Battle of Königgrätz
The battle of Königgrätz on July 3, 1866 near the Bohemian town of Königgrätz was the decisive battle in the German War . The Prussian Army defeated the armies of Austria and Saxony . Over 400,000 soldiers fought each other in a costly battle in an area around ten kilometers wide and five kilometers deep. The strategically important hills Svíb near Maslowed and Chlum near Shestar formed the centers of the fighting . The victory made Prussia the leading power in Germany, and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck implemented the small German solution . The battle is considered one of the pioneers of the German Empire in 1871. In several languages, the battle for the village is Sadowa named, especially in France, where it was perceived as a political defeat and the call "revenge for Sadowa!" Arose.
Prehistory of the war of 1866
After the Napoleonic Wars , the old interstate order in Europe was largely restored between the European powers at the Congress of Vienna . On the territory of the Holy Roman Empire , the German Confederation emerged as a loose confederation of states, which included parts of Prussia and Austria. The cause of the Austro-Prussian war lay in the tensions between the powers Prussia and Austria, which grew ever greater in the struggle for supremacy in the German Confederation: In the autumn crisis of 1850 , war between the two almost broke out; under Russian pressure Prussia had to give up its national state project, the Erfurt Union .
The reason for the war was the conflict over ownership of the areas of Schleswig and Holstein that were jointly administered by Austria and Prussia after the German-Danish War . In 1865 the differences were overcome again with the Gastein Convention , in which Austria limited itself to the administration of Holstein. But when Prussia occupied Holstein, contrary to the provisions of this agreement, Austria declared the mobilization of the federal army . Prussia then left the German Confederation and declared war on Austria on June 19, 1866.
Most of the small states of Thuringia stood on the side of Prussia ( Augusta von Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach was the wife of the Prussian king), some northern German states and Italy , which should receive Veneto from Austria in the event of a victory .
Approach of the Prussians to Bohemia
On the side of the Prussians , the chief of the general staff, General von Moltke, had worked out a long-range pincer maneuver. Moltke's battle plan was based on a principle that was quite problematic in its execution: "March separately - strike together", that is, a deployment contrary to traditional strategic doctrine on the "outer lines" and not the inner lines with their advantage of shorter paths and easier mutual reinforcement.
At the end of June 1866, the Prussian High Command put three armies on the march - the 1st Army under Prince Friedrich Karl Nikolaus von Prussia rallied in Lusatia , the 2nd Army under his cousin, Crown Prince Friedrich-Wilhelm , had to advance from Silesia in the east . The Elbarmee under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld turned against the Saxons and advanced from Dresden over the Bohemian border to Rumburg . The large-scale encirclement movement was intended to include the entire Austrian armed forces in northern Bohemia . The Elbarmee (General Command VIII. Army Corps with 46,000 men) had to occupy Saxony and attack the Austrians from the west, from the north the 1st Army (II, III and IV Army Corps with 93,000 men) was supposed to go via Reichenbach pushing southwards draw the main enemy power on itself, while the 2nd Army (Guard, I., V. and VI. Army Corps with 115,000 men) of the Crown Prince had to advance from the east via Glatz and the Owl Mountains .
The Prussian 2nd Army advanced in three army columns, partly from the County of Glatz, via Braunau, as well as on Landeshuter Straße to Liebau . On June 27, the Prussian I. Corps at Trautenau was defeated by the Austrian X. Corps under FML Ludwig von Gablenz and had to go back to Goldenöls , then the Prussian Guard Corps advancing via Eypel took over the vanguard and defeated parts of the Austrian IV Corps at Thrush and Burkersdorf . On June 27, the left wing of the Crown Prince's army, the V Corps of General Steinmetz , the Austrian VI. Corps under FML Ramming near Nachod , on June 28 the Austrian VIII. Corps under Archduke Leopold near Skalitz , and on June 29 parts of the opposing IV Corps (FML Tassilo Festetics ) at Jaromierz and Schweinschädel thrown back.
On June 28th the Prussian 1st Army had repulsed the enemy at Turnau and Podol and was able to establish the union with the Elbarmee on the Iser . The Elbarmee had defeated the Saxons and the Austrian I. Corps (FML Clam-Gallas ) at Münchengrätz at the same time . On June 29, the Prussian 1st Army had another success against the Saxon corps under Prince Albert near Gitschin . In the Koeniginhof area the connection between the Crown Prince and the army of Prince Friedrich Karl was finally established on June 30th with around 220,000 men, of which 60,000 men could not intervene in time at the Battle of Königgrätz on July 3rd.
The Austrians march to battle
The Austrian Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek was known as a skilled strategist through his military successes in the campaigns in Italy (1848 and 1859) and was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Northern Army after the outbreak of war - at the age of 61. Since he had no military experience whatsoever for the new Bohemian theater of war, he initially tried unsuccessfully to refuse the office, but complied with Emperor Franz Joseph's decision .
The Austrian vanguard had already had bad experiences with the Prussian needle rifle in several battles , so Benedek decided to position his main force on a series of small hills between the Bistritz and the Elbe in a strong defensive position, the Königgrätz fortress behind it could withdraw if necessary cover. He hoped that the infantry lying in this position , supported by strong artillery , could stop the Prussian advance.
The Austrians had seven corps at their disposal, but three of them had already suffered severely from the preliminary battles, so that around 190,000 men were gathered at the heights. On the left wing, an eighth corps - around 22,000 Saxons under Crown Prince Albert - was assigned the heights at Problus. The Saxon 2nd Division under Lieutenant General Thuisko von Stieglitz stood behind Problus, the Leib Brigade on the right, the 1st Brigade on the left. The Saxon 1st Division under Lieutenant General Bernhard von Schimpf was assembled between Lubno, Popowitz and Tresowitz and had concentrated its reserves between Problus and Stresetitz . The Saxon 3rd Brigade was stationed in Problus, the 11th and 12th Brigade in Nieder-Prim . The Austrian VIII Corps (under FML Joseph von Weber since June 29 ), serving as a back-up, secured the positions in Ober-Prim and the forest in front of it from bypassing. Cavalry of the Saxon 2nd Division maintained contact with the Austrian X. Corps at Popowitz. In the center Benedek united around 44,000 men with 134 cannons, the X. Corps under FML Gablenz, weakened by the preliminary battles, and the even fresher III. Corps under Archduke Ernst , which held the heights of Lipa and Chlum. As a right wing with about 55,000 men followed the IV. Corps under FML Festetics south of Maslowed, near Cistowes and Nedelist , the II. Corps under FML Karl von Thun and Hohenstein held the position from Sendrasitz to the Elbe. Benedek kept a third of his army behind, the I. (Major General Gondrecourt ) and VI. Corps (FML Ramming ), with over 60,000 men and 320 guns in reserve. With these formations he wanted to carry out his counterattack as soon as the Prussian attack had stalled at his front defensive position.
On July 3, around 4 a.m., the Prussian 1st Army under Friedrich Karl began to march to Bistritz . On the left the 7th Division reached Cerekwitz, in the middle the 8th Division under General August von Horn advanced as the advance guard on Klenitz, on the right the 3rd and 4th Divisions were advancing towards Dohalitz and Mokrowous . It was followed in the second line by the 5th and 6th Divisions in the direction of Sadowa. The advance guard of the Horn division was involved in an artillery exchange with the artillery of the Austrian X. Corps at Swiep (Svíb). When the Prussians tried to cross the Bistritz, two Austrian corps commanders decided to raise their profile and take action against the right flank of the enemy. Without making any further front against the expected Prussian 2nd Army, the troops of Corps Commanders Festetics and Thun left their positions and advanced westward, leaving a gap in the Austrian defense in a northerly direction; exactly where the Prussian 2nd Army was to intervene later.
In the morning the Austrians only had the Prussian 1st Army in front of them - the units of the Crown Prince were still on the march, and the Elbarmee had not yet crossed the Bistritz near Nechanitz. As a result, the pressure on the outnumbered Prussian troops there increased. In the middle, Thun and Festetics were involved in heavy fighting in the Swiepwald. The Prussian 7th Division under Major General Eduard von Fransecky , including in particular the 2nd Magdeburg Infantry Regiment No. 27 , holed up in the Swiepwald and tried to repel the offensive of two Austrian corps in a terrible slaughter. On the wings, the Prussians occupied the forest near Swiep. Without artillery preparation and knowledge of the army command, the Austrians tried to recapture the forest under Graf Festetics. Count Festetics' right foot was shattered by a grenade, so that FML Anton Mollinary led the conduct of the further attacks. A hard battle raged in the Swiepwald, with the Prussian 7th Division almost wiped out, but at the same time the Austrians suffered heavy losses. The Prussian 8th Division got stuck in the Holawald and was reinforced by the 4th Division under General Friedrich Adrian Herwarth von Bittenfeld .
Meanwhile, the Elbarmee also crossed the Bistritz at the southern end of the front. From 10 o'clock in the morning the 15th Division had succeeded in crossing the Bistritz near Lubno, and General Philipp Carl von Canstein was preparing the attack on Neu- and Nieder-Prim.
The Austrian generals were already rocking themselves in the feeling of victory, and the first resentment arose at the Prussian headquarters against the eccentric Moltke's unorthodox deployment plan. Even King Wilhelm I and his Prime Minister Bismarck feared defeat. Around noon, the Prussian 1st Guard Regiment appeared on foot at the level of the opposite village of Horenowes . It formed the avant-garde of the Prussian Guard Corps belonging to the 2nd Army - the Crown Prince's army was there and together with the Elbar army attacking from the south-west took the Austrian troops grimacing in the Swiepwald into pincers. At 1:45 p.m. the attack of the 14th Division under General Munster-Meinhövel began against the Problus-Stresetitz line. Before the pressure of the Elbarmee from Nechanitz , the Saxon corps opposite slowly retreated in the afternoon.
Around 1 p.m., when Benedek wanted to give the order to deploy the reserve, the Austrians were fully aware of the danger that now threatened from the north. The Prussian 1st Guard Division under General Hiller von Gärtringen - vanguard of the now intervening 2nd Army - was approaching Chlum via Maslowed. FML Thun, threatened in the rear, had to immediately lead the majority of its troops back to the east. The Austrian positions in the Swiepwald also collapsed as a result.
Behind the arriving 2nd Guard Division , the Prussian 1st and 5th Corps were already advancing, the 11th and 12th Divisions of VI. Corps under General Louis von Mutius was already pushing into the Austrian flank on the far right. Thun had to order the withdrawal of his corps on the western bank of the Elbe, which made the situation on the right wing of the Austrians even more exposed.
Benedek himself led an infantry brigade in an ineffective counterattack near Chlum. The Austrian reserve - the VI. Corps - was able to almost recapture the lost Chlum in close combat with the Prussian 1st Guard Division , but was stopped shortly before the goal. To relieve the struggling infantry, two Austrian cavalry divisions finally attacked in the battle near Stresetitz and Rosberitz-Langenhof, where 39.5 Austrian squadrons faced around 31 Prussian squadrons. The attack by the Hessen cuirassiers at Rosberitz hit the Prussian cavalry brigade under Major General Georg von der Groeben and led to the premature demolition due to the intervention of the opposing infantry. The heavy 3rd Reserve Cavalry Division under Major General Karl von Coudenhove , with the Cuirassier Brigade under Prince Windischgrätz near Stresetitz, was more than equal to the Prussian Dragoons.
Even before the intervention of the 16th Division under General Friedrich August von Etzel , which had followed through the Bistritz, the positions of the Saxons at Problus had also collapsed. When Ramming's last counterattack at Chlum failed, Benedek ordered the sacrifice of his last reserves. As the entire Austrian army threatened to be encircled, von Benedek gave up the battle around four o'clock and ordered the retreat to Königgrätz. At the Elbarmee, the 14th Division with its 27th Infantry Brigade under General Emil von Schwartzkoppen was able to push the Saxons out of the village of Problus. The defenders of Problus were among the last battalions to leave the battlefield and reared the Austrians. The I. Corps under Major General Leopold Gondrecourt had to prevent the Prussians from cutting off the retreat of the main Austrian power with three brigades. Before this corps could break free from the enemy, it had suffered losses of 279 officers and 10,000 men, 2,800 of whom were taken prisoner.
The returning Austrians were pursued by the Prussian cavalry, which was then kept at a sufficient distance by the artillery. The defeated Austrians withdrew to the Elbe under the protection of the cannons of the Königgrätz Fortress. The fortress commander Major General Leopold von Weigl , misunderstanding the situation, closed the city gates in the evening and created a small swamp area by opening sluices, which demanded further unnecessary losses from the Austrians who pushed back.
The total losses of the Prussians in the battle amounted to 359 officers, 8,794 men and 909 horses, of which 1,929 were killed, 6,948 wounded and 276 were missing. The Austrians lost 1,313 officers, 41,499 men and 6,010 horsemen, including 5,658 dead, 7,574 wounded, 7,410 missing and 22,170 prisoners. The Saxon corps lost 55 officers and 1,446 men, 135 dead, 940 wounded and 426 missing.
Reasons for the outcome of the battle
Recent research has significantly reduced the assessment of the importance of the needle gun . The firing rate of the firing needle rifle is about 3 times higher than that of a Minié muzzle loader, but the range of the firing needle rifle was only about half that of the Austrian Lorenz rifles (the Prussian firing needle rifles had a range of 600 meters, but were off 300 meters practically no longer accurate; the muzzle loaders of the Minié rifle type , however, had a range of around 900 meters).
In addition to the higher cadence of the breech loader, for example, in the Battle of Königgrätz a. a. another advantage that the shooter could reload the weapon lying down. He was therefore less exposed to enemy fire than the shooter equipped with a muzzle loader, who had to stand or kneel to reload and was mostly uncovered during the reloading process. However, the Prussian soldiers usually shot standing up against an oncoming enemy.
Peter Aumüller put the following factors together:
- The Austrian peace policy in the run-up to the battle with massive disarmament of artillery and cavalry, because Austria visibly disarmed under Finance Minister Ignaz von Plener . The budget share of the civil departments rose, the military, on the other hand, was permanently deprived of resources and resources. 93 cavalry - escadrons were dissolved as 51 batteries of artillery .
- Overloading of the staff due to the elimination of intermediate instances as a result of the austerity policy.
- No replenishment of the depot stocks.
- Long-term decommissioning of experienced officers .
- Postponement of the introduction of the needle gun for alleged budgetary reasons.
- The exchange, which has been underway since July 1, between Benedek's operational advisors, Lieutenant Field Marshal Alfred von Henikstein and Gideon von Krismanic .
- Useless battles against given orders by the subordinates, especially in the Swiep forest.
Thorsten Loch and Lars Zacharias argue similarly - more recently.
The Prussian 1st Army under Friedrich Karl pursued the Austrians to Brno; the 2nd Army under the Crown Prince on Olmütz and the Elbarmee followed the Austrians via Iglau to Znaim . The Prussians reached the Danube area in mid-July and proceeded without major resistance to the Stockerau and Gänserndorf line in the northern apron of Vienna. On July 26, 1866, the preliminary peace of Nikolsburg was concluded, which was followed by the final peace treaty in Prague on August 23.
The battle also had far-reaching political consequences for the Habsburg Empire. Despite the successful battles at Custoza (June 24th) and Lissa (July 20th) against the Italians who had entered the war on the Prussian side, Emperor Franz Joseph saw himself at peace after the devastating defeat at Königgrätz to surrender and cede Veneto to Italy forced by Vienna . As a result of the Austrian defeat, the previous German Confederation dissolved; Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein , Hanover , Kurhessen , Nassau and the Free City of Frankfurt and created the North German Confederation . Domestically, too, Emperor Franz Joseph came under strong pressure from the efforts of his peoples for autonomy. The Austrian monarchy was very weak in foreign policy, on December 21, 1867 the settlement with Hungary and the December constitution had to be approved in the Reichsrat.
The importance of the battle was not hidden from foreign contemporaries either. In Paris during the Second Empire it was feared that a powerful, united neighbor under Prussian supremacy was forming on the eastern border. In order to prevent Prussia from further unifying German states, the battle cry Revanche pour Sadowa! (" Revenge for Sadowa! "). The aim was to “nip in the bud” the new neighbor. The Chassepot rifle was introduced as one of the armaments measures in 1866 , although it was clear in Paris that a rifle with a metal cartridge would have been desirable because the Chassepot system had various disadvantages . However, the Chassepot rifle was available quickly and at a comparatively low price.
After the news of the outcome of the battle had been brought to him, the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph is said to have scolded his general in a very un-imperial way: “Benedek, the idiot!”. Benedek was removed from his office, replaced by Archduke Albrecht of Austria-Teschen and brought before a court martial. However, the proceedings were discontinued under imperial pressure and Benedek ordered to remain silent about the battle for the rest of his life, which he adhered to.
Today's historians are of the opinion that Benedek made a few mishaps, but the defeat was due to Hungarian officers who, contrary to Benedek's orders, launched a counterattack in the Swiepwald, tearing the Austrian front apart and thus tearing it up from the "belated" Prussian 1st Guard Regiment were taken by surprise on foot. However, Benedek was fairly well informed about the superiority of the needle gun, not least because the head of the military intelligence service , Georg von Kees , was part of his staff. Therefore, he chose mostly dense forest terrain for the Austrian positions (as in the Swiepwald) in order to force the Prussians into close combat, in which their more modern rifles were of little use to them. This tactic also worked pretty well, up to and including the counterattack that was disastrous for the Austrians.
In the numerous anecdotes that have survived about this memorable conflict between Prussia and Austria, the saying is repeated again and again: “The Prussians don't shoot that fast!” This is supposed to be an allusion to the Prussian needle guns , which gave them a great advantage provided, even if not decisive for a battle or even a war.
Sebastian Haffner contradicts this derivation in his book Preußen ohne Legende :
"The saying ... does not refer to their (the Prussians) shooting in combat - they even shot particularly quickly ... but it is written because they weren't so quick to shoot deserters .. In Prussia such unfortunate people were beaten half to death, but then nursed back to health so that they could serve again. They were far too valuable to be shot; Prussian thrift here too. "
Whatever the interpretation, the saying remains in the eyes of posterity connected with the battle of Königgrätz and the associated final rise of Prussia to the dominant power in German politics.
Another interpretation is derived from the fact that, following the French model, the inscription " Ultima ratio regis" = "the king's last resort" was engraved on all Prussian cannons since 1742 and popularly developed into "The Prussians don't shoot that fast" .
One of the observers of the battle was the most famous war correspondent at the time, William Howard Russell of The Times in London , who also had a correspondent in each of the two headquarters of the opposing armies. Russell watched the battle with a telescope from the Königgrätz church tower.
Wilhelm I allowed Prince Hermann von Pückler-Muskau , then 80 years old , to join the royal entourage. However, on the day of the battle they failed to wake the old man. Although he slept through the events, he was later recognized for his participation.
In Theodor Fontane's novel Effi Briest , the title character gives birth to their daughter Annie, their only child, on the day of Königgrätz, July 3rd. Quotation from the 14th chapter: “... and on the morning of July 3rd there was a cradle next to Effi's bed. Doctor Hannemann patted the young woman's hand and said: 'It's Königgrätz's day today; pity it's a girl. But the other can follow suit, and the Prussians have many victory days. '"
Military historical significance
Königgrätz was the first battle in Europe before large contingents of troops were relocated by rail. Moltke had to bring troops on four fronts (Austria, on the other hand, had the advantage of the inner line ). Moltke attributed a share in his victory to the railway; Clark puts that into perspective. Saxon locomotive drivers drove numerous Saxon locomotives to Eger in order to withdraw them from the Prussians. Possibly Prussia used the findings of its military observers from the Civil War (1861–1865) in the USA. The Prussian needle rifle could not only be reloaded faster than the muzzle-loaders that had been in use until then , but also while lying down, i.e. under cover. Paul von Hindenburg , who took part in the battle as a second lieutenant , later described the effect of the needle guns as "terrible".
To the reception
The Prussian military musician Gottfried Piefke composed the Königgrätzer March (AM II, 195) to commemorate the battle, supposedly still on the battlefield . This is still one of the most famous German military marches at home and abroad; in Austria it is performed very rarely for obvious reasons.
In the Army History Museum in Vienna, the battle of Königgrätz is extensively documented using a variety of objects. Several needle rifles by Johann Nikolaus von Dreyse are on display alongside the Austrian Lorenz rifles. A field cannon M 1863 documents the superiority of the Austrian artillery in the years 1864 to 1866 in terms of shooting precision and mobility. The monumental painting (8 × 5 meters) by Václav Sochor shows the end of a cavalry battery of the kk field artillery regiment No. 8, which covered the retreat of the defeated Austrian army across the Elbe and sacrificed itself in the process. This sacrifice was also addressed by Rudolf Otto von Ottenfeld in his painting A sheet of fame of the Austrian artillery .
Memorial cross for combatants
The memorial cross for the victorious Prussian army bears the inscription: GOD WAS WITH US, HIM TO BE HONORED.
The cross is made of light bronze with a raised edge and has a multiple grooved eyelet with a ribbon ring. Between the four cross arm angles is a laurel wreath all around. On the front there is the letter cipher
WR with arched inscription
PREUSSENS SIEGREICHEM HEERE in a round central shield.
The upper cross arm shows the royal crown, the three other cross arms bear the inscription "God was with us, he be the glory". On the back there is the Prussian eagle in a round central shield and the inscription KÖNIGGRÄTZ DEN 3 JULI 1866 on the four arms of the cross
- Carl Bleibtreu : Battle of Königgrätz on July 3, 1866 , 1903, Reprint 2006 Verlag Rockstuhl , Bad Langensalza, ISBN 978-3-938997-65-9 .
- Roland Krug von Nidda: 1866 - Königgrätz. Two views of Germany . Amalthea-Verlag Vienna-Munich-Zurich 1966.
- Heinz Helmert, Hans-Jürgen Usczeck: Prussian-German Wars from 1864 to 1871. Military course . 6th revised edition. Military publishing house of the German democratic republic, Berlin 1988, ISBN 3-327-00222-3 .
- Frank Zimmer: Bismarck's fight against Emperor Franz Joseph. Königgrätz and its consequences . Verlag Styria, Cologne 1996, ISBN 3-222-12377-2 .
- Gordon A. Craig : Königgrätz. 1866 - a battle makes world history . 4th edition. Zsolnay, Vienna 1997, ISBN 3-552-04824-3 .
- Stefan Kurz: 150 years of the Battle of Königgrätz - considerations on the state of research . 2017, HGM knowledge blog
The steam on the run | (Locomotive escape)
- At Königsgrätz on the day after the battle. From a Silesian landowner . In: The Gazebo . Issue 33, 1866, pp. 512-514 ( full text [ Wikisource ]).
- The steam on the run . In: The Gazebo . Issue 47, 1866, pp. 737-739 ( full text [ Wikisource ]).
- Peter Aumüller: Feldzeugmeister Benedek and the battle of Königgrätz. Anatomy of defeat .
- Numbers and cards. Prussia web
- German war on deutsche-schutzgebiete.de
- Website about preserved monuments on the battlefield near Königgrätz
- Battlefield 1866 - Chlum u Sadové . ostboehmen.info
- Eric Dorn Brose: German history, 1789–1871. From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Empire. Berghahn, Providence 1997, ISBN 1-57181-056-0 , p. 342.
- Craig: Königgrätz, Zsolnay Verlag, Vienna 1997, p. 215.
- Craig: Königgrätz, Zsolnay Verlag, Vienna 1997, pp. 262 and 263.
- Georg Ortenburg: Weapons of the Wars of Unification 1848–1871. Bechtermünz 2005, original 1990, ISBN 3-8289-0521-8 , p. 145.
- Geoffrey Wawro: The Austro-Prussian War. Cambridge University Press, 1997; ISBN 978-0-521-62951-5 .
- Georg Ortenburg: Arms of the Wars of Unification 1848–1871 , Verlag Bechtermünz, 2005, first edition 1990, ISBN 3-8289-0521-8 , p. 179.
- Peter Aumüller: Feldzeugmeister Benedek and the battle of Königgrätz. Anatomy of defeat .
- Thorsten Loch and Lars Zacharias: The Battlefield of Königgrätz Revisited . In: International Journal of Military History and Historiography . tape 36 , 2016, p. 192-201 .
- year 1866 in the LeMO / German Historical Museum
- Sebastian Haffner , Ulrich Weiland: Prussia without legend . Verlag RM-Buch-und-Medien-Vertrieb, Gütersloh 1999, p. 106.
- Christopher Clark : Prussia, Rise and Fall. 1600-1947 . 7th edition. DVA, 2009, ISBN 978-3-421-05392-3 , p. 612.
- Paul von Hindenburg : From my life . Hirzel Verlag, Leipzig 1920, p. 24 ( Textarchiv - Internet Archive ); see also p. 22.
- Manfried Rauchsteiner , Manfred Litscher (Ed.): The Army History Museum in Vienna . Graz, Vienna 2000, p. 53 f.
- Königgrätz: A beautiful battle . In: Der Spiegel . No. 27 , 1966 ( online review of Gordon Craig's book).