Heinrich flood

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As Heinrich flood or July floods or Black Friday from Waldeck is flooding referred after severe storms on 15 and 16 July 1965 North Hesse , southern Lower Saxony and East Westphalia and parts of present day states of Saxony-Anhalt , Thuringia and Saxony met. A total of 16 people died, three of them in the GDR, in the flood that followed the extreme heavy rain . There were damages in the three-digit DM and Ostmark millions. The catchment areas of the Twiste and Diemel , the town of Bad Karlshafen at the mouth of the Diemel , the catchment area of ​​the Lippe and Altenau , where seven people died, and the Ilme were particularly hard hit . The today's districts of Göttingen , Holzminden and Kassel were also badly affected . Major damage occurred in the inner cities of Paderborn , Lippstadt and Kassel . In the GDR, the districts of Erfurt , Suhl , Gera , Karl-Marx-Stadt , Leipzig , Dresden and Halle were badly affected.

Preliminary remark

The Heinrich flood of July 1965 took place at a time when modern information technology and the methodology of hydrology and meteorology were in their infancy. There were no weather satellites, the authorities responsible for water level and weather forecasting worked at national level; there was only a rudimentary international network. Especially in the case of smaller rivers and streams, the runoff behavior in the event of flooding was completely unknown. In many places there was no level at them. Sudden worsening weather or a sudden rise in the water level could sometimes only be recognized when it was too late to warn the population in good time.

Analog technologies in the form of telephone, teletype and radio were available as means of communication. Notices, daily newspapers, air raid sirens and loudspeaker trucks from the police and fire brigade served as a link between the authorities and the population. Television and radio only broadcast a limited number of hours a day. The current programs were often taken over by other German broadcasters and were very difficult to change or interrupt. The fact that in the 1960s the power supply in the settlement areas, both in the countryside and in the cities, was overhead lines proved to be problematic . These overhead lines were often badly damaged by lightning strikes and storms, which led to widespread, long-lasting power outages. Under such conditions the population could only be warned by loudspeaker vans from the police and fire brigade or by officers going from house to house. If electricity and telephone connections were interrupted and driveways were impassable, only rescue measures could be initiated.

Course of the disaster

July 15, 1965 8:35 p.m. Heavy storms over Einbeck - the entire city center is flooded. The district of Einbeck triggers a disaster alarm. Storms move in a west-southwest direction.
July 16, 1965 5:00 a.m. The weakened thunderstorm precipitation with heavy rain, which passed the Einbeck area the evening before, reached the Paderborn area . They last all morning.
July 16, 1965 10:00 a.m. After repeated thunderstorm rainstorms in the area of Heinade , Stadtoldendorf , Mackensen and Dassel , the district of Einbeck triggers another disaster alarm. Storms are moving in a west-southwest direction again. In Bevern (Holzminden district) , a woman is hit by a flash flood and killed.
July 16, 1965 12:00 p.m. Dramatic deterioration in weather in the area of ​​the Paderborn plateau . Between 12:00 p.m. and 2:25 p.m., a total of 3 downpours fell at the Paderborn Landesfrauenklinik weather station, with 89.5 mm of precipitation.
July 16, 1965 1:57 p.m. The flood wave of the Schmittwasser reaches its peak with 15.4 m³ / s.
July 16, 1965 2:30 p.m. A disaster alarm is triggered in the Paderborn district .
July 16, 1965 2:38 p.m. The flood wave of the Ellerbach reaches its peak with 20.6 m³ / s.
July 16, 1965 4:00 p.m. The German geologist Eck von Zezschwitz observed a 500 m wide and 1000 m long stratified flood near Elisenhof that reached 20 cm in height until 6:00 p.m.
July 16, 1965 4:00 p.m. Paderborn – Bielefeld railway line interrupted
July 16, 1965 4:30 p.m. The district of Münden triggers a disaster pre- alarm.
July 16, 1965 5:00 p.m. Break of the road embankment at the Wrexer pond in the course of the B 252. A 4 m high tidal wave is rolling through Wrexen
July 16, 1965 5:00 p.m. On the Korbach – Volkmarsen , Kassel – Warburg and Kassel – Eichenberg railway lines , operations must be stopped after floods and landslides. Replacement traffic cannot be set up because the streets are flooded.
July 16, 1965 5:55 p.m. The district of Münden triggers a disaster alarm.
July 17, 1965 02:00 h The flood wave of the Diemel reaches Helmarshausen ; the place is flooded meters high within a very short time. The population is warned with sirens.
July 17, 1965 3:25 a.m. The Diemel Bridge over Bundesstrasse 7 near Warburg , which is important for supraregional traffic , is destroyed.
July 17, 1965 4:00 a.m. Big alarm in Bad Karlshafen by siren, as the flood wave of the Diemel reaches the city. It is flooded meters high within a very short time. Numerous residents surprised by the water can only be rescued by the Bundeswehr with boats.
July 17, 1965 4:00 a.m. The peak of the flood of the Lippe passes the Bentfeld gauge with a peak value of 404 m³ / s (mean value 1956/1965: 11.9 m³ / s)
July 17, 1965 5:00 a.m. Flood peak of the Diemel passes with the peak value 820 m³ / s Helmarshausen (mean value 1956/1965: 9.53 m³ / s)
July 17, 1965 6:30 a.m. The peak of the flood of the Lippe passes the Bentfeld gauge with a peak value of 404 m³ / s (mean value 1956/1965: 11.9 m³ / s)
July 17, 1965 6:30 a.m. Collapse of the Almebrücke in Neuhaus Castle

Development of the weather situation

After an unusually wet and cold spring and summer, warm air masses flowed north from the subtropics in mid-July 1965, where they met cold Scandinavian air masses. A so-called cold air droplet formed on the back of the warm air flowing in over northern France , which led to the very moist warm air flowing in being completely surrounded by cold air. The warm air slipped on the cold air, which led to severe thunderstorms with torrential precipitation.

Already in the late evening hours of July 15, there were severe storms in the Einbeck area with torrential rains, which led to extensive flooding. Due to the situation, the authorities responsible for disaster control in what was then the district of Einbeck felt compelled to trigger a disaster alarm at 8:45 p.m., three quarters of an hour after the storm began. In the following hours the precipitation area, interspersed with heavy thunderstorms, moved further west and also led to thunderstorms in the area of ​​the later disaster area.

In the morning hours of July 16, severe storms set in in the Stadtoldendorf / Heinade / Mackensen area, which led to an aggravation of the flood situation in the Ilme area. The storms withdrew with reinforcements in a westerly direction and reached the Paderborn / Warburg area around noon. From 12:00 p.m. onwards, in almost complete darkness, over the Paderborn plateau , the Warburger Börde and the Waldecker Tafelland on an area limited to the west by the Rothaargebirge and to the east by the Eggegebirge and Reinhardswald , roughly two-hour, torrential and thunderstorm precipitation set in slowly relocated to the east to around Einbeck / Göttingen and reached this in the evening hours.

During the storm in an area between Paderborn in the north, Brilon in the southwest and Warburg and Hofgeismar in the east, as well as in the Kassel and Fritzlar area, rain amounts of well over 100 mm were recorded at the weather stations, most of which fell within a period of two hours. In the area between Paderborn and Höxter in the north, as well as Warburg and Hofgeismar in the south, there was around 200 mm of precipitation in 72 hours between July 14 and July 17, in Dalheim even well over 200 mm in 24 hours. For a short time maximum rain intensities of up to 4.5 mm / minute were found.

Further severe storms aggravated the situation again in the following days, especially in the Kassel and Hannoversch Münden area .

Development of the water levels

In the catchment area of ​​the Diemel and Twiste as well as the Lippe and Altenau, the precipitation could no longer be absorbed by the already saturated soils; Likewise, the underground cave systems typical of karst landscapes were already so filled that a catastrophic runoff event occurred. Due to the above-ground runoff and the erupting karst springs in the area of ​​the Paderborn plateau, but also in the Stadtoldendorf and Heinade area in the Holzminden district, previously unobserved water levels were reached in the rivers and streams within a very short time. The erupting karst springs on the flanks of the box valleys typical of karst landscapes and the high intensity of the precipitation meant that large amounts of water not only penetrated into the villages from the rivers, but also flowed down to the valley directly from the mountain flanks as flash floods . There were numerous mudslides in unfavorable slope areas . Dam structures, such as road embankments, bridges and culverts that were too small, but also field walls and even pasture fences, which held the abundant floating debris, temporarily led to even higher water levels.

Due to the extreme precipitation in the water-saturated soil, the water levels in streams and rivers in the precipitation area rose rapidly. Depending on the size of the catchment area, the possibility of overflow and the efficiency of the river bed, maximum water levels were reached shortly after the midday storm had subsided.

A discharge of 15.4 m³ / s was determined on the Schmittwasser on July 16 at 13:57, and a discharge of 20.6 m³ / s on the Ellerbach at 14:38. In Paderborn on July 16, the discharge at the Pader gauge was 47.3 m³ / s, which corresponds to almost 10 times the mean discharge. At the Pader spring it took until the end of August for the values ​​to normalize. This extreme runoff led to widespread flooding in the urban area. The Altenau brought a flood wave to the Lippe, which caused flooding up to the mouth of the Lippe. The flow was at the level of the Lippe at ten times the five-year mean.

The level of the Diemel at its mouth in Bad Karlshafen rose in the morning of July 17 within a few hours by 5 meters. In Eberschütz, which was passed by the flood peak in the night from July 16 to 17, the Diemel swelled so quickly that the place was flooded within half an hour.

At the gauge on the upper reaches of the Diemel in Westheim near Marsberg , the flow on July 16 was 225 cubic meters per second (mean value 1954/2006: 5.26 m³ / s). In Helmarshausen near Bad Karlshafen on the lower reaches of the Diemel, the flow was even 820 cubic meters per second, normal here is around 10.4 m³ / s.

The flood wave of the Diemel led to a water level in the Weser near Bad Karlshafen that was above the summer flood of 1956 . However, the flood peak of the Weser flattened significantly on its course up to the Weser weir in Bremen- Hastedt and, in contrast to the July flood in 1956, was no longer noticeable on the tide levels of the Weser below Bremen.

At the Fulda and Eder gauges , the situation remained relaxed despite the extreme rainfall, as the water level of the Edersee had already been lowered a few days earlier. The partially drained reservoir was able to absorb and store 29 million cubic meters, which came from the heavy rainfall in the catchment area of ​​the upper reaches of the Eder.

Damage

General

The starting point for many very serious damage was numerous dam structures. This included the small dams built at the many water mills at the time, as well as outdated road bridges and culverts that were not designed for such a load and were badly damaged or destroyed. In the settlements, the river cross-sections were very narrowed by built-in structures and as a result were not able to absorb the water masses coming from the upper reaches.

The large numbers of floating debris that were carried along and blocked passages and bridges proved to be very dangerous. The stone arch or vault bridges that were common in the region at that time proved to be particularly vulnerable , 40 of which were destroyed or so badly damaged in the catchment area of ​​Alme, Altenau and Lippe that they had to be replaced by new buildings.

Numerous massive bridges were destroyed or severely damaged by the flood waves, some of which were meter-high, from dam breaks, thereby interrupting national road connections as well as electricity and telephone connections. Field walls built across the cross-section of the valley or near the banks, which could not withstand the high water pressure in the long term, also proved to be the cause of high tidal waves. The collapse of the medieval monastery wall in Dalheim as well as the break of a road embankment near Wrexen , the break of the medieval city wall at the passage of the Esse in Grebenstein and the collapse of a flood dam in Etteln led to meter-high and completely unexpected occurrences for the population tidal waves raging down the valley.

Serious damage occurred on the agricultural areas where grassland had been converted from floodplain to arable land, as well as in areas where river straightening was carried out as part of amelioration measures . There was not only severe damage to the banks, but also, as on the Dalbach below Oesdorf near Westheim, the course of the river being relocated back into the old river bed.

Embankments with only single trees were also badly damaged. There were severe bank breaks, severe scouring and deepening of the riverbeds and brooks. In the Paderborn district alone, 24 road bridges were destroyed. Large deposits of silt and gravel formed above the dams.

About Scot conclusions also led to severe damage to farmland caused by the falling of the slopes of valleys box to the valley sheet flow and flash floods were deposited there. Depending on the slope of the slope, these floods had a similar character to that observed in alpine torrents . The German geologist, Ecke von Zezschwitz , who was in the disaster area during the storm, observed as an eye witness at Elisenhof a stratified flood about 1.5 km long and several hundred meters wide.

On the flanks of Kastentäler there were large landslides in many places, in unfavorable places whole old forest stands slide down, for example in the forest areas near Blankenrode . In some areas, the special geological structure of the karst and the slope and soil conditions led to the formation of badland . In the Minstal , about 1.5 km southeast of Etteln between Donnerberg and Ettlerberg , a 1.5 km long and up to 5 m deep erosion channel that reached into the rock was washed out. Not only loose material but also large rock material had been washed out of this channel. The cause of this is assumed to be a downpour, with a rainfall of more than 150 mm falling in a very short time.

Diemel river basin

In the catchment area of ​​the Diemel and its tributaries, the villages of Wrexen , Grebenstein , Helmarshausen , Trendelburg and Bad Karlshafen were particularly hard hit. A particular focus of damage was in Wrexen. After 156 mm of precipitation fell in Rhoden within a very short time and immediately drained into the Rhodener Bach, which drained towards the Diemel, the water masses in front of the bridge in the embankment of the federal road 252 , which was not designed for such a flood, was so high on that the dam was flooded. The outer embankment, which was much too steep, gave way under the water masses that were now flooding the dam in a broad front and the dam broke to a length of 80 m. As a result of the dam breach, the previously dammed water masses suddenly poured onto the areas below the dam. On their way down to the valley, three water mills and the associated buildings were hit by a four-meter high tidal wave and seriously damaged or destroyed. On the way to Diemel in Wrexen, the massive road bridge in the course of Ramser Strasse was completely washed away. Numerous houses and businesses were badly damaged and building rubble and agricultural equipment were transported over long distances. A woman was killed in the storm in Wrexen. She was in a house that was hit by a mudslide.

The bridge over the Diemel in the course of the federal highway 7 near Warburg was destroyed by the flood. This interrupted an important national road connection between Kassel and Paderborn at the time. In the station of Immenhausen at the Kassel-Warburg railway stranded hundreds Federal Railroad passengers of the Germans, as the track was no longer navigable because of the flooding of the station in Grebenstein.

In Grebenstein , the Esse , a tributary of the Diemel, drove tree trunks from a sawmill above the town to the city wall. The river, which was initially dammed up by the flotsam made of long wood, then caused the city wall to partially collapse at the inlet of the Esse on the Hilte, whereupon the water suddenly poured into the city center in the form of a meter-high tidal wave and caused severe damage together with the tree trunks that were carried along.

In Helmarshausen over 100 people were trapped in the rapidly rising water of the Diemel. They could only be saved with the help of helicopters. There was one dead while being rescued.

In Trendelburg and Bad Karlshafen, too, there was severe damage from flooding. The entire historic old town of Bad Karlshafen was flooded several meters high. The water level of the flood of 1956 was exceeded on the Weser. Debris and animal carcasses were shipped to Hameln.

The catchment area of ​​Lippe, Alme and Altenau

The catchment area of ​​the Lippe and that of its tributary Alme was hardest hit . The focus was on the Paderborn plateau with the towns of Etteln and Borchen an der Altenau (Alme) . In Etteln, 200 people were trapped by rapidly rising floods and 7 residents were killed, including 4 children, after a field wall, which had initially kept the water from Altenau away, gave way under the pressure of the water masses. After the wall broke, a two-meter high tidal wave suddenly poured into the village. Four people, including three children, were washed out of a residential building and drowned. Many of the residents of Etteln, who were in mortal danger, could only be rescued from their homes with helicopters or with heavy military equipment.

Two people were killed in the floods in Neuhaus Castle. Here the bridge over the Alme was destroyed in the course of the federal highway 64 after it was clogged with debris. The flood wave of the Alme, but also the precipitation, which the rainwater sewer system can no longer cope with, flooded parts of the inner city of Paderborn, where some streets were flooded up to a meter high. Serious damage occurred in the flooded houses in the city center and in the shops and factories.

Serious damage from flooding also occurred in Schwaney , where the entire town center was flooded, and in Lipperode . In Lippstadt , the city center was flooded up to a meter high. Numerous important buildings, including the two hospitals, were no longer accessible to the emergency services. Floods also occurred in the further course of the Lippe in the Hamm , Haltern am See and Dorsten areas ; However, no settlement areas were affected here; the Lippe dykes, which were controlled by the responsible authorities, withstood the flood.

Schede river basin

In the valley of the Schede there was serious damage in Volkmarshausen , where a felt factory was flooded and its stocks were washed away. Here, as in the other disaster areas, drainage ditches that were completely blocked by mud caused major problems.

Ilme river basin

On the Ilme , the places Mackensen, Einbeck and Dassel were flooded. The Spüligbach had brought a tidal wave of previously unknown height from the karst areas in Hellental and from Holzberg . A landslide on the Bierberg near Dassel led to the failure of telecommunications equipment.

River basins of Fulda and Werra

Landslides and floods interrupted numerous rail connections. In the Kassel area, rail traffic on the Kassel – Eichenberg line on the Kassel – Hannoversch Münden and Kassel – Waldkappel section came to a standstill after landslides. In Kassel traffic came to a standstill on some arterial roads because the sewer system was not designed for such large amounts of precipitation within a very short time.

A campsite on the Fulda in Hannoversch Münden was cleared as a precaution.

In Wilhelmshausen am Reinhardswald , a brook coming from Gahrenberg brought a large amount of flotsam and debris that flooded parts of the place. Here, as elsewhere, bridges were clogged with floating debris, so that the drainage was massively impeded.

Damage in the GDR

Neighboring areas of the former GDR were also affected by severe storms, for example in Großengottern and Torgau . A total of three people were killed. Violent thunderstorms on July 16, 1965 particularly affected Thuringia and the western Ore Mountains , where they led to rainfall of up to 75 l / m².

Crisis management

Due to the catastrophic rainfall in the noon and early afternoon hours and the rapidly swelling rivers and streams, the responsible authorities triggered a disaster alarm. This led to the deployment of thousands of civil and military helpers. In addition to the local fire brigades, the Red Cross, the church relief services, the police and the technical relief organization, soldiers from the Bundeswehr and the British Rhine Army stationed in Detmold , Hameln and the Senne were also on duty.

While in Lower Saxony the disaster plans drawn up by the emergency services after the severe weather disasters of August 1955 and June 1961 in the Leine area and the July floods in 1956 on the Leine, Aller and Weser took hold and the more severe effects could be prevented through a centrally coordinated deployment of the rescue forces, the Disaster response in the affected North Rhine-Westphalian regions as inadequate. During the clean-up work, the then North Rhine-Westphalian Interior Minister Willi Weyer had to admit serious deficiencies in disaster control.

Due to the lack of coordination of the emergency services, there were initially major problems with the rescue measures. The Bundeswehr and Belgian, Dutch and British military units stationed in the region deployed on their own after the local commanders recognized the existence of a catastrophic emergency. Other rescue units such as the fire brigade, THW and Red Cross knew nothing about these missions.

The complete collapse of the telecommunications network and the lack of radio equipment were particularly devastating. The responsible district authorities had to send out messengers in some areas to warn the municipal administrations in the endangered areas. Some of these only reached the affected areas after hours. In the particularly badly affected municipality of Etteln, the technical operations command set up there by the municipal administration only had a single radio device. The numerous destroyed bridges and the impassable local, regional and national roads, even for high-wheeled emergency vehicles, caused considerable problems. As a result, long detours were sometimes necessary to reach the locations.

The inadequate equipment of the rescue teams prevented a rescue of the trapped in many places. At the Kuhlemühle Küting near Ossendorf , the attempt by the German Armed Forces to rescue eight people and several children from the buildings enclosed by the water with a helicopter that was not designed for this situation failed. In Etteln, a woman and a child fell from the rescue rope temporarily attached to the helicopter. Sometimes people sat on the roofs of their houses for 17 hours in the flood area. On the Diemel, too, a woman was killed in a failed helicopter rescue operation. A dramatic rescue operation was also carried out below the Wrexer pond between Wrexen and Rhoden, where a catastrophic tidal wave occurred after a road embankment broke. The people trapped in the mill building threatened by collapse, including two children, could not be rescued from the air because the helicopters in use were only equipped with rope ladders that were too short and therefore they could not be reached. The Wrex citizen Louiza Ramus , who rescued the trapped from the building together with the recreational diver Horst Richard Platt , was honored with the rescue medal of the state of Hesse for her selfless act in December 1965 by the then Hessian Prime Minister Georg August Zinn .

Investigations and measures after the flood

Investigations

Just a few weeks after the disaster, extensive investigations into the course and the damage caused by the flood were initiated. The investigations by the geologist and then director of the Geological State Office of North Rhine-Westphalia in Krefeld, Herbert Karrenberg, precipitation intensity and erosion in the karst area of ​​Paderborn during the storm of July 16, 1965 , the work of the geologist Ecke von Zezschwitz, soil and vegetation influences on floods and Erosion during the storm of July 16, 1965 in the area of ​​the Paderborn plateau (1967) as well as the expert opinion prepared by the then Federal Institute for Vegetation Science , Nature Conservation and Landscape Management and on behalf of the Regional Association of Westphalia-Lippe on flood- related landscape damage in the catchment of Altenau and its tributaries by Walter Mrass Collaboration by Wilhelm Lohmeyer and Gerhard Olschowy . Among other things, the work Ecke von Zezschwitz 'is of particular importance, since Zezschwitz experienced the storm himself as an eyewitness and, as an experienced geologist, made detailed observations that could be incorporated into both his and Herbert Karrenberg's work.

In the investigation by Mrass, Lohmeyer and Olschowy, the main focus was on the damage that occurred outside of the settlement areas. They found that sections of the river, the banks of which consisted of closed trees, preferably ash and willow , survived even this extreme flood without major damage. This applied both to flat banks and to impact slopes at risk of erosion . Here, the ash turned out to be optimal, as its dense roots defined the bank in such a way that the water masses could not wash away the loose material on the bank. In some areas, according to Mrass, Lohmeyer and Olschowy, shrubs, especially nettles, also proved to be extremely effective bank protection during the Heinrich flood . The stinging nettles laid down the bank substrate with their far-reaching roots, and the plants with the strong currents settled on the bank floor and thus prevented erosion.

After Mrass, Lohmeyer and Olschowy, the most severe damage occurred on sections with a loose tree population in the bank area as well as those without any tree population. This was especially true for sections of the river where grassland use extended right up to the bank. A turf destroyed by cattle treading in the area of ​​the drinking troughs favored the bank destruction to a very high degree. Fence systems also had an extremely negative effect. Dam structures, such as bridges and culverts with insufficient flow capacity, encouraged bank breaks and the formation of deep pools below the structures. Sections of the bank with individual trees or groups of trees also showed severe damage. In contrast to a closed stock of trees on the bank, the eddy formations here intensified the effect of the highly turbulent flooding. There was a very strong formation of ponds , the trees standing on the bank were uprooted and as a result, as flotsam, formed obstacles in front of culverts and bridges. This floating debris aggravated the situation not only in front of dam structures such as bridges and culverts, but also pasture fences developed a flood-damming effect due to the advancing drifting debris.

Measures after the flood

In the aftermath of the July floods in 1965, flood protection and the system of water boards in the affected areas were reorganized. In order to prevent similar events, massive interventions were made in the river budget. This included straightening, deepening and channeling the river beds, widening the bridge cross-sections and creating large retention basins, such as in the catchment area of ​​the Alme near Husen-Dalheim and its tributary, the Sauer near Sudheim and Ebbinghausen . The Aabach dam near Bad Wünnenberg, which was planned before the Second World War , was also tailored and implemented to meet the needs of flood protection, creating additional storage facilities in the Aabach catchment area in the event of flooding. In the area of ​​responsibility of the Upper Lippe Water Association, founded in 1971 , 23 flood retention basins were built.

Massive interventions in the form of river straightening and the construction of dykes also took place in the catchment area of ​​the Diemel. At the Twiste of planned in the first half of the 20th century, but then again rejected was Twistesee built to improve flood protection.

In Lower Saxony, measures had already been initiated after the storm disaster of August 1955 , the floods on the Weser, Aller and Leine in July 1956 and the June floods in southern Hanover and the flood disaster of 1962 on the North Sea coast. These included u. a. an improvement in disaster control, a fundamental reform of the sometimes centuries-old water association law, but above all the establishment of the Aller-Leine-Oker Plan. At the time of the Heinrich flood, the planning procedures for the construction of flood protection structures in Lower Saxony were already in full swing.

Commemoration

Although the Heinrich flood caused a sensation in the national press, it is largely forgotten outside the affected areas. Due to the limited disaster area, it stands in the shadow of the storm surge in 1962 on the German North Sea coast, the hurricane Quimburga in 1972 and the catastrophic floods on the Oder in 1997 and the Elbe in 2002 and 2013 . However, in many places, flood marks still attached to buildings remind of the event.

However, commemorative events are held regularly on the anniversaries of the disaster. The anniversaries of the catastrophe are also commemorated in the regional press and regional magazines of Westdeutscher Rundfunk. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Heinrich flood, Bishop Franz-Josef Bode from Osnabrück visited Etteln, where he witnessed the catastrophe as a teenager. A stele was erected in Etteln in July 2015 for the 50th anniversary .

Individual evidence

  1. a b c … Severe weather catastrophe in the Paderborner Land… ( Memento of the original from June 8, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Report on the Delbrück fire brigade website. Retrieved February 1, 2012.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.feuerwehr-delbrueck.de
  2. Three dead in the zone from severe storms. In: Hamburger Abendblatt. No. 163, July 23, 1965.
  3. Zinn: Devastating and terrible: ten people drowned in North Hesse, East Westphalia and Lower Saxony. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 164 of July 19, 1965.
  4. a b "Heinrichsflut" 50 years ago ... ( Memento from June 30, 2015 in the web archive archive.today )
  5. Water, nothing but water: Large roundabout closed due to flooding. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 163, July 17, 1965, accessed June 30, 2015.
  6. a b c d That was left: destroyed bridges and collapsed houses. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 164, July 19, 1965.
  7. ^ A b Landesamt für Gewässerkunde Rhineland-Palatinate: German hydrological yearbook: Rhine area. Year of discharge 1965 . Mainz 1968, p. 203.
  8. ^ Lower Saxony Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forests - State Office for Hydrology in Hanover: German Hydrological Yearbook, Weser and Ems area. Year of discharge 1965. Hannover 1966, p. 91.
  9. a b Lower Saxony State Agency for Water Management and Coastal Protection: German Hydrological Yearbook 2006. Self-published, Norden 2010, p. 150.
  10. Severe weather led to a disaster alert. In: Einbecker Morgenpost. No. 164, July 16, 1965.
  11. a b After severe weather disaster now flooding - disaster alarm yesterday also in Dassel. In: Einbecker Morgenpost. No. 163, 17./18. July 1965
  12. a b c d H. Karrenberg: Precipitation intensity and erosion in the karst area of ​​Paderborn during the storm of July 16, 1965. In: Advances in the geology of Rhineland and Westphalia, 16. Krefeld 1968, pp. 41-64.
  13. Concentrated load - disasters. In: Der Spiegel. 31/1965, Retrieved February 3, 2012.
  14. Frank Striewe (local home keeper and chronicler): History from Schwaney - flood 1965. Schwaney, accessed on March 21, 2013, on heimatpflege-altenbeken.de
  15. a b c d E. Zezschwitz: Soil and vegetation influences on floods and erosion during storms of July 16, 1965 in the area of ​​the Paderborn plateau. In: Journal for Arable and Plant Cultivation. Volume 125, No. 3, Berlin / Hamburg 1967, pp. 189-210.
  16. Bernhard Dachner: Observations on the runoff behavior of the Pader and the Pader springs. accessed on March 26, 2012, at lwl.org (PDF; 1.22 MB)
  17. ^ Lower Saxony Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forests - State Office for Hydrology in Hanover: German Hydrological Yearbook, Weser and Ems area. Year of discharge 1965 . Hanover 1966, p. 9.
  18. Flood flows away - chaos remains. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 164, July 19, 1965
  19. Lower Saxony State Agency for Water Management and Coastal Protection: German Hydrological Yearbook 2006. Self-published, Norden 2010, p. 149.
  20. Waters ( Memento of the original from May 25, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Anglerverein Hofgeismar 1948 eV, accessed on February 6, 2012. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.anglerverein-hofgeismar.de
  21. Hamburger Abendblatt. July 19, 1965.
  22. Flood 1965 ( Memento of the original from May 28, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . Heimat- und Verkehrsverein Wrexen eV, accessed on February 1, 2012. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.diemelstadt-wrexen.de
  23. Bernhard Liedmann: July 4th. Paderborn district. District Fire Brigade Association Paderborn. In: Westfälisches Volksblatt. accessed on July 8, 2015, at kfv-paderborn.de
  24. a b c d e W. Mrass, W. Lohmeyer, G. Olschowy: Flood- related landscape damage in the catchment area of ​​the Altenau and its tributaries. In: Series of publications for landscape management and nature conservation. Issue 1, Bad Godesberg 1966, pp. 127–190.
  25. ^ German weather service: German meteorological yearbook 1965 . Frankfurt am Main 1969.
  26. ↑ The situation in the disaster area has improved. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 165, July 20, 1965.
  27. K.-H. Stelter: Flood 1965. ( Memento of the original from May 28, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Waldeckische Landeszeitung. July 19, 1965, on diemelstadt-wrexen.de @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.diemelstadt-wrexen.de
  28. a b c Disaster alert: downpours over northern Hesse. In: Hessische Allgemeine. No. 163, July 17, 1965.
  29. Information on the history of Grebenstein ( Memento from January 4, 2002 in the Internet Archive )
  30. Friedrich Hamm: Natural History Chronicle of Northwest Germany. Landbuchverlag, Hannover 1976, p. 313.
  31. a b Günther Kautzky: Flood in East Westphalia. In: The technical relief organization. Monthly magazine of the THW. Vol. 12, No. 9/1965, pp. 2-6.
  32. Damages run into the thousands. In: Göttinger Tageblatt. No. 165, July 19, 1965.
  33. Severe weather led to a disaster alert. In: Einbecker Morgenpost. No. 162, July 16, 1965
  34. 75 liters of rain per square meter. In: New Germany. July 17, 1965. (ND archive)
  35. Disaster full alarm: The operation worked relatively well. In: Mündensche Allgemeine. No. 163, July 17, 1965
  36. a b Cloudbursts led to chaos and death. In: Bremer Nachrichten. No. 165, July 19, 1965, p. 8.
  37. 35 years ago - in July 1965 - flood alarm - severe weather disaster in Lippstadt! Traditionsverein Feldartilleriebataillon 71/110 zu Dülmen eV (2000), accessed on February 12, 2012 (PDF; 150 kB)
  38. It started with a hailstorm: the water came too quickly. In: Einbecker Morgenpost. No. 165, July 19, 1965.
  39. Christoph Brodesser: The Heinrichsflut 1965. Use of the German Red Cross in the flood disaster in East Westphalia. Books on Demand, 2015, ISBN 978-3-7347-8690-7 .
  40. ^ Waldeckische Allgemeine dated December 14, 1965: Rescue medal for selfless action
  41. Gerhard Olschowy, Walter Mrass: flood-related damage in the catchment landscape of Altenau and its tributaries. 1966.
  42. Flood protection. ( Memento of the original from May 10, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Aabach-Talsperre water association, accessed on February 10, 2012, at aabachtalsperre.de  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.aabachtalsperre.de
  43. Gerhard Müller: The Aabachtalsperre, a drinking water reservoir on the southern edge of the Paderborn plateau. Retrieved February 10, 2012 . (PDF; 1.1 MB)
  44. Expert group "Flood Protection Weser" of the FGG Weser: Flood Protection Plan Weser. Status: June 7, 2006. Hildesheim, p. 8.
  45. Commemoration of the victims - flood disaster 1965.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. In: Westfalen-Blatt. July 2, 2013, on borchen-online.de@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.borchen-online.de  
  46. Remembrance to touch - stele will remind of floods. In: Neue Westfälische Zeitung. May 29, 2015, on pgr-etteln.de
  47. Neue Westfälische: Inauguration of a stele in Borchen-Etteln to commemorate the floods in the Altenau valley in 1965. Retrieved on January 29, 2020 .

literature

  • Christoph Brodesser: The Heinrichsflut 1965. Use of the German Red Cross in the flood disaster in East Westphalia. Books on Demand, 2015, ISBN 978-3-7347-8690-7 .
  • Bruno Hake: Welda . A village between the nobility and the church. Hermes Verlag, Warburg 1994, ISBN 3-922032-29-X .
  • H. Karrenberg: Precipitation intensity and erosion in the karst area of ​​Paderborn during the storm of July 16, 1965. In: Advances in the geology of Rhineland and Westphalia, 16. Krefeld 1968, pp. 41-64.
  • Walter Mrass, Wilhelm Lohmeyer, Gerhard Olschowy: Flood- related landscape damage in the catchment area of ​​Altenau and its tributaries. In: Series of publications for landscape management and nature conservation. Issue 1, Bad Godesberg 1966, pp. 127–190.
  • Gerhard Olschowy, Walter Mrass: Flood- related landscape damage in the catchment of the Altenau and its tributaries. 1966. on books.google.de
  • Michael Weber: Flood on the Altenau. The Heinrich Flood of 1965 southeast of Paderborn. Self-published, Borchen-Nordborchen 2005, ISBN 3-930264-52-8 . (Review by Wolfgang Feige in the journal Heimatpflege in Westfalen , issue 4/2008, pp. 36–37. PDF; 4.5 MB)
  • Corner of Zezschwitz : Influences of soil and vegetation on floods and erosion during the storm of July 16, 1965 in the area of ​​the Paderborn plateau. In: Journal for Arable and Plant Cultivation. Volume 125, No. 3, Berlin / Hamburg 1967, pp. 189-210.

Web links

Pictures of the Heinrich flood in Merxhausen (Heinade)

Coordinates: 51 ° 38 ′ 33.5 "  N , 9 ° 26 ′ 52.3"  E