New Wendlingen – Ulm line

New Wendlingen – Ulm line
Overview of the planned high-speed route
Route number (DB) :	4813
Route length:	59.575 km
Gauge :	1435 mm ( standard gauge )
Power system :	15 kV 16.7 Hz  ~
Maximum slope :	in Ulm Hbf: 35 ‰ free route: 31 ‰ (exceptional value), otherwise 25  ‰
Minimum radius :	2305 m
Top speed:	250 km / h
Dual track :	continuous
Legend New line from Stuttgart 25,200 Neckar Bridge Wendlingen (136 m) 25.500 Route from Plochingen (57 m) Wendlingen (Neckar) 25.540 Teckbahn to Oberlenningen 25.500 Route to Tübingen (57 m) Tunnel (375 m) 25.6 Neckartal junction Wendlinger curve 26,077 West portal Albvorlandtunnel (8176 m) GZA tunnel (203 m) 26,433 Abzw Rübholz freight train connection Wendlingen 34.253 East portal Albvorlandtunnel (8176 m) 35.013 Nabern (Üst) 36.260 34.252 Kilometer jump (excess length) Teckbahn Lindach railway overpass 37.200 Tunnel rest area in front of the Aichelberg (253 m) 39.270 Boßler tunnel (8806 m) 48.000 Filstal Bridge (~ 485 m) 48,553 Steinbühl tunnel (4847 m) 53.800 Tunnel under the BAB 8 (378 m) 54.500 Merklingen ram stable 55.100 Widderstall tunnel (963 m) 57.747 Merklingen Bf 58.900 Merklingen Tunnel (394 m) 64,340 64,326 Kilometer jump (excess length) 66.500 Imberg tunnel (499 m) 75.825 Dornstadt portal (Albabstieg tunnel) Alb descent tunnel (5943 m) 81.760 Connecting line Filstalbahn – Ulm Rbf 81.768 Portal Ulm (Albabstieg tunnel) Filstalbahn from Stuttgart Brenzbahn from Aalen from Sigmaringen 82,406 Ulm central station Southern Railway to Friedrichshafen Route to Augsburg

The new Wendlingen – Ulm line is a new railway line (NBS) under construction between Wendlingen near Stuttgart and Ulm for long-distance, regional and freight transport. The high-speed line is intended to cross the Swabian Alb at speeds of up to 250 km / h. Along with Stuttgart 21, it is part of the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project . Together with the new Stuttgart – Wendlingen line , the planned route measures around 84.8 kilometers. 50.7 percent (30.218 kilometers) of the 59.575 kilometer route is in tunnels.

As part of the new and upgraded Stuttgart – Augsburg line, the line is included in the urgent needs of the 2003 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. It is also part of the "Priority Axis No. 17" of the Trans-European Networks ( Paris - Budapest / Bratislava , so-called " Magistrale for Europe ") and its Rhine-Danube corridor . The line is to take over the high-speed long - distance passenger traffic from the Filstalbahn Stuttgart – Ulm, which opened in 1850 . The Filstalbahn allows up to 160 km / h in sections, but due to the numerous tight curves in the area of ​​the Albaufstieges ( curve radius of less than 300 meters), only speeds of 70 km / h are possible in the Geislinger Steige area .

Preparatory construction work for the new line began in autumn 2010. The symbolic groundbreaking ceremony was celebrated on May 7, 2012; the shell of the line should be completed by 2018. Completion is now expected in December 2022 , a few years before Stuttgart 21. In January 2018, the DB Supervisory Board set an increase in the total value to 3.7 billion euros. Before that, the total cost was officially estimated at 3.3 billion euros.

overview

The stretch currently under construction connects to the Stuttgart 21 project in an easterly direction and begins at the western abutment of the planned Wendlingen bridge over the Neckar . Much of it runs parallel to the A 8 motorway . Trains between Stuttgart and the Plochingen – Tübingen line will use the Wendlinger curve to reach the new line near Wendlingen . Before merging into Ulm Central Station , the line crosses under the Stuttgart – Ulm track. In the east, the new line connects to the Neu-Ulm train station ( Neu-Ulm 21 ), which opened on March 18, 2007 .

The route under construction rises from Stuttgart (around 240  m above sea  level ) in the direction of Hohenstadt to 746  m above sea level. NN and falls in the direction of Ulm again to 478  m above sea level. Above sea level.

A total of 30 of the 61-kilometer route run in five tunnels. It also includes five undercuts less than 500 meters in length. Above ground, the route mostly runs parallel to the A 8. Of the 61 kilometers, only around 11 kilometers are in the same terrain. The standard cross-section of the double-track line is 13.30 meters; in areas that are bundled with the motorway, a shoulder distance of 19.75 meters is provided between the motorway and the new line. A total of 20 bridges and 17 railway overpasses are to be built. Ulm Central Station is to be converted for the new line.

course

The critical uphill section begins in route km 37 with a gradient of 30.99 ‰ over 1.47 kilometers and continues with gradients between 17.5 and 25 ‰ until reaching the Alb plateau (km 53).

In the area of ​​the Wendlinger bend , the section under construction enters the Albvorland tunnel (8.2 kilometers). In the tube it crosses under the motorway twice and comes to the surface southwest of Kirchheim . To the south, it runs largely parallel to the motorway in a south-east-east direction. After passing under the motorway service station in front of the Aichelberg , the motorway is turned away to get to the Aichelberg junction. In the Ziegelrain forest area , the planned route disappears in the Boßler tunnel . In the approximately 8.7 kilometer long tube, the adjoining Filstalbrücke (approx. 485 meters) and the following Steinbühl tunnel (4.8 kilometers), the route climbs the Swabian Alb up to a height of 746  m with inclines of about 24 to 31 ‰ ü. NN in the Steinbühl tunnel near Hohenstadt. To the north of Laichingen it comes to the surface again and follows, largely flat, the A 8 in a south-easterly direction. Between Dornstadt and Lehr , the line leaves the parallel position and runs in the Albabstieg tunnel (5.9 kilometers) in a south-eastern 90-degree curve and reaches the Ulm railway junction in a southerly direction.

The line is to lead into platform tracks 1 to 2 of Ulm Central Station.

Alignment

The line under construction rises from its lowest point at Wendlingen 276  m above sea level. NN to its highest point at the eastern portal of the Steinbühl tunnel ( 746  m above sea level ) by 470 meters and then falls again to Ulm main station by 268 meters to 478  m above sea level. NN from.

The alignment (status: 1994, now obsolete) envisages an increase in the gradient of an average of 24.47 ‰ over a length of 15.91 kilometers, with a maximum gradient of 30.99 ‰ over a length of 1.47 kilometers. The start of the Alb ascent (towards Ulm) is 361  m above sea level. NN (building km 39.3), the saddle point at 750  m above sea level. NN (construction km 55.2), the descent towards Ulm is flatter at 13.5 ‰. Shortly before the entrance to Ulm main station, a slope of 35 ‰ is reached over a length of 177 meters. Compared to the existing route, an altitude difference of at least 160 meters must be overcome.

Long- distance passenger rail trains are to run mainly at 250 km / h on the route.

Due to its incline of up to 35 ‰, the route for freight traffic can only be used by light, disc- braked express freight trains with a train weight of up to around 1000 tons. Freight trains should mainly travel at 120 km / h, selected freight trains in individual sections at 160 km / h. The freight trains on the route should be around 400 meters long. According to information from DB Netz, the relevant upper limit for the total weight of freight trains on the route in the direction of Ulm would be 1065 tonnes, in the direction of Stuttgart 1445 tonnes. Freight traffic is to be added to the new line via Plochingen and Wendlingen .

Sections

The new Wendlingen – Ulm line project forms plan approval area 2 of the new and upgraded Stuttgart – Augsburg line and is in turn divided into seven plan approval sections:

• Section 2.1 a / b connects to Section 1.4 of the Stuttgart 21 project near Wendlingen am Neckar . The application for planning approval was submitted on December 23, 2005. The planning documents were revised between 2007 and 2009. A total of nine plan amendment procedures were included in the procedure. The display took place from April 14th to May 13th, 2009. The public hearing took place on January 26th and 27th, 2010 in Kirchheim unter Teck, the hearing process was concluded in March 2014. The decision was issued on March 23, 2015 and has been legally binding since June 1, 2015.
• Section 2.1 c (foothills of the Alb) is the subsequent section that is to run parallel to the A 8 motorway between Weilheim and Aichelberg . The planning approval decision was issued on August 13, 1999 - as the first section of the overall Stuttgart – Ulm project - and has been legally binding since April 2002. It would have expired in 2007 and was therefore extended.
• The section 2.2 (Albaufstieg) consists essentially of the approximately 8.8 kilometer Boßler Tunnel , of about 485 meters long Filstalbrücke and out of the approximately 4.8 kilometer Steinbühltunnel . The approximately 1150 objections raised against this section were discussed on December 9 and 10, 2008 . The consultation process for this section was completed in August 2009. The planning approval decision was issued in October 2011.
• In section 2.3 (Alb plateau) , the planned route runs above ground parallel to the A 8 motorway. The planning approval decision for the 21-kilometer section between Widderstall and Dornstadt was issued in mid-November 2008. Construction of this section began on May 7, 2012, in parallel with the six-lane expansion of the A8.
• This is followed by section 2.4 (Alb descent) , in which the route is led through a tunnel into the city of Ulm . The planning approval procedure for this section was initiated on June 18, 2007.
  The hearing process was completed by the Tübingen regional council at the end of December 2009. On June 25, 2012, the planning approval decision was issued by the Federal Railway Authority.
• The section 2.5 a1 comprises the inclusion in the Ulmer central station . The plan approval procedure was initiated for this on June 18, 2007. The discussion process was negotiated with PFA 2.4. The hearing process was completed by the Tübingen regional council at the end of December 2009. The planning approval decision was received by Deutsche Bahn on March 13, 2015.
• The Section 2.5a2 (Danube Bridge) already provides the connection to the project Neu-Ulm 21 ago. This section, for which a plan approval decision was available in 2003 and construction began in the same year, went into operation in November 2007.
• The section 2.5b (Neu-Ulm 21) includes redesigning the station Neu-Ulm . The originally very extensive station was completely rebuilt between autumn 2003 and November 2007. This included the reduction to four tracks and the new installation of the station in a trough structure with subsequent clearing of the former above-ground railway systems.

The regional council of Stuttgart expected the completion of all planning approval procedures by the end of 2008 under favorable conditions in mid-2007. At that time, Deutsche Bahn expected the completion of the planning approval procedures (in all areas or ongoing) by 2009. In April 2009, the company expected to be able to complete all planning approval procedures by the end of 2009. In mid-December 2009, the railway expected a “quick” decision in the five sections that were still open.

In the case of section 2.3, which has been approved by the plan, Deutsche Bahn AG is suing the conditions in the resolution (as of mid-December 2009).

history

background

As early as April 1986, an engineering office based near Ulm had proposed a route to Ulm close to the autobahn, which was similar to today's route and fully integrated Ulm. According to this, trains in the direction of Ulm in Stuttgart should first take the Gäubahn and then turn south of the state capital onto a new line that would have run via the airport and Wendlingen to Ulm.

The route planned today goes back to the traffic scientist Gerhard Heimerl , who in August 1988 commented on the new and upgraded Plochingen – Günzburg route (for example, provided for in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1985 ) and developed this route based on this. To him, the planning between Plochingen and Günzburg seemed “too narrow in terms of concept and space”. In a memorandum , he stated that “planning to start in Plochingen” could not do justice to the goal of a “seamless high-speed route on the Mannheim - Stuttgart - Ulm - Augsburg - Munich route”. Regardless of any further conceivable expansions, the maximum speed would remain limited to 120 to 160 km / h over a length of around 60 kilometers and a “slow travel section” would thus be built into the high-speed network.

Heimerl proposed an underground through station for Stuttgart under the existing Stuttgart main station with two or four tracks. The further new line to Ulm should run largely parallel to the A8. He recommended a separation of slow and fast traffic. From this he derived more flexible route parameters (maximum gradient of 32.5 instead of 12.5 ‰). In Ulm, too, the new line was to be introduced directly into the existing main train station, with a tunnel going under the northern parts of the city.

In a statement pursuant to Section 49 of the Federal Railway Act , the state of Baden-Württemberg agreed with the new considerations of the railway, which became the starting point for further planning from the end of the 1980s. In the meantime, other large-scale alternatives have been examined:

• A combined new and upgraded line to Ulm and on to Augsburg,
• the expansion of the Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt-Aalen and Riesbahn (so-called "Remstalweg", Stuttgart-Schorndorf-Aalen-Donauwörth-Augsburg) with a maximum gradient of 12.5 ‰,
• a new line based on the course of the A8 as well
• Combinations of these variants. According to Heimerl's concept, heavy goods traffic should continue to run on the old routes (with reloading on the Geislinger Steige or via the Bad Cannstatt – Aalen route).

As an extension of the line to the east, Heimerl proposed a new line with a more direct route between Ulm and Dinkelscherben (so-called variant H II ).

According to Heimerl, various preliminary investigations of possible locations of through stations in Stuttgart did not show a satisfactory result. From this background, the approach of a continuous high-speed route through the Stuttgart main station, which was converted into a through station, was ultimately developed as part of Stuttgart 21.

The German railway sees the new lines project as an integral part of Stuttgart 21. Prior to the conclusion of the financing agreement in March 2009 considered the Federal Ministry of Transport, a separate analysis is necessary in order to in case of failure pursue the financing of Stuttgart 21 alternative connections of the new line.

Variant discussion

Heimerl's suggestion was taken up by the planners and, referred to as the H-route , was finally made the basis for further planning. In addition to a continuous new line from Stuttgart to Ulm (in a largely parallel position on the autobahn), the concept also envisaged the dismantling of the Stuttgart main train station, which Heimerl saw as a bottleneck. The German Federal Railroad had temporarily developed a mixed solution called the K-route , which connected a through station converted into a central station with a tunnel to Plochingen. A variant discussion resulted in a decision by the DB board in July 1990, which preferred a route based on the Heimerl variant "for strategic reasons" and "under the aspect of future prospects". Before this decision, calculations had shown more than a billion Deutschmarks higher costs for the K-route compared to the H-route. In the further course of the project, the Stuttgart 21 project was developed with the new motorway close to Ulm. In the meantime, other large-scale alternatives have been examined: A combined new and upgraded route to Ulm and on to Augsburg, the upgrade of the Remstalweg with a maximum gradient of 12.5 ‰, a new route based on the course of the A8 and combinations of these variants.

After weighing up the various projects until October 1991, two concepts were pursued:

• The framework concept K envisaged a four-track expansion of the existing line between Plochingen and Süßen, with mixed operation and a maximum gradient of 12.5 ‰. A tunnel inclined by up to 35 ‰ for long-distance traffic was to connect Stuttgart main station with Plochingen. In the Swabian Alb, a new section of the line was to be built, which was to be linked to the existing line at Beimerstetten. This variant was created based on a variant of the new and upgraded Plochingen – Günzburg line. It envisaged a four-track expansion between Plochingen and Günzburg and, subsequently, a bypass of the Geislinger Steige in a fully freight train-compatible (12.5 ‰ incline) tunnel between Süßen / Gingen and Beimerstetten. From there it should first meet the existing route again and lead straight from Jungingen to Ulm main station. The abbreviation K stood for combination or Krittian route (after the DB planner, Ernst Krittian ).
• The framework concept H was designed as a pure high-speed line with a 25 ‰ slope, whereby the existing line should continue to be used by regional and freight trains. An than Railway Tunnel Stuttgart specified and up to 35 ‰ steeper tunnel should Feuerbach connect to the Filderebene over a four-track through station in transversal position under the main station Stuttgart with the highway. 8 From Wendlingen, a route parallel to the autobahn with a gradient of up to 25 ‰ should be created. In addition, the existing line between Plochingen and Günzburg was to be expanded to three tracks. This variant, initially also known as the motorway route , was based on a continuous separation of fast and slow trains, with the latter also running on the Remstalweg, which was to be expanded to two tracks, via Donauwörth, Goldshöfe and Aalen. The maximum gradient of 32.5 ‰ between Wendlingen and Ulm planned in Heimerl's proposal from 1988 was reduced to 25 ‰ in order to increase the freight train suitability of the new line.

Both variants provided for a full connection to Ulm and included a new or upgraded route between Ulm and Augsburg. According to the planning status of June 1991, investments of 3.2 billion DM were planned for the H variant between Stuttgart and Ulm, and 4.0 billion DM for the K variant; in the case of the H variant, an additional DM 0.8 billion was set aside for the expansion of the Remstalweg.

In October 1991, the DB presented a variant designated as H ' and K' for integration into a four-track through station in Stuttgart, whereby the existing terminal station with 16 tracks was to be retained. The estimated costs were 3.9 (K ′) and 3.2 (H ′) billion D-Marks. Compared to the original variants, travel time extensions of four (K) or three (H) minutes were calculated. With maximum expansion, the capacity of both variants was considered sufficient. Another reason for the two "'" variants were investigations to cross under the valley basin without endangering the mineral water.

In 1992 the federal government commissioned Professor Rothengatter at the University of Karlsruhe to examine the variants H, K, H ', K' and a variant H with a stop in the Neckar valley. As a result, no significant effect of the flat K-route on freight traffic was seen, since Rothengatter and Heimerl assumed increasingly lighter trains. A variant H was preferred, whereby an additional station outside the catchment area of ​​the main station could increase the economic and economic profitability. As a result of this study, the Deutsche Bundesbahn then investigated further variants, which include routing long-distance trains via the goods bypass, with a stop in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim , as well as a new clasp between Stuttgart-Feuerbach and Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt . The station there is to be expanded into a long-distance station .

In mid-1992, all four variants were presented to the state of Baden-Württemberg. In consultation with the local authorities concerned, the state submitted a statement on September 15, 1992, in which it clearly spoke out in favor of a route close to the motorway. Further demands were, among other things, the integration of Stuttgart and Ulm, the underpassing of the Stuttgart main train station, a new line from the airport close to the motorway and the integration of the airport into the new line. The project of a new and upgraded line between Stuttgart, Ulm and Augsburg was included in the urgent requirement of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1992 .

After a fundamental decision on the segregation of traffic had been made with Netz 21 , a variant K _{25 was} developed from variant K , which allows for a new section of the existing line (25 ‰, 250 km / h) for long-distance traffic and a continuous four-track expansion in the Filstal intended for 160 or 200 km / h. At the same time, four variants for the Stuttgart area were developed for both variants in the Stuttgart area.

According to information from DB planner Ernst Krittian, DB weighed 80 variants for a new line between Stuttgart and Ulm up until the early 1990s. The variant parallel to the autobahn has proven to be the solution with the least impact on residents, but it was not suitable for freight trains. At its meeting on December 8, 1992, the board of directors of the German Federal Railroad spoke out in favor of the route close to the autobahn on the new Stuttgart – Ulm line. The integration into the Stuttgart main station was still unclear at the time. According to the planning status of January 1993, two and a half trains should run between Stuttgart and Ulm per hour and direction in ICE traffic.

In December 1993, the board of directors of the Deutsche Bundesbahn decided to keep Stuttgart Central Station as the terminus. As in the through station variant, the new line should run parallel to the autobahn in the direction of Stuttgart via Wendlingen to Denkendorf (Sulzbach viaduct). From there the route should lead via Esslingen / Mettingen and merge there with the existing route. A connection to the airport was not included in these plans.

The Stuttgart 21 project was officially presented on April 18, 1994 . It provided for the conversion of the main station from a terminal to an eight-track through station.

The feasibility study to Stuttgart 21 while the beginning of 1995 was initially to connect the airport to the NBS a train station in shunt with a Gleisdreieck provided, the Gäubahn should be abandoned to pipe even after these plans. To connect the new line (Hauptbahnhof – Denkendorf – Wendlingen) costs of 1,065 million DM (including 15 percent planning costs) were planned.

The regional planning procedure initiated in September 1994 was completed in September 1995. Around 24,000 objections to the project were raised . On November 7, 1995, the federal government, the state and Deutsche Bahn AG concluded a framework agreement for the development and promotion of the Stuttgart 21 project. In the same month, the Stuttgart regional council announced the regional planning decision for a high-speed line between Wendlingen and Ulm. The plan approval procedure was expected to be initiated by the end of 1996 at this point in time. The travel time between Stuttgart and Ulm should be reduced from 53 to 40 minutes. The planned costs were 2.2 billion Deutschmarks . In the regional planning procedure concluded in 1997, a route largely bundled with the A8 was identified as the cheapest option. 23 of the 61 km of the route are to run in tunnels.

Compared to other rail transport projects, the project was postponed in the 1990s. It was not included in the federal government's inventory planning for the period 1998 to 2002, so funding was not secured. In 1999, the railway stated that due to the increased costs in other major projects, the realization of the high-speed line could only be expected after 2010. The state of Baden-Württemberg thereupon offered pre-financing for the route in autumn 1999, provided that the DB would give a specific year for the realization of Stuttgart 21 and the new route. At the end of 1999 the state government of Baden-Württemberg agreed to contribute between half a billion and one billion D-Marks to the realization of the high-speed line. The planned total cost of the route at that time was around three billion Deutschmarks.

Due to a tight budget, in November 1999 Deutsche Bahn considered the possibility of using tilting technology trains on the existing line in anticipation of the new line . According to this calculation, the difference in travel time compared to the new line would have been 18 minutes between Stuttgart and Ulm.

In October 2006, the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg passed a fundamental resolution for the realization of Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line.

planning

The planning phase was marked by numerous delays. According to DB ProjektBau's earlier plans , construction was to begin in autumn 2005 and commissioning in 2013. After cuts in the federal budget, there were delays. In 2000, the planning of the route was temporarily stopped. At the beginning of 2002 it was planned to complete the plan approval procedure by the end of 2004. According to an updated profitability calculation, the line should be built between mid-2005 and mid-2012. Commissioning was also planned for 2013.

On October 23, 2006, a final decision on the realization of the new line as well as on Stuttgart 21 was to be made as part of a top-level discussion between Federal Transport Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee , Prime Minister Günther Oettinger and Railway Chief Hartmut Mehdorn . July finally made the decision.

The route was originally planned exclusively for fast passenger traffic. In the course of the planning, the shared use through fast freight traffic was included in the planning. In contrast to a (comparatively flat) pure freight route, a route only used by passenger traffic can be laid out with a gradient of up to around 40 ‰ (e.g. high-speed route Cologne – Rhine / Main ) in a cost-saving manner.

The establishment of a regional train station near Merklingen was discussed and after a potential analysis (2014), a feasibility study (mid-2015) and the commitment of the surrounding communities to bear around half of the total costs, it was now realized as Merklingen (Swabian Alb) train station .

As part of an exploration program along the planned course of the tunnel (status 2007) around 1700 boreholes, 200 (larger, but not very deep) excavations and 800 soundings were carried out. The route was adapted to the results of the exploration.

By mid-March 2008, the end of the objection period for the Aichelberg - Hohenstadt section , around 1,250 objections had been received . After examining the objections, a public hearing is to be scheduled in the second half of the year. Most of the objections are directed against the planned construction site traffic.

On September 1, 2011, the planning of the railway equipment and the superstructure was put out to tender across Europe. The contract to be awarded should run from February 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015.

The last planning approval decision for the route was issued in March 2015.

DB ProjektBau GmbH had been entrusted with project management since around 2002 . On September 1, 2013, DB Projekt Stuttgart-Ulm GmbH took over this function.

As was announced in November 2019, the switches at the Nabern transfer point should be driven at 130 or 160 instead of 100 km / h.

In August 2020, the postponement of the transfer point, now known as the "Merklingen-Widderstall", became known.

construction

Official groundbreaking for the new line on May 7, 2012

Symbolic stop at the Steinbühl tunnel (July 19, 2013)

The first preparatory work began in autumn 2010 for a 52-meter-long bridge over Landesstrasse 1214 near Aichelberg. This work was interrupted in the course of the arbitration talks of the Stuttgart 21 project in mid-November 2010 and resumed on December 13, 2010. Construction work was completed in late August 2011, according to other sources in December 2011.

The groundbreaking ceremony for the entire project was planned for Christmas 2010, was then postponed to 2011 and finally took place in May 2012.

Originally, the first preparatory measures were supposed to begin a few months after the agreement of July 2007, and large-scale construction work from 2010. At the end of 2007, construction was expected to start in 2008.

At the end of March 2009, Deutsche Bahn AG announced the supervision of the construction of the shell of construction section 2.2, in mid-November 2009 for construction section 2.3, and at the beginning of June 2010 for section 2.5a1 (Ulm main station). and in mid-August 2010 for section 2.1.

As part of the preliminary archaeological exploration, the remains of seven settlements were found in 2010 alone.

In July 2011 (as of June 2011), three bridges between Temmenhausen and Dornstadt should be tendered as the first construction measures in planning approval section 2.3 .

In August 2012, the construction of a 6.9 km long section on the Alb plateau, including nine bridges, was awarded.

The construction of the Albabstieg and Widderstall tunnels was put out to tender in July 2012. At the end of December 2012, the construction contract for an approx. 6.6 kilometer long section on the Alb plateau (section kilometers 61.4 to 68.0) with the Imberg tunnel was put out to tender . The work for this section of the route was awarded in December 2013 for a total value of 61.9 million euros. The contractor intends to have the work completed by autumn 2017.

Construction began in planning approval section 2.1 c in November 2010. Section 2.3 followed in December 2011. In February 2012, building preparation measures began in plan approval section 2.2. In March 2012, accompanying measures (PfA 2.2) and pipe laying (PfA 2.3) were documented as construction progress.

The drive on the Steinbühl Tunnel began on June 6, 2013, and the symbolic attack was celebrated on July 19, 2013.

Driving in the Boßler Tunnel is to begin in summer 2013, and construction of the Filstal Bridge in autumn 2014. In 2013 information centers were to be built in Wendlingen and Ulm. Various viewpoints are also planned. The Wendlingen information center, which is ultimately planned for 2017, was then not implemented for cost reasons.

The excavation of the Alb descent tunnel should begin at the end of April or beginning of May 2014. In January 2015, the construction contract for a 7.6-kilometer section on the Alb plateau (from 53.8 kilometers onwards) was awarded to a consortium led by Leonhard Weiss and Bauer Spezialtiefbau . It was the last of four major construction contracts in this section.

In December 2015, the construction of the Albvorland Tunnel and the adjoining structures and sections were awarded for a total of around 390 million euros. As the last structural work on the new line, two construction contracts for the connection to Ulm Central Station were awarded in January 2016 for around 52 million euros.

According to a press report, the railway equipment was put out to tender in December 2015. (Slab track, rails, switches, overhead lines, power supply and telecommunications). The order volume should total several hundred million euros. The contract for the construction of the track system, energy and telecommunications, for example, was awarded to Rhomberg and Swietelsky for around 243 million euros, according to the announcement in January 2018 . Construction work is scheduled to begin in 2019.

In June 2016, half of the tunnel was excavated. At the end of 2017, 39.6 of 61.6 kilometers (64%) had been driven.

In September 2019, the northern track had already been laid in front of the west portal of the Albabstieg tunnel.

Construction work at the western end of the line (May 2020)

In August 2019, the first twelve kilometers of track were laid. Work began in the Alb descent tunnel. On October 29, 2019, the end of the machine drive at the Albvorland Tunnel, the last tunnel on the route, was celebrated, and the tunnel drive for the route was almost complete.

In mid-July 2020, the tunneling was completed and 37 kilometers of track laid.

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  The bridge over the L1214 near Aichelberg, which was completed in 2011 (May 2012)

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  Construction work on a bridge structure on the Alb plateau near Dornstadt (May 2013)

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  Starting pit of the Steinbühl tunnel , where tunneling began in June 2013 (May 2013)

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  Start pit of the Steinbühl tunnel in November 2015

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  Work on a new overpass over the new line and motorway near Temmenhausen on the Alb plateau (May 2013)

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  Construction work on a railway overpass over a dirt road near Dornstadt (August 2013)

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  Municipal road between Böttingen and Dornstadt, which is to be run via the NBS in the future (February 2014)

Installation

In the financing agreement of April 2009, completion was planned for December 2019 at the latest, together with Stuttgart 21. In March 2012, commissioning was postponed by one year to December 2020. According to a media report from March 2012, Deutsche Bahn may not have expected commissioning until December 2021 due to delays in planning approval. According to a statement, this would occur if various premises could not or only partially be met. For example, the paper for plan approval section 2.1ab assumes a plan approval decision in 2014 and the start of construction in 2015. According to a report from January 2013, Deutsche Bahn planned internally to decide on the start-up date initially planned for December 2020 after decisions about the Filderdialog . In June 2013, commissioning was planned for December 2021.

According to an expert opinion on behalf of Deutsche Bahn that became known at the end of January 2018, commissioning is now expected at the end of 2022. Complex plan change procedures for species protection in the foothills of the Alb were given as the cause. The commissioning date was confirmed by the infrastructure operator DB Netz, as was the planned mandatory use of ETCS as a network access criterion for all trains. Test drives are scheduled to begin in early 2022.

Due to the fact that Stuttgart 21 is not expected to go into operation until 2025, the new line is scheduled to go into operation earlier. The existing lines between Stuttgart Hauptbahnhof and Wendlingen are to be used first. Operation will be single-track in an approximately 12 km long section between Wendlingen train station and the Nabern transfer point. The long-distance travel time between Stuttgart and Ulm should be reduced by 10 to 15 minutes. The tender for regional transport originally planned for the fourth quarter of 2019 for the period 2022 to 2025 was delayed because Deutsche Bahn did not deliver the required and promised data on time. It should now take place from the end of 2020 and be completed in the first quarter of 2021.

A "decisive investigation by Deutsche Bahn into early commissioning" of the new line should be available in summer 2020. Due to delays in construction on the Filstal Bridge, a single-track commissioning has been considered. In July 2020, Deutsche Bahn announced that it wanted to put both tracks into operation at the same time. Operation with two to three long-distance trains per hour is planned. In regional traffic, a two-hour cycle is planned between Wendlingen and Ulm, which is to be increased every hour between Merklingen and Ulm.

Costs and financing

Planning approval provision in sections	Estimated costs (million euros)
2.1	0798.7
2.2	1074.3
2.3	0479.4
2.4	0443.0
2.5	0143.8
total	2939.2

prehistory

In March 2000, the representatives of the federal government on the DB supervisory board made their approval of the Stuttgart 21 project subject to the condition that the new line and the Stuttgart 21 project would be implemented at the same time. The state of Baden-Württemberg then decided to take over the entire pre-financing of the new line under these conditions.

In mid-February 2001, the federal and state governments surprisingly agreed on the financing of Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm. The state undertook to pre-finance the cost of the new line in full. A loan whose additional costs for the state (depending on interest rate developments) were estimated at up to one billion D-Marks should therefore be repaid by the federal government in eight annual installments from 2011. A profitability study submitted by an auditing company at the beginning of 2001 expected a cost risk of at least 420 million D-Marks compared to the calculated three billion D-Marks. The report was kept under lock and key.

At the beginning of 2002, the figure for 1998 was 1.5 billion euros.

According to a media report from July 2011, Deutsche Bahn calculated the project internally in October 2002 at at least 2.3 billion euros (including price increases 2.6 billion euros). Compared to the previous planning status, the construction costs would have increased by 470 million euros. The official cost at that time was 1.35 billion euros. The additional costs were communicated to the state government of Baden-Württemberg at a meeting on July 4, 2003. According to the protocol notes, the costs should not be communicated to the federal government in order not to trigger an “out-of-date discussion” in the development phase of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 .

In October 2004 the expected costs were increased from 1.5 to 2.025 billion euros. The cost increases were due to changes in the line layout and comparatively unfavorable new geological findings. According to these plans, the federal government should take over 231 million euros in 2016 and 288 million euros in 2017.

In 2006, Deutsche Bahn carried out a further economic study on Stuttgart 21 and the new line. The study, classified by the railway as a business and trade secret, was examined by an auditor in 2007 on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Transport.

At the end of August 2006, the financing of 500 million euros of the estimated two billion euros in total costs had not been clarified. At a top-level meeting between the federal, state and railways on October 23, 2006, the necessity of the project was out of the question, but with reference to the financing of the Nuremberg-Berlin project , the federal government did not see itself in a position to start financing until 2015. Of these two billion euros in total, the federal government and Deutsche Bahn were to assume 1.54 billion euros and the state 498 million euros. In addition, the state offered pre-financing for the federal portion so that construction could start in 2009.

As part of a declaration of intent on July 19, 2007, the federal, state, city, railways and the Stuttgart Region Association agreed to bring the start of construction for Stuttgart 21 and the new line forward to 2010. At an estimated cost of around two billion euros, the state of Baden-Württemberg agreed to invest a total of 950 million euros in the new line by 2016. The federal government undertakes to secure the follow-up financing from 2016 and to assume the risk of construction costs and to apply for TEN grants for the project from the European Union.

The state paid its share in six installments between 2010 and 2015. The state financed its share in Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm from a reserve formed in 2008 , including the interest accrued from it. If the state funds are used up before 2016, Deutsche Bahn will finance up to 130 million euros. The agreed financial contributions from the federal government are between 50 and 289 million euros per year and were or will be provided in the years 2016 to 2020.

The then Prime Minister Günther Oettinger justified the use of tax revenue with the gain of time that was created by the early start of construction from 2016 to 2010. The co-financing of the federal project is in total cheaper than paying interest on bank loans for a possible private pre-financing. According to the federal government, federal financing of the new line was not possible before 2017 because the budget for other projects in the investment framework plan for transport projects was required (as of May 2007). If Stuttgart 21 were to fail, federal funding for the route would be possible in 2016 at the earliest and therefore not very likely. Furthermore, failure to implement this would jeopardize the traffic effects of the new Rhine / Main – Rhine / Neckar line .

On April 2, 2009, the financing contract for the realization of Stuttgart 21 and the new line was signed. This provides for investments of 2.025 billion euros for the new line. The country contributes 950 million euros. The remaining EUR 1.05 billion is borne by the federal government in accordance with Section 8 (1)  BSchWAG . The federal government also bears the risk of building costs. According to the Federal Ministry of Transport, it is common practice to assume the entire risk of construction costs for projects in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan. Deutsche Bahn wanted to contribute to the total costs with its own funds amounting to 150 million euros.

The underlying cost calculation was based on the price and planning status from 2004 and was updated on the basis of the results of the draft planning. Funding by the federal government should therefore take place from January 1, 2016; until then, the federal state of Baden-Württemberg will take over the federal share on the basis of the federal funding rules. Due to the difficult geology, high risk surcharges were included in the construction costs. In addition, a risk fund of 1.45 billion euros was set up together with the Stuttgart 21 project. The cost estimate was based on the 2004 price level.

The European Union provided 101.45 million euros for the route by 2013. In the years 2007 to 2009 the EU already contributed around 2.4 million euros. By 2008, around 130 million euros had been spent on planning the project. In 2012 and 2013, the European Union contributed 20.6 million euros to the financing of the route. Further EU funds of up to 432.9 million euros are planned up to 2020.

The budget committee of the German Bundestag was on 20 November 2008 Federal funds totaling 1.55 billion euros for Stuttgart 21 and the new line between Wendlingen and Ulm free.

The Federal Court was the end of 2008 based on a cost of 3.2 billion euros. This investigation is based on standards of the Federal Ministry of Transport. The Vieregg-Rössler office determined in September 2010 a study of 5.3 billion euros as probable costs and indicated a possible range of 4.6 billion to around 10 billion euros. As the main reason for the wide range, the experts named the uncertainty as to the extent to which the cost-intensive New Austrian Tunneling Method could and would be dispensed with. Deutsche Bahn contradicted the report.

The utilization of the existing line should be "in the economically optimal range" after the completion of the new line.

Cost estimate from July 2010

The total costs of the project were estimated in July 2010, at the price and planning status of 2010, at 2.9 billion euros. Of this, 2.5 billion euros went to construction costs, 399 million euros to planning costs and 25 million euros to official fees. For example, 1.5 billion euros of the construction costs went to tunnels, 340 million euros to the track structure, 135 million euros to the superstructure and 113 million euros to the contact line system. A buffer for future price increases was not included. According to a press report from mid-January 2013, in September 2012 Deutsche Bahn assumed total costs of 3.26 billion euros , taking into account inflation and unchanged real value . The financing of these additional costs is unclear.

The additional costs of 865 million euros that arose compared to the previous forecast of 2004 (2.0 billion euros) resulted, according to Deutsche Bahn, from the more detailed planning up to then (665 million euros) and inflation (200 million euros). The additional costs included, among other things, 25 additional crosscuts in the tunnels and costs for ETCS equipment on the route.

The cost-benefit analysis of the new line by the Federal Ministry of Transport based on this cost estimate showed a benefit-cost factor of 1.2. Assuming that the Mottgers brace and further expansion between Fulda and Erfurt will not be implemented in the foreseeable future, this value will increase to 1.5.

Financing the additional costs

Talks between the federal, state and railways about the financing of the additional costs that became known in 2010 began in July 2010 and lasted in November 2010 and March 2011.

In September 2010 and March 2011, the state of Baden-Württemberg denied reports of such discussions. It is assumed that the federal government will assume the additional costs. According to a media report, DB and the state should contribute to the additional costs.

In autumn 2010, the federal government checked the consistency of the cost increases and announced that it would secure financing from 2016, despite the increased costs. According to a media report, DB has meanwhile tried to reduce costs below the 2004 level and increase the benefits. However, the Federal Ministry of Transport did not accept this.

In autumn 2010, a representative of the Federal Ministry of Transport declared that the additional costs of 865 million euros should primarily be covered by so-called “third-party funds” without giving any further details. Part of the approximately one billion euros in funds that were to be invested in the rail network from 2012 to 2015 should also be used to finance the federal contribution. These funds in turn came partly from the dividend that Deutsche Bahn AG will pay to the federal government from 2011 onwards.

On February 9, 2011, Deutsche Bahn formally applied for a cost update. The financing should thus be carried forward from a total value of 2.025 to 2.89 billion euros. The EBA recommended the update to the Federal Ministry of Transport on August 22, 2011. With the entry into force of the federal budget for 2012, the financing agreement could be updated. The amendment agreement was signed on March 15, 2012. The federal government will take over 1,770.1 million euros. In 2016 he should contribute 102.1 million euros, in 2017 399.0 million euros. From 2018 onwards, 1269 million euros are still to be financed. According to a media report, Deutsche Bahn's own share in the route amounts to 75 million euros, mainly for the dismantling of existing systems and a possible exceeding of planning costs.

Further development

According to information provided by Deutsche Bahn in February 2014, the project would be around ten percent below the cost forecast and, if the project went well, it could be completed a year earlier than planned. According to information from railway boss Rüdiger Grube from December 2014, the project is in the three-digit million range below the cost estimate.

According to DB information, the expected cost of the route was around 100 million euros below budget at the end of 2015. Two thirds of the construction works have been awarded, mostly below the cost estimates. There was a lack of construction work on the Albquerung, construction work in Ulm Central Station and the railway equipment. According to DB information, the expected costs of the new line were almost ten percent below the budget of 3.26 billion euros at the end of 2016.

By March 2015, the country had made payments totaling 324 million euros. The remaining 626 million euros should be paid out by the end of 2016. By December 2015, around 600 million euros had been spent, which was borne exclusively by the state. The state expects that the remaining grant will be called up by the beginning of 2017. After the European Union is subsidizing the new line with up to 433 million euros, the country's outstanding payments will be due later.

In January 2018, the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn followed the decisions of the DB Management Board and the findings of a new report prepared by PwC and Emch + Berger on behalf of DB and set the increase in the total value to 3.7 billion. The main causes of the additional costs were given as geological risks and the construction of an electronic interlocking in Ulm. The cost forecast at the end of the third quarter of 2018 was still 3.7 billion; Euro. 73 percent of the construction work had been awarded.

business

With the commissioning of the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project, an additional hourly long-distance service between Stuttgart and Ulm is to be offered by extending lines to Munich that end in Stuttgart today. This means that there would be at least half an hourly service between Stuttgart and Munich. An hourly service is planned for regional traffic between Stuttgart and Ulm, with a journey time of less than 45 minutes between the two main train stations with stops at the airport and in Merklingen. The line is to be extended to Lake Constance.

The minimum travel time Stuttgart – Ulm on the ICE 3 (including a 5 percent standard surcharge) was given in 2011 as 25.5 minutes. The planned travel time in the concept for the country was 31 minutes, in order to be on the safe side given the uncertain vehicle situation. According to Deutsche Bahn, journey times of less than 31 minutes should be achievable with ICE 3 and ICE 4 as well as infrastructure optimizations in the meantime. Furthermore, the permissible speed should be increased on parts of the route.

The first expert draft of the Deutschland-Takt , presented in 2018, provided for a basic offer with four long-distance trains per hour and direction over the route for 2030: A half-hourly service with 250 km / h long-distance trains between Frankfurt and Munich was supplemented by an hourly service with 230 km / h fast trains (Karlsruhe – Vienna, partly beyond), a two-hour line Paris – Munich (with trains running at 300 km / h) and a two-hour line between Hamburg and Ulm (also with 300 km / h trains). The scheduled travel time between Stuttgart and Ulm (and vice versa) was 31 minutes (without a stop) or 37 minutes with a two-minute stop at the airport for the hourly 230 km / h line and 43 minutes with an eight-minute airport stop for the Hamburg line –Ulm. In addition, an hourly service with trains running at 160 km / h was planned for regional traffic, with a journey time of 40 minutes with intermediate stops at the airport and at Merklingen train station.

The third draft submitted in June 2020 provides for four and a half trains per hour and direction, including three and a half long-distance trains. Two and a half of the three and a half train pairs are stored with 300 km / h fast trains with a travel time of mostly 27 minutes in each direction, a two-hour train in each direction for 250 km / h (32 minutes in each direction) and 230 km / h (38 minutes in each direction) , with a stop at Stuttgart Airport).

A traffic forecast expected an increase in the number of passengers between Stuttgart and Ulm from around 19,000 (2010) to around 32,000 passengers per day (in 2025). 28,500 travelers were expected on the new line. For regional traffic, the forecast on the supply side was based on the state's 2020 timetable concept.

The project was carried out as part of the NBS / ABS Stuttgart – Ulm – Augsburg in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 1992 . The underlying traffic forecast provided for 70 long-distance passenger and 80 freight trains per day and direction on the new line for 2010. In mid-1994, Deutsche Bahn anticipated 50 long-distance passenger trains and 20 freight trains. The segregation of fast and slow traffic ( network 21 ) was not yet taken into account.

In the 2001 summer timetable, 93 long-distance, 128 regional and 106 freight trains as well as 130 S-Bahn trains ran on the existing line every day. In the course of updating the planning for the 2003 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan, 20 pairs of “light and fast” freight trains were relocated to the new line in the Stuttgart – Ulm corridor in order to relieve the existing line and enable faster connections. According to the railway, this adjustment has no effect on the total numbers in the respective corridors.

According to the planning status of 2007, the number of trains from Stuttgart to Ulm should be increased from 30 to 53 after completion of the new line. In 2010, the operating concept provided for three long-distance trains per hour and direction on the new line. In addition, up to two fast regional trains per hour and direction were planned during rush hour. The state of Baden-Wuerttemberg planned to tender the regional transport when the exact completion date was clear. In June 2018 it announced that it would set up regional traffic from Stuttgart via Plochingen and Wendlingen to Ulm from December 2022 to probably December 2025. Around 600,000 train kilometers per year are planned. In the 2015 operating scenario on which the planning approval was originally based, 168 long-distance passenger trains, 124 local trains and 212 freight trains were expected in the corridor between Wendlingen or Plochingen and Ulm. In 2004 these figures were updated according to the traffic forecast of the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2003 (also with reference year 2015). According to this, 154 long-distance, 86 local and 170 freight trains as well as 134 S-Bahn were expected in the corridor. For Stuttgart main station, 53 long-distance departures per day to Ulm were calculated on the new line, 16 long-distance trains should run over the existing line (Göppingen).

As part of the 2010 requirement plan review, 49 pairs of passenger rail trains were expected on the route, along with 16 freight trains (sum of both directions) of freight transport. In the course of the underlying traffic forecast, trains with a total weight between 460 and 618 t were expected on the new line. The freight trains would choose the route over the new line because of the slightly shorter travel times. For the evaluation of the profitability of the project, however, the choice between Stuttgart and Ulm is not important, since the capacity in the corridor between Wendlingen and Ulm would in any case be expanded. According to the federal government, freight traffic contributed to a quarter of the total benefit. The additional rail traffic due to the new line was assessed, for example through the capacities for freight traffic on the existing line due to the relocation of long-distance passenger traffic. Simple shifts of traffic from the existing to the new line were not evaluated.

The operating program for the 2011 stress test at Stuttgart 21 provided for a basic service of four and a half trains per hour and direction across the route, including 3.5 long-distance trains and one regional train. At peak hour (arrival 7:00 a.m. to 7:59 a.m. at Stuttgart main station), 12 trains were planned for Stuttgart, including 10 long-distance and 2 regional trains.

For the Stuttgart – Ulm route, DB Fernverkehr wants to purchase two class 245 locomotives as tow locomotives.

technology

The slab track is to be used on the route . The route is to be equipped with ETCS Level 2 ( ETCS Baseline 3 ) with regular block division. Instead of the originally planned Ks signals and PZB with long block distances, the line is now to be equipped with ETCS Level 2 "without signals". ETCS vehicle equipment should also be a network access criterion for the route.

The ETCS equipment for the route was awarded in August 2017 for 4.6 million euros. The electronic signal box (ESTW) was awarded to Siemens in the same month for an undisclosed amount. At least four signal box locations (Neckartal, Nabern, Merklingen and Albabstieg) are to be created.

The planned excavation cross-section of the tunnel tubes is 83.3 square meters.

Effects

The planned high-speed line should shorten the length of the route between the main stations in Stuttgart and Ulm from 93 kilometers to around 85 kilometers.

Among other things, the following travel time reductions are planned:

• from Stuttgart to Ulm from 54 to 28 or 31 minutes in long-distance traffic; from 60 to 41 minutes in regional traffic
• from Stuttgart to Munich (in long-distance traffic) from 130 to 94 minutes (with expansion of the Augsburg – Munich route for up to 230 km / h),
• from Stuttgart to Vienna (in long-distance traffic, with further expansions) from six hours and 39 minutes to four hours and 50 minutes.

A shortening of 10 minutes, to exactly 3 hours, is planned between Frankfurt am Main and Munich . In 2015, Deutsche Bahn planned to have two ICE trains per hour and direction on the route for 2030.

Freight trains can use the route towards Ulm via a connecting curve from the Filstalbahn . According to the railway, this will free up capacities on the Filstalbahn, which can be used to concentrate regional traffic. With a gradient of up to 35 ‰, the new line is steeper than the Geislinger Steige .

In the course of the planned expansion of long-distance traffic between Stuttgart and Ulm, regional traffic between Ulm and Augsburg is likely to be overhauled and travel times longer until this route is also expanded.

criticism

The Netzwerk Privatbahnen (now: Netzwerk Europäische Eisenbahnen ) criticized the fact that the new line (as well as the existing line) could not be negotiated by heavy freight trains without the (costly) carrying a second locomotive or renting a push locomotive for the climb due to its steep inclines. Even before the construction of the line, considerable detours for heavy freight trains are therefore cheaper than the additional costs for push or additional locomotives. Replacing it would cost up to 1,300 euros per train. The immediate bypass routes are not suitable for bypasses due to the single track, lack of electrification and nightly shutdowns. It is more economical to take long detours, the benefit of the new line for freight traffic is therefore doubtful. The decision to build Stuttgart 21 and the new line would cement the existing disadvantages for freight traffic.

Critics complained that the route (alignment status from 1994) contradicts the objectives of the TSI . With a few exceptions, this provides for a maximum gradient of 35 ‰, provided the sliding gradient does not exceed a value of 25 ‰ over a maximum length of ten kilometers and the continuous 35 ‰ gradient does not exceed a length of 6000 meters. The idea behind this regulation is to enable vehicles to travel at maximum speed in a flat section after a comparatively short phase of ascent. Shorter climbs could be driven through with a swing drive with no or reduced drive power. The TSI admittedly complies with the legal and formal requirements of the choice of an almost 16-kilometer-long gradient of 24.5 ‰, but contradicts its basic idea. Prof. Heimerl as the author of this route variant never commented on the aspects of driving dynamics; there was no discussion among experts about the disadvantages of the inclines and slopes of the route.

Proponents referred to driving dynamics calculations, according to which an ICE 3 entering the ascent to the Swabian Alb in the direction of Ulm at 250 km / h is still 208 km / h at the apex. The loss of driving time compared to a continuous journey at 250 km / h is one minute. The steady-state speed of such a train on a 24.5 ‰ gradient is around 200 km / h.

Critics saw the steep incline as an obstacle to operations for freight traffic, as only light freight trains could use the route. Even if two locomotives were pre-tensioned, only about 1100 t train weight could be achieved in the decisive 31 ‰ gradient. The formation of the Alb ascent also stands in the way of mixed traffic of passenger and freight trains (during the day). With an expected use by one ICE per hour and direction (status: 2005), an extensive passenger transport route cannot be justified. The European Commission assumed that the number of fast freight trains that can use the route will increase due to technical progress before the route is commissioned. According to DB information, the mean incline of 24.47 ‰ is decisive for the trailer load, provided that free passage in the 31 ‰ section can be ensured.

The Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD) criticized the fact that the operation of the Stuttgart airport train station worsened travel times. The stop at the airport, only twelve kilometers from the main train station, extends the travel time between the main stations in Ulm and Stuttgart by five minutes. A journey time of 30 minutes, which is favorable in the sense of an integral cycle timetable , is exceeded.

The VCD also criticized the calculation of the traffic volume on which the plan approval procedure is based . They ignore the shift in traffic between Frankfurt am Main and Munich via the new high-speed line Nuremberg – Ingolstadt – Munich and assume that the number of freight trains is too high (20 express freight trains and 60 freight trains per day) in order to improve the profitability calculation of the project. Even in the case of express freight trains, the higher train path prices and energy costs contrasted with the savings in travel time should be viewed critically. Furthermore, the effects of reunification were not taken into account, which had given the connection between Stuttgart and Munich more of a tangent than a main traffic axis.

The VCD suggested that the sections between Ulm and Augsburg and between Augsburg and Munich should be expanded in the sense of an integral clock timetable. He suggested an alternative route between Ulm and Stuttgart. According to this, the section between Stuttgart and Göppingen, which is already largely passable at around 150 km / h, should be upgraded in part to 160 km / h. From Göppingen, the route envisaged an expansion for 250 km / h, which is followed by a new line between Amstetten and Ulm that can be driven at the same speed . Its gradient should not exceed 12.5 ‰, in individual sections up to 15.5 ‰. In order to separate fast and slow traffic, the route between the main stations provided for a continuous four-track system, in long-distance traffic the use of active tilting technology between Untertürkheim and Göppingen , with a continuous speed of 160 km / h. The association stated the travel time savings in long-distance traffic compared to the existing route at around 20 minutes.

In a study in September 2010, the Vieregg-Rössler office assessed the new line as not being suitable for freight trains. The reasons given by the experts are the steep incline, the lack of partition walls in the short, double-track tunnels that prevent traffic between the ICE and the freight train, the lack of overtaking opportunities and the large height difference of 370 meters in one go. At best, freight traffic can take place at night between the last and the first ICE. This calls into question the profitability calculations of the new line.

According to calculations by the vehicle industry, ICE 1 , ICE 2 and ICE T are not suitable for driving over the route because of the thermal design of the drive and brakes. Deutsche Bahn contradicted this.

Critics asserted that the route planning would make the procurement of the new ICx trains (now ICE 4 ) more expensive because the trains would now have to be able to use a 31 ‰ steep ramp of infinite length.

Web links

Commons : New Wendlingen – Ulm line  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Planning approval documents
• Project description of the new line (NBS) Wendlingen - Ulm . Annex 1.1 to the Stuttgart 21 financing agreement on the website of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure Baden-Württemberg

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Audit for the operational quality review Stuttgart 21st final report. (PDF; 3.3 MiB; PDF page 33) "Version 1-00", profile IN-03. SMA & Partner AG , July 21, 2011, p. 4 , accessed on July 21, 2011 . 
2. ↑ ^{a b c} Planning approval documents for the expansion and new construction line Stuttgart - Augsburg. Wendlingen - Ulm area: Section 2.5a1: Ulm Hbf (…) Annex 1: Explanatory report . P. 32, 33.
3. ^ Matthias Breidenstein, Stefan Kielbassa, Herwig Ludwig: An overview of the tunnels on the new Wendlingen – Ulm line . In: tunnel . Official organ of the STUVA . tape 32 , no. 2 . Bauverlag BV GmbH, March 2013, ISSN  0722-6241 , p. 28-40 .
4. ^ ^{A b} D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision. 2010 / S 158-244693. Electronic Official Journal of the European Union, August 17, 2010, archived from the original on November 28, 2011 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
5. ^ Memorandum: New building project Stuttgart - Ulm. (PDF; 14 pages; 7.1 MiB) SMA and Partner AG, June 4, 2008, archived from the original on August 1, 2010 ; Retrieved June 4, 2008 . 
6. ^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines. Document 2019 / S 143-351187. In: Supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union . July 26, 2019, accessed on July 28, 2019 (German). 
7. ↑ ^{a b} Plan change notification according to § 18 Abs. 1 AEG i. V. m. Section 76 (2) VwVfG and Section 18d AEG for the project “Project Stuttgart-Ulm, PFA 2.3, 7th change of plan“ Transfer point Merklingen-Widderstall ”” in the municipality of Merklingen Railway km 54.580 to 57.338 on the 4813 Feuerbach - Stuttgart main station deep - Ulm Hbf. (PDF) Federal Railway Office, August 13, 2020, accessed on August 19, 2020 . 
8. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} DB ProjektBau GmbH: New building project Stuttgart – Ulm. (PDF; 5.2 MiB) New routes, new traffic concept for the region, Germany and Europe. May 2007, archived from the original on October 22, 2013 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
9. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Sven Andersen: New line Stuttgart - Ulm feasible ?. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 8/9, 2005, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 368 f.
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Peter Marquart : The development of project planning. (PDF; 8 MiB) In: Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen - Ulm: The consideration of water management in planning - an interim balance - conference proceedings. Regional Council Stuttgart , September 26, 2006, pp. 6–13 , archived from the original on December 17, 2011 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
11. ↑ European Commission (Ed.): The Core Network Corridors: Trans European Transport Network 2013 . Brussels September 2013, p. 38–40 ( online [PDF]). The Core Network Corridors: Trans European Transport Network 2013 ( Memento from February 2, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
12. ^ DB Netz AG: speed booklet 797 of December 13, 2010, z. B. page 48.
13. ^ ^{A b} Peter Marquart : Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. Planning status and outlook. In: Tiefbau , 119, No. 4, 2007, ISSN  0944-8780 , pp. 190–196 ( PDF; 657 KiB ( Memento from October 20, 2014 in the Internet Archive )).
14. ↑ Udo Andriof : Start of construction of the new line. direct to Stuttgart 21, November 12, 2010, accessed on November 28, 2010 . 
15. ↑ ^{a b} Bahn begins construction work. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 7, 2012.
16. ↑ “Glück auf” under the Alb . In: Südwest Presse . December 2, 2013, ZDB -ID 1360527-6 , p. 12 .
17. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bahn AG advised on schedule and cost developments for Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen-Ulm line. In: deutschebahn.com. Deutsche Bahn, January 26, 2018, archived from the original on January 27, 2018 ; accessed on January 26, 2018 .  
18. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Landtag of Baden-Württemberg (ed.): Financing agreement for the Stuttgart – Ulm rail project ( memo from August 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 2.4 MiB). Printed matter 14/4382 of April 22, 2009.
19. ↑ ^{a b} DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, p. 11 f.
20. ↑ ^{a b c} Hany Azer , B. Engel: Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm . In: tunnel . July 2009, ISSN  0722-6241 , p. 12–24 ( tunnel-online.info [PDF; 290 kB ]).
21. ^ ^{A b c d} Philipp Langefeld, Gerald Lindner, Stefan Penn : The new Wendlingen - Ulm line, a project at the transition from the planning to the construction phase . In: Railway technical review . No. 12 , 2012, ISSN  0013-2845 , p. 16-20 .
22. ↑ ^{a b} WRITTEN QUESTION from Michael Cramer (Verts / ALE) to the Commission . Question of December 12, 2006, reply of March 2, 2007.
23. ↑ ^{a b c d} German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Bettina Herlitzius, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 17/5571 - (PDF; 87 KiB). Printed matter 17/5700 of May 3, 2011, p. 5.
24. ↑ ^{a b c} Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Winfried Hermann, Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Bettina Herlitzius, other MPs and the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90 / THE GREENS (PDF; 145 KiB). In: Printed matter 17/955 of March 3, 2010.
25. ↑ ^{a b Regional} Council Stuttgart: Stuttgart 21 / ICE Schnellbahntrasse Wendlingen - Ulm: Regional President welcomes agreement for the largest transport project in Baden-Württemberg . Press release from July 19, 2007.
26. ↑ Federal Railway Office (Ed.): Plan approval decision according to §§ 18 General Railway Act (AEG), 78 Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG) for the project "PFA 2.1 a / b, NBS Wendlingen - Ulm, Albvorland", in the communities of Wendlingen am Neckar, Oberboihingen, Kirchheim unter Teck and Dettingen unter Teck Railway km 25,200 to 36,260 on the Wendlingen - Ulm route and "relocation of the L 1250 state road between Wendlingen and Oberboihingen" . Stuttgart March 23, 2015, p. 61, 65-80 ( online [PDF]). Planning approval according to §§ 18 General Railway Act (AEG), 78 Administrative Procedure Act (VwVfG) for the project "PFA 2.1 a / b, Wendlingen - Ulm, Albvorland", in the communities of Wendlingen am Neckar, Oberboihingen, Kirchheim unter Teck and Dettingen unter Teck Railway km 25.200 to 36.260 on the Wendlingen - Ulm route and "relocation of the L 1250 state road between Wendlingen and Oberboihingen" ( memento from November 26, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
27. ↑ Gaby Kiedaisch: We don't want to bring legal action . In: Nürtinger Zeitung . July 2, 2015, p. 16 .
28. ↑ ^{a b} The further timetable of the major project . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . October 24, 2006, p. 19 .
29. ↑ More than 1000 objections to the Bahn-Albaufstieg. In: Heilbronner Voice (online edition), December 3, 2008.
30. ↑ Schnellbahntrasse Wendlingen - Ulm: Stuttgart regional council concludes the hearing process for the ascent of the Alb . Press release from the regional council of Stuttgart, August 20, 2009.
31. ↑ New line clears an important hurdle. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . October 21, 2011, accessed February 3, 2018 . 
32. ↑ Regional Council Tübingen (Ed.): Course set for new ICE line and expansion of the A 8 on the Swabian Alb . Press release from November 20, 2008.
33. ↑ ^{a b} Start of construction in spring? ( Memento of February 13, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )  ( page no longer available , search in web archives ). Südwestpresse, December 31, 2009.
34. ↑ Federal Railway Office (Ed.): Plan approval decision according to § 18 General Railway Act (AEG) for the upgraded and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, Wendlingen - Ulm area: Plan approval section 2.4, Alb descent km 75.250 - km 81.768 . ( PDF  ( page no longer available , search in web archives ); 0.7 MiB).
35. ↑ Julia Kling: The train can build at the main station . In: Südwest Presse . March 14, 2015, ZDB -ID 1360527-6 , p. 17 .
36. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Deutsche Bahn AG: Stuttgart 21 and the new line to Ulm are built . Topic service as of July 19, 2007 on the website of Deutsche Bahn AG (source no longer available online).
37. ↑ ^{a b} Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): Implementing ideas, connecting people, creating perspectives. , Brochure (36 pages, April 2009, p. 14).
38. ↑ ^{a b} Large-scale project Stuttgart 21 overcomes parliamentary hurdle in committee ( memento of October 18, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). Current announcement (hib) of the German Bundestag from December 16, 2009.
39. ↑ Off the beaten track. In: Göppinger Kreisnachrichten , April 23, 1986, p. 15.
40. ^ ^{A b} Gerhard Heimerl : Efficient transport as a location factor. In: The Railway Engineer . 1996, No. 5, ISSN  0013-2810 , pp. 8-12.
41. ^ ^{A b} Gerhard Heimerl : Routing of the DB high-speed line Stuttgart - Augsburg - Munich: Comments and considerations on the documentation of the preliminary investigations of the ABS / NBS Plochingen - Günzburg . Stuttgart, 1988, especially pp. 18 and 21.
42. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway junction. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory report Part I: General part . Plan approved document of January 28, 2005, pp. 50–58.
43. ↑ ^{a b} Gerhard Heimerl : Winding paths to the goal. Detours and obstacles on the way to Stuttgart 21. In: Turm-Forum Stuttgart 21 e. V. (Ed.): The Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. A milestone in the European high-speed network . Stuttgart 2006, "Sonderedition 678-1006", pp. 47–49.
44. ↑ ^{a b} German Bundestag: Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from MPs Winfried Hermann, Fritz Kuhn, Alexander Bonde, other MPs and the Alliance 90 / THE GREENS parliamentary group (PDF; 90 KiB). Printed paper 16/5331 dated May 30, 2007.
45. ↑ ^{a b c d} Deutsche Bundesbahn, NBS project group of the Bahnbauzentrale (publisher): Information on the expansion and new construction of the Stuttgart - Augsburg line . Twelve-page leporello , Stuttgart, June 1991.
46. ↑ ^{a b} Planned tunnels in the course of the new Stuttgart – Ulm line. In: Tunnel , Issue 5/1993, ISSN  0722-6241 , pp. 288-292.
47. ↑ Stuttgarter Zeitung , October 21, 2010, p. 24, stuttgarter-zeitung.de .
48. ^ Deutsche Bundesbahn / Deutsche Reichsbahn (Ed.): Vision of an ICE line network in 2005. In: Die Bahn informs , "Reprint June '93", p. 17.
49. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, projects (ed.): Project »Stuttgart 21«. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, approx. 1995, p. 21, similar version (PDF; 14 MiB).
50. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, project (ed. :): "Stuttgart 21" project: The feasibility study (overview) . Four-page information brochure, no year (circa 1995).
51. ^ Deutsche Bahn AG, network division, Stuttgart regional area, projects (ed.): Project »Stuttgart 21«. The feasibility study . Brochure (40 A4 pages), Stuttgart, circa 1995, p. 32f.
52. ↑ Regional planning for the new Wendlingen - Ulm line at the regional council. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , September 16, 1994.
53. ↑ Options for optimizing the new line to Ulm - The Neckartalbahnhof is under discussion again. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 26, 1995.
54. ↑ Notification of spatial planning decision for the Wendlingen - Ulm express railway line. In: Eisenbahn-Kurier , No. 278, November 1998, ISSN  0170-5288 , p. 21.
55. ^ Günter Dutt: A journey through 150 years of tunnel structures in Württemberg. In: Yearbook for Railway History, Volume 28, 1996, ISSN  0340-4250 , pp. 47-64.
56. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Klaus Arnoldi: Plea for a needs-based expansion. (PDF; 8 pages; 880 KiB) Verkehrsclub Deutschland, April 2, 2004, accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
57. ↑ News update shortly. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 10, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 396.
58. ↑ The federal states set the course against the railway and the federal government. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 267, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. L14.
59. ↑ Bahn board member for the construction of “Stuttgart 21”. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 276, 1999, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 2.
60. ^ Message vote for Stuttgart 21. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 12, year 1999, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 506.
61. ↑ Helmut Kobus : The development of water management problems in the planning process. (PDF; 8 MiB) In: Project Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen - Ulm: The consideration of water management in planning - an interim balance - conference proceedings. Regional Council Stuttgart , September 26, 2006, pp. 14-27 , archived from the original on December 17, 2011 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 .  
62. ↑ The course has been set. In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 1.
63. ↑ 1250 objections to route. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten. March 20, 2008, archived from the original on February 12, 2013 ; Retrieved March 20, 2008 . 
64. ^ D-Stuttgart: Technical planning services for traffic systems . Document 2011 / S 167-276528 of September 1, 2011 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.
65. ↑ Last approval for NBS Wendlingen - Ulm received. In: railway magazine . No. 5 , 2015, ISSN  0342-1902 , p. 26 .
66. ^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines. In: ted.europa.eu. November 15, 2019, accessed on November 16, 2019 (The turnout speeds are derived from Weiche_ (Bahn) #Schnellfahrweise .). 
67. ↑ Announcement of the first work on the new line. In: Dialog 21 , Edition 3, January 2011, ( ZDB -ID 2569219-7 ), p. 4.
68. ↑ Andreas Schanz: The groundbreaking for the ICE route Wendlingen - Ulm is due in autumn. In: Schwäbische Zeitung , July 8, 2010.
69. ↑ Geissler stops building preparations on the railway line. In: Handelsblatt . No. 219, 2010, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 22.
70. ↑ ^{a b} Thomas Braun: Construction of the new line: the railway starts. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , December 13, 2010.
71. ↑ Raimund Wieble: First bridge on the ICE line completed. In: Südwest Presse . August 29, 2011, archived from the original on December 18, 2011 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
72. ↑ ^{a b c} Thomas Wüpper: Bahn is expecting further delays internally. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , vol. 68, no. 93, 21./22. April 2012, p. 21 (similar version online ).
73. ↑ Intermediate sprint on the strolling route. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , November 26, 2007.
74. ^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision . Document 2009 / S 60-086614 of March 27, 2009 in the electronic gazette of the European Union.
75. ^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision. NOTICE - SECTORS. Service contract . Document 2009 / S 222-319800 of November 18, 2009 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.
76. ^ D-Stuttgart: Construction site supervision . Document 161576-2010 dated June 3, 2010 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.
77. ↑ Roman sanctuary on ICE route Wendlingen-Ulm. ( Memento from November 27, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) In: news.de , January 21, 2011.
78. ↑ Communication office Bahnprojekt Stuttgart – Ulm e. V. (Ed.): Construction work at Stuttgart 21 and the new Wendlingen-Ulm route continue . Press release from June 15, 2011.
79. ^ Stuttgart-Ulm rail project (ed.): Deutsche Bahn awards the construction of a new section of line on the Alb plateau . Press release from August 8, 2012.
80. ^ D-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines . Document 2012 / S 9-013692 of January 14, 2012 in the electronic gazette of the European Union.
81. ^ D-Stuttgart: construction of railway tunnels . Document 2012 / S 136-227619 of July 18, 2012 in the supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union .
82. ^ D-Stuttgart: tunnel construction work . Document 2012 / S 129-214642 of July 7, 2012 in the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union.
83. ^ D-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines . Document 2012 / S 248-411363 of December 27, 2012 in the supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union .
84. ^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines . Document 2013 / S 238-414499 of December 7, 2013 in the supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union .
85. ↑ STUTZ receives major order for the Stuttgart 21 rail sub-project . Press release from Stutz dated November 6, 2013.
86. ↑ Andreas Pflüger: The big drilling and digging begins in mid-2013. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 24, January 30, 2012.
87. ↑ Something is happening in the Stuttgart station tower. In: Reference , ZDB -ID 2663557-4 , issue 3/2012, p. 30 ( PDF ; 2.1 MiB).
88. ↑ No information center for Wendlingen . In: Nürtinger Zeitung . January 3, 2017, p. 14 ( ntz.de - chargeable).
89. ↑ Jürgen Buchta: Tunnel construction starts in March . In: Südwest Presse . October 17, 2013, ZDB -ID 1360527-6 , p. 18 ( swp.de ).
90. ^ S-21 order for construction company Leonhard Weiss . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 18 , 23 January 2015, p. 22 .
91. ↑ New line: the next section is tough . In: Augsburger Allgemeine . February 12, 2015, p. 33 .
92. ↑ Swiss company builds Albvorland tunnel . In: Esslinger Zeitung . December 24, 2015, ZDB -ID 125919-2 , p. 13 .
93. ↑ New line: Deutsche Bahn awards contracts worth millions . In: Augsburger Allgemeine . January 16, 2016, p. 26 .
94. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Bahn writes out equipment for the route . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 71 , December 17, 2015, p. 19 ( stuttgarter-nachrichten.de ).
95. ↑ ^{a b} Railway technology: order awarded . In: Nürtinger Zeitung . January 16, 2018, p. 14 .
96. ↑ Ulm - Wendlingen track contract awarded. In: railwaygazette.com. January 12, 2018, accessed January 13, 2018 . 
97. ↑ Halfway through: half of the tunnels on the new Wendlingen – Ulm line were driven . Announcement on the project website from June 20, 2016.
98. ↑ Tunnel construction for the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. Deutsche Bahn AG, December 18, 2017, accessed on January 6, 2018 . 
99. ↑ The rails will be laid on the Alb plateau . Communication from Deutsche Bahn dated August 7, 2019.
100. ↑ Alb foreland: The “WANDA” tunnel boring machine has reached its destination. In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. Deutsche Bahn, October 29, 2019, accessed on October 29, 2019 . 
101. ↑ ^{a b c} Jörg Hamann: On course for commissioning: Bahnstart2022Train traffic on the new Wendlingen – Ulm line. (PDF) In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. DB Project Stuttgart – Ulm, July 15, 2020, accessed on July 15, 2020 . 
102. ↑ ^{a b c} Volker Kefer : Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen-Ulm Document for the Examination and Compliance Committee (PCA) of the DB and the Steering Committee (LK) S21 . Berlin / Stuttgart, March 23, 2012, pp. 21, 26, 27, 28.
103. ↑ ^{a b} Thomas Wüpper: The new line and the forgotten inflation . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . January 21, 2013, p. 15 .
104. ↑ Commissioning. Retrieved January 17, 2019 . 
105. ↑ ^{a b c} Application by Abg. Martin Rivoir and others SPD and statement of the Ministry of Transport. (PDF) Ordering trains for the Merklingen railway station. State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, July 13, 2020, accessed on August 15, 2020 . 
106. ↑ Good arguments for travelers. (PNG) In: s21erleben.de. Retrieved January 6, 2019 . 
107. ↑ The country has to be patient when planning trains . stuttgarter-zeitung.de from December 17, 2019.
108. ↑ The offer on the Filstalbahn is to be further developed. Ministry of Transport Baden-Württemberg, April 17, 2020, accessed on April 18, 2020 . 
109. ↑ Jürgen Bock: Stuttgart 21: Filstalbrücke is very late. In: stuttgarter-nachrichten.de. January 30, 2020, accessed February 2, 2020 . 
110. ↑ Bahn sees itself on course for bridge construction in: Stuttgarter Nachrichten of July 16, 2020
111. ↑ ^{a b} German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Matthias Gastel, Harald Ebner, Christian Kühn (Tübingen), other MPs and the parliamentary group ALLIANCE 90 / THE GREENS - printed matter 18/2123 - state of the new line Wendlingen –Ulm . tape 18 , no. 2239 , July 25, 2014, ISSN  0722-8333 , p. 8, 9 ( bundestag.de [PDF]).
112. ↑ Municipal Council of the City of Stuttgart: Printed matter 177/2001. March 2001.
113. ↑ Mathias Bury: Money for ICE route only if yes to the new station . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . October 24, 2006, p. 21 .
114. ↑ Billionaire project “Stuttgart 21” is realized. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 38, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 5.
115. ↑ ^{a b} Michael Ohnewald : Secret paper on Stuttgart 21 fuels speculation . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . March 16, 2001, p. 23 .
116. ↑ Cost explosion in major rail projects. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 61, 2001, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 2.
117. ↑ DB Projects South at a glance. In: Stuttgart 21. The project magazine . Spring 2002 edition, March 2002, ZDB -ID 1500833-2 , p. 2.
118. ↑ Thomas Wüpper, Thomas Braun: Bahn contained additional costs to the Bundestag. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung (online edition), around July 5, 2011.
119. ↑ Michael Ohnewald: Balance of the engineers: Stuttgart 21 not more expensive. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , No. 252, October 29, 2004, p. 21.
120. ↑ ^{a b} Thomas Wüpper: The financial plan for the ICE route involves risks . No. 98, April 27, 2012, p. 21 (similar version online ).
121. ^ Oettinger appeals to the federal government. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , No. 199, 2006, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 6.
122. ↑ Peter Reinhardt: Bund stands at Stuttgart 21 . In: Handelsblatt . No. 205 , October 24, 2006, ISSN  0017-7296 , p. 6 .
123. ↑ Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Republic of Germany (...), the state of Baden-Württemberg (...), Deutsche Bahn AG, DB Netz AG, DB Station & Service AG and DB Energie GmbH (...), the state capital Stuttgart (...) , the Verband Region Stuttgart (...) for the realization of the new Stuttgart - Ulm line and the Stuttgart 21 project dated July 19, 2007. (PDF) ( Memento from April 23, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
124. ↑ ^{a b} Michael Isenberg: Who pays the additional costs for the ICE line? ". In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , September 4, 2010.
125. ↑ Is Stuttgart taking money away from 21 other projects? ( Memento of February 6, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Mannheimer Morgen , August 24, 2010.  
126. ↑ ^{a b} German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the Federal Government to the small question of the MPs Dr. Anton Hofreiter, Dr. Valerie Wilms, Harald Ebner, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 17/6952 - (PDF; 100 KiB). Printed matter 17/7173 of September 27, 2011.
127. ↑ Financing for Stuttgart 21 is available. In: Spiegel online, July 19, 2007.
128. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG: Current state of affairs Stuttgart 21 (PDF; 95 KiB). Information (10 A4 pages) dated December 10, 2009, p. 7.
129. ↑ Financing agreement postponed again. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . September 24, 2008, archived from the original on February 23, 2009 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
130. ↑ Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development: Report request from the budget committee of the German Bundestag for the adjustment meeting for the HH 2009 on November 20, 2008 . Tripartite opinion of November 13, 2008.
131. ^ ^{A b} Jörg Nauke: Opponents present the timetable. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , November 4, 2010.
132. ↑ 27 kilometers of tunnels through difficult rock. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , October 4, 2006.
133. ^ Billion project Stuttgart 21 sealed ( Memento of April 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten , April 2, 2009 (online edition).
134. ↑ ^{a b} Federal Audit Office : Report of the Federal Audit Office in accordance with Section 88 (2) BHO on the Stuttgart 21 project and the new Wendlingen - Ulm line ( memento from October 9, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 574 KiB), October 2008.
135. ↑ ^{a b} Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development: Report on the subject of “Current cost development on the new Wendlingen - Ulm line and the overall Stuttgart 21 project”. State of affairs. (PDF; 249 KiB). Committee printed matter 17 (15) 96 of the Committee on Transport, Building and Urban Development at the German Bundestag, September 2010.
136. ↑ "The railway is not interested in glossing over the project".  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Eßlinger Zeitung , August 20, 2008.  
137. ^ Konstantin Schwarz: EU gives money for Stuttgart 21 and route to Ulm . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 16 , January 21, 2014, p. 15 ( stuttgarter-nachrichten.de ).
138. ↑ ^{a b} Konstantin Schwarz: EU pays one billion for the railway line to Ulm . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 161 , July 16, 2015, p. 17 ( stuttgarter-nachrichten.de ).
139. ^ Konstantin Schwarz, Markus Grabitz: The project is running. In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . November 21, 2008, archived from the original on October 23, 2010 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
140. ↑ Lowering the Stuttgart train station will be more expensive. In: Die Welt , November 4, 2008.
141. ↑ ^{a b} Vieregg-Rössler GmbH Innovative Verkehrsberatung (Ed.): Forecast of the probable project costs of the new Wendlingen - Ulm line and suggestions for improving passenger and freight train traffic in the Stuttgart - Augsburg corridor (PDF; 303 KiB), client parliamentary group Bündnis 90 / DIE GREENS in the German Bundestag, DIE GRÜNEN parliamentary group in the state parliament of Baden-Württemberg, Munich in September 2010.
142. ↑ Deutsche Bahn AG (Ed.): DB: Horror figures for the new Wendlingen-Ulm line are incomprehensible . Press release from September 8, 2010.
143. ↑ ^{a b} 865 million euros more expensive. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , July 27, 2010.
144. ↑ German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the deputies Harald Ebner, Dr. Valerie Wilms, Sylvia Kotting-Uhl, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - Printed matter 17/12357: Cost development of the new Wendlingen – Ulm line . Printed matter 17/12656. March 11, 2013, ISSN  0722-8333 ( bundestag.de [PDF]).
145. ↑ Inflation buffer in the cost estimate of the new line? . Directly to June 9, 2011.
146. ↑ Costs for crossing the Alb more precisely. In: Dialog 21 , Edition 2, September 2010, ( ZDB -ID 2569219-7 ), p. 1.
147. ↑ New test confirms the economic viability of the new ICE line from Stuttgart to Ulm. Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Transport Baden-Württemberg, November 11, 2010, archived from the original on November 14, 2010 ; Retrieved November 14, 2010 . 
148. ↑ ^{a b c} Thomas Braun: Land and rail should add more. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung (online edition), March 3, 2011.
149. ↑ Distribution of costs: Bahn should pay more for Stuttgart 21 ( Memento from November 19, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Financial Times Deutschland , November 17, 2010.
150. ↑ Country: No new discussions about the expressway line . bild.de , September 1, 2010.
151. ^ The federal government wants more money from the state and railways. ( Memento from September 4, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . August 31, 2010.
152. ↑ New line: the federal government feels it has an obligation. ( Memento from February 11, 2013 in the web archive archive.today )  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives ) In: Pforzheimer Zeitung . September 29, 2010.
153. ↑ Police end occupation of the station. ( Memento from July 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . July 26, 2010.
154. ↑ DB Mobility Logistics AG: DB welcomes the commitment of additional funds to expand the railways: an extra billion by 2015 . Press release from March 16, 2011.
155. ↑ Thomas Wüpper: ICE route brings a lot of money to the railway. In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , May 8, 2012, No. 106, p. 17 ( similar version ).
156. ↑ Fabian Zehe: NEW CONSTRUCTION ROUTE: Planners report savings . In: Südwest Presse . February 5, 2014, ZDB -ID 1360527-6 , p. 14 ( swp.de ).
157. ↑ Daniela Kuhr: Free WiFi is coming for everyone . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . December 3, 2014, ISSN  0174-4917 , p. 17 .
158. ↑ Andreas Böhme: Some calculate this way, others quite differently . In: Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung . December 17, 2015, p. 20 ( rnz.de ).
159. ↑ Christian Milankovic: We're not doing youth research here . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . tape 72 , December 10, 2016, p. 24 ( stuttgarter-zeitung.de ).
160. ↑ 596 million paid to railways . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 62 , March 16, 2015, p. 15 .
161. ↑ Konstantin Schwarz: Land pays the rest of the new line in the spring . In: Stuttgarter Nachrichten . No. 288 , December 12, 2015, p. 23 ( stuttgarter-nachrichten.de ).
162. ^ Winfried Hermann: Planned train service on the Stuttgart − Ulm route. (PDF) Printed matter 16 / 3058. In: landtag-bw.de. State Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, November 24, 2017, pp. 2, 3 , accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
163. ↑ Audit for the operational quality review Stuttgart 21. (PDF) Final report. DB Netz, Land Baden-Württemberg, July 21, 2011, p. Modules FP-01 (PDF pages 55 ff.) And FP-05 (PDF page 80 ff.) , Accessed on July 18, 2019 (“Version 1 -00 "). 
164. ↑ The Stuttgart node in the 2nd expert draft of the Deutschland-Takt. (PDF) In: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de. Deutsche Bahn, 2020, p. 4 in PDF , archived from the original on January 3, 2020 ; accessed on January 3, 2020 . 
165. ^ Christian Milankovic: Federal government is planning a new rail tunnel in Stuttgart . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung . tape 76 , March 13, 2020, p. 21 ( online for a fee ).
166. ↑ Target timetable Germany-Takt: First expert draft long-distance traffic. (PDF) SMA und Partner , October 9, 2018, accessed on October 21, 2018 . 
167. ↑ Destination timetable Germany-Takt. (PDF) Third expert draft for long-distance transport. SMA und Partner AG, June 30, 2020, accessed June 30, 2020 . 
168. ↑ Destination timetable Germany-Takt. (PDF) Third expert draft for long-distance transport. SMA und Partner AG, June 30, 2020, accessed June 30, 2020 . 
169. ↑ Verband Region Stuttgart (Ed.): Session No. 190/2013, Transport Committee on May 8, 2013: Update of the regional transport plan - results of the traffic forecast for the reference scenario 2025 . May 8, 2013, p. 11 ( Session No. 190/2013, Transport Committee on May 8, 2013: Update of the regional transport plan - results of the traffic forecast for the reference scenario 2025 ( Memento of October 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 615 kB ]).
170. ^ Verband Region Stuttgart (ed.): Annex 4.1 to template 190/2013; Examination of the transport committee on May 8, 2013 . May 8, 2013, p. 1 ( Annex 4.1 to submission 190/2013; exam of the transport committee on May 8, 2013 ( memento of October 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 5.2 MB ]).
171. ↑ German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Sabine Leidig, Eva Bulling-Schröter, Herbert Behrens, other MPs and the parliamentary group DIE LINKE. - Printed matter 17/3021 - Rail freight traffic on the new Nuremberg – Ingolstadt and Wendlingen – Ulm lines (PDF; 96 KiB). Printed matter 17/3311 of October 14, 2010.
172. ↑ German Bundestag: Answer of the federal government to a small question (...): Saving possibilities through new routing of railways for high-speed traffic taking into account the tilting train technology. (PDF; 335 KiB). Printed matter 13/2130 of August 10, 1995.
173. ↑ ^{a b c d} DBProjekt GmbH, Stuttgart 21 (Ed.): Plan approval documents: Redesign of the Stuttgart railway node. Expansion and new line Stuttgart - Augsburg, area Stuttgart - Wendlingen with airport connection: Section 1.1, valley crossing with main station. Construction km -0.4 -42.0 to +0.4 +32.0. Explanatory Report Part I: General Part - Supplement (adaptation to the BVWP 2003) . As of October 4, 2004, pp. 31, 33, 35, 41, 43.
174. ^ Joachim Nied, Peter Marquart : Planning, implementation and geology of the major projects Stuttgart 21 and NBS Wendlingen – Ulm. In: Geotechnik , 30 (2007), No. 4, ISSN  0172-6145 , pp. 225-230.
175. ↑ Statement from SMA and Partner AG on the publication of confidential meeting documents. (PDF; 64.7 KiB) SMA and Partner AG, July 28, 2010, archived from the original on October 9, 2010 ; accessed on February 4, 2018 . 
176. ↑ Does the allocation of railway lines affect railway stops? In: Schwäbische Zeitung . November 19, 2015, p. 17 .
177. ^ Germany-Stuttgart: Public rail transport / public rail transport. In: ted.europa.eu. June 15, 2018, accessed June 15, 2018 . 
178. ↑ Basic cycle train (26 trains) with peak hour trains (49 trains) according to the design of DB Netz. (PDF) DB Netz AG, State of Baden-Württemberg, June 30, 2011, accessed on October 27, 2018 . 
179. ↑ Stress test Stuttgart 21. (PDF) Timetable robustness test . DB Netz AG, June 30, 2011, p. 44 , accessed October 27, 2018 . 
180. ↑ Current information from the vehicle sector (Part 1) . In: Union of German Locomotive Drivers (Ed.): Advance . No. 7 , July 2017, ISSN  1438-0099 , p. 24-26 .
181. ^ DB Netz (Ed.): European Train Control System (ETCS) at DB Netz AG . Frankfurt am Main April 2014, p. 10 ( online [PDF]). European Train Control System (ETCS) at DB Netz AG ( Memento from June 14, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
182. ↑ ^{a b} German Bundestag (ed.): Answer of the federal government to the small question of the MPs Matthias Gastel, Stephan Kühn (Dresden), Tabea Rößner, other MPs and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN - printed matter 18/4405 - current planning and implementation status of the new Wendlingen – Ulm line and its performance . tape 18 , no. 4555 , April 7, 2015, ISSN  0722-8333 , p. 3 ( bundestag.de [PDF]).
183. ↑ Germany-Stuttgart: Electrical signaling devices for rail traffic. Document 2019 / S 197-478618. In: Supplement to the Electronic Official Journal of the European Union . October 11, 2019, accessed on October 14, 2019 (German). 
184. ↑ Germany-Stuttgart: Electrical signaling devices for rail traffic. In: ted.europa.eu. August 22, 2017. Retrieved August 22, 2017 . 
185. ↑ Germany-Stuttgart: Electrical signaling devices for rail traffic. In: ted.europa.eu. September 16, 2017. Retrieved September 19, 2017 . 
186. ^ Germany-Stuttgart: Construction work for railway lines. Document 2020 / S 100-239370. In: Tenders Electronic Daily . May 25, 2020, accessed May 25, 2020 . 
187. ↑ Track price software 2011 (as of October 2010) ( Memento from May 13, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) of DB Netz AG : Distance between Ulm Hbf and Stuttgart Hbf of 93.022 kilometers.
188. ↑ ^{a b} Notice of the Steinbühl tunnel. Ceremonial start of construction of the new Wendlingen – Ulm line / Susanne Ramsauer is the tunnel sponsor. Deutsche Bahn AG, July 19, 2013, archived from the original on July 24, 2013 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
189. ↑ ^{a b} More rail for metropolises and regions. (PDF; 3.12 MiB) Deutsche Bahn AG, March 18, 2015, pp. 3, 7 , archived from the original on April 4, 2015 ; accessed on February 3, 2018 . 
190. ↑ Bavarian Railway Company puts the regional traffic of the "Augsburger Netze" out to tender. In: beg.bahnland-bayern.de. Bavarian Railway Company , December 27, 2017, accessed on December 27, 2017 . 
191. ↑ The high-speed line Stuttgart - Ulm cemented the problems of rail freight traffic in the southwest instead of eliminating them . In: Netzwerk Privatbahnen (Ed.): Position paper . July 12, 2007.
192. ^ ^{A b} Wrong arguments against the NBS Wendlingen - Ulm. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . Issue 11/2005, p. 512.
193. ^ Heinz Kurz: InterCityExpress. EK-Verlag, Freiburg, 2009, ISBN 978-3-88255-228-7 , p. 281.
194. ^ Sven Andersen: Bottlenecks in the corridor Stuttgart - Munich . In: Eisenbahn-Revue International . No. 3 , March 2011, ISSN  1421-2811 , p. 115 f .