánság. Under this pressure the soldiers switched to Bethlen and Horthy and it was dissolved in January 1922.

During an audience with Horthy in early August, he was unable to convince Horthy that what had happened to him was a violation of a gentlemen's agreement. Immediately after his return he wrote a threatening letter to the legitimist speaker of parliament (another was the complaint against him because of the extortion of Kornhauser and the annoyance at newspaper articles that shed light on the Kornhauser affair and the parliamentary debate that followed) in which he spoke of this one traitor and cursed Czech spy, at the same time he accused the defense minister. Since this incident at the latest, he has even been viewed by Conservative MPs as an ordinary criminal. The new scandals took advantage of Bethlen, who wanted to get rid of Prónay completely, but needed his troops. In the end, he was persuaded by Horthy, who appeared to act as a mediator, but in reality at Bethlen’s request, to resign from his position and hand over the command to his deputy until the investigation into the Kornhauser case was concluded. On August 28, 1921, he was forced to resign from the National Army or he was released from the National Army / his hunter battalion due to his request by Horthy as royal chamberlain and lieutenant colonel, ostensibly to calm public opinion. In return, he was promised in writing that he would be reinstated as soon as the situation had calmed down, which Bethlen certainly did not intend to do. De facto, however, it was a dishonorable dismissal after the battalion had already been withdrawn for his conduct.

Due to the behavior of the Hungarian government in the West Hungary / Lajtabánság question, Borus assumes that this step was taken so that Prónay would not act as a member of the army in West Hungary, but that the actions there could be declared as spontaneous actions. Körner-Lakatos names the attacks by his unit and his acts of terrorism as the reason for Prónay's exclusion from the national army. The assumption of Borus can be correct, since the handover of West Hungary by Hungary to Austria should take place on the day of his release. The modalities negotiated with Prónay and, according to the opposition, in writing regarding his departure (see below) make this appear possible. Immediately after it became known that he was leaving Austria, it was assumed that Prónay was given a free hand to join the rioters and that the Horthy regime should not be compromised by leaving the Hungarian army, so this process is being viewed with suspicion in Western Europe, even if one hoped that this measure would ease the situation in places. In Austria this was partly worth breaking news from the correspondent and reports on the first two pages.

Prónay hoped that the government would end the campaign against him, but legitimist politicians in parliament brought up the violence of other free group leaders like Iván Héjjas and called for an investigation into their crimes.

According to the documents submitted by the opposition, Prónay's hope was more than justified.

At the end of 1923, the opposition objected to Bethlen's unreliable behavior in the context of the Kornhauser affair and the (first) dismissal of Prónay from the army. As soon as he became aware of Kornhauser's kidnapping, Vázsonyi demanded that Prónay be released from the army.

However, it became known that a conference was taking place in which Bethlen, the Minister of Defense, a Field Marshal and Prónay took part. Prónay is said to have left the conference indignant and declared that he was leaving the army. However, the defense minister sent a messenger after him with the request that Prónay should not quit the service, but only hand in a four-week vacation.

An interpellation was read out in parliament. Prónay insulted and threatened the President of Parliament, whom the enemies of Hungary had helped to his place.

Now Prónay was finally persuaded to resign from the army, about which a contract was concluded with him. This became known to the opposition, who found the conditions extremely strange and therefore had the wording read out in parliament.

The contract had file number 26,820 / 1921 dated August 26, 1921 and was signed by Horthy, Bethlen and the Minister of Defense and included the following items:

- Confirmation of Prónay's withdrawal from the army, which was announced in Ordinance Gazette No. 42/1921.

- the exit was voluntary and of its own accord due to the current political situation and higher interests of Hungary

- as soon as these cease to exist, Prónay would be reinstated in its old position

- It is claimed that Prónay did a great service to Hungary in difficult times of crisis

- He must therefore be treated at least in the same way as the other officers when determining the remuneration and supplies, referring to the current legal situation

- He was therefore granted: from September 1, 1921, full pay for six months, from March 1, 1922, the transitional pay for three years, then the retirement pension

- The difference between the transitional pay and the active pay will be paid out to him from the National Army Fund of the Reich Administration Office

- His troops, officially known as the 1st Gendarmerie Reserve Battalion, have not seen any changes in their staff or organization. The command post remains reserved for Prónay.

Also dated August 26, 1921, was a second document that did not have a ministerial signature but only the note "Seen, Horthy"

In both documents, the opposition complained that the regulation of Prónay's remuneration did not correspond to the legal regulation, the said fund was at least not known to the opposition, the battalion was treated as a private property of Prónay, his command post was assured as an option and that he would be transferred back to the army or whose active status has been confirmed. In late 1923 or early 1924, in a debate in parliament, the fund emerged as a disposition fund of the Reich Administration Office, which viewed disposition funds as legally questionable. According to the Arbeiterzeitung of January 30, 1924, Prónay received all of his earnings from this fund.

Thereupon Prónay made a corresponding application for relocation on August 31, 1921. In her reply, Bethlen named Prónay an honored friend whose re-entry into the army Bethlen willingly agreed to. Bethlen had also written to the Minister of Defense urgently to arrange for Prónay's accommodation (although he owned the house or at least an apartment in Szentkiralyi and had leased the estate in Bicske). As soon as the Minister has informed Bethlen of the measures taken, it would be an honor for Bethlen to inform Prónay immediately so that he is no longer worried than necessary.

With this approach, the opposition felt deceived by Bethlen in the Prónay case. And the disappointment and demands of Prónay are understandable if the accusations of the opposition are correct.

After leaving the army, he returned to the estate of his friend Gyula Batthyány in Bicske , the location of his battalion's former cavalry company. There he rented a farmhouse with his wife and waited for further developments. The fact that he is referred to as a large landowner in the OSZK must refer to this property.

On September 3, the Kornhauser case was heard in a military tribunal in Budapest. He and his officer were charged with unauthorized arrest and attempted extortion. The plaintiff was Kornhauser. Like his officer, he received a symbolic so-called professor's prison sentence of ten days for offenses in the public service. Both were acquitted of the allegation of public violence and extortion, however, since Prónay had no intention of enrichment, as he had a legitimate claim against Kornhauser. Although the judgments were unjustifiably lenient and contrary to all applicable law, both defendants appealed.

Obviously, Chief Clerk Prónay was not even questioned, because if the statements made by Pál were correct, Mihály would have made himself liable to prosecution. In addition, the cruel behavior of his younger brother, especially towards Jews, was already internationally known and he should have expected the behavior that Pál Prónay showed towards Kornhauser.

But Pál Prónay himself also makes himself implausible, since he himself described different versions (he was assigned the claim by Mihály or he was only the debtor).

Pál Prónay was relieved that the judge had charged him with the less serious abuse of power and not with corruption.

According to the English Wikipedia, however, he had to serve several short sentences before leaving for western Hungary. A second concern insulting the President of Parliament. In this he was sentenced to 30 days of house arrest under supervision for defamation.

The Kornhauser case had a very negative effect on his position of power and his self-esteem. More important than the two prison terms for the threatening letter to the President of Parliament and the blackmailing of Kornhauser was the end of his career as one of Horthy's advisors and important military leader because of these two incidents.

During the summer, his relationships with the Horthy elite hit rock bottom. Again he planned to emigrate to Latin America. He also thought of going to Poland and fighting with the Polish army against the invasion of the Red Army. He overcame his depression when he was persuaded to join the nationalist uprising in Burgenland .

In 1921 he was retired as a lieutenant colonel.

According to Geza Muräny, shortly before his West Hungary article was published in the Weltbühne on September 22, 1921, the following was possible for Prónay:

“Recently” he publicly berated the President of the National Assembly and forced him to abdicate because he had allowed an interpellation regarding the detachments.

“This” day he imprisoned one of his main creditors and tortured him until the latter gave him a receipt for the amount due. He apparently acted clumsily, the matter surprisingly came to court, where Prónay was acquitted as expected.

Murany did not give more precise dates or the name of the creditor. It cannot be Kornhauser, the information differs far too much for that.

He did not take part in the fighting between August 28 and September 8 in Burgenland, nor did he take part in the two battles against Austrians near Agendorf / Ágfalva .

Dictator of the Leithabanate / Lajtabánság

In the peace treaties of Saint-Germain with Austria in September 1919 and Trianon with Hungary in June 1920, the ethnically mixed, predominantly German-speaking western Hungary was awarded to Austria. Before that it was Hungarian for 1000 years. In contrast, paramilitary associations and nationalist groups such as the secret society Etelközi Szövetség (EKSz or EX), founded by MOVE, or the Ebredő Magyarok Egyesülete , deutsch ( Union of Awakening Hungarians , ÉME) and MOVE, saw the area as an integral part of Hungary and the old ones Wanted to restore Hungary's borders. During the summer, many militia members came to western Hungary, looting and harassment of the German-speaking and Croatian ethnic groups.

Even the most fanatical Hungarians realized that the majority of the West Hungarian population was against a guerrilla war with Austria. The alleged West Hungarian irregulars often came from central Hungary, many were unemployed professional officers, national students and refugees from Slovakia , Transylvania and Croatia who lived in camps. Many served under Prónay and Héjjas, who even then had a bad reputation. The composition of the irregulars and thus their military and moral value varied widely. One of the most feared was the Rongyos Gárda (rag guards after their desolate equipment). In the area of ​​what would later become Burgenland there was torture and occasional murders. In the event of serious looting and rape, the leaders rigorously punished the rioters who were involved in them.

In the summer of 1921 the process of handing over western Hungary or the annexation of Burgenland to Austria entered its final decisive phase.

Also in the summer of 1921, a second legitimist putsch was surprisingly prepared by ex-king / ex-emperor Karl. The Carlist had learned from the failed coup in March that appropriate military support was necessary. The ongoing build-up of free troops in western Hungary enabled the Carlist to build troops loyal to the king, a key figure in this was the major (later colonel) Gyula Ostenburg-Morawek , his unit was stationed by legitimist politicians as the 2nd Gendarmerie Reserve Battalion in the Sopron - Eisenstadt area. These units began to pose a potential threat to the newly established Horthy regime. The anti-Habsburg Free Kingmakers took action against this. Prónay and Héjjas should not only act against Austria, but also watch legitimist units such as the Ostenburgs. These intra-Hungarian rivalries were to be decisive for the Austrian conquest of Burgenland .

According to Schlag, more recent research shows that the irregulars were not camouflaged Hungarian government troops, although the Hungarian government fully supported the irregulars at the beginning of the fighting and provided them with the best equipment and supplies.

Since August, irregulars have been preventing western Hungary from being taken over by the Austrian gendarmerie, who were well equipped and wanted to prevent the area from being annexed to Austria by force. However, in the course of time the union movement for Austria became stronger and stronger, it became more and more difficult for the irregulars, not least because of Prónay's totalitarian administration as dictator.

After Prónay and his irregulars moved into Vas County, the invading Austrians were thrown back across the state border on August 28, 1921, and a week later he allegedly received supreme command from Gömbös over all irregulars in southern Burgenland / western Hungary.

In contrast to the majority population of western Hungary, the Magyar towns were disappointed about the decision to join the area to Austria out of injured national pride and fear of the status of a minority; this was particularly strong in Oberwart, where they wanted to enforce that the region around Oberwart and Bad Tatzmannsdorf should stay near Hungary.

Some of the insurgents used to be members of the Prónay Company.

Who ultimately commissioned Prónay is controversial in research (Horthy, Bethlen, Gömbös ...). What is certain is that he acted with the backing of official agencies that were only hired under international pressure. Officially, it was alleged that Prónay acted without orders or orders from official bodies, but took over his high command at the request of the insurgents. Since the Hungarian authorities could not officially try to hold or recapture western Hungary, they could only act in hiding and make fights look like spontaneous action by the population. In any case, he was the royal chamberlain during the fighting in western Hungary. Furthermore, his appearance in western Hungary was seen as advantageous and he had done a great deal there (allegedly ending attacks and mistreatment of the population and building a unified leadership). In retrospect, Horthy saw the activities of the irregulars as positive.

He and his wife arrived in Sopron on September 6th ; the following day he traveled to Großpetersdorf via Szombathely .

The irregulars called themselves the Royal Hungarian West Hungarian insurgents. They were nominally subordinate to Gyula Gömbös. The strength is given as 2,700 - 30,000 men, there will have been a maximum of 10,000 men. Their strengths were the constant and quick agility and concentrated appearance, through which they could pretend a higher team strength, they were also more combative and experienced than the Austrian troops and thus militarily superior. In addition, they received weapons, ammunition and sometimes food from Hungary.

In September, the following units formed under Prónay:

• I. Freischerkorps in Oberwart under Árpád Taby . He was the Hungarian commander of the battle at Kirchschlag in the Bucklige Welt shortly before Prónay's arrival in the region.
• II. Freischärlerkorps first in Oberpullendorf, then in Lackenbach under Miklós Budaházy
• III. Freischärlerkorps first in Eltendorf , then in Güssing under Endre Molnár (officer)
• IV. Freischärlerkorps first in Parndorf , then in Neusiedl am See under Iván Héjjas from the second half of September

He claimed to have issued a daily order in September to take over the supreme command of the insurgents. In any case, he increasingly seized the leadership of the irregulars in the south.

In the course of September the Entente wanted to finally solve the West Hungary problem and issued an ultimatum to Hungary asking them to evacuate the area. When the ultimatum of the victorious powers arrived in Budapest on September 23, it became clear that the cession of German West Hungary was inevitable. Only a violent solution seemed promising. Even then, certain circles, including members of parliament from the disputed areas, were thinking of a declaration of independence for German-West Hungary and the reconnection to Hungary after a major referendum. This was taken up by Gömbös and Prónay. Official Hungary tacitly agreed, although the low chances of success were recognized. The main consideration here was to achieve compromises in favor of Hungary by gaining time and taking advantage of Austria's plight; Hungary's approach was ultimately successful.

Prónay lived with his wife at the owner and publisher of the Oberwarther Sunday newspaper, Friedrich Reiß (politician, 1864) .

At first he was busy with organizational and administrative tasks.

Gömbös appeared in Oberwart and informed him that he was responsible for the replenishment. The equipment and funds Prónay requested arrived soon after. However, Prónay forbade Gömbös interference.

Fighting did not start until Prónay had taken over the command and Iván Héjjas reported to him and was commissioned by Prónay with the formation of the IV. Trooper Corps.

His units also pursued a massive policy of intimidation.

On October 3, the Hungarian government surrendered western Hungary to the Ententegenerals in Sopron; on October 4, all regular troops withdrew with the exception of the Ostenburg units (subordinate to the Inter-Allied Commission in Sopron).

However, Austria wanted to take over the promised area only after the irregulars had left. With the exception of Sopron, the Hungarian armed forces withdrew from the area, creating a power vacuum.

Prónay felt that one should not hesitate now to save the area for Hungary, but recognized the low interest of the population, even the Burgenland Hungarians , in his cause and therefore formed a government made up of people who obeyed him.

When he was called, they formed a meeting on October 4th in the morning and issued a proclamation in which the violation of the right to self-determination and a 1000-year tradition by the peace treaties was criticized with very violent words. Austria was portrayed as communist and hating Hungary and that the three great ethnic groups would stand together against Austria. Lajtabánság is proclaimed to guarantee the right to self-determination. At the same time, a provisional legislative assembly elected Prónay as head of state and minister of the army. The post of the Bán remained vacant for the time being, a briefly considered Freischarführer, who was the only militant from the region, had little ideological agreement with Prónay. Therefore, the name Lajtai Bán for Prónay, which occurs regularly on the Internet, is strictly incorrect, it was officially only interim. The state is generally classified as a republic.

The constituent people's assembly declared the area to be independent from Austria and Hungary and on October 4th at noon called the new state of Lajtabánság , which is considered to be one of the most curious political experiments after the First World War. Officially, his aim was to reconnect the area to western Hungary after a referendum.

After that, Prónay was entrusted with the constitution of the government and the drafting of the constitution as the commander-in-chief of the troops.

According to contemporaries, the initiative to found the state clearly came from himself, and he practically appointed himself head of state.

In the October 9th issue (title page), his landlord named the proclamation an event of world historical importance, although it was only an operetta state (Moritsch) or a stillbirth (Bodó). Miklós Bánffy even called the company childish and nonsensical in his memoirs. The authority of the state was based on the armed forces of the irregulars, whereby only those in the south were directly subordinate to Prónay, Héjjas (border area to Bratislava to Lake Neusiedl) only subordinated themselves to a limited extent, the units around Eisenstadt behaved almost hostile for reasons of rivalry and those from Mattersburg refused just loosely on him. The irregular corps in both cities were legitimist.

The alliance of the legitimist aristocrats on the one hand and the pro-Prónay and pro-Horthy free groups on the other hand only lasted for a short time. The legitimist aristocrats did not support Lajtabánság also because of the dictator's emotional and psychological instability.

Since his landlord was a converted Jew, the Jews in western Hungary were not concerned, according to Fogarassy, ​​despite the recent Kornhauser scandal.

Prónay was also aware that the new state found very little support from the locals, as he complained about their apathy, despite probably extorted declarations of loyalty from dozens of communities. The state was supported by Hungarian officers and a few notables and around 3,000 very aggressive rioters. The declaration of independence also took place in the other headquarters of the rebels ( Güssing , Oberpullendorf and Neusiedl am See ). Each municipality gave its command post a recognition of the lead habanate, signed by the mayors and the jury of the respective places, this was done under more or more force. Allegedly, he was highly valued and revered by all insurgents.

Nevertheless, some of the irregulars had to maintain themselves. This was done through regular payment, requisitions, extortion, and sometimes worthless acknowledgments of receipt of the services provided by the commanders. This played a role again and again in the countless legal disputes against Prónay after the failure of the Leithabanat.

The state was not recognized internationally. A nationalist homepage claims that the Banat was recognized by the USA.

The National Assembly elected him Minister of the Army, and he retained his position as Supreme Free Corps Leader. The function of banus, which was reserved for a Burgenlander, remained vacant, but he reserved the right to exercise the head of state's agendas until the “final clarification of this question”. He was also chairman of the six-member State Council (president, defense minister, interior minister, foreign minister, economy minister, education minister, justice minister).

From the beginning he acted like a legitimate regent.

Together with the declaration of independence, he proclaimed the neutrality of the state.

He ordered not to attack Austrian territory, but to defend themselves in the event of an Austrian attack, which was implemented differently in different places.

In doing so, he was ahead of previously announced declarations of independence in Eisenstadt and Sopron .

At first he broke off all ties with Hungary, and left-wing extremists served as role models for him. The dictator signed his orders in the official gazette and the approval of the Lajtabánság stamp series with “fővezer” / supreme leader , so he considered himself equal to Horthy. He invoked the right of peoples to self-determination proclaimed by Thomas Woodrow Wilson and claimed that Bolshevik chaos reigned in Austria (meaning the government of Karl Renner ) and that law and order had to be restored.

In the days that followed, he had ID cards and passes issued, the stamps withdrawn and “Lajtabánság-posta” printed on them.

He also devoted himself to building up the administration. His government issued its orders in three languages ​​(Hungarian, German, Croatian) and proclaimed the equality of citizens regardless of ethnicity. In fact, Hungarian dominated. However, only one official gazette was published on October 30th, and it was only written in Hungarian. He made himself a (interim) bán and threatened in his edicts with execution anyone who offered resistance.

He set up police forces, had postage and postage stamps printed in a Viennese printing house (most of them were overstamped Hungarian stamps, the 79 printed in Vienna were rarely used), designed national coats of arms and uniforms for his troops and levied customs duties to ensure his independence State to demonstrate. From the trains on the route from Austria to Hungary, he collected a certain percentage of the transported goods, which were auctioned in the border stations. Before establishing the Leithabanat, he had set up a field telephone network.

He developed a personality cult around himself (pictures of him on his postage stamps, posters and official portraits), he was addressed by Fövezer / Supreme Leader and also signed his orders in the official gazette, although he was only the head of a completely insignificant small state, which was recognized by Hungary at most. But he didn't impress anyone. The personality cult (in addition to the fighting and murders), however, served to establish the cohesion of the ideological and the goal of heterogeneous groups. Here it reached special proportions, such as kissing clothes and hands, perhaps also other commanders, after military successes.

On the recommendation of Gömbös, he moved his headquarters to Großpetersdorf, which was further away from the Austrian border than Oberwart, for security reasons. In contrast to the Austrian units on the Styrian border, it had practically no artillery and a maximum of 3,000 combat-tested soldiers. According to other information, he had over 5,000 poorly equipped insurgents, mainly from the southern Hungarian lowlands. Mostly he stayed in these two places, less often in Sopron.

His statement that he would not have found a Burgenlander for the government council for fear of the consequences in the event of Austria taking possession of the area is doubtful. The probable reason is, typical for him, that he only accepted people who carried out his orders without contradiction.

He did not enter into regular diplomatic relations with any other state, nor was the state recognized; only the Universal Postal Union was properly registered to issue its own postage stamps.

The state soon became a fiction, with skirmishes among the irregulars between the Carlist and Free Kingmakers.

The promise of neutrality was also worthless because the irregulars continued to attack the Austrian border guards.

His Freischärlergruppen were serious crimes against the non-cooperating civilians in German-West Hungary chalked and Jews. Among other things, he and Héjjas imposed death sentences without prior interrogation.

The irregulars brought in all of the local grain harvest and large quantities of cattle and only made promises. These processes played a major role in the processes he led in the 1920s and 1930s.

Against guerrillas imposed he and his lieutenants very severe penalties, like a hundred lashes or executions even in opposition to superiors, theft inferior goods, even upon mere suspicion. Some of the executions were carried out in accordance with the civil law following a secret vote by an officer corps.

The proclamation of the state had foreign policy complications for Hungary. Hungary also recognized that Prónay's declaration of independence even turned pro-Hungarian residents against Hungary.

Hungary distanced itself from him during the negotiations in Venice.

Time was running out for him in Lajtabánság.

Under pressure from the victorious powers, the Hungarian government of Prime Minister Count István Bethlen was finally forced to drop Lajtabánság after a few weeks. France and Italy in particular wanted to end the turmoil in this area.

On October 12th, Horthy wrote to him personally to evacuate all of western Hungary, since an agreement in Venice was very likely and armed foreign intervention threatened. The fact that Horthy wrote to Prónay personally shows that Prónay still held a key position.

On October 13th, a compromise was negotiated between Austria and Hungary in Venice with Italy as mediation. Austria should receive two thirds of the area, in return Hungary withdraws its troops and militants by the beginning of November , there should be a vote on Sopron .

After that, the Hungarian government stopped paying wages and supplies for Lajtabánság .

While the Hungarian government saw this as a success, the insurgents, especially Prónay, were disappointed, they expected territorial gains, for him the existence of the Leithabanat and his own position as regent was at stake (he saw himself as equal to imperial administrator Horthy) . Because of this, he didn't give in in any way over the next few weeks. The Hungarian government ordered a tightened blockade against the Leithabanat. Etelközi Szövetség (EKSz) also stopped his support, whereupon he resigned and encouraged the officers of the Leithabanat to follow him. Bethlen then sent an EKSz delegation to persuade him to give up, Prónay refused.

His and Ostenburg's refusal jeopardized the agreement in the Venice negotiations and increased the risk of foreign intervention.

The government stopped their support, his subordinates were threatened with negative consequences if they did not leave the area immediately, Bethlen even threatened the invasion of pro-government troops. Nevertheless, on October 19, Prónay wrote to Bethlen that he would continue the resistance.

Prónay saw this as a betrayal of the national cause. Since he could not cope with the humiliation caused by his defeat in the Kornhauser affair, he pursued a rocking policy during the Second Legitimistic Uprising in the following period, which had very negative consequences for him for at least ten years.

Because of his repeated non-compliance with government orders and the atrocities committed by his troops, Bethlen convinced Prónay to leave, with Prónay maneuvering himself into an increasingly precarious position. Bethlen was also prepared to use government troops to drive the dictator out of the disputed region. Out of annoyance at this humiliation, Prónay sought rapprochement with the legitimists and even sent his legitimist wife as a messenger. During the first legitimist overthrow attempt he was considered one of the most fanatical supporters of Horthy, allegedly he even planned to take King Karl (ex-emperor Karl I of Austria) prisoner. Otherwise, too, he was extremely hostile to legitimists. He would have had the most important legitimist officer, Colonel Lehár, almost murdered a week earlier if the incident had not become public and had turned the elite against him. Lehár traveled on official orders in the government car and carried a letter from Bethlen with him. He should inspect the country and investigate allegations of increasingly serious acts of terrorism by formations of Prónay, Héjjas and others. He was captured and interrogated by Prónay militias. The militias declared that they were only responsible to Horthy, but Lehár had the opportunity to call for help. In addition, his friend and ally Gyula Ostenburg-Morawek and the likewise legitimist commissioner for western Hungary intervened. Most recently, the Entente Commission forced Colonel Lehar to be released. Hence the legitimists distrusted him. With Ostenburg and the commissioner, Prónay agreed in mid-October to remain neutral during the second legitimist coup attempt on October 19, 1921, although he was considered a free kingmaker and supporter of Gömbös. According to Bánffy, however, he was not a legitimist and even his wife could only have got him to behave neutrally. Karl was defeated on October 23 and 24 by troops provided by MOVE and ÉME, among others. Only after the failure of the coup did he send a weak force towards Sopron. Prónay lost reputation due to his rocking policy or very ambiguous attitude, the members of his former battalion and the free squad leaders, who owed his career to him, followed the matter closely. At the end of October he lost his most reliable and best trained troops. Above all, he gambled away the trust of his previous protectors and friends Horthy and Gömbös, whom he had also already become uncomfortable.

He is said to have indicated to his wife that he saw no real chance for the king to return to power. According to the wording of the interview, it may well be that she wanted to exonerate him.

The second legitimist uprising accelerated the end of the Leithabanat, as some of the irregulars supported Charles IV, while others fought him.

The arrest of Colonel Lehár had no consequences for Pronay.

He angered Horthy with his megalomania, his blind hatred of Prime Minister Bethlen, his ignorance of political realities and his ambiguous behavior during the second legitimist overthrow attempt. His total misunderstanding of the political and military situation shows his plan to march with Ostenburg against Vienna and to help a right-wing government that he liked by occupying Vienna to power if it renounced Burgenland / western Hungary, the plan soon came to nothing. He did not value the Austrian Armed Forces very highly because it was politically divided. Only on October 14th did he send a negotiator after the negotiations in Venice had ended and the referendum had been fixed in Sopron. Around this time he had realized that he had a maximum of 3,000 reliable people available.

Since his power was very fragile, the insurgents displayed very martial and patriotic behavior against the population.

On October 22nd, Prónay issued a circular to his troops informing him of the return of King Charles, from which it emerges that he considered himself the dictator of a sovereign state who viewed these issues as a matter for another sovereign state.

On October 26th he moved his headquarters to Sopron, which was preparing for the referendum and where he met with Gömbös, who was commissioned by Horthy to inform Prónay about the course of the legitimist overturn.

Horthy rightly feared foreign policy intervention if Prónay did not evacuate western Hungary / Burgenland. He threatened to have Prónay's troops disarmed by regular troops.

On October 30th, he published the only official gazette in which, among other things, he stipulated the state symbols.

On October 31, Prónay, who had been summoned to Budapest, undertook to withdraw with his troops by November 6 and to evacuate the area, otherwise Hungary would use regular troops against him. On the morning of November 4th, after he had released everyone from their oath, he and his followers left the region against full amnesty for the crimes committed since August 1919, as his troops were not strong enough to hold their own against the regular Hungarian troops he had very little popular support. By taking office as a totalitarian dictator, he not only failed to win over at least the majority of the population, but also spoiled those circles that were in favor of staying with Hungary and who were certainly more positive about a Hungarian separate state.

The troops were transported away by train, but he refused to disarm.

He assumed that the Ödenburg vote would take place on November 10th and he planned to invade Burgenland again if the outcome was in favor of Austria.

On November 6th he drove from Szombathely via Hungarian Altenburg / Mosonmagyaróvár to Budapest, where he arrived on November 8th. On his return he and his people were welcomed like heroes by the political and military elite. The rebels marched into the Franz-Josefs-Kavalleriekaserne, where he gave a speech.

The withdrawal of Prónay and thus the end of Lajtabánság is considered the end of the terror terror.

But by trying to establish an independent Leithabanat and his refusal to come to Horthy during the second legitimist coup attempt, since he could not choose between these and the legitimists and thus lost Horthy's favor, he destroyed his last chance, the command to get back via his battalion in the foreseeable future. With that he lost his power base and retired as an important political factor in Hungary between the wars.

Prónay donated a medal to commemorate the fighting in 1921.

Prónay as a politician

The plebiscite in Sopron (article referendum in Ödenburg ) took place on December 14th, in eight surrounding villages on the 16th. He had been commissioned by the Prime Minister's office to take part in their preparations together with Ranzenberger, Colonel Lehár and Ostenburg, among others, but he was completely passive during the first negotiations. However, he is ascribed an important role in armed resistance to influence the referendum or intimidate the population.

Horthy issued an amnesty in November for all crimes committed by the irregulars except robbery, did not allow new trials and closed all investigations.

After the end of Lajtabánság , however, he lost more and more importance, his political career ended at the latest in 1923. Unlike Benito Mussolini , Francisco Franco or Hermann Göring , he never received power or an important position within the state hierarchy. Unlike the Russian generals Alexander Wassiljewitsch Kolchak and Anton Ivanovich Denikin , he won the civil war or was on the winning side, but soon lost his power to his conservative rivals. He has already been compared several times with the Roman von Ungern-Sternberg . He was never an important person in European history, on the other hand he is too important to ignore. In his diaries he claimed to have been the first European National Socialist, a claim that was typical for him and completely unfounded. He also presented himself as one of the founders of Hungarian fascism. He was far too reactionary and too orientated towards the world that existed before 1918 to be a fascist.

However, other militia leaders such as Ostenburg or Héjjas did not play a major role in the national army, the establishment and consolidation of which had very little to do with the militias.

Prónay was still very present in the international press, especially because of legal disputes and honorary affairs, which have their roots in incidents during the struggle of the irregulars against the Austrians and in Lajtabánság . The Austrian print media reported about him correspondingly frequently.

Prónay was able to play a significant role in Hungarian politics between 1919 and 1921 because large parts of the political elite including Horthy and the middle class shared his delusions. While Prónay's delusions were based on a serious mental illness with deeper structural causes, among the elite they disappeared relatively quickly, albeit never completely.

He was originally one of Horthy's most important allies, but in the autumn of 1921 he finally lost measure and purpose. Despite his behavior, he continued to be treated very mildly by the elite. Nevertheless, he disappeared from politics or was pushed aside later this month.

Horthy and Bethlen wanted to integrate him into their political system and buy his loyalty and therefore made him generous job offers (he was only refused the return of his old commando), all of which Prónay refused because he did not want to be restricted and wanted his command back. But he was refused for fear of a right-wing extremist coup.

He refused to be pardoned because he had not committed any crimes and requested an army investigation into his administration in the Leithabanat in order to restore his reputation and punish those officers who disobeyed him during the second legitimist overthrow attempt. Horthy and his elite got a committee to certify that he had not been guilty of anything during the second legitimist overthrow attempt. He did not get his command back, however, and then reproached Horthy for months. For sentimental reasons, Horthy kept him about a year longer than political interests allowed.

Like the relationship with Gömbös, that with Horthy was not without contradiction. The stubborn Prónay did not hide his disdain for Horthy in his diaries . He described him as an intellectual lightweight and a leader without a backbone, a gossip, a snob , a man whose demeanor was only cocky, in whom big words were followed by small deeds, a weak, decisive leader under the influence of Freemasons and philosophers , such as Bethlen .

Horthy had many flaws, but at least he had political talent, had a more nuanced view of politics, and knew his limits. On the one hand, he was happy to be welcomed by Prónay and his people and shared with them the shock of the defeat of Hungary and the events that followed. Over time, however, Prónay became too radical for him, just as Horthy Prónay was not radical enough, especially on the Jewish question.

Prónay chose Horthy because of the similar professional and social background and because both were against liberals and leftists as well as against Jews. In the long run, however, tensions between Horthy and Prónay were inevitable. That he joined Horthy became increasingly a disadvantage for Prónay for the reasons mentioned.

But Prónay did not understand that Horthy was using it in the same way that he was using Horthy.

He also accused the most powerful patriotic association, the EKSz, of being behind the rebellion of its officers during the second legitimist overthrow attempt. Prónay resigned on March 1, 1922, while the secret society expelled him on March 9. Leaving the EKSz was a new low point in his political career, from which he never recovered.

Since he was uncooperative with any approach from Horthy and Bethlen, Bethlen drove a wedge between him and his officers in order to eliminate all these men as a political danger. In 1921 Bethlen achieved that at least most of them separated from him. In doing so, he lost his power base, which contributed significantly to his loss of his position as a major political factor later that year.

From September 1921 or 1922 he was with the ÉME, a meeting point for members of the voluntary corps and war veterans. active and on February 1, 1922, he was elected vice-chairman of the ÉME. Typical for him was his inaugural speech against the government, parliament and Jews, which were accompanied by anti-Semitic inflammatory chants, such as the demand to kill opponents within 24 hours or slogans such as “Long live the pogrom”. The idea of ​​joining Prónays comes from his former lieutenant and ÉME supporter Héjjas. Prónay himself wanted to rebuild his power in this way and to compensate for the loss of his battalion. His appointment to the ÉME management team was a mistake. The officer and aristocrat Prónay did not fit journalists, lawyers and engineers, whom he considered of low birth and questionable convictions, even if the ÉME is viewed as an officers' society. Their orientation was, among other things, anti-legitimistic. He immediately took over responsibility for rebuilding the secret service and military wing of the ÉME nemzetvédelmi osztály, together with Héjjas he was the leader of the military wing. However, despite his high position within the ÉME, he was not able to turn it into a viable or useful political party. However, he achieved the establishment or continued existence of ÉME cells.

His entry into the ÉME management team did not go unnoticed. In 1922 and 1923 the acts of terrorism he ÉME on Jewish institutions, embassies and others increased. Only a few within three years (1921–1924) were spectacular and since early 1922 they no longer posed a threat to the regime. In public, Prónay denied having anything to do with it. Since the ÉME consisted of various terrorist cells , some of which were independent , he could not plan every single attack. But he was certainly the initiator, confidante and helper in terrorist attacks on Jewish events and foreign embassies in the following three years, and he also approved the attacks on the Jews.

In the spring and summer of 1922 his relationship with Horthy, the Bethlen government and the military elite deteriorated. In June he visited Horthy for the last time, who denied Prónay's accusations and ended the audience after a short time. The removal of Prónay and his people from the public is also quite rightly seen as a concession by Horthy and praying to the Hungarian and international public.

In the same year, officers and militias who were previously subordinate to him and still stood by him wanted to involve him in the second West Hungarian uprising attempt. They were dissatisfied with the Venice Treaty. They prepared a major attack from Burgenland and the re-establishment of the Leithabanat in the summer. The plan became known through deliberate indiscretion by the government, which had all insurgents near the Austrian border disarmed by regular Hungarian troops. Some crossed the Austrian border. Your attack on Hagensdorf failed. Those insurgents who had crossed the Austrian border were taken prisoner by the Austrian gendarmerie. Because Prónay claimed that this attack took place without his knowledge, the case against him was dropped. However, Schlag is certain that in the context of the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian border he made another attempt to recruit irregulars and tried to intervene in high politics, which remained an insignificant episode. Conversely, Prónay accused Gömbös, typical of him, of having betrayed the plan to the government; he tried to challenge it to a duel, which was rejected.

At the end of 1922 he met with General Wrangel, the leader of the Russian White Army in Belgrade, and offered him his services. The motive was his frustration , which he did not accept. Later he wanted to fight the Red Army too, only in his last months in freedom did it come to that.

Political and social decline

Loss of his position as a person of respect and terrorist leader among the awakening Hungarians

On February 28, 1923, Prónay was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in absentia in Romania because, as one of the ÉME leaders, he planned an attack on the Romanian royal couple in order to create a better international situation for Hungary through the murder of King Ferdinand . The attack was decided, planned and organized by the ÉME at a secret meeting.

On June 17, 1923, there was a split in the ÉME, as part of Prónay, Gömbös and Héjjas broke up, because some of them were too extremist and this group advocated calmer conditions. On the 18th or 19th, the entire management resigned at an extraordinary general assembly, which was replaced by an executive committee, which included Prónay and Héjjas.

In July 1923, Prime Minister Bethlen was forced to respond to Prónay's allegations (justified by the above newspaper reports) that he was a liar because he had failed to keep or broke his promise to reinstate him as commander of his troops, which became the matter public. Bethlen had to protect his honor, especially from young officers. Bethlen turned down a regular duel because he didn't want to risk his life because of someone with such a bad character and reputation as Prónay. He therefore cited Prónay before a court of honor, before which a dispute between them should take place. The court of honor consisted of famous and respected men. Prónay was counting on his victory and wasn't prepared to apologize to Bethlen. Contrary to his expectations, all jury members, including Prónay's distant cousin György Prónay, decided : Bethlen was not authorized to reinstate him, Prónay's accusations are baseless and his behavior is impossible and he was forced to apologize. This was done by two authorized representatives on the grounds that Prónay had become aware of previously unknown facts through the negotiations and therefore revoked his insults. It was believed that the conflict had been resolved amicably. Prónay reported, however, that he did not agree with the declaration made by his authorized representative and that he had therefore already requested it for the duel. According to international newspaper reports, the "chivalrous affair" reached its climax between the 23rd and 25th and was sometimes worth a break in the news to the reporters. The magazines reported, however, that Bethlen had Prónay confronted, among other things, through the defense minister and did not do so personally. The Prager Tagblatt described the occasion as follows: Prónay had declared at an ÉME electoral meeting in Szeged on July 21 that Bethlen had broken his promise, on which he had given his word of honor, whereupon Bethlen asked Prónay to duel. After the affair was over, the elite were no longer obliged to respond to Prónay's provocations; he was finally no longer viewed as a person of respect.

In the same year Gömbös founded a new party: The Hungarian National Independence Party, better known as the Party of Racial Protectors, Prónay is even said to have been one of its founding members. (Magyar Nemzeti Függetlenségi Párt - Fajvédõ Párt).

From the end of 1923 Prónay led numerous honorary trials, often in connection with the incidents in western Hungary / Lajtabánság / Burgenland. In some cases, he and his opponents were conducting several processes at the same time, which makes it difficult to deal with them. The dictator was partly the plaintiff and partly the accused.

According to Huszadik Század, it was seen as a danger in the 1920s and not afterwards.

In mid-June 1924, the city administration for the 8th district of Budapest (his residential district) and a police criminal senate sentenced him to a fine of 50,000 kroner, and if he was not brought in to five days of arrest, as he was not entitled to the title of lieutenant colonel outside of the Hungarian army because he left the Hungarian army lead. Prónay did not wait for the verdict to be announced, but threatened the police judge and left the courtroom. The written verdict was served on him on June 20. Already on June 21, the defense lawyer appealed and demanded the annulment of the entire proceedings because of the illegal exclusion of the public and an open violation of the appointment decree, which was issued by Horthy himself. Therefore, it is a breach of the constitution to deny Prónay the charge of a lieutenant colonel and the associated rights. In newspaper reports and files he is sometimes referred to as a former lieutenant colonel or a senior lieutenant colonel. D. or made off duty, but also referred to as a private person.

In the last months of 1924 Prónay was involved in numerous honor affairs, which were at least partially connected with duel demands. Because of General Nagy's reservation order (see below), an attempt was made to find an amicable solution for one part, but all attempts failed until mid-September, apparently due to Prónay's refusal.

On September 18, 1924, he was seriously injured in one of these duels, a saber duel. A member of parliament had reported Chief Count Mihály Prónay for false testimony. Whereupon Pál named him a notorious pathological liar, slander and coward in an open letter and claimed that his brother wanted to force the sporty young man to do his duty at the front. Whereupon the MP asked Prónay for a duel. The MP was left-handed and, as such, enjoyed a decisive advantage over a right-handed person like Prónay. For this reason, Prónay was offered a postponement of the duel, which Prónay turned down. In addition, Prónay exhausted himself right at the beginning of the first course because he had badly divided his forces, he suffered an injury on his right thumb in which a tendon was severed or a severe cut on his right arm (regarding the injuries they differ Reports). Despite the concerns of the attending doctors who tended the wound (s), Prónay continued the fight. Towards the end of the second passage he had other serious injuries: a four-inch wound on his temple that not only reached the bone but also injured the artery. Other reports speak of two cuts on the forehead that reach to the bone. In any case, Prónay was declared incapable of fighting by the doctors due to the serious injuries and the duel was broken off. This did not resolve the conflict for either side.

It was not reported whether Chief Squad Prónay, whose administration is otherwise assessed positively, was in agreement or at least informed with the actions of his youngest (surviving) brother and whether the complaint against him was justified. After all, he accepted two horses stolen by Pál in 1919 and, especially in the Kornhauser case, he must have behaved very questionably and if Pál's statements and newspaper reports were correct, he would have heard in court himself.

According to the Arbeiterzeitung of September 25, 1924, Prónay had a statement published in the Hungarian provincial press in the immediately preceding time that he wanted to travel to Austria for a while. The reason he gave was that the reason was the prohibition of Commander-in-Chief Nagy to duel or to prove the truth. The prospect that the civil court will settle its matter is extremely slim, after all, people refuse to settle them in all of the trials. Nagy would also have created the military tribunal against him and prevented him from getting his battalion back. The subject of the process are events in western Hungary that one does not want to look at objectively. According to AZ, however, he can still have workers, democrats, Jews and Austrians beaten, which he makes ample use of. Another reason is that he defected to the legitimists. The AZ also criticized that he was allowed to leave the country unhindered as a multiple convicted murderer. Due to his behavior in western Hungary, especially as the head of the Leithabanat and in connection with the referendum in Ödenburg (his troops had so intimidated the majority of the pro-Austrian population that the majority voted for Hungary), he is undesirable in Austria, should not be granted or given asylum Sentenced to imprisonment. Apparently, however, he did not plan to apply for asylum in Austria and whether he actually entered Austria was not reported.

At the beginning of January 1925, another knightly affair arose between Prónay and Ranzenberger in connection with a murder trial and incidents in Lajtabánság. Prónay met Ranzenberger in a sports facility and accused him of having Ranzenberger defended the murderer when Prónay was already demanding an investigation against him. This accusation surprised Ranzenberger, whereupon Prónay felt he was staring at him and Prónay threatened Ranzenberger with a slap in the face. Probably because of this incident, Prónay was later also called "Slap Prónay" in the press.

On March 24, 1925 he was sentenced to a fine of one and a half million crowns for defamation (letter from Prónay in the course of an honorary affair):

In April 1925 Prónay was sentenced twice for defamation to heavy fines of 3 million crowns each.

On April 7th (plaintiff Ranzenberger) for defamation in the press against former officers of his unit. The verdict included a 3-year probation period.

On April 16 (plaintiff Oberkommandierenden General Nagy) for defamation of the Supreme Command and the officer corps regarding a reservation order from Nagy to the officers not to participate in honorary affairs in which Prónay was also involved. Prónay accused Nagy of using one of his orders as an excuse because it was too cowardly for the chivalrous satisfaction. To make matters worse, the court found that Prónay had been a former officer as mitigating his alleged patriotic merits. It is noticeable that the trial was held before the Budapest Criminal Court, a civil court. Both sides called. Here the sentence was apparently pronounced without parole.

In connection with his trial of Prónay in April 1925, General Nagy pronounced the most severe personal and social boycott in an order to his officers against Lieutenant Colonel Prónay. This ban also applied to Prónay's seconds and had resulted in numerous duel demands by one of his seconds against various racial protectors, such as Gyula Gömbös . Such a large number of people were involved that because of this and because of the risk of injury, even the National Assembly dealt with it.

On June 9, 1925, Prónay reacted as vice-president of the ÉME in a similar way to the EKSz years earlier. Horthy had ordered a rally for himself. The national (istisch) associations, societies and associations have therefore planned a rally for him on Corpus Christi day . However, Prónay spoke out against participation at a committee meeting on this issue, as ÉME had to abstain from all politics. If the association made a different decision, he would step down as deputy chairman and leave the association. However, he stayed with the ÉME.

In Hatvan , a by-election was required due to the death of a member of parliament in 1925. The party of racial protectors set up Prónay. The ruling party's opponent held a program speech against the right-wing Bolsheviks on July 27th. On the drive back to Budapest, the opposing candidate escaped an assassination attempt by accident. The suspicion quickly arose that the Hatvan ÉME was behind the assassination.

In the course of 1925 he was charged with embezzlement and stolen goods with three other people. Two of them were of Jewish faith.

In March 1927 the dictator was convicted twice in press trials for defamation in the press. The occasion was his allegations against Commander-in-Chief Pál Nágy, who died on February 10, and which he raised several times in open letters and in newspapers. Prónay has claimed that looting in western Hungary had no consequences for those responsible and that everything was covered up in an investigation by the military court. Whereupon Nagy forbade the officers to duel and interact with Prónay, based on numerous defamatory and defamatory allegations against him that Nagy was too cowardly to have a fair argument with him. On the 4th he was sentenced to two months' imprisonment and a 480 pengo fine (the proof of the truth was refused, and it was also stated that Prónay, as commander-in-chief and chief military judge, was lord of life and death and should have remedied the grievances himself), on the 24th, Apparently in the appeal hearing brought about by Prónay himself and the public prosecutor, a fine of 2500 Pengö.

In addition to the reasons for the verdict, it must be added that Prónay most likely selected the officers he criticized at the time of hiring and at least did not part with most of them and he was therefore at least the person primarily responsible for the wrong appointments. To make matters worse, he was a totalitarian dictator and totalitarian dictators take on as much authority as possible.

On March 31, 1927, another press trial took place against Prónay, in the course of which he suffered an unusually severe fit of rage . He had accused a military auditor in a newspaper of having committed irregularities in a negotiation in which he was involved. When the auditor refutes Prónay's allegations (he does not belong to a secret society, as Prónay claims, and the judgment was passed by an independent five-person court, and he cannot remember all the details), Prónay contradicts, but made a pact with the court . For his statements, Prónay received two fines of 80 pengő each. After the second sentence was imposed, the situation escalated. Prónay got louder and more aggressive. He repeatedly criticized the seriousness of the litigation and accused the judge of what he was doing to him. He doesn't acknowledge the fines and he doesn't mind them, nor does he care if he has to spend the rest of his life in this court. With the request to sit down and the reference that Prónay had to pay the fines and that he should no longer write such articles, then he would no longer come to court and he would teach Prónay honorable behavior and two further fines in the same way The presiding judge only managed to get Prónay to threaten that the time would come when he would get his rights. In the end, Prónay stood trembling in front of the chairman's podium, stamped his foot, had blood-red eyes and yelled at the judge so that it could also be heard in adjacent rooms. Nobody needs to teach him how to behave honestly, not even towards courts, but he only accepts objective courts. When the chairman realized that Prónay had completely lost control of himself, that he himself was already very excited and that the situation was threatening to escalate completely, he interrupted the meeting to discuss stricter consequences for Prónay. He also had the room cleared and only the public prosecutor, Prónay and his defense lawyer were allowed to stay in the room. At the end of the consultation and at the beginning of the continuation of the treatment, Prónay asked the court to excuse him, because he could not have controlled himself because of the military auditor. After the trial resumed, numerous witnesses were heard who confirmed that there had been looting of people who were not enemies in western Hungary. The trial continued on another day. There was apparently no connection with the proceedings taking place in the same month.

Confrontation with Viktor Ranzenberger in January 1928 and subsequent legal dispute

On January 15, 1928, an incident occurred that not only caused a sensation in Budapest, especially among the upper classes and the supporters of Prónay, but also sparked international media coverage, some of the newspapers even received an urgent message by telegram to theirs Worth editing, the newspaper "A Reggel" reported on it in the first place. However, the reports regarding the dispute and the subsequent official act differ considerably. He wanted to have dinner with his wife in a restaurant. On the way there, the couple met Gardemajor Ranzenberger, who were out and about in uniform, apparently looking provocatively at Prónay and his wife from top to bottom. At first, however, Prónay ignored his opponent and continued on his way. After visiting the restaurant, both spouses met Ranzenberger again in the Kossuth-Straße / Franziskanerplatz area. This time, however, Prónay let go of his wife's arm and went up to Ranzenberger and asked what he had to do with him. Ranzenberger replied that he didn't bother with a person like Prónay. In the course of the argument, during which both got in the middle of the roadway, Prónay repeatedly hit Ranzenberger with his short leather-coated stick, Ranzenberger in turn inflicted several wounds on Prónay with his sharp sword, especially a six centimeter wide sharp cut on the Prónay left arm, which severed the arm muscle and reached down to the bone. Prónay drew a revolver, whereupon Ranzenberger backed away. A large crowd formed, including quite a few sympathizers. The confrontation was ended by the police, both had to go to the post command, had to identify themselves and were released after being questioned.

Prónay told the police that he would have liked to shoot Ranzenberger, but he had to consider the interests of the people as more important. He would also need Ranzenberger to bring to light what happened to the battalion's money. According to the media, Prónay also gave another reason: Ranzenberger insulted Prónay's wife shortly after the wedding, whereupon Prónay turned on a court of honor that had not yet settled the matter. Because of his marriage to a former lady-in-waiting of the ex-queen (in Austria ex-empress) Zita, he was accused from several sides of having become a legitimist. In the end, both were released.

Prónay had to go to a surgical clinic for the severely bleeding wound, but was only able to return home a few hours after the incident. He was visited by many of his followers or asked how he was.

Both opponents granted an interview to the newspaper Az Est in which they described their point of view.

Prónay was visited and interviewed in his apartment on January 17th by a reporter from the newspaper. The dictator was very objective and cooperative. Similar to Ranzenberger in his interview, he naturally describes the situation differently and briefly and precisely and not overly like Prónay.

It was criticized that two well-known war criminals were allowed to move freely in Budapest armed in this way. Prónay was not a member of the army at the time, while Ranzenberger was a guard major. Several media referred to the fact that January 15th was a Sunday. Another point of criticism was that there was a man among the visitors who was officially serving a prison term. At that time, one only expected a duel or the like.

Despite the sometimes considerable differences in the reporting, it is clear that Prónay, if not started the dispute, unnecessarily fueled it. Ungvári formulates similarly that he has gotten into the fight. His conviction was therefore justified. On the other hand, the choleric and uncontrolled temperament of Prónay had long been known and Ranzenberger should have expected such behavior from his former superior. It should also be questioned what role Ms. Prónay played and perhaps incited her husband to act, because on the way there the exdictator ignored Ranzenberger, and she also stated that Ranzenberger stared at her in a provocative way and that she felt provoked too.

Around ten days later, newspapers reported that Ranzenberger was demanding the chivalrous satisfaction because of his reconsideration with Prónay (either because of the incident at Franziskanerplatz or a trial that was going on at the time), but Prónay had written to his second that he was only granting satisfaction with the weapon, but no chivalrous satisfaction .

The trial of the incident on January 15, 1928 on Franziskanerplatz took place the following November, Prónay was the accused. The first day of the trial must have been shortly before November 20th. According to the complaint, Prónay abused Ranzenberger on the street and assaulted him with a pencil. Prónay had appeared with a large number of documents. In contrast to his other processes, he appeared confused and depressed and appeared calm on the outside, but you could tell that he could just control himself. In fact, he was so nervous that he clung to a table so tightly that a piece of it almost broke off. Prónay admitted that he hit Ranzenberger with the stick because Ranzenberger fixed him on the street when he met him and when he confronted Ranzenberger, the latter insulted him and pulled the saber, whereupon he struck Ranzenberger with the stick. Ranzenberger then struck him with the saber. Among other things, he testified that he put the revolver down when the police arrived and did not shoot for fear of legal consequences. Ranzenberger, in turn, denied that he had fixed Prónay and said that he had struck with the stick for absolutely no reason, whereupon he pulled the saber. The suspicion that Prónay was a legitimist was again put forward, although this had nothing to do with the cause itself. During the questioning there was a dispute between him and Ranzenberger, whereupon the judge warned both of them on the grounds that the conduct of the case was his concern and not that of the parties to the dispute. After hearing many witnesses, mostly upper class passers-by or prominence who testified to having seen a brawl, besides Ms. Prónay, the hearing was adjourned to hear further witnesses.

March 1929 was the last day of the trial. Prónay was charged with minor assault and defamation. Ranzenberger claimed to have been attacked by Prónay with a pencil and called Bolshevik (the latter appears here for the first time in the reporting). Prónay insisted that he was not aware of any guilt. He admitted that he had hit Ranzenberger with a stick, but denied calling Ranzenberger a communist. He defended himself by saying that he acted in an affect, because he was angry, because Ranzenberger had fixed him and his wife and behaved disrespectfully. Ranzenberger, in turn, justified himself by saying that if Prónay attacked him with a lead pipe, he was forced to draw his sword for his own safety.

Prónay was fined 80 pengo for assault.

Further attempts at a political career and rapprochement with social democracy

In 1929 it became known that he had illegal coins minted to commemorate the uprising in western Hungary. Since this had no consequences for him, he distributed them to veterans and friends over the next two years.

At the beginning of 1929 he let the newspaper "Magyarság" spread that he still had the short iron-studded stick he had carried in western Hungary. He is often in court as a plaintiff or a defendant. He must live like an intern in his apartment. He hasn't bothered about politics for years. And although he lives the most undemanding life, he increasingly has to struggle with worries. These statements are only partially true. Even with serious violations of the law, he was almost always able to move freely. According to Bodó, he lived very lavishly, although his honestly earned income was actually low, and he could not have had any financial worries. He was represented in politics at least until the 1930s, albeit without success. He has only ever been a defendant in libel and property crimes trials and never in murder trials .

In December 1929, together with his wife, he granted an interview to the magazine Huszadik Század, in which he was unusually moderate and in which he expressed his conviction that a national movement could be brought about. He organizes the Frontharcosok Országos Szövetsége fighters' association, his wife a welfare association for the poor. He wanted to lead the non-political fighters at the front, whom he considered worthy and capable of competently representing the country and they should not trust politicians. They would have proven their skills in World War I when they risked their lives. It is therefore not acceptable for them to be a subgroup of MOVE and to be politically instrumentalized for a privileged clique. The country should come first. The government or MOVE with the tacit consent of the masses have demanded a lot of money, but are hindering it. Poor people are excluded by the cost. He will send out that nobody is excluded from him because of party-political or religious issues, including Jews and Social Democrats are welcome, they have the same rights as the other members. He would issue a certificate of poverty if he had differentiated according to religion in the fight. It would have been “all for one and one for all”. He had operated for the foundation for years and there were branches in several cities (he was particularly closely connected with the cities and regions mentioned). He believed that within the provincial regions there would soon be groups modeled on the national federation and signs that the vast majority of frontline soldiers would join. His immediate goal is after the development of a 20-point program to ensure the livelihood of the frontline soldiers and the government to be put under pressure. There should be mutual support in the association so that no front soldier is unemployed. The widows and orphans should also be provided with security (apparently his wife took over this area). He demanded the abolition of pluralism and, for the front-line combatant organizations, local representative bodies and committees as well as adequate representation in the House of Lords. He was sure that the former officers would support the association and join collectively because of their privations and experiences in the war. He was just as certain that the Defense Minister would support these measures if he really cared about the future of the soldiers at the front. Despite his reservations about MOVE, he values ​​a common front. Prónay further claimed not only to ask about membership fees, but also to want to make donations to members. The membership fee should be low and only payable by those who can afford it. An association with corresponding objectives was actually formed that year and changed its name in 1939. However, the constituent assembly announced by Prónay among others was not approved by the chief of the state police in mid-March 1930 for reasons of security. It is possible that it is identical to the fascist association mentioned above.

In the 1930s he usually continued to vegetate on the fringes of Hungarian politics as a member of the far-right opposition to the government. Even Bodó cannot identify any political importance Prónay in any of the fascist parties and movements that emerged after the Great Depression.

In 1930 he was accepted back into the army because of the intercession of Gyula Gömbös .

On May 14, 1930, during one of the theft trials in western Hungary, he asked via newspapers for former comrades who would testify in his favor. At the time, he assumed responsibility as commander-in-chief, but at that time allegedly not financially able to pay for others, although a few months earlier he had agreed to donate money to combatants.

At the end of September 1930 a press trial took place before the Budapest Criminal Court because Ranzenberger had sued Prónay. Apparently there is a connection with the incident at Franziskanerplatz, although it was primarily about Prónay's stance on legitimism and (due to the great influence on her husband, at least partially applicable) allegations against Ms. Prónay that she was a political poisoner. In this, Prónay declares that he will refute the allegations made against him and his wife. Two witnesses exonerated him, a total of 140 witnesses were summoned to the trial.

Defeat by Viktor Ranzenberger, second expulsion from the army and the climax of his rapprochement with social democracy

Shortly before the end of the great trial against Ranzenberger in 1931, his wife Huszadik granted Század an interview in which she claims that he is involved in an office that campaigns for the disabled. Since he tried to support the soldiers in his unit, he may well visit ministries for former soldiers in his unit. Since he was chairman of the Hungarian Fascist Party at the time, it may also be that he used his office there for such purposes. He also only lives on a pension and only very spartan. From the interview, however, it is clear that he was able to raise a lot of money for the ongoing legal proceedings, albeit pre-financed by a loan of 800,000 gold crowns from the military, and still lived in the house that he moved into after his marriage (however, is Due to the sources and files, it is unclear whether he used the entire house or just an apartment on the ground floor with his wife. The latter is more likely because if you enter the address on hungaricana, other residents appear in the period in question 1921–1945 on.). One wants to accuse him wrongly because he shows grievances. It also portrays him as a person who is primarily interested in classical music and less interested in theater. Almost all of these statements contradict those in literature, sometimes even his own.

On April 28, 1931, a court hearing before the Budapest Criminal Court took place in camera (the Arbeiter Zeitung suspected so that no incriminating things would become known to the Horthy regime. But in this way the partly aggressive supporters of both parties were locked out and Apparently they wanted to offer Prónay as little opportunity as possible for scandalous appearances such as on March 31, 1927, since he preferred the broadest possible public for scandals. Negotiation details were leaked to the Social Democrats through indiscretion), the description of the incidents in this case up to the beginning of May differ from Part considerably. Because of the incorrect approach, especially Prónay's special treatment, the international media interest was enormous until mid-May. It was believed that because of his complicity in the crimes of the Horthy regime, he was treated so mildly by the authorities. In part, this was worth the newspapers' telegrams to their editorial offices. Prónay was then president of the Hungarian Fascist Party. The process itself was already taking months. Prónay had been sued by Ranzenberger for defamation regarding Prónay's allegations: enrichment in western Hungary and allegations of underhandedness, false testimony and participation in criminal manipulation (the same allegations were made by Ranzenberger against Prónay). Another topic was the referendum in Ödenburg . Prónay has published its usual allegations in several newspapers. Prónay also refused to give Ranzenberger chivalrous satisfaction, which was considered the grossest insult in these circles. Prónay justified his allegations on five points. Judges were the leading judges of Horthy, the chairman was Horthy's parade judge. According to Arbeiter Zeitung, Prónay could have backed up his allegations with 150 witnesses and lots of evidence. It was difficult for the judges to refute Prónay's allegations. She could only have done it by declaring the statements of Ranzenberger and the officers on his side to be above suspicion. A statement by the then Minister of War Gömbös was also quoted. The officers blamed his wife for his (alleged) change of heart. During the hearing, Prónay suddenly left the courtroom, either on his own initiative or after consulting his defense attorney, after declaring: “I do not expect an impartial judgment from you. Do what you want, I am not at your disposal ”. Allegedly, before his defense attorney could make his plea, he had suddenly left the room, but had returned for a few minutes. The president of the court then interrupted the hearing. After the resumption, the President stated that he (or the entire Tribunal) had ordered Prónay's arrest because the latter had declared that he would not return and adjourned the trial. A verdict could not be pronounced because Prónay had already left the courtroom, which was then set for May 5th. Prónay first met with some right-wing extremists in parliament, then drove to the headquarters of the fascist party and then returned to his apartment, where he was awaited by detectives sent there by the police department to arrest him. At first he told them that he wanted to surrender voluntarily, but not to go with them because he would not let himself be led through the streets like a criminal. He told the detectives to give way only to violence and he is also said to have said: "Go home, dear people, I want to sleep soundly". Several police officers and detectives were standing in front of his house, the section of street in front of the house was driven by police officers, and members of the press were also present. The local conditions make it unlikely that the house was surrounded by a police cordon. The officers repeatedly asked him to obey the law and surrender. He always replied that he would present himself late in the morning the following day. Prónay himself stayed in his apartment and received journalists that night, to whom he explained that he was not a theoretician of jurisprudence, but that he "got blood in his head" when the president of the court refused additional evidence. He has evidence that numerous people have enriched themselves in western Hungary. For years he has been prevented from presenting these in public, he has even been ousted from public life. At the same time, the police, the State Secretary for the Interior, who otherwise cracked down hard, and Prónay's defender, who stressed that Prónay had reacted in this way because of his straight military sense, and that he would voluntarily surrender, discussed in the police department. However, this was rejected, the arrest warrant had to be carried out, and to surrender voluntarily was not sufficient. Envoys were even sent to Prónay, but Prónay remained stubborn. Despite the long negotiations between the police and Prónay, the only thing that was achieved was that he volunteered. Sometimes it is said that he barricaded himself in his apartment. But that is rather unlikely, since either he or his wife kept receiving visitors. He should have just withdrawn into his apartment, locked the door and waited for further developments. Due to his approach, however, the arrest warrant could not be served on him.

On April 29, Prónay left his apartment in the morning through a side entrance. He was greeted by numerous supporters in front of his apartment, around a hundred members of the fascist opposition front-line fighters' association that he had founded took up positions at the front door. The situation threatened to escalate, and the number of police officers and detectives doubled. Prónay drove to the public prosecutor's office in a car (private car or taxi), where he and his defense attorney (allegedly also with two journalists and the detective) reported to the chief prosecutor. Due to the crowd in front of his house, the departure was only noticed at the last moment, one was able to hold on to the car, the others had to order a taxi to pursue them. At the prosecutor's office, he was told that he would have to remain in detention until the next hearing and the verdict was announced at the end of the week or the following week. Prónay even had the public prosecutor record a report that he had only surrendered voluntarily and without any official coercion. He was threatened with several months in prison. He was actually sent to the detention center until the next trial, where he stayed until the next trial. The remaining police officers were removed from his home. The description of the Linzer Tages-Post , however, differs greatly from the other reports: his apartment has been guarded since midnight. In the early hours of the morning, the senior police officers issued orders regarding his arrest. In the morning a large number of uniformed and secret police officers appeared in front of his apartment. Several members of the Fascist Party (former participants in the West Hungarian uprising) entered his home. Other party members stood in front of it and denied access to the apartment. When the police knocked on his apartment door, he said he would go to the prosecutor's office an hour and a half later and that no one would be allowed into his apartment until then. He was arrested two hours later. According to the Arbeiter Zeitung on April 30, he only presented himself in the courthouse that evening after long negotiations.

April 30, 1931: Rumors surfaced that Prónay's followers would band together to help their leader, which turned out to be exaggerated. Only ten people came to the Minister of Justice, but they were not received. There was no organization of ex-irregulars, and the Secretary of State for Home Affairs described rumors as nonsensical. Any revolutionary experiment would be nipped in the bud with brute force. On that day, Prónay filed an appeal. On the same day, his defense lawyer was brought to justice by the court for statements that were offensive to the Bar and sentenced to three months in prison. On the same day, the Social Democrats protested in parliament against Prónay's special treatment, as the entire state power had failed to enforce a court decision and even the city council and the interior ministry had to consult on the situation. It was criticized that Prónay was allowed to take out so much, especially since Prónay apparently intended to run as a candidate for the National Assembly and, if elected, would have a broad forum for disseminating his views. A Liberal MP, on the other hand, said in a parliamentary session that Prónay did not have to defend himself and only had to be present in the courtroom during the pleading, and that the action against Prónay was therefore illegal. Anyone who leaves the courtroom and returns to their home is not attempting to escape. A socialist declared that he did not care about the legal situation, despite a huge police presence, Prónay could not be arrested and one must seriously ask oneself whether one would do the same with an ordinary citizen. The Justice Minister said that laws would be adhered to uncompromisingly during his tenure.

On May 2, 1931, the Royal Table, acting as the court of appeal, rejected his defense counsel's request for release, so Prónay had to remain in custody until the verdict was pronounced on May 5. For the correspondent of the Neue Wiener Tagblatt, this was even worth sending a telegram to the editorial office.

The verdict was announced on May 5, 1931. Prónay was brought out from remand prison. He was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for defamation, an additional fine of 6,000 pengö and reimbursement of legal costs of 2,838.70 pengö to the Hungarian tax authorities and 8,000 pengö legal fees to Ranzenberger. How high the payments to be made by Prónay can be seen from the conversion at Fogarassy: The present value of 100 pengõ was 500 - 600 forints in 1978.

The judgment was justified in great detail. He had not been able to prove the publicly raised allegations and these were completely unfounded (his political career was destroyed by the action against him, Ranzenberger and other officers had committed criminal acts), but Ranzenberger his very well (Prónay's change from the free Kingmakers to the Legitimists after his marriage to a former lady-in-waiting of ex-empress Zita, hostility to Jews). Gyula Gömbös's opinion of Prónay that he had become Karlist was also cited as a reason for Prónay's conviction. Further his refusal to evacuate western Hungary and his men to withdraw from Budapest on the orders of Prime Minister Bethlen. Thefts and falsification of cash books were not known to Ranzenberger. Prónay was removed from the army because of his improper attitude mentioned in the judgment. His allegations against the officers are unfounded. On this occasion, for the first time, the personality of Prónay and his motives for his many years of conflict with Ranzenberger were dealt with psychologically. On the one hand, the reason was desperation, as his military career has stalled. Other motifs mentioned were pure craving for recognition (establishing Lajtabánság ) and pure vanity (issuing commemorative coins and stamps with his image). The defendant lacked the self-control, further the necessary insight and sobriety, which is required in difficult and critical situations. He was unable to create the rule of law and harmony, and as a commander he lacked self-discipline. The text suggests that no specialists or psychologists were called in, a medical report would have looked different, especially the lack of diagnoses.

The judgment had to be published in the daily newspapers “A Reggel” and “Magyarság”.

However, Prónay was released because the prosecutor did not insist on further detention, allegedly only temporarily. He and his defense lawyer as well as Ranzenberger appealed. In front of the courthouse, Prónay was cheered by numerous supporters when he appeared on the street with his wife.

On May 6, 1931, in connection with this affair, the State Secretary for the Interior, who was also responsible for the State Police, submitted his resignation to Prime Minister Bethlen .

On May 7, 1931, a criminal trial took place against Prónay's defense lawyer. During the trial, the court asked the military authorities to provide certain files relating to embezzlement or other malpractice in the Szeged Hunters Battalion. The military authorities refused to do so because they had to be considerate of the sensitive and special nature of the matter. The Social Democrats thereupon demanded in a parliamentary interpellation that the documents in question be presented in Parliament, which the Justice Minister refused.

What is striking is the comment in the Arbeiter Zeitung of May 8, 1931, in which, despite all the criticism of the former terrorist and Bán von Lajtabánság, she was of the opinion that Prónay's allegations were justified. Gardemajor Ranzenberger was one of the best officers of the Horthy regime, the best was earlier Prónay, who was considered the liberator of Sopron and was one of the first to be actively supported by the regime as Bán. As such, he knew many details which, if they were discovered, could become very uncomfortable for the Horthy regime. That was the real reason for the exclusion from the army. Prónay himself could not attack Horthy directly and therefore attacked Ranzenberger. In a text that was to be classified as anti-Semitic, the newspaper described that leading Jews had reclaimed and got back the money they had lost through the terrorist terror. This has been criticized by the Supreme Court. Whereupon Prónay was sued in a civil case for recourse to these costs. The Ministry of Defense put down this process because of higher state interests. This was kept secret in Parliament to the advantage of Prónay. In addition, Prónay knew a lot about grievances with responsibility and finances. That also explains his brisk tone and his self-confidence even before the Horthy court. He would have made the statement before leaving the courtroom because he had noticed the partiality of the court. The Horthy regime has still prevailed, but not entirely because he knew too much about the Horthy regime's guilt for the terrorist terror as a leader in this party. Therefore, as a fallen terrorist, he was still able to assert more than the elected parliament. There may be a connection between the rapprochement between Prónay and the Social Democrats, which began in December 1929 and peaked a few weeks later.

In the newspaper Budapesti Hirlap there were reports between May 17 and June 3, 1931 concerning the entitlement to use the title of lieutenant colonel by Prónay. The newspaper reported in a short message that he was not authorized to do so. Prónay, on the other hand, emphasized that he would receive the corresponding payments.

On June 27, 1931, Prónay is said to have drawn closer to the Social Democrats than in December 1929. In Budapest, some fascist opposition splinter parties had not been admitted by the electoral authority. Under his chairmanship, the representatives of the fascist Front Fighter Party and the Hungarian Workers' Party spoke out in favor of a closed vote for the Social Democratic Party. The debate was decided by Prónay himself, who was then chairman of the fascist opposition bloc, on the grounds that the social democratic party actually shared the fascist ideals. According to the communist magazine “Rote Fahne”, the social democratic “Nepszava” would have described this as a historical necessity and a correct assessment of the political situation.

After 1931, at least the Austrian press lost interest in him, mainly because of his defeat in the trial against Ranzenberger in May 1931. After the trials in 1932, the interest of the Hungarian press also decreased significantly. It is astonishing how often Prónay, as a minor politician who attracted attention mainly through excessive behavior in public, has managed to get him featured on the front page and pages two and three, and even more astonishing the wide coverage in the Hungarian press (especially in quality newspapers that viewed him critically) in the literally insignificant processes, whereby reporters let themselves be instrumentalized by the married couple. The initiative for this may have come from Ms. Prónay and not from the exdictator himself. Ten years earlier, he had been a staunch opponent of reporters and at least initiated assassinations of leading press people, including newspaper employees, who later asked him for interviews. He only changed his behavior in the years before the trial; his wife was also interviewed or she spoke to the reporter alone.

Between January 21 and 30, 1932, the appeal hearing took place in camera. After studying secret military records, the verdict was changed by a prónay benevolent judge to a fine of 1,000 pengö, of which 600 are to be paid before the prison sentence, then 100 pengö daily. The insulted Ranzenberger are to be reimbursed 2500 Pengö in legal fees.

Another appeal hearing took place between May 10 and 13, 1932. There were press representatives, for example from "A Reggel" present. In essence, the previous verdict was confirmed, Prónay was sentenced to pay the legal costs and payment of Ranzenberger's lawyer and a fine of 150 pengö. The verdict was issued on June 8th and could no longer be appealed.

In 1932 he founded with Gyula Ostenburg-Morawek the short-lived Hungarian National Fascist Party / Magyar Fasiszta Part or Magyar Országos Fascist Párt, which also gained no importance. Its function, according to its own definition, was that of the right-wing extremist opposition to the conservative authoritarian regime and was designed as a mass party modeled on the NSDAP. Its existence was very fleeting and it was unable to gain mass support, its members later joining other fascist groups.

In 1932, his former officer László Vannay , who was also involved in the White Terror, was charged with a failed right-wing coup. Prónay was also cited in court, but he was not charged with any violations of the law. However, he was accused of instigating a breach of the peace and received a six-month prison sentence for incitement to hatred .

In 1932 a trial took place in which Viktor Ranzenberger and Prónay were involved. During the trial, Prónay lost his temper, among other things he insulted the judge and the defendant. The judge wanted to teach him a lesson and a fine and a six-month sentence, which some say he actually had to serve, others that it was unlikely.

Therefore, Prónay was expelled from the Hungarian army for the second time as alezredes ( lieutenant colonel ) and his rank was stripped from him. Bodó suspects that at the age of 57 he also lost interest in a military career due to the changes that had occurred in the army and the military system.

Final marginalization after leaving the army for the second time

After leaving the army for the second time, when he finally saw no more opportunity to prove himself in combat operations, he spent his time at horse races, at gaming tables in officers' casinos, restaurants and clubs of right-wing extremist organizations. In the 20s and 30s his name appeared in tabloids and in domestic parts of newspapers because of shouting anti-Semitic rant etc. in public space, otherwise little was learned about him until shortly before the end of the war, he was only considered more troubling since the 30s elderly man. He also tried to settle old bills. In the dispute, he even went so far that he was Gömbös, to whom he owed his advancement after the First World War and his resumption in the army, and Héjjas, one of his closest companions, who subordinated his troops to him and to whom he at least within the ÉME the membership, if not due to the post of vice chairman, in his diary entries.

In February 1934 he made an offer to set up a volunteer corps in order to recapture Burgenland for Hungary during the civil war in Vienna, but failed because of the negative attitude of the responsible persons.

Prónay did not draw any conclusions from his defeats in court, Fogarassy suspects paranoia querulans, but there is no one hundred percent proof. 1934 ex officio criminal proceedings for defamation were initiated against him. The proceedings were significantly delayed by the defense lawyer and the judge's lack of familiarity with the matter. Defense Minister Gyula Gömbös, on the other hand, did not want to hand over the files, as state secrets and sensitive internal matters of the military would become public and thus the interests of the state and the military would be harmed. The material would put a considerable strain not only on the angry Prónay, but also on his comrades in his former battalion. Due to the changed political situation (Burgenland had come to the German Reich through the annexation of Austria in 1938) the public prosecutor issued the instruction to discontinue the proceedings, which took place on September 19, 1939 by the Budapest Criminal Court.

There may be a connection with the trial that Gyula Gömbös's predecessor as defense minister initiated against Prónay. In a petition to Gömbös, the latter claimed that the plaintiff had been chased out of office for attempted manipulation. Prónay was fined 1000 pengö on October 15, 1934 for defamation, and he appealed against this judgment.

He owed his long, if ultimately unsuccessful, political career to luck and the indolence of others. Prónay could only delay the end of his political career, but not prevent it. One of the reasons is that he later fell out with at least most of the leaders of the organizations to which he belonged because of his problematic nature and because he did not tolerate any contradiction. In addition, he did not seem to recognize the complexity of a modern state (interactions, bureaucracy, role of political parties and interest groups). In the age of democratic politics he ignored the importance of the “social question” as a means of political mobilization, which casts doubt on his claim to be the first fascist in Europe, even if he is labeled a fascist by others. After all, he seems to have understood that, like the men in his unit, he was not acting in a vacuum, but was part of an international phenomenon.

He has always had an extremely lavish lifestyle, which he could never have afforded because of his income (low salary or pension, lost savings). However, it is questionable how he could save himself a small fortune after living so lavishly, he did not earn much as an officer and even stayed as a simple lieutenant in particularly expensive luxury hotels such as the Hotel Bristol and the Hotel Sacher in Vienna. He also boasted in his diaries that he had obtained the necessary funds through robbery, extortion and “confiscation”, especially from wealthy Jews and foreigners. Bodó therefore suspects that he also stole his house at 38 Szentkirályi utca in Budapest, an area with a very high Jewish population, which he moved into with his wife after his marriage (so far there is no evidence in the sources on how he acquired the house. In newspaper reports, however, at least for the most part, only a four-room apartment on the ground floor of the house is mentioned; in the file directories that can be viewed via Hungaricana, the address is ground floor or ground floor / 2. However, there is only one purchase contract without a name for the Subject matter of the contract, in which only he and his wife appear as parties, as well as the name of a notary. It must have been something valuable, otherwise the couple would not have had a contract drawn up between them. A purchase contract with a previous owner or files with a restitution claim can be found hungaricana neither under his name nor under the address). In any case, in 1944 he moved to the house at Szentkirály 25 / a. When asked to restore stolen goods, he was reluctant, if at all, to comply.

In the second half of the 1930s and early 1940s, he was under state surveillance, especially the National Security Center ÁVK, as was his wife. She was said to have had affairs with Galeazzo Ciano , the Italian foreign minister and son-in-law of Benito Mussolini , and then the Italian ambassador. Both spouses were seen as allies rather than potential enemies. The ÁVK used his wife to provide the Italian embassy with false information. She was rated by the ÁVK as a highly intelligent woman who provided the Foreign Ministry with reliable information on Italian domestic and foreign policy. Prónay himself was not classified as very dangerous by the ÁVK, at least less than the fascist parties, especially the Arrow Cross party, which is becoming more and more popular.

On April 20, 1944, a statement was recorded by him, but it is not clear from the file whether he merely confirmed to an officer that he was employed in Szeged during the Kun regime or whether he was still involved in legal disputes in 1944.

In July 1944 at the latest, he moved to Szentkirály 25 / a, where he wrote his memoirs.

Freischarführer in World War II

Prónay became politically active again in the last months of the Second World War, he supported the alliance with National Socialist Germany from the beginning and was angry about the swing policy of the Hungarian government during the war.

In 1944 he sympathized with the Arrow Cruiser leader Ferenc Szálasi , he was acquainted with him and was among the first to congratulate Szálasi and offer him their services, but no longer played an important role among the fascist organizations, whether he played a role in Szálasi's seizure of power, is unclear. Although he was a sympathizer, he did not join the party.

In October 1944, the Arrow Crosses seized power and set up various militias to destroy the political opponents and end the genocide of the Jews. At that time, Prónay reappeared for a short time.

In mid-November 1944 he built a death squad or free corps, the central Hungarist fighting force or black death squad (it was one of the ad hoc associations outside of the war scheme), it was the first such initiative whose task also included participating in the genocide belonged, but the unit played no major role in the genocide. However, according to Bodó, Paramilitary Violence (2004), she was involved in a series of massacres, mainly of Jews, in late 1944. However, since Prónay fell out with Vannay and therefore the unit was divided, it must be clarified for which massacre Prónay was responsible. There were no connections to the deportation of Hungarian Jews. Apparently he was already busy with the organization of a volunteer corps when Budapest became a front-line city and began his organizational work after the German occupation, although he was already 70 years old at the time.

An attempt after October 15, 1944 had failed when he reported to the responsible minister that the Prónay department had been newly formed, and he and Vannay proposed to the minister a unit of the order of 1,500 men, but it was always doubted whether whether this strength has ever been achieved. After the Arrow Cross coup, Prónay saw a favorable opportunity; the Prónay-Vannay department existed by November at the latest. However, there were major differences in the command structure and social background to the Freikorps after the First World War. He was also originally joined by a number of young volunteers who had no idea who he was. His last known headquarters was the Hubay House at 51 Zugligeti Street in western Budapest.

This fulfilled his long-cherished wish to be able to lead his own troop again. According to Schlag, it consisted of voluntary Arrow Cross members, but this contradicts other sources, according to which other groups of people were also represented. As a kind of urban guerrilla in Budapest, behind the advancing Red Army, it was supposed to carry out acts of sabotage and attacks against their collaborators.

He managed the recruiting personally, but at that time he almost failed again. The present military complained: lack of discipline, Prónay's environment consisted of older soldiers with a lack of knowledge of modern tactics at the time, but who interfered in all matters. Therefore one did not want to give him any resources.

The old Prónay (called az öreg / the old man) was also in no way able to carry out a proper recruitment and training program (recruits without combat experience, after receiving weapons and uniforms, quick and simple training in drill, combat formation and use of the Weapon). His tactical knowledge was poor and his view of the fighting was based on outdated knowledge.

His inability to work with others also had a negative impact. He fell out with his subordinate László Vannay within a few weeks, who then founded his own unit (which later received official status), most of the soldiers recruited under his leadership left the unit and switched to Vannay and all students in the unit to the university -Sturmbataillon, whereupon he first defiled the head of the university battalion, who was appointed by the official authorities, and then accused Vannay of poaching his people. His own officers had to take his riding crop from him so that he would not attack anyone with it. Many of the young volunteers will have turned away from him again, who believed they had joined a legendary hero and had to realize over time that he was just a badly disturbed criminal, whose mental decline was already very advanced must have been. Few of them join him because of his demeanor and argumentative nature. His influence during the siege of Budapest was therefore small.

He tried to get support everywhere, but this was always rejected because of these incidents and untrue statements, in some cases this was justified by his age. His troop strength was apparently only inadequately equipped 100-120 men, he himself claimed that there were 1,500, Soros mentions 250.

At Christmas 1944 he voluntarily stayed in the besieged city. Whether he risked arrest by the Soviets out of idealism or trusted his talent to get away with a very mild punishment even for the most serious crimes (which actually happened a year later) is not clear from the sources. His close ally Iván Héjjas, on the other hand, withdrew with his unit via Transdanubia to Graz when the situation became hopeless, and fled himself further via Germany to Spain in order to evade a judicial conviction.

From December 25, 1944, he led a volunteer force on the Buda side.

He became increasingly lethargic during the siege of Budapest (the cauldron was completely closed on December 27, 1944) and was rarely seen in the corps command.

His unit was officially merged with the National Armed Forces Service on January 7, 1945. There may be a connection with the following incident: The Prónay Command was subordinate to the General Staff Captain Zoltán Mikó , who secretly worked with Raoul Wallenberg . Since one would not suspect Jews, deserters and resistance fighters in a right-wing extremist unit, some members of these groups were assigned to the Prónay Commando. Carelessly, a Jewish worker was exposed on November 21, 1944 in the headquarters of the commando, while another admitted during an interrogation that there were others. Ten more were captured and executed on December 10, 1944, all attempts to save them failed (the Prónay unit reported five executions). For fear of further exposure, the survivors were relocated as there was fear of investigations and the smuggling of informers. Prónay was recommended to disband his unit and distribute it to other formations. On the other hand, like other Hungarist units, his unit was assigned to the so-called KISKA auxiliary troops, which were disbanded the day before, January 6, 1945, due to their unreliability.

Remnants of his unit were seen on January 29, 1945 near the Budapest South Railway Station, when they were supporting other units.

He was last seen with a weapon in hand near Buda Castle during an attempt to escape on February 11 and 12, 1945 and died on February 12. According to some sources, he is said to have been slain in Budapest in March 1945 in Kútvölgy (in the west of Budapest) or to have fallen there. His like-minded friends and friends spread the word that he was murdered by Arrow Crosses. Schlag suspected that he died during one of his assignments as a guerrilla leader in February 1945 in the battle for Budapest. Haberman deviates most of all with his assumptions: he probably perished in 1944 and probably in Czechoslovakia , perhaps because the unabridged memoirs were found there. All other sources suggest that he was in Budapest at the time. All of these versions found their way into the specialist literature.

End of life

However, he survived the siege of Budapest and continued his fight against the communists until his capture by Soviet troops on March 20, 1945. It was only when documents regarding his fate after the fall of Budapest became available after the opening of the Soviet archives that this fact became known and that he was initially classified as a prisoner of war. On June 10, 1946, he was sentenced by a Soviet court or a special court council of the Soviet State Security to 20 years of hard labor only for sabotage and espionage, not for his acts during the terrorist terror and his others (at least partly in a leading position) committed crimes, and taken to a camp in Siberia. In 1947 or 1948 (on the Mad Monarchist blog the period is narrowed down to late 1947 or early 1948) he is said to have died in the Gulag. However, the Russian authorities have not disclosed details such as the circumstances of his arrest or death, date and place. Barotányi attributes the unusually mild sentence (the death penalty was actually imposed in such cases) to the fact that he was considered a member of a non-regular force.

However, newspapers announced his capture as early as April 1945. It was announced that he would be tried in the People's Court (which did not happen, he was tried in a Soviet court in Moscow. It is believed that he would have been sentenced to death by the Hungarian People's Court like Ferenc Szálasi or Ivan Héjjas ). It is said that he was last in Pest (city) .

On September 20, 1945, the Minister of Defense announced that he would Prónay, he called him Colonel, with 46 other officers on the basis of Decree 667/1945 §1 through Decree 28.611 / eln. vkf on June 19, 1945 as a war criminal and expelled from the army.

Three days after his conviction in Moscow, Népszava printed an interview with one of his guards, in which he stated that Prónay was the only one who had admitted his guilt and that everyone else had tried to evade their responsibility.

Why not only communists later covered up his capture and spread the word that he had fallen or been murdered shortly before the end of the war, is currently not clear from the available sources. It is also unclear why this misinformation was believed to be true for decades. At least the newspapers mentioned had a very large reach and were accessible to many people.

There is an entry on the Internet that he was possibly last seen on June 24, 1946 in Butyrka prison in Moscow and that he suffered from severe heart problems. However, there is only talk of 15 years in prison. It is very likely that it could be the Butyrka, from which many prisoners were allocated to the Gulag camps.

There is also a message on the Internet that he was in one or more camps and was murdered. There you can always find information that he lived for several years. However, the information from official Russian authorities suggests that he died on December 31, 1948 at the latest.

To judge the person

Bodó deals with the person of Prónay in his monograph on Prónay from 2010 as well as with his previous article “Paramilitary Violence”. Prónay's person and actions are mostly treated in connection with the white ( counterrevolutionary ) terror and the complex Lajtabánság . With access to the unabridged version of Prónay's memoirs, Bodó was able to add Prónay's self-portrayal to the pure fact reproduction. This also fits the historian's goal of examining the techniques of Prónay's “impression managements” in order to be perceived by his contemporaries as a person of respect. Fogarassy suspected that Prónay was paranoia querulans, but emphasized that there was no one hundred percent proof. The court dealt with his psyche for the first time in the large trial against Ranzenberger in the spring of 1931. At that time, however, he was apparently not brought before a specialist. Bodó is and Fogarassy was a historian, and in 1931 lawyers and perhaps the military should have dealt with his mental state. The reasoning for the judgment only contains personality traits and no diagnoses, a specialist medical report would have been structured differently.

More detailed examinations by experts on his mental and physical state of health, as they exist for other dictators, especially for Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin (there are detailed medical reports on the mental and physical condition of Hitler and Stalin), but also more detailed personality studies such as for Béla, among others Kun , Miklos Horthy and Ferenc Szálasi of the psychiatrist Prof. Johann Benos do not exist.

The diaries serve as a source for analyzing his personality and his mental disorder (s). In themselves they have only limited value, since they were not used for self-reflection or as material for historians, but for selfish purposes: the implementation of his political rehabilitation and the demeaning of his enemies and former allies. You always have to check and double-check the content. They say more about Prónay's personality than about the topics and content he deals with.

His motives do not emerge from the diary entries, not even which events have deformed his psyche or its inner excitement, which found its outlet in violence. Sometimes, however, disappointed personal ambition and dissatisfaction are suspected. Presumably, the large discrepancy between his moderate talent and / or performance and his high demands on his environment, which emerges from the available sources and which apparently already existed in his youth, play a role, whereby he apparently never makes mistakes with himself, but only with others sought.

personality

Mental illness prónays are likely, such as sadism . He enjoyed the suffering of others and described with pleasure and in great detail the atrocities that his men had committed in his presence. Many leftists saw him as a Hungarian de Sade. Geza Murany called him and Héjjas on the world stage , which was close to the radical democratic bourgeois left, bloodthirsty, sadistic, megalomaniac, their atrocities would overshadow all the horror novels of world literature, all the criminal chronicles of medieval witch trials and he had awakened all the atrocities of the Inquisition . Népszava accused him of bestial instincts. After evaluating the unabridged memoirs, the historian Bodó also sees signs of political paranoia : extreme mistrust and the belief that they are the chosen victim for people with malevolent intentions, combined with a feeling of grandiosity. He concentrates on the negative and hides everything that could reduce his fear, he also tends to be contentious, irritable, lacking in humor, and react extremely sensitively to insignificant things. This defensive stance implies a constant readiness to attack. His environment must always treat him like a raw egg so that he does not feel provoked and get violent. Because of their deep-seated distrust and suspicion of others, a paranoid cannot maintain close relationships. He acts hostile to those he believes to be enemies and in a self-fulfilling prophecy he provokes hostilities that reinforce his thinking and behavior. Obsessed with a fear of loss of authority, he is a "collector of injustices" and is always vigilant about attacks by a higher power and outside individuals to impose his will on him, and therefore shows an exaggerated independence. According to the sources, Prónay fulfilled most of these characteristics. Prónay saw Jews and people of Jewish descent everywhere and that he could recognize them by their views and actions. Fogarassy suspects paranoia querulans . Obviously he was not aware that his repeated accusations were tiresome to his audience and showed how little his importance really was after 1921. Bodó already classified him in his essay "Paramilitary Violence" from 2004 as an insignificant and provincial person.

In 1931 he was accused of megalomania , vanity and a lust for prestige. His behavior is described as emotionally unstable and uncontrolled; he was seen as physical, unbridled, easily excitable, inconsiderate, angry, aggressive, heated, dismissive, bad-tempered and rough, in the more favorable case as energetic, energetic and dynamic. Because of his emotional and psychological instability, the legitimist aristocrats did not want to support Lajtabánság and his dictator. He was increasingly looking for revenge for defeats he had suffered and considered himself a victim, who was wronged by Horthy and his liberal advisors, as a misunderstood genius and the first National Socialist in Europe. From the social democratic side like Héjjas Prónay was seen as a forerunner of Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich .

In the opinion of many critics, Prónay was ruthless, cruel, rude, immature, stubborn , gross and tasteless, always vicious, threatening, outrageous and a toxic personality. Prónay was a rumor maker, but also talented at snapping them up. He was relentlessly gathering potentially damaging information about rivals. He bragged about private details, which was inappropriate for a man seeking respect and social rehabilitation. His lifestyle, which has always been extremely lavish and which he must have financed for the most part at the expense of others, fits in with this. In some cases he himself admitted that he had robbed or extorted money and property.

The lack of interest in theoretical reading and complex contexts described by Bodó suggest that he was not very talented; Entries in the diary show that his learning effort was limited. He refused to keep his military knowledge up to date, one reason for his failure as a guerrilla leader in 1944/45. According to the assessments of his superiors, practical intelligence must have been significantly more pronounced.

A lack of political talent and foresight contributed to his political failure. An example of his unprofessional political behavior was his rocking policy during the second legitimist uprising, which adopted him as a serious actor in Hungary; through his behavior in western Hungary / Burgenland, he destroyed the last chances of Hungarian rule there. He also underestimated the social question of why he was ill-suited as a figurehead for the fascists. Prónay overestimated his position within his organizations. He proposed completely unrealistic steps such as the unauthorized crossing of the demarcation line in southern Hungary and the subsequent smashing of the Soviet republic, which should include a pogrom. Most of the time he only worked as an extremely cruel henchman of other, more talented dictators such as Béla Kun in the spring of 1919 and Miklós Horthy (1919–1944).

He had a poor sense of family. His long education and frequent transfers have apparently alienated him from his family. His unsociable and anti-social nature may also play a role. Like many other officers, he mostly lived in barracks, hotels and rented apartments. As his real family, he may have considered his battalion, which he led from 1919–1921. With his political marginalization he became even more anti-social than before. Even as an older man, he displayed behavior that was only socially acceptable among younger officers, in whose circles he was popular. This behavior was also encouraged by the intensive coverage of the Hungarian press even on insignificant events. Some of the reporters let him invite them to his private apartment, where he could present himself as a loving family man and socially-minded politician who acted out of idealism and only wanted justice.

He owed his power in his battalion to his charisma rather than his military qualifications or position. He was a good networker, which made his ascent possible and slowed his decline. His quarreling and insufficient teamwork, however, at least ruined most of his successes.

ideology

Socially and culturally, Prónay was a conservative. He presented himself as a wise and selfless patriot who always put the nation above his personal interests. His stereotypical ideas corresponded to those of the officer corps, the lower nobility and the middle class of the province. As for a number of other officers, Hungary's defeat in World War I came as a shock and humiliation. On the other hand, he despised traditions, especially in the military field. The October Revolution and the communist dictatorship were for him the work of the Jews and Freemasons, and he blamed them for the failure of the counterrevolution. He saw himself as an expert on Jews and claimed that he would immediately recognize them by their looks, which qualified him more as a statesman than diplomatic or other tangible skills. Compared to the Nazis, however, he was a more traditional anti-Semite.

Despite his right-wing conservative attitude, he was also referred to as a “right-wing Bolschwik” and revolutionary (as an exponent of fascist organizations) or a “White Bolshevik”, and even as the dictator of the Leithabanat, he also had left-wing extremist role models. Even under the socialist government after the First World War, he openly wore a red badge, even if he claimed that he had only done this to deceive the other side. As a servant of the Kun regime he did not offer any resistance, only after its end did he take action against Kun and his top officials, and the communists whom he had murdered during the White Terror apparently had no significant functions under Béla Kun or only became at all murdered on suspicion of being a communist. He was involved in the increasing requisitions and looting for the army. He served the communist regime as long as he could get enough advantages for himself. The reasons for taking action against the Hungarian Federal Socialist Council Republic are likely to have been more personal than ideological. The way in which he left the communist sphere of control suggests that he did not want to break all bridges, but wanted to leave open the possibility of returning to the communist sphere of influence if he should fail with the anti-communists.

His world of thought resembled that of the German Freikorpsführer in that he condemned the liberal pre-war society, glorified the youth and saw violence as a creative power - and raged against democracy and socialism, although Prónay had originally worked for them after the First World War and his move to the right-wing everything Apparently had personal, not ideological, reasons. He did not hesitate to come to terms with the left (Social Democrats, Communists) or even to found left-wing extremist organizations and to be a top function of such organizations (Hungarian National Socialists, at least part of the fascist bloc), if he benefited from it himself. He offered his services to the side that gave him the most benefits. His main motive must have always been his own advantage at the expense of others, whereby he preferred extreme positions in politics (extreme national conservatism, fascism, Bolshevism). As a commander, he repeatedly changed sides during the terrorist terrorism. As of December 1929, as a fascist leader, he approached the left again after around ten years, at least for the following years. He was accused of having (again) switched to the legitimists on the occasion of his marriage to a former lady-in-waiting of ex-empress Zita, which was used against him in numerous court cases in the 1920s and 1930s. Despite his mostly anti-Jewish attitude in public, in December 1929 he also campaigned for their membership in the Front Fighter Association and cultivated personal relationships with individual Jews. The unusually mild punishment on the part of the Soviet Union and the fact that he lived in the gulag for a long time despite his old age and the conditions of imprisonment could indicate that he did not really oppose the Stalinist regime after the end of fascism in Hungary .

marriage

Prónay married on April 11, 1921 (according to Haberman 1920, on the print of his wedding photo kept in the Trianon Museum Várpalota he writes in a dedication that he married on April 12) in Budapest Countess Eleonore Aimeé Countess Pálffy-Daun, a former Lady-in-waiting of ex-empress Zita.

Bodó suspects that their origins from the Counts of the Pálffy family , their connection to the royal family and the legitimists certainly played a role; at least in the short version of his memoirs, he mentions them less often than the luxury objects in his possession , which he regards as objects of love, and mostly in his Connection with power and politics. Another reason for marriage may have been alleged paternal ancestors: Alfonso I (Portugal) , Ferdinand I (León) , Hugo Capet , Charlemagne and William the Conqueror . On the other hand, he must have been fascinated by her personality and never said or written a negative word about her. Bodó admits that Prónay must have truly loved his wife. He describes Prónay as a respectful and submissive husband who describes her in his memoirs as refined, kind-hearted and beautiful. She must also have been far more talented than him. She apparently dressed less elaborately than he did and presented herself as a simple living benefactress. Although she had first-class manners, on the other hand she was moody and bitchy. Media coverage suggests that she must have had a significant impact on her husband.

Conversely, one has to ask why his wife married a failed and extremely cruel man who was well below her level and who was only a baron , who belonged to an old Hungarian aristocratic family, but who did not claim any such famous ancestors. Maybe she wanted to win him over to legitimism. But he was already internationally known (they met at the beginning of 1920, Prónay proposed marriage the following October) not only for his cruelty, but also for his unreliability.

It was a strikingly simple wedding, a clear sign that he was already socially outclassed back then. Only close relatives and a few civilian friends appeared, otherwise only officers from his unit. The lack of leading figures in Hungary, such as Horthys, was also striking. The fact that he did not go on his honeymoon may be due to a lack of money. He only wore a simple uniform and no parade uniform or diszmagyar as is usual with men of his origin, and his wife's wedding dress was also very simple. Since he was litigating financial liabilities just a few months later, it is possible that he was already heavily in debt back then. In addition, the couple had their second home in Bicske.

It was also alleged by a number of his officers that Zita was the maid of honor. In an interview in 1931, however, his wife said that the originally planned wedding date on March 28, 1921 should have been postponed because of Charles IV's stay in Szombathely. In any case, the ex-queen or empress cannot be seen on the wedding photo.

According to a note by SS-Obersturmführer Kienast on October 22, 1943, Archduke Albrecht's biological father is said to have been Prónay as Friedrich's former wing adjutant instead of Friedrich von Österreich-Teschen (progenitor of the Hungarian line from Habsburg-Lorraine ). However, this is extremely unlikely. Although Prónay had actually boasted in his memoirs and named the names of his lovers, Albrecht's mother Isabella von Croÿ , at least not in the publications of the historian Béla Bodó in front.

Rehabilitation procedure

The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rehabilitated Prónay on June 27, 2001 on the basis of Article 3b of the Political Persecution Act of October 18, 1991 - on the grounds that the allegations against him were not correct. It was not known who carried out the rehabilitation; allegedly a relative made an application. Although the 20-year prison sentence was unusually mild and possibly reduced to 15 years a short time later, Prónay has also proven to have committed all crimes which, at least under Russian law at the time, constituted grounds for exclusion from rehabilitation.

reception

research

Although he cannot be classified as a fascist (even if he appeared as their spokesman or was used by fascist parties as a figurehead and also held leading positions), he is important for research on fascism, according to Bodó.

Due to his change from an average adolescent to a cruel dictator, he would also be of interest for research on dictatorship and radicalization, but there are only rudimentary studies, especially by Bodó in his two studies from 2004 and 2011. How and where he radicalized himself has not yet been researched. There are only conjectures about the reason.

Likewise, his career is an example of why such people can get this far and commit such crimes or persist for so long. Probably there have been warning signs of a problematic character since his youth. Even when his cruel leadership in the army was known and his mental state could no longer be overlooked, he was not released, not even honorably for health reasons. His "dismissal" in August 1921 was apparently only a release from work or a transfer to retirement so that he could be sent to western Hungary as a militant and not as a public servant and he was later put back into the active status. Despite his severe and progressive mental illness (s), he was apparently never examined by a psychiatrist and / or neurologist or even admitted to a clinic. His legal capacity was never denied or restricted, although he constantly lived (far) beyond his means and was dangerous for his environment. When he lost importance, he was not hushed up by the press, but pages were reported in Hungary about his literally insignificant trials and reporters were invited by him. In doing so, they not only encouraged him to continue to behave at least as before, but also gave him a broad forum with aftermath to this day.

politics

He is still viewed positively in Hungary and even celebrated as a hero in nationalist Hungarian circles and cultivated a personality cult around him, whereby they can also refer to the rehabilitation by the Russian Federation or to interviews in newspapers published at the time (also in quality newspapers who viewed him critically), in which he was extremely moderate, expressed himself very eloquently, was able to present himself as a socially committed politician and loving family man or was presented as such by his wife and therefore certain Hungarian circles can claim that he is completely different than the majority represents him. Furthermore, he is presented to young people like his young volunteers in World War II, at least on the Internet, as a legendary hero, which he never was.

In 2009, a nationalist society based in Budapest was founded, which bears his name and is close to Jobbik and opposed to so-called liberal Bolshevism (by the way, he is sometimes considered a kind of national Bolshevik and apparently worked for the Bolsheviks in 1919 and from 1946 onwards ). It is called to always remember him. The official Russian information regarding the last years of his life is partially ignored. His involvement in forcing the referendum in Ödenburg through armed resistance is positively highlighted. The wife of party chairman Gábor Vona is the flag mother of the society. Contrary to the company's name, however, it was not vitéz, but baró. Membership in the Vitézi Rend is not known and was not necessary as the family has belonged to the nobility for centuries.

What is striking is the contradiction between the fact that circles with higher education, as they are strongly represented among Jobbik supporters, take a moderately gifted and educationally hostile man like Prónay as their role model. It is understandable that he is revered among the many young people among Jobbik supporters due to the importance that youth has in his worldview.

On October 3, 2010, Jobbik supporters held a memorial ceremony for Lajtabánság in Oberwart , approved by the competent Austrian authority , which led to a request from Green MP Karl Öllinger in the Austrian National Council .

Commemoration and legacy

In Heimito von Doderer's 1956 novel The Demons , Prónay is mentioned briefly (Part II, Chapter 3).

A separate room is dedicated to him and Lajtabánság in the Trianon Museum in Várpalota . His estate is also located there (minutes of his duels, photos, objects, tangible memories, letters). It is also working on the publication of its unabridged memoir, see p. Literature by Pál Prónay.

Prónay's diaries served as the basis for the film Imposztorok (Hungary 1969). The film character who is based on his person, however, is called Pál Doborján.

To Prónays lifetime his diaries have not appeared in print (title: Tótprónai és Blatniczai Prónay Pál alezredes naplójegyzetei az év 1921. szeptember 1-től 1922. év végéig lefolyt fontosabb eseményekre vonatkozólag "The diary entries of Lieutenant-Colonel Pál Prónay de Tótprónai and. Blatnicza as related to the most important events from September 1, 1921 and till the end of 1922 ). However, the Trianon Museum in Várpalota has announced the release "in the near future".

According to Bodó and Fogarassy, ​​his detailed diaries, which he - comparable to memoirs - intended for the public are in the archives of the National Security Service in Budapest and have so far only been accessible to a few scholars. He has already made a selection from his actual diary entries and processed them literarily in the late thirties and early forties. Bodó regards the majority of the entries as original, others may have influenced later political developments. He classifies it as an important political source to be used with caution, knowing the leading figures of the time. Apparently the target group changed during the revision: from people who could have rehabilitated him to young Arrow Cross members .

The original documents from which Prónay made the selection have been lost. The first volume about the youth is also missing. Volumes 2 and 3 consist of typewritten text with handwritten additions and photo illustrations, the second volume extends from the end of October 1918 to August 31, 1921, the third volume continues until the end of 1922. Fogarassy assumes that the final editing of this volume took place in the spring of 1944, since the death of Julius von Ostenburg-Morawek on January 12, 1944 is mentioned in it. Fogarassy also suspects the existence of a fourth volume, which is said to cover the period from 1923 to 1944, and assumes that it is lost in an archive.

Excerpts are generally accessible:

• Pál Prónay: A határban a Halál kaszál. (Translation: “Death mows at the border”.) Foreword and remarks by Agnes Szabó and Ervin Pamlényi, Budapest 1963 (especially on the White Terror). According to Bodó, however, passages that could incriminate the Democrats and Communists have been left out; the majority of the memoirs are intended to discredit the interwar regime. At least in the description of the Kornhauser scandal and the relationship with his wife from the first meeting to marriage, massive text interventions at the instigation of the regime of János Kádár can be assumed.
• Béla Bodó: Pál Prónay: Paramilitary Violence and Anti-Semitism in Hungary, 1919–1921 (= The Carl Beck Papers. No. 2101). Center for Russian & East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh , March 2011, doi : 10.5195 / cbp.2011.167 , p. 1 ff. (English excerpts distributed over the text).
• Lászlo Fogarassy: Paul Prónay's memories of the “Lajta-Banat”. In: Burgenland homeland sheets. 52nd year, Heft 1, Eisenstadt 1990, pp. 1–10 (German summary of the texts on the Leithabanat), PDF on ZOBODAT

literature

• Béla Bodó: Pál Prónay: Paramilitary Violence and Anti-Semitism in Hungary, 1919–1921 (= The Carl Beck Papers. No. 2101). Center for Russian & East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh , March 2011, doi : 10.5195 / cbp.2011.167 .
• Béla Bodó: Hungarian Aristocracy and the White Terror. In: Journal of Contemporary History . Volume 45, No. 4, October 2010, pp. 703 ff.
• Béla Bodó: The White Terror in Hungary, 1919–1921. In: The Austrian History Yearbook. Volume 42, April 2011, p. 133 ff.
• Béla Bodó: Favorites or Pariahs? In: The Austrian History Yearbook. Volume 46, April 2015, p. 327 ff.
• Béla Bodó: Militia Violence and State Power in Hungary, 1919–1922. In: Hungaria Studies Review. Volume 33, No. 1–2, 2006, p. 121 ff.
• Béla Bodó: Paramilitary Violence in Hungary after the First World War. In: East European Quarterly. Volume 38, No. 2, 2004, p. 129 ff. (Outdated in places and revised and corrected by himself in later publications, at that time only excerpts from his memoirs from 1963 were accessible to him).
• Josef Borus: Defenders in West Hungary (1921). In: Scientific work from Burgenland . Issue 95, Eisenstadt 1996, p. 51 ff, PDF on ZOBODAT
• Burgenland Association of Municipalities (Hrsg): Municipality is home. Eisenstadt 2011 (PDF) .
• Lászlo Fogarassy: Paul Prónay's memories of the “Lajta-Banat”. In: Burgenland homeland sheets . 52nd year, issue 1, Eisenstadt 1990, pp. 1–10, PDF on ZOBODAT
• Lászlo Fogarassy: Prónay Pál emlékezései az 1921.évi nyugat-magyarországi eseményekről Első rész. In: EPA Soproni Szemle. Volume 40, 1986, No. 1, pp. 118-138 (PDF) .
• Lászlo Fogarassy: A Prónay - Ranzenberger pör (1930-1932). In: EPA Soproni Szemle. Volume 32, 1978, No. 1, pp. 23-36 (not only for the specified period) (PDF) .
• Gusztáv Haberman: Pál Prónay. In: Személyi adattár a szegedi polgár-családok történetéhez - Tanulmanyok Csongrád megye történetébõl. Volume 19, Szeged 1992, p. 226.
• Gerald Schlag: Burgenland. XX. Century. Eisenstadt 1991, article Paul Pronay , p. 244 f.
• Gerald Schlag: Born out of rubble (= Scientific papers from Burgenland. Volume 106). Eisenstadt 2001, PDF on ZOBODAT
• Krisztián Ungváry : Battle for Budapest. London 2011 (German edition: The Battle of Budapest 1944/45. 2nd edition, Munich 2001; Original title: Budapest Ostroma. Budapest 1998. 3rd edition published, based on his dissertation at the Eötvös-Loránd University of Budapest. For Prónays last months In freedom).

Web links

Wikiquote: Pál Prónay  - Quotes

• Zoltan Barotányi: A többi kegyelem. A prónay ügy. In: Magyar Narancs , March 10, 2005 (Hungarian)
• Prónay Pál katonai pályafutása - frissítve. In: Magyarhonved Blog , September 4, 2012 (Hungarian; private weblog; uncritical, but has additional information, apparently from the environment of the Hungarian army)
• Lt. Colonel Pál Prónay. In: The Mad Monarchist , March 4, 2017 (English; private weblog; does not mention any evidence, factual errors, is critical of Prónay and has additional information from personnel files and perhaps also Russian-Soviet files)
• Prónay Pál. In: Magyar életrajzi lexikon (Hungarian)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ English and Hungarian Wikipedia, but there are different spellings of the family name. The spelling of the name suffix differs, both places can be written with t or th.
2. ↑ Józef Botlik, The Fate of Western Hungary 1918–1921, Buffalo n.d., p. 1 92 Note 216 Original title Nyugat-Magyarország sorsa 1918–1921, Vassilvágy, 2nd edition 2008
3. ↑ The members of the family branch concerned had been barons since the late 18th century. The Prónays have been documented since 1279, some of them have been of importance for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hungary since the 16th century
4. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 4 ff .; ders., White Terror, p. 141; Fogarassy, ​​EPA 1986, XL, 1, p. 24.
5. ↑ According to genealogy websites such as geni, geneall and familysearch, there can be up to nine siblings (pages accessed multiple times). For the family history see also Constantin von Wurzbach : Prónay von Tót-Próna and zu Blathnitza, the barons of, Genealogy . In: Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich . 24th part. Imperial-Royal Court and State Printing Office, Vienna 1872, p. 11 ( digitized version ).
6. ↑ According to B. Bodó, Prónay does not report anything about his childhood in his diaries. There is also no evidence of violence or abuse in childhood and adolescence or that his parents treated him worse than his seven to nine siblings. The later cruel, antisocial behavior of Prónay can therefore probably not be derived from mediated values ​​of the family or, as sociologists and psychologists ( Alice Miller ) have suggested, from early experiences. There was also no close relationship with his mother, whom Volker Elis Pilgrim and Johann Benos used as an explanatory model, as he had mostly lived in boarding schools and barracks since he was 12 . None of the siblings was noticeable by above-average violence. See Bodó, Prónay, pp. 6 and 64, notes on the value system throughout the text, especially pp. 45 ff .; Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2, EPA 1986, XL, 1, p. 24.
7. ^ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memories, p. 2; Bodó, Prónay, p. 6 f .; A soproni Laehne-féle nyilavánossági joggal biró gymnasium értesítője az 1890/91-iki tanevról. Sopron 1891, pp. 56–68 (student list and statistics, curriculum, subjects); Erich Körner-Lakatos, Horthy Miklós, Münster 2015, p. 18 and information on the school p. 19 ff and p. 23 note 33, which must be compared with the information in Bodó, Prónay. Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay p. 244.
8. ↑ Ildikó Németh: The catchment area of ​​a western Hungarian school town at the turn of the century. In: Researcher - Designer - Mediator. Festschrift Gerald Schlag (= scientific work from Burgenland. Volume 105). Eisenstadt 2001, ISBN 3-85405-142-5 , pp. 253–267, here pp. 257 f, PDF on ZOBODAT
   A soproni Laehne-féle nyilvánossági joggal biró gymnasium értesítője az 1890/91-iki tanévről. Sopron 1891, p. 52 ff. On the family archive : Pronay at Radixforum.com, accessed on February 2, 2017.
9. ↑ Military Schematism 1912, Vienna 1911, p. 730 and Military Schematism, 1913, Vienna 1912, p. 772
10. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 6 ff .; Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2; Magyarhonved blog.
11. ^ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, pp. 2 and 9; EPA 1986, XL, 1, p. 24; Magyar Èletrajzi Lexicon MEK (web links). There are different statements in the literature in which institution Prónay served, which may be due to their spatial proximity and confusion.
12. ^ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memories, p. 2; Bodó, Prónay, p. 7 f .; Vadász- és Versenylap 36. évfolyam, 1. Szám, January 1, 1892, p. 19; Newspaper editions of December 27, 1894: Prager Tagblatt, p. 3, Grazer Tagblatt, p. 5; Erich Körner-Lakatos, Ada Kaleh, Tannu-Tuwa, Acre, Münster 2010, p. 168, note 278. Brother Gyula in the 22nd Hussar Regiment: Vadász és Versenylap, 29 évfolyam, 20.szám, 14 May 1885, p 208; Military Schematism 1896 (as of December 12, 1895), p. 600 and 653, Benos, 20 European dictators: Ioannis Metaxas
13. ↑ Fogarassy 1986 and 1990 claims that Prónay managed his parents' estate from 1896 to 1900, while Schlag was a family estate in 1991 for the same period.
14. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 8 or 6 (listing of some of his siblings).
15. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 8; Prónay István. In: Nógrád Megyei Múzeumok Évkönyve. Volume 22, 1998, p. 25 (short biography of the father).
16. ↑ Schematism for the imperial and royal lords and for the imperial and royal navy, place of publication in Vienna: 1900 edition (as of December 6, 1899), p. 725, 1901 edition (as of December 2, 1900), p. 733.
17. ^ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memories, p. 2; Bodó, Prónay, p. 8; Haberman, Prónay, p. 226, with slightly different information in each case, see also Military Schematism 1908 (as of November 28, 1907), p. 700, Military Schematism 1900, p. 667. So there Schlag, Burgenland 1991, Article Paul Pronay, p 244, deviating from the fact that Prónay had entered an artillery regiment in 1900 and later in the hussar regiment 13. Apparently he only came from reserve to active status in 1902. See Fogarassy, ​​EPA 1986, XL, 1, p. 24.
18. ↑ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2 and EPA 1986, XL, 1, p. 24; Bodó, Prónay, 8 f., P. 1; ders., Paramilitary, 2004, p. 150; Jászkun memorial, pp. 149, 217, 243, 308 (Prónay as százados or Kapitány / captain); Magyarhonved blog; Prónay Pál (1874-1944 / 1945). In: MEK.oszk.hu , accessed December 7, 2016; Schlag, Burgenland, article Paul Pronay, p. 244; Appointment to captain: Newspapers of November 7th: foreign paper, p. 14; Neues Wiener Journal, p. 14; Deutsches Volksblatt, p. 8 and Grazer Volksblatt, p. 12; Military Merit Cross 3rd class: Grazer Volksblatt of March 14, 1915, p. 8. Newspapers of March 15, 1915: Neues Prager Tagblatt, p. 4 and Reichspost, p. 6; The highest commendable recognition: Fremdblatt dated August 15, 1915, p. 8; Another commendable recognition: Reichspost of October 3, 1916, p. 15; Haberman, Prónay, p. 226; Mad Monarchist Blog, Prónay.
19. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 9; ders., White Terror, p. 159; ders., Paramilitary, 2004, p. 150; Magyarhonved blog; Jászkun, memorial, especially p. 307 (Százados or Kapitány / Hauptmann); Wiener Mondags-Journal of July 29, 1912, p. 6; (Linzer) Tages-Post of July 27, 1912, p. 3; Mad Monarchist Blog, Prónay.
20. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 10 ff .; Fogarassy, ​​EPA, 1986, XL, 1, p. 24; Schlag, Burgenland, article Paul Pronay p. 244; Mad Monarchist Blog, Prónay.
21. ↑ Burgenland Association of Municipalities, p. 8; Bodó, White Terror, p. 140
22. ↑ see English Wikipedia en: White Terror (Hungary)
23. ↑ Bodó, Prónay pp. 14-16; ders., Hungarian Aristocracy, p. 711; ders., White Terror, pp. 139-162; other Favorites, S 334 and 343; ders., Militia Violence, p. 124; ders., Paramilitary 2004, 134ff, 145ff, 152ff, 167, detailed description of his battalion: Paramilitary 2004, pp. 139–167; Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2; Ungváry, Schlacht, p. 128; engl. P. 78; Körner-Lakatos, p. 81, note 178; Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Memoirs, annotated by Andrew L. Simon, 2000, p. 153, Bánffy, The Phoenix Land, p. 270f; English Wikipedia
24. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 16-20; ders., Favorites, p. 356, note 123; ders., Paramilitary 2004, pp. 134, 139, 158f; Schlag, Burgenland, article Paul Pronay p. 244; Prónay's creed: in the indexes of files listed on Hungaricana, the Protestant creed is listed, which means the Augsburg creed. According to Bodó, Prónay, p. 5, the family had several high-ranking members. Some of his siblings were Catholic: https://familysearch.org/search/record/results?count=20&query=%2Bgivenname%3Astephanus~%20%2Bsurname%3Apronay~%20%2Bbirth_place%3Aromh%C3%A1ny~% 20% 2Bbirth_year% 3A1821-1877 ~ Retrieved February 23, 2017
25. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 20-25 and p. 52., ders., White Terror, pp. 139 and 150-162, ders. Paramilitary 2004, pp. 134f, 145ff, 152ff, 159; Magyarhonved blog; http://mek.oszk.hu/01900/01906/html/index44.html accessed December 7, 2016; Arbeiterwille, February 19, 1924, p. 5; Vorarlberger Wacht, November 14, 1920, page 2; ID featured in this article; Robert Gerwarth / John Home, War in Peace, Oxford 2012, p. 63 after Prónay, A határban; English Wikipedia (see discussion) According to Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónay's memoirs, p. 2, he became a company commander in Szeged, but through terrorist acts he had the displeasure of the White Government there. Paul Lendvai, The Hungarians, 2nd edition. Bergisch Gladbach pp. 428 and 434; http://frontoldal.hu/ki-volt-pronay-pal/ , accessed on December 29, 2016; Schlag, Burgenland, article Paul Prónay, p 244; ders .; Aus Trümmern, p. 352ff; The fact that he was lieutenant colonel on his wedding day can be seen from the uniform of the wedding photo, which shows two large stars on the collar. He has three little stars on the ID card for the Jäger Battalion (captain). Both pictures are shown in Bodó, Prónay, p. 42. Regarding his crimes in the Balaton region: http://mek.oszk.hu/11000/11020/11020.pdf , accessed on April 3, 2017, but should not be up to date, the time and place of death is 1944 / 45 and Kutvölgy / Budapest, but contains images of Prónay of above-average quality.
26. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 25-28; ders. Favorites, p. 346; ders. Paramilitary Violence 2004, pp. 137, 163ff and 170 note 22; Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2; Lendvai, Hungary, p. 435; Vorarlberger Wacht, November 14, 1920, p. 2
27. ↑ Burgenland Association of Municipalities, p. 8; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy, p. 87.
28. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 29f .; ders., Favorites, p. 349; Militia Violence, p. 147; ders., Paramilitary 2004, pp. 135ff; Prónay, A határban, pp. 250f; Official Hungarian Ordinance Gazette from August 28, 1921 quoted according to Borus, Freischärler, p. 60f. Note 26; with regard to his uncontrolled behavior, including in court, see Bodó, Prónay and ders. Favorites each passim, ders. Paramilitary Violence 2004, p. 135; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy, p. 139, note 314; ders., Ada Kaleh, Tannu-Tuwa, Acre, Münster 2010, p. 168, note 278http: //infovilag.hu/hir-23190-kastelyszallok_kastelyprogramok_epitett_.html, accessed on December 5, 2016; http://mek.oszk.hu/01900/01906/html/index44.html , accessed December 7, 2016; Õrség - Die Wart 57 (December 2015), p. 30; Ordinary criminal and several prison terms: Bela Bodó, Paramilitary 2004, p. 166; Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay 245; Supplement to “Workers Will”, No. 242 of September 5, 1921, page 1f; Arbeiter Zeitung of September 6, 1921, p. 3; December 7, 1923, p. 2 and January 30, 1924, page 2; Fogarassy; Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 23; Salzburger Volksblatt, September 1, 1921, p. 2; (Linzer) Tages-Post, September 1, 1921, p. 1f. http://www.europeana.eu/portal/de/record/2023859/_http___keptar_oszk_hu_025600_025618__.html?q=Rakovszky+Istv%C3%A1n accessed on July 13, 2017; The name of the barracks is different: Nándor or Nádor barracks. Since the barracks are said to be located near Budapest Castle, it must be the Nándor barracks, which now houses the Budapest Museum of Military History, in which he also had a room for himself.
29. ^ Geza Muräny, West-Ungarn, XVII. Volume, September 22, 1921, No. 38, p. 279, https://archive.org/stream/DieWeltbhneVolltextJuliDezember1921/Die%20Weltb%C3%BChne_Volltext_Juli-Dezember_1921_djvu.txt , accessed on January 19, 2017
30. ^ Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónays Memoirs, p. 2
31. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 31ff; ders. Favorites, p. 343; ders., White Terror, p. 141; ders. Paramilitary 2004, pp. 136f and 166; Ungváry, Schlacht, p. 128; ders., Hungarian Aristocracy, pp. 716f; Fogarassy, ​​Prónays Memories pp. 2ff; ders., The memoirs of Freikorpsommandanten Viktor von Maderspach, in: Burgenländische Heimatblätter 41, Eisenstadt 1979, p. 25; ders., Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 26; Borus, Freischärler, pp. 52 and 60ff; Bodó, Iván Héjjas, East Central Europe 37 (2010), p. 265; Wolfgang Wildberger, 90 years old Burgenland, in: unterm åpflbam. kukmirner gemeindenachrichten, 30th edition, 1/2011, p. 20f; Josef Rittsteuer, The establishment of the Apostolic Administration Burgenland, in: Burgenländische Heimatblätter 23, Eisenstadt 1961, p. 134, note 17; Andreas Moritsch (ed.), From Ethos to Nationality, Munich 1999, p. 111; Gerhard Bitz, Peter Dusek, Martina Lajczak (eds), “victim” / “perpetrator” family stories. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Historical Social Science Working Papers No. 20, Vienna 2014, p. 53; Andreas Pöschek, The first attempt at restoration by King Charles IV of Hungary, Volume 1, Vienna 2005, p. 7, note 20; Margit Szöllösi-Janze, The Arrow Cross Movement in Hungary, Munich 1989, p. 84, also Diss. Munich 1985/86; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy, pp. 139ff; Schlag, Born out of rubble, pp. 426, 434, 395ff; Leonhard Prickler, The emergence of the Burgenland coat of arms, in: Wissenschaftliche Arbeit aus dem Burgenland 105 (2001), p. 331, both available at zobodat.at; Õrség - Die Wart 57 (December 2015), p. 30f; http://www.atlas-burgenland.at/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200 , accessed on January 19, 2017, with the personality cult it is not clear whether Prónay and Héjjas or another commander was meant, one relates on Borus, Freischärler, p. 63; Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay, p. 244f; ders., Aus Trümmern, p. 430ff; Miklós Bánffy, The Phoenix Land, Arcadia 2003, pp. 254 and 277; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1931-majus/bulvar/pronaynenal , accessed March 7, 2017; Lajtabánság Hivatalos Lapja No. 1 of October 30, 1921 (Official Gazette); Approval of the stamp series: Prónay, A határban, pictorial part.
32. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 68, ders. White Terror, p. 141, ders., Paramilitary 2004, pp. 136f and 166; http://nemzetidal.gportal.hu/gindex.php?pg=3730952&nid=6107101 , accessed February 15, 2017
33. ↑ Ludwig Jedlicka, The military land acquisition of Burgenland in: Burgenländische Heimatblätter 23 (1961), p. 123
34. ↑ Borus, Freischärler p. 62; Burgenland freedom June 8, 1946, p. 2; Bánffy, Phoenix Land, pp. 270f; Article Pál Prónay in the Hungarian Wikipedia
35. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 35 f.
36. ↑ Bodó. Prónay, p. 41, the other, Paramilitary 2004, p. 134 and 167.
37. ↑ Bodó. Prónay, pp. 36f and 67ff; ders. White Terror p. 141; the other, Favorites; Pp. 334, 343, 347 and 352; ders., Militia Violence, pp. 135 and 141, ders. Paramilitary 2004, pp. 137, 160ff; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy, p. 87; ders., Ada Kaleh, Tannu-Tuwa, Acre, Münster 2010, p. 168, note 278
38. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 37; ders. Favorites, p. 347; Fogarassy, ​​p. 10; Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay, p. 245
39. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 38; Another Favorites, p. 343
40. ↑ Tagblatt, February 28, 1923, p. 2; Rote Fahne, March 2, 1923, p. 3; Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung, March 2, 1923, p. 3; Reichspost, March 2, 1923, p. 5; (Linzer) Tages-Post, March 3, 1923, p. 3
41. ^ Bregenzer / Vorarlberger Tagblatt, June 19, 1923, p. 2; Arbeiter Zeitung, June 19, 1923, p. 3; Salzburger Volksblatt, June 19, 1923, p. 7; Neues Wiener Tagblatt (daily edition), June 19, 1923, p. 1; Pilsener Tagblatt, June 20, 1923, p. 2
42. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 38 and 50; Prager Tagblatt, July 22, 1923, p. 2; Neues Wiener Tagblatt, July 23, 1923, p. 3; Neues Wiener Journal, July 25, 1923, p. 4; Wiener Zeitung, July 25, 1923, p. 6; Illustrated Kronen-Zeitung, July 25, 1923; P. 7; Salzburger Wacht, July 25, 1923, p. 4; (Linzer) Tages-Post, July 26, 1923, p. 2.
43. ↑ Bodó, Favorites, p. 347
44. ↑ Detailed information under Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger`; Bodó, Prónay; ANNO (newspaper article); Hungaricana (also sources of court files from the years 1923–1925): [1]
45. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 38f; Neues Wiener Journal, September 16, 1924, p. 11; Salzburger Wacht, September 19, 1924, p. 3; Reichspost, September 19, 1924, p. 5; Wiener Zeitung, September 19, 1924, p. 3; Neues Wiener Tagblatt (daily edition), September 19, 1924, p. 1; Neues Wiener Journal, September 20, 1924, p. 9f; Salzburger Volksblatt, September 20, 1924, p. 3; Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung, January 13, 1925, p. 5; Trial in March 1925: Neues Wiener Journal, March 25, 1925, p. 3; Salzburger Wacht, March 25, 1925, p. 4; (Linzer) Tages-Post, p. 2; Trials in April 1925: Salzburger Wacht, April 8, 1925, p. 2; Arbeiter Zeitung, April 8, 1925, p. 7; Salzburger Volksblatt, April 8, 1925, p. 8; Neues Wiener Journal, April 8, 1925, p. 2; (Linzer) Tages-Post April 9, 1925, p. 3; Prager Tagblatt, April 16, 1925, p. 2; Neues Wiener Journal, April 16, 1925, p. 4; Tagblatt, April 17, 1925, p. 2; (Linzer) Tages-Post, April 17, 1925, p. 3; Danzer Army Zeitung, April 24, 1925, p. 1; Salzburger Chronik, July 13, 1925, p. 6; Incident of June 1925: Reichspost, June 9, 1925 and Arbeiter Zeitung, June 10, 1925, each page 3; Salzburger Wacht, June 10, 1925, p. 2; Budapest Fővaros Leváltáral, Criminal procedures HU BFL-VII.18.d-05 / 0194-1925, accessed from hungaricana.hu on January 8, 2018; Arbeiterwille, June 11, 1926, p. 7; Das Kleine Blatt, March 5, 1927, pp. 5; Arbeiter Zeitung, March 5, 1927, p. 1; Tagblatt, March 11, 1927, page 6; Salzburger Volksblatt, March 25, 1927, p. 10; Népszava, April 1, 1927, p. 5; Az Est, April 1, 1927, pp. 1f; Arbeiterwille, April 2, 1927, p. 6; Tagblatt, April 2, 1927, p. 4; Incident from January 1928: Bodó, Prónay, S, 39, note 82: Diary p. 337; Reichspost, January 16, 1928, page 3; Salzburg Chronicle, January 16, 1928, page 7; Salzburger Volksblatt, January 16, 1928, p. 9; Arbeiter Zeitung, January 16, 1928, page 3 and January 17, 1928, page 1; Az Est, January 17, 1928, p. 3; Magyarország, January 17, 1928, p. 5; Tagblatt, January 17, 1928, p. 8; (Linzer) Tages-Post, January 17, 1928, p. 11; Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung, January 17, 1928, p. 9; Nyírvidék (49th évfolyam), January 17, 1928, 13th szám, p. 1; Prager Tagblatt, January 17, 1928, p. 4; Ungvari, Battle German edition, p. 128; Tagblatt, January 25, 1928, p. 4; Tagblatt, November 20, 1928, p. 9; Magyar Országos Tudósíto, 1929 marcius / 1, March 8, 1929, not paginated, URL https://library.hungaricana.hu/en/view/MOT_1929_03_1/?pg=158&layout=s&query=pr%C3%B3nay%20p%C3 % A1l a In some of the cited reports the name Ranzenberger is misspelled: Ratzenberger; ; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1929-december/politika/pronay-pal-bejelenti , accessed on December 2, 2016; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1930-marcius/politika/horthy-istvan-es-pronay-pal-frontharcos-szovetseg-nek-alakulo-gyuleset-a-belugyminiszter-is-betiltotta , accessed on April 3, 2017 ; http://darabanth.blog.hu/2014/06/11/orszagos_frontharcos_szovetseg_jelvenye ; AZ September 25, 1924, p. 2; Tagblatt, June 24, 1924, p. 6; Neues Wiener Journal, June 22, 1924, p. 2; Arbeiter Zeitung of July 28, 1925 and Tagblatt of July 29, 1925, each page 2; Arbeiter Zeitung of April 4, 1929, page 2; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1928-november/bulvar/pronay , accessed March 1, 2017; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay - Ranzenberger; P. 25; Regarding the administration of Chief Count Mihály Prónay: - ( Memento of the original of September 13, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , not paginated (pdf page 14), accessed on March 23, 2017 
46. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 67, ders. Paramilitary Violence 2004, p. 136
47. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 39
48. ↑ Bodó, Favorites, p. 343f, ders., Paramilitary 2004, p. 136; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy p. 142; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1931-majus/bulvar/pronaynenal , accessed on December 2, 2016. The commitment to disabled people can be related to the Front Fighters Association founded in 1929. Tagblatt, September 27, 1930, p. 10; Arbeiter Zeitung April 29, 1931, p. 5, Zalamegyei Ujság, 14. évfolyam, 97. szám, April 30, 1931, p. 3, April 30, 1931, p. 2, May 6, 1931, p. 3 and 8 May p. 8; Neues Wiener Abendblatt 118 of April 29, 1931, p. 2; Neues Wiener Tagblatt, April 29, 1931 / daily edition, p. 3, daily edition of April 30, 1931, page 3, daily edition of May 3, 1931, p. 5, daily edition of May 6, p. 3, May 1, 1931 , P. 3; (Linzer) Tagblatt, May 7, 1931, p. 11; (Linzer) Tages-Post, April 29, 1931, p. 11, April 30, 1931, p. 7; Wiener Zeitung, May 6, 1931, p. 6; Reichspost, April 29 and 30, 1931, each p. 6; Salzburger Wacht, No. 110, May 14, 1930, p. 2 and May 6, 1931, p. 2; Freedom !, April 29, 1931, p. 2; Prager Tagblatt, April 30, 1931, p. 3; Salzburger Volksblatt, May 6 and 7, 1931, p. 9 and p. 3; Illustrierte Kronen Zeitung of May 6, 1931, p. 13; Rote Fahne June 28, 1931, page 2, Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 34ff
49. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 39; ders. Favorites, p. 344; ders., Paramilitary 2004, p. 136; Mad monarchist, Prónay
50. ↑ Bodó, Paramilitary 2004, p. 136; In other sources, however, he is still referred to as alezredes, but in 1921 he was deprived of his right to use the rank, and the subsequent leadership earned him the conviction for presumption of office. As early as 1931 the discussion had arisen as to whether he was allowed to use the title. In the purchase agreement for his house, he is referred to as a retired lieutenant colonel.
51. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 39; For the sales contract, see note 47 to this article.
52. ↑ Bodó, Prónay pp. 22, 44 - 70, quarreled with many of his companions: passim; Militia Violence, p. 127ff, the same, Paramilitary 2004, p. 133ff; Reference to the purchase agreement with key data: https://archives.hungaricana.hu/en/lear/Kozjegyzoi/14141/?list=eyJmaWx0ZXJzIjogeyJEQVRBQkFTRSI6IFsiS09aSkVHWVpPSSJdfSwgInF1ZXJ5IjogIlwicHJcdTAwZjNuYXkgcFx1MDBlMWxcIiJ9 ; Hungarian and German Wikipedia on Gyula Gömbös ; Salzburger Volksblatt, December 16, 1935, p. 2; Mad Monarchist, Prónay; Relocation within Szentkirály: https://axioart.com/tetel/1944-level-pronay-pal-lajtai-ban-rongyos-gardistanak-cimez , letter posted in mid-July 1944, accessed on June 6, 2017, but read here the address is more like No. 15/4, by the way, here it is called alezredes. Reading 25 / a: Fogarassy, ​​emlékezésen az 1921.évi, p. 23
53. ↑ http://hibpaintings.axioart.com/tetel/pronay-pal-1874-1946-katonatiszt-altal-sajatkezoleg-alairt_564395 accessed on 2016-12-15
54. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 39f; ders., Favorites, p. 344; Fogarassy, ​​emlékezésen az 1921.évi, p. 23; https://axioart.com/tetel/1944-level-pronay-pal-lajtai-ban-rongyos-gardistanak-cimez , letter posted in mid-July 1944, accessed on June 6, 2017, but here the address can also be used as 15 / 4 can be read.
55. ↑ Bodó, Favorites, p. 344, ders. Paramilitary 2004, p. 136
56. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 40f .; ders. Favorites, pp. 336, 341 ff, 358; ders., Paramilitary 2004, p. 136; English Wikipedia, Ungváry, Battle, pp. 68, 78ff, 329, 333 note 28, German edition pp. 90, 128ff and 371ff, approx. p. 89; Tivadar Soros, Masquerade, 2011 (e-book 2013), p. 155, German edition 295; Vilmos Bondor, A Mikó-rejtély, Budapest 1995, p. 38f; Körner-Lakatos, Horthy p. 142. Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay, p. 245; Mad Monarchist, Prónay; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay Pál emlékezetései az 1921.évi, p. 23. Unlike the other two battalions, the location of his unit was not shown in the plans of Ungváry. Bodó, Iván Héjjas. The life of a counterrevolutionary, in: East Central Europe, 37 (2010), p. 271: Budapest City.org_Budapest ostroma, 1945, accessed on January 31, 2018
57. ↑ Ungváry, Schlacht, p. 130; Bodó, Prónay, p. 41; ders. Favorites p. 344; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay Pál emlékezetései az 1921.évi, p. 23
58. ↑ Ungváry, Battle, p. 80, German edition p. 130, Bodó, Prónay, p. 41; Favorites p. 344; Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay, p. 245; Haberman, Prónay, p. 226
59. ↑ Béla Bodó, Prónay, p. 41; ders., Favorites, pp. 344f; Józef Botlik, The Fate of Western Hungary 1918–1921, Buffalo n.d., p. 92 Note 216 Original title Nyugat-Magyarország sorsa 1918–1921, Vassilvágy, 2nd edition 2008; Ungváry, p. 80; Barotányi, A többi; http://frontoldal.hu/ki-volt-pronay-pal/ , accessed on December 29, 2016; Mad monarchist, Prónay
60. ^ Népszava, April 10, 1945, p. 4, June 13, 1946, p. 5; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1945-aprilis/bulvar/letartoztattak-pronay-pal-alezredest-a-szalasi-partizanok-vezeret , last accessed on November 9, 2016; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 36; Honvédségi Közlöny, 18. szám, October 1, 1945, p. 170; Világ, June 21, 1945, p. 3
61. ↑ http://www.haboruskeresoszolgalat.hu/?id=7&t=39&page=52m , accessed on December 13, 2016.
62. ↑ http://users.atw.hu/fenyut-mnke/mnke502_elemei/rongyosgarda.htm , accessed on February 15, 2017. The entry about him is unlikely to be reliable, because he is referred to as "ezredes" / Oberst, was he has never been. However, he is referred to as such in documents etc. that can be accessed via hungaricana, as well as in old Budapest address books under his long-standing address. The job titles in contemporary documents are not at all precise, sometimes he is also referred to as a private person or a. D. designated. However, he himself signed as alezredes at the beginning of 1944 and an envelope from June 1944 has been received on which he is referred to as alezredes. A promotion to colonel is therefore unlikely. The main reason why rumors about his death are emerging is that the Russian Federation , like the Soviet Union and perhaps Hungarian official bodies, withhold most of the information. The rumor also surfaced on nationalistic Hungarian websites that he was lying in a nameless mass grave, which has not been verified as there are not a few individual graves in the Gulag .
63. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 44-69; Barotany; http://frontoldal.hu/ki-volt-pronay-pal/ , accessed on December 29, 2016
64. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 67 f.
65. ^ Schlag, Burgenland, Paul Pronay, p. 245; Bodó, Prónay, pp. 3 ff., 38 f. and 44-69; ders., Favorites, pp. 334 and 341 ff .; ders., Paramilitary 2004, pp. 133 ff., 146 ff., 151 ff., 163 ff. and 170 note 30; ders., Hungarian Aristocracy, p. 716 f .; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 36; Ungváry, Battle p. 78 f., German edition p. 128, Hungarian p. 89; Körner-Lakatos, p. 142; frontoldal.hu , accessed December 29, 2016; Geza Muräny, West Hungary, in: Die Weltbühne, XVII. Volume, September 22, 1921, No. 38, page 279; Arbeiter Zeitung, April 4, 1929, p. 2; Barotany; Die Weltbühne 1921 , accessed on January 19, 2017; Népszava, April 10, 1945, p. 4.
66. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 49, 53 ff., 66, 69; ders., Paramilitary 2004, pp. 151, 161 and 167; Robert Gerwarth / John Home, War in Peace, Oxford 2012, p. 63.
67. ↑ Bodó, Paramilitary 2004, p. 133 f., Rejection of Traditions: passim.
68. ↑ Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 26; Mad monarchist, Prónay.
69. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, pp. 28, 40 and 54, ders. Paramilitary, p. 150; Fogarassy, ​​Prónay-Ranzenberger, pp. 26f; http://www.huszadikszazad.hu/1931-majus/bulvar/pronaynenal , accessed March 7, 2017; Hungarian Wikipedia: Bp. IV. ker. állami házassági akv. 101/1921. folyószám; Haberman, Prónay, p. 226; The wedding picture can be accessed several times on the internet in different quality. To the alleged descent of his wife: geneall. net: Wilhelm Leopold Bonifacius Maria, Count Pálffy-Daun ab Erdöd, Prince of Teano, accessed on November 2, 2017.
70. ↑ Federal Archives Koblenz, Pers. Staff Reichsführer SS, No. 2067.
71. ↑ Bodo, Prónay p. 8, 52 ff .; ders., Paramilitary, 2004, p. 150.
72. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 41; Magyarhonved blog, Hungarian Wikipedia Pál Prónay. According to Barotány, this was announced by the Moscow prosecutor's office. Russian jurisprudence: Leonid P. Kopalin, on the rehabilitation of German citizens who were repressed by Soviet organs for political reasons, in: Klaus-Peter Graffius / Horst Hennig (eds), Between Bautzen and Vorkuta, Leipzig 2004, p. 184 ff. ( uncritical towards Vladimir Putin, but offers an overview of the case law and the procedure); no application required for counterrevolutionary, so-called “political” crimes: p. 185.
73. ↑ Bodó. Prónay, p. 41
74. ↑ Nationalist websites: all accessed on October 6, 2016: https://kuruc.info/r/9/89516/ . Hungarian and English, accessed October 6, 2016: https://onsizzle.com/i/p%C3%A1l-pr%C3%B3nay-the-hungarian-hero-who-defended-a-portion-of-western -hungary-1177419 . There are certainly other websites of this type; http://www.atlas-burgenland.at/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200 , accessed on January 19, 2017. http://pronayhu.wixsite.com/pronay , accessed on May 31, 2017
75. ^ Zeit Online , accessed May 31, 2017; The standard , accessed May 31, 2017.
76. ↑ Parlament.gv.at , accessed on May 31, 2017.
77. ↑ Heimito von Doderer: The Demons (= dtv 10476). Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, Munich 1985, p. 547.
78. ^ Entry on the museum in the Hungarian Wikipedia, accessed on February 7, 2017
79. ↑ Video on YouTube .
80. ↑ Entry at IMDb.com .
81. ↑ Bodó, Favorites, p. 334; Announcement of the publication of the unabridged memoir , accessed on May 22, 2017 (Hungarian).
82. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 44, ders. Paramilitary, p. 133 or Fogarassy, ​​Paul Prónay's memories, p. 1; another. Prónay-Ranzenberger, p. 25.
83. ↑ Bodó, Prónay, p. 77, note 94.
84. ↑ Bodó, Paramilitary Violence, 2004, p. 133.