Günther Lütjens

Captain of the Sea Lütjens (1934)

Johann Günther Lütjens (born May 25, 1889 in Wiesbaden ; † May 27, 1941 in the North Atlantic (position 48 ° 10 ′  N , 16 ° 12 ′  W )) was a German naval officer . As an admiral , he was most recently the fleet commander and commander of battleships in the Kriegsmarine during World War II .

Lütjens initially served in the Imperial Navy . During the First World War he was boat commander and semi-flotilla chief at the torpedo boat weapon on the Flemish coast. Taken into the Imperial Navy, he was also appointed to various naval staffs. In 1934 he was appointed commander of the light cruiser Karlsruhe and rose to the position of leader of the torpedo boats (FdT) until the beginning of the Second World War . In 1940 he was used as commander of the reconnaissance forces and deputy fleet chief in the invasion of Denmark and Norway and commanded the cover group. Subsequently, the admiral, described by contemporaries as aloof, aristocratic and strict, led a trade war against British convoys in the Atlantic as fleet chief . In May 1941, Lütjens' combat group sank the British battle cruiser Hood as part of the Rhine Exercise Company . Lütjens fell a few days later when his flagship Bismarck went down .

The destroyer Lütjens of the German Navy was named after him in 1969.

Private life

Lütjens' parents were Johannes Lütjens († 1920) and Luise geb. Volz. He spent his youth in Freiburg im Breisgau , where he also passed his Abitur at the Berthold-Gymnasium . His father was a merchant and of Protestant faith. Günther decided to serve in the Imperial Navy. In the summer of 1929 Lütjens married Margarete Backenköhler, the daughter of the secret medical councilor Gerhard Backenköhler . Margarete was the sister of his future chief of staff, Admiral Otto Backenköhler . Even if Lütjens said of himself that he should not be married at all given his responsibilities, his marriage is described as happy. Lütjens had three sons and a daughter.

Imperial Navy

At Hansa Lütjens was deployed as a lieutenant at sea for about two years.

Lütjens occurred on April 3, 1907 as a midshipman in the Imperial Navy, first attended the Marine Sciences in Kiel and was there from 9 April in the Department 07 trained naval officer. In May 1907 he was transferred to the large cruiser Freya, which was used as a training ship , for practical on-board training. Lütjens also embarked on his first trip around the world on board this cruiser . His character traits were already viewed differently during these years, and this different assessment would not change until Lütjens' death. Because of his sincerity, quick perception and dry humor, Lütjens was very popular with some, while other contemporaries described the cadet as ambitious, aloof and serious. Lütjens' first on-board training ended in March 1908. Subsequently, from April 1908, he took part in a one-year ensign course at the Kiel Naval School. There Lütjens was promoted to ensign at sea on August 21, 1908 . Because of his achievements, he belonged to the top group of his year. In a ranking made later from 1913, Lütjens came 11th out of 132 graduates.

After the naval school, Lütjens attended an artillery and torpedo course and in September 1909 finished his infantry training in the II. Seebataillon in Wilhelmshaven . The second practical on-board training took place from October 1909 to mid-September 1910 on the liner Alsace . After the successful completion, Lütjens was briefly available to the I. Marine Inspection in September 1910 before he was entrusted with his first on-board command on September 26, 1910. Due to his skills, he was given the job of a training officer on the training ship König Wilhelm . At that time, the old tank frigate was a stationary living and training ship in the port of Flensburg . There Lütjens was promoted to lieutenant on September 28, 1910 . In April 1911 he switched to the sea cadet officer on the Great Cruiser Hansa , where he stayed for almost the next two years. On this ship, Lütjens took part in two other world trips. After that he was again a training officer for SMS König Wilhelm from April to September 1913 . On September 27, 1913 Lütjens was promoted to lieutenant at sea and switched to torpedo boat weapons. There he was used as a company officer in the I. Torpedo Division in Kiel. In November 1913 he came as a deck officer for the 2nd Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla under Commander Henry Schuur on the torpedo boat G 169 . From March 1914 he performed the same function on the torpedo boat G 172 .

First World War

At the beginning of the First World War , Lütjens was assigned to the Jade Harbor Flotilla as a boat commander in August 1914 . The Jade Harbor Flotilla was under the command of the leader of the torpedo boats Rear Admiral Leberecht Maaß and consisted of the lead boat Alice Roosevelt and a further six old or older torpedo boats used for mine detection purposes. Their job was to secure and clear up the jade. From September 1914 he was in command of the T 68, which had been converted into a minesweeper . At the beginning of December of the same year he switched to the I. Torpedo Division as a company officer. Lütjens attended a mine-hunting course there and was in command of the torpedo boat T 21 from mid-January 1915 . At the beginning of May 1915 he joined the Flanders torpedo boat flotilla . There Lütjens, who had been awarded the Iron Cross 2nd class on October 6, 1915, commanded the new but less powerful torpedo boats A 5 and A 20 until February 1916 , before taking command of the local A semi-flotilla in February 1916 took over. In this position he was also the commander of the larger torpedo boat A 40 . On August 17, 1916, Lütjens was awarded the Iron Cross 1st class for his probation in several companies as a semi-flotilla chief. On the night of March 25th to 26th, 1917, Lütjens was involved in the bombardment of Dunkirk with four torpedo boats . On May 2nd, in search of survivors of a shot down German aircraft, Lütjens boat A 40 and its sister boat A 42 engaged in a skirmish with four British motor torpedo boats . Lütjens' boats were able to avoid a torpedo shot. On May 19, Lütjens launched another attack on Dunkirk with five torpedo boats from his semi-flotilla. His boats attacked the French destroyers Capitaine Mehl , Enseigne Roux , Magon and Bouclier . In connection with his primary mission to keep the routes of the German submarines clear, there were skirmishes with British destroyers, speedboats and aircraft. These tasks increased in the last years of the war with the unrestricted submarine warfare . The material superiority of the enemy and the constant danger of mines resulted in considerable losses of people and material in their own ranks. On May 24, 1917, Lütjens was promoted to lieutenant captain.

Lütjens received special recognition from his superiors for the relocation of the personnel of the semi-flotilla from Antwerp after the Armistice of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. On September 30, the evacuation order for the bases on the Flemish coast was issued. Most of the German torpedo boats were moved to Antwerp via the canals. Due to the haste in the evacuation, most of the boats were blown up or ended up in Dutch internment; Lütjens also decided to take this step. Relocating his boat units by sea to Wilhelmshaven was out of the question due to the insufficient speed of most of the vehicles. He marched back through Belgium with the staff of the unit . He was able to complete this task by the end of November.

At the end of the war, Lütjens was a highly decorated lieutenant captain. In addition to the two classes of the Iron Cross, he wore the Knight's Cross of the Royal House Order of Hohenzollern with Swords (November 24, 1917), the Oldenburg Friedrich August Cross II. And I. Class and the Knight's Cross II. Class of the Order of the Zähringer Lion . He was also the bearer of the Hanseatic Cross of the Hanseatic City of Hamburg. In addition, Adalbert Prince of Prussia presented him with a silver plate in memory of August 17, 1916, the date the Iron Cross 1st class was awarded to Lütjens.

Transition period

During the Kiel sailors' uprising , the prelude to the November Revolution , at the end of which was the overthrow of the monarchy , Lütjens stayed at the Baltic Sea naval station in Kiel from November 24, 1918 and was thus at the center of events. The extent to which Lütjens himself was involved in the proceedings surrounding the sailors' uprising cannot be determined. On December 1, 1918, he was posted to Warnemünde . There he became head of the sea transport office. However, he did not stay long in this post. Until November 1919 Lütjens changed several times as head of the sea transport point between Warnemünde and Lübeck . On September 15, 1919 he became company commander of the Coast Guard Division IV in Cuxhaven and in January 1921 as an officer in the newly founded Reichsmarine .

Imperial Navy

The Silesia , took part on the Lütjens of association exercises.

According to the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Versailles , the Imperial Navy had to accept strict limits in terms of its strength (15,000 men) and its surface forces. Since there was no on-board command for Lütjens in the foreseeable future, he was appointed to the naval command on June 7, 1921 . His superior was Admiral Paul Behncke . Lütjens was there until the end of September 1923 as a department head in the fleet department (A II) of the naval command office. In this position Lütjens dealt with strategic and marine-political issues. This included the observation and analysis of the Washington Naval Conference and its disarmament regulations. As part of his strategic work, Lütjens wrote a lengthy article on the development of the sea powers in the years 1918 to 1922. His treatise appeared in 1923 in the first post-war edition of the magazine Nauticus . In October 1923 he was appointed head of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Half Flotilla in Wilhelmshaven , which he commanded until September 1925. He then moved to the North Sea naval station as an adjutant and personnel officer until the beginning of October 1929 . There Lütjens was promoted to Korvettenkapitän on April 1, 1926 . At the same time as the promotion he received a silver cup with a personal dedication from Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia . During his service at the naval station, he took part in a voyage with the sailing yacht Asta in August 1926 (embarkation, although the ship's required number of personnel had already been reached) and in April and August 1928 in a formation exercise and a torpedo shooting on board the liner Silesia under command attended by Captain Alfred Saalwächter .

On October 3, 1929, Lütjens again took over a command post as head of the I. Torpedo Boat Flotilla in Swinoujscie , which he commanded until mid-September 1931. This period of service was interrupted by a staff officer and torpedo training course. Another course for commanders and staff officers in command posts and navigation followed in February 1931. On September 17, 1931, Lütjens was appointed by Erich Raeder to the naval management of the Reichswehr Ministry. His successor as flotilla chief was the later Vice Admiral Kurt Fricke . In the naval command, Lütjens was promoted to frigate captain on October 1st, 1931. In the naval management, Lütjens initially acted as a head of department in the fleet and naval officer personnel department. On September 26, 1932, he was promoted to head of this department, a position that Lütjens, who was promoted to sea captain on July 1, 1933, held until mid-September 1934. On September 12, 1934, like all World War II participants, he received the Cross of Honor for Frontline Fighters .

Navy and World War II

The Karlsruhe off San Diego in March 1934.

On September 16, 1934, Lütjens was appointed commander of the light cruiser Karlsruhe . He commanded the ship, which was primarily used as a training ship during the transition from the Reich to the Kriegsmarine until September 25, 1935. From October 1934, the Karlsruhe set sail for several months abroad with the destination America. The journey went over the Azores to South America , led through the Strait of Magellan and then ran north along the west coast of South America and North America ( Los Angeles and San Francisco ) to Vancouver in Canada . From there the Karlsruhe drove south again to the Panama Canal , passed it and advanced into the Caribbean . The visits to Houston (Texas) and Charleston (South Carolina) formed the conclusion . After a nine-month voyage , the Karlsruhe returned to Kiel via northern Spain . There, Raeder Lütjens announced in the presence of Dönitz that he would change to the office as officer personnel chief due to the German-British naval agreement . At the end of September 1935, Lütjens was assigned to the North Sea naval station, where he was chief of staff until mid-March 1936. In March 1936, Lütjens returned to the Reich War Ministry (formerly Reichswehr Ministry). There he was chief of the naval officer personnel department in the high command of the navy and then from October 1936 to October 1937, now from October 1, 1937, rear admiral , head of the naval personnel office based in the " Bendlerblock " on Tirpitzufer (since 1947 Reichpietschufer ) in Berlin. He was succeeded by his former crewmate, Captain Conrad Patzig . At this point in time Lütjens could already look back on 30 years of service. For this he had already received the Wehrmacht service awards 1st to 4th class on October 2, 1936 .

On October 8, 1937, the Admiral returned to his original branch of service, the torpedo boats, when he was appointed leader of the torpedo boats (FdT) in Swinoujscie. He was not only responsible for the torpedo boats, but also the destroyers and speedboats. Together with his superior, the commander of the naval station of the Baltic Sea Admiral Conrad Albrecht , Lütjens designed the “preferred thrust to the east”. Instead of an offensive against the West, Albrechts and Lütjens' simulation game envisaged smashing the Soviet Union through a rapidly launched offensive operation. This was to be done in cooperation with the Navy, which was intended for the conquest of the Baltic Sea area. The plan was rejected by the naval war command. When, on February 5, 1938, Hitler dismissed Reich Minister of War von Blomberg and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel General von Fritsch, for reasons that later turned out to be threadbare ( Blomberg-Fritsch crisis ), and even took over the leadership of the Wehrmacht , Lütjens did not leave at the request of his subordinate Corvette Captain Rolf Johannesson for a discussion. Lütjens advised him not to worry about things that were none of his business. This does not prove whether Lütjens was indifferent to the affair. At the beginning of February it was not yet possible to assess the reasons for dismissal. It could also have driven Lütjens' concern about the comradely solidarity in the naval officer corps not to allow a broad discussion to arise. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, General Admiral Raeder, did not gain any organizational advantage from the reorganization of the Wehrmacht leadership, since since 1934 - like the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Air Force - he was able to present his departmental interests directly to Hitler and always did so. In late autumn 1938 at the latest, Lütjens made a personal change to reject National Socialism. In November 1938 he was one of the few flag officers , along with others such as Karl Dönitz , Erich Schulte Mönting and Conrad Patzig , who protested against the November pogroms of 1938 . This did not damage Lütjens' career. On August 20, 1938 he was awarded the Commander's Cross with Star of the Hungarian Order of Merit with a brilliant breast star. This award took place on August 22, 1938 in connection with the naval parade and the celebrations for the launch of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen , at which the Hungarian Governor Miklós Horthy and Hitler were present. He received permission to wear this foreign medal on December 21, 1938. On September 17, 1938, the President of the German Red Cross, Carl Eduard von Sachsen-Coburg and Gotha , awarded Lütjens the German Red Cross First Class Decoration in recognition of his previous status acquired special merits.

First North Sea missions

The Leopard torpedo boat in 1934.

As leader of the torpedo boats (FdT), he commanded them from the outbreak of the Second World War until October 20, 1939. In August 1939, the FdT was responsible for twelve predator-class torpedo boats ( wolf , polecat , jaguar , leopard , lynx , tiger ) and the bird of prey -Class ( seagull , albatross , falcon , griffin , condor , white-tailed eagle ). During the German invasion of Poland , Lütjens' destroyers laid mine barriers in the North Sea from September 3 to 20, 1939, which German propaganda referred to as "Westwall mine barriers". He was wounded in his first mission on September 3, for which he was awarded the Wound Badge in Black on February 20, 1940 . From October 17-18, 1939, his boats took part in an offensive mining operation. For this, Lütjens received the repeat clasps for the Iron Cross II and I class on September 4 and October 25, 1939 . Already at this early stage of the naval war there was a problem of competence and the resulting lack of clarity in the chain of command regarding the conduct of operations with the group commander in chief West Alfred Saalwächter on the one hand and Hermann Boehm as fleet chief on the other. This also included the activities of the FdT (Lütjens), which justified its criticism. After major organizational changes within the Navy was Friedrich Bonte on 20 October 1939 Lütjens' successor as FdT next day Lütjens Vice Admiral sparked Hermann Densch as Commander of the scouting forces (BdA), who for from November 1939 commander Admiral became the naval station of the North Sea. The light cruisers Emden , Königsberg , Karlsruhe , Cologne , Leipzig and Nuremberg were subordinate to the new BdA .

With the cruisers Nuremberg , Leipzig and Cologne , the BdA ran out on December 13, 1939 for another operation in the North Sea. Her job was to escort the five destroyers Z 4 Richard Beitzen , Z 14 Friedrich Ihn , Z 15 Erich Steinbrinck , Z 19 Hermann Künne , who had laid mines off Newcastle the day before . The sea waters near the British coast were considered "contaminated by submarines". For this reason, Lütjens let his association run zigzagging towards the German destroyers at top speed. His fears came true when the three ships were sighted and attacked by the British submarine Salmon . The Leipzig and Nürnberg were torpedoed and badly damaged. The fact that Lütjens did not lose his entire formation on that day is due to the fact that the rushing destroyers in turn took care of the protection of the defenseless cruisers. Despite this setback, German destroyers and cruisers ran from October 1939 to February 1940 on twelve mine operations in the North Sea. Besides Newcastle, their main destinations were the waters of Hull , Cromer , the Shetland Strait and the Thames Estuary. The British merchant fleet lost 76 ships to mines.

Lütjens received further awards during this time. On October 26, 1939, as FdT, he received the medal commemorating the return of the Memelland , as his torpedo boats ( leopard and polecat ) had been involved in this connection . On December 20, 1939, he was awarded the medal in memory of October 1, 1938 , and on New Year's Day 1940, he was promoted to Vice Admiral . In this capacity, in the run-up to the Weser Exercise company in March 1940, he was entrusted with the management of the business of the previous fleet boss, Wilhelm Marschall . After constant differences with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Erich Raeder , Marschall was severely weakened in his position, dropped out due to illness and submitted his resignation in 1943.

Weser exercise company

The light cruiser Emden as part of an association on April 8, 1940 during Operation Weser Exercise

Fleet Association Lütjens at Weser exercise; the beige ships (group 2) were destined for Trondheim; the rest (group 1) targeted Narvik. The abbreviations reflect the call signs during the operation:
AS = Z 22 Anton Schmitt
HL = Z 18 Hans Lüdemann
GT = Z 2 Georg Thiele
WH = Z 21 Wilhelm Heidkamp
EK = Z 13 Erich Koellner
WZ = Z 9 Wolfgang Zenker
EG = Z 12 Erich Giese
BA = Z 11 Bernd von Arnim
PJ = Z 5 Paul Jacobi
BH = Z 8 Bruno Heinemann
HK = Z 19 Hermann Künne
SH = Scharnhorst
GU = Gneisenau
HP = Admiral Hipper
TR = Z 6 Theodor Riedel
DR = Z 17 Diether von Roeder
FE = Z 16 Friedrich Eckoldt

→ Main article : Company Weser Exercise

With the start of Operation Weser Exercise on April 7, 1940, Lütjens was appointed commander of the cover group in his capacity as commissioned fleet chief . During the Weser exercise , he acted as a fleet commander and commander of the reconnaissance forces . The cover group consisted of the two battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst , with the fleet chief staying at Gneisenau . Lütjens left Schillig Roadstead on April 7th . The primary task of both battleships was to protect the German invasion force, which was leaving for Narvik and Trondheim, from British ship units. A short time later the cover group united with the destroyer fleet. In total, the association consisted of two battleships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and 14 destroyers. It was the largest self-contained task force that the Navy could assemble for offensive operations during World War II. Due to catastrophic weather conditions, there were wind forces seven to nine, Lütjens' association was torn apart. As a result, the actual task of the cover association was not fulfilled. So it was that the destroyer Bernd von Arnim was sighted and attacked by the British destroyer HMS Glowworm on April 8, 1940. The Glowworm was the cover ship of the Renown ( Operation Wilfred ) at this time . Thereupon Lütjens had Admiral Hipper turn, who shot the destroyer with artillery. When Admiral Hipper followed the enemy, both ships rammed each other. Admiral Hipper suffered a 500-ton water ingress but remained maneuverable. The glowworm capsized . After Admiral Hipper took in 58 British survivors, she continued her mission. As a result of this event, Lütjens decided to accompany Group 1 of the association to the entrance of the Vestfjord , because he feared that he would encounter British forces or Norwegian coastal armored vehicles there. At the same time he dismissed Group 2 with Admiral Hipper in the direction of Trondheim. On the same day, around 9:00 p.m., Lütjens' cover group completed its mission and released the destroyer association into the Vestfjord, where the battle for Narvik broke out.

Then the cover association turned in, with Lütjens cruising near Lofoten to prevent possible intervention by British naval forces. On the morning of April 9th Gneisenau got in touch with the British battle cruiser HMS Renown (Admiral William Whitworth), which opened fire on Gneisenau at 05:05 . A few minutes later a short but fierce artillery battle broke out between Renown , Gneisenau and Scharnhorst , in which Lütjens' flagship and the British battleship were hit without being seriously damaged. Six people died on Gneisenau . At around 5:44 am the Renown turned and escaped. After the battle, the situation was unclear for Lütjens. He suspected more heavy ship units and decided to march back. In fact, in addition to the Renown, only the HMS Repulse operated in this area. On April 10, Lütjens' ships were standing near the Jan Mayen , heading south. On his return, Lütjens initially stayed very far west to avoid the presumed British main forces. On the night of April 11, he had the two ships turned hard eastward near the Shetlands and was able to make contact with Admiral Hipper in the early morning of April 12 . At around 8:00 p.m. Lütjens took the ships into the Jade and reached Wilhelmshaven without incident. This ended Lütjens' activities with the Weser Exercise company. In recognition of his achievements and the “total fulfillment of his mission”, Lütjens was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross on June 14, 1940 . However, the reason for the award of the Knight's Cross to Lütjens did not reflect the true assessment by the naval command. Overall, the Admiral's conduct during the "Weser exercise" was rated only as satisfactory. Above all, the loss of ten destroyers and the failure of both battleships as a result of combat damage weighed heavily on the Navy. This was joined by the prevailing torpedo crisis . Overall, after the Weser exercise, the sense of using heavy surface units against the superior British fleet was again lively discussed by the naval command.

Fleet chief

After the Weser Exercise company , Marschall took over the duties of the fleet chief again. His unsuccessful leadership at Juno , however, led to the final break between Marshal and the Naval War Command . Despite his merits, Admiral Marschall was even denied the Knight's Cross because of these discrepancies. After his replacement on June 13, 1940, Lütjens was appointed the new fleet manager on July 9, 1940. In the course of handing over the official business, he received the order to do everything possible to sail out again with heavy surface units as soon as possible. In the order, the Gneisenau combat group placed great value on active and offensive action . Within a short time Lütjens became the third captain of the navy. His two predecessors had been removed from their offices due to quarrels and differences of opinion with Grand Admiral Raeder regarding operational and tactical principles. In order to save himself the same fate, Lütjens changed into an obedient and dutiful officer towards his superior. This change was intensified when profound differences arose with Raeder on questions of operational and tactical principles. While Raeder continued to plead for the immediate use of his thick ships and planned to have them put to sea individually if necessary, Lütjens insisted on powerful units with escorts. In the end, Raeder prevailed with his strategy and the broken Lütjens drew his conclusions. Instead of emphasizing his point of view, however, in order to avoid all differences, he adhered strictly to the stipulations in his operations and acted in the interests of the naval command. The admiral underlined this in a conversation with his predecessor Marshal. In response to his opinion that if the situation changed, Lütjens did not have to feel too tied to the order of operations, Lütjens replied that two fleet chiefs had already left their commands in disagreement with the naval command; he doesn't want to be the third.

In the summer of 1940 he initially acted as fleet chief in connection with the Sea Lion Company , the planned invasion of England, and at times also as Naval Commander West . During this time Raeder created an organizational naval staff (Flottenkommando Org.) At Lütjen's request. From then on, the naval staff at Lütjen's side had the task of handling all organizational and material matters for the admiral. At the same time, Lütjens, as fleet chief, would also act as commander of the battleships (BdS); but this position had expired in October 1939.

In June 1940 Lütjens took over the leadership of a battleship association as fleet chief, which was to start the Atlantic War on June 20 from Trondheim in Norway . The association consisted of Gneisenau , Hipper and the damaged Scharnhorst . Lütjens' operation was not lucky. On the night of June 20, the Gneisenau was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine Clydes . Lütjens then broke off the venture. This initially ended the Atlantic warfare from Norway for the Navy. From August 3 to October 19, 1940, Lütjens was entrusted with the management of the commander of the Security West. On November 11, 1940, he was awarded the Destroyer War Badge in this capacity . At the end of 1940 it became clear that the operations of the battleships, which would from now on be longer, would mean the longer absence of the fleet chief. Therefore, the fleet command was restructured and a second admiral was introduced to the fleet and embarked on the Hela . At the end of 1940 Lütjens ran out again with the battleship association Scharnhorst , Gneisenau , Hipper (group north) and some torpedo boats to break through the Atlantic again. But due to boiler and machine damage, Raeder ordered the operation with these ships to be terminated on December 28. What is interesting here is the fact that the more defensive-thinking Lütjens wanted to run out again with the association after a short repair period in Trondheim; However, Raeder stuck to his decision.

Operation Berlin

Gneisenau (above) and Scharnhorst ; Battleship Association Lütjens in the Atlantic War from January to March 1941

After repairing the battleships, Lütjens carried out operations against British merchant shipping in the Atlantic under the code name Operation Berlin between January and March 1941 . The ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were involved in this. Despite British persecution, the Admiral managed to break through the Atlantic on February 4, 1941. From February 5, his two ships operated on the supply route Halifax –England ( HX route ). After Lütjens broke off a first attack on the convoy HX 106 because the escort was too strong, his battleship formation sank five ships on February 22nd. Subsequently, Lütjens moved the task force to the sea route Sierra Leone -England, as ships of the Royal Navy were increasingly patrolling the previous area of ​​operation.

On March 7th, the association discovered the convoy SL 67 on the new route , but did not attack due to excessive escort. Instead, Lütjens radioed the position of the convoy to nearby German submarines. U 105 ( Georg Schewe ) and U 124 ( Georg-Wilhelm Schulz ) sank ten ships, but to Lütjens' disappointment, the accompanying battleship Malaya did not . After refueling his unit, Lütjens continued to pursue ships on the HX route. After the sinking of another single ship, the battleship association encountered a large number of ships from a disbanded convoy on March 15 and 16. The two German battleships caused a "massacre" among the freighters during the two-day battle. Gneisenau sank seven freighters and captured three ships that were sent as prizes to western France. Scharnhorst sank six ships. On the night of March 18-19, 1941, the admiral decided to break off the operation, as both ships should be ready for action again at the end of April to take part in the Rhine exercise. On March 21, 1941, Lütjens' association entered Brest under the protection of the torpedo boats Iltis and Jaguar .

In total, his combat group sank 22 armed merchant ships in the North Atlantic with a total of around 115,000 gross tons. The German warships under participated prize regulations to about 800 survivors. Lütjens was mentioned in the Wehrmacht report on March 22, 1941 . For his successful operation, Lütjens was named on the front page of the Völkischer Beobachter on March 23, 1941 . The propaganda headline was:„Deutsche Schlachtschiffe räumen im Atlantik auf – Der neueste Schlag: 224.000 BRT.“

In the final meeting on March 27, 1941 in the Operations Department of the Naval War Command, Admiral von Raeder received high recognition. In particular, Lütjens' great operational skill under control of all tactical situations was highlighted. In addition, Lütjens strengthened the leadership's confidence in further battleship missions. This was not least due to the excellent seafaring and military performance of the crews. Although Lütjens had demonstrated tactical skill with Operation Berlin , it was not taken into account that the course of the successful venture had been significantly favored by luck. In operational terms, Lütjens achieved the hoped-for relief for other theaters of war with his Atlantic operation. This particularly affected the Mediterranean region , where the navy was able to carry out material and troop transports to and from Tripoli without any disruption.

Company Rhine exercise

The large windows show the Admiralsbrücke, Lütjens' temporary command post on the Bismarck , above the platform with the headlights.

The last picture of the Bismarck immediately after the battle in Iceland. Taken from the Prinz Eugen .

The dismantling maneuver of the Bismarck reconstructed by R. Rohwer on the night of May 25, 1941 from 02:29 a.m. to 04:08 a.m. On the Bismarck , the ripping off of the British contact points by Lütjens was not recognized.

Bismarck survivors are picked up by HMS Dorsetshire .

→ Main article : Company Rhine exercise

In the spring of 1941, Lütjens, judged by the high command of the Navy to be extremely experienced in the war against the Allied convoy shipping, was appointed commander of a task force deployed against the supply transports for the British Isles. With operation command from the April 22, 1941 Lütjens gave the operation the military code name operation rheinübung , inspired by the name of operation weserübung . The core of the new combat unit formed Lütjens' flagship Bismarck ( Ernst Lindemann ) and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen ( Helmuth Brinkmann ). Lütjens was initially against this venture. In his opinion, one should wait until the operational readiness of the other battleships was secured before a "teaspoonful" deployment of heavy surface units. Lütjens called it the Scharnhorst and the sister ship of the Bismarck , the Tirpitz . Its commander, Karl Topp , had asked Lütjens to take part in the operation. In addition, the selected Bismarck / Prinz Eugen ship association could not have been more different with regard to the sea endurance of the two ships. In the following conversation, however, Raeder convinced his admiral of the need to start this operation soon. Although Lütjens' concerns persisted, he also decided to do it, it was said to be voluntary. His previous successful venture in the Atlantic played a decisive role in this. Lütjens enjoyed the complete confidence of the Grand Admiral. However, his doubts about the feasibility of the company remained.

When Hitler visited the Bismarck in Gdynia on May 5, 1941 , Lütjens took the opportunity to speak to his Commander-in-Chief personally. Raeder was not present on this visit. After the tour of the ship, which Lütjens had personally attended, he found the opportunity to have a longer discussion with Hitler in the admiral's apartment. The admiral wanted to convince Hitler to postpone the operation. In particular, he referred to the danger posed by torpedo planes. However, Hitler could not bring himself to an appropriate order. Instead, he left the final decision to Raeder. This stuck to his original plan. It is not known how Lütjens reacted to the departure order that surprised him. Dark premonitions crept over him, as he confessed to Hans Voss on the day he left the Naval War Command in Berlin on April 26th. He made no secret of the fact that he would probably not come back from the mission. On May 12, the admiral and his 75-man naval staff embarked on the Bismarck . Lütjens' chief of staff was the sea captain Harald Netzbandt . I. Admiral staff officer was frigate captain Paul Ascher. Frigate Captain Emil Melms was appointed 2nd Admiral Staff Officer. Melms had previously been general adviser at the OKM. The III. Admiral staff officer, Corvette Captain Gerhardt Böhmig , was not on board during the Rhine exercise . The IV. Admiralty Staff Officer was Corvette Captain Hans Nitzschke, also coming from the OKM as a consultant. Lütjens' fleet engineer was frigate captain (engineer) Karl Thannemann. Fleet doctor was Dr. Eduard Langer.

The day before, Lütjens had repeated his premonitions to his old crewmate Conrad Patzig . He said to him verbatim: “I am aware that sooner or later I will have to sacrifice myself given the unequal ratio of forces. I have finished my private life and I am determined to honor the task that has been assigned to me, one way or another. "

Lütjens made several fatal mistakes at the Rheinituation company.

• As early as January 1941, Karl Topp , the Tirpitz's commander , had his ship carried out a simulation game while his ship was in dock to check whether his battleship would be able to break through into the Atlantic. The results were sobering and showed that, contrary to the conviction of the naval war command, it was not possible to achieve this goal as soon as the British were aware of the presence of a heavy unit in the North Sea. Since both Ernst Lindemann and Adalbert Schneider were present at this simulation game, it can be assumed that Lütjens also knew about it, but obviously ignored the results during his preparations.
• He repeatedly failed to refuel the battleship Bismarck when the opportunity arose. The fuel oil deficit was 1200 tons. During the decisive pursuit by the two English units and the aircraft of the HMS Ark Royal , the speed of the Bismarck had to be reduced to 21 knots from May 24th in order to be able to reach the port of St. Nazaire with the remaining fuel available. Lütjens later ordered a course for Brest .
• In the battle between the Bismarck and the two British ships HMS Hood and Prince of Wales on May 24th in the Denmark Strait , the admiral showed a very hesitant behavior due to the literal interpretation of the operational orders to avoid combat with equivalent ship units. Although both British ships had already fired their first salvo, he did not issue a fire permit for his unit's artillery. Commandant Lindemann therefore gave permission to fire on his own, although this would actually have been under the authority of the admiral. Lütjens accepted this insubordination without protest . After the direct hit in the ammunition chamber and the explosion of the hood, Lindemann urged the admiral to pursue the Prince of Wales . Lütjens categorically rejected this suggestion, as he felt bound by the original order, which defined the sinking of merchant ships as the main task of the Bismarck . For this he was sharply criticized by Hitler at a briefing. The sinking was mentioned in the Wehrmacht report on the same day .

Because of these differences of opinion, the fleet manager and Lindemann broke up. The conflicts were not carried out in front of the team by either person, but they did not go unnoticed. According to statements made by survivors, there were loud clashes, so that the crew spoke of "thick air on the bridge". After the battle, Lütjens radioed Raeder and, in addition to reporting the success, mentioned the damage to the Bismarck . Grand Admiral Raeder, who could then have canceled the operation, left the decision to Lütjens, as Lütjens was probably best able to assess the extent to which the ship was still operational. Lütjens wanted to break off the operation and decided on May 24th around 8:00 a.m. to call at a French port.

• Lütjens also misjudged the possibilities of the new type of radar on British ships. The admiral was first confronted with this weapon in combat during the operation on the Rhine exercise. After he had dealt with this new technology, he tended to overestimate its capabilities: The fleet chief believed that he was always being monitored by radar location, which was not real, because the radar on the British cruisers was technically not yet fully developed. Lütjens estimated the range of the British radar at 350 hm , a length measure commonly used in the navy, which corresponds to 35 kilometers. This explains his misjudgment when the flagship escaped from the location of the pursuers on May 25, 1941, whose range in reality was only 13 kilometers.
• By sending unnecessarily detailed radio messages, he made it possible to rediscover the Bismarck using conventional radio direction finding . Finally Lütjens received an order from the Marine Group West in Paris to finally keep radio silence . The radio message sent on May 25 at 9:00 a.m. lasted 30 minutes and led to the targeting by the enemy. Just a few hours before the sinking, Lütjens applied for the Knight's Cross to be awarded to Corvette Captain Adalbert Schneider by radio for his decisive part in the sinking of the Hood . Between the battle in Iceland and the sinking of the ship, the fleet chief radioed a total of 26 times to superior positions. The originally successful tactical maneuver ordered by Lütjens turned out to be in vain because the radio silence was broken by him.

Lütjens saw no way of escaping the British contact points. In addition, the precarious fuel situation prevented a breakthrough into the Atlantic. After the fatal torpedo hit on the rudder angle of the Bismarck , Lütjens quickly recognized the hopeless situation on the evening of May 26th. There is no other explanation for the fact that the admiral summoned his commander in chief to fight to the last grenade before the results of the investigation were available. In his desperation, Lütjens is said to have promised the immediate award of the Iron Cross to anyone who would get rid of the jammed steering gear. As early as May 25, the admiral had made a leadership error when he revealed his hopelessness in an address to the entire crew on his birthday.

After the fierce artillery battle with the battleships King George V and HMS Rodney, as well as after torpedo hits by HMS Dorsetshire , the burning battleship sank at 10:40 a.m. local time. Lütjen's efforts to save the Bismarck's war diary have been handed down in order to preserve his decisions, assessments of the situation, opinions and considerations for posterity. After an attempt to fly out the book had failed (damage to the aircraft catapult), Lütjens requested in his last radio message from 07:10 to the group West a submarine, which was to pick up the book and bring it to southern France. His radio message read: "Send a submarine to keep track of the war diary." This attempt also failed.

The last documented meeting of Lütjens is described by the Bismarck survivor Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg . Accordingly, he happened to meet Lütjens and his 1st Admiral Staff Officer Paul Ascher on the upper deck in the early morning of May 27th at around 8:30 a.m. The admiral was composed and looked self-confident and returned his military salute . Then he went with his companion in the direction of the Admiral Bridge.

death

The exact time of Lütjen's death is unknown. It is during the artillery battle between 8:45 and 10:00 fallen . This assumption was confirmed by Müllenheim-Rechberg, who assumed that Lütjens and his staff probably fell at their respective battle stations. Diving expeditions to the wreck prove that the superstructures including the Admiral Bridge were destroyed. Shortly thereafter, the Bismarck's commander , Lindemann, gave the order to sink the burning battleship, which sank within four minutes between 10:35 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. in the Atlantic. Lütjens died along with another 2105 soldiers of the crew at positions 48 ° 10′N and 16 ° 12′W. Only 116 crew members could be saved.

His wife learned of her husband's death the day after the battleship sank, after the Nazi regime saw the sinking earlier than intended in the Wehrmacht report on May 28, 1941, in which Lütjen's death was claused has been. The British side also did not issue a statement from which it would have been evident that the admiral was among the survivors. On the same day Lütjens was on the front page of the Daily Mail under the headline relating to the sinking of his ship: BISMARCK: FOUR TREMENDOUS DAYS – Three British Fleets Raced to Make ‚the Kill‘called. (Bismarck, Four mighty days - Three British fleets in the race for success). On July 28th, Lütjen's widow received a condolence letter from Hitler with the wording: "I extend my sincere and heartfelt condolences to the painful loss that you and your loved ones have suffered through the heroic death of your husband." the naval command of Lütjens and his naval staff free from all guilt. Raeder took full responsibility for the loss of the Bismarck .

Posthumously , Lütjens was awarded the Fleet War Badge on May 9, 1942 for participating in the Bismarck 's war voyages. In response to the sinking of the Bismarck , the Atlantic War continued as a result of submarines. Lütjen's successor as fleet chief was Admiral Otto Schniewind on June 13, 1941 .

personality

Admiral Lütjens during the Weser exercise in April 1940.

A picture of Lütjen's personality was already shown by his surroundings in his early years. Few people described the admiral as cheerful. For most of his subordinates, but also for his commanders, the thin-looking Lütjens appeared aloof, reserved, aristocratic and strict. His eyes were described by fellow men as dark and serious. The admiral had an air of perceived inaccessibility, gloom, and seclusion. Because of his great zeal for service and zest for action, he appeared self-centered, ambitious and strict to others. He mostly made his decisions alone. Even Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz described Lütjens as a sober person who did not shrink from uncompromising treatment of his subordinates. On the other hand, he attested that he had an upright character and an intelligent head, logical in his ability to think and averse to any vain utterance; his tactical skills were undisputed. Lütjens was undoubtedly a good tactician and a highly qualified officer who exuded a high level of integrity and trustworthiness. But he lacked the human qualities that were necessary to inspire his crew during a battle and to maintain their fighting spirit even in hopeless situations.

A proximity of Lütjens to National Socialism cannot be proven; he was first and foremost an officer whose characteristics had been shaped in the Imperial Navy. In his opinion, as an officer he was indispensable to his fatherland and the state. His attitude did not change, as in 1933 the Nazis to Hitler the seizure of power succeeded. From then on, Hitler embodied the state for him and with it his compelling loyalty as an officer. Lütjen's personal relationship with his commander-in-chief remained cool until his death, as reflected in Hitler's succinct letter of congratulations on Lütjen's 52nd birthday, “Best wishes for your birthday”.

In 1938, Lütjens was one of the few who ended the pogrom on 9/10. November openly condemned. Lütjens in his capacity as leader of the torpedo boats and Dönitz as commander of the submarines called on November 10, 1938, to their superior, fleet chief Admiral Hermann Boehm, on this matter. The personal protest against the anti-Semitic processes in the Reich also took place on behalf of the officers subordinate to them. Apparently both officers saw Boehm as a like-minded and suitable person who should bring their protest about Raeder to the attention of the government. Oskar Kummetz also joined the protest in his capacity as head of Boehm's staff. Boehm then passed the officers' objections on to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Raeder, with his own "tightened" statement. This is said to have passed this on to Hitler without any consequences for the protesting officers. The documents prepared for this by all the people involved have not yet been found, so that some historians doubt the process as a whole. Whether the protest from Lütjens was out of indignation over the obvious violations of the legal order or the moral order of values ​​or out of concern for Germany's reputation in the world cannot be determined without speculation. Although this protest is now doubted by some historians, it is mentioned in the memoirs of both Boehm and Raeder.

During his service time for the personnel management of the Navy Lütjens behaved passively in the strict interpretation of the Nuremberg race laws , that is, he did not apply them to the officer corps of the Navy and simply ignored them. His 1st Admiralty Staff Officer Paul Ascher was “non-Aryans”. Against this background it is interesting that Lütjen's brother-in-law Admiral Otto Backenköhler was considered a half-Jew .

On the other hand, Lütjen's closeness to the Nazi system was for a long time derived from the last two radio messages from Bismarck . It is undisputed that Lütjens radioed the situation to the OKM about 30 minutes after the momentous torpedo hit. The radio message ended with the addition of Lütjens: “We're fighting to the last grenade. Long live the Führer. ”Two hours later, Lütjens radioed again, this time to Hitler personally with the wording:“ We fight to the last in faith in you, my Führer, and with a firm belief in German victory! ”. These radio messages were interpreted as evidence of Lütjen's fanaticism to the point of death. For a long time they shaped the image of an admiral of perseverance who, in the hour of his downfall, still sent telegrams of deference to his commander-in-chief. However , they do not prove a devotion to Lütjen or even an affinity to the Nazi system. According to current knowledge, his relationship to National Socialism remained distant throughout his life. This is supported by the fact that the wording of his last radio message almost coincides with a decree of the OKM of December 22, 1939, which was issued in connection with the self-sinking of Admiral Graf Spee . The heroic passage reflected in this report thus only corresponded to the Nazi linguistic usage at the time .

Even the heroic death of Lütjen, staged by the propaganda, with which Bismarck went down in front of a superior enemy with waving flags, do not reveal any conclusions about Lütjen's closeness to National Socialism. Such was and is still the premature abandonment of a unmaneuverable but weapons moderate yet fully combat-capable ship, for example, by scuttling , unthinkable in the traditional view of the Navy. The German navy in particular was shocked by the scuttling of the fully armed Graf Spee and reacted with a corresponding decree by Raeder. In it he demanded that German warships have to fight to the “last shell”. Lütjen's actions were dominated by this doctrine. Also, because of the treatment of his predecessors as fleet chiefs and because of his personality, he could not contradict or ignore the orders of his commander-in-chief. Ultimately, Lütjen's decision to enter the final battle is interpreted as the fulfillment of duty and obedience. Neither Lütjens nor Lindemann thought of surrender at any time and therefore forbade the crew to leave the ship prematurely. In a way, Lütjen's death was portrayed as a self-sacrifice .

Later evaluation

Müllenheim-Rechberg; Senior survivor of the Bismarck and author of the book Battleship Bismarck 1940/41 - The report of a survivor .

The fight and fall of the Bismarck found national and international echoes in post-war literature. No other event in the history of naval warfare in the 20th century has been so much written and controversially debated as the first and last deployment of the German battleship Bismarck .

Michael Salewski already stated in 1970 that despite the vast number of literary works, no newer findings are to be expected when looking at the final battle. Nevertheless, the subject was given new food in 1980 when one of the few surviving officers of the Bismarck , Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg , remembered battleship Bismarck 1940/41. A survivor's report published. His book and the impressions it contained of the operations and ship command of the Bismarck gave cause to look at the operation of the Bismarck again. For this purpose, a study by Corvette Captain Hans Joachim Oels appeared in 1983 under the title “The use of the battleship Bismarck from the perspective of operations and ship command” on behalf of the German Maritime Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office (MGFA). At the beginning of his remarks, however, Oels states that the passages from Müllenheim-Rechberg contained therein are only of limited use for an evaluation. He obtained his testimony from the author himself, who stated that his work could only give a very limited insight into the thought processes of the association and ship's command, since as the 4th artillery officer (4th AO) he was not a witness in the decision-making of the ship's command was present. Against this background, Oels comes to the conclusion that Müllenheim-Rechberg's statements can only be interpreted as personal points of view due to the loss of the Bismarck's war diary . In his work, Müllenheim-Rechberg states for the final battle that the Bismarck's crew did not want to give up their ship [willingly] before the battle. He does not give any indications of a possible mutiny . Müllenheim-Rechberg even goes a step further and states that most of the fatalities were not causally recorded in the artillery fire. They only died after the sinking of the Bismarck , when the Royal Navy had to stop their rescue maneuvers due to potential submarine danger. He puts the number of sailors remaining in the water at possibly several hundred.

The Oels study comes to the conclusion that any questions as to why and why the ship's command acted as it did, led to speculation . Further and reliable factors that would have contributed to the understanding of Lütjen's actions could not be determined due to the loss of the Bismarck's war diary . The war diary, reconstructed later, is based on the memories of survivors. Oels continues that the conduct of the ship's command cannot be seen through “today's glasses” without taking into account the education and self-image of the naval officer corps of the time and the current orders. The naval historian Werner Rahn followed this approach in his 1991 publication: On the 50th anniversary of the death of Admiral Günther Lütjens . Even the British Admiral Sir John Tovey , who was involved in the sinking of the Bismarck on board his flagship HMS King George V , comes to the conclusion that the battle of the battleship against a superior opponent "was worthy of the old days of the Imperial German Navy ] was ".

Vice-Admiral Günther Fromm , former fleet chief of the German Navy, took up the study produced by Oels and recapitulated the circumstances surrounding it at the time. According to him, several decisive factors led to the implementation of the Rhine exercise . First of all, Fromm refers to the strategically extremely favorable starting position in the spring of 1941 and mentions the successful operation of Berlin under Lütjens with his combat group Scharnhorst / Gneisenau, which had been successful a few months earlier . In addition, there were successful operations by Admiral Hipper in the Azores and the return of the equally successful Admiral Scheer from their mission in the Indian Ocean. At this time, the auxiliary cruisers Atlantis , Thor , Orion , Komet , Kormoran and Penguin were also involved in the trade war in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the South Seas . From this, Fromm draws the conclusion that a new Atlantic operation was expected and carried out by the naval command as soon as possible. For the Navy, only Lütjens, who was experienced in this matter, could be considered for this new venture. Accordingly, Fromm assumes an immense burden on the ship's command. At the same time, Fromm Lütjens reflects on possible trains of thought when he recognized the powerful British radar location, which the fleet chief almost forced himself to believe in the ongoing operation and which may have influenced his actions more than expected. This is the only way Fromm explains the lengthy radio messages given by the fleet chief, which again led to the Bismarck's alignment. As a result, Fromm recognizes in Lütjens a transformation from dismay into hopelessness - which in turn explains his depressing speech to the occupation, which Fromm describes as a “human error in leadership”. At the same time, in this situation he refers to the role model function of the ship's command and criticizes Lütjens / Lindemann's behavior with regard to their differences of opinion, which should never become the subject of discussion with the crew. The statement had previously made Müllenheim-Rechberg.

In 2001, the historian Holger Afflerbach published the publication “Go down with a waving flag”, which is also based on the work of the survivor of the Bismarck occupation of Müllenheim-Rechberg. He quotes the order issued by Raeder: "The German warship fights with the full commitment of its crew to the last shell, until it wins or goes down with a waving flag." Afflerbach understands this order as a binding suicide order and refers to the sinking of the Bismarck , the he sees by name as a “prime example” of the consequences of this command. Afflerbach judges the behavior of the Bismarck's command, including the commanding Admiral Lütjens, towards the battleship's crew as “irresponsible” and “criminal”. In doing so, he refers to an interpretation of the situation presented in von Müllenheim-Rechberg's book and the alternatives to the last battle expressed by him. In retrospect, Müllenheim-Rechberg considers a surrender and self-sinking of the battleship without enemy influence in order to save the life of the crew. Afflerbach comes to the conclusion that the motivation and attitude of Lütjens as an exposed representative of the naval officer corps is based on the thinking of a predominant doom mysticism (when allegedly hopeless situations occur) among those responsible in the Navy, and describes Lütjens behavior as fanatical . At the same time Afflerbach draws the conclusion that the Bismarck's crew developed the necessary corps spirit in the last battle and followed their commander to his death without protests.

Post-war reception

The Lütjens (D185) in 2003.

In the British movie The Last Voyage of the Bismarck , Lütjens was portrayed by Karel Štěpánek .

On March 22, 1969 one of three new destroyers of the German Navy was named after Günther Lütjens. Its official name was Lütjens (D 185) . On the occasion of the christening when the ship was launched, when Gerda Lütjens was present as daughter-in-law, Defense State Secretary Karl Carstens said that the name Lütjens should serve as a model for future generations thanks to its unwavering sense of responsibility and devoted loyalty to duty. At the same time, the naming should remind of the suffering and death of all those German soldiers who stayed at sea. This choice of name was also based on the assumption that Lütjens had protested against the anti-Semitic crimes and thus demonstrated moral courage and that he had done his duty by sacrificing his life when the Bismarck was sunk in 1941 . This was preceded by a violent dispute between the then Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder and the naval leadership. Up until this point in time, the federal government adhered to the unwritten principle that only names should be used that had stood out in the resistance against the Nazi regime; for example the personalities of July 20, 1944 . Schröder, on the other hand, countered and enforced that the taboo of using “German hero names of the Second World War” for the Bundeswehr was broken. The honor of Lütjens, the highest-ranking German naval officer who fell in action during World War II, was a signal to the public that the Wehrmacht had now officially become a tradition for the Bundeswehr.

However, it was not certain whether one of the three destroyers would actually receive the name Lütjens . On the contrary, the then inspector of the German Navy, Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge (“Who was Lütjens anyway?”) Instead suggested the names Adenauer , Berlin and Rommel for the three destroyers . Schröder remained tough. However, he took up the idea that the three ships should be named after the “heroes” of all three Wehrmacht parts (army, navy, air force). The doubts about the name Lütjens persisted. Although the Admiral's life path had been deemed worthy in a study by the Military History Research Office , the naval leadership remained adamant. Vice-Admiral Karl-Adolf Zenker suggested the name Prien . The "bull of Scapa Flow" is more suitable. But Prien's involvement in the Nazi system could not be negated. Schröder finally ended the political turmoil and stayed with Lütjens . The other two destroyers were named Rommel ( Rommel (D 187) ) and Mölders ( Mölders (D 186) ). The three ships were grouped under ship class 103 / 103A / 103B , which is also called Lütjens class .

In view of the circumstances of Günther Lütjens' death, ie the "honorable" fight to the last grenade, leading naval circles are currently assessing a traditional reference to this admiral in a more differentiated manner. The leadership of the German Navy considers the preservation of the health and life of the members of the German naval forces as a priority and thus stands in contrast to the ruthless sacrifice of the soldiers in the Second World War.

Fonts

• The development of the sea powers of 1918/22 and their influence by the Washington Conference. In: Nauticus. 1923, pp. 241-271.

estate

Parts of Lütjens' personal estate were publicly auctioned on June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer. A uniform of the admiral as well as some medals and badges of honor can be viewed along with other exhibits of the Navy in the International Maritime Museum (IMMH) in Hamburg .

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b c} Federal Archives Personnel Form Günther Lütjens p. 1.
2. ^ Gerhard Hümmelchen: Admiral Günther Lütjens . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the war , Primus Verlag 2011, p. 407.
3. ↑ Reinhard Stumpf: The Wehrmacht Elite - Structure of Rank and Origin of German Generals and Admirals 1933–1945. Harald Boldt Verlag 1982, p. 270.
4. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Werner Rahn: On the 50th anniversary of the death of Admiral Günther Lütjens. Printed in the journal Marineforum No. 5, 1991 year, p. 164.
5. ↑ Alma Kreuter: German-speaking neurologists and psychiatrists - A biographical-bibliographical lexicon from the forerunners to the middle of the 20th century , De Gruyter Saur 1996, p. 62.
6. ↑ ^{a b} Eberhard Kliem: General Admiral Hermann Boehm - A German Navy Officer in the 20th Century , Oldenburg Isensee Verlag 2011, ISBN 978-3-89995-798-3 , p. 199.
7. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Gerhard Hümmelchen: Admiral Günther Lütjens . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the war , Primus Verlag 2011, p. 410.
8. ^ Gerhard Hümmelchen: Admiral Günther Lütjens . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the world war , Primus Verlag 2011, p. 408.
9. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i} Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals: 1849-1945, The military careers of naval, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers in the rank of admiral. Volume 2 H-O, Biblio-Verlag 1989, p. 407.
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j} Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy . Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, p. 20.
11. ↑ Otto Groos: The War in the North Sea , ES Mittler Verlag 1924, p. 289.
12. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 347.
13. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 349.
14. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy . Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, p. 21.
15. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 360.
16. ^ Walter Gladisch: The war at sea 1914-1918. The war in the North Sea. Volume 6: From June 1916 to spring 1917. ES Mittler & Sohn 1937, p. 328.
17. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 361.
18. ↑ Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935-1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 102.
19. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 365.
20. ^ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 46.
21. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals: 1849–1945, The military careers of naval, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers in the rank of admiral. Volume 2 H-O, Biblio-Verlag 1989, p. 408.
22. ↑ Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Volume 2, Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft 1985, p. 78.
23. ^ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 47.
24. ↑ Kevin R. Young: Heil Davy - A Nazi Visit to the Alamo . In: Alamo Courier - the journal of the Alamo Battlefield Association . October 1996 ( online ).
25. ↑ Erich Topp: Torches over the Atlantic - life report of a submarine commander . Ullstein TB, 2009, p. 57-82 .
26. ^ Diary of the chief seaman Steinbach, (taken on May 18, 2014) ( Memento from May 18, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
27. ^ Karl Dönitz: Ten Years and Twenty Days , Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1991, p. 12.
28. ↑ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 14.
29. ↑ Horst Steigler: The Navy and the Eastern Campaign , Military Publishing 2010, p. 26 f.
30. ^ Rolf Johannesson: Officer in critical time , Verlag ES Mittler, 1989, p. 54 f.
31. ↑ This was always an urgent concern for the commanding admiral of the North Sea naval station and later fleet chief, Admiral Hermann Boehm; see. Eberhard Kliem: General Admiral Hermann Boehm - A German naval officer in the 20th century , Isensee Verlag 2011, pp. 159f., 170.
32. ↑ Jürgen Förster: "The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State - A Structural History Analysis", Oldenbourg Verlag 2009, pp. 40, 47, 49, 52 and Erich Raeder: "Mein Leben", 2 vols. In 1 vol. Bublies Verlag 2009, z. BS 226 (August 1934), p. 236 (May 1935).
33. ↑ Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935-1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 345.
34. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy . Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, p. 22.
35. ↑ Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Biographies - a mirror of naval history from 1815 to the present, Volume 5: Ship biographies from Kaiser to Lütjens , Mundus Verlag, Ratingen o. J. (Approved licensed edition Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, Hamburg, approx. 1990), p. 240.
36. ↑ Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Biographies - a mirror of naval history from 1815 to the present, Volume 5: Ship biographies from Kaiser to Lütjens , Mundus Verlag, Ratingen o. J. (Approved licensed edition Koehlers Verlagsgesellschaft, Hamburg, approx. 1990), p. 225.
37. ^ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 15.
38. ^ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 16.
39. ↑ ^{a b} Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy . Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, p. 19.
40. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 74.
41. ↑ Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, Hans Umbreit: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 2, The establishment of hegemony on the European continent, Military History Research Office 1979, p. 166.
42. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 99 f.
43. ^ War diary Naval Commander West, September 4, 1939.
44. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 138.
45. ↑ ^{a b} Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 75.
46. ↑ Cajus Bekker: Damned Sea - A War Diary of the German Navy, Stalling Verlag 1971, p. 63.
47. ↑ Cajus Bekker: Damned Sea - A War Diary of the German Navy, Stalling Verlag 1971, p. 61.
48. ↑ Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals: 1849-1945, The military careers of naval, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers in the rank of admiral. Volume 2 H – O, Biblio-Verlag 1989, p. 207.
49. ↑ Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals: 1849-1945, The military careers of naval, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers in the rank of admiral. Volume 2 H-O, Biblio-Verlag 1989, p. 223.
50. ^ Dieter Hartwig: General Admiral Wilhelm Marschall . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the war , Primus Verlag 2011, p. 162.
51. ^ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 , Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 64.
52. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, Hans Umbreit: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 2, The establishment of hegemony on the European continent, Military History Research Office 1979, p. 213.
53. ^ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 , Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 54.
54. ↑ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 80.
55. ^ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 82.
56. ↑ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Military History Research Office (Hrsg.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 83.
57. ^ ^{A b} Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 99.
58. ^ ^{A b c} Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, Hans Umbreit: The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 2, The establishment of hegemony on the European continent, Military History Research Office 1979, p. 214.
59. ↑ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 , Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 86.
60. ↑ Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German Attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940 , Military History Research Office (ed.), Oldenbourg Verlag 1994, p. 140.
61. ↑ Veit Scherzer : Knight's Cross bearers 1939-1945. The holders of the Iron Cross of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and armed forces allied with Germany according to the documents of the Federal Archives. 2nd Edition. Scherzers Militaer-Verlag, Ranis / Jena 2007, ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2 , p. 492.
62. ^ ^{A b c} Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935–1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 195.
63. ↑ see Wolfgang Kähler, Commander of the Gneisenau: Battleship Gneisenau, Heyne Verlag, 1974, p. 54.
64. ↑ Jochen Brennecke: Battleship Bismarck , Koehler Verlag 1997, p. 11.
65. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 224.
66. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 207.
67. ^ Special deposit of June 24, 1989 from the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 27.
68. ↑ see Wolfgang Kähler, Commander of the Gneisenau: Battleship Gneisenau , Heyne Verlag, 1979.
69. ↑ see Elfrath: Deutsche Kriegsmarine, part 4. 1998, Podzun Verlag, p. 179 f.
70. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 79.
71. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 385.
72. ↑ See for the entire operation Niklas Zetterling, Michael Tamelander: Bismarck. The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship. Casemate 2009, pp. 64-81.
73. ^ Rainer Busch, Hans-Joachim Röll: The U-Boat War 1939-1945, Volume 3, German U-Boat Successes from September 1939 to May 1945. Mittler & Sohn 2001, p. 92.
74. ^ Rainer Busch, Hans-Joachim Röll: The U-Boat War 1939-1945, Volume 3, German U-Boat Successes from September 1939 to May 1945. Mittler & Sohn 2001, p. 105.
75. ^ Karl Dönitz: Ten Years and Twenty Days , Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1991, p. 159.
76. ^ Robert Jackson: German warships in World War II , Gondrom Verlag 1999, p. 69.
77. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 390.
78. ↑ Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939 , Koehlers Verlag 2001, p. 80.
79. ^ Karl-Volker Neugebauer , Manfred Görtemaker, Reiner Pommerin and Rüdiger Wenzke: The time after 1945: Armies in transition . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2007, p. 132.
80. ↑ without author: The Wehrmacht Reports 1939–1945. Volume 1 September 1939 to December 31, 1941, Gesellschaft für Literatur und Bildung mbH 1989, p. 450 f.
81. ^ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: The Second World War , Komet Verlag 2008, p. 368.
82. ^ ^{A b} Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935–1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 389.
83. ↑ Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935-1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 448.
84. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 386.
85. ↑ ^{a b} Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939–1945 , on behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research, JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 241.
86. ↑ Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander in Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939-1945 . On behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research , JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 240.
87. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck . Flechsig Publishing House. 2005, picture 13.
88. ↑ Hans Joachim Oels: The use of the battleship Bismarck from the perspective of operations and ship command In: The naval officer as a leader in battle - Lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , published by the German Marine Institute with the support of MGFA, Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 125.
89. ↑ ^{a b} Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935–1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 451.
90. ↑ Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939–1945 , On behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research, JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 228.
91. ↑ ^{a b c} Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 76.
92. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941–1943 , p. 373.
93. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 392.
94. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 79.
95. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941–1943 , p. 375.
96. ^ Cajus Bekker: Damned Sea - A War Diary of the German Navy, Stalling Verlag 1971, p. 211.
97. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 393.
98. ↑ ^{a b c} Erich Raeder: My life, Commander in Chief of the German Navy 1935–1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 452.
99. ↑ see Elfrath: Deutsche Kriegsmarine, part 4, Podzun Verlag, p. 180.
100. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941–1943 , p. 376.
101. ↑ Jochen Brennecke: Battleship Bismarck: high point and end of an epoch , Koehler Verlag 1960, p. 59.
102. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 82.
103. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 84.
104. ↑ http://i.ebayimg.com/00/s/MTAyNFg1NzY=/z/rDQAAOSwvc9WFY9N/$_75 .
105. ↑ Jochen Brennecke: Battleship Bismarck , Koehler Verlag 1997, p. 162.
106. ^ Paul Schmalenbach, Schwerer Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, Heyne Verlag, 1978, p. 178.
107. ↑ ^{a b c} Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943 , p. 377.
108. ^ ^{A b} Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943 , p. 381.
109. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 120.
110. ↑ Cajus Bekker: Damned Sea - A War Diary of the German Navy, Stalling Verlag 1971, p. 217.
111. ↑ see Cajus Bekker, Das Bildbuch der Deutschen Kriegsmarine, Heyne Verlag, 1972, p. 119.
112. ^ Gerhard Wagner: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler 1939–1945. Lehmann Verlag Munich 1972, p. 239.
113. ↑ without author: The Wehrmacht Reports 1939–1945. Volume 1 September 1939 to December 31, 1941, Gesellschaft für Literatur und Bildung mbH 1989, pp. 538ff.
114. ^ German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in combat - lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 131.
115. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 127.
116. ↑ Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935-1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 454.
117. ^ German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in battle - lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 135.
118. ↑ Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Situation lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939-1945 , on behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research, JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 242.
119. ↑ Robert D. Ballard: The discovery of Bismarck Ullstein Verlag 1993, p. 126.
120. ↑ Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939–1945 , On behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research, JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 245.
121. ^ ^{A b} Robert D. Ballard: The discovery of the Bismarck Ullstein Verlag 1993, p. 139.
122. ↑ ^{a b c} Cajus Bekker: Battle and sinking of the navy; a documentary report in words and pictures , Spontholz Verlag 1953, p. 57.
123. ↑ ^{a b} German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in combat - lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 124.
124. ↑ ^{a b c} Cajus Bekker: Battle and sinking of the navy; a documentary report in words and pictures , Spontholz Verlag 1953, p. 61.
125. ↑ Veit Scherzer: Knight's Cross bearers 1939-1945. The holders of the Iron Cross of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm and armed forces allied with Germany according to the documents of the Federal Archives. 2nd Edition. Scherzers Militaer-Verlag, Ranis / Jena 2007, ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2 , p. 675.
126. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941–1943 , pp. 130–202.
127. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943 , p. 380.
128. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Werner Rahn: On the 50th anniversary of the death of Admiral Günther Lütjens. printed in the journal Marineforum Nr. 5, year 1991, p. 165.
129. ^ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: The Second World War , Komet Verlag 2008, p. 376.
130. ↑ German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in combat - lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 137.
131. ^ Wording of the address after Müllenheim-Rechberg: "Soldiers from the battleship Bismarck! You have earned yourselves great fame! The sinking of the battle cruiser Hood has not only military but also moral value, the Hood was the pride of England. The enemy will now try to gather his forces and attack us. So I fired Prince Eugene yesterday at noon so that he could wage his own trade war in the Atlantic. He managed to escape the enemy. We, on the other hand, have orders * [* this is not true, calling at a port was Lütjen's decision] to call at a French port in view of the hits received. On the way there the enemy will rally and face us to fight. The German people are with you and we will shoot until the pipes glow and until the last projectile has left the pipes. For us soldiers it is now: win or die! "
132. ↑ ^{a b c d} German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in combat - Lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 130.
133. ↑ ^{a b} Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 207.
134. ^ Cajus Bekker: Battle and Fall of the Navy; a documentary report in words and pictures , Spontholz Verlag 1953, p. 217.
135. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 216.
136. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 222.
137. ↑ Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939–1945 , on behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research, JF Lehmann Verlag 1972, p. 252.
138. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 243.
139. ↑ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: The Second World War , Komet Verlag 2008, p. 378.
140. ↑ ^{a b c d} German Marine Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office: The naval officer as a leader in combat - lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 129.
141. ↑ without author: The Wehrmacht Reports 1939–1945. Volume 1 September 1939 to December 31, 1941, Gesellschaft für Literatur und Bildung mbH 1989, p. 542.
142. ↑ Wording of the Wehrmacht report: “As announced yesterday, the battleship Bismarck was unable to maneuver after its victorious battle near Iceland on May 26th in the evening due to a torpedo hit by an enemy aircraft. True to the last radio message from the fleet chief Admiral Lütjens, the battleship with its commander Captain Lindemann and his brave crew succumbed to multiple enemy superiorities on May 27th in the morning and sank with the flag waving. "
143. ^ Daily Mail from Wednesday, May 28, 1941.
144. ↑ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 28.
145. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 451.
146. ↑ Erich Raeder: Mein Leben, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 1935-1943. Bublies Verlag 2009, p. 455.
147. ^ Special auction of June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer, p. 25.
148. ↑ Wolfgang Schumann and Gerhart Hass: Germany in the Second World War, Volume 1, preparation, unleashing and course of the war until June 22, 1941. Akademie-Verlag Berlin 1974, p. 368.
149. ↑ Manfred Dörr: The knight's cross bearers of the surface forces of the navy . Volume 2: L-Z. Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1996, p. 230.
150. ↑ ^{a b c d} Robert D. Ballard, Rick Archbold, Karl-Otto von Czernicki, Ralf Friese: The discovery of Bismarck. Ullstein Verlag 1993, p. 31.
151. ↑ Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943 , p. 83.
152. ^ ^{A b} Horst Boog, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: The expansion to world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943 , p. 374.
153. ↑ ^{a b c d} Gerhard Hümmelchen: Admiral Günther Lütjens . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the war , Primus Verlag 2011, p. 411.
154. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 161.
155. ^ Eberhard Kliem: General Admiral Hermann Boehm - A German naval officer in the 20th century , Isensee Verlag, Oldenburg 2011, p. 174 f.
156. ^ Eberhard Kliem: General Admiral Hermann Boehm - A German naval officer in the 20th century , Isensee Verlag, Oldenburg 2011, p. 175.
157. ↑ see Cajus Bekker: Das Bildbuch der Deutschen Kriegsmarine, Heyne Verlag, 1972, p. 106.
158. ↑ Peter Greiner, Harro von Senger, Till Philip Koltermann von Harrassowitz: The fall of the Third Reich as reflected in the German-Japanese cultural encounter 1933-1945 , Harrassowitz 2009, p. 156.
159. ↑ Anuschka Albertz: Exemplary Heroism - The History of Reception of the Battle of Thermopylae from Antiquity to the Present , Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag 2006, p. 315.
160. ↑ ^{a b c} Hans Joachim Oels: The use of the battleship Bismarck from the point of view of operations and ship command In: The naval officer as a leader in combat - Lectures at the historical-tactical conference of the fleet 1983 , published by the German Marine Institute with the support of MGFA , Mittler Verlag 1984, p. 104.
161. ^ Michael Salewski: The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1 1935-1941, Bernard & Graefe Verlag 1970, p. 394.
162. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Ullstein Verlag 1980, pp. 87f.
163. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck , Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 244ff.
164. ^ Werner Rahn: On the 50th anniversary of Admiral Günther Lütjens' death. Printed in the journal Marineforum No. 5, 1991 year, p. 164 ff.
165. ^ Cajus Bekker: Kampf und Untergang der Kriegsmarine , Adolf Spontholz Verlag Hannover 1953, p. 61.
166. ↑ ^{a b c} Günter Fromm: Statement by the Commander of the Fleet In: The naval officer as a leader in battle , published by the German Maritime Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office, Mittler & Sohn Verlag 1984, p. 136.
167. ↑ Günter Fromm: Statement by the Commander of the Fleet In: The naval officer as a leader in battle , published by the German Maritime Institute with the support of the Military History Research Office, Mittler & Sohn Verlag 1984, p. 137.
168. ↑ ^{a b c} Holger Afflerbach: "Go down with a waving flag". Refusal to surrender in the German Navy. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 49th year 2001, p. 608.
169. ^ Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg: Battleship Bismarck, Flechig Verlag 2005, p. 278.
170. ^ ^{A b} Holger Afflerbach: "Going down with a waving flag". Refusal to surrender in the German Navy. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 49th year 2001, pp. 595–612, here p. 609.
171. ↑ Der Spiegel , issue no. 35 of the year 1967, p. 23 available online
172. ↑ ^{a b c} Holger Afflerbach: "Go down with a waving flag". Refusal to surrender in the German Navy. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 49th year 2001, issue 4, pp. 595–612, here p. 612. ( Online ; PDF; 6.3 MB)
173. ↑ ^{a b c} Der Spiegel, issue no.35 of the 1967 year, p. 24.
174. ↑ Der Spiegel, issue No. 35 of the 1967 year, p. 25.
175. ^ Special auction on June 24, 1989 by the auction house for Historica Hüsken / Schäfer

literature

• Holger Afflerbach : "Go down with a waving flag". Refusal to surrender in the German Navy. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 49th year 2001, issue 4, ISSN  0042-5702 , pp. 595-612. ( Online ; PDF; 6.3 MB).
• Robert D. Ballard, Rick Archbold, Karl-Otto von Czernicki, Ralf Friese: The discovery of Bismarck. Ullstein Verlag, 1993, ISBN 3-548-23298-1 .
• Cajus Bekker : Damned Sea - A War Diary of the German Navy , Stalling-Verlag , 1971, ISBN 3-7979-1342-7 .
• Cajus Bekker: Battle and Fall of the Navy; a documentary report in words and pictures. Sponholtz Verlag 1953, OCLC 9174689
• Horst Boog , Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, Bernd Wegner: The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 6: The global war: the expansion to the world war and the change of initiative 1941-1943. ISBN 978-3-421-06233-8 .
• Rainer Busch, Hans-Joachim Röll: The submarine war 1939-1945. Volume 3: German submarine successes from September 1939 to May 1945. Mittler & Sohn, 2001, ISBN 3-8132-0513-4 .
• Karl Dönitz : Ten years and twenty days. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1991, ISBN 3-7637-5186-6 .
• Harald Fock: Z-Vor! International development and war missions of destroyers and torpedo boats 1914 to 1939. Koehlers Verlag, 2001, ISBN 3-7822-0762-9 .
• Jürgen Förster: The Wehrmacht in the Nazi State - A structural-historical analysis. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-85172-4
• Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals: 1849-1945, The military careers of naval, engineer, sanitary, weapons and administrative officers in the admiral rank. Volume 2: HO. Biblio-Verlag, 1989, ISBN 3-7648-1499-3 .
• Gerhard Hümmelchen : Admiral Günther Lütjens . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.): Hitler's military elite. From the beginning of the war to the end of the world war . Volume 2. Primus Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, ISBN 3-89678-089-1 (Reprint 2012: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , WBG)
• Eberhard Kliem: General Admiral Hermann Boehm - A German naval officer in the 20th century. Isensee Verlag, Oldenburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-89995-798-3 .
• Klaus A. Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, Hans Umbreit: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 2: The establishment of hegemony on the European continent. Military History Research Office , 1979, ISBN 3-421-01935-5 .
• Burkard Freiherr von Müllenheim-Rechberg : Battleship Bismarck. Flechig Publishing House. 2005, ISBN 3-88189-591-4 .
• Hans-Martin Ottmer: Weser Exercise - The German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940. Military History Research Office (Hrsg.), Oldenbourg Verlag . 1994, ISBN 3-486-56092-1 .
• without author: The Wehrmacht Reports 1939–1945. Volume 1: September 1939 to December 31, 1941. Society for Literature and Education 1989.
• Erich Raeder : My life. 2 volumes in 1 volume Bublies Verlag , Beltheim-Schnellbach 2009, ISBN 978-3-937820-07-1 .
• Werner Rahn : On the 50th anniversary of Admiral Günther Lütjens' death. In: Marineforum. No. 5, born in 1991.
• Michael Salewski : The German Naval Warfare 1935-1945. Volume 1: 1935-1941. Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1970, OCLC 612191997
• Gerhard Wagner, Erich Raeder, Karl Dönitz: Lectures of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy before Hitler, 1939–1945. On behalf of the Working Group for Defense Research. JF Lehmann Verlag, 1972, OCLC 318750
• Niklas Zetterling, Michael Tamelander: Bismarck. The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship. Casemat, Philadelphia (PA), Newbury (GB), 2009 ISBN 978-1-935149-04-0 .

Web links

Commons : Günther Lütjens  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Internet presence of the International Maritime Museum
• Newspaper article about Günther Lütjens in the press kit of the 20th century of the ZBW - Leibniz Information Center for Economics .