Battle for the Seelow Heights

Battle for the Seelow Heights

Part of: Second World War

Soviet artillery in front of Berlin

date	April 16-19, 1945
place	Seelow
output	Victory of the Soviet Union and Poland

Parties to the conflict
Soviet Union Poland	German Empire
Commander
Georgi Schukow Wassili Tschuikow Michail Katukow Stanisław Popławski	Gotthard Heinrici Theodor Busse Helmuth Weidling
Troop strength
1st Belarusian front eleven armies 77 divisions with 1,000,000 soldiers 3,155 tanks 20,130 guns and grenade launchers	9th Army 15 divisions with 190,000 soldiers 512 tanks 2,625 guns 300 aircraft 300–400 anti-aircraft guns
losses
approx. 33,000 killed and 40,000 wounded 743 tanks (Soviet data)	unknown, according to Soviet data: 80,000 men, 300 tanks and assault guns

The Battle of the Seelow Heights from April 16-19, 1945 opened the Battle of Berlin at the end of the Second World War . Almost 1 million Red Army soldiers fought against around 120,000 German soldiers. The 1st Byelorussian Front under the command of Marshal Zhukov broke through the positions of the Vistula Army Group of the German Wehrmacht in a large-scale attack . The major battle, also known as the Battle of the Oder, marked the end of the German Eastern Front .

background

After the Soviet offensive on the Vistula , which broke out on January 12, 1945 , the 1st Belarusian Front pushed the German 9th Army back west between Warsaw and Radom . The southern German 4th Panzer Army was defeated in the Kielce area by the 1st Ukrainian Front . On January 15, 1945 the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front against the German 17th Army began from the Jasło area ; By January 19, 1945, the Soviets succeeded in conquering Krakow . As a result of the rapid collapse of Army Group A , the Wehrmacht lost all still held areas of Poland, and the front was approaching the old German border. Between January 26 and February 3, 1945 Marshal Zhukov's troops broke through the German positions in Neumark and formed the first bridgeheads on both sides of Küstrin and north of Fürstenberg on the western bank of the Oder. The main Soviet thrust was aimed directly at the Reich capital Berlin.

The first Ukrainian Front offensive towards Silesia began further south on February 8, 1945 ; in mid-February, Wroclaw , which had been declared a fortress, was completely surrounded by Soviet troops. On April 9th, Königsberg in East Prussia was captured by the Red Army on the northern section . This enabled the 2nd Belarusian Front under Marshal Rokossovsky to advance west to the east bank of the Oder . During the first two weeks of April, the Red Army carried out a regrouping here, during which the 1st Belarusian Front was concentrated on the eastern bank of the Oder, off the Seelow Heights. The 2nd Belarusian Front, however, occupied the abandoned positions north-east of the heights as far as the coast near Stettin . Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front from Upper Silesia advanced on the southern flank between Görlitz - Bad Muskau and Forst and the Lusatian Neisse .

Soviet deployment

For the Berlin operation , the Stawka deployed three fronts on the Oder and Neisse rivers. On the northern flank between Oderberg via Stettin to the Baltic Sea stood the 2nd Belarusian Front with five armies (11th Rifle Corps with 33 divisions and three artillery divisions and a few other artillery and rocket launcher brigades). Rokossowski's front had 951 tanks and self-propelled guns as well as 8,320 artillery pieces (2,770 of which were  mortars ). Opposite the 2nd Belarusian Front stood the 3rd Panzer Army on the German side with 11 divisions and 212 tanks and practically no conventional artillery, except for about 600–700 anti-aircraft guns of 8.8 cm caliber .

The Red Army's most powerful front, the 1st Belorussian Front, consisted of eleven armies (77 rifle divisions, seven armored and three Mech. Corps, eight artillery divisions and other artillery and rocket launcher brigades). This should lead the main blow . Zhukov's units had 3,155 tanks and self-propelled guns as well as 20,130 artillery pieces (7186 of which were mortars) and were concentrated in the western Oder bridgehead of Küstrin. It faced a newly assembled German 9th Army in front of the Seelow Heights.

In the south, the 1st Ukrainian Front marched on the Neisse from Guben via Forst to the Görlitz area . Konev's front consisted of eight armies (48 rifle divisions, six tank and four Mech. Corps). The combat strength consisted of 2055 tanks and self-propelled guns as well as 13,571 artillery pieces (5225 of which were mortars). In the parallel Cottbus-Potsdam operation, Konev's front prepared the main thrust against the German 4th Panzer Army in the direction of Cottbus and Spremberg .

The three Soviet fronts possessed a total of about 2.5 million men, 6,250  tanks , 7,500 aircraft, 41,600  artillery pieces and mortars, 3,255  Katyusha - rocket launchers and 95,383 motor vehicles.

German defense

View over the Oderbruch from the Seelower Heights

During the Battle of East Pomerania on March 21, 1945, Colonel-General Gotthard Heinrici replaced Heinrich Himmler, who was completely inexperienced in the military, as Commander in Chief of Army Group Vistula . As one of the best defensive tacticians in the German Wehrmacht , he immediately drafted plans for the defense on the Oder. He realized that the main Soviet thrust would take place over the Oder along Reichsstrasse 1 . So he decided to defend the west bank of the Oder only with a thin veil, and instead had the Seelower Heights fortified, which form the western edge of the Oderbruch and rise about 48 meters above the woodless Oder lowlands. The eponymous town of Seelow is located on today's federal highway 1 about 18 kilometers west of the point where the road crosses the river at Küstrin / Kostrzyn nad Odrą. In order to achieve the necessary manpower for the defense, he had the German lines thinned out in other places. At the same time, German pioneers transformed the Oderbruch, which was already soaked by the spring flood, into a single swamp by opening a reservoir upstream. Behind it, three defensive belts were created that reached as far as the outskirts of Berlin . The last line, about 15-20 km behind the first line, was the so-called Wotan position , which consisted of tank trenches , PaK positions and an extensive network of trenches and bunkers.

The German 9th Army in the main area of ​​attack covered the front from the Finow Canal in the north to Guben in the south; the positions on the Seelow heights formed the most important defensive section. They expected the Soviet attack on the Oderbruch with clearly inferior forces. This consisted of 15 divisions with 512 tanks, 344 artillery and 300–400 anti-aircraft guns. The left wing between Oderberg and Letschin was created by the CI. Army corps formed under General der Artillerie Berlin . The LVI then led south. Panzer Corps under General der Artillerie Weidling in the Seelow area and the XI. SS Army Corps under SS Obergruppenführer Kleinheisterkamp up to the heights of Lebus. A strong garrison under Colonel Biehler was still on the eastern bank of the Oder in Frankfurt an der Oder , which had been declared a fortress. The right wing of the 9th Army stood between the garrison of Frankfurt and Fürstenberg and was covered by the V SS Mountain Corps under SS Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln .

Comparison of the two forces

The battle

April 16

In the early morning hours of April 16, 1945, 3:00 a.m. CEST , 5:00 a.m. Moscow time , the attack was initiated by what was probably the strongest barrage in history. 40,000 artillery pieces, including many of the dreaded Katyushas , were used. According to Soviet information, 1,236,000 shells with a total weight of 98,000 tons were fired during the artillery offensive on the first day, which required 2,450 freight wagons for transport. Friedrich Schöneck, soldier of the 309th Infantry Division near Sietzing, wrote about the artillery strike:

“A deafening noise fills the air. Compared to everything that has gone before, this is no longer a barrage, it is a hurricane that tears apart everything above, in front of and behind us. The sky is glowing red, as if it were about to burst. The ground wobbles, shakes and rocks like a ship in a force of 10 wind. "

A large part of this blow remained ineffective, however, since the German leadership of the Army Group ( Colonel General Heinrici ) and the 9th Army ( General Busse ) had expected the attack on that day. The night before, the bulk of the units had been detached from the front, except for safeguards, and moved to the prepared positions on the Seelow Heights. This large-scale combat procedure was developed in the First World War and used here in an improved manner. Behind the main battle line (HKL) a large combat HKL was set up a few kilometers away, into which the troops would retreat if an artillery attack was expected. The fuses, which made up a sixth of the trench thickness, had the function of simulating the full occupation of the HVAC. On April 15 at 10:00 p.m. and on April 16 at 2:00 a.m., the Soviet troops scanned the front positions and were deceived. Since the artillery strike was mainly aimed at the front positions, this fatal error led, as it was stated in the daily report of Army Group Vistula on April 16, that the "effect of the enemy fire was in no relation to the high ammunition expenditure". The front lines had to be left to the Red Army without a fight in this large-scale combat process. In addition, when the own security forces were taken up, there was fire by their own troops. In order to regain connection, some of the own positions had to be stormed for the admission.

Starting position for the Battle of the Oder on April 16, 1945

Half an hour after the artillery strike (at 3:30 a.m. CEST), the 1st Belarusian Front attacked across the Oder. At the same time the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced further south across the Neisse. While the 1st Guards Panzer Army was being held back on the eastern bank of the Oder, the first attack by the 8th Guards Army under Colonel General Vasily Chuikov turned into a disaster. Tschuikow had prepared the use of 143 searchlights with which the German defenders were to be blinded and the battlefield to be illuminated for their own weapons. The light of the headlights was scattered by the morning fog and the powder smoke and thrown back on the attackers, blinded them and led to a bright background against which the attacking infantry and advancing armored spearheads were clearly visible. In addition, the swampy ground proved to be a major obstacle under the conditions of the German barrage . These circumstances led to enormously high losses in the Soviet 28th and 29th Guard Corps deployed against the line Dolgelin - Friedersdorf . In the section of the 5th shock army , however, the Alte Oder could be reached at Platkow-Gusow , and the 3rd shock army had also come within five and twelve kilometers of the Altlewin – Letschin line. The northern Polish 1st Army had overcome the tributary of the Old Oder to the north of Neulewins . The advance of the Soviet 47th Army on Barnim threatened the positions of the 606th Infantry Division near Wriezen .

The Soviet plan of operations provided for the storming of the Seelow Heights for the first day, but for the time being there was only a gain in terrain of six kilometers, the heavily pressed lines of the XI. SS Corps and the LVI. Panzer corps at the Seelow Heights had remained intact. South of the main battlefield, on the other hand, Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was able to keep to the schedule against the German 4th Panzer Army and had successfully crossed the Neisse at Forst and Muskau. Zhukov had to report to Moscow that the battle for the Seelow Heights was not going according to plan on his front . In order to drive Zhukov on, Stalin then told him that he was also giving Marshal Konev permission to direct his armored forces from the south northwards towards Berlin. Under great pressure of time and success, Marshal Zhukov, who absolutely wanted to take Berlin himself, made a serious tactical mistake and was already throwing his reserves into battle prematurely. In previous major battles, the tank reserves had always been used for pushing after the infantry had broken through. At around 4 p.m. Zhukov nevertheless ordered the 1st and 2nd Guard Panzer Army to be deployed in the main battlefield. This led to chaos, especially in the area of ​​the 8th Guard Army; the armored forces introduced prevented the infantry from accessing their supplies and from coordinating their attacks. The so densely massed Soviet forces offered the still intact German artillery a good target, and the bombardment again led to heavy Soviet losses. The Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Guards Armored Army MJ Katukow justified the misuse of the armored armies to break through an intact defense and the later deployment in the streets of Berlin, which was not appropriate for armored armies, with the fear that “reactionary circles in the USA and Great Britain” would be “behind the scenes "Would use the Red Army to" forestall and let Anglo-American troops take Berlin ".

In the evening, put the Ia Army Group Vistula, Hans-Georg Eismann found that the German divisions have "suffered greatly" particularly by the heavy enemy fire "." First by the two and a half hour barrage, and then by the whole day “very strong temporal and local fire summaries on particular points” as well as 2000 enemy air raids.

17th April

On the second day, the staff of the 1st Belarusian Front combed the rear area in search of all units that could still be thrown into the battle, as the Soviet tactics of massed frontal attacks had proven to be even more lossy than normal. On that day there was heavy air fighting over the Oder front. On the northern section of Army Group Vistula, the Northeast Air Force Command ( General der Flieger Fiebig ) was able to deploy 1,433 aircraft, in the southern section, Luftflotte 6 (Colonel General von Greim ) was able to deploy 791 aircraft. This contingent was more than three times the superiority of four Soviet air armies. In the section of the 1st Belarusian Front, the Germans faced the Soviet 16th and 18th Air Armies with 3,188 aircraft. The 16th Air Army under Colonel General Rudenko deployed 647 attack planes and fighters, which gained control of the air and intervened in the ground fighting.

At dusk on April 17, the German front in front of Zhukov was still intact, but on the verge of collapse. In the south, however, the remains of Army Group Center under General Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner did not prove to be such an obstacle. Under the pressure of the attack by the 1st Ukrainian Front, the German 4th Panzer Army had to retreat on the north flank under the General of the Panzer Troop Grasses . Schörner kept his two reserve armored divisions to cover his center instead of using them to support the 4th Panzer Army. This tactical error was the turning point of the battle, because at nightfall the positions of both the Vistula Army Group and the southern sections of the Central Army Group had become untenable. Only an immediate return to the line of the 4th Panzer Army could save them from being encircled.

Soviet breakthrough on April 18th

On April 18, both Soviet fronts advanced steadily with very heavy losses. The left wing of the German 9th Army, the CI defending up to Bad Freienwalde . Army Corps collapsed before the attack by the Soviet 47th Army and 3rd Shock Army . The 5th Jäger Division had to go back from the Oderbruch to the Alte Oder near Wriezen before the Soviet 61st and Polish 1st Army . The front of the southern sections of Divisional Group 606 and 309th Infantry Division still holding between Trebbin and Altfriedland collapsed.

The 151st and 171st Rifle Divisions of the 3rd Shock Army fought their way to the Möglin and Batzlow line via Kunersdorf and Metzdorf . The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division tried to build up a new defensive front between Lüdersdorf and Frankenfelde and to achieve the lost connection to the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division (Colonel Rauch) standing near Prötzel . On the Platkow-Gusow - Werbig line , the remnants of the 9th Parachute Division and the Müncheberg Panzer Division wrestled with the Soviet 5th Shock Army and the 2nd Guards Armored Army.

To strengthen the hard-pressed LVI. Panzer Corps had already ordered Colonel General Heinrici on April 17th to surrender the 11th SS Panzer Grenadier Division from the front of the 3rd Panzer Army. Immediately after the arrival, SS Panzer Reconnaissance Division 11 intervened in the combat area of ​​the 9th Paratrooper Division near Wulkow, but was stopped by Soviet gunfire.

Katukov's 1st Armored Guard Army was victorious in battle west of Reichenberg and north of Buckow with SS Panzer Regiment 11 and with Heavy SS Panzer Division 102 at Neuentempel and Marxdorf. Towards evening the Soviet 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belarusian Front broke through the third and last line of defense of the 20th Panzer Grenadier Division , and the front of the German 9th Army broke up between Wriezen and Müncheberg . In the south on the Neisse section, the Soviet 3rd Guard Army and the 3rd Armored Guard Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front prepared to break through into the open terrain towards Cottbus after the conquest of Forst .

April 19th

The front, which was torn open for 25 kilometers between Wriezen and Behlendorf on April 19, split the German 9th Army in two. The remnants of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division were forced to go back to the bridgehead near Eberswalde because of the now open right flank and the threat behind them. This enabled the advance of the Soviet 61st Army under General Below south of the Finow Canal to the west. Units of the Polish 1st Army crossed the Alte Oder near Ranft and threatened the German defenders near Bad Freienwalde from the south. The Soviet 47th Army, headed south of it, under General Perkhorovich, occupied Wriezen and was assigned the 9th Panzer Corps as the advance on the Havel continued . The 3rd shock army under Colonel General Kuznetsov overran the last positions of the German CI. Army Corps and paved the way for the 2nd Guards Panzer Army under Colonel General Bogdanov, which was introduced for a breakthrough . The 1st mechanical corps under Lieutenant General Kriwoschein had to support the 3rd Shock Army, the 12th Guards Panzer Corps under Major General Teljakow the advance of the 5th Shock Army on Grunow. The 5th shock army of General Bersarin pushed the remains of the paratroopers back on Neu-Hardenberg .

Chuikov's 8th Guards Army and Katukov's 1st Guards Panzer Army broke the last resistance of the German LVI. Panzer Corps on the Seelower Heights, the 82nd Guards Rifle Division captured Müncheberg . Only a few scattered German formations lay between the Soviets and Berlin. The remnants of the Kurmark Panzergrenadier Division gave up the Marxdorf - Dolgelin line , went back and tried in vain to occupy a line between Berkenbrück and Kersdorf with a front facing north and east.

At the XI. As a result of the Soviet breakthrough, the SS Corps also had to withdraw the previously intact front of the 169th and 712th Infantry Divisions between Carzig and Lebus before the pressure of the Soviet 69th Army ( Kolpaktschi ). South of the Friedrich Wilhelm Canal as far as Fürstenberg , the less pressured positions of the 32nd SS Grenadier Division and the 391st Security Division withstood the pressure of the Soviet 33rd Army for a short time.

On the evening of April 19, the front of the German 9th Army had ceased to exist; the nests of resistance, which were still held individually, were enclosed and rubbed open. Zhukov's bandages were on the fourth day of the operation where they should have been on the second day, April 17th.

Conclusion

Overview of the overall situation (April 16-25, 1945)

The position on the Seelower Heights was the last main defense position outside Berlin. After April 19, the way to Berlin was open. The remains of the beaten LVI. Panzer Corps had to retreat to the Rahnsdorf – Neuenhagen line and, in the course of April 21, to the Köpenick – Marzahn line. After the 1st Ukrainian Front south of Cottbus had broken through, their two tank armies turned north on Berlin. The entire south wing of the 9th Army and the 5th Army Corps of the 4th Panzer Army were facing encirclement by the Soviet 3rd Guards Army and the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time the German V. and XI. SS Corps of the 9th Army trapped between the Neisse and the Spreewald in the Halbe pocket. During the Soviet 13th Army to the preceding tank forces on April 21 in Lubben succeeded, Konews operated 13th Army towards Wittenberg and the 5th Guards Army against Torgau , where on April 25 on the same connection to the first US- Army was established.

The losses of the Soviet breakthrough on the Oder were very high. Between April 16 and April 19, the Soviet troops lost 2,807 tanks. Around 12,000 German soldiers died in the four days of the battle, while over 33,000 were killed on the Soviet side.

On April 25, Berlin was completely enclosed and the Battle of Berlin reached its climax. A week later Adolf Hitler was dead, and two weeks later the war in Europe was over.

After the war, Zhukov's critics complained that he should have turned the 1st Belarusian Front away from Reichsstrasse 1 to Berlin and bypassed the German positions on the route of the 1st Ukrainian Front over the Neisse, in order to avoid the high losses and the delay to avoid. It must be borne in mind, however, that the 1st Belarusian front was concentrated on a very narrow attack strip, which probably made a detour impossible. The other generals at the front, on the other hand, could and did bypass this position.

Seelower Heights Memorial

Seelower Heights Memorial, bronze sculpture by Lew Kerbel

Soviet military cemetery in Letschin village

The Seelower Heights memorial commemorates the battle with a monumental sculpture by Lew Kerbel . Immediately after the capture of Berlin, Marshal Zhukov commissioned the erection of monuments to commemorate the “glorious journey” of his troops. In Seelow, it was inaugurated on November 27, 1945, connected to a Soviet war graveyard . In 1972 GDR authorities expanded the complex into a memorial with a museum . The battle was declared a victory by the GDR, namely by the Soviet friends. Citizens from all over the GDR were often brought here to celebrate the Soviet Union. After the peaceful revolution , the memorial was converted into a cultural monument for the state of Brandenburg .

literature

• Antony Beevor : Berlin: the Downfall, 1945. Viking, London / New York, 2002, ISBN 0-670-88695-5 .
• Gerd-Ulrich Herrmann : The battle for the Seelow heights. Places of remembrance on both sides of the Oder (= places of history ). Links, Berlin 2015, ISBN 978-3-86153-831-8 .
• Gerald Ramm, Mathias Hiller: God with us: War experiences from Brandenburg and Berlin. Ramm, Woltersdorf 2005, ISBN 3-930958-11-2 .
• Wilhelm Tieke : The end between Oder and Elbe - The battle for Berlin 1945. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1992, ISBN 3-87943-734-3 .
• Richard Lakowski: Seelow 1945. The decisive battle on the Oder. Siegler Verlag, 2005, ISBN 3-87748-634-7 .
• Tony LeTissier: Breakthrough on the Oder. The advance of the Red Army in 1945. Ullstein, 1995, ISBN 3-550-07072-1 .
• Helmut Altner: Dance of Death Berlin. Berlin Story Verlag, 2012, ISBN 978-3-86368-031-2 .
• Earl F. Ziemke: Battle For Berlin: End Of The Third Reich. Ballantine Books / Macdonald & Co, New York / London 1969.
• Sigvard Thomke: From the school desk to the cannons to collapse. Self-published, Uppsala 2007, ISBN 978-91-85205-60-8 . (Reminder report of an air force helper 1944–1945.)
• Ove C. Kronborg: Da krigen kom tilbage: 100 dage foran Berlin 1945. Forlaget Als, Høruphav 2015, ISBN 978-87-996754-7-0 . (Danish)
• Алексей Валерьевич Исаев: Берлин 45-го. Сражения в логове зверя . Яуза, Эксмо, Moscow 2007, ISBN 978-5-699-20927-9 , p. 362 f. (Russian)

Web links

• Seelower Heights Memorial
• Try a new perspective on the battle

Individual evidence

1. ↑ According to Wojenno-istoritsceskij shurnal, Moscow 1965 in Tony Le Tissier: Der Kampf um Berlin. Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, list of Soviet forces for the "Berlin Operation". P. 212.
2. ↑ In Soviet data, grenade launchers from the 82 mm grenade launcher are counted as artillery. Albert Seaton: Stalin as Military Commander . London 1976, p. 250.
3. Jump up ↑ Manpower, tanks, guns and planes according to: Richard Lakowski: The collapse of the German defense between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian Mountains . In: MGFA (Hrsg.): The German Reich and the Second World War . Munich 2008, Volume 10/1, p. 616.
4. ↑ Seelower Heights Memorial
5. ^ Anthony Beevor: Berlin - Slutstriden . Historisk Media, Lund 2003, ISBN 91-85057-01-0 , p. 283 .
6. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: Breakthrough on the Oder. The advance of the Red Army in 1945. Ullstein, 1995, ISBN 3-550-07072-1 , p. 332.
7. ↑ Richard Lakowski: Seelow 1945. The decisive battle on the Oder . Berlin 1994, p. 87.
8. ^ Order of Stawka No. 11059 of April 2, 1945. Printed in: Alexander Hill: The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–45. A documentary reader . Abingdon 2009, Document 159.
9. ^ Tony Le Tissier: Battle for Berlin . Bechtermünz, 1997, p. 212.
10. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: The fight for Berlin . Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, Appendix war organization, pp. 213–217.
11. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: The fight for Berlin. Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, Appendix war organization, pp. 227–229.
12. ↑ Wassili Tschuikow: The end of the Third Reich. Goldmann Munich 1966, p. 118.
13. ^ GK Zhukov : Memories and Thoughts . Berlin 1976, p. 335.
14. ↑ Quotation from Tony LeTissier: Breakthrough on the Oder . Augsburg 1997, p. 220.
15. ↑ Karl stitch: The fight for the Seelow heights . Achen 2018, p. 96 and p. 101.
16. ↑ Hans Schäufler, Wilhelm Tieke: The end between the Vistula and Elbe 1944/45 . Stuttgart 2003, p. 96.
17. ↑ MJ Katukow : At the top of the main thrust . Berlin 1979, p. 361.
18. ^ Wolfgang Ruge , Wolfgang Schumann : Documents on German History 1942–1945 . Frankfurt am Main 1977, p. 114 f.
19. ↑ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: The Second World War. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf 1985, p. 1016.
20. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: Breakthrough on the Oder. Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, pp. 293-317.
21. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: The fight for Berlin . Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, p. 76 f.
22. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: Breakthrough on the Oder. Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, pp. 318-332.
23. ↑ Richard Lakowski: Seelow 1945. The decisive battle on the Oder . Berlin 1994, p. 87.
24. ↑ Tony Le Tissier: Breakthrough on the Oder. Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997, p. 336 f.

Coordinates: 52 ° 32 ′ 5.1 ″  N , 14 ° 23 ′ 45.1 ″  E