Amselfeld speech

As gazimestan speech is the speech by Slobodan Milosevic referred to this on Vidovdan , the 28. June 1989 , on the occasion of the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in front of an audience of millions on the historic site of the Battle in Gazimestan / Kosovo has held .

This speech by the President of the Union of Communists of Serbia on the religious, national and popular holiday popular with the Serbs , which in the Serbian tradition has a close historical and mythically exaggerated connection to Kosovo Polje (Blackbird Field), is often seen as an essential step on the way to the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Western media had cited the Amselfeld speech before and during the Kosovo war as evidence of a militant nationalist sentiment or politics of Milošević. However, this interpretation of the speech was questioned in the public discussion and condemned as a deliberate deception. Regardless of the controversial interpretation, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published excerpts of the translated speech, and the original wording was heavily distorted.

Prehistory and background

→ Main article : History of Kosovo

Historical and mythical background of the Vidovdan celebration: the Kosovo myth

The battle on the Amselfeld, celebrating its several hundredth anniversary in 1989, was also placed in close connection with the culturally significant Kosovo myth in Western science . This is what Norman Naimark , Professor of Eastern European Studies , who, together with Wayne S. Vucinich , organized conferences on June 2 and 3, 1989 for the 600th anniversary and in commemoration of the Battle of the Blackbird Field at Stanford University in California , as The background for this celebration in Stanford is the Kosovo cycle , which is not only one of the greatest epic poems in world history , but also a high point of Serbian culture. For the understanding of the festivals in connection with the battle on the Amselfeld and for the classification and evaluation of the contents of the Amselfeld speech of 1989, a more precise knowledge of the nature and changes of the Kosovo myth (also: Amselfeld myth ) is of decisive importance forms a central part of the Serbian national mythology , and its emergence began immediately with the battle on the Blackbird Field:

Praise to Prince Lazar - the gold embroidery on red silk, written by Jefimija around 1402 and executed as a shroud for the relic of Lazar's head, praises Lazar as a Christian “martyr” for the “choice of the heavenly kingdom” and killing the enemy of the Christians (Murad I. ) and is considered the earliest lyrical testimony in Church Slavonic script by Serbian editors

Probably with the Battle of the Mariza in 1371, the way for the Ottoman Empire to conquer the Balkans was opened. At the Battle of the Blackbird Field on June 28, 1389, an Ottoman army, personally commanded by Sultan Murad I , accompanied by his sons Bayezid I and Yakub, claimed the battlefield against a Christian army whose Serbian troops were led by the Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and Vuk Branković . The Christian army led by Vlatko Vuković men of the Bosnian King Tvrtko I and possibly some Albanian contingents under Lazar's flag as well as mercenaries from different parts of the region stood by the side. Both Lazar, the leader of the Christians, and Sultan Murad I, the leader of the opposing Muslims , died in the battle. As a result, Lazar's successor Stefan Lazarević subordinated himself to Murad's successor, Bayezid I, as a vassal .

According to Tim Judah, there is no comparable case in all of European history of the effect that Kosovo had on the “national psyche of the Serbs” after the battle on the Blackbird Field. Even if the region flourished under Ottoman rule in the 15th to 17th centuries, religious legends in ecclesiastical and dynastic interests portrayed a catastrophic defeat against the “ godless ”, while the legends presumably depict the The world of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the military, business and administration in the Ottoman Empire were increasingly overwhelmed and the tax burden on the population increased.

About a year after the battle, Lazar's bones were transferred to the Ravanica monastery , and the first ecclesiastical texts (“legends”) glorified the prince who had been declared a saint . These legends should first help to give the public a theological explanation for the defeat of the Christians against the "godless" and to secure the rule of the Lazars dynasty and thus also the influence of the Orthodox Church, which is a coalition with this dynasty . After the Lazarevći dynasty ended, the Church wanted to save the imperial idea to which it was bound. How popular these legends have been over the centuries and whether there were also oral versions (“sagas”) in addition to the church texts is unknown, as sources were only available in the 19th century.

Sculpture of Miloš Obilić created by Ivan Meštrović as part of his blackbird field cycle. 1908, today in the Serbian National Museum in Belgrade

From the martyr's death conjured up in church legends later developed the mythical image of the “choice of the heavenly kingdom ”, the choice between honorable death and life in shame as part of the Kosovo myth, with a battle perceived as a military defeat as a transcendent victory was taken. In the legends that have been preserved as stories or songs , especially since the 18th and 19th centuries, Miloš Obilić (also: Kobilić) stands in the foreground as the alleged murderer of Murad I, often as a nobleman who was wrongly accused before his own , who was heroically involved List until the Sultan arrives, kills him and thus restores his honor. The legends contrast the “hero” Miloš with the “traitor”, Prince Vuk Branković, who unknightly preferred his own interests to the sacrificial death against the “infidels”.

The blind epic poet and Guslar Filip Višnjić as part of the hero's monument in Kruševac, founded in 1889 to mark the 500th anniversary of the Battle of the Blackbird Field and completed in 1904 by Đorđe Jovanović

In the 19th century, the epoch of European nation-state formation and the increasing disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the legends and sagas with the Kosovo motif turned into a national myth, as in the mountain wreath of the Njegoš , which was used as a means of struggle for the unification of the Montenegrin Tribes against internal resistance was designed. The liberation struggle against the Ottomans was subordinated to a Manichaean division of the world into the forces of “good” and “evil”, and the driving force for the struggle was now, unlike in the Greek tragedy , the people themselves. This epic had an enormous national political success. People grew up with his verses that they are said to have known better than the Lord's Prayer , and the Kosovo myth continued for generations. Based on the “Bergkranz”, the “Kosovo Oath” was institutionalized as a conscious decision for the heavenly kingdom throughout the second half of the 19th century. Hero's death, the “heavenly realm” and the “earthly realm” (the nation state) that would necessarily come were closely linked. The writing of the epic helped the emerging nation with its unifying effect to enforce the building of a Montenegrin state against the civil war-like uprisings of the tribal leaders who, like under the Ottomans, resisted the introduction of tax collections . After the internal stabilization, Montenegro developed into a center for the unification of Serbs, as it would later become Serbia for the unification of the southern Slavs of Yugoslavia (Serbia as "Piedmont of the South Slavs").

Serbia was a small state in the mid-19th century in danger from the surrounding great powers incorporated to be so by the Habsburgs and the Russian Empire . The prevailing opinion was that large parts of the southern Slavs would be Serbs. While the presence and strength of the Habsburg Empire prevented an expansion of Serbia to the north and west, the government directed its interest to the south, including Kosovo ("Old Serbia"), which gradually made the Kosovo myth one for the Serbian state received central importance. The replacement of the monarch in his role as sovereign by the people increased national interest in the Kosovo myth, which gradually made it easier for the people to distinguish themselves and their values ​​from “the Turks”, and more generally from “the Muslims” in particular to define "the Albanians" themselves. The Serbian nationalist mobilization of the population reached a high point in 1889 to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the Battle of the Blackbird Field and also jumped over the existing national borders. A big celebration including a requiem for the fallen on the blackbird field took place in Belgrade. In honor of the heroes of the Battle of the Blackbird Field, the king was involved in the construction of a memorial in Kruševac as well as a powder room that was supposed to be used in the fight against the "Turks". The celebrations put the liberation of Kosovo at the center of national desires and evoked the unity of all Serbs, under whatever rule they lived. The spread of songs, poems, pictures and detailed descriptions in printed matter such as calendars, almanacs and magazines increased the popularization of the Kosovo myth.

The Kosovo myth was combined with the cult of St. Vitus , which was developed parallel to it , on whose holiday, June 15th, ^July. / June 28th ^greg. , the Orthodox Church venerated the canonized Prince Lazar shortly after the battle on the Amselfeld. Since the 1860s, the popularity of St. Vitus's Day ( Vidovdan ), on which the hero and God (in that order) should be remembered, increased sharply. War ( First Serbian-Ottoman War ) was declared on the Ottoman Empire on Vidovdan in 1876 . On Vidovdan 1881, Čedomilj Mijatović signed the secret convention with the Habsburg monarchy, with which Milan IV (from 1882 Milan I) received Austrian support for his dynasty and for a possible expansion of the territory to the south in return for renouncing an independent foreign policy. From 1890, Vidovdan was officially recorded as a holiday on which “the Serbian warriors who fell for the faith and the fatherland are remembered”. Until the end of World War II, the Vidovdan also marked the end of the school year when prizes were awarded to the best students.

The much-praised peonies of Kosovo in front of the Gračanica Monastery in an impressionistic depiction of Nadežda Petrović in the Second Balkan War in 1913, one year after the end of Ottoman rule over Kosovo

In addition to this official development, which the bourgeoisie created from the “national tradition”, there were also old and diverse folk traditions around St. Vitus's Day, in which the sagas and legends of the battle were incorporated into peasant customs, which were also influenced by pagan ideas were. For example, on the evening before the festival, the owner of the house presented everyone with a bouquet of peonies , to which the recipients replied: “ I will be like the one who shed his blood on the blackbird field. “The blackbird fields peonies were considered to have grown from the shed blood of the blackbird fields heroes, whereby the red should come from Serbian and the blue from“ Turkish ”blood.

On the other hand, there was a tendency, particularly among the educated, to distance themselves from myths and to take a scientific and historical perspective. By analyzing the sources an attempt was made to come to a realistic idea of ​​the battle. Branković's betrayal in particular was rejected.

Many artists also worked in the various genres of art to express the traditions in a modern and national way. For example, when the first film was shot in Serbia in 1904, the English director was persuaded to integrate the Kosovo myth.

Four of the twelve caryatids of the Vidovdan Temple, the symbol of a fictional, unified South Slavic state planned by Ivan Meštrović from around 1905 to 1911, but never realized. Today the caryatids stand on either side of the main entrance to the Serbian National Museum in Belgrade.

The design of a Vidovdan temple by the sculptor Ivan Meštrović, who was born in Slavonia , represents the attempt to use the Kosovo myth for the realization of a unified South Slavic state . Mestrovic had followed this project since about 1905, at the exhibition for the first time in 1910 Viennese Secession presented with great success and eventually won first place for sculpture when he be Vidovdantempel project on the honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the National Association of Italy aligned di Esposizione Roma ( International Exhibition for Art, Architecture and National Identity ) in Rome in 1911 in the form of sketches and sculptures of the Kosovo heroes ( Kosovo cycle ) in the Serbian pavilion, after he had previously been refused for the South Slavic section of the Austria-Hungary pavilion had been. Through a combination of Western Catholic and Byzantine elements , the Kosovo myth was used to remind of the great historical defeats of all South Slav peoples and thus create the central memorial of the future Yugoslavia.

In the First Balkan War from 1912 to 1913, Serbia succeeded in recapturing "Old Serbia" (especially Kosovo) from Ottoman rule. The Gračanica Monastery , built in the first half of the 14th century, which was to play a special role in the Vidovdan celebrations , came under Serbian control again . The relics of Prince Lazar were brought to the monastery near the historic battlefield from 1988 to 1989 in preparation for the 600th anniversary of the Battle of the Blackbird Field. In 2012 the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Irinej referred to the monastery as “Serbian Jerusalem ” at the Vidovdan celebration in Pristina on July 1st and on the occasion of the 100 years ago liberation from Ottoman rule : “ This is our Serbian Jerusalem. Here was, is and always will be holy Serbian land. "This is one of the most famous monuments of Byzantine art in force monastery stands today along with other cultural objects as" Medieval Monuments in Kosovo "(" Medieval monuments in Kosovo ") because of the difficult current security situation in Kosovo on the UNESCO -run Red List of endangered World heritage .

The victory over the Ottoman Empire, which was enthusiastically celebrated in Serbia, was widely compared in the press with medieval history and the battle of Kosovo. The government also served the battle on the Amselfeld as legitimation for the annexation of Kosovo in the sense of the common practice of European power politics as “ mission civilisatrice ”, which also brought Western commentators on their side. On October 23, 1912, for the first time since the end of Ottoman rule, a memorial service was held at the site of the battle on Gazimestan. The parallelization of the Serbian national history with the story of the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as a history of salvation now found its apparent end. In addition to the "defeat" of 1389, which had already been compared to a " crucifixion ", the time of Ottoman rule was now assessed as a time of "death and burial", but the "reconquest" or "liberation" of Kosovo in the First Balkan War as a " resurrection " . The prevailing view in Serbia was characterized by a rigid dualism between “Europe” and “ Asia ”, “Christianity” and “Islam”, “ civilized ” and “wild” and “ nation ” and “ tribe ”, in which the Albanians as negatively evaluated opposite pole to the own characteristic was assigned. In historical retrospect, the Christian Serbs were seen as the “suffering people in Kosovo and Macedonia” who for centuries defended “the blissful Christian-European culture and civilization from Asian barbarism ”. The dilemma of Serbian nationalism, which was typical for Europe at that time, due to the contradiction between the claims of liberation ( national self-determination , freedom from foreign rule ) and the dynasty (vision of a powerful empire), was attempted by giving the population the due to "historical rights" claimed areas as originally identical to their own nationality (Islamized Serbs and Croats in Bosnia , Albanized Serbs in Kosovo or Macedonians , who are "actually" Serbs, Bulgarians or Greeks ). The connection of their dynastic interests with nationalism enabled the monarchs not only to absorb the aggression directed against them, but also to turn around in their favor and place themselves at the head of this strong, new movement.

Advertisement for “Kossovo Day” 1916 - Vidovdan and Kosovo myth as part of British propaganda for solidarity with the “heroic” Serbian struggle for “Western civilization”

In 1914, the Kosovo myth first took on a global political role when the 19-year-old Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip shot the Austrian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie Chotek in Sarajevo on Vidovdan . The fact that the visit of the Habsburg couple to the Bosnian provincial capital took place on St. Vitus's Day of all places was seen as a provocation by the nationalist Serbian youth . Princip was a member of the secret organization Ujedinjenje ili smrt ( union or death ), which explicitly referred to the Kosovo oath with its name. The assassin , who mastered the mountain wreath by heart , stated that with his act he wanted to help regain the freedom that had been lost over 500 years earlier. There are, however, deeper reasons for the resulting First World War in the competing power interests of the major European powers.

After the first successes against Austria-Hungary , the Serbian army came under severe pressure from the summer of 1915 under an Austro-German offensive and when Bulgaria entered the war . During these difficult times, the Kosovo myth again played an essential role. After the collapse of Serbia, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, in line with Lazar's legendary decision, announced: “ It is better that we all die as free people than that we live like slaves. “Using the Kosovo myth, Serbian authors also tried to win over the British and French public to Serbia and its expansion goals. And finally, British and French authors used it to upgrade the Serbs in their role as allies of the Entente . In Great Britain and France , the Battle of the Blackbird Field was referred to as a “turning point not only in Serbian but also European history” and as a “lighthouse that casts the rays of western civilization over the Black Sea”. The world war, in which the allies Great Britain, France and Serbia faced an alliance of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary with the Ottoman Empire of all things , was presented as a continuation of the heroic-civilizing line of this mission civilisatrice . In 1916, under the influence of the historian Robert W. Seton-Watson , the Yugoslav Council in London declared June 28 a national holiday for Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and organized a five-week celebration of Vidovdan. This gained enormous publicity through distribution in schools, churches, cinemas and brochures, with hundreds of thousands of people reaching the British public.

After the establishment of the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav state (the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed on Vidovdan 1919, the so-called Vidovdan Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was proclaimed on Vidovdan 1921), however, it failed to implement the internal unity of all "peoples" of the young state, in which there was no majority people who, due to their numerical and economic primacy, could largely dominate , integrate or assimilate the other nationalities . The Kosovo myth remained largely a symbol of the pursuit of the unity of the “Serbian” regions. The theoretical and applied answers followed a pattern that prevailed in Europe at the time , according to which the superior side enforced its ideas of unity with authoritarianism and, if necessary, with force, while the inferior side waited for an opportunity to rebel. In the eyes of many Serbs, both the problem of “betrayal” and that of ingratitude for their self-sacrificing “fight for the freedom of others” remained virulent. However, they felt this ingratitude not from Europe, but from the rest of the southern Slavs.

The Kosovo oath as an inscription on the monument to the heroes of Kosovo on Gazimestan from 1953: “Anyone who is Serb and of Serbian sex - and does not come to the fight in Kosovo [Blackbird Field] - may not have children born out of love - neither boys nor girls - may nothing grow out of his hands - neither red wine nor white wheat ... "

On June 28, 1939, 100,000 people gathered on the historic Gazimestan battlefield for the 550th anniversary . When the Yugoslav government acceded to the Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941 on very favorable terms , it was the Serbian public who protested violently. Serbian officers overthrew the government and had Milan Cvetković replaced by Dušan Simović . On March 27, a huge crowd in downtown Belgrade chanted “Better war than a pact!” And “Better death than slavery!” In affirmation of the Kosovo oath , and the Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo Dožić also announced on the radio: “ We have for again voted for the heavenly kingdom, that is, for the kingdom of divine truth and justice, of national unity and freedom. This is an eternal ideal, carried in the hearts of all Serbs, protected and lit up in the shrines of our Orthodox monasteries. “Although the new government had not withdrawn its signature on the treaty, Adolf Hitler decided to destroy Yugoslavia as a state and attacked the country on April 6th with the Wehrmacht . The Air Force reached under the code name " business judgment " without prior declaration of war with well over 600 combat and fighter planes that protected by any anti-aircraft capital Belgrade on, with fire and cluster bombs much of the city destroyed and more people were killed than in the previous bombings Warsaw , Coventry and Rotterdam together. On April 17th, the German Reich had won the war and divided Yugoslavia. After the German invasion and the occupation of the country, the unresolved nationality conflicts were carried out under the ideological influences of National Socialism and fascism and in the military escalation of violence during World War II . The Axis powers used the hostility between the Balkan peoples to stabilize their rule in south-eastern Europe . The national differences between Serbs, on the one hand, and Croats and Muslims, on the other, were significantly exacerbated. Hundreds of thousands of Serbs came under the fascist Ustasha - regime to death, the radical Serbs hostile antijugoslawisch, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist was aligned and with unconditional hardness against the Serb population and the Orthodox Church was going on. The majority of the Albanian population in Kosovo and Macedonia profited from the occupation and the associated granting of self-government rights and, in view of the prospect of a post-war Albania defined according to ethnic boundaries, largely showed solidarity with the occupiers. On the other hand, after decades of oppression of the Albanian population, the Serbian population was in turn exposed to particularly severe strains. In Kosovo, the Albanians took massive revenge on Slavic colonists such as Serbs and Montenegrins through murder and displacement. Many of the Serbian population drew their courage from the legendary heroes of the Kosovo battle. On October 22nd, 1944, after the Glina massacre of Serbs by the Croatian Ustaše, the choral society "Obilić" was founded on the ruins of the Glina church . Even partisans continued the Kosovo battle and compared their fallen with the Amselfelder heroes. On Vidovdan 1948, Josef Stalin had to accept what he said was the "greatest defeat" of his career with the adoption of the first Cominform resolution, which took into account the persistent independence of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia through its exclusion from the Cominform.

After the victory of the partisans, borne by large parts of the Serbian population, and the partial unification of the peoples against the fascist occupiers, the Kosovo myth played only a minor role in socialist society after the Second World War, which became particularly clear on the anniversary of the battle. The party ideologues tried to create new myths with the partisan struggle, which also placed unity, somewhat expanded to include “brotherhood”, and heroism. During this time, the Serbian Orthodox Church therefore took over the maintenance of the memory of the battle on the Blackbird Field.

Status development of the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo

The monument to the heroes of Kosovo on Gazimestan, modeled on a medieval tower and erected in 1953, designed by Aleksandar Deroko

Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito , the implementation of the autonomy rights of the Kosovar Albanian population in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo had been prevented in Yugoslavia since Tito's break with Josef Stalin from 1948 to 1966. This policy was implemented by the Yugoslav Vice President and Head of the Yugoslav Secret Service , Aleksandar Ranković .

After Ranković's dismissal in 1966, the autonomy status of the province of Kosovo (as well as that of the province of Vojvodina ) was expanded to an extraordinary extent with the help of changes to the Yugoslav constitution of 1967 and 1974, so that the status of the Serbian province of Kosovo was only extended by the exclusion of the right of secession from that of the Yugoslav republics. Since 1968 there has been a tendency towards a reversal of the discrimination in Kosovo against the Serbs, even if this did not reach the extent of the earlier discrimination against the Albanians. By strengthening the two Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Tito wanted to weaken the Serbian Republic in order to maintain his elaborate system of power balance in the multi-ethnic federation . As a result, the Yugoslav leadership held down both the Kosovar-Albanian demand for a separate republic, which had been emerging since 1968, as well as the 1976 non-public demand of the Serbian leadership for a constitutional amendment to expand the powers of the Serbian Republic in relation to its provinces. After Tito's death in 1980, in a climate of severe economic crisis, the dispersing forces within Yugoslavia began to outweigh the cohesive forces. In 1981 the Yugoslav government imposed a state of emergency over the province of Kosovo for several months when serious unrest broke out, especially among Albanian students, who began to object to the difficult economic situation, assumed an increasingly nationalist character and demanded republic status for Kosovo. The unrest and its suppression by the Yugoslav leadership contributed significantly to a polarization of the ethnic groups of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and led to a nationwide strengthening of nationalisms in Yugoslavia. Since the first nationalist mass rally of the Serbs in Kosovo on the occasion of the death of Aleksandar Ranković in 1983, at which they complained about their difficult situation in the province and called for a correction of the political course of the 1974 constitutional amendment, there have been an increasing number of actions with the same goal. The Serbs, who had played the role of “pioneers” and “fighters” for the unification of the southern Slavs and the creation of Yugoslavia since the turn of the century and who had played the primary role of “ victims of genocide ” in World War II , had the lead in Yugoslavia The former Habsburg territories, Slovenia and Croatia , cannot catch up and neither gain the military nor the economic power to lead the way. Serbia had not achieved the leading role of a “Piedmont of the Southern Slavs”, as it had sought with the slogan and model of Piedmont as the center of the unification movement in Italy . In addition, specifically weakened by Tito in their role with the extreme appreciation of the autonomy rights of the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, without having corresponding minority rights in other Yugoslav republics, they saw themselves deprived of their “thanks” or “wages” and their development through the Kosovo made even more difficult. Because Kosovo as the poorest area of ​​Yugoslavia was indeed regarded in Yugoslavia as part of the “wider Serbia”, but the Serbian government could not determine the policy there since 1967/1974. To make matters worse for the Serbian side, Kosovo was historically charged as a symbol of self-sacrifice and was charged again in the 1980s.

When a group of Serbian and Montenegrin activists traveled to Belgrade in 1987 and invited Ivan Stambolić to assess the situation in Kosovo because of increasing problems, the latter sent Slobodan Milošević, the western-oriented reformer, in order not to become involved in nationalist affairs was assessed against the representatives of bureaucratically frozen institutions, and who, as a former director of the Belgrade Bank, had good international relations with the USA and economic competence. Milošević's support for the Serbian, nationalist demonstrators against the local police forces in Kosovo with his statement " Nobody is allowed to hit you " was seen as a break with the communist line of suppression of nationalist attitudes that had been followed up to that point and was particularly encouraged by its rapid and intensive dissemination and repetition of his words in the press and television his rise to power and his reputation as a nationalist leader of the Serbs. Within the League of Communists of Serbia, Milošević's faction of bureaucratic hardliners , who were striving for a centralistic and increasingly nationalistic course , prevailed after a political dispute with moderate forces in September 1987 . In autumn 1988, the dismissal of leading Albanian politicians in Kosovo led to the first successes in restricting the previous status of autonomy, which in March 1989, after protests and the declaration of a state of emergency, were followed by additional statutory provisions for the Serbian constitution, which in fact eliminated autonomy, which was followed by violent uprisings The Kosovar Albanians broke out and were brutally suppressed. Until the mid-1980s, Serbian state television and radio reported more and more frequently and in greater detail about Kosovo, while avoiding nationalistic or mythical tones, after September 1987 the media loyal to the regime massively backed the demand for the restriction of autonomy the Serbian provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The resurgence of national ideas during the conflict-ridden times of economic misery contributed significantly to the strengthening of the Serbian Orthodox Church . On the part of the church there were also views that emphasized the metaphysical or ideal significance of Kosovo for the Serbs or Serbs. The priest Božidar Mijač, for example, saw the Serbian identity in the form of the numerous church places in Kosovo threatened by the majority of Kosovar Albanians in the province and as in need of protection, since they offered a metaphysically important place for the minority of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, on which the ideogenesis of the Serbian nation took place.

In 1988, the remains of Prince Lazar from the Ravanica monastery founded by Lazar , where they were taken after the Battle of the Blackbird Field in 1389, were transferred from the church through the dioceses of Zvornik , Tuzla , Šabac and Valjevo , Šumadija and Žiča to Brought to Gračanica Monastery . The transfer of the prince's relics through the many “holy” places in Serbian-populated regions from autumn 1988 to winter 1989 by the church was used by many people to express their religious- national veneration when the relics arrived .

After this preparation, the highlight of the celebrations, chaired by the Serbian Orthodox Church, took place on June 28, 1989 with great effort and with active participation of the population, the 600th anniversary of the Battle of the Blackbird Field. Over a million people attended the celebration.

Two days before the event, Der Spiegel published an interview with Ibrahim Rugova in which he claimed that the Serbs were now appearing as Ranković's avenger. The “purely Serbian, chauvinist celebration” is a provocation that conceals the participation of the Albanians in the battle on the part of the Christian army and could lead to bloody confrontations: “ Just consider: a million revolted Serbs who are in hotels, pensions and even billeting in private rooms all over Kosovo. There is drinking and boasting. A wrong word can act like a spark on a powder keg. "

Well-known versions of the speech

There are different translations available for the speech, some of which differ significantly in their arrangement and content.

According to Polónyi, Milošević's speech, which lasted about 15 minutes, was apparently not archived as a sound or audiovisual medium by the television and radio stations in Serbia, nor by those in Germany or Austria, despite its foreseeable relevance as a historical speech, so a careful comparison of the existing fragments and versions is necessary to separate Milošević's actual statements from the rumors. During the so-called Milošević trial before the Hague Tribunal (ICTY), Milošević had a video played with the speech as part of his defense in January 2005, which was made publicly with the voice-over of the Serbian / English interpreter of the court on the Internet with the help of the court corresponding software (the official website of the ICTY refers to the RealPlayer , for example ) can be played online , and transcripts are also available on the Internet from the ICTY in English and French. Complete versions of the speech are now also available as audio and video documents on well-known Internet video portals.

Serbian versions

• The Serbian daily Politika printed the speech on June 29, 1989.

• A version printed by Đorđe Jevtić in his book "Bitka za Kosovo" from 1998 contains a number of errors and a significant change in the order of the paragraphs as well as a longer, marked omission compared to the Politika version.

• Another Serbian version has been made available by the Wikisource project, but has since been removed.

German translations

• On June 28, 1999, on the tenth anniversary of the speech and shortly after the NATO war against Yugoslavia, the FAZ published a German translation of the speech, which was based on a template transmitted by the Slovenian news agency STA ( Slovenska tiskovna agencija ) and under With the help of Tamara Labas.

• The German translation by Donka Lange, presented by Jürgen Elsässer for the first time in the magazine specifically in 2001, follows a publication in Politika .

• Ralph Hartmann translated parts of the speech according to Milošević's information, which he had given before the Hague Tribunal (ICTY).

• Carl Polónyi oriented his translation, published in 2010, on the one in Politika. printed version and highlighted the differences and peculiarities of the aforementioned German translations.

English translations

• There is a translation by the BBC dated June 28, 1989 , in which a number of passages are marked as acoustically inaudible.

• The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) has drawn up a version based on the BBC translation in which the dubious passages have been supplemented or edited by Milošević's defense lawyers.

• The US Department of Commerce has apparently also created a version based on the BBC translation, which has meanwhile also been used for the Wikisource project . used, but has since been deleted there.

Evaluation of the different versions

The two Serbian versions from Politika and from Jevtić do not differ significantly in terms of content.

In the German versions, however, there were deviations in content from the Serbian original and lengthy omissions. The version printed in the FAZ and described in the introduction as “a speech permeated with chauvinism” has a much more aggressive effect than the Serbian original due to the partly marked, partly unmarked omissions and changes in content.

The translation made by Donka Lange and used by Jürgen Elsässer, on the other hand, tends to weaken the nationalistic tipped points from the Serbian speech (and translates, for example, sometimes “bravery” instead of “heroism” or “fighting” instead of “battles”).

In addition to the study by Polónyi (2010), there was a video version of the Amselfeld speech on the video portal YouTube , which included a translation in English subtitles in addition to the Serbian or Serbo-Croatian sound and additionally different translations of the FAZ of June 28, 1989 (in the German original and with English Translation) bot. The English subtitles were exactly the same with the exception of a few places (in one place the mention of the rejection of "non-working people" is omitted, in another place the statement "six centuries" has been corrected to "five centuries" according to the actual speech) the translation of the US Department of Commerce.

Some deviations and omissions in the FAZ translation

Polónyi	FAZ / Labas
Six centuries ago, exactly 600 years ago, one of the greatest battles of that time took place in this place in the heart of Serbia, on the blackbird field .	At this place, on this spot in the heart of Serbia, on the blackbird field of Kosovo, one of the greatest battles of all time took place 600 years ago .
Today it is difficult to say what is historical truth and what is legend about the battle of Kosovo. But that is no longer important today. The people remembered and forgot, depressed with sorrow and full of hope, like every other people in the world. It was ashamed of treason and glorified heroism.	Truth and legend are close together in the story of the Battle of the Blackbird Field. Crushed by the suffering of the years and yet full of hope, our people have some memories. It scorned treason and extolled heroism.
The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people would not have been accepted by any people in the world, either historically or ethically .	No people in the world could, ethnically and historically, accept the concessions made by the various Serbian leaders to the detriment of their people.
Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality, they felt guilty not only towards others, but also towards themselves. The discord among the Serbian politicians has thrown Serbia back and their inferiority has demeaned Serbia. It was like that for decades. So today we are in the blackbird field to say that it is no longer so. There is no better place in Serbia than the Blackbird Field to say this. And therefore there is no better place than the blackbird's field to say that unity will bring prosperity to the Serbian people and Serbia and to each of its citizens, regardless of their national or religious affiliation.	The disagreement among Serbian politicians, combined with a vassal mentality, contributed to the humiliation of Serbia and made it appear inferior. It went on for years and decades. Today we are gathered here in the Amselfeld to say that this time has passed ...
Therefore, the optimism about the future that can be found on a large scale in Serbia today is real insofar as it is based on freedom that enables all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities to improve social conditions and their own lives.	Therefore, the optimism that prevails in Serbia today about its future is realistic ...
Serbs have never lived in Serbia. Today more citizens of other peoples and nationalities live in it than before. That is not a handicap for Serbia. I honestly believe that this is its advantage. In this sense, the national composition of almost everyone, especially the developed countries of the present world, is changing. Citizens of different nationalities, different beliefs and different races live together more and more successfully.	Never in history has Serbia been inhabited only by Serbs. Today more than ever before, citizens of all ethnic and national groups live here. This is not a handicap for the country. I sincerely believe that this is an advantage ...
Above all, socialism as a progressive and just democratic form of society should not allow people to be divided according to their nationality and belief. The only differences that can and must be allowed under socialism are those between the working and the inactive, between the honest and the dishonest. Therefore, everyone who lives honestly from their work in Serbia and respects other people and other nationalities - is at home in this republic.	Socialism as a progressive and democratic form of society must not allow a separation according to nationality and religion in coexistence. The only difference allowed under socialism is the difference between working people and those who do nothing, between honorable and dishonorable people. That is why everyone who lives righteously from their work in Serbia deserves the respect of others.
Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can only exist on the condition that all the nations living in it have full equality. The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has led to national, but also social, cultural and many less important divisions. Of all these divisions, the most dramatic are the national divisions. Eliminating them will facilitate the elimination of other divisions and mitigate the consequences these other divisions have produced.	Yugoslavia is a multinational society and can only survive on the basis of complete equality of all nations living here ...
At the time when this famous historical battle was unfolding in Kosovo, people looked to the stars and waited for their help. Today, six centuries later, they look again at the stars and wait to conquer them.	At the time of the famous battle of Kosovo, people turned to the stars for help. Today, six centuries later, they are looking at the stars again and praying for victory .
In the memory of the Serbian people, this discord was decisive for the losses and fate that Serbia had to endure for five centuries. And even if it were not so from the historical point of view, the certainty remains that the people have experienced their discord as their greatest misfortune.	The Serbian people fatefully remember the discord that led to their military defeat. Serbia experienced its disagreement for five centuries as a single great calamity.
And such an awareness of mutual relations is a fundamental necessity for Yugoslavia too, because its fate lies in the united hands of all its peoples.	...
Six centuries later we are again in battles and before battles. They are not wielded with weapons, although even such have not yet been ruled out. But whatever it is for which one, these battles cannot be won without determination, bravery and sacrifice. Without the good qualities that existed on the blackbird field back then, a long time ago. Our main battle today is linked to the realization of economic, political, cultural and general social prosperity. For a faster and more successful approach to the civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle we especially need heroism. A different kind of heroism, of course. But that courage, without which nothing serious and great in the world can be achieved, remains unchanged, remains forever necessary.	Six centuries later , we are at war again and face new battles. These are not armed battles, although they cannot be ruled out. But regardless of the nature of the battles, they cannot be won without decisiveness, bravery and self-sacrifice - qualities that have been common in Kosovo for so long. Our most important struggle today is to achieve economic, political, cultural and general social prosperity. For this civilizational endeavor on the threshold of the 21st century, we need special heroism. Needless to say, bravery, without which nothing serious and great can be achieved in the world, remains unchanged and forever necessary.

Reviews and ratings of the speech in the press and politics

There has been a colportage in the media of a number of false statements from the speech, which concern not only details but the overall character of the speech.

Examples of international voices that attribute a sharp nationalistic character to the speech, as well as voices against:

"[...] when the 600th Anniversary of the Kosovo Battle with the Turks was held at Gazimestan in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic stated that he will" unite all Serbs into one state, either with institutional or non-institutional measures, even with weapons if necessary ", what was done in 1991."

"[...] when the 600th anniversary of the battle with the Turks was held in 1989 on the Blackbird Field on Gazimestan, Slobodan Milošević declared that he would" unite all Serbs into one state, whether with institutional or non-institutional measures, even with weapons if necessary «, which was implemented in 1991."

- Vladimir Žerjavić , former UN official, 1997

"Nine years ago today, Milosevic's fiery speech here to a million angry Serbs was a rallying cry for nationalism and boosted his popularity enough to make him the country's uncontested leader."

"Nine years ago today, Milošević's ardent speech here to a million angry Serbs was a rallying cry for nationalism and raised its popularity high enough to make him the undisputed leader of the country."

- The Washington Post , June 29, 1998

“But it is primitive nationalism, egged on by the self-deluding myth of Serbs as perennial victims, that has become both Mr Milosevic's rescuer (when communism collapsed with the Soviet Union) and his nemesis. It was a stirringly virulent nationalist speech he made in Kosovo, in 1989, harking back to the Serb Prince Lazar's suicidally brave battle against the Turks a mere six centuries ago, that saved his leadership when the Serbian old guard looked in danger of ejection. Now he may have become a victim of his own propaganda. "

“But it is primitive nationalism, spurred on by the self-deceiving myth of the Serbs as the eternal victim, that was both the salvation of Mr. Milošević (when communism collapsed with the Soviet Union) and his downfall. It was a rousingly infectious nationalist speech that he had given in Kosovo in 1989, with recourse to the suicidally courageous battle of the Serbian Prince Lazar against the Turks a stupid six centuries earlier, which secured his leadership when the old Serbian guard seemed in danger of being thrown out become. Now he should have become a victim of his own propaganda. "

- The Economist , June 3, 1999

“The time of the humiliation of Serbia has passed”. With a speech riddled with chauvinism, Milosevic set in motion a disastrous development for the Balkans ten years ago in Kosovo. "

- FAZ , June 28, 1999

By omitting parts of the speech in the FAZ article, the apparently quoting headline “The time of the humiliation of Serbia has expired” with the addition “a speech permeated by chauvinism” could be constructed. The long-standing ambassador of the GDR in Yugoslavia, Ralph Hartmann, sharply criticized the FAZ for its interpretation of the speech: “ Who, like the FAZ, the Serbian President's advocacy of overcoming the dramatic national divisions in Yugoslavia as inevitable conditions for the economic and social Prosperity of the country, for unity in Serbia as a prerequisite for the well-being of all its citizens, regardless of their national and religious affiliation, defamed as "chauvinism", distorts the truth and tries to mislead the public. "

The then German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping assigned the so-called Amselfeld speech a " Greater Serbian " character that advocates ethnic homogeneity , but none of the known versions of the speech contain any substantive approaches:

"On this day Milosevic spoke of" Greater Serbia "and that this country should be ethnically pure."

- Rudolf Scharping, 1999

Scharping had also come forward with a number of other serious allegations against the Serbian-Yugoslav leadership, such as the presentation of an alleged horseshoe plan to expel the Kosovar Albanians, an alleged massacre in Rogovo or an alleged concentration camp in Pristina . After all, he had presented the plans to expel the Kosovar Albanians, which were assumed in his allegations, along with the so-called Račak massacre as the decisive reason for the NATO war against Yugoslavia. Polónyi sees the "existential dimension of the" humanitarian intervention " as the reason for the striking statements made by leading German politicians during this period [...], which demanded more than rational justifications such as the prevention of an impending or already started genocide." This applies primarily Line for Rudolf Scharping, "who as Minister of War suddenly had to bear the main burden of justification". Independently of the Amselfeld speech, Polónyi judges the claim that Milošević pursued a “Greater Serbian policy” as “at least questionable”. If “Greater Serbian politics” were to be understood as the aim of unifying Serbia with all Serbian-majority or, for historical reasons, Serbian territories, the same would apply “to Croatian and Albanian political leaders of the 1990s [and are] directly related to the disastrous centrifugal development in Yugoslavia during the 1980s ”. Milošević does not apply to Milošević if this refers to an association with Hitler's “Greater German Reich”, which has been the official name since June 1943 for a Germany that has been increasingly expanded through raids on other states.

Natalija Bašič attributed the well-known statement by Milošević to the Blackbird Field Speech: " Nobody will ever hit you again ". However, this actually goes back to April 1987, when Milošević had assured angry Serbian demonstrators in Kosovo that he would support the police forces and thus deviated from the communist line that was usual up to now, which is seen as the beginning of Milošević's career ascent. The art historian Bojana Pejic also relocates this saying to 1989, although she speaks of a “notorious speech in Pristina”.

The alleged statement: " Islam should never again subjugate the Serbs " was incorrectly described by scholars as part of the Amselfeld speech.

In a brief statement on the Amselfeld speech, Matthias Rüb, Balkan correspondent for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, mentions the "announcement" of potentially imminent "fights" as the only point of content:

"28. 6. 1989: At least 1 million Serbs gather at the Gazimesdan Memorial near Prishtina to commemorate the "Battle of the Blackbird Field" 600 years earlier; Milošević announces possible fights. "

- Matthias Rüb, 1999

In the same sense, Naimark also presents the speech and puts this in the context of a will to avoid the separation or autonomy of other parts of Yugoslavia:

"On June 28, 1989, the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic called a mass rally on Kosovo Field, and a million Serbs showed up. Like Hitler descending through the clouds by airplane to attend the Nuremberg rally portrayed in Leni Riefenstahl's" Triumph of the Will, "Milosevic arrived by helicopter amidst a throng of excited supporters to deliver a warning of war and sacrifice:" Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two world wars, they have liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves ... The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated ... Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet. Surrounded by Serbian Orthodox priests, Milosevic repeated the refrain that Serbia had suffered too much to allow Yugoslavia's component parts to fall away through autonomy or separation. Wherever Serb bones lie buried in the soil, Milosevic insisted, that was Serbian territory. Wherever Serb blood was shed, that was the Serbian patrimony. "

“On June 28, 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Blackbird Field, Milošević held a rally in the same place, and a million Serbs flocked. In Leni Riefenstahl's film Triumph of Wills , when Hitler landed on the party congress grounds by plane, Milošević appeared by helicopter to his enthusiastic supporters to warn of war and victims: »In their history the Serbs have never conquered or exploited others. They sacrificed themselves in two world wars, they freed themselves and, if they could, helped others with their liberation ... The heroism of Kosovo does not allow us to forget that we were once brave and dignified and were among the few who went to battle undefeated ... Six centuries later we are again in battles and quarrels. There are no armed battles yet, although that cannot be ruled out. ”Surrounded by Serbian Orthodox priests, Milošević repeated the refrain that Serbia had suffered too much for the other parts of Yugoslavia to be separated through autonomy and separation. Wherever Serb remains are buried, there is Serbian territory, he emphasized. Wherever Serbian blood has been shed, the country is Serbian heritage. "

- Norman M. Naimark, 2001

Polónyi points out that the use of metaphors of war in Yugoslavia has been known since 1987, for example by the Slovenian party leader Milan Kučan, who warned in 1987 with a view to the 8th plenum of the Central Committee of the Serbian Union of Communists: “ The Kosovo could soon become a Lebanon in the Balkans ”.

The speech is often referred to as the starting point for a nationalist policy by Milošević:

“In 1953, a memorial tower was built on the site to commemorate the Serbian victims. This tower is in turn remembered today as the place where Slobodan Milosevic launched his nationalist policy when commemorating the 600th anniversary of the battle in 1989 ”

“In 1953 a tower was built at the site to commemorate the Serbian victims. This tower, on the other hand, is remembered today as the place where Slobodan Milošević began his nationalist policy when he commemorated the 600th anniversary of the battle in 1989. "

- UNESCO, Expert Report 2003

In the mass media, interpretations of the speech are not always clearly differentiated from a verbatim representation, as for example in a television documentary by ZDF from 2007:

"In 1989 the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic affirmed in the Amselfeld:" Kosovo will remain Serbian. ""

- ZDF documentary by Klaus Prömpers, 2007

In an editorial in the FAZ in 2007, Michael Martens assumes a multifaceted instrumentalization of the Kosovo myth, which was and will be practiced in Serbian politics before Milošević, by him and after his death, and equates the mythic struggle with the current issue of the day :

“How practical this Kosovo myth is has even indirectly confirmed Milosevic himself, admitting that it is difficult to distinguish between the legend and the story of the battle. He used the tradition of the Serbian defeat six centuries later as an instrument for the abolition of time. A mythical past was transplanted into the present and made arable for daily politics. The battle against the Turks was no longer the distant din of weapons from ancient times. Kosovo was yesterday. This was also evident in the 1999 NATO war against "Yugoslavia". In the Serbian propaganda about the Kosovo war, the story appeared in the form of a repeat offender, with the Western alliance in the role of the Ottomans. The legendary template is also so well suited for political purposes because one of its central elements is the story of the traitor, the "Serbian Judas" Vuk Brankovic, who is said to be responsible for the downfall of the Serbs because he abandoned Prince Lazar have. No Serb wants to give his opponents the opportunity to discredit him as Brankovic. Therefore, apart from a young and until further notice probably minor epigone of the murdered reformer Zoran Djindjic, no well-known politician in Belgrade dares to publicly break out of the fatal consensus that Serbia should never give up Kosovo. "

- Michael Martens, FAZ, February 5, 2007

Scientific criticism and analysis of the speech

Carl Polónyi points out that the speech was often interpreted as an announcement of the later wars (with the passage: " Today [...] we are again in battles and before battles. They are not fought with weapons, although neither are there any excluded. ”), but it is actually less aggressive than the speech given at the Belgrade Meeting of Fraternity and Unity on November 19, 1988. In his analysis of the speech (2010) he comes to the conclusion that Milošević's speech about the central event in Serbian history places the present in a continuity with the past, but neither celebrates the resurrection of the medieval heroes nor the present in context of an eternal antagonistic struggle, but rather vaguely tries to serve nationalist and socialist expectations almost equally. He let the current situation appear to be characterized by healthy self-confidence, justified pride and tolerance. In the center of the speech Milošević placed the main motifs of the Kosovo myth, the evocation of “unity”, the threat of “betrayal” and the ideal of “heroism”. Both are images of the war, but the enemies would remain vague and would only be addressed indirectly when it comes to the battles in and before which Serbia stands and which could possibly also be fought with weapons in the future. Or when Milošević speaks of the suffering that Serbia has been inflicted unjustly. By only touching or not mentioning the real threat - economic, political, social and ideological decline - Milošević worried his audience. He points out a way out of the crisis not through an analysis, but rather by emphasizing the need for “unity”. By insisting on “unity”, warning against renewed “betrayal” and calling for “heroism”, he created the scenario of war, even if the wording of his speech seemed to say something completely different. Despite the wording, the speech is about "enemies", but they only take shape in the mind of the listener.

“The common thread of Milosevic's speech consists of two constants from Serbian history, by means of which Milosevic constructs something like a 'people's character' [...]. One is the discord that leads to betrayal, which the lost battle reminds [...] This long introduction leads to the praise of a multinational society that Serbia has always been - here Milosevic changes into a socialist tone. A division of society according to nationality and religion should not allow socialism in particular [...] What is said above all that all fears of Serbian dominance are simply absurd. He is making the problem of an overwhelming Albanian majority in Kosovo and the severe tensions that exist with it disappear by emphasizing that citizens of non-Serb nationality are not a handicap for Serbia, they have always been there here. The Albanians living in Kosovo are simply not mentioned in the entire speech; it seems as if they don't exist. Together with the discord, it conjures up its counterpart, unity [...]. It includes both national territorial unity, i.e. the reintegration of Vojvodina and Kosovo into the Serbian Republic, as well as internal unity, the unity among the Serbs. As the second constant in Serbian history since the battle of Kosovo, Milosevic emphasizes heroism. Here, too, he does not speak as a propagandist of the myth, but as a politician who knows how to use a myth for his politics. The heroism required today is certainly different from that 600 years ago, because this time the battle is about "realizing economic, political and social prosperity," in other words, connecting with the economically most powerful states on earth must be found. Like politicians all over the world, Milosevic emphasizes the importance of national virtues: determination, bravery and willingness to make sacrifices [...]. The speech also shows a modern, detached use of myth. It is broken historically, but symbolically intact. Milosevic does not use it to stage the intoxication of being immersed in him again, a national rebirth. But he clearly understood the central content of the Kosovo myth: on the one hand, unity and the inherent threat of discord and betrayal, on the other hand, heroism. He succeeds in achieving a balance through a double distance: distance from the myth (for example by admitting twice that historical reality is not known exactly [...]) and distance from the analysis that breaks the myth. He touches on both the myth (for example when he asks: "What will we do in front of Milos?" [...]) and the problems (that of the nationality dispute and that of economic development), but he does not address either one closer to the other. So his speech remains largely without mythizing, that is also fanatical power. It is more of a fleeting sketch of current popular movements. Once again, Milosevic proves himself to be a leader not by inciting and stimulating, but by being a mouthpiece. The reinforcing and mobilizing effect that it has at the same time easily fades into the background. But it is central. As the mouthpiece of the people, it acts acoustically, psychologically and socially as an amplifier of their currently prevailing demands and actions;

- Carl Polónyi, 2010

Not through Milošević's speech, but through the coming together of different elements, the celebration would have been given the meaning of a “national rebirth”. Above all, the celebration was celebrated as a celebration of the regained unity, which the "lesson from 1389" had drawn. A unity that has also overcome the division between state and church. The aim is now to achieve this unity in Yugoslavia as a whole. According to Polónyi, the media made a decisive contribution to this expectation and feeling, and it was through their charged representation that the celebration really gained its nationalist unity. Polónyi describes the assessment of the speech as a call for war as appropriate insofar as his structural analysis of the mythological images of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle shows that this could be described as the (re) birth of the Serbian nation if Milošević did not expressly stage them as such:

“The“ birth of the nation ”already takes place when“ sacrifices ”are conjured up; those who will actually be murdered in the future are already included. On the one hand, the celebration had the "great sacrifice" of the battle as an occasion, on the other hand, "the nation" faced "battles" again, possibly even with weapons, and again "willingness to make sacrifices" was required [...]. Therefore, the widespread horror of just this sentence is a very precise reaction. Despite the limbo in which Milošević seems to be keeping him, it is the signal of »birth« - and thus of murder. "

- Carl Polónyi, 2010

Excerpts from the speech

“The Kosovo battle contains another great symbol. That is the symbol of heroism. Poems, dances, literature and novels were dedicated to this symbol. For more than six centuries Kosovar heroism has inspired our creativity, nourished pride, saved us from forgetting that we were once a great and brave army and made us proud to be invincible even in defeat. "

“Six centuries later, today we are at war again and face new battles. These are not armed battles, although they cannot be ruled out. But regardless of the type of battle, battles cannot be won without decisiveness, courage and self-sacrifice, without these qualities that were present in Kosovo so long before. [...] Never in history have Serbs lived alone in Serbia. Today more than ever before, citizens of all ethnic and national groups live here. This is not a handicap for Serbia. I sincerely believe that this is a benefit. The national structure is changing in this direction in all countries of this contemporary world, especially in developed countries. Citizens of different nationalities, beliefs and races live together more and more, and more and more successfully. Socialism, especially as a progressive and democratic society, would not dare to allow people to live separately according to nationality and religion. [...] Long live peace and brotherhood among the nations! "

literature

• Valeria Heuberger, Arnold Suppan, Elisabeth Vyslonzil (eds.): The Balkans. Peace zone or powder keg? Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1998, ISBN 3-631-32532-0 . (Viennese Eastern European Studies 7)
• Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction - National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 186-200, 202f., 214f., 485-495.

Web links

• German translation of the Amselfeld speech by Slobodan Milosevic on June 28, 1989 in Gazimestan (Kosovo) (Attention: this is a German translation of an unnamed English translation!)
• English translation ( memento of January 10, 2013 on WebCite ) and French translation ( memento of January 29, 2013 on WebCite ) of the speech in the transcripts of the ICTY process " Milošević, Slobodan (IT-02-54)» Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia " ", transcript from January 26, 2005 (hearing by Mitar Balević), beginning on page 35787; see. also video of the ICTY meeting on January 26, 2005 "Wednesday, January 26 - 09:00 - 13:45" ( RAM ; 0 kB), on which the video of the Amselfeld speech from 1989 is played, including the Serbian / English interpreter of the court speaks an English translation as a voice-over (from 04 ° 08'00 ''), http://hague.bard.edu/past_video/01-2005.html
• Video of the entire speech with English subtitles . YouTube , uploaded September 28, 2011. Subtitles largely match the US Department of Commerce translation. The press reactions displayed are authentic (last accessed on January 22, 2013).

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Ralph Hartmann: The glorious victors: the turning point in Belgrade and the miraculous rescue of German warriors of honor , Dietz, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-320-02003-X , p. 57, 66-84.
2. ^ ^{A b c d e f g h i j k} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
3. ^ Naimark: Kosovo case changed the intervention policies. (English). "Stanford Balkan in America" ​​project 2012 , YouTube video, published on January 31, 2013 on by BalkanInAmerica (with reference to: Balkan in America project: archive link ( memento of the original from October 14, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: the archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ): Question to Norman Naimark: "Together with late professor Wayne Vucinich you organized celebration of the 600 years anniversary of Kosovo battle at Stanford. What was the context of that event? "; Answer from Norman Naimark: "Well in general towards the end of his life professor Vuchinich was very interested [and] we were interested at Stanford in talking about Serbian culture, talking about the high points of Serbian culture. This included a conference on Ivo Andrich and also a conference on the Kosovo cycle. Which, as you know, is one of the greatest epic poems in world history not to mention just Serbian history. So it was, you know, an idea to talk about the high points of Serbian culture during a period when a lot was in transition things were changing quickly and it was important to point out that this is a great you know, cultural niche. So i think that's basically the context. " Additional note: Wayne S. Vucinich chaired the Stanford 600th anniversary conference. 
4. ↑ ^{a b c d} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 25-27.
5. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , pp. 55f.
6. ^ Tim Judah, The Serbs - History, Myth, & the Destruction og Yugoslavia , 2nd edition, Yale University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-300-08507-9 , p. 31.
7. ^ Tim Judah, The Serbs - History, Myth, & the Destruction og Yugoslavia , 2nd edition, Yale University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-300-08507-9 , p. 30.
8. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 34f., 37.
9. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 35–37.
10. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 37-39.
11. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 49-58.
12. ↑ ^{a b} Reinhard Wittram, in: Verlag Ploetz (ed.): Excerpt from history , 28th edition, Ploetz, Würzburg 1976, ISBN 3-87640-000-7 , p. 1082.
13. ↑ Note: the presence of Kosovar-Serbian songs in Serbian culture has been preserved to this day. In addition to songs dealing with the Kosovo myth, other songs from the region, even in the Torlak dialect, which is closely related to Bulgarian and Macedonian , are still popular in Serbia. Some well-known examples are: Видовдан (Vidovdan), Ој Косово, Косово = Са Косова зора свиће (Oj Kosovo, Kosovo = Sa Kosova zora sviće), Гора (Gora = гасвочио), Гора (Gora = гасвочио), Гора (Gora = газовиора = јасвочо), Гора (Gora = газовио Кora = гасвочi), Гора (Gora), језвиоро (Gora), јеочoro Kosovo), Маријо Дели Бела Кумријо (Marijo Deli Bela Kumrijo), Уснила је дубок санак = Еј, драги, драги = драги = Косовс jei, Косовски = Косовс jei, боари Косовс jei, Косовски = Косовс jei, Косовсje боnжуž Косовс jei, Косовсje, Косовски = Косовс jei боnжуž " ), Удаде се Јагодо (Udade se Jagodo), Ој голубе, мој голубе (Oj golube, moj golube), Киша пада, трава раситo (Gusta растo), ГанамаП (Ганама) (ГанамаП), ГанараП (ГанамаП), анараП (Ганама) (ГанамаП), ГанамаП (ГанамаП), анамаП (Ганама) (ГанараП) (ГанараП), ГанамаП (Ганама) (ГанамаП), ГанамаП (Ганама) mi magla padnala), Навали Се Шар Планина (Navali Se Šar Planina). Is a world which has become known, recent example of the use of the symbolic power of the Vidovdan the sealed Dejan Ivanović and Željko Joksimović composed Оро (Oro), with Jelena Tomasevic (on the Frula accompanied by Bora Dugić ) on the date the first and only in Serbia organized Eurovision Song Contest 2008 in Belgrade and took sixth place.
14. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 60-64.
15. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 64-66.
16. ↑ ^{a b c d} The Role of St. Vitus' Day in Modern Serbian ( Memento from February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) (Internet version on www.kosovo.net), by Dimitrije Đorđević.
17. ↑ Косовски божури - Грачаница Надеждe Петровић (Kosovski božuri - Gračanica Nadežde Petrović) ( Memento of 4 February 2013 Webcite ) (Serbian) Kosovo Peonies - Gracanica by Nadezda Petrovic ( Memento of 5 February 2013 Webcite ) (English). Народни музеј у Београду (Narodni muzej Beograd - National Museum Belgrade), by Љубица Миљковић (Ljubica Miljković).
18. ^ ^{A b c} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 66f.
19. ↑ Todd Courtenay, The 1911 International Exposition in Rome: architecture, archeology, and national identity , Journal of Historical Geography, 37 , (4) (2011), pp. 440–459, doi: 10.1016 / j.jhg.2011.02.025 .
20. ↑ Historical Kosovo ( memento of February 6, 2013 on WebCite ) , May 15, 2012, by Lyudmil Antonov.
21. ↑ ^{a b c d} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 95f.
22. ↑ Скулптуре за Видовдански храм (Sculpture za Vidovdanski hram) ( Memento from February 5, 2013 on WebCite ) (Serbian), Sculptures for The Vidovdan Temple ( Memento from February 5, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Народни музеј у Београду (Narodni muzej Beograd - National Museum Belgrade), by Vera Grujić.
23. ↑ Irena Kraševac, Ivan Mestrovic and his Viennese patron Karl Wittgenstein . In: Grégor Kokorz, Helga Mitterbauer (Eds.): Transition and entanglements - Cultural transfers in Europe , Peter Lang, Bern 2004, ISBN 3-03910-398-9 , here pp. 140–142.
24. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 75f.
25. ↑ ^{a b} Patriarch Irinej in Gracanica: “This is our Serbian Jerusalem” ( Memento of February 6, 2013 on WebCite ) , Pro Oriente.
26. ↑ World Heritage Committee puts Medieval Monuments in Kosovo on Danger List and extends site in Andorra, ending this year's inscriptions ( Memento of February 6, 2013 on WebCite ) , UNESCO, communication, July 13, 2006.
27. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 73f.
28. ^ Carl Polónyi, Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004 , Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 78f.
29. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 80f.
30. ↑ Anonymus, Kosovo Day (1389-1916) ( Memento of February 6, 2013 on WebCite ) (Internet version on de.scribd.com), Polsue Limited, London 1916. Quotation: "To-day Serbia is downtrodden and enchained by the powerful allies of the fierce Turk: Germans, Magyars, and Bulgars. The Christian Kaisers from Berlin and Vienna started a brutal and merciless crusade against the Serbs, who have been, with all their Southern Slav brothers from Croatia and Slovenia, a protecting barrière for them during centuries. Now it is a question which is really the Christian nation: the Serbs, who unsupported fought and suffered horribly for Christianity during five hundred years, or the Germans, who made their glory allied with Islam, in crushing the little Serbian nation? There is a Jugoslav proverb, "The sword in the hand of the Turk is less dangerous then the pen in the hand of the Shvaba" (German). It is so. [...] While the conquest of Serbia will remain for ever a shame for Germany and their barbaric allies, It will remain for ever in the same degree a new glory for Serbia. In their lucid hours the Germans called Serbia der Leuchtthurm des Ostens (the shining tower of the East) [...] ", with reference to Gustav Rasch, Der Leuchtthurm des Ostens , 1873, p. 187"
31. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 85.
32. ↑ The Serbian inscription on the monument reads accurately: "Ко је Србин и српскога рода - и не дошо на бој на Косово - не имао од срца порода - ни мушкога ни девојачкога - Од руке му ништа не родило - рујно вино ни пшеница бела - Рђом капо док му је колена "
33. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 97f.
34. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 103.
35. ^ ^{A b} Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace . Wieser , Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , p. 34 ff .
36. ↑ Tito in Ostberlin , Die Zeit, June 4, 1965, No. 23, page 1 ( memento of February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) and page 2 ( memento of February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) of the Internet version, by Wolfgang Leonhard.
37. ↑ Damir Hajric, The "Cominform Conflict" 1948 - Yugoslavia's revolt against Moscow's hegemony ( Memento from February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) , Bachelor thesis, GRIN, 2007, p. 3.
38. ↑ The Red Monarch ( Memento from February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) , Der Spiegel, 29/1980, July 14, 1980, by Milovan Djilas.
39. ↑ The Other Dictator ( Memento from February 8, 2013 on WebCite ) , MDR, LexiTV, last updated: March 1, 2010, by Michael Schmittbetz.
40. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 103f.
41. ^ ^{A b} Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , p. 38ff.
42. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 105–110.
43. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , pp. 138f.
44. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 105ff.
45. ↑ ^{a b c d} Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , p. 41ff.
46. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 110.
47. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 110ff.
48. ^ ^{A b c} Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , pp. 155-159.
49. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 58, 149 f., 209.
50. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler, Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace , Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , p. 41f.
51. ^ Carl Polónyi, Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004 , Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 147 f.
52. ^ Carl Polónyi, Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004 , Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 150f.
53. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 186f.
54. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , pp. 173f.
55. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , pp. 52-54, 56f.
56. ^ ^{A b} Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , pp. 52-54.
57. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , pp. 173-177.
58. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , pp. 58f.
59. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 120.
60. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova - The long way to peace. Wieser, Klagenfurt et al. 2004, ISBN 3-85129-430-0 , p. 55, with reference to: Radmila Radić, The Church and the Serbian Question , In: Nebojša Popov , The Road to War in Serbia - Trauma and Carthasis , Budapest 2000, p. 250.
61. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , p. 178.
62. ↑ The Serbs come back as avengers ( memento from January 23, 2013 on WebCite ). In: Der Spiegel. 26/1986, June 26, 1989.
63. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , p. 178; with reference to: The Serbs come back as avengers. In: Der Spiegel. No. 26/1989, pp. 159-161.
64. ↑ English translation ( memento from January 10, 2013 on WebCite ) and French translation ( memento from January 29, 2013 on WebCite ) of the speech in the transcripts of the ICTY process " Milošević, Slobodan (IT-02-54)» Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia " ", transcript of January 26, 2005 (hearing by Mitar Balević), beginning on page 35787; see. also video of the ICTY meeting on January 26, 2005 "Wednesday, January 26 - 09:00 - 13:45" ( RAM ; 0 kB), on which the video of the Amselfeld speech from 1989 is played, including the Serbian / English interpreter of the court speaks an English translation as a voice-over (from 04 ° 08'00 ''), http://hague.bard.edu/past_video/01-2005.html
65. ↑ z. B. Celi govor Slobodana Miloševića na Gazimestanu 1989. YouTube , uploaded December 4, 2011 by drkucalo2 (last accessed January 22, 2013).
66. ↑ ^{a b} z. B. Gazimestan 1989 - Газиместан 1989 . dailymotion.com, uploaded on July 6, 2015 from the dailymotion channel AnaHarvey (last accessed on December 21, 2015).
67. ↑ Politika, June 20, 1989, p. 3f .; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
68. ↑ Đorđe Jevtić, Bitka za Kosovo - Šest vekova posle, Volume 1, Priština and Belgrad 1998, pp. 204–208; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
69. ↑ Gazimestan speech; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
70. ↑ ^{a b} "The time of the humiliation of Serbia is up". In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. June 28, 1999, p. 11; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
71. ^ Jürgen Elsässer: War Lies - From the Kosovo Conflict to the Milosevic Process. Berlin 2004, pp. 283–286, first in: specifically, August 2001, pp. 16f; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
72. ↑ Ralph Hartmann: Der Fall Milošević: Ein Lesebuch , Dietz, Berlin 2002, ISBN 3-320-02034-X , p. 215, 222-224, with reference to http: //www.sps.org-yu/index- ie.htm {{dead link | date = 2018-03 | archivebot = 2018-03-29 15:00:22 InternetArchiveBot | url = http: //www.sps.org-yu/index-ie.htm}}.
73. ↑ BBC text version ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (Internet version on emperors-clothes.com); Facsimile version (PDF) in three pages: Page 1 ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF; 757 kB), Page 2 ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF; 482 kB), Page 3 ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF; 509 kB); Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
74. ↑ Text version of the US Department of Commerce ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (Internet version on emperors-clothes.com); Former URL to the version on Wikisource: Gazimestan speech; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
75. ↑ Speech by Slobodan Milosevic at the Central Celebration Marking the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Gazimestan, June 28, 1989 . In: Heike Krieger: The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation 1974–1999. Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-521-80071-4 , pp. 10f. (Translation in American English , possibly reprint from the US Department of Commerce translation).
76. ^ Slobodan Milosevic's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech - Gazimestan - June 28, 1989 ( Memento of January 22, 2013 on WebCite ) (Internet version at www.slobodan-milosevic.org); Translated by the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce of the US according to the internet source
77. ↑ Note: The two points are denominated in the spoken original of this YouTube video: "Једине разлике које се у социјализму могу да допусте и треба да допусте су између радних и нерадних , између поштених и непоштених." (from 10'45``) and "У памћењу српског народа та неслога је била пресудна за губитак битке и уак битке и уак на велу се пресудна за губитак битке и уак повелу се неског ук увелу на неског ук навелу се неског ук повелу нед кан повелу на неског. (from 14'54 '').
78. ↑ The inventions and lies of Dr. Bulajic on internet ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ). July 1997, edited December 1997, Zagreb , by Vladimir Zerjavic.
79. ^ R. Jeffrey Smith: Bitter Serbs Blame Leader for Risking Beloved Kosovo ( Memento January 22, 2013 on WebCite ). In: The Washington Post. June 29, 1998, p. A10.
80. ^ What next for Slobodan Milosevic? ( January 22, 2013 memento on WebCite ) In: The Economist. June 3, 1999.
81. ↑ »The time of the humiliation of Serbia has passed«. With a speech riddled with chauvinism, Milosevic set in motion a disastrous development for the Balkans ten years ago in Kosovo. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. June 28, 1999.
82. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 486, 490.
83. ↑ Ralph Hartmann: The glorious victors: the turning point in Belgrade and the miraculous rescue of honor from German warriors of aggression , Dietz, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-320-02003-X , p. 81.
84. ↑ ^{a b} We must not look the ^{other way} - The Kosovo War and Europe. Berlin 1999, p. 19; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
85. ↑ Heinz Loquai: The Kosovo conflict - way in an avoidable war - The time from late November 1997 to March 1999. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2000, ISBN 3-7890-6681-8 , S. 138th
86. ↑ Truth, Censorship, Propaganda - The Media and War. Part 2 , Panorama , broadcast on April 15, 1999: Udo Röbel, editor-in-chief of the Bild-Zeitung: “ I'm not afraid either, to bring things by name and to the point, if you expect that from the picture. When you see the page 'They are driving them into the concentration camp', this picture was so impressive, this trek of tens of thousands from Pristina, that actually spoke for itself. And if then, on that day, the defense minister of concentration camps in Serbia or in Kosovo speaks, then this picture and this line get an eerie drama. "
87. ^ Hermann Meyn: Mass media in Germany. UVK, Constance, new edition. 2004, ISBN 3-89669-420-0 , p. 270.
88. ↑ It started with a lie. WDR, by Jo Angerer and Mathias Werth, broadcast on ARD on February 8, 2001, transcription available at the URL: http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/themen/NATO-Krieg/ard-sendung.html
89. ^ Time travel: As an observer in Kosovo ( Memento from August 10, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), NDR, broadcast on January 15, 2012; The film can be viewed on some video portals.
90. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 399f.
91. ↑ Rudolf Scharping: We must not look the other way - The Kosovo War and Europe. Berlin 1999, p. 215; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 333, footnote 260.
92. ↑ Natalija Bašič: War as Adventure - Enemy Images and Violence from the Perspective of Ex-Yugoslav Soldiers 1991–1995. Gießen 2004, p. 100, without naming the source of Milošević's statement; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
93. ↑ Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, Robert Pichler: Kosovo - Kosova: Myths, data, facts. 2nd Edition. Wieser, Klagenfurt 1999, ISBN 3-85129-304-5 , p. 174.
94. ↑ The Groove vom Amselfeld ( Memento from January 22, 2013 on WebCite ). Jungle World, No. 17, April 21, 1999, interview by Katja Diefenbach.
95. ^ Ed Vulliamy: Seasons in Hell - Understanding Bosnian's War. New York 1994, p. 51 and Vamik D. Volkan: The Failure of Diplomacy - On the Psychoanalysis of National, Ethnic and Religious Conflicts. Giessen 2003, p. 93; Quoted from: Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980–2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 485ff.
96. ^ Matthias Rüb: Kosovo - causes and consequences of a war in Europe. DTV, Munich, November 1999, ISBN 3-423-36175-1 , p. 185.
97. ^ Norman M. Naimark: Fires of Hatred - Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century Europe. Harvard university Press, London 2001, ISBN 0-674-00313-6 , p. 152, with reference to: Judah: The Serbs. P. 164.
98. ↑ Norman M. Naimark: Flammender Hass - Ethnic cleansing in the 20th century. Federal Center for Political Education, Bonn 2009, ISBN 3-89331-960-2 , p. 223, footnote 159. with reference to: Judah: The Serbs. P. 190f.
99. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , p. 116.
100. ^ A Lebanon in the Balkans ( Memento from January 25, 2013 on WebCite ) . In: Der Spiegel. 48/1987, November 23, 1987.
101. ^ UNESCO, Cultural Heritage in South-East Europe: Kosovo; SEE edition featuring UNESCO mission in Kosovo and extensive field visits outside Pristina (March 2003), Cultural heritage in South-East Europe; 1 ( Memento from February 16, 2013 on WebCite ) (English, PDF; 2.9 MB). Published in 2003, 154 p., Here p. 117. UNESCO homepage ( Memento from February 16, 2013 on WebCite ).
102. ↑ Powder Keg Kosovo - Living with Hate . TV documentary, ZDF , 2007, a film by Klaus Prömpers.
103. ↑ The Kosovo Myth ( Memento January 30, 2013 on WebCite ) . Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 5, 2007, by Michael Martens.
104. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 189–197.
105. ^ ^{A b c} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 194–197.
106. ^ Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War Using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 202f.
107. ^ ^{A b} Carl Polónyi: Salvation and Destruction: National Myths and War using the Example of Yugoslavia 1980-2004. Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-8305-1724-5 , pp. 202f., Footnote 37.