Adenauer era
The Adenauer era is the time when Konrad Adenauer was chancellor from September 15, 1949 to October 16, 1963 in the Federal Republic of Germany .
prehistory
In the beginning there was next to no sign that the chancellorship of the first head of government was going to become an era. Even the old age of the Chancellor candidate Konrad Adenauer indicated that this represented a beginning, that he should lead the new state towards democracy as a pioneer for a younger generation. Also spoke against a long era that the party was completely new and not yet formed nationwide before the first election. After the end of the Second World War , Christian-democratic and Christian-social parties were founded spontaneously and independently of one another . However, since mergers were forbidden in the French and American zones of occupation, the CDU formed comparatively quickly in the British zone of occupation and laid down several programs that later dictated the political direction for the entire party in the Federal Republic. It was not until 1950 that the federal party Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) was formed.
Between February 26 and March 1, 1946, a meeting of the zone committee of the Christian Democratic Union for the British zone took place in the Karolinen Hospital in Neheim-Hüsten. At this conference Konrad Adenauer was formally elected chairman of the CDU. At this conference, Adenauer essentially shaped the content of the Neheim-Hüstener program , which represented a departure from original Christian socialism towards a reorganization of the economy and society in order to overcome the class struggle .
After the handover of the Frankfurt documents on July 1, 1948, which were regarded as the recommendation of the Western Allied occupation powers to found a West German state, the 65-member Parliamentary Council met on September 1, 1948 under the presidency of Konrad Adenauer in Bonn and worked in the the following months the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany . Although Adenauer had no significant influence on the content of the Basic Law, he was the first politician to be noticed by a broader public after the Second World War.
As a result, Adenauer became the top candidate of the Union parties for the election to the 1st German Bundestag on August 14, 1949. The election campaign was coordinated with Ludwig Erhard's economic policy , although first of all fundamental decisions had to be made. The concept of the social market economy was brought fully into focus.
The beginnings and first goals
The Union parties narrowly won the election to the 1st German Bundestag and entered the constituent session of the Bundestag as the strongest parliamentary group. On September 15, 1949, Konrad Adenauer was elected the first Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the first ballot with 202 of 402 votes - and thus only one vote ahead . The SPD politician Egon Bahr commented: “We made fun of the Chancellor he trusted. Adenauer with a single vote majority, that was not a result that allowed stability or a long life of this government to be expected. ”The CDU / CSU formed a coalition with the FDP and the DP . On September 20, 1949, Adenauer presented his first cabinet . In 1950 the CDU was formed at the federal level and Adenauer was also elected as the first federal chairman of the CDU.
One of the first important decisions that the German Bundestag had to make was the question of the seat of government . Although the Parliamentary Council had designated Bonn as the seat of government and the provisional capital of the West German state, the final decision was postponed on the recommendation of the Prime Ministers of the three western occupation zones and handed over to the German Bundestag. Since Adenauer already favored Bonn in the Parliamentary Council and in the end also decisively enforced it, this vote was also important for Adenauer's position. In its session on November 3, 1949, the German Bundestag voted in favor of Bonn by 200 votes to 176. Although the many well-preserved representative buildings had officially tipped the balance, it is still assumed that Konrad Adenauer wanted Bonn as the seat of government, primarily because of its proximity to his home town of Rhöndorf . The vote was considered to be one of the first decisions by the German Bundestag that did not have to be approved by the High Commissioners of the occupying powers. These had left the question of the capital entirely in the hands of the Bundestag as long as Berlin's four-power status was not affected.
Another landmark decision followed a year later. The federal government issued the so-called Adenauer decree . With this decree, civil servants could be dismissed from the service if they belonged to an organization or party that was viewed by the federal government as anti-constitutional . This mainly affected members of the KPD and the DKP-DRP .
Political goals
At the beginning, the federal government under Adenauer had to establish its capacity to act. The Federal Republic was formally founded, but was still under the complete control of the Allied High Commission . This could overturn any resolution of the German Bundestag if it saw the democratic development endangered; with which the most important concern of the federal government resulted from this fact.
The following key points were defined as goals:
- Regaining state sovereignty
- Reunification of Germany within the borders of 1937
- Establishing and maintaining the military and political security of the Federal Republic
- Reconstruction of the economy and internal social equilibrium
- Failure to recognize the Oder-Neisse Line
In addition, the prosecution of German war crimes in the Second World War and the initiation of further Nazi trials under Control Council Act No. 10 should be postponed until its repeal, in order to dispel the public accusation that federal policy is subject to an alleged victors' justice .
First successes
Shortly after the business of government was taken up, Adenauer was able to record the first successes. With the Petersberg Agreement , the first steps towards sovereignty could be taken. Adenauer saw the end of the dismantling as the most important concern, as this was the only way to achieve an economic upturn, which was essential for stabilizing the country. But the agreement also led to the first controversy with the opposition. On November 24, 1949, Konrad Adenauer issued a government statement on this. In the discussion that followed, Kurt Schumacher severely criticized the Chancellor because, in the opinion of the SPD, Adenauer had made considerable concessions to the Allies. Above all, the approval and participation in the Ruhr authority was criticized; In this context, Schumacher referred to Adenauer as Federal Chancellor of the Allies in November 1949 . Adenauer's deputy in the Chancellery, Franz Blücher (FDP), was appointed to represent the federal government .
Adenauer achieved another partial success in 1951. On March 15, the Foreign Office was re-established, which at the same time meant that the Federal Republic of Germany had gained its capacity to act in foreign policy. Formally, the Foreign Office was still under the control of the High Commission. Adenauer initially refrained from appointing a foreign minister and took over the office himself. The name “Foreign Office” was deliberately retained to document that it was the legal successor and that it is in the tradition up to Bismarck . During the reconstruction, the leading positions in the Foreign Service were predominantly occupied by civil servants who were already active as NSDAP members during the Nazi era.
Adenauer came closer to another goal in 1952. After tough negotiations with the Western Allies, with the signing of the Germany Treaty on May 26, 1952, he laid the foundations for regaining national sovereignty. However, this contract initially did not come into force.
Way to a common Europe
Coal and steel union
As early as 1950, joint control of coal and steel was regulated on the basis of the Schuman Plan . Today this is seen as one of three stages towards reconciliation with France and the first step towards a European Community.
The ECSC Treaty provided for the High Authority with its seat in Luxembourg as the highest body. A (ministerial) council was supposed to represent the interests of the national governments vis-à-vis the High Authority and had to be heard in all fundamental decisions. The contract came into force in 1952 and ran until 2002.
Criticism from Erhard
Ludwig Erhard was critical of the coal and steel union. Erhard was not prepared to put all economic principles behind the political goals of integration. As soon as the proposal became known, he ordered investigations into the economic consequences in order to be able to assess the response from the German economy.
Opposition resistance
The opposition put up bitter resistance during the debate on ratification of the treaty. Mainly because of the initial non-participation of the United Kingdom, the opposition spoke of a "small Europe" that was not sustainable.
European Defense Community
On August 11, 1950, following Churchill's proposal , the Council of Europe demanded the formation of a European army with German participation. In May 1953 the EVG treaties were ratified by the Federal Republic. Other states such as the Netherlands , Belgium and Luxembourg had already ratified the treaties, and in Italy the treaty was about to be voted on. But in France the votes against the treaty increased. The EVG contracts, which were originally based on the Pleven Plan, were intended, on the one hand, to contain the risk of a re-armed Germany, and on the other hand, they hoped for an improved position vis-à-vis the USSR. For the Federal Republic, these treaties meant de facto sovereignty.
But for France, the treaty meant giving up sovereignty. Due to the slight relaxation in relation to the Soviet Union, the inevitable need for the EVG contract was no longer given. In France, a Gaullist government that was skeptical of the EVG had taken power. Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France tried again to hold up the EDC process and ultimately succeeded when the National Assembly rejected the ratification of the EDC Treaty on August 30, 1954.
West connection
After initial success, the Adenauer government was at a crossroads. On the one hand, reunification continued to be the primary goal, but this goal seemed to be becoming increasingly distant. On March 10, 1952, Josef Stalin offered the Western Allies with the so-called Stalin Note to negotiate the reunification and neutralization of Germany. For Adenauer, however, reunification was only conceivable with successful integration into the West . The Western Allies also made it clear that the prerequisite for negotiations would be compliance with the UN Charter and that a reunified Germany would be free to decide which alliances it would like to join. But above all the integration of Germany into the European Defense Community (EDG) was meant. This goal was also pursued by Adenauer, as it would mean both the rearmament of Germany and the end of the occupation statute. Regarding the Stalin Note, Adenauer also feared that the negotiations with the Soviet Union would delay the unification process in Europe as well as with the USA. In the end, the federal government, the SPD and large parts of the population agreed that Stalin's proposals should not be taken seriously.
Up until the 1980s, there was a dispute over whether the Stalin Note was a disruptive maneuver or a serious proposal by the USSR . But even within the Adenauer government as well as from opposition circles there was criticism of Adenauer's attitude until 1958. Thomas Dehler from the FDP and former CDU and later SPD member Gustav Heinemann criticized that the Adenauer government had not done enough for reunification. Today historians largely view the Stalin Note as a disruptive maneuver.
Adenauer was able to continue his goal of western integration. The incorporation of the Federal Republic into the Western community of states was supposed to make it possible to strive for reunification from a position of strength which, in Adenauer's opinion, could only be achieved at the cost of sovietization as a whole without a secure link to the West. Above all, Adenauer hoped that the gain in confidence in the Western powers would give himself greater scope for foreign policy and greater sovereignty in domestic policy.
In historical retrospect, Adenauer's policy meant the first turn away from the doctrine of a national power state and the commitment of a German state to the values of a community of states.
Social market economy
With the currency reform in 1948 , a relatively quick economic recovery began in West Germany. This essentially bore the signature of the independent economic expert Ludwig Erhard . On March 2, 1948, at the suggestion of the FDP, Erhard was elected director of the administration for the economy of the United Economic Area and, despite initial resistance from the occupying powers, pushed through the end of the forced economy.
Erhard's definition of the social market economy was essentially based on the principle of ordoliberalism . Some historians and economic researchers also refer to the social market economy as the third way between capitalism and communism. The principle of Erhard was based primarily on an extensive free economy within the framework of a state order. The social market economy aims to realize the advantages of a free market economy, such as economic efficiency and a high supply of goods, but at the same time its disadvantages, such as destructive competition, the concentration of economic power or the anti-social effects of market processes (e.g. unemployment), to avoid. The general goal was therefore the greatest possible prosperity with the best possible social security.
Adenauer relied fully on the economic upswing and the Erhard system during the election campaign. Subsequently, after the election of Adenauer as Federal Chancellor, he became the first Minister of Economics of the Federal Republic. Success was not long in coming. Full employment was achieved in the Federal Republic of Germany as early as the mid-1950s with enormous economic growth.
Konrad Adenauer himself largely stayed out of economic and social policy and gave his ministers a free hand. The rapid economic upswing and the associated prosperity of the population had several consequences. On the one hand the popularity of the federal government increased, on the other hand there were also the first waves of emigration from the GDR to West Germany and to West Berlin. Although Adenauer had relied entirely on Erhard and his social market economy in the election campaign, Adenauer was also Erhard's greatest opponent within the government. In addition to Adenauer, the resistance in the Federation of German Industry , which saw itself too strictly regulated, also grew . The BDI operated agreements increasingly directly with Adenauer and passed Erhard over.
Erhard rejected the term " economic miracle " and insisted that economic growth was the result of a successful market economy policy. There was increasing broad support for Erhard's policies in the SPD. The SPD indirectly adopted the principle of the social market economy in the Godesberg program under the title “ democratic socialism ” which contained essential components of Erhard's principle and is still part of the SPD's basic program today.
The 2nd legislative period
On September 6, 1953, Adenauer ran again for election. The election campaign for the 1953 Bundestag election was overshadowed by the popular uprising on June 17, 1953 in the GDR . Adenauer benefited from this. Fear of communism and the Soviet Union grew among the population. But Germany's policy was not the only decisive factor for the voters. Since 1952 the economy grew steadily and the prosperity had become noticeable for the people, which also meant a steadily growing satisfaction with the federal government. The social market economy had become the central ideology of the Federal Republic of Germany.
During the election campaign, the SPD advertised “ German unity ” on its posters , the CDU warned against it: “ All roads of Marxism lead to Moscow .” And the FDP posted: “ Where Ollenhauer plows, Moscow sows. "The SPD party chairman Kurt Schumacher said in his last interview before his death in 1952:" According to social democracy, the reunification of Germany is more urgent and more important for peace ... than any form of integration of part of Germany with other European countries. "
The Union parties were able to gain 14.2% and came to 45.2%. The SPD lost slightly and came to 28.8%. The KPD suffered particularly heavy losses, slipping from 5.7% in 1949 to 2.2% and was no longer represented in the German Bundestag. But the governing parties FDP and DP also suffered losses. The DP lost slightly and came to 3.3%, but was able to move into the 2nd Bundestag with 15 members due to 10 direct electoral districts it won. The FDP lost 2.2% and came to 9.5%. The biggest winner besides the CDU was the All-German Bloc / Federation of Expellees and Disenfranchised, founded in 1950 . The GB / BHE immediately achieved 5.8% and moved into the Bundestag with 27 members.
In his second cabinet, Adenauer formed a coalition of CDU / CSU together with the FDP, DP and GB / BHE. Of the initially 15 ministries, the CDU occupied 7, the CSU 2, the FDP 3, the DP 2 and the GB / BHE 1. There were also 4 ministers for special tasks (one each from the CDU, CSU, BHE and FDP). The Minister for Special Tasks Robert Tillmann was a representative of the Federal Government in the Council of Elders of the German Bundestag . Ludwig Erhard (independent) became Minister of Economic Affairs. Konrad Adenauer initially remained Foreign Minister . He appointed Hans Globke as head of the Chancellery , whose internal career he had personally promoted during the first legislative period. On the part of the federal government, Globke was significantly involved in the transfer of the Nazi-polluted organization Gehlen to the Federal Intelligence Service , which has been ongoing since 1953 .
With 333 of the 487 MPs (excluding the MPs from West Berlin ), the government had a two-thirds majority in the second legislative period , which was sufficient to make constitutional changes.
The miracle of Bern
Winning the soccer world championship in Switzerland in 1954 was of particular importance for the young Federal Republic and benefited Adenauer's federal government. The political scientist Arthur Heinrich spoke in connection with the world championship victory of 1954 of "the real hour of birth of the Federal Republic". The historian Joachim Fest put forward a similar interpretation : "July 4th 1954 is the actual date of foundation of the Federal Republic".
The significance of this event only becomes clear when one looks at the reactions to the founding of the state five years earlier. May 23, 1949 passed the consciousness of the people almost without a trace. Surveys in the three western zones showed that two fifths of the citizens were completely indifferent to the new constitution. The news “ Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed ” was not even worth a lead story in the daily newspapers .
However, the portrayal of the “third founding day of the Federal Republic” after the currency reform in 1948 and the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 is highly controversial among historians. Politically, however, the surprising World Cup win also caused irritation and difficulties. At the ceremony, the German football fans who had traveled with them sang the first stanza instead of the third stanza of the Deutschlandlied. However, there were practical reasons for this: the national anthem was only officially introduced in 1952 by Federal President Theodor Heuss at the instigation of Adenauer. The third verse was simply not known to many.
Adenauer, who couldn't do much with sports himself, hadn't traveled to the final in Bern. However, Adenauer's World Cup win was important elsewhere. In the GDR, the government stuck to the socialist brother state of Hungary, but the population stuck to their West German compatriots. The open expressions of sympathy by the East German population were a thorn in the side of the GDR leadership. More solidarity with the socialist brothers in Hungary was expected. The East German newspapers found it difficult to counter the German-German emotions.
Economic miracle
In 1955 Ludwig Erhard's strategy worked. On August 5, 1955, the millionth VW Beetle was sold. This date is now considered to be the "key date" of the economic miracle. 1955 was also the turning point in the export industry. After a foreign trade deficit of around three billion Deutschmarks in 1950, a surplus of one billion Deutschmarks was reported in 1955. The most important yardstick for the economy was the Hanover industrial fair . In 1955, around 4,000 exhibitors from 18 countries gathered there. What went down in the history of the Federal Republic as an economic miracle was based on the political strategy of the USA and Erhard's economic policy. The Federal Republic of Germany received start-up financing of around DM 20 billion through the Marshall Plan until 1954. It was the declared aim of the USA to incorporate the Federal Republic as an economically strong partner into the western alliance at the interface between the two blocs. The upswing took place in several “waves” that were based on needs. Above all, the greatest need of the population was to eat properly. In 1955 a worker in the Federal Republic of Germany spent around DM 200 of his wages averaging around DM 500 on food. A real "feeding wave" swept over the country. The wave of clothing followed the wave of food, then the wave of furnishings and finally the wave of cars and travel. In addition to steadily increasing demand on the domestic market, the automotive industry was also able to demonstrate very good export figures and quickly became the driving force behind German foreign trade.
However, the dark side of the economic miracle also became visible. The gap between rich and poor widened widely in the 1950s. Industry and trade benefited the fastest from the upswing, while workers only slowly. But that should change soon. Due to the enormous growth of the leading industries, other industries were able to follow suit. This meant that the number of unemployed fell sharply and there was practically full employment. What was previously one of the greatest problems facing the Federal Republic has now become one of its greatest advantages. Due to the flight and displacement of around 12 million people, the country had a large number of workers and skilled workers. The federal government paid great attention to orienting funding to needs. Until the mid-1950s, the trade unions had held back on questions of social benefits, working hours and wage increases in order not to endanger the investment power of companies. The rapid upswing, however, aroused workers' expectations of being able to benefit from prosperity.
Moscow trip
On June 7, 1955, Kostylev, the first secretary of the embassy of the Soviet Union in Paris, brought an invitation to the Representation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which the state and party leadership under Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin offered the Federal Republic to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations.
For Adenauer, this invitation came at an extremely inopportune time, since a four-power conference was looming and it was not possible to calculate in which direction the Soviet Union would move on the German question.
Targets of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union invited the Federal Government with the aim of establishing diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with the Federal Republic. However, Adenauer and parts of the federal government feared that the exchange of ambassadors could further cement the division of Germany.
In fact, there were statements by Soviet diplomats beforehand that confirmed this fear. The Soviet ambassador in Paris, Vinogradov, said that the Germans could not count on the restoration of unity for the time being. If Adenauer were offered diplomatic, economic and cultural relations from the Soviet Union, he could hardly ask for more. Everything else is largely unrealistic.
Goals of the Federal Republic of Germany
There was initially no specific goal for the German side. The demands for reunification or even the restoration of the country within the borders of 1937 were unrealistic. Adenauer's top priority was the release of around 10,000 Germans who were still in Soviet captivity. But the position of the Federal Republic on the German question had to be preserved. Despite the unfavorable timing and the conditions, the trip aroused the hope in the population that there would be progress on the German question. In particular, the coalition partner FDP put pressure on Adenauer and demanded that reunification be addressed. The opposition, which had sharply criticized Adenauer's strategy of consistent ties to the West in advance, also called on Adenauer to take action in a similar manner. The negotiating strategy and goals remained controversial within the 141-strong delegation.
Requirements and positions of the negotiating partners
Adenauer established long before the Paris Accords that the path to reunification could only lead through diplomatic relations with Moscow. There was also agreement on the Soviet side that they wanted to release the prisoners of war in order to set a sign of relaxation after the end of Stalinism. However, both sides tried to maintain their position and not to appear as the one to give in, even though both negotiating parties could not afford to fail, neither domestically nor externally. Adenauer wanted to meet “Soviet Russia” as an equal negotiating partner. This position was extremely controversial within the delegation. Foreign Minister von Brentano in particular relied more on a concession, which led to conflicts with Adenauer.
The negotiations
Two questions remained as a subject of negotiation: on the one hand the wish of the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic and on the other hand the question of prisoners of war. The Soviet leadership insisted that there were no prisoners of war, but that only legally convicted criminals were imprisoned in Soviet camps. In fact, some SS criminals such as Wilhelm Schubert and Gustav Sorge were among the prisoners of war. Both were members of the SS and were considered sadistic mass murderers in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp . The Soviet Union insisted that all 9628 prisoners return to Germany, mainly because of the standpoint of having no prisoners of war. The German side set the clear condition for establishing diplomatic relations that the German question remains open and is not affected by the exchange. Finally, after just four days of negotiations, an agreement was reached on September 12, 1955, according to which all prisoners of war could return to Germany . Shortly before the end of the visit to Moscow, Adenauer and Nikolai Bulganin agreed that all civilian prisoners could also return to Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR officially exchanged ambassadors. The GDR was not recognized by the Federal Republic and, according to a joint press statement, was not the subject of the negotiations.
The GDR leadership therefore criticized the outcome of the negotiations; a highly unusual process, since criticism of the Soviet Union on the part of the GDR was not intended in the bilateral relationship between the two states.
The historian and chancellor biographer Henning Köhler spoke of Adenauer's “most spectacular political action”. When asked what was the most difficult part of the negotiations, the Chancellor mentioned the name of Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano.
Hallstein Doctrine
The Hallstein Doctrine, developed after Adenauer's trip to Moscow in 1955, was intended to counteract recognition of the GDR by third countries.
The Adenauer government did not attempt to consolidate the division of Germany by not establishing or discontinuing diplomatic relations with states that recognized the GDR. On the other hand, this also clearly denied the legitimacy of the GDR's existence. Relations with Moscow were seen as an exception, as the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was presented as indispensable for reasons of the importance of this state. Hallstein himself is not the author of the doctrine; Rather, it goes back to a formulation by Wilhelm Grewe , head of the political department in the Foreign Ministry, on September 23, 1955.
The strategy was highly controversial from the start. The greatest danger was one's own isolation if the GDR were recognized by a large number of states. But in the mid-1950s, Adenauer also had the Western powers behind him, which had not considered recognizing the GDR.
Rearmament
On March 20, 1956, Article 87a of the Basic Law came into force. The Federal Republic of Germany thus had an army again. On June 7, 1955, Theodor Blank was appointed the first Federal Minister of Defense; on November 12, 1955, he swore in the first 101 soldiers of the Bundeswehr.
The rearmament is considered a first severe test for the Federal Republic. At times up to two thirds of the population were against a German army. So there were massive protests and demonstrations in 1955. The opposition under Kurt Schumacher strictly rejected an independent army and pursued the goal of a collective security system with the East. Above all, he gave reunification priority over Adenauer's goal of consistent western integration. In the population, it was less the strategy and direction that were decisive than the fear of another war. Both the GDR and the Federal Republic tried to create facts much earlier. Although a complete demilitarization of Germany had been decided at the Potsdam Conference, both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union relied on self-defense of their respective borders very early on. The Federal Border Guard was introduced in 1951 and the Barracked People's Police in the GDR in 1952 .
KPD ban
After a negotiation period of five years, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was banned by the 1st Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court according to Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law .
The judgment, like the entire procedure, is still very controversial today. Various constitutional lawyers are of the opinion that the Senate would not confirm the verdict today under the same conditions and actions by the party. Konrad Adenauer personally put considerable pressure on the 1st Senate in the course of the negotiations. He threatened to transfer the case to the 2nd Senate if the 1st Senate did not come to a decision soon. However, the verdict did not trigger any protest from the population, as the KPD was already relatively isolated at that time. The core of the working class trusted the SPD, and the KPD also had no support from the trade unions. In large parts of the population, the KPD was seen as an extension of the SED .
The process gained historical importance not because it was one of a total of three prohibition proceedings against a party, but because it was (and still is) the only proceedings in which the federal government actively attempted to intervene.
Break of the coalition
In 1956 the FDP left the coalition, officially because of differences in Germany policy. But Konrad Adenauer actually ended the coalition with the FDP. The background was that Adenauer tried to persuade the FDP to replace chairman Thomas Dehler with the national-liberal August-Martin Euler . When the project failed, Adenauer tried to weaken the FDP by changing the electoral law and to push it out of the Bundestag. The right to vote should be changed in such a way that 60% of the MPs are elected directly and only 40% via the state lists, whereby the direct mandates are not taken into account. This trench voting system would have greatly favored the major parties, especially the CDU / CSU, as 172 were directly elected from their 244 members in the Bundestag.
As an immediate reaction to Adenauer's attack, the FDP terminated the coalition with the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia and joined forces with the SPD there.
Adenauer managed to split the FDP parliamentary group. The so-called Euler Group left the FDP, officially in protest against the SPD / FDP coalition in North Rhine-Westphalia. All four FDP ministers were among these 16 members of the Bundestag. They founded the Free People's Party (FVP) and formed a new coalition with Adenauer. The cabinet remained unchanged despite the departure of the FDP from the coalition.
After leaving the coalition, the FDP tried to concentrate fully on Germany policy and made contact with the GDR block party LDPD. In doing so, however, she found that there was no longer anything in common between the bloc party and the Free Democrats, as the LDPD had completely subscribed to the SED line.
Election campaign for the election of the 3rd German Bundestag
The election campaign for the 1957 Bundestag election concentrated on Germany's policy. With their demand that the Federal Republic of Germany should withdraw from NATO and the GDR from the Warsaw Pact in order to make reunification possible, the Social Democrats (SPD) went on a course of confrontation with Adenauer's previous policy in Germany and thus also questioned integration with the West. Another focus of the SPD was the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr. The SPD evaluated nuclear weapons as purely offensive weapons. The Christian Democrats (CDU) countered with the slogan No experiments . Adenauer's election campaign was extremely fierce. He described it as the end of Germany if the SPD should win.
At the height of power
The CDU / CSU was able to win an absolute majority of votes and mandates for the first time and to date only. With 50.2% of the vote and 270 MPs, Adenauer could now govern alone and did not need a coalition partner. When forming the cabinet, Adenauer left two ministries to the DP. The CDU had renounced some direct candidates in favor of the DP and thus enabled the DP, which won six direct mandates, to enter the German Bundestag, although it failed because of the five percent threshold (see: piggyback procedure ). The Minister for Transport , Hans-Christoph Seebohm , and the Minister for Affairs of the Federal Council and the Länder , Hans-Joachim von Merkatz , both joined the CDU in 1960. Only five parties and four parliamentary groups were now represented in parliament, as the GB / BHE also just failed to pass the five percent threshold with 4.6% . The cabinet now only consisted of 18 ministers, as the four ministers for “special tasks” (previously also ministers without portfolio ) were no longer appointed. Despite the ongoing conflicts, Heinrich von Brentano remained Foreign Minister . Ludwig Erhard became Adenauer's deputy .
A major factor deciding the choice was Adenauer's successful trip to Moscow and the associated return of the prisoners of war as well as the accession of the Saarland to the federal territory. The SPD under Erich Ollenhauer was able to gain three percentage points, but had to classify the election as a bitter defeat in view of the demands for the abandonment of western integration in favor of reunification. The evocation of a danger posed by rearmament and the plan to procure nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr could not influence the voters either.
Treaty of Rome
On January 1, 1958, the Treaty of Rome came into force. These included the EEC Treaty and the EURATOM Treaty .
EURATOM treaty
- safe and effective nuclear energy
- Passing on important know-how
- peaceful use
- joint research and development
- common approach to achieve achievements
- Modernization; Access to the best technical resources
- Safety standards
- common market for substances used
- Tasks performed by the Council, Commission, Assembly and the ECJ
EEC Treaty (European Economic Community)
- Securing social and economic progress
- Removal of European barriers; Abolition of customs duties
- Improving living and working conditions
- constant economic expansion, balanced trade, fair competition
- common trade, agriculture and transport policies
- Maintaining peace and freedom
- greater stability, closer relations between states
- Free movement of people, services, capital and goods
- Approximation of national laws
- internal and external financial stability
The Oberländer case
On May 4, 1960, the Minister for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims, Theodor Oberländer, resigned. This was preceded by a heated argument from 1959 about Oberländer's role during the Nazi era .
When he was eighteen at the time, Oberländer was involved in the 1923 Hitler coup . Its role during World War II was controversial for years. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED wanted to use Oberländer as an example to “prove the essential equality of the Bonn system with Hitler's fascism”. In a show trial Oberländer was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment. Adenauer refused to dismiss Oberländer. He argued that he was unwilling to "cut off a man's head just because the SED wants it" . Although Oberländer had not been able to prove any war crimes up to this point, the Adenauer government was under pressure. Oberländer was accused of participating in pogroms in Lemberg , Galicia . Oberländer himself denied the allegations until his death in 1998. To date, no evidence of involvement has been found. Nevertheless, Oberländer was considered particularly exemplary of the continuity of the functional elite between the Third Reich and the post-war republic.
After the SPD had applied for a committee of inquiry into Oberländer's past, he finally resigned on May 4, 1960 after having received pension entitlement, rejecting the allegations.
Oberländer's successor was former DP MP Hans-Joachim von Merkatz , who was already Minister for State Affairs and Justice in Adenauer's second cabinet and had joined the CDU a few weeks before his reappointment as Minister for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims. Oberländer remained a member of the Bundestag. In the 1961 federal elections , he missed entry, but moved up again in 1963 via the Lower Saxony state list for the CDU after the MP Elisabeth Vietje had died.
After reunification, on November 28, 1993, the Berlin Regional Court overturned the GDR ruling against Oberländer for formal reasons. From a historical perspective, Oberländer is assessed very differently. For Adenauer, people like Oberländer or Globke were indispensable for building up the Federal Republic of Germany. Philipp-Christian Wachs ruled in his book Der Fall Theodor Oberländer (1905–1998) that Theodor Oberländer belonged to the academic elite of National Socialism. His life was part of the history of both German states and how they dealt with the past.
construction of the Berlin wall
On the night of August 12th to 13th, 1961, the GDR began, with the approval of the Kremlin, to seal off the border between the three western zones and the eastern zone of Berlin. In the days that followed, work began on building a wall 155 kilometers long. The U-Bahn and S-Bahn connections were interrupted. This closed the last loophole through which GDR citizens could enter the West.
Months before, there were repeated rumors that the GDR was planning to completely seal off the borders. Both the Western Allies and the federal government were informed of the impending measures. However, there was no information about the type and timing of the measures. On August 10, 1961, the BND received information about the imminent construction of the wall. At a press conference in East Berlin on June 15, 1961, Walter Ulbricht replied to the question from journalist Annamarie Doherr from the Frankfurter Rundschau :
“I understand your question to mean that there are people in West Germany who want us to mobilize the construction workers of the GDR capital to erect a wall, yes? I do not know that there is such an intention, as the construction workers in the capital are mainly engaged in housing construction and their manpower is used to the full for this purpose. Nobody has the intention to build a wall."
Ulbricht was the first to use the term “wall” for border security. At that point, the West realized what border security it would be.
Declaration by Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, August 13, 1961: The rulers of the Soviet zone began tonight to seal off West Berlin from its surroundings, openly breaking the four-power agreements. This measure was taken because the regime imposed on the Central German population by a foreign power could no longer master the internal difficulties in its sphere of influence. The other Eastern Bloc countries have asked the zone regime to remove this state of weakness and insecurity. The entire world public was shown every day by the mass exodus from the zone what pressure the residents are under and that they are not granted the right to self-determination recognized throughout the world. The arbitrariness of the Pankow regime has created a serious situation. The necessary countermeasures are being taken in conjunction with our allies. The federal government asks all Germans to trust these measures. It is the order of the day to face the challenge of the East with firmness but also calmly and not to do anything that can only aggravate the situation but not improve it. We still feel very closely connected with the Germans in the Soviet zone and in East Berlin; they are and will remain our German brothers and sisters. The Federal Government remains firmly committed to the goal of German unity in freedom. Given the importance of the incident, I asked the Foreign Minister to let the German missions inform the foreign governments.
Adenauer's reluctance aroused displeasure in both the Federal Republic and Berlin. It was mainly expected of the Berliners that Adenauer would make his way to Berlin immediately, but he did not travel until 22/23. August to Berlin. The Western Allies also initially saw no need for action. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: Existing reports indicate that the measures taken so far are directed against the residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not against the position of the Allies in West Berlin or the access to West Berlin. West Berliners were reassured by the visit of US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and the hero of the Airlift General Lucius D. Clay . Johnson assured Mayor Willy Brandt that the status of Berlin would not be shaken, and the USA increased the military presence in Berlin. Adenauer's reputation was damaged by his behavior after the Wall was built.
Adenauer's exchange offer
According to a report by Der Spiegel magazine , the federal government released secret documents in 2011 showing that Adenauer tried to propose that John F. Kennedy offer the Soviet Union a barter deal. Thuringia and parts of Mecklenburg and Saxony should fall to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin should be given up. The background was that Thuringia had originally been occupied by the Americans, but then fell to the Soviet Union as part of the Four Power Agreement. Adenauer wanted to end the Berlin crisis. Above all, however, economic interests should have been in the foreground. The magazine describes the campaign as "an advantageous exchange"
Germany television
At the end of 1958, the Freie Fernsehen GmbH (FFG) was founded in Frankfurt as a federally owned private broadcaster based on the opinion of the television theorist Gerhard Eckert . The foundation went back to an initiative of Konrad Adenauer, who did not see the reporting of the regional stations in the ARD as always neutral and felt underrepresented.
A second program independent of the ARD should serve as a counterweight. Since, according to the Basic Law, cultural sovereignty was reserved for the federal states, the private-sector organization of the station should make this possible. Another argument was that the Deutsche Bundespost and thus the federal government were responsible for the radio stations and could therefore also rule on the television companies. Adenauer saw the time for such a reorganization as he was of the opinion that the absolute majority in parliament would have the citizens behind him. Since the SPD- led countries had already announced resistance, Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH was founded; the federal states should have a 49% stake in it, while 51% should remain with the federal government. The FFG should, however, de facto act as the sole program designer.
The idea of a private television company was not new. As early as 1952 there were first considerations of the economy to set up a private radio station in order to be able to present itself better with advertising. In 1953 the Federal Post Minister refused the state agencies further frequencies and announced that they would support private broadcasters. In the same year the radio industry interest group was supposed to lay the foundation stone for its own institute, but this establishment never came about. In addition to FFG and Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH, two further subsidiaries were founded. On the one hand, the Fernsehverkaufs- und Werbegemeinschaft mbH as a 99 percent subsidiary of the FFG, which had the purpose of preventing the advertising industry from having a direct influence on programming, which was primarily a requirement within the CDU as well as the churches. In addition, the Deutscher Fernsehdienst GmbH was founded, which was responsible for the daily reporting of the news. This company was 51% a subsidiary of FFG. The remaining shares were divided between the International Television Agency GmbH (IFAG) in Wiesbaden, in which the federal government held a 51% stake, and the German weekly newsreel with 12% each. The Protestant Church and Tellux-Film each held 10% and Marx Verlag, as a Jewish representative, 5% of the shares.
Since the federal government, along with the BDI, had the sole right to propose the composition of the FFG's supervisory board and the licensee was 51% owned by the federal government, Deutschland-Fernsehen, with the shares of IFAG and FFG in DFD GmbH, was in fact a purely state broadcaster. On August 1, 1960, Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH was entered in the Cologne Commercial Register. Konrad Adenauer signed for the federal government and the Federal Minister of Justice Schäffer in trust for the federal states. For January 1, 1961, the frequency allocation was requested from the Deutsche Bundespost. But the states did not accept Schäffer, which is why the statutes had to be changed on August 25th and the federal government had to take over the contribution of the states of 11,000 DM up to then.
The states of Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony and Hesse, governed by the SPD, then filed a lawsuit with the Federal Constitutional Court . The Federal Constitutional Court banned the broadcasting of other channels besides ARD by interim order until the main proceedings were concluded. This judgment initially applied not only to the FFG and Deutschland-Fernsehen, but also to the counter-models of the state agencies NDR and HR , which in turn wanted to offer a second program. This meant that it was no longer possible to start broadcasting on January 1, 1961. Adenauer did expect that the federal states would be right in the main proceedings, but he also saw a chance that a decision would be made in favor of the federal government, as there was indeed a certain overlapping of competencies. In Art. 73 No. 7 a. F. GG was responsible for the technical implementation of the Federal Post Office, in Art. 5 GG the cultural sovereignty was assigned to the states. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled in the first broadcasting judgment neither in favor of the states nor the federal law. There was a clear distinction between the technical and the cultural implementation by the broadcaster as the provider. The Bundespost was responsible for the implementation, but for the content it was exclusively the federal states. For Adenauer, this judgment was a crushing defeat. FFG and Deutschland-Fernsehen had to be dissolved immediately. The federal government had to pay the liabilities and costs of around DM 30 to 35 million. Adenauer tried some kind of damage limitation and asked the federal states to take over the material that had already been produced.
The consequences
From today's perspective, the failure of Deutschland-Fernsehen GmbH was the actual beginning of the end of the Adenauer era, along with Adenauer's behavior during the construction of the Berlin Wall. For Konrad Adenauer, failure was both a great loss of face and power. The attempt had positive and negative consequences for the German media landscape. There were contracts u. a. concluded with Windrose Film- und Fernsehproduktions GmbH , run by Peter von Zahn , which, with a budget of around 50 million DM, provided a foreign reporting network unprecedented for German standards for eight years. The WDR took over the programs produced up to then with great success. They were the basis for the series Weltspiegel, which still exists today .
The Federal Constitutional Court only dealt with the creation of private providers 20 years later, when the cable network was being prepared, and in 1981 passed the further fundamental judgment that both private and public providers may broadcast. It was not until 1984 that Radio Luxemburg broadcast the first purely private television on the RTL plus cable channel.
Politically, this judgment did not end the Adenauer era. By preventing “Adenauer's Chancellor TV”, the SPD-ruled countries in particular came under pressure, as the creation of a second full program was now expected. The CDU / CSU parliamentary group was able to prevent a second ARD program, whereupon the states decided to create an institution under public law (AdöR, AöR) independent of the ARD. The station was named Second German Television (ZDF) . The state of Rhineland-Palatinate bought the broadcasting center of the FFG in Eschborn for ZDF . Between 1964 and 1969, the ARD broadcasters set up the “third party” programs.
The presidential crisis
1959 ended the second term of office of the first Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany Theodor Heuss . Konrad Adenauer proposed Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard as his successor. But one quickly suspected that this proposal was a move by Adenauer, which would have prevented Erhard as his successor in the office of Federal Chancellor. The CDU continued to favor Erhard as Adenauer's successor. When Erhard finally refused, he submitted his candidacy himself. The aim was to be able to control his successor from the presidency. But when Adenauer noticed how little power the office of Federal President contained, he finally renounced the candidacy and persuaded Heinrich Lübke to take over from Heuss. Lübke was then also elected second Federal President by the Federal Assembly.
Election campaign for the 4th German Bundestag
For the CDU - without Adenauer! was the campaign slogan of the FDP. The entire election campaign in the 1961 federal election was extremely personified. The focus was not on content, but on the top candidates. This was especially true for the top candidates among the competitors. The SPD did not set up its chairman Erich Ollenhauer, but the Governing Mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt. The CDU / CSU continued to rely on Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The FDP campaigned with Erich Mende.
The conflict between challenger Brandt and incumbent Adenauer initially determined the election campaign, which was then overshadowed by the construction of the Berlin Wall.
But initially the dispute between Adenauer and Brandt was in the foreground. Brandt was popular and was considered a beacon of hope. Adenauer tried to defame him personally. He tried to take advantage of the fact that Brandt had emigrated to Norway during the Nazi era, had changed his name and, before he had turned into a social democrat, had been a radical socialist at a young age. But Brandt also handed out. In a campaign speech on August 12, 1961, he said he wanted to push the "old man", "frozen into a monument", from his pedestal.
During an election campaign appearance in Regensburg on August 14th, one day after the start of the barricade measures on the Berlin border, Adenauer, under pressure, let himself be carried away to the derailment of "Mr. Brandt alias Frahm". This was received with incomprehension by the population. Adenauer's polls fell. No one was interested in resolutely joining forces in overcoming the Berlin crisis. The roles were clearly distributed among the population: the acting Governing Mayor versus the hesitant Federal Chancellor.
In terms of factual issues, the SPD relied primarily on the slogans “Prosperity is for everyone” and “Happy holidays. Annual leave of at least four weeks ”. Furthermore, the SPD committed itself to NATO membership and the social market economy. The CDU continued to rely on itself with the slogan "No experiments tomorrow either - CDU". The FDP advertised with “A free people needs free democrats”.
For the CDU it became clear that a coalition partner would be needed. But the FDP set the condition “not with Adenauer”, who in turn struck back and did not rule out the option of a grand coalition with the SPD. This again put the FDP under pressure if it did not want to end up in the opposition again.
The elections
As expected, the CDU / CSU lost the absolute majority and together came to 45.3%. It benefited from the failure of the All-German Party, which, measured against the election results of its predecessor parties, lost around 5.2% and failed to pass the five percent threshold with 2.8% of the votes. The SPD was able to gain around two million votes with 11,427,355 votes (36.2%). This gave them around 50,000 more votes than the CDU and, as in 1949, they became the party with the most votes in the Bundestag. It was the first election after the adoption of the Godesberg program, which marked a departure from historical Marxism towards democratic socialism. Today this program is seen as the completed change of the SPD to a people's party. Overall, however, the election success is tied to the person Willy Brandt. The biggest winner was the FDP. With 12.8% of the votes, she was able to achieve her best result to date.
In terms of mandates in the 4th German Bundestag, however, the CDU remained the strongest party because, due to its high number of direct mandates (114 versus 92 in the SPD), it obtained five overhang mandates , which at that time were not yet compensated for by compensatory mandates ; With 192 seats, it had two more than the SPD. The CDU / CSU parliamentary group thus united 242 mandates and was still the strongest group. The SPD got 190, the FDP 62.
Coalition negotiations
After the election, the FDP stuck to its declared goal of entering into a coalition with the CDU / CSU. Initially, however, the negotiations were held on the assumption that Konrad Adenauer did not want to be elected Federal Chancellor. The factual issues were first clarified and an agreement was reached quickly. The personnel discussion dragged on, however. Adenauer put the FDP under further pressure with the option of a grand coalition. He wanted a fourth term at all costs. In purely mathematical terms, a coalition with the SPD would have been possible for the FDP, but that was not an option for the FDP at the time. After Adenauer made a coalition offer to the SPD, the FDP overturned. However, she was able to get Adenauer to promise to resign within the legislative period. Nevertheless, the FDP had to expose itself to the accusation of fraudulent voting, as it had advertised strongly that it wanted to replace Adenauer.
The government
At first, Adenauer Chancellor and Ludwig Erhard remained his deputy. The FDP and CSU each received five ministries, the CDU and the Chancellor eleven. Unlike later, the Foreign Office remained in the hands of the CDU Chancellor Party.
Franco-German cooperation
In 1962, the French President Charles de Gaulle accepted an invitation from Konrad Adenauer to make a state visit to Germany. De Gaulle relied primarily on the symbolic power of the visit. De Gaulle's welcoming speech at Cologne-Bonn Airport ended with the words: "Long live Germany, long live Franco-German friendship!" In addition to pithy words, de Gaulle also relied on symbolic actions. De Gaulle wanted a meeting with representatives of the working class. In addition to his first travel destinations in Bonn and Düsseldorf, de Gaulle went to Thyssen in Duisburg. After Thyssen had manufactured weapons that were used against France in the First and Second World Wars, de Gaulle now wanted to document his willingness to cooperate. In addition to the great symbolic power and importance of the meeting as the “beginning of a friendship” between the former arch enemies, the visit also had political significance for Europe. France had the goal of setting up Europe as a counterweight to the USA and therefore needed Germany as an economic factor. But Adenauer also had the goal of asserting himself in a common Europe. However, Adenauer was also strongly tied to the USA and did not want to weaken relations with the USA. France put more distance to the USA. It was decided that Adenauer would return to Paris and a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on Franco-German cooperation, also known as the Élysée Treaty , was developed.
Élysée Treaty
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, President Charles de Gaulle, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and the French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville
The Élysée Treaty was the first treaty between Germany and France for cooperation between the two countries. It is commonly referred to as the first friendship treaty between the two states. From a political point of view, however, this representation is not entirely correct, as France was de facto still an occupying power at this point in time and still had the right to veto decisions by the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, politicians and historians refer to this treaty as the cornerstone for the end of arch enmity between Germany and France and the beginning of a new era in Europe. The treaty obliges both governments to consult on all important questions of foreign, security, youth and cultural policy. In addition, regular meetings at government level were decided. The contract was signed on January 22nd, 1963. Both parties signed the German and the French version. As a special gesture, Charles de Gaulle embraced Konrad Adenauer after signing. From today's perspective, it is assumed that this embrace came from de Gaulle, who relied heavily on symbolism and thus wanted to underline the importance of the contract. It was the first of the three grand gestures to date that were intended to underscore the Franco-German friendship. On September 22, 1984 Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand were hand in hand in Verdun for a large ceremony in memory of the victims of the wars between France and Germany. On June 6, 2004, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac embraced on the 60th anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy , with a German Chancellor invited for the first time. The close relationship with France is based in particular on the personal good relationship between de Gaulle and Adenauer, and later also between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, Kohl and Mitterrand, Schröder and Chirac as well as Merkel and Sarkozy.
The preamble, which was added to the treaty by the German side prior to ratification, caused displeasure in the meantime. In it the Germans declared their close ties to the USA and their willingness to accept Great Britain into the EEC. De Gaulle, however, pursued the goal that Europe should make itself more independent from the USA. In 1958, de Gaulle refused to place the French Mediterranean fleet under NATO command. Adenauer stuck to his stance of integration with the West and saw Germany above all on the side of the USA.
The contract came into force on July 2, 1963 after it was signed. This was followed on July 5, 1963 by the founding agreement for the Franco-German Youth Office . In the period that followed, numerous town twinning partnerships and partnerships between schools and associations were established. Formally, however, the state of occupation was only ended with the 1990 two-plus-four contract .
Mirror affair
The Spiegel affair was about the self-image of the press in the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to press freedom. Historians also refer to it as the Strauss affair.
Background of the affair
In the 41/1962 issue of the news magazine Der Spiegel , an article was published under the title “ Bundeswehr Conditionally ready for defense ”. The author was the deputy editor-in-chief Conrad Ahlers . The content of the article was the NATO maneuver " Fallex 62 ". Fallex 62 was the first NATO maneuver based on the assumption that World War III would begin with a major attack on Europe. According to the Spiegel , the maneuver relentlessly revealed deficiencies in the Bundeswehr in the event of a defense. The Bundeswehr received the lowest so-called NATO grade 4 of the NATO high command, which meant that the classification was conditionally suitable for defense . In addition to the actual maneuver, Der Spiegel also described the strategy of how Strauss came to the Ministry of Defense and how he skillfully manipulated the target strength of the Bundeswehr. Strauss called this and other representations treason. Von Strauss argued that some representations should come from secret papers of the federal government. Der Spiegel accused Strauss of pursuing the goal of bringing nuclear weapons into the power of the Federal Republic and making Germany a nuclear power. Spiegel's main allegation was that Strauss had neglected the conventional equipment of the Bundeswehr in order to procure nuclear weapons. Strauss, in turn, accused the mirror of deception, active bribery and treasonable falsification.
The article was preceded by a long-running feud between Strauss and Spiegel editor-in-chief Rudolf Augstein . Strauss had been suspected of corruption several times through reports by Spiegel , for example in the so-called Fibag affair and the Uncle Aloys affair. Strauss tried to bring defamation lawsuits against Augstein and the Spiegel , but they failed. The depiction of the defense minister attached "a smell of corruption" , the mirror was even allowed to claim across the board.
Beginning of the affair
On the night of October 26, 1962, police officers occupied and searched the editorial offices of Spiegel in Hamburg and Bonn on behalf of the Federal Prosecutor's Office . This was preceded by a complaint from the then Colonel of the Reserve, Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte . Rudolf Augstein , Claus Jacobi, Conrad Ahlers , Hans Schmelz and, eight days after the start of the action, Hans Detlev Becker were arrested and their apartments searched. The editorial rooms and their inventory were confiscated.
The arrest of Conrad Ahlers was viewed as particularly offensive. At the time, he was on vacation in Spain. At that time the Franco regime ruled there. Franz Josef Strauss arranged this arrest through the Madrid military attaché Achim Oster . Rudolf Augstein, who initially went into hiding, turned himself in two days after the action. In addition to the allegations from the article, it was also stated that officers of the Bundeswehr had allegedly been bribed in order to get at the explosive material. The Spiegel article entitled “Ready to take defense” contains 37 military secrets, some of which are extremely important.
The political argument
In a question time of the German Bundestag on November 7th and 8th, 1962, the SPD criticized the crackdown on the Spiegel in the most violent way. Above all, the action against Conrad Ahlers, and the fact that, on the instructions of Defense Minister Strauss, they worked almost directly with the Franco regime, were criticized. Strauss himself denied in the course of Question Time that he had intervened in the investigation at all. He claimed: "I had nothing to do with the initiation of the procedure" . Contrary to Strauss's expectations, Konrad Adenauer was cautious. From his speech in the German Bundestag:
"We have an abyss of treason in the country" [...] (murmuring in the hall) "Who says that?" "I say that!"
The SPD believed neither Strauss nor that Der Spiegel had committed treason with the report. The coalition partner FDP initially held back. Only the MP Wolfgang Döring , who was friends with Rudolph Augstein, said to Adenauer: “ But Mr. Chancellor, I owe it not only to my friend, but also to the citizen Augstein and everyone else to protest against your saying here, Mr Augstein earned money on treason, then you were the first to pass a judgment here that only the courts are entitled to pass! (Applause)"
On November 9, 1962, Franz Josef Strauss admitted that he had called Madrid, but only at the instigation of the judicial authorities. In response to the charge that he lied for two weeks, Strauss replied that he only wanted to make it clear that he had nothing to do with the arrests.
The FDP felt completely ignored. In particular, the Minister of Justice responsible, Wolfgang Stammberger , who was not even informed about the action, was outraged by Strauss's behavior. This had not only bypassed the Minister of Justice, the Interior Senator Helmut Schmidt , who was actually responsible for the police action in Hamburg , was informed only belatedly. In addition, the Foreign Office was bypassed in the action in Spain.
The consequences
The FDP ministers Wolfgang Stammberger ( justice ), Heinz Starke ( finances ), Wolfgang Mischnick ( displaced persons, refugees and war victims ), Hans Lenz ( treasure ) and Walter Scheel ( economic cooperation ) resigned and demanded the resignation of Franz Josef Strauss. Konrad Adenauer initially offered the SPD negotiations to form a grand coalition. But the SPD would only have been ready to enter into negotiations if Adenauer had resigned. Adenauer could no longer hold Strauss. On November 30th, Franz Josef Strauss submitted his resignation and Adenauer had to reshuffle the cabinet. He himself announced his resignation for October 1963. Stammberger and Starke no longer belonged to the new cabinet . Strauss was entrusted with carrying out the business in the Ministry of Defense until Kai-Uwe von Hassel was appointed on January 9, 1963.
The Spiegel editorial office in Hamburg was released again after four weeks. Those arrested were released, Augstein after 103 days, Hans Schmelz after 81, Ahlers after 56 days.
Later results
On May 13, 1965, the Federal Court of Justice declared the proceedings against the editors of the Spiegel to be over. However, a constitutional complaint by the Spiegel against the searches and seizures in its editorial offices was rejected by the Federal Constitutional Court on August 5, 1966 in the event of a tie. In this case, only half of the judges rated the population's right to be fully informed higher than the suspicion of treason.
In the book The Memoirs , published after Strauss's death in 1988, Strauss finally admitted that he had carried out the nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr at the expense of conventional ones. He continued to speak of treason.
A letter from Adenauer was shown in a broadcast on the documentation channel Phoenix , in which a telephone conversation between Adenauer and Strauss is documented, in which Adenauer had given him full freedom of action. In the letter, Adenauer assured Strauss full support, which he did not give him at the hearing in the German Bundestag.
End of the Adenauer era
On October 15, 1963, exactly 14 years and one month after taking office, the President of the Bundestag Eugen Gerstenmaier said goodbye to Konrad Adenauer:
- “On September 15, 1949, you rose here from your seat of parliament to take the place of Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. Today you leave him with a historic achievement, unbowed and with honor. At that time you got up and stepped in front of the house. Today the German Bundestag stands in front of you, Mr. Chancellor, to express its gratitude for the German people: Konrad Adenauer has rendered outstanding services to the fatherland. "
Konrad Adenauer ruled almost half a month longer than all 14 Chancellors of the Weimar Republic put together (counting from Philipp Scheidemann's takeover on February 13, 1919 to Kurt von Schleicher's resignation on January 28, 1933). Adenauer remained federal chairman of the CDU until 1966 and a member of the Bundestag until his death on April 19, 1967.
Adenauer was a declared opponent of Ludwig Erhard as Federal Chancellor and continued to fight him after his resignation. Adenauer advocated a grand coalition with the argument that diplomatic relations with Eastern European countries would be possible. This meant Adenauer's departure from the Hallstein Doctrine. But after the federal election in 1965 , it initially remained with the black-yellow coalition under Erhard. On October 27, 1966, however, all FDP ministers resigned after disputes over the 1967 budget, after the CDU did not rule out tax increases to compensate for the budget deficit, which the FDP strictly rejected.
Adenauer felt confirmed and Erhard lost all support in the CDU. At first all options were open, whether there should be a renewed coalition with the FDP with a different line-up or a grand coalition. A grand coalition finally followed under Kurt Georg Kiesinger , who was supported by Konrad Adenauer until his death.
Trivia
- Conrad Ahlers became deputy head of the Federal Government's Press and Information Office in 1966 and was thus an employee of the Federal Cabinet and thus of Franz Josef Strauss, who had had him arrested four years earlier. In a conversation with Der Spiegel , Rudolf Augstein described the relationship between Ahlers and Strauss as friendly, both before and after the arrest.
- Rudolf Augstein visited Konrad Adenauer shortly before his death in his house in Rhöndorf. At this meeting, the two of them made it up with a hug.
- In the first electoral period (1949–1953) there were the most calls to order (156) and word withdrawals (40) to date (status 2011). A similar number (136) was not reached until the Greens entered the German Bundestag in 1982.
literature
- Klaus A. Maier , Bruno Thoss (ed.): West integration, security and the German question. Sources on foreign policy in the Adenauer era 1949–1963 (= Selected Sources on German Modern History , Volume 42). Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1994, ISBN 3-534-11228-8 .
- Hans-Erich Volkmann (Ed.): Sources on domestic politics in the Adenauer era 1949–1963. Constitution and consolidation of the Federal Republic (= selected sources on German history in modern times , volume 40). Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-11229-6 .
Web links
- Konrad Adenauer Foundation eV
- Literature from and about the Adenauer era in the catalog of the German National Library
- Dorlis Blume, Irmgard Zündorf: Konrad Adenauer. Tabular curriculum vitae in the LeMO ( DHM and HdG )
- “Memories” - Adenauer's memoirs from 1945–1963
- Konrad Adenauer in the files of the Reich Chancellery
- Konrad Adenauer in conversation with Günter Gaus, 1965 (1) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer in conversation with Günter Gaus, 1965 (2) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer in conversation with Günter Gaus, 1965 (3) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer - Der Patriarch (1/4) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer - Der Patriarch (2/4) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer - Der Patriarch (3/4) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
- Konrad Adenauer - Der Patriarch (4/4) on YouTube , accessed on November 13, 2011
Individual evidence
- ↑ Konrad Adenauer Foundation : Adenauer era - 1949–1963 ( Memento from February 27, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ Guido Knopp: Chancellor, the mighty of politics. ISBN 3-570-00645-X , p. 20.
- ↑ Dieter Grieshaber: The Federal Republic of Germany in the years 1949-1951. History and Culture Association Köngen e. V, February 27, 2011, accessed April 22, 2015 .
- ↑ Cf. Norbert Frei : Past Policy. The beginnings of the Federal Republic and the Nazi past. Munich 1999, ISBN 3-423-30720-X ; or Jörg Friedrich : The cold amnesty. Nazi perpetrators in the Federal Republic. Frankfurt am Main 1984, ISBN 3-596-24308-4 .
- ^ Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Government declaration on the Petersberg Agreement
- ↑ Schumacher's "Chancellor of the Allies"
- ↑ ECSC Treaty
- ↑ April 18, 1951: Signing of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in Paris
- ↑ Erhard's critical reaction to the coal and steel union
- ^ Resistance of the opposition to the ECSC Treaty ( Memento of February 14, 2005 in the Internet Archive )
- ^ Western integration
- ↑ The Third Way
- ↑ Full employment in the 50s
- ↑ Udo Kempf, Hans-Georg Merz: Chancellor and Minister 1949–1998. Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden 2001, p. 86.
- ↑ Bundestag elections 1953 ( Memento from July 29, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
- ↑ a b Elections 1953, report of the Kölner Stadtanzeiger
- ↑ Significance of the miracle of Bern
- ↑ Guido Knopp: Our Century. ISBN 3-442-15044-2 , p. 338.
- ↑ Football World Cup 54
- ↑ PDF (digitized version)
- ↑ Werner Kilian: Adenauer's trip to Moscow . June 7, 1955. Ed .: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. Herder Verlag, Freiburg im Breisgau 2005, ISBN 3-451-22995-1 (10 pages, kas.de [PDF; 68 kB ; accessed on March 19, 2017]).
- ↑ a b Adenauer's trip to Moscow was a good move. Welt Online, September 8, 2009, accessed April 21, 2015 .
- ^ A b Hanns Jürgen Küsters : Moscow trip 1955 .
- ^ House of History : Hallstein Doctrine ( LeMO )
- ↑ Federal Law Gazette No. 11/1956
- ↑ Rearmament divides West German society - series 60 times Germany of the rbb ( Memento from May 19, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ BVerfG, judgment of August 17, 1956, Az. 1 BvB 2/51, BVerfGE 5, 85 - KPD ban.
- ↑ Adenauer manipulates the right to vote
- ^ House of History: CDU election poster
- ↑ Klaus Wiegrefe about Theodor Oberländer in Spiegel Online Zeitgeschichte
- ^ Philipp-Christian Wachs: The case of Theodor Oberländer (1905-1998). ISBN 3-593-36445-X .
- ↑ Chronicle of the Wall: Explanation by Konrad Adenauer
- ↑ Adenauer in Berlin after the Wall was built - Konrad Adenauer Foundation
- ↑ Chronicle of the Wall: Reaction of the US Secretary of State to the Wall
- ↑ Spiegel report on Adenauer's secret negotiations with Kennedy about the exchange of Berlin for Thuringia
- ↑ 1961: Adenauer's chancellor television fails - from planet knowledge
- ↑ Domestic political crises - The end of the "Adenauer era" Information on political education (Issue 258) of the Federal Agency for Political Education
- ↑ Elections 1961 - from the archive of the German Bundestag ( Memento from August 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
- ^ House of History: The Wall - General Election Campaign 1961
- ↑ Brandt - Adenauer presentation of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
- ↑ Germany visit de Gaulle 1962 - Arte broadcast Karambolage 245 - 09/10/11 ( Memento from June 10, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ The Élysée Treaty - Published by the House of History ( Memento of February 21, 2001 in the Internet Archive )
- ^ The Spiegel affair - information on political education (issue 258) of the Federal Agency for Political Education
- ↑ Article Bundeswehr conditionally ready for defense in issue 41/1962 of the news magazine DER SPIEGEL
- ↑ Presentation of the allegations in the Spiegel from November 7, 1962.
- ↑ Planet Wissen: Feud between Augstein and Strauss ( Memento from December 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ The fight for freedom of the press - The Spiegel Affair 1962 - Deutschlandradio Kultur ( Memento from April 20, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ Victory of press freedom - Planet Wissen zur Spiegel Affair ( Memento from December 13, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the constitutional complaint of the magazine Der Spiegel from?. August 1963
- ↑ The memories. posthumously. Siedler, Berlin 1989, ISBN 3-88680-682-0 .
- ↑ Adenauer 1961 - beginning of the end. In: Focus. Retrieved April 23, 2015 .
- ↑ Spiegel interview by Rudolph Augstein on the Spiegel affair in 2002
- ↑ Data handbook on the history of the German Bundestag 1949 to 2003. Retrieved on May 16, 2020 .