Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo
Advance of the Austrians and Germans after the Battle of Karfreit
| date | October 24, 1917 to October 27, 1917 |
|---|---|
| place | Kobarid |
| output | Victory of the Central Powers , retreat of the Italians to the Piave |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
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|
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| Troop strength | |
| 400,000 soldiers, 34 divisions | 856,000 soldiers, 41 divisions |
| losses | |
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Dead: about 5,000 |
Dead: around 13,000, more than 300,000 prisoners |
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1915
1st Isonzo - 2nd Isonzo - 3rd Isonzo - 4th Isonzo - Lavarone (1915-1916)
1916
5th Isonzo - South Tyrol offensive - 6th Isonzo - Doberdò - 7. Isonzo - 8. Isonzo - 9th Isonzo -
First Dolomites Offensive - Second Dolomites offensive -
Avalanche disaster
1917
10th Isonzo - Ortigara - 11th Isonzo - 12th Isonzo - Pozzuolo - Monte Grappa
1918
Piave - San Matteo - Vittorio Veneto
The Twelfth Isonzo Battle or Battle of Karfreit (today's Kobarid ), Italian Battaglia di Caporetto , is the name of the last Isonzo battle in the First World War . It began on October 24, 1917 and ended as such on October 27, 1917 with the achievement of the Tagliamento, which was set as the maximum target . Often the subsequent fighting up to the transition to trench warfare on the Piave is also included in the battle. The battle was the first major movement Battle on the date in trench warfare persisting Alpine Front and one of the greatest military victory of the Central Powers during the war. The success of the offensive was largely based on the use of poison gas together with the artillery strike . The defeat led to a serious crisis in the Italian military leadership and the dismissal of the Italian Commander-in-Chief Cadorna. A stabilization of the front could only be guaranteed by the insertion of French and British troops - the withdrawal of German troops and the overstretching of the supply lines did not remain without effect.
Starting position
In the Austro-Hungarian headquarters in Baden near Vienna, it was realized that another attack like the previous one ( Eleventh Isonzo Battle ) could no longer be repelled. One was therefore forced to react and saw the only way to go about attacking oneself. However, this project would not have been feasible with one's own efforts, so the German ally was asked for support. Although the German Chief of the General Staff Field Marshal von Hindenburg and with him the "First Quartermaster General" General of the Infantry Ludendorff wanted to focus on the East, they saw that relief for Austria-Hungary would be necessary. The only operational minimum objective was initially to recapture the lost territories up to the imperial border and - if the attack should be sufficient - advance to the Tagliamento . The German troops should be withdrawn after reaching the river at the latest.
- Wording of the operation order
COMMAND
- The aim of the operation is to push the Italians back across the imperial border and, if possible, across the Tagliamento. To this end, the entire army front will simultaneously take the offensive on a day to be determined.
- The German 14th Army will have the task of breaking through the enemy front in the area of the Jeza Heights west of Tolmein, and then first of all to win the line: Heights north of Cividale – imperial border north-west of the Korada. The army will also have to facilitate the crossing of the Isonzo for the right wing of the 2nd Isonzo Army.
- The Krauss Corps (kuk I. Korps) will be responsible for breaking out from the present area of the kuk 93rd Infantry Division (near Flitsch) to cover the right flank of the 14th Army.
- The 2nd Isonzo Army, holding the north wing strong, will take up the attack at the same time as the 14th Army and first cross the border north-west of Korada – Mt. To reach Santo.
- The 1st Isonzo Army will initially have to bind the strongest possible enemy forces by gripping them vigorously.
- The day of attack is provisionally expected to be October 22nd.
Kdo. The Southwest Front
troops
The 14th Army was reorganized for this purpose ; an initially purely German, later a mixed German-Austrian-Hungarian unit under the command of General der Infanterie Otto von Below , which was to lead the main thrust (this was aimed at the left shoulder of the Italian 2nd Army). Austria-Hungary pulled the previous 1st and 2nd Isonzo Army together to form "Army Group Boroević" on the left wing and deployed the 10th (kuk) Army under the command of Field Marshal Freiherr von Krobatin from the Carnic Alps from the north to support them Italian flank. In the final phase, the 11th (kuk) Army of the South Tyrolean Front also intervened in the battle.
41 Italian divisions with 3,626 guns and 34 Allied divisions with 3302 guns faced each other.
Major associations involved in each case
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| I. | II. |
|---|---|
11th Army (Austria-Hungary) under Colonel General Viktor von Scheuchenstuel 10th Army (Eastern Hungary) under Colonel General Alexander Freiherr von Krobatin
14th Army (German Reich) under General of the Infantry Otto von Below
1st Isonzo Army (Eastern Hungary) under Infantry General Johann Ritter von Henriquez 2nd Isonzo Army (Eastern Hungary) under Colonel General Wenzel von Wurm |
( Judiciary , Trentino, South Tyrol)
( Fiemme Valley , Dolomite Front)
( Carnic Alps , Carinthian border)
(on the Isonzo, in the main attack area to the south of Gorizia)
(on the Isonzo, southern section south of Gorizia to the Adriatic Sea) |
Situation development by October 24, 1917
Although the time of the attack had been betrayed by two defected Czech and Romanian officers and the Italian enemy reconnaissance had already passed on corresponding reports to the army command, the Italian side could not decide in time to take effective countermeasures. A committee of inquiry chaired by General Carlo Caneva found after the war that the military reconnaissance had gained and reported the following findings:
- September 14, 1917: The border between Austria and Switzerland was closed , a German division was present in South Tyrol, Austro-Hungarian troops withdrew from South Tyrol and moved to other fronts, about 15 Austro-Hungarian divisions were moved from the Russian front to Carinthia and Carniola .
- September 30, 1917: German officers appear in large numbers at the front near Tolmein , German troops arrive in Grahovo.
- October 2, 1917: An Austro-Hungarian division is relocated to the Baca valley, the 12th German infantry division is relocated from Alsace to Carinthia, German troops appear in Villach.
- October 3, 1917: German infantry and artillery arrive at the Tolmein front.
- October 18, 1917: Extensive troop movements from Villach to Laibach .
General Cadorna was of the opinion, however, that the positions were strong enough to hold off the attackers long enough for reinforcements to be brought in. For this reason he did nothing serious; only obstacles were removed, the artillery strengthened somewhat, and some Bersaglieri and Alpini companies were placed in the affected sections.
As a result of the events that followed, the 4th Italian Army, which stood west of the line Feltre - Belluno - Pieve and held the front to Tyrol, suddenly found itself threatened in its rear and was ultimately forced to withdraw as quickly as possible from the heights of the Dolomites.
- 14th Army deployments
- Left:
- " Group Scotti " with 1. (kuk) InfTrpDiv at Selo, behind it 5. (d) InfDiv
- " Gruppe Berrer " with 200th InfDiv in the southern part of the Tolmeiner bridgehead, behind it the 26th (d) InfDiv
- Center:
- "Gruppe Stein" (Royal Bavarian III. Corps) with Alpine Corps in the northern part of the bridgehead, 12th (d) InfDiv north of Tolmein, 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv to the Krn. Behind the Alpenkorps Ostl. Sela the 117th (d) InfDiv
- Right:
- Krauss group : (I. kuk Corps) with 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv to the Flitsch basin, 22nd (kk) SchtzDiv in the Flitsch basin, kuk Edelweiss division to the Rombon. Behind it, northeast of Soca, the German Jäger Division .
- Army reserves:
- Behind the left wing in the depths: 13th (kk) SchtzDiv, 4th (kuk) InfTrpDiv and 33. (kuk) InfTrpDiv
- The Italian armed forces were standing
- 2nd Army: from Rombon near Flitsch to Wippach near Görz (28 divisions)
- 3rd Army: from the Wippach near Gorizia over the southern karst plateau to the sea (13 divisions)
- Directions of attack
- "Scotti Group": Globocak - Tribil - Castel del Monte
- “Berrer Group”: Monte Hum - Monte San Martino - Cividale
- "Group stone":
- Left Wing: Jeza - Kolowratrücken - Monte Matajur - Natisone valley
- right wing: Idersko - Karfreit - Monte Mia - Monte Juanes - Monte Madlessena
- "Krauss Group":
- Main thrust in the valley of Flitsch via Saga on the Stol
- left wing 55. (kuk) InfTrp: Vrsic - Ravna - Starosela
- all strength then: Monteaperta - Monte le Zuffine
- Northern side column in the mountains: Prevalascharte - Neveasattel - Resiutta - Venzone
Chronological sequence of the events of the battle
October 24, 1917
The Italian troops were completely taken by surprise when the allies began to strike at two o'clock. The high proportion of gas grenades and the previously unknown intensity of artillery fire by the Italian soldiers on their side immediately not only led to heavy losses in the far too densely occupied front trenches, but also to the first signs of disintegration. The right section of the 2nd (it) Army, which was particularly attacked, gave way almost immediately and began to drag along the wings that had been created and hung in the air. For this reason, in the morning of the same day, deep break-ins were made in the Flitsch and Tolmein area and an unexpected number of prisoners was taken. The 12th Inf Div had managed to overcome 27 kilometers by evening and to advance to near Robic on the national border.
The use of gas carried out together with the artillery strike is one of the most momentous uses of poison gas on the southern front. Instead of the B and C warfare agents previously used by Austro-Hungarian troops, which the Italians no longer feared, the method from the western front using gas cannons was used. In support of an Austro-Hungarian attack, German pioneer units used gas cannons with 70,000 green and blue cross grenades and the new substances chlorine-arsine warfare agent and diphosgene to break masks (so-called colored shooting ) on the southern front from October 24th . The gas cannons were fired to fill the Naklo Gorge south of Flitsch with five to six tons of green cross. An entire Italian unit died here. Major Graf von Pfeil and Klein Ellguth , the commander of the German engineer battalion 35 , which commanded the gas cannon attack near Flitsch, described the effect:
"Already in 1015 a.m. the gorges were found completely gas-free and a perfect gas effect was determined. Only a few living, seriously ill Italians were brought back from the foremost enemy position; in the ravine itself, the entire crew, around 500 or 600 men, were dead. Only a few had put on the masks, the position of the dead suggested sudden gastrointestinal death. Dead horses, dogs and rats were also found. "
October 25, 1917
Despite the numerical superiority of the Italian infantry and artillery , the incipient chaos and ultimately the incorrect and late use of the reserves made the success of the allies possible. There were 144 infantry battalions available as reserves on the Italian side, but these could not be deployed immediately because they were widely dispersed in the area of the plain south of the mountains between Cividale, Palmanova and the Isonzo. They were rushed and thrown at the attackers without a plan and wiped out. On the evening of that day, the front Italian position system and Monte Stol were taken.
The 3rd Army, operating south to the Adriatic Sea , also began to give way on that day, as their left flank hung in the air and the danger of encirclement became more and more threatening. Large parts were drawn into the panic and added to the chaos.
The parts of the 2nd (it) Army standing on the Carnic Alps also began to give way. On the one hand, giving in to the pressure of the 10th (kuk) Army, on the other hand, so as not to be cut off by the advancing parts of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army.
Although the leadership of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army endeavored from the start to carry the attack beyond the originally fixed short-range goal (Gorizia and the imperial border), the results so far surprised them. According to the results so far, the command of the Austro-Hungarian Southwest Front immediately ordered the pursuit, initially as far as the Tagliamento, and set this as a preliminary operational target.
October 26, 1917
After storming Monte Matajur , Monte Hum and Globocak, the second Italian position was overcome. The third position was practically no longer available, so the operational breakthrough was achieved.
The beginning of the breakthrough made itself felt in the area in front of the 1st (kuk) Isonzo Army. Here, too, the Italians fell back. On the evening of that day the 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army had reached the Isonzo. Only the right wing of the army made slower progress in the Rombon area because of the difficult terrain and very bad weather. Here, too, the resistance was considerably stronger than on the other sections of the front.
October 27, 1917
Gorizia fell to the Austro-Hungarian troops without resistance, which meant that the originally specified minimum target had already been achieved. The 14th (German / Austrian) Army hit the plain and began to pursue the 2nd (Italian) Army. At that time it consisted only of a conglomerate of hastily flowing back troops, which the attackers often outflanked and captured by the thousands. By then the Italian army had already lost around 200,000 soldiers in captivity and an enormous amount of military equipment.
When it began to appear that the operation could continue beyond the Tagliamento, the goals began to be set further. The troops were ordered to seize the bridges over the river before they could be destroyed. The task was to catch up and destroy the bulk of the Italian Isonzo armies in front of or behind the river. To this end, General von Below issued the following army order:
- AHQu. October 27, 1917 10 o'clock in the evening
- Army command
- 1. Win the Tagliamento bridges at Ragogna-Dignano-Codroipo before the enemy destroys them
- 2nd combat strip:
- Krauß left: Colloredo (excl.) - Daniele Süd (incl.) - Vacile (incl.)
- Stone left: Plaino (incl.) - Silvella - (incl.) - Gradiska (incl.)
- Scotti left: Railway Udine - Codroipo - (incl.) - Casarsa - (incl.)
- 3. AOK on October 28 Kneza, on October 29th Good Friday.
Maximum kdo. Krainburg
The Italian chief of staff, General Cadorna issued the general withdrawal order for the Italian Isonzo army. He left his headquarters in Udine that afternoon. The civilian population also began to leave the city, adding to the confusion on the retreat streets.
Sequence of the following events from October 28 to November 11, 1917
October 28, 1917
In the evening the attack of the 10th (kuk) Army began on the left flank of the 2nd (IT) Army. The Great Pal east of the Plöckenpass and Pontebba were conquered. The 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army reached the line Prepotto - Cormons , the 1st (kuk) Isonzo Army the lower reaches of the Isonzo.
The entire Italian armed forces were in retreat between the sea and Carinthia. At 10 a.m. the last rearguards had crossed the Isonzo unmolested. The 3rd (it) Army withdrew to the heights of Palmanova , severely hampered by around 250,000 dispersed soldiers from the 2nd (it) Army and countless civilian refugees.
On the Tagliamento, several war bridges were destroyed and torn away by the floods. The retreating troops of the 2nd (it) and 3rd (it) Armies therefore concentrated in two wings on the bridge of Pinzano in the north and that of Codroipo in the south. The heads of the 14th (d / ö) Army pushed into this vacuum between the two streams of refugees and were just before the Tagliamento near Rivis.
Udine was captured by the 29th (d) Infantry Division that day.
The weather that day was characterized by unusually heavy rainfall, which made it difficult to fight forwards. Added to this were the rivers and streams that had already risen up before, and their levels continued to increase as a result. The retreating Italians had enough solid bridges at their disposal, which they largely destroyed behind them, so that the pursuers were dependent on war bridges and the fixed bridges that had not been completely destroyed. The former had to be built first, the latter had to be repaired.
At Salt the fixed bridge over the Torrente Torre could be taken “in a usable condition” and the water could be crossed by the (d) Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 18 .
Fighting also took place in the Rombon area and Resia valley .
October 29, 1917
From this day on, the army headquarters were in Krainburg (14th (d) Army), Tarvis (10th (kuk) Army), Ober-Loitsch (2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army), Sana (1st (kuk) Isonzo -Armee), Adelsberg (Hgrp. Boroević) and in Marburg an der Drau the Kdo kuk Südwestfront.
The 14th (d / ö) Army reached the Tagliamento with mass, but the further advance was initially delayed because the troops of the allies had to be regrouped and regrouped. The Austro-Hungarian formations of the left section (1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army) were still hanging back. The 1st (kuk) Isonzo Army had difficulties overcoming the Isonzo. The radio telegraphic connection was interrupted due to unfavorable weather conditions, at this time the headquarters of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army were in the dark about the location of these units. The 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army was able to join the 14th (German / Austrian) Army with its right wing. The 10th (kuk) Army reached the line Forni Avoltri - Rigolata - Paluzza - Paidaro - Moggio - Udinese.
Lieutenant General Albert von Berrer fell that day, and Lieutenant General Eberhard von Hofacker took command of the “Berrer Group” .
The 22nd (kk) rifle division received the order to strike a war bridge over the "Torrente Torre" near Tarcento . After completion, the 43rd (Imperial and Royal) Rifle Brigade arrived on the western bank during the morning and occupied Tarcento.
In the evening the tank factory "Chiusaforte" in the Raccolana valley was taken by the kuk Feldjäger battalion No. 30.
The 200th (d) Inf Div captured a bridgehead at Bonzicco.
The 7th (kuk) mountain brigade advanced over the not completely blown bridge of Firmano and reached the area around San Gottardo - La Buse dai Veris - Laipacco without touching the enemy. On the erroneous assumption that this bridge was no longer passable, the 22nd ( Imperial and Royal ) Mountain Brigade turned via Cividale into the Remanzacco - Selvis - Orzano area. This brigade also had no contact with the enemy.
The 3rd (it) Army began with the XXIII. (it) and the XIII. (it) Corps in the southern area with the crossing over the Tagliamento. On the northern wing, the retreat was mixed up with the unordered parts of the 2nd (IT) Army, which partly led to chaotic conditions here.
October 30, 1917
The left wing of the 14th (d / ö) Army turned to the south-west and attacked at Codroipo and east of it, in order to cut off the Italian troops from the Tagliamento. As a result, the bridge at Codroipo was blown up around 2:30 p.m. Over 60,000 men of the II., VI., XXIV. And XXVII. Corps of the 2nd (it) Army as well as the V and IX. Corps of the 3rd (it) Army in captivity. The troops of the 2nd (it) Army marching back here in a disciplined manner were able to move south in good time and, together with the remains of the 3rd (it) Army (which had already left all heavy equipment on site), cross the river unhindered at Madrisio and Latisana .
As a result of the 14th (German / Austrian) army turning left, which was not agreed with the leadership of the 2nd (Austro-Hungarian) Isonzo Army, the two troops crossed on the advance, which led to problems on the ground and to discrepancies on the Command level led.
In the 10th (kuk) Army the 22nd (kk) rifle division reached Gemona . An Alpini battalion retreating from the mountains was captured there. The barriers at Osoppo and Ospedaletto had already been abandoned and were occupied. Heads of the division reached the Tagliamento, on the opposite bank of which the towns of Bordano , Braulins, Trasaghis and Peonis were still occupied by Italian troops.
The pursuit of the retreating Italians in a south-westerly direction was ordered for the Stein group.
The (kuk) 50th InfTrpDiv and the (d) 12th InfDiv attacked the Italian positions on Monte Ragogna.
The place Pozzuolo del Friuli was taken by the 10th (kuk) Mountain Brigade.
October 31, 1917
The 10th (Austro-Hungarian) Army was advancing all the way to the Plöcken Pass . Italian troops began to dismantle and bring back their stationary equipment up to Cortina d'Ampezzo . On the part of the allies, it was concluded from this that the Italians did not intend to stop on the Tagliamento, but rather to build a new front on the Piave.
On the late evening of that day, the situation on the left wing of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army was as follows:
- The Alpine Corps stood east of Dignano with the intention of forcing the passage over the Tagliamento. A large amount of captured bridge equipment was available for this purpose.
- The 200th Inf Div was at San Odorico and east of it
- The 26. (d) Inf Div had taken Codroipo and tried to capture the bridges (a railway bridge, a wooden bridge and a war bridge) intact.
- The 5th (d) Inf Div fought in the Rivolto -Galleriano-Sclaunico line. The artillery was already suffering from a lack of ammunition here.
- The 117th (d) InfDiv booth with parts at Pasian di Prato , Pozzuolo and Udine
- The (kuk) 1. InfTrpDiv near Udine and in Mortigliano
- The 28th (kuk) InfTrpDiv with parts between Pozzuolo and Udine
- The 57th (kuk) InfTrpDiv with parts between Pozzuolo and Udine
The 15th (kuk) Mountain Brigade received the order to take Monte Ragogna. This mountain dominated the bridges of Cornino and San Pietro and absolutely had to be conquered (but this no longer succeeded that day). Then the 5th (kuk) mountain brigade should cross the Tagliamento on the bridge of Cornino and advance towards Pinzano.
In the area of the 3rd (it) Army, there were only four infantry brigades left as rearguard on the eastern bank of the Tagliamento. Six infantry brigades had withdrawn across the river in perfect order. The parts of the 2nd (it) Army with the remains of the II., VI. and XXIV. Corps on a possibility of transition.
Due to inadequate agreements, parts of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army and the 2nd (Austro-Hungarian) Isonzo Army clashed again.
Around 5 p.m., the 60th (kuk) InfTrpDiv from the south and the 5th (d) InfDiv from the north reached Roveredo .
On that day there was only significant fighting east of Latisana , where the German / Austrian forces exerted strong pressure on the retreating Italians.
November 1, 1917
The troops of the allies tried in vain to cross the Tagliamento that day in several places. Early in the morning the Tagliamento Bridge near Cornino was blown up by Italian pioneers. However, the explosions were only incomplete, so that a battalion of (kuk) InfRgt No. 30 was able to advance to the river island under the bridge. Due to the strong resistance from the western bank and the still raging river (although the level had fallen by about 80 cm in the meantime), no further advance was possible at this time.
The bridge near Madrisio, which was only insufficiently blasted by the Italians, was repaired and would be usable again in the foreseeable future.
The Monte Ragogna was conquered that day, the rearward threat to the river crossings was thus eliminated.
The blown bridge at Pinzano was temporarily unusable again. This river crossing was therefore initially canceled.
The less powerful 10th (kuk) Army advanced haltingly and thereby initially prevented the important removal of the “Monte Festa” armored factory, which blocked the Fellatal , which is important for supplies . This was followed by regrouping and the 10th (kuk) Army was assigned the (kuk) Edelweiss Division and the 22nd (kk) Rifle Division.
Attempts by the (d) Jäger Division to cross the river at Braulins failed because of enemy resistance and the current that was still raging.
Shifts and regroupings took place throughout the day in order to instruct the disorganized units in their assigned combat sectors.
After stubborn resistance in house-to-house combat , the 10th (kuk) InfTrpDiv in Latisana reached the bridges that had already been blown up.
November 2, 1917
In response to urgent requests from AOK 14, the 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv and the 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv (General d. Inf. Krauss) began attempts to cross the Tagliamento on this day.
The 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv had to compete with Cornio, the 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv near Pontaiba (the wooden bridge standing here was only insufficiently destroyed and could be made accessible again). The 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv would be supported by the following 22nd (kk) Rifle Division and the (kuk) Edelweiss Division. The (d) Jäger Division was supposed to cross the river at Braulins and from there support the 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv.
After several unsuccessful attempts at Codroipo and Madrisio, the IV Battalion of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry Regiment No. 2 managed to cross the river on a restored bridge at around 6:00 p.m. and to form a bridgehead. The bridgehead could be widened until late in the evening, but had to hold its own all night against strong Italian counter-attacks, which could only be repulsed with difficulty.
On the upper Tagliamento the 10th (kuk) Army made considerable progress. The 1st (kuk) and the 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army were busy all day regrouping their units and thus initially stepped on the spot.
The attempt of the 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv to cross over at Pontaiba failed because of the current, which did not allow the construction of swimming bridges.
November 3, 1917
The regrouping was completed by evening. However, new attacks should only take place after the heavy artillery had drawn in. Regardless of this, the 38th (kuk) infantry brigade under its commandant Colonel Count Zedtwitz broke out of the bridgehead, advanced over the Torrento Pontaiba and occupied Monte Santos near Manazzos. The crossing points over the Tagliamento were thus secured.
The reconnaissance began telegrams from General Cadorna, with whom he still tried in complete ignorance of the actual situation, to stabilize the front on the Tagliamento. The only troops available to him in the center were the corps of Lieutenant General di Giorgio, consisting of the remains of the 20th (it) Inf Div near Ragogna and the 33rd (it) Inf Div near Pinzano.
The withdrawal of five German divisions planned for this point in time was postponed.
The attempts to cross the Tagliamento at Amaro , Venzone and Braulins were broken off by the German Jäger Division without any results. She was now ordered to cross the river at Cornino.
The 22nd (kk) Rifle Division, which was marching north to support the 10th (kuk) Army, was called back to follow the 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv across the Tagliamento.
November 4, 1917
In the course of the morning the allies advanced as far as the Torrente Arzino and occupied the bridges. By acting independently, the Torrente Pontaiba could also be exceeded.
The commander of the 14th (d / ö) Army, General d. Inf. Von Below, told the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Southwest Front, Archduke Eugen , that he intended to extend the objective of the operation to the Adige . However, he stuck to the Piave as the greatest possible gain in terrain. Furthermore, the intervention of the 11th (kuk) Army from the Trentino was discussed, to which von Below believed he could give up larger forces. Von Below wanted to advance as soon as possible from Belluno over the western bank of the Piave, and then turn south, while the 11th (Austro-Hungarian) Army was to provide back cover at the same time. At the same time, a possible amphibious landing behind the mouth of the Piave was discussed. The long-term goal should now be the Adige and Verona .
The attempt of the 216th (d) InfBrig to cross the Tagliamento near Tolmezzo failed due to the resistance of the 36th (it) InfDiv and 63rd (it) InfDiv on the west bank.
Intercepted radio messages from the Italian High Command stated that the 4th (it) Army was to attack the right wing of the 14th (d) Army from the north.
The 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv crossed the Tagliamento near Cornino. Behind her followed parts of the (d) Jägerdivision with the Guard Reserve Jäger Battalion and the Guard Reserve Rifle Battalion.
November 5, 1917
The 9th (kuk) InfTrpDiv managed to cross the Tagliamento near Codroipo around 9 p.m. with weak defense. From around 3 a.m. this bridgehead could be expanded and reinforcements added. A large number of the Italian soldiers defending the west bank here were captured.
The 22nd (kk) rifle division crossed the Tagliamento near Cornino in the morning. The headquarters of the “Krauss Group” was set up in Treviso .
The bridgehead created at Pinzano could be extended to the west and south by the 12th (d) InfDiv and parts of the 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv.
The 11th (kuk) Army reported that the Italians would evacuate the area of the Three Peaks , the Tofana Group with Cortina d'Ampezzo and south of Arabba to the Rolle Pass .
An order from the High Command of the Southwestern Front demanded the uninterrupted pursuit over the Piave and meanwhile the Brenta as an operational target.
Sections of the 4th (it) Army threatened by the encirclement set off to the southwest and tried to join the retreating units of the 2nd (it) Army. The German Jägerdivision brought this movement to a standstill after heavy fighting near Gerchia.
By evening the Italian troops on the Dolomite front were on a complete retreat as far as the Colbricon. Austro-Hungarian troops occupied Cortina d'Ampezzo and Tredolo.
The 1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army crossed the poorly defended Tagliamento and reached the line Azzano Decimo - Villotta - Pramaggiore - Belflore - Lison.
November 6, 1917
The left wing of the 10th (kuk) Army continued their pursuit in the mountains. The 59th (kuk) GebBrig and the 216th (kuk) InfBrig reached Tramonti .
The German Jägerdivision fended off strong Italian counter-attacks in the Gerchia area and then attacked the 36th Inf Div fighting here. Until the evening it was possible to advance into the Pielungo - Palamagior room and with individual departments to Palazzo Ceonis. About 4,000 prisoners were taken that day and a large amount of material was captured.
In the "Krauss group", the 55th (kuk) and 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv reached their marching goals in Malnisio and Montereale , respectively , without encountering major resistance. The 22nd (kk) SchützenDiv reached Meduno and received the order to advance over the mountains on Belluno . The 55th (kuk) and the 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv received the order to continue the advance on Vittorio along the Torrente Cellina .
The 12th Inf Div continued the pursuit and marched in three columns to the Livenza crossings at Fiaschetti , Sacile and Carolana. However, all bridges had been destroyed.
The 13th (kk) SchützenDiv crossed the Tagliamento and advanced to Vivaro .
In the meantime the troops of the Italian Tyrol front had retreated as far as the Valsugana .
The AOK 14 now intended to attack the enemy front, which was slowly forming from the Valsugana over the Grappa massif to the Piave, at the weakest point between Brenta and Piave and to push through here.
The 10th (kuk) Army advanced further in the mountains, the 1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army reached Livenza in the plain .
November 7, 1917
The first reports of the appearance of English and French divisions near Conegliano and Treviso reached AOK 14.
The "Krauss Group" received the order to advance to Longarone and Belluno before the 10th (Austro-Hungarian) Army and to support the attack of the 14th (German / Austrian) Army on the Piave by attacking Feltre .
The "Scotti Group" was supposed to advance towards the Piave at the foot of the mountain.
The Italian Tyrol front fell back further in front of the 11th (kuk) army that pushed in. Primör , the Cordevole and Boite valleys, and Auronzo were captured.
The "Monte Festa" tank factory surrendered after an attempt by the crew to break out had failed.
The cycling company of (d) Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 8 was able to capture a 3,000-man Italian infantry regiment with 22 machine guns and two revolver cannons with its own strength of 60 men near Tramonti.
The 117th (d) Inf Div fought its way over the Livenza against slow resistance at Brugnera . In the evening a bridgehead was built on the western bank.
The 1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo armies crossed the Livenza.
November 8, 1917
Because of the expected heavy resistance behind Vittorio, the troops were reinforced here by pulling in heavy artillery, the 1st (kuk) InfTrp Div and the 5th (d) InfDiv.
The I. (kuk) Corps received the order to advance to Feltre via Longarone and Belluno .
The 15th (kuk) GebBrig reached Vittorio and pushed further west to get hold of one or more Piave bridges if possible. However, the advance got stuck at Revine Lago.
South of the (D / Ö) 14th Army, the 1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo Army reached the Monticano sector.
November 9, 1917
A company of the Württemberg Mountain Battalion under Lieutenant Erwin Rommel and a company of the ( imperial ) Slovene Rifle Regiment "Marburg" No. 26 crossed the Piave south of Longarone on a weir and built a bridgehead on the western bank. The commander of the 22nd (kk) rifle division, Major General Müller, immediately pushed in reinforcements so that this bridgehead could be held against Italian attacks.
The heads of the 10th (kuk) Army had meanwhile reached the eastern bank of the Piave near Codissaga (north of Longarone) and fired from there on the crowded Italian troops in the city.
The 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv started the advance against Belluno from Vittorio at seven o'clock. In the case of Fadalto, however, this initially remained in front of an Italian bolt position and could not be continued until the evening.
Parts of the 117th Inf Div reached the Piave around 3 p.m. and was fired at with artillery from the opposite bank. The 200th (d) Inf Div crossed the Tagliamento at Bonzicco as an army reserve and initially stopped in the Pordenone - Pozzo area. The 1st (kuk) InfTrpDiv moved to the Flaibano - Plasencis area, the 5th (d) InfDiv, as well as the 4th (kuk) and the 33rd (kuk) InfTrpDiv remained in their areas of disposal to the west and east of Udine.
In the area of the "Heeresgruppe Conrad" (11th (kuk) Army) the Italians vacated their positions in the Asiago area . North of the Valsugana they withdrew to the area east of Castello Tesino.
The 1st (kuk) and 2nd (kuk) Isonzo armies reached the Piave after fighting with Italian rear guards.
November 10, 1917
The Württemberg mountain battalion as the vanguard of the 22nd (kk) rifle division reached Belluno. The division itself also arrived there that evening. The Edelweiss Division was ordered to Longarone to cover the back of the 22nd (Imperial and Royal) rifle division against Italian units advancing from the north.
The 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv marched to Castione across from Belluno. The Piave bridges had already been blown up here, at Ponte nelle alpi and Cesana. The 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv reached the Piave near Bas and San Vito. Because of the blown bridges and the heavy artillery fire, the attempt to cross the river was not made.
At Vidor , the 12th Inf Div tried to push in the Italian bridgehead and at the same time to penetrate the bridge with mass. Strong Italian resistance - supported by massive artillery fire - initially prevented this project. During the night, however, the bridgehead was abandoned and the bridge was blown up.
The 13th (kk) rifle division reached the river at Nervesa and developed along its entire breadth on the eastern bank. Strong enemy forces and field fortifications were recognized on the opposite side. On the basis of incoming reports and other information, the high command had to take note that considerable resistance was to be expected on the Piave. Furthermore, there was a risk of overstretching the supply lines, since the last usable train station was in San Lucia near Tolmein. Nevertheless, the "Krauss Group" (before the units of the 10th (kuk) Army) stood on both sides of the river and was ready to roll up the Italian positions flanking downstream. However, south of Feltre was the Grappa massif , which turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle. The Italian units had already evacuated the Feltre Basin, leaving almost all of the equipment behind, and thus escaped being gripped. The advancing (kuk) 10th Army under Colonel General von Krobatin and (kuk) 11th Army under Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf broke the Italian locking bars at Pieve di Cadore and in Val Sugana, but did not get beyond the Asiago - Monte Baldo line .
The lack of artillery ammunition prompted the leadership to initially refrain from violent penetration across the Piave on a broad front.
November 11, 1917
On November 11th, the Piave was crossed in several places and bridgeheads were set up on the western bank. However, further advance was no longer possible.
The end of the offensive from November 12th to December 3rd, 1917
In particular due to the lack of artillery ammunition to support another attack beyond the Piave, the offensive came to a standstill here. There were more loss-making attempts to conquer the Grappa massif by the end of the month. However, these were unsuccessful against the heavily developed mountain positions. The 11th (Austro-Hungarian) Army also made no further progress. Both would have been necessary, however, to collapse the Italian defensive position on the Piave from the north and thus threaten Vicenza , Padua and ultimately Venice . It was now taking its revenge for not having followed the suggestion made by Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who had suggested that a push to Brescia and Milan should be conducted through Judiciary and along Lake Garda .
On November 29, 1917, the high command of the Southwest Front decided to cease offensive movements. This order was issued on December 3, 1917. The circumstances have not yet been fully clarified, but the poor general supply situation may have played a not insignificant role.
The bridgeheads on the west bank of the Piave were abandoned, the Austro-Hungarian troops withdrew to the east bank and went into trench warfare.
Most of the Italian army by this time was completely demoralized and finished. However, fresh troops had begun to be deployed on the Piave, who were not involved in the previous disaster and whose resistance steadily stiffened as the front approached the Italian heartland.
The Allied reinforcements and supplies of material, which were deployed immediately, had not yet unfolded at this point in time. With the help of the USA, however, the existence-threatening Italian material losses were quickly compensated for. The army was rebuilt under the corset of the English and French support divisions.
Italian losses
The information about the Italian casualties during the Twelfth Battle of Isonzo and the battles immediately following vary widely. In some sources, they only refer to the losses of the 2nd (it) Army that was most affected, without taking into account the 3rd (it) Army, which was also involved. They are therefore often set too low; on the other hand, the loss figures in Italian literature of the fascist Mussolini era are often extremely low.
The Italian losses of people and material were determined in 1918 by a commission of the kuk Evidenzbureau under the direction of Colonel Ritter von Pohl for the period October 20, 1917 to November 20, 1917 as follows:
- Personnel losses:
- between 10,000 and 13,000 fallen
- approx. 30,000 wounded
- about 300,000 dispersed
- approx. 66,000 deserters
- 298,745 prisoners + 6,220 defectors
Total losses (even if only temporary) approx. 714,000 men. With a troop strength of approx. 667,000 men in the 2nd (it) Army and approx. 207,000 men in the 3rd (it) Army, this corresponded to a percentage of 84%.
- Material losses:
- 3512 guns of all calibers
- 1732 mortars of all calibers
- 2899 machine guns
- approx. 300,000 rifles
- an undetectable amount of pioneer and training equipment, clothing and equipment, ammunition, food and cattle for slaughter
The following were evaluated:
- Italian reports in the press and other notices (official loss lists)
- Lists of prisoner assembly centers and prisoner of war camps
- Field police reports
- Reports from the units
- Reports of the loot officers
- Reports of the war graves commission
Political Consequences
The Italian government was considering relocating to Naples in November because a military vacuum had opened up west of the Piave and the worst was feared.
A commission of inquiry consistently uncovered the shortcomings that had led to this military catastrophe and brought to light some appalling failures in organization and leadership. Chief of Staff Luigi Cadorna was complimented away in the Allied Supreme War Council created at the Allied Conference in Rapallo from November 5 to 7, 1917 . In 1919 he was stripped of his rank by parliament and his salary canceled (he got both back from Mussolini in 1924). Cadorna's successor as chief of staff was Armando Diaz .
It was only after Caporetto's defeat that Italian politics moved away from the demands of the London Treaty and to seek an understanding with Serbia and the South Slavic Committee under Ante Trumbić .
Official Italy - especially under Benito Mussolini - ignored the "disgrace of Caporetto" with silence. For the dictator, the defeat was proof of the weakness and illness of liberal Italy, against which he wanted to take action with a “cult of violence”. “Caporetto” eventually became synonymous with a “heavy defeat”. Mussolini himself described the failed general strike in Italy in 1922 as the “caporetto of Italian socialism ”.
Final consideration
The Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo was by no means planned as a breakthrough battle, but was only intended to relieve the extremely distressed Isonzo front, so that the Austro-Hungarian leadership was completely surprised by the initial success. With different preparations and more resources, as well as a different objective as a result, there would have been a serious danger for Italy that the pincer movement from Trentino to the south would have been completed. This would also have destroyed the 4th Italian Army, which would have meant the ultimate defeat for Italy. On the whole, there was a strategic failure here too, as was the case with the South Tyrol offensive in 1916 .
Field Marshal von Hindenburg writes in his war memoirs that he would have preferred if one had advanced through Judiciary to Lake Garda and towards Milan at the same time . However, he was unable to assert himself with the Austro-Hungarian High Command. Such massive intervention on both wings of the front would not have been a militarian issue for Italy.
Nevertheless, several British and French divisions, a total of 240,000 men, had to be relocated to Italy to support the Italian side. This prevented the Italian army from falling apart and Italy from leaving the war ( cf. “ First Piave Battle ” ). In this case the Entente would not only have lost Russia, which was eliminated from the World War in the wake of the October Revolution , but also Italy.
Even if various respected authors - such as Heinz Lichem von Löwenbourg - are of the opinion that it is not understandable why the offensive on the Piave was stopped, it must be said that the troops were completely exhausted after the previous hunt the supply lines were simply overstretched. In addition, the forced withdrawal of the Italian front from the Dolomites and the Carnic Alps shortened the front for them by about 240 kilometers and the Italian leadership immediately deployed these operational units on the Piave and on Monte Grappa, which was criminally ignored by the Austro-Hungarian leadership .
A large part of the territorial gains for the Central Powers were lost again by the end of the war due to the rapidly deteriorating military strength ( cf. “Third Piave Battle” ).
Formation of 14th Army and 2nd (it) Army
Germany / Austria-Hungary
14th Army
Army
High Command: General of the Infantry Otto von Below
Chief of Staff: Lieutenant General Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen
Higher Artillery Commander: Major General Richard von Berendt
Headquarters: Gorenji Log
-
I. kuk Korps (Krauss Group - Infantry General Alfred Krauss )
- Headquarters: On Monte Nero ( Krn )
- 3rd kuk infantry division "Edelweiss Division" (Major General Heinrich Wieden Edler von Alpenbach)
- 22nd Imperial and Royal Rifle Division (Major General Rudolf Müller)
- 55th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division (Major General Felix Prinz zu Schwarzenberg)
- German Jägerdivision (Colonel Georg von Wodkte)
-
Kgl. Bay. III. Army Corps (Stein Group - Lieutenant General Hermann Freiherr von Stein )
- Headquarters: Mengore
- 50th kuk infantry division (Major General Karl Gerabek)
- 12th (d) Infantry Division (Major General Arnold Lequis)
- 117th (d) Infantry Division (Major General Paul Seydel)
- German Alpine Corps (Major General Ludwig von Tutschek)
-
General Command 51 (d) (Group Berrer - Lieutenant General Albert von Berrer)
- Headquarters: Santa Lucia d'Isonzo
- 26th (d) Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Eberhard von Hofacker)
- 200th (d) Infantry Division (Major General Ernst von Below)
-
XV. kuk Corps (Scotti Group - Lieutenant Field Marshal Karl Scotti)
- Headquarters: Santa Lucia d'Isonzo
- 1st kuk infantry division (Field Marshal Lieutenant Joseph Metzger)
- 5th (d) Infantry Division (Major General Hasso Georg von Wedel)
-
Army reserve
- 4th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division (Field Marshal Lieutenant Alfred Pfeffer von Ehrenstein)
- 13th Imperial and Royal Infantry Division (Field Marshal Lieutenant Franz Kalser von Maasfeld)
- 33rd Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division (Major General Artur Iwanski von Iwanina)
-
Major formations still assigned to the 14th Army in the following period
- 35th Imperial and Royal Infantry Division (Field Marshal Lieutenant Eugen von Podhoransky)
- 94th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division (Field Marshal Lieutenant Marcel Lavrowski)
- Strength:
- 98,400 soldiers (infantry only)
- 164 battalions (including 65 German)
- 1,759 guns of all calibers
Italy
2ª Armata (2nd Army)
Comandante in capo: (Commander-in-Chief) Lieutenant General Luigi Capello
Chief of Staff: Colonel Silvio Egidi
Headquarters: On Monte Rombon in Vipacco
- First line
- IV Corpo d'armata (IV Army Corps) Lieutenant General Alberto Cavaciocchi
- Headquarters: On Monte Rombon in Dolje
- 50ª Divisione (50th Infantry Division) Major General Giovanni Arrighi
- Brigata (Brigade) "Friuli" - 87th and 88th Infantry Regiments
- Brigata "Foggia" - 280th Infantry Regiment
- Battaglioni alpini (alpine battalions) "Borgo S. Dalmazzo", "Dronero" and "Saluzzo"
- 2º Gruppo alpini - (2nd alpine group) with the alpine battalions "Ceva", "Mondovì" and "Monviso"
- 43ª Divisione Lieutenant General Angelo Farisoglio
- Brigata "Genova" - 97th and 98th infantry regiments
- 1/2 Brigata "Etna" - 223rd Infantry Regiment
- V raggruppamento alpini: 5º gruppo (5th alpine group) with the battalions "Monte Albergian", "Val Chisone" and "Belluno"
- 9º reggimento bersaglieri (9th Bersaglieri Regiment)
- 46ª Divisione Lieutenant General Giulio Amadei
- Brigata "Caltanissetta" - 147th and 148th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Alessandria" - 155th and 156th infantry regiments
- 1/2 Brigata "Etna" - 224th Infantry Regiment
- 2º reggimento bersaglieri (2nd Bersaglieri Regiment)
- 34ª Divisione, riserva di corpo d'armata (Corps reserve)
- Brigata "Foggia" - 281st and 282nd Infantry Regiments
- Battaglione alpini (alpine battalion) "Monte Argentera".
- XXVII Corpo d'armata (XXVII Army Corps) Lieutenant General Pietro Badoglio
- Headquarters: Breg
- 19ª Divisione - Major General Giovanni Villani
- Brigata "Napoli" - 75th and 78th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Taro" - 207th and 208th Infantry Regiment (without II. Btl)
- Brigata "Spezia" - 125th and 126th infantry regiments
- 65ª Divisione
- Brigata "Belluno" - 274th Infantry Regiment, 1st and 2nd Battalion / 275. Infantry regiment
- 22ª Divisione
- 1/2 Brigata (Brigade) "Pescara" - 211th and 212th Infantry Regiment
- 64ª Divisione
- 1/2 Brigata "Belluno" - 276th Infantry Regiment, III. Btl / 275. Infantry regiment
- Share Brigata "Taro" with II. Btl / 208. Infantry regiment
- Riserva di corpo d'armata: (Corps reserve)
- X Gruppo Alpini: (X. Alpine group) battalions "Vicenza", "Monte Berico", "Morbegno" and "Val d'Adige"
- Brigata "Puglie" - 71st and 72nd Infantry Regiments (already pushed into the front)
- Brigata "Roma" - 78th and 80th Infantry Regiment (already pushed into the front)
- XXIV Corpo d'armata (XXIV Army Corps) Lieutenant General Enrico Caviglia
- Headquarters: Breg al monte Zgorevnice
- 49ª Divisione
- Brigata "Lambro" - 205th and 206th Infantry Regiment (on the morning of October 24th, the "brigata Lambro" was assigned to the XIV Corpo d'armata and replaced the brigade "Palermo")
- Brigata "Sele" - 219th and 220th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Ravenna" - 37th and 38th infantry regiments
- 68ª Divisione
- Brigata "Grosseto" - 237th and 238th infantry regiments
- 10ª divisions
- Brigata "Verona" - 83rd and 84th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Campobasso" - 229th and 230th infantry regiments
- II Corpo d'armata (II Army Corps) Major General Alberico Albricci
- Headquarters: Zgorevnice al monte Sella di Dol
- 67ª Divisione
- Brigata "Cremona" - 21st and 22nd Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Tortona" - 257th and 258th infantry regiments
- 44ª Divisione
- Brigata "Re" - 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Brescia" - 19th and 20th infantry regiments
- 8ª Divisione
- Brigata "Udine" - 95th and 96th infantry regiments
- Brigata “Forlì” - 43rd and 44th infantry regiments
- Riserva di corpo d'armata: (Corps reserve)
- Brigata "Aquila" - 269th and 270th infantry regiments
- VI Corpo d'armata (VI Army Corps) Lieutenant General Luigi Lombardi
- Headquarters: Sella di Dol in Borgo Carinzia ( Gorizia )
- 66ª Divisione
- Brigata "Cuneo" - 7th and 8th Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Abruzzi" - 57th and 58th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Milano" - 159th and 160th Infantry Regiment (for tactical reasons it was directly subordinate to the AOK)
- 24ª Divisione
- Brigata "Gaeta" - 263rd and 264th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Emilia" - 119th and 120th infantry regiments
- VIII Corpo d'armata (VIII Army Corps) Major General Francesco Grazioli
- Headquarters: Borgo Carinzia (Gorizia) al Vipacco
- 48ª Divisione
- Brigata "Piemonte" - 3rd and 4th Infantry Regiment
- Brigata “Borgo Maurizio” - 253rd and 254th infantry regiments
- 59ª Divisione
- Brigata "Pesaro" - 239th and 240th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Modena" - 41st and 42nd Infantry Regiments
- 7ª Divisione
- Brigata "Lucca" - 163rd and 164th Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Bergamo" - 25th and 26th Infantry Regiments
- Brigata "Sesia" - 201st and 202nd Infantry Regiment in Gorizia (for tactical reasons directly subordinate to the AOK)
- Second line
- VII Corpo d'armata (VII Army Corps) Major General Luigi Bongiovanni
- Headquarters: Between Monte Matajur and Globočak
- 3ª divisions
- Brigata "Elba" - 261st and 262nd infantry regiments
- Brigata "Arno" - 213rd and 214th Infantry Regiment
- 62ª Divisione
- Brigata "Salerno" - 89th and 90th infantry regiments
- IV brigata bersaglieri (IV Bersaglieri Brigade) - 14th and 20th Bersaglieri regiments
- Riserva di Corpo d'armata: (Corps reserve)
- Brigata "Firenze" - 127th and 128th infantry regiments
- XIV Corpo d'armata (VII Army Corps) Lieutenant General Pier Luigi Sagramoso - (Army Reserve)
- Headquarters: between the source of the Judrio and the Isonzo
- 20ª divisions
- Brigata "Palermo" - 67th and 68th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Livorno" - 33rd and 34th Infantry Regiments
- 30ª divisions
- Brigata "Treviso" - 115th and 116th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Girgenti" - 247th and 248th
- XXVIII Corpo d'armata (XXVII Army Corps) Major General Alessandro Saporiti - (Army Reserve)
- Headquarters: In the Judrio Valley north of Cormons
- 23ª Divisione
- Brigata "Messina" - 93rd and 94th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Sassari" - 151st and 152nd infantry regiments
- Brigata "Venezia" - 83rd and 84th infantry regiments
- Brigata “Avellino” - 231st and 232nd infantry regiments
- 47ª Divisione
- I. brigata bersaglieri - 6th and 12th Bersaglieri Regiment
- V. brigata bersaglieri - 4th and 21st Bersaglieri Regiment
- Brigata "Milano" - 159th and 160th Infantry Regiment (withdrawn from 66th InfDiv / VI. AK)
- Riserve del Comando Supremo (Reserve of the High Command)
- 60ª Divisione (under VIII Corpo d'armata)
- Brigata "Taranto" - 143rd and 144th infantry regiments
- Brigata "Ferrara" - 47th and 48th infantry regiments
- 53ª Divisione (under XIV Corpo d'armata)
- Brigata "Vicenza" - 227/228. and 229th Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Potenza" - 271/272. and 273rd Infantry Regiment
- 13ª Divisione (subordinate to XXVIII Corpo d'armata)
- Brigata “Massa Carrara” - 251st and 252nd infantry regiments
- Brigata "Jonio" - 221st and 222nd Infantry Regiment
- Brigata "Teramo" - 241st and 242nd Infantry Regiment (directly subordinate to the XXVIII Corpo d'armata)
- 2nd Army strength:
- 20,222 officers
- 646,795 NCOs and men
- 353 infantry battalions (including 17 alpine battalions and 24 Bersaglieri battalions)
- 2,430 guns of all calibers
Others
Erwin Rommel took part in the battle as a first lieutenant in the Württemberg mountain battalion and played an important role in the conquest of Monte Matajur , for which he was awarded the order Pour le Mérite .
literature
- Anton Graf Bossi-Fedrigotti: Kaiserjäger. Fame and end. According to the war diary of Colonel v. Cordier. Stocker , Graz 1977, ISBN 3-7020-0263-4 .
- Alberto Cavaciocchi: Un anno al comando del IV Corpo d'armata . Gaspari, Udine 2006, ISBN 88-7541-051-8 .
- Cyril Falls: Caporetto 1917 . Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1966.
- Paolo Gaspari: Le bugie di Caporetto. La fine della memoria dannata . Gaspari, Udine 2011, ISBN 978-88-7541-179-4 .
- Angelo Gatti: Caporetto. Diario di guerra (maggio-dicembre 1917). Il Mulino, Bologna 2007, ISBN 978-88-15-11857-8 .
- Paolo Giacomel, Günther Obwegs, Michael Wachtler: Dolomites. War, death and suffering. Athesia, Bozen 2010, ISBN 978-88-8266-680-4 .
- Vajs Klavora: Monte San Gabriele. Hermagoras, Klagenfurt 1998, ISBN 3-85013-578-0 .
- Heinz von Lichem : The lonely war. Athesia, Bozen 1981, ISBN 88-7014-174-8 .
- Heinz von Lichem: War in the Alps. 1915-1918. 3 volumes. Weltbild, Augsburg 1995, ISBN 3-89350-545-8 .
- Hans Magenschab : The grandfathers' war 1914–1918. Verlag der Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Vienna 1988, ISBN 3-7046-0115-2 .
- Marco Mantini, Paolo Gaspari, Paolo Pozzato: Generali nella nebbia. Le trentasei ore di batta. Gaspari, Udine 2007, ISBN 978-88-7541-103-9 .
- Alberto Monticone: La battaglia di Caporetto. Gaspari, Udine 1999, ISBN 88-86338-29-5 .
- Günther Obwegs, Michael Wachtler: Dolomites. War in the mountains. Athesia, Bozen 2010, ISBN 978-88-8266-681-1 .
- Austrian Federal Ministry for the Army and War Archives, Edmund Glaise-Horstenau (Ed.): Austria-Hungary's last war. 1914-1918. Volume VI, 2nd edition. Publishing house of the military science reports, Vienna 1931.
- Adolf Paulus (Ed.): The I. World War in the picture. Löwit, Wiesbaden 1979.
- Camillo Pavan: I prigionieri italiani dopo Caporetto. Pavan, Treviso 2001, ISBN 88-900509-5-0 .
- Manfried Rauchsteiner (Ed.): Weapon loyalty. The 12th Isonzo Battle of 1917. Accompanying volume for the exhibition of the Austrian State Archives. Fassbaender: Vienna 2007, ISBN 978-3-902575-04-3 .
- Walther Schaumann : From the Ortler to the Adria / Dall 'Ortles all' Adriatico. The southwest front in pictures / Immagini del Fronte Italo-Austriaco. 1915-1918. Mayer, Vienna 1993, ISBN 3-901025-20-0 .
- Mario Silverstri: Caporetto. Una battaglia e un enigma. BUR, Milan 2003, ISBN 88-17-10711-5 .
- Miro Simčič: The Battle of the Isonzo. 888 days of war in the Karst in plans, maps and reports. Stocker, Heidelberg 2003, ISBN 3-7020-0947-7 .
- Robert Striffler: The mine war on Monte Cimone 1916–1918. Kienesberger, Nuremberg 2001, ISBN 3-923995-21-0 .
- Ufficio Storico SME: L'esercito italiano nella Grande Guerra (1915-1918). Volume IV. Le operazioni del 1917. 3 volumes, Rome 1954.
- Michael Forcher : Tyrol and the First World War. Haymon, Innsbruck 2014, ISBN 978-3-85218-964-2 .
Literary reception
- Ernest Hemingway : In another country . (Hemingway, who participated in the fighting as a volunteer medic on the Allied side, lets his experiences flow into the novel.)
- Alessandro Baricco : This Story (Questa Storia Fandango, Rome 2005). (A main character in the book takes part in the battle; the escape is depicted in a drastic way)
Remarks
- ↑ However, this was replaced by the 55th kuk InfTrpDiv before the offensive began.
- ↑ seen from the east
- ↑ the beginning was set for November 10th.
- ↑ 28 Div. of the 2nd Army, 13 Div. 3rd Army
- ↑ weaker than their opponents in terms of personnel
- ↑ including mine thrower
- ↑ Typical for this type of recording, which would have been almost a suicide squad in the immediate battle with the technology of the time
- ↑ Lieutenant in the Tichi Reserve
- ^ First Lieutenant Maxim, Ordonnanzoffizier der 50th (kuk) InfTrpDiv
- ↑ The "German Alpine Corps" was moved to South Tyrol to deceive and was also deployed there.
- ↑ South Tyrol at that time meant today's Trentino
- ↑ in Tolmein
- Jump up ↑ Infantry Division
- ^ The kk rifle divisions were called kk Landwehr divisions until 1917
- ↑ 3. InfTrpDiv
- ↑ for this act the then Lieutenant Rommel was awarded the order Pour le Merite.
- ↑ There were also tens of thousands of civilian refugees on the move with their carts, which added to the chaos.
- ↑ the railway bridge was already damaged but still usable.
- ↑ Infantry Troop Division, the kuk designation for a large unit of division strength
- ↑ consisting of the "German Alpine Corps", the "German Jägerdivision" and the 22nd (kk) rifle division
- ↑ consisting of 50th (kuk) and 55th (kuk) InfTrpDiv, as well as 1. (kuk) InfDiv
- ↑ This also includes the reports of the loot officers.
- ↑ Since these figures were not created for propaganda purposes, but for the information of the AOK, no exaggeration of any kind can be assumed
- ↑ in which this battle falls.
- ↑ The numbers of personnel losses could only be determined on the basis of experience and troop reports. Deviations are possible both upwards and downwards.
- ↑ see: Austria-Hungary's Last War 1914–1918 Volume VI.
- ↑ This also includes the permanently missing
- ↑ a b c All figures matched the information provided by the Italian commission of inquiry
- ↑ most of them were probably recaptured
- ↑ number determined at the time of the survey
- ↑ Most of the scattered could be reintegrated into the troops
- ↑ a b taken to the loot collection point
- ↑ because it is often used immediately
- ↑ Barbed wire, cleat boards, telegraph wire, pontoons, beams and tools
- ↑ Wagons, draft horses and pack animals
- ↑ Underwear, shoes, belts, steel helmets, coats and trousers were used
- ↑ as since the spelling reform of 1996 Field Marshal Lieutenant referred
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b Manfried Rauchsteiner : The gas cannons from Flitsch. In: Die Presse , print edition of October 20, 2007 and online edition of October 19, 2007 , accessed on January 17, 2015
- ^ Gerhard Hirschfeld: Encyclopedia First World War p. 406.
- ↑ Rolf Wörsdörfer p. 97ff.
- ^ Rolf Wörsdörfer: Adriatic crisis hot spot 1915–1955. Construction and articulation of the national in the Italian-Yugoslav border area. Schöningh, Paderborn / Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-506-70144-4 , p. 104.
- ^ John R. Schindler: Isonzo. The forgotten sacrifice of the Great War. Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport 2001, ISBN 0-275-97204-6 , p. 278.
- ^ John Horne: A Companion to World War I. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 2010, p. 89.
- ↑ Forchner p. 356 ff.
- ^ Taken from: L'esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915–1918) Volume I – III. Roma: Ministero della Guerra - Ufficio Storico 1929–1974.
