Battle of the Netherlands

This article is not adequately provided with supporting documents (for example individual proofs ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

The individual references can be picked up from the English-language article .

Phases of the German conquest of the Netherlands

The Battle of the Netherlands was part of the western campaign during World War II . The battle lasted from May 10, 1940 until the surrender of the main Dutch forces on May 14. The Dutch troops in the province of Zeeland resisted the Wehrmacht until May 17, when Germany completed the occupation of the entire country. In the Battle of the Netherlands, paratroopers were deployed in large numbers for the first time to occupy tactical points and support the advance of the ground troops. The German Air Force used paratroopers to capture several airfields near Rotterdam and The Hague . This helped to quickly overrun the country and block the Dutch armed forces.

After the devastating air force bombing of Rotterdam on May 14, the Germans threatened to bomb other Dutch cities if the Dutch armed forces refused to surrender. The general staff knew that they could not stop the bombers and ordered the Dutch army to cease hostilities. The last occupied parts of the Netherlands were retaken by Western Allied forces in 1945 .

context

Dutch soldiers on guard, November 1939

Prelude

The United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany in 1939 after the German invasion of Poland . During the so-called seat war in the winter of 1939/40, however, no major land operations took place in Western Europe. It was during this period that the British and French were building their forces in anticipation of a long war, and the Germans were completing their conquest of Poland. On October 9, Adolf Hitler ordered plans to invade the Netherlands to be used as a base against Great Britain and to prevent a similar attack by Allied forces that could threaten the vital Ruhr area . A joint Dutch-Belgian peace offer on both sides was rejected on November 7th.

Securing the Nijmegen Waal Bridge with the help of a barrier by Dutch soldiers during the Albania crisis.

The Dutch were ill-prepared to withstand such an invasion. When Hitler came to power the Dutch had begun to arm themselves again, but more slowly than France or Belgium ; it was not until 1936 that the defense budget was gradually increased. Successive Dutch governments tended to avoid openly identifying Germany as an acute military threat. This was due, on the one hand, to the desire not to alienate a vital trading partner, to the point of suppressing criticism of Nazi policies, and, on the other hand, to a policy of strict budgetary limits that the conservative Dutch governments were faced with. They tried in vain to the Great Depression to combat that was especially difficult for Dutch society. The Prime Minister Hendrikus Colijn , who was in office between 1933 and 1939, was personally convinced that Germany would not violate Dutch neutrality.

International tensions increased in the late 1930s. Crises were caused by the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936; the Anschluss and Sudeten crises of 1938 and the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the Italian invasion of Albania in the spring of 1939. These events forced the Dutch government to be more vigilant, but they limited their response as much as possible. The most important measure was a partial mobilization of 100,000 men in April 1939.

After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent outbreak of the Second World War, the Netherlands hoped to remain neutral, as 25 years ago it World War I had done. To ensure this neutrality, the Dutch army was mobilized and entrenched from August 24th. Large sums (nearly 900 million guilders ) were spent on defense. However, it turned out to be very difficult to obtain new material during the war, especially since the Dutch had ordered some of their new equipment from Germany, which deliberately delayed deliveries. In addition, a significant portion of the funds was earmarked for the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia ), much of it going towards the plan to build three battlecruisers .

The strategic position of the Dutch, who were on the free flanks of their fortification lines between France and Germany, made the area a logical path for a possible offensive by either side. In a radio address on January 20, 1940, Winston Churchill tried to convince them not to wait for an inevitable German attack but to join the Anglo-French Entente. Both the Belgians and the Dutch refused, despite the fact that the German plans to attack fell into Belgian hands after a German aircraft crash in January 1940 in what became known as the Mechelen incident .

The French High Command considered to violate the neutrality of the Netherlands, when the Anglo-French coalition were not connected before the scheduled major Allied offensive in the summer of 1941, but the French cabinet, which feared a negative public reaction, put a veto one . An invasion plan was considered in the event that Germany alone attacked the Netherlands and required an advance of the Entente over Belgium, or the Netherlands helped the enemy by tolerating a German advance into Belgium over the southern part of their territory. The Dutch government never officially stated how to proceed in an emergency. The majority of ministers preferred to oppose an attack, a minority and Queen Wilhelmina refused at all costs to become a German ally. The Dutch tried several times to act as mediators in order to reach a negotiated peace agreement between the Entente and Germany.

After the Germans marched into Norway and Denmark ( Operation Weser Exercise ), followed by a warning from the new Japanese naval attaché, Captain Tadashi Maeda, that a German attack on the Netherlands was safe, the Dutch military realized that it was impossible to evade the conflict be. They began to prepare for war. Dutch border troops have been placed on greater alert. Reports of the alleged actions of a fifth column in Scandinavia sparked widespread fears that the Netherlands, too, had been infiltrated by German agents with the support of traitors. Countermeasures were taken against a possible attack on airfields and ports. A state of emergency was declared on April 19. Most civilians, however, harbored the illusion that their country could be spared, an attitude that has since been described as a state of refusal. Hoping that the restrained policies of the Entente and Central Powers during World War I could be repeated, the Dutch tried to avoid the attention of the great powers and a war in which they feared a loss of life comparable to that of the previous conflict was. On April 10, Great Britain and France repeated their request that the Dutch go to war on their side, but this was again refused.

Dutch armed forces

Dutch main lines of defense

In the Netherlands all the objective prerequisites for a successful defense were in place: a dense population, rich, young, disciplined and well educated; a geography that favors the defender; and a strong technological and industrial base, including a defense industry . However, these had not been exploited: While the German Wehrmacht had many deficits in equipment and training at that time, the Dutch army was far less prepared for the war in comparison. The myth of the general German equipment advantage over the opposing armies in the Battle of France was indeed a reality in the case of the Battle of the Netherlands. Germany had a modern army with tanks and dive bombers (like the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka ), while the Netherlands had an army whose armored troops comprised only 39 armored cars and five tanks, as well as an air force consisting largely of double-deckers. The attitude of the Dutch government towards the war was reflected in the state of the country's armed forces, which had not significantly expanded their equipment since World War I and were insufficiently armed even by 1918 standards. In the 1920s, an economic recession from 1920 to 1927 and the general easing in international relations led to a limitation in the defense budget. Only 1.5 million guilders a year were spent on equipment in that decade. In both 1931 and 1933, the committees set up to further cut back failed because they concluded that the acceptable minimum had been reached and indicated that an increase in spending was urgently needed. It was not until February 1936 that a law was passed creating a special 53.4 million guilder defense fund.

The lack of trained labor or sufficient material reserves prevented a rapid expansion of the Dutch armed forces. There was just enough artillery to equip the larger units: eight infantry divisions ( grouped into four army corps ), a light (i.e. motorized) division, and two independent brigades (Brigade A and Brigade B), each half a division or five battalions . All other infantry combat troops were set up as light infantry battalions that were distributed over the entire territory to delay the movement of the enemy. About two thousand bunkers had been built, but in rows with no depth. There were no large modern fortresses like the Belgian fortress Eben-Emael . The only modern fortification complex was that in Kornwerderzand , which protected the Afsluitdijk . A total of 48 infantry regiments and 22 infantry battalions were available for strategic border defense. By comparison, Belgium had 22 full divisions, despite a smaller male population with higher average ages, which was 30 divisions when smaller units were included.

After September 1939, desperate efforts were made to improve the situation, but with very little result. Germany delayed deliveries for obvious reasons; France was reluctant to equip an army that would not clearly be on its side. The Soviet Union , one of the abundant sources of arms, was inaccessible because, unlike most other nations, the Dutch did not recognize the communist regime. An attempt in 1940 to procure Soviet equipment captured from Finland failed.

On May 10, the most noticeable shortage of the Dutch army was its lack of armored vehicles. While the other main participants all had a sizeable armored force, the Netherlands was unable to procure the minimum of 146 modern tanks (110 light, 36 medium) that they had deemed necessary as early as 1937. A single Renault FT tank , for which only one driver had been trained and which was solely responsible for testing anti-tank traps, had remained the only example of its kind and was no longer in service until 1940. There were two squads of armored cars, each with a dozen Landsverk M36 or M38 vehicles. Another dozen DAF M39 vehicles were just being put into service, some of which still had to be equipped with their main armament. A single platoon of five Carden-Loyd Mark VI tanks used by the artillery completed the list of Dutch tanks.

The Dutch artillery had a total of 676 howitzers and field guns : 310 Krupp 75 mm field guns , some manufactured under license; 52 105mm Bofors howitzers, the only truly modern pieces; 144 obsolete Krupp 125 mm cannons; 40 150 mm sFH13; 72 Krupp 150 mm L / 24 howitzers and 28 Vickers 152 mm L / 15 howitzers. 386 Böhler 47 mm L / 39 guns were available as anti-tank guns, although they were effective weapons, but too few were available and only achieved a third of the planned strength; another three hundred antiquated 6 Veld (57 mm) and 8 Staal field cannons (84 mm) played the same role for the cover forces. At the time of the invasion, only eight of the 120 modern 105 mm guns ordered from Germany had been delivered. Most of the artillery pieces were not motorized, but were drawn by horses.

The Dutch infantry deployed approximately 2,200 7.92 mm machine guns, some of which were manufactured under license, and eight hundred Vickers machine guns . Many of them were built into the bunkers. Each battalion had a heavy machine gun company of twelve men. The Dutch infantry squads were armed with a light machine gun, the M.20 Lewis machine gun, of which about 8,000 were available. Most of the Dutch infantrymen were armed with the M.95 rifle, which had been introduced in 1895. There were only six 80mm mortars for each regiment. This lack of firepower severely affected the combat performance of the Dutch infantry.

Although the Netherlands was the headquarters of Philips , one of the largest manufacturers of radio equipment in Europe , the Dutch army mainly used telephone connections. Only the artillery was equipped with the modest number of 225 radios.

Dutch Air Force

Mobile Dutch anti-aircraft gun

The Dutch Air Force , which was not an independent branch of the Dutch armed forces but part of the army, operated a fleet of 155 aircraft on May 10: 28 twin-engine Fokker GI fighter planes ; 31 Fokker D.XXI and seven Fokker D.XVII ; ten twin-engined Fokker TVs , fifteen light Fokker CX and 35 Fokker CV bombers, twelve Douglas DB-8 dive bombers (used as fighters) and seventeen Koolhoven FK.51 reconnaissance aircraft - thus 74 of the 155 aircraft were double-deckers. Of these aircraft, 125 were operational. The rest of the Air Force School used three Fokker D.XXI, six Fokker D.XVII, a single Fokker GI and Fokker TV as well as seven Fokker CV and several training aircraft. Another forty operational aircraft, along with roughly the same number of reserve and training ships, served sea aviation. The production potential of the Dutch military aircraft industry, consisting of the companies Fokker and Koolhoven , was not fully exploited for budget reasons.

Dutch military airports

(these were not necessarily all occupied by aircraft)

• Bergen (North Holland)
• Eelde
• Gilze-Rijen
• Haamstede (Zeeland)
• Hilversum
• Ockenburg (near The Hague , secondary airport )
• Ruijgenhoek
• Schiphol
• Soesterberg
• Valkenburg (near Leiden )
• Vlijt ( Texel , for fighter flight school)
• Waalhaven (in Rotterdam)
• Welschap (near Eindhoven )
• Ypenburg (near The Hague)
• Middenmeer (in the Wieringermeerpolder )
• Twente (near Enschede )

Naval air bases and bases

Naval air bases

• De Kooy (30 training aircraft)
• De Mok (Texel, seaplanes) (17 planes)
• Schellingwoude (11 aircraft)
• Veere (8 planes)

bases

• Brasemermeer (3 planes)
• Westeinderplassen (8 aircraft)
• Alkmaardermeer (3 planes)

Training and readiness

The Dutch army was not only poorly equipped, but also poorly trained. In particular, little experience was gained in dealing with larger units above the battalion level. From 1932 to 1936, the Dutch Army did not conduct summer field maneuvers in order to obtain military funding. In addition, the individual soldier lacked many necessary skills. Before the war, only a minority of young men approved for military service had actually been drafted. By 1938, the recruits only served 24 weeks, just enough to receive basic training in the infantry. In the same year the period of service was extended to eleven months. The low quality of conscripts was not compensated for by a large number of professional soldiers. In 1940 there were only 1,206 career officers. It had been hoped that these deficiencies could be remedied quickly when war threatened, but after the mobilization of all Dutch armed forces on August 28, 1939 (increasing the armed forces to around 280,000 men) readiness improved only slowly: most of the time was available spent on the construction of defenses. During this time, among other things, the lack of practice ammunition limited the training, while the cohesion of the units remained low. By its own standards, the Dutch army was incapacitated in May 1940. It was unable to carry out an offensive even at the division level, while carrying out major operations was way beyond its capacity.

German generals and tacticians (along with Hitler himself) had just as little opinion of the Dutch military and expected that the actual core region of Holland could be conquered in about three to five days.

Dutch defense strategy

The Grebbelinie, a defensive position in front of the Dutch waterline, in dark blue.

In the 17th century, the Dutch Republic had developed a defense system called the Dutch Waterline , which protected all major cities in the west by flooding part of the countryside during the Franco-Dutch War . At the beginning of the 19th century this line was shifted slightly to the east beyond Utrecht and later modernized with fortresses. This new position was called the New Dutch Waterline . The line was reinforced with new bunkers in 1940 as the fortifications were out of date. The line was on the far eastern edge of the areas below sea level. This allowed the ground in front of the fortifications to be easily flooded with a few feet of water that was too shallow for boats but deep enough to turn the ground into an impassable swamp . The area west of the New Dutch Waterline was called Fortress Holland (Dutch: Vesting Holland ), the eastern flank of which was covered by the IJsselmeer and the southern flank of which was protected by the lower reaches of three broad parallel rivers: the Rhine and the Meuse . It acted as a national redoubt which , in the most optimistic predictions, was expected to last for up to three months without Allied support, which, however, was far too high. Before the war, people wanted to retire quickly to this position after a defensive phase (the so-called blue case). In 1939, it was recognized that such an attitude constituted an invitation to invade and made it impossible to negotiate a common defense with the Entente. Proposals by German diplomats, according to which the Dutch government would secretly approve an advance into the country, were rejected.

From September 1939 a more eastern main line of defense was built. This second main defense position had a northern part, which was formed by the Grebbelinie at the foot of the Utrechtse Heuvelrug , an ice age moraine between the IJsselmeer and the Lower Rhine . It was built at the instigation of the Commander in Chief of the Field Army, Lieutenant General Jan Joseph Godfried van Voorst tot Voorst . This line was extended to include a southern part: the Peel-Raam position between the Meuse and the Belgian border along the Peel Marshes and the Raam stream, as ordered by the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, General Izaäk Reijnders . In the south, the Germans wanted to be held back as far as possible to cover a French advance. The fourth and second army corps were on the Grebbelinie. The 3rd Army Corps was stationed at the Peel-Raam position, with a light division behind it to cover the southern flank. Brigade A and B were between the Lower Rhine and the Maas. The 1st Army Corps was a strategic reserve in Fort Holland, the southern perimeter of which was occupied by a further ten battalions and the easternmost by six battalions. All of these lines were reinforced by bunkers.

Formation of troops

The Peel-Raam position

In front of the Peel-Raam position, which served as the main defense line, was the IJssel-Maas line, a line of defense along the IJssel and Maas rivers , which was connected by positions in the Betuwe , again with bunkers, and was occupied by an umbrella made up of fourteen "border battalions" . At the end of 1939, General Van Voorst tot Voorst, reviving the plans he had drawn up in 1937, to make use of the excellent defensive capabilities of these rivers. He proposed a shift towards a more mobile strategy by creating a delayed battle at the expected border crossings near Arnhem and Gennep , in order to force the German divisions to use much of their offensive force before they reached the main line of defense and ideally even defeat them. This was considered too risky by the Dutch government and General Reijnders. The latter wanted the army to first offer strong resistance at the Grebbelinie and in the Peel-Raam position and then fall back on Fort Holland. This was also seen by the government as too risky, especially with regard to German air rule, and had the disadvantage that two strategic options had to be fully prepared. Reijnders had already been denied full military authority in the defense zones, and the conflict over strategy further undermined his political position. On February 5, 1940, he was forced to resign because of these differences of opinion with his superiors. He was replaced by General Henri Winkelman , who decided that in the north the Grebbelinie would be the main line of defense on which the decisive battle would be fought, also because it would be easier to break out with a counter-offensive if conditions were favorable. With regard to the Peel Raam position, however, he made no comparable decision.

During the Seat War, the Netherlands officially adhered to a policy of strict neutrality. The Dutch military command negotiated secretly with Belgium and France through the Dutch military attaché in Paris, Lieutenant Colonel David van Voorst Evekink, in order to coordinate a common defense for a German invasion. This failed because of insurmountable differences of opinion about which strategy to pursue.

Participating Dutch associations

• Supreme Commander: General HG Winkelman and Lieutenant General JWN Varwijk

Land Forces

• Fortress Holland (Lieutenant General J. van Andel)
• Western Front Command (Reserve Colonel Gerard Johannes de Groot)
• 1st Army Corps (Major General Nicolaas Theodorus Carstens) (fortress Holland, strategic reserve) (20,000 men)
  • 1st Division (Colonel WFK Bischoff van Heemskerk)
    • Grenadier Regiment (Major JK de Visser)
    • Jägerregiment (Lieutenant Colonel HD Scherpenhuijzen)
    • 4th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel HD Buurman)
    • 2nd Artillery Regiment
  • 3rd Division (Colonel LH ​​Kraak)
    • 1st Infantry Regiment
    • 9th Infantry Regiment
    • 12th Infantry Regiment
    • 6th Artillery Regiment
• a light division (Colonel HC van der Bijl)
• two regiments of cyclists
• 3rd Huzar Regiment (motorcyclists)
• an artillery regiment
• a liaison department

• Army Corps Troops
  • including the 3rd regiment of hussars, an artillery department and a battalion of cyclists

• Other troops
  • 1st regiment of hussars (motorcyclists)
  • 15 security forces depot departments

• Commander position Den Helder (H. Jolles)
• Territorial Commander Friesland (Colonel J. Veenbaas)
  • 33rd Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel WA Groenendijk)
  • 36th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel JH Sonne)
  • Other troops including the 1st and 12th Batavian Border Troops and various surveillance troops

• Commander in Zeeland (H. Schout, HJ van der Stad)
  • 38th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel JHW Bruins)
  • 40th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel PLR van der Drift)
  • various other troops, including the 14th Border Battalion

Field Army (Lieutenant General JJ Baron van Voorst to Voorst)

• 2nd Army Corps (Major General Jacob Harberts) Southern Grebbe Line (20,000 men)
  • 2nd Division (10,000 men) (Colonel JS Barbas)
    • 10th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel PJ van den Briel)
    • 15th Infantry Regiment
    • 22nd Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel JF de Ridder)
    • 4th Artillery Regiment
    • Division troops u. a. a liaison division, an engineering company, an anti-aircraft gun company, an anti-aircraft machine gun company and two machine gun groups

• • 4th Division (10,000 men) (Colonel AA van Loon)
    • 8th Infantry Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel WF Hennink)
    • 19th Infantry Regiment
    • 8th Artillery Regiment
    • Division troops, among other things, a liaison department, 2 companies for anti-aircraft guns, a pioneer company, a *** company for anti-aircraft guns and 2 machine gun groups

• • Army Corps
    • 4th Hussar Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Jr. SMSA de Marees van Swinderen)
    • 11th Infantry Regiment
    • 15th Artillery Regiment
    • Artillery of the 19th regiment

• 3rd Army Corps (Major General Adrianus Antonius van Nijnatten) (Noord-Brabant) (20,000 men)
  • 5th department
  • 2nd Infantry Regiment
  • 13th Infantry Regiment
  • 17th Infantry Regiment
  • 3rd Artillery Regiment
  • 6th department
  • 3rd Infantry Regiment
  • 6th Infantry Regiment
  • 14th Infantry Regiment
  • 7th Artillery Regiment
  • 20 border battalions
  • 20th Artillery Regiment
  • a light division
  • 2 regiments of cyclists
  • 2nd regiment of hussars (motorcyclists) (Lieutenant Colonel AJE Mathon)
  • Army Corps troops, including 3 infantry battalions.

• 4th Army Corps (Major General Adrianus Rudolphus van den Bent) (northern Grebbelinie) (20,000 men)
  • 7th department
  • 7th Infantry Regiment
  • 18th Infantry Regiment
  • Division troops, including two artillery departments, seven machine gun groups, an anti-aircraft company, an anti-aircraft company, an engineer company and a liaison department
  • 8th department
  • 5th Infantry Regiment
  • 16th Infantry Regiment
  • 21st Infantry Regiment
  • 5th Artillery Regiment
  • Division troops
  • Army Corps troops
    • 1st regiment of hussars
    • 5th Hussar Regiment
    • others: including four artillery divisions and a mortar company
    • Brigade A (Col. J. van Voorthuizen)
    • Brigade B (Colonel JCC Nijland)
    • 24th Infantry Regiment
    • 2 battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment
    • a reconnaissance company
    • a liaison department
    • a pioneer company
    • a machine gun troop

• Brigade G.
  • Territorial Commander Overijssel (Colonel J. Dwars)
  • eight infantry battalions, including the 22nd Border Battalion and the battalions of the 35th Infantry Regiment

Coordination with Belgium

Because of its obvious strategic importance, Belgium, although neutral in principle, had already made fairly detailed arrangements for coordination with the Entente forces. This made it difficult for the Dutch to change these plans according to their wishes. The Dutch called on the Belgians to combine their defense with the Peel-Raam position, which Reijnders did not want to give up without a fight. He did not endorse Van Voorst tot Voorst's plan to occupy a so-called "orange position" on the much shorter line 's-Hertogenbosch - Tilburg , in order to have a continuous front with the Belgian lines in, as suggested by the Belgian general Raoul van Overstraeten near Turnhout to form.

When Winkelman took command, he intensified negotiations and proposed on February 21 that Belgium should establish a connection line with the Peel-Raam position along the Belgian part of the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal . The Belgians refused to do this unless the Dutch increased their presence in Limburg. No forces were available to the Dutch to comply with this request. Repeated Belgian requests to review the orange position were rejected by Winkelman. Therefore, in the event of an invasion, the Belgians decided to withdraw all their troops to their main line of defense, the Albert Canal . This created a dangerous gap forty kilometers in length. The French were asked to fill them up. The French Commander in Chief Maurice Gamelin was more than interested in including the Dutch on his front, as he - like Major General Bernard Montgomery four years later - hoped to bypass the Siegfried Line to the north when the Entente launched its planned offensive in 1941. However, he dared not expand his supply lines that far unless the Belgians and Dutch sided with the Allies before the German attack. When both nations refused, Gamelin made it clear that he would take a liaison position near Breda . The Dutch did not fortify this area. On March 30th, Winkelman secretly decided to give up the Peel-Raam position immediately after the start of a German attack and to withdraw his 3rd Army Corps to the Linge to cover the southern flank of the Grebbelinie, with only one covering force remaining behind. This Waal-Linge position should be reinforced with bunkers. The budget for such buildings was increased by a hundred million guilders.

After the German attack on Denmark and Norway in April 1940, when the Germans deployed a large number of airborne troops, the Dutch command worried about whether they too could fall victim to such a strategic attack. To repel an attack, five infantry battalions were stationed at the main ports and air force bases, including the Hague airfield in Ypenburg and the Rotterdam airfield in Waalhaven. These were reinforced by additional anti-aircraft cannons, two armored cars and twelve of the 24 operational armored cars. These targeted measures were accompanied by more general measures: the Dutch had deployed no fewer than 32 hospital ships across the country and fifteen trains to facilitate troop movements.

French strategy

In addition to the Dutch and German 18th Armies, a third, not much smaller force, would operate on Dutch soil: the French 7th Army. It had its own objectives within the larger French strategy, and French planning had long considered the possibility of operations on Dutch territory. The coastal regions of Zeeland and Holland were difficult to navigate due to their many waterways. However, both the French and the Germans saw the possibility of a surprise attack in this region. For the Germans this would have the advantage of bypassing the Antwerp - Namur route . The Zeeland islands have been classified as strategically critical as they are directly across the Thames Estuary , so conquering them would pose a particular threat to the security of England .

Rapid forces, whether offensive or defensive, were required to deny the enemy places of vital importance. Long before the Germans, the French had considered using airborne troops to carry out rapid attacks. As early as 1936, the French had commissioned the construction of light tanks that were supposed to be transportable by air. However, these plans were abandoned in 1940 because they did not have cargo planes large enough to carry them. A naval and an infantry division should leave for Zeeland to block the Westerschelde against a German crossing. These would send armed forces across the Scheldt to the islands, which should be supplied by overseas ships.

The French Commander-in-Chief Maurice Gamelin feared that the Dutch could be tempted to surrender quickly or even to accept the German “protection”. He therefore moved the former French strategic reserve, the 7th Army, in front of Antwerp to cover the eastern banks of the river, to maintain the connection with the fortress Holland further north and to maintain an Allied left flank across the Rhine. The troops deployed for this task consisted of the 16th Army Corps, consisting of the 9th motorized infantry division (which also had some chain armored vehicles) and the 4th infantry division; and the 1st Army Corps, consisting of the 25th Motorized Infantry Division and the 21st Infantry Division. This army was later reinforced by the 1st Mechanized Light Division, an armored division of the French cavalry. Together with the two departments in Zeeland, seven French departments were responsible for the operation.

Although the French troops had a higher proportion of motorized units than their German opponents, given the distances to be traveled, they could not hope to reach their assigned sector in order to advance in combat before the enemy. Their only chance to beat the Germans was to use rail transport. This implied that they would be vulnerable in the concentration phase and would build their armed forces near Breda. They needed the Dutch troops in the Peel-Raam position to delay the Germans a few extra days to allow French stationing and anchoring, but the French rapid formations would also provide a security screen. These consisted of the reconnaissance units of the tank and engine departments, which were equipped with the relatively well armed Panhard 178 armored car . These would concentrate on two task forces named after their commander: the Beauchesne group and the Lestoquoi group.

German strategy

German tank I.

During the many changes in the Yellow Case deployment plans , the idea of ​​leaving Fortress Holland untouched, as the Dutch had hoped, was sometimes considered. The first version, dated October 19, 1939, suggested the possibility of a full cast under favorable conditions. In the version dated October 29, it was proposed to limit the crossing to a line south of Venlo . In the Holland directive of November 15, it was decided to conquer the entire south, but not to advance further in the north than the Grebbelinie and to occupy the Frisian islands . Hermann Göring insisted on a complete conquest, as he needed the Dutch airfields against Great Britain. He also feared the Entente could reinforce Fortress Holland after a partial defeat and use the airfields to bomb German cities and troops. Another argument in favor of a full conquest was that the fall of France was seen as desirable, even for political reasons, in order to secure a Dutch surrender, as defeat could bring less hostile governments to power in Britain and France. A quick defeat would also free troops for other sectors of the front.

Although it was decided on January 17, 1940 to conquer the whole of the Netherlands, only a few units could be made available for this task. Case Yellow's main effort would be halfway between Namur and Sedan in France. The attack on central Belgium was only a deception - and the attack on the fortress of Holland was only a side issue of this deception. Although both the 6th and 18th Armies were stationed on the Dutch border, the first, much larger force would move south of Venlo to Belgium, leaving only the 18th Army under General Georg von Küchler to defeat the main Dutch force . Of all the German armies that took part in the operation, this was by far the weakest. It contained only four regular infantry divisions (the 207th, 227th, 254th, and 256th infantry divisions), which were supported by three reserve divisions (208th, 225th, and 526th infantry divisions) that did not take part in the fighting. Six of these divisions were so-called "third wave units", which were only set up in August 1939 by Landwehr territorial units. Aside from those who were World War I veterans, they had few professional officers and little combat experience. Like the Dutch army, most soldiers (88%) were not adequately trained. The seventh division was the 526th Infantry Division, a pure security unit with no serious combat training. The German divisions, with a nominal strength of 17,807 men, were fifty percent larger than their Dutch counterparts and had twice the effective firepower, but nevertheless lacked the numerical superiority necessary for a successful offensive.

To remedy this, various small units were used to reinforce the 18th Army. The first was the only German cavalry division with the aptly named 1st Cavalry Division . The mounted troops of this unit, accompanied by some infantrymen, were supposed to occupy the poorly defended provinces east of the IJssel and then attempt to cross the Afsluitdijk. A simultaneous landing in Holland near Enkhuizen was to be attempted, using barges to enter the small port of Stavoren . Since both efforts were unlikely, the mass of the regular divisions was reinforced by the SS-disposable division (including the SS-Standarten “Der Führer”, “Deutschland” and “Germania”) and the Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, which were to serve as attack infantry to break through the Dutch fortified positions.

The Germans resorted to unconventional means to ensure victory. The Germans had trained two airborne divisions. The first, the 7th Flieger Division , consisted of paratroopers; the second was the 22nd Airborne Infantry Division . Originally it was planned that the largest German attack would take place in Flanders, and it was expected that these troops would be used to attempt a crossing over the Scheldt near Ghent . This operation was canceled, so it was decided to use it to get an easy victory in the Netherlands. On the first day, the airborne troops tried to secure the airfields around the Dutch seat of government, The Hague, and then to take their government prisoner together with the Dutch high command and Queen Wilhelmina. The plan had been worked out by Hitler personally and had expressed an earlier idea of ​​having an "armed protection of Dutch neutrality" offered through an envoy. H. to become a German protectorate . If this does not lead to the desired immediate collapse, the bridges in Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Moerdijk should be secured at the same time so that a mechanized force could relieve the airborne troops from the south. This force was to be the German 9th Panzer Division .

This was the only German tank division with only two tank battalions, the total number of tanks in the unit was 141. The intention was to take advantage of a break in the Dutch lines of the 254th and 256th Infantry Divisions and join them to form the XXVI Army Corps , on the Gennep-Herzogenbusch axis. At the same time an offensive against the Grebbelinie in the east would be carried out by the 207th and 227th Infantry Divisions, which had formed the Xth Army Corps, in order to attack the main body of the Dutch field army. The expectation was that despite their lack of numerical superiority, they would force the Dutch back to Fortress Holland's eastern front or beyond. If the Dutch did not surrender on the first day, the 18th Army expected to enter Fortress Holland from the south over the Moerdijk bridges on the third day and thus secure victory. There was no precise timetable for the complete destruction of the Dutch armed forces. A special aspect of the command structure was that the air attack was exclusively an Air Force operation. The air force would initially not be under the command of the OKH . The attack on Rotterdam was ultimately to be an army operation and was seen by it as the focus of the campaign in the Netherlands. The 18th Army regarded the airborne landings as primarily the XXVI. Army Corps subordinated.

Of all of the Yellow Case operations, this one embodied most strongly the concept of a blitzkrieg , as the term was understood at the time: strategic raid. Like the Yellow Case as a whole, it involved a high risk strategy.

Participating German associations

→ See main article: Schematic war organization of the Wehrmacht on May 10, 1940

18th Army

• X Army Corps
• 207th Infantry Division (reinforced with the SS Regiment Der Führer)
• 227th Infantry Division (reinforced with SS Regiment)
• 223rd Infantry Division (reinforced with SS Regiment)
• 110th Infantry Division (reinforced with the SS Regiment)
• XVI. Army Corps
• 208 Infantry Division (parts)
• 225th Infantry Division (parts)
• 254th Infantry Division (parts)
• 256th Infantry Division (parts)
• 526 Infantry Division (parts)
• 527 Infantry Division (parts)
• SS Regiment Germany
• 9th Armored Division
• Paratrooper Division
• 1st bat. Paratrooper Regiment 2
• 2nd bat. Paratrooper Regiment 2
• 22nd Airborne Division
• 16th Infantry Regiment
• 47th Infantry Regiment
• 65th Infantry Regiment
• 1st Cavalry Division

The total strength of the German units mentioned, which were deployed during the attack on the Netherlands, is estimated at around 150,000 men. This does not apply to the air force crews and not to parts of the 6th Army that crossed Dutch territory on their way to Belgium (see below).

In addition, the following were active in the southern Netherlands:

6th Army

• IV Army Corps
• 4th Armored Division
• 7th Infantry Division
• 18th Infantry Division
• 35th Infantry Division
• 61st Infantry Division
• 311 Infantry Division
• IX. Army Corps
• 30th Infantry Division
• 216 Infantry Division
• XI. Army Corps (Wehrmacht)
• 14th Infantry Division
• 19th Infantry Division
• 31st Infantry Division
• XXVI. Army Corps (Wehrmacht)
• 526th Infantry Division
• XXVII. Army Corps (Wehrmacht)
• 269th Infantry Division

The Easter affair

The German people and German troops in general did not like to violate Dutch neutrality. German propaganda therefore justifies the invasion as a reaction to an alleged Entente attempt to occupy the Netherlands, similar to the reasoning used by the German Empire in World War I with regard to Belgium. Some German officers were averse to the Nazi regime and also concerned about the invasion. One of them, Colonel Hans Oster , an Abwehr (German military intelligence) officer began March 1939 to pass information to his friend, the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Gijsbertus J. Sas. That information included the attack date on Case Gelb. Sas informed the Allies about other military attachés. However, several postponements while the Germans waited for favorable weather conditions resulted in a number of false positives that the Dutch government and others were skeptical of the information. Sa's correct prediction of the date of the attack on Denmark and Norway went largely unnoticed. Although he indicated that a German armored division was attempting to attack fortress Holland from Noord-Brabant and that it was a plan to capture the Queen, Dutch defense strategy was not adapted and it was not understood that these elements were part of a larger scheme. On May 4, Sas again warned of an impending attack; this time it coincided with a warning from Pope Pius XII . When Oster called his friend again on the evening of May 9th and said "Tomorrow morning", Dutch troops were put on alert.

Oster was one of the leading figures in the German resistance from 1938 to 1943 and was hanged for the murder of Hitler after the bomb attack of July 20, 1944.

The battle

10th of May

German paratroopers land in the Netherlands on May 10, 1940

The geography of the landing areas: at the coast is The Hague; Rotterdam is at n , Waalhaven at 9 and Dordrecht at 7 ; h indicates the Hollands Diep.

On the morning of May 10, 1940, the Dutch woke to the sound of aircraft engines booming in the sky. Germany had started Operation Yellow Case and attacked the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Luxembourg , in the case of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg even without a declaration of war on the hostilities; France was already at war.

During the night, the air force violated the Dutch airspace. The Kampfgeschwader 4 (KG 4), crossed it and then disappeared to the west, which gave the illusion of the Dutch, the operation was directed at England. But over the North Sea it turned again to the east in order to carry out a surprise attack on the Dutch airfields together with the other squadrons. Under the leadership of Colonel Martin Fiebig , KG 4 hit the naval airfield in De Kooy and destroyed 35 aircraft, most of them trainers. Fiebig himself was shot down and spent five days as a Dutch prisoner of war. The KG 4 also hit Amsterdam-Schiphol , where the Dutch lost a third of their medium bombers, and The Hague airfields, where the I./KG 4 destroyed half of the 21 defending fighter planes, to Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) and the To support Kampfgeschwader 54 (KG 54) in attacks on ports and communication facilities. KG 4 lost a total of 11 Heinkel He 111 bombers and three Junkers Ju 88s on May 10 ; the KG 30 and 54 another nine bombers. The Jagdgeschwader 26 (JG 26) and the Destroyer Squadron 26 (ZG 26) shot down 25 Dutch aircraft in a dogfight and lost nine combat aircraft. The 2nd Air Fleet of Albert Kesselring brought it to 41. The Dutch had the day at the end of only 70 aircraft. They claimed that most of the German planes were destroyed on May 10th. Spread over Dutch territory, they continued the fight against the Luftwaffe if possible and celebrated 13 victories over German fighter planes by May 14th. Immediately after the bombing, between 04:30 and 05:00 local time, paratroopers were landed near the airfields. Dutch anti-aircraft batteries had shot down numerous Ju 52 transport aircraft belonging to the Luftwaffe transport groups. The German Ju-52 losses in the entire battle amounted to about 250, which was 50% of the fleet's strength.

Burning German Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft in Ypenburg

The attack on The Hague ended in operational failure. The paratroopers were unable to capture the main airfield in Ypenburg in time so that further airborne infantry could be followed with Junkers transport aircraft. Although one armored car was bombed, the other five Landsverks tanks, supported by machine gun emplacements, destroyed the eighteen Junkers transport planes of the first two waves, killing many occupants. When the runway was blocked by wrecks, the remaining waves broke off the landing and tried to find alternatives. They often dropped their airborne troops on meadows or on the beach, thus dispersing the troops. The small auxiliary airfield at Ockenburg was only lightly defended and immediately fell victim to a German attack. The Valkenburg airfield was also quickly occupied, and the defenders' morale was shaken by the bombing. However, the runway was still under construction and the water table had not yet lowered, and the aircraft landing there sank in the soft ground. None of the airfields was therefore able to receive significant reinforcements. In the end, the paratroopers occupied Ypenburg but did not advance to The Hague as their route was blocked by hastily assembled Dutch troops. In the early afternoon they were dispersed by fire from three Dutch artillery batteries. Dutch batteries also drove the German occupiers from the other two fields. The remaining airborne troops sought refuge in the surrounding villages and villas.

Destroyed German transport aircraft of the type Ju 52 on the airfield in Waalhaven .

The German losses at Waalhaven airfield were limited. The attack on Rotterdam was much more successful. Twelve Heinkel He 59 seaplanes, overcrowded with two troop trains, landed in the heart of the city and unloaded attack teams who captured the Willemsbrücke, a bridge over the New Maas, to form a bridgehead. At the same time, the Waalhaven military airfield, located south of the city on the island of IJsselmonde, was attacked by air forces. An infantry battalion was stationed here, but so close to the airfield that the paratroopers landed near their positions. A confusing fight ensued. The first wave of Junkers suffered no losses and the transports continued to land. In the end, the Dutch defenders were overwhelmed. The increasing number of German troops began to move east to occupy IJsselmonde and eventually made contact with the paratroopers who were to occupy the vital bridge at Dordrecht . Although the Dutch Navy intervened - the torpedo boats Z5 and TM 51 attacked the Willemsbrug and later the destroyer HNLMS Van Galen went up the Nieuwe Waterweg to bomb the airfield at a short distance - but this only resulted in the sinking of the Van Galen after one Bomb attack. A plan to use the gunboats HNLMS Flores and HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau was therefore abandoned. The Dordrecht Bridge was captured on the island of Dordrecht, but the occupation endured in the city itself. The long Moerdijk bridges over the wide Hollands Diep estuary, which connects the island with the province of Noord-Brabant , were conquered and a bridgehead attached to the south side.

German air landings in Rotterdam

German landings in Rotterdam. Carrying out a plan approved by Hitler, the Germans attempted to capture the IJssel and Maas bridges intact by using commando teams of Brandenburgers who began to infiltrate before the main advance across the Dutch border. Some troops arrived on the evening of May 9th. They approached the bridges on the night of May 10th. Some teams had some men disguised as Dutch military police who pretended to bring in a group of German prisoners to fool the Dutch detonation teams. Some of these "military police" were real Dutch, members of the National Socialist Movement, the Dutch Nazi party. Most of these attempts failed and the bridges were blown up on two occasions with Brandenburgers and everyone. The main exception was the Gennep Railway Bridge . An armored train immediately crossed it, followed by a troop train that drove directly through the Peel Raam position near Mill and unloaded an infantry battalion behind the defensive line.

The Dutch have presented reports on German soldiers in disguise to international news agencies. This caused fear of a fifth column , particularly in Belgium and France . Unlike later in these two countries, however, there was no mass exodus of civilians clogging the streets in the Netherlands. In general, German soldiers behaved in a civilized manner towards the Dutch population and stood in proper queues in the shops to buy goods that were rationed in Germany, such as B. Buying chocolate.

The Sint Servaas Bridge in Maastricht was destroyed by the Dutch armed forces.

Transfer from Pak to ferry on the afternoon of May 10, 1940

After the generally unsuccessful attacks on the bridges, the German divisions began attempting to cross the rivers IJssel and Maas . The first waves were usually destroyed because the bunkers were not sufficiently fired at. In most places, repeated shelling destroyed the bunkers and the infantry divisions crossed the river after building pontoon bridges. But with some, like Venlo , the attempt was abandoned. In Arnhem , the Leibstandarte Der Führer led the attack and that day advanced to the Grebbe Line , followed by the 207th Infantry Division .

Despite the blasting of the Wilhelmina Bridge and the Sint Servaas Bridge, German troops quickly conquered the Maastricht traffic junction. Photo 10 May 1940 in Maastricht.

Even before the armored train arrived, it was planned to withdraw the 3rd Army Corps from behind the Peel-Raam position and to take all of the artillery with them with the exception of 36 8 Staal field cannons (84 mm). Each of its six regiments was to leave behind a battalion as cover forces along with fourteen "border battalions". The group was called the "Peel Division". This retreat was originally planned for the first night after the invasion under cover of darkness, but due to the rapid German advance, an immediate retreat was ordered at 06:45 to prevent the 3rd Army Corps from becoming involved with enemy troops. The corps joined "Brigade G", six battalions that had already occupied the Waal - Linge line, and was thus brought back into shape. It wouldn't see any more fighting.

The light division stationed in Vught was the only maneuvering force owned by the Dutch army. The planned withdrawal had also been carried out a day earlier. The regiments had driven over the Maas and Waal bridges and then turned left through the Alblasserwaard when it was decided in the afternoon to counter the German landing in the air on IJsselmonde. In the evening it reached the Noord, the river that separates the Alblasserwaard from IJsselmonde. There they found that the sector near the only bridge, which was built in 1939, was not heavily occupied by the airborne troops because the Germans simply hadn't known of its existence due to outdated maps. It was decided to postpone a crossing to the next day in order to gather enough strength. No attempt was made to build a beachhead .

In the meantime, on the evening of the 10th, around 10 p.m., French reconnaissance elements with Panhard 178 armored cars had arrived at the Dutch border and formed an avant-garde for the French 1st Mechanized Light Division. This division operated on the northern flank of the 7th French Army. Their mission was to ensure contact between Fortress Holland and Antwerp. Attempts to coordinate the French advance with Colonel Leonard Johannes Schmidt, the military commander of the Dutch troops on Noord-Brabant, were largely unsuccessful as the Dutch defense, apart from the fact that it could not be reached that day, already collapsed. In Mill, the 256th Infantry Division was initially unable to take advantage of the opportunity to have a battalion behind the defenders as it failed to locate it. After a first attack by attack elements had been repulsed, a full attack on the main line of defense was initially postponed until the next day, as most of the artillery guns had not yet passed the only pontoon bridge over the Meuse , which had caused a traffic jam as it was damaged in an incident had been. In the early evening, in a sudden change of plan, it was decided to attack, although there was no artillery support other than a 105 mm battery. An unsolicited Stuka attack, which also hit the mill sector shortly before the advance, devastated some Dutch defenders and formed a weak section in the line from which the Dutch troops were removed. Although the Germans were slow to take advantage of the breakthrough, Colonel Schmidt ordered at 8:30 p.m. to abandon the Peel-Raam position and withdraw his troops to the west in order to improvise a new line on the Zuid-Willemsvaart Canal .

In the north, the 1st Cavalry Division had reached the Meppel - Groningen line at the end of the day , which was delayed by logistical problems and the demolition of 236 bridges by Dutch defenders. The Dutch troop strength in this area was weak.

In the extreme south, the six border battalions in the province of Limburg only slightly delayed the advance of the German 6th Army ; before noon the area was overrun and the strategic city of Maastricht had surrendered, paving the way for the German offensive to central Belgium. However, the Germans failed to capture the main bridge unscathed, forcing them to postpone the crossing by the 4th Panzer Division until the next day.

May 11th

On May 11, the Dutch commander, General Winkelman, faced two priorities. First he wanted to take out the German airborne troops. Although the strategic attack had failed, he feared a further build-up of the enemy over Waalhaven and saw in the German possession of the Moerdijk bridges a serious obstacle to the movement of Allied reinforcements into the fortress Holland. The second priority was closely related to the first: the French army was able to build a strong line of defense in Noord-Brabant to connect the fortress of Holland with the main Allied forces in Belgium. Having withdrawn most of his troops from the region, Winkelman had limited resources to influence this process and left the task largely to the local commanders.

Little was achieved that day in either respect. The planned counterattack of the light division against the airborne troops on IJsselmonde failed. The bridge over the Noord River had been prepared in time for the German paratroopers to defend themselves, and it proved impossible to force it. Several attempts to cross the river by boat only managed to build a few isolated bridgeheads. At 10:15 a.m., the light division received permission to abort the crossing and ordered to shift its axis of attack by reinforcing the Dutch troops on the island of Dordrecht , where it arrived that night. After the island of Dordrecht had been freed from enemy troops, the division should advance over the Dordrecht Bridge to IJsselmonde to reach Rotterdam.

General of the paratroopers Kurt Student

Earlier in the day, Dutch battalions made two attempts to attack the western flank of the German perimeter. The first battalion, which had been withdrawn from the Belgian border, partially crossed the Alte Maas at two points ( Oud-Beijerland and Puttershoek ) and tried to storm the bridge at Barendrecht to IJsselmonde on the Hoekse Waard, with the ferry at the previous day Wieldrecht crossed the Dordtse Kil to the island of Dordrecht and tried to expand his bridgehead. Although the crossings were successful, the advance of the first battalion was carried out only hesitantly; The troops were surprised and dispersed by German counter-attacks. The second battalion was also surprised when many men were captured. In the afternoon a French reconnaissance unit, the 5th Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie, with the support of another Dutch border battalion, attempted an attack on the southern Moerdijk bridgehead, but the armored carriages of the 6th Cuirassiers, with which they were reinforced, were bombed by German Stukas and had to withdraw.

In Rotterdam the Dutch did not succeed in removing the German airborne troops from their bridgehead on the north bank of the Meuse, although they were reinforced by an infantry regiment. Despite General Kurt Student's permission , the German commander in Rotterdam refused to evacuate this bridgehead, and the few German defenders clung to a single office building protected by a canal from them and covered by the fire from the south bank. The two remaining Dutch bombers could not destroy the Willemsbrücke. The German armed forces involved in the previous day's attack on The Hague did not believe in the successful attempts to eliminate the isolated groups of around 1,600 paratroopers and airborne troops.

In Noord-Brabant the situation deteriorated rapidly. The French commanders of the 7th Army had expected that the Dutch resistance at the Maas and Peel-Raam positions with a force of about five divisions would have brought them at least four days to build a line of defense near Breda . They were unpleasantly surprised to learn that the top three divisions had moved north and that the remaining forces were already in retreat. The withdrawal of the Peel Division from the Peel-Raam position to the Zuid-Willemsvaart , a canal some 10 to 30 kilometers to the west, meant leaving their well-anchored positions and the little artillery in exchange behind for a completely unprepared line . In addition, the east bank of the canal was higher than the west bank and provided excellent cover for the attackers. After all, the order to withdraw never reached Mill; As a result, a section of the canal near Heeswijk was not defended. Since this section contained a bridge that had not been demolished, the Germans could easily cross the canal around 1 p.m. A second crossing at Erp against the opposition resulted in a general breakdown of the line. By the end of the 11th the Germans had crossed the Zuid-Willemsvaart in most places, and the Peel Division had largely been disbanded. Colonel Schmidt's plans to concentrate his armed forces on the Tilburg - Herzogenbusch route failed. With the French refusing to advance further northeast than Tilburg, a dangerous gap opened up, apart from a few armored vehicles that went as far as Berlicum. Given the general Dutch weakness in the region, Winkelman asked the British government to send an army corps to strengthen Allied positions in the region and to bomb Waalhaven airfield.

All efforts in the south were based on the assumption that the Grebbe Line could repel attacks on its own; Their reserves were even partially shifted to the counterattack against the air forces. However, there was some evidence that a problem was developing in this sector. Motorized elements of the SS standard "Der Führer", which preceded the 207th Infantry Division , had reached the southernmost part of the Grebbe line in front of the Grebbeberg on the evening of the 10th . This sector of the main line of defense had no flooding in front of it and was therefore chosen as the division's main axis of attack. It was protected by a number of outposts manned by two companies of infantry. At around three-thirty on the morning of the 11th, German artillery began shelling the outposts, followed by an attack by two battalions of the Führer at dawn. Since the German fire had cut the telephone lines, no artillery support could be requested from the Dutch defenders. The defense was further hampered by the fact that the area was not yet cleared of vegetation, which provided good cover for the attackers. Around noon a breakthrough was made in the far north of the outpost line, and the Dutch positions were then slowly rolled up from behind. The outnumbered and inferior armed companies resisted as best they could, but by evening all outposts were in German hands. The commander of the 2nd Army Corps, Major General Jacob Harberts, did not respond appropriately. He did not notice that motorized SS troops were involved in the attack, and believed that the cowardice of the defenders had turned the outposts over to a small testing German force. He ordered a night counterattack by the 4th Division's individual reserve battalion. This attack was canceled. Dutch troops from the main line, who had not been informed of the procedure, fired at the battalion, which led to great confusion, and a pioneer bridge required to cross the Grift creek was not brought forward in time. However, heavy Dutch artillery preparatory fire had the unintended effect that the Germans abandoned their plans for a night attack.

Meanwhile the 1st Cavalry Division advanced in the north through the province of Friesland towards the last Dutch replacement line, the Wonsstellung, and reached Sneek in the evening . Most of the Dutch troops had been evacuated from the north via the Afsluitdijk .

12th of May

• See also: Battle of the Grebbeberg

On the morning of May 12th, General Winkelman remained moderately optimistic. He still assumed that, with the help of the French, a solid line of defense could be established in Noord-Brabant, and expected that good progress could be made in eliminating the air forces without facing any particular threat to the Grebbe Line would be aware. During the day his hopes were dashed.

In the previous two days the 9th Panzer Division had seen little action. It crossed the Meuse in the early morning of May 11th, but was unable to advance quickly that day over streets crowded with infantry division supplies. The Panzer Division was under orders to join the airborne troops as soon as the infantry troops broke through the Peel-Raam position. Since the entire Dutch front had disbanded, the conditions were favorable for such an attempt. This would not be hindered by the French armed forces. Since the German 6th Army was threatening its right flank and there was no time to prepare a line of defense, Gamelin ordered the 7th Army to withdraw its left flank. 2nd Brigade Légère Mécanique, part of the 1st Division Légère Mécanique, which had arrived in Tilburg, withdrew to the south. The 25th Division d'Infanterie Motorisée in Breda did not advance further north than the mark. Since the original order to occupy the Geertruidenberg sector had not been obeyed, the route to the Moerdijk bridges would not be blocked and the German armored division would not be attacked by its stronger French mechanized counterpart. Reconnaissance members of the 9th Panzer Division used this opportunity effectively: At dawn, north of Tilburg , near Loon op Zand , they surprised Colonel Schmidt and took him prisoner. The Dutch troops in the province lost all unified command as a result. Shortly after noon, German armored vehicles had penetrated the southern bridgehead of Moerdijk thirty kilometers to the west and cut the fortress of Holland off from the main Allied forces. at 4:45 p.m. they reached the bridges themselves. The northern part of this troop would not stay long in the region: at 1:35 p.m. Gamelin ordered a complete retreat of all French troops in Noord-Brabant to Antwerp , which were now limited to actions by the rear guard would.

Grebbeberg seen from the south (2005).

While the situation in the south became critical, the Germans made their first successful efforts in the east to drive the Dutch defenders off the Grebbeberg. After a preparatory artillery fire in the morning, a battalion of the Führer attacked an eight hundred meter wide section of the main line, which was occupied by a Dutch company. She took advantage of the many blind spots in the Dutch fire area and soon broke through the Dutch positions, which had little depth. A second German battalion then expanded the incursion to the north. The Dutch artillery was just as strong as the German, but did not fire sufficiently against the enemy concentration of infantry and was largely limited to the prohibition. Eight hundred meters to the west was a stop line, a continuous trench system from which the defenders were supposed to exercise active defense and carry out local counter-attacks. However, due to a lack of numbers, training and heavy weapons, the attacks failed because of the well-trained SS troops. By evening the Germans had taken control of the heavily forested area between the two lines. When one of the SS battalion commanders, Obersturmbannführer Hilmar Wäckerle , discovered a weak point, he suddenly attacked with a hastily assembled troop about company strength . In a case of infiltration tactics rare for this battle, he broke the stop line and advanced 1.6 km to the west until he was stopped by a fall-back line along the Rhenen railway. The breakthrough sparked panic among defenders, who for the most part have given up the hold line at this point. However, since Wäckerle had no time to coordinate his approach with other units, it was not exploited any further. Order was restored at the stop line and the SS company was isolated and surrounded. The earlier general German advance later led to the main line being abandoned more than 3.2 km to the north because the troops there feared an attack from behind.

The Dutch understood that the occupying forces of the Grebbe Line would not be strong enough to repel all attacks on their own. They should delay an offensive until the reserves strengthened it. Since it was not understood the day before that the German main attack was imminent, these reserves would not arrive in time to intervene in the battle in the defense zone between the two systems of rifts. This was all the more serious since the stop line was lacking in depth and lacking large shelters to accommodate enough troops to carry out a strong frontal counterattack. Late in the evening it was decided to carry out a flank attack from the north the next day.

To the north, the Wons position formed a bridgehead at the eastern end of the enclosure dike. it was about nine kilometers long in circumference to enclose enough land to accommodate large numbers of retreating troops without making them too vulnerable to air strikes. On May 12, units with a combined strength of only two battalions were still present, so the line was kept weak. This was taken advantage of by the first German unit to arrive, the only bicycle battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. At noon, in a concentrated attack, it quickly penetrated the line, forcing the defenders to retreat to the enclosure dike. For some, the German advance cut their escape route by land; They left the small port of Makkum and took the last remaining ships on the east side of the IJsselmeer. This denied the Germans any craft for attempting a crossing, the plan of which has now been abandoned.

Burnt out shell oil reservoirs

In the afternoon General Winkelman received information about armored forces advancing in Langstraat on the road between 's-Hertogenbosch and the Moerdijk bridges. He still hoped these forces were French, but Radio Bremen's announcement at 11:00 p.m. that German tanks had teamed up with the paratroopers put an end to those hopes. He was finally beginning to understand the essence of German strategy. He ordered the artillery batteries at Hoekse Waard to try to destroy the Moerdijk bridges and sent a special engineer unit to Rotterdam to blow up the Willemsbrücke. Pessimistic about the general situation at the time, he also ordered that Royal Dutch Shell's huge strategic oil reserves at Pernis be set on fire. The Dutch government was informed of his concerns by Winkelman early that afternoon and asked Winston Churchill to request three British divisions to turn the tide. The new prime minister replied that he simply had no reserves; However, three British torpedo boats were sent to the IJsselmeer. The 2nd Welsh Guard Battalion was also ready to be sent to Hoek van Holland , although it would not arrive in time.

In contrast to Winkelman, the German command was very satisfied with the day's events. It was feared that the third day of the operation could be a "day of crisis" as the XXVI. Army Corps had to overcome the resistance of several French divisions near Breda . Germans were also concerned that they might face Belgian or even British divisions. Therefore, before the invasion, von Bock asked to be reinforced by another army corps in this effort. When Chief of Staff Franz Halder denied this, he had arranged for the formation of an additional army corps headquarters to control the complex strategic situation of the simultaneous struggle against the Allies and the advance into Fortress Holland over the Moerdijk bridges. As no real crisis appeared to be looming on May 12, as the French withdrew and the Belgian and British armed forces were completely absent, von Bock decided that the XXVI. Army Corps would be responsible for pursuing the French south towards Antwerp , while some armed forces would be directed from the new headquarters, Generalkommando XXXIX under the command of Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmidt , to advance north at 254. Infantry division, mostly 9th Panzer Division , and SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.

May 13th

The HMS Codrington , on which the members of the Dutch royal family were evacuated to Great Britain

HMS Codrington , who evacuated members of the Dutch royal family from the Netherlands . In the early morning of May 13th, General Winkelman informed the Dutch government that he thought the general situation was critical. On land, the Dutch were cut off from the Allied front and it had become clear that no major Allied landings were to be expected to reinforce fortress Holland at sea. Without this support, there was no prospect of sustained successful resistance. German tanks could pass through Rotterdam quickly; Winkelman had already arranged all available anti-tank guns in a radius around The Hague to protect the seat of government. However, an immediate collapse of the Dutch defense could still be prevented if the planned counter-attacks could seal off the southern front at Dordrecht and restore the eastern border at Grebbeberg . Therefore, the cabinet decided to continue the fight for the time being and gave the general the mandate to surrender the army if he saw fit, as well as instructions to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Nevertheless, it was also considered essential to bring Queen Wilhelmina to safety; She left Hook of Holland around noon , where a British battalion of the Irish Guards was present, on the HMS Hereward , a British destroyer. When sea mines made it too dangerous to get to Zeeland, she went to England. The evening before, the Queen's only child and presumed heiress, Princess Juliana, had traveled to Harwich on the HMS Codrington with her husband Prince Bernhard von Lippe-Biesterfeld and their children from IJmuiden . Arrangements for departure had been made before the invasion. Since the Queen was constitutionally part of the government, her departure gave the cabinet the choice of whether to follow her or to stay. After heated discussions it was decided to leave as well: the ministers left Hoek van Holland on the HMS Windsor at 7:20 pm to form a government- in- exile in London , after they had given Winkelman full governance over the home country. Three Dutch merchant ships escorted by British warships transferred government bonds and diamonds to the United Kingdom.

While two tank units of the 9th Panzer Division remained with XXVI Army Corps to pursue the retreating French, the other four began to cross the Moerdijk traffic bridge at 05:20. Two tank units also went to the north side. The Dutch made some attempts to indirectly block the advance of German armaments. At around 6 a.m. the last operational bomber, a Fokker T. V, dropped two bombs on the bridge. You hit a bridge pillar, but you couldn't explode; The bomber was shot down. Dutch batteries in the Hoekse Waard attempted to destroy the bridge with artillery fire despite bomber attacks, but the massive structure was only slightly damaged. Attempts to flood the island of Dordrecht failed because the inlet locks could not be opened - and were too small anyway.

The light division tried to break through the German corridor by advancing west and connecting to a small bridgehead of the ferry across the Dortse Kil. However, two of the four available battalions were used inefficiently to retake the suburbs of Dordrecht . As the other two battalions approached the main street, they were hit head-on by a few dozen German tanks. The avant-garde of the Dutch troops, not being informed of their presence, mistook the red air-recognition cloths attached to the German armor for orange flags that French vehicles could use to indicate their friendly intentions - orange is used by the Dutch as her state color - and ran towards the vehicles to greet them, only understanding their mistake when they were gunned down. The battalions, which were later hit by a Stuka bombing, fled to the east. A disaster was prevented by 47-mm and 75-mm batteries, which broke off the direct fire attack by the German tanks. The left wing of the Light Division then completed an ordered retreat into the Alblasserwaard around 1:00 p.m. despite the high losses. In the early afternoon, eight tanks reduced the ferry's bridgehead. A tank unit also tried to conquer the old city center of Dordrecht without infantry support and bravely broke the barricades, but was ordered to retreat after fierce street fighting in which at least two Panzerkampfwagen II were destroyed and three tanks were badly damaged. All Dutch troops were withdrawn from the island that night.

The German armored troops advanced north over the Dordrecht Bridge to the island of IJsselmonde. Three tanks, two PzKpfw. IIs and a Panzerkampfwagen III of the staff platoon of the 1st Panzer Battalion stormed the Barendrecht Bridge in the Hoekse Waard, but they were all lost to a single 47mm anti-tank gun. Although the Germans did not pursue their attack, this area was also given up by the Dutch troops.

The Willemsbücke shortly after its opening in 1878, seen from Noordereiland.

One last attempt was made in Rotterdam to blow up the Willemsbrücke. The commander of the 2nd Irish Guard of the Battalion in Hoek van Holland, 32 km west, declined to participate in the attempt because it was outside his area of ​​command. Two Dutch companies, mainly composed of Dutch marines, stormed the beachhead. The bridge was reached and the remaining fifty German defenders in the building in front of it were about to surrender when the attack was called off after hours of fighting due to heavy flank fire from across the river.

In the north, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division , Major General Kurt Feldt , faced the unenviable task of advancing across the dike due to the lack of ships. This dam was blocked by the Kornwerderzand position, which protected a large complex of locks to regulate the water level of the IJsselmeer, which had to be high enough to sustain many floods in Fortress Holland. The main fortification contained 47 mm anti-tank guns. Long canal pillars protrude to the right and left in front of and behind the locks; Bunkers had been built on these, which could set a heavy fire on the dam, which would not offer the slightest cover for any attacker. On May 13th, the position was reinforced by a 20mm anti-aircraft battery. Feldt had intended to destroy the position first with a battery of siege mortars, but the train carrying it was blocked on May 10 by a blown railway bridge in Winschoten . Several air strikes on May 13 had little effect: in the late afternoon, five bicycle detachments attempted to approach the main bunker complex under the guise of artillery fire, but fled soon after being shot at. The first was nailed down and could only retreat under cover of darkness, leaving a few dead behind.

In the east, the Germans tried to overcome the resistance in the Grebbe Line by also using the other division of the X Army Corps, the 227th Infantry Division. Orders were given to break through a second attack axis near Scherpenzeel , where a dry approach route had been discovered by the floods. The line in this area was defended by the Dutch 2nd Infantry Division. Two German regiments were to attack at the same time in neighboring sectors. After the regiment on the right, 366th Infantry Regiment, reached the starting position for the attack, the regiment on the left, 412th Infantry Regiment, was delayed by flanking fire from the Dutch outpost line whose position was incorrect. It allowed itself to engage in fragmented firefights, and although the reserve regiment was eventually brought forward, little progress was made against the outposts. In the meantime, the waiting 366th Infantry Regiment was hit by concentrated Dutch artillery fire and had to withdraw, resulting in a total failure of the attack by the 227th Infantry Division.

Junkers Ju 87 Bs

In the extreme south of the Grebbe Line, the Grebbeberg, the Germans deployed three SS battalions, including support troops and three fresh infantry battalions from the IR.322. two of IR.374 placed in immediate reserve. On the night of May 12th to 13th, about a dozen battalions had assembled in this sector. These forces consisted of the reserve battalions of several army corps, divisions and brigades as well as the independent Brigade B, which had been liberated as the main line of defense in the Land van Maas en Waal in the wake of the retreat of the III. Army corps had been abandoned from Noord-Brabant. However, not all of these units would be counterattacked in a single attempt to retake the main line. Some battalions were immediately drafted into the battle on the stop line, others were kept in reserve, mainly behind the fall-back line near the Rhenen railway. In addition, most of the battalions were a quarter less strong. Four were to be used under the command of Brigade B for the flanking attack from the north. This attack was delayed for several hours; When it finally started late in the morning of May 13, there was a comparable advance of two battalions of the Führer. Unaware of the Dutch intentions, this brigade had shifted its axis of attack to the north in order to roll up the Grebbe Line from behind.

A confused encounter battle ensued, in which the vanguard of the Dutch troops, poorly supported by their artillery, gave way to the attacking SS troops at around 12.30 p.m. Soon this led to a general withdrawal of the brigade, which turned into an escape when the area around Grebbeberg was bombed by 27 Ju 87 Stukas at 1:30 p.m.

Meanwhile, the 207th Infantry Division was obliged to fight for the first time on Grebbeberg itself when two battalions of its 322nd Infantry Regiments attacked the stop line. The first wave of German attackers was repulsed with heavy losses, but a second wave managed to fragment the trench line, which was then taken after fierce fighting. The regiment then wiped the area to the west, which was delayed by resistance from several Dutch command posts. It retreated in the late afternoon, just as the SS battalions were being relocated further north to avoid preparatory artillery fire. After the relocation, the Germans wanted to attack again to take over the Rhenen Fallback Line and the village of Achterberg. However, these preparations would prove superfluous: the Dutch had already disappeared.

The same Stuka bombing that routed Brigade B also broke the morale of the reserves in Rhenen . By the morning these troops had already shown serious discipline problems, with units disintegrating due to the German prohibition fire and leaving the battlefield. In the late afternoon most of the 4th Infantry Division fled west. The Germans had expected the Dutch to try to fill in gaps in the line, and indeed it was planned to move two regiments of the Dutch 3rd Army Corps north for this purpose. The Dutch command now suffered such a loss of control that all considerations to restore a continuous front had to be given up. A gap 8 km wide had emerged in the defense. Fearing that they might otherwise be encircled, Van Voorst tot Voorst ordered the three army corps at 8:30 p.m. to immediately abandon both the Grebbe line and the Waal - Linge position and to move to the eastern front of fortress Holland during the night New to withdraw Dutch waterline. The Germans, however, did not take advantage of their success immediately; It was only around 9 p.m. that they realized that the gap existed even after the renewed advance had not encountered any enemy resistance.

May 14th

Bunker at Kornwerderzand

Despite his pessimism on the Dutch government and the mandate to surrender the army, General Winkelman waited for events to end and avoided actually surrendering until it was absolutely necessary. In doing so, he was perhaps motivated by the desire to engage the opposing German troops as long as possible to support the Allied war effort. Although the situation remained critical in the early morning of May 14th, a certain calm was felt in the Dutch headquarters.

Picture after the street fighting in Rotterdam. In the foreground a Dutch position.

In the north, a German artillery bombardment began at 9 a.m. on the Kornwerderzand position . However, the German batteries were forced to move away after being caught off guard by a counterfire from 15 km away. Aft cannon of HNLMS Johan Maurits van Nassau, who drove into the Wadden Sea . Feldt now decided to land on the coast of Noord-Holland . Some barges were found. The crossing was only actually carried out after the surrender. During this operation, one barge collapsed and the rest got lost. Fears of such a landing had led Winkelman on May 12th to order the occupation of an improvised "Amsterdam position" along the North Sea Canal, but only weak forces were available.

In the east, the field army successfully withdrew from the Grebbe Line to the eastern front under the cover of the ground fog , without being bombed as feared, and broke away from the enemy troops that were gradually pursuing. The new location had some serious drawbacks: the floods were largely unfinished and the earthworks and berms that were needed because trenches to be flooded in the peat soil had not yet been made, so defenses had to be improvised, to accommodate the much larger number of troops.

On IJsselmonde , the German armed forces were preparing to cross the Maas in Rotterdam , which was defended by around eight Dutch battalions. Crossings would be attempted in two sectors. The main attack would take place in the center of the city, with the German 9th Panzer Division advancing over the Willemsbrücke. Then SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler would cross a battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 22nd Airborne Division to the left and east of Rotterdam in order to operate on boats. These relief attacks could prevent a concentration of Dutch armed forces and block the advance of the 9th Panzer Division through a densely built-up urban area that is cut by canals. Given these conditions and the limited resources available, the focus was on air support. As early as May 13, von Küchler, fearing that the British might strengthen the fortress of Holland, instructed Schmidt: "The resistance in Rotterdam should be broken by all means, if necessary threatened with the destruction of the city and carried out." He should be supported by the highest management level, like Hitler in the Führer directive No. 11 (Führer directive No. 11): "On the north wing, the resistance of the Dutch army has proven to be stronger than expected. Both political and military reasons demand to break this resistance quickly. (...) In addition, the rapid conquest of the fortress of Holland is to be facilitated by a targeted weakening of the air power operated by the Sixth Army. Kampfgeschwader 54 , with Heinkel He 111 bombers , was therefore moved from the sixth to the eighteenth army relocated.

Generals Kurt Student and Schmidt wanted a limited air strike to temporarily paralyze the defense and allow the tanks to break out of the bridgehead. Severe destruction of the city should be avoided as this would only hinder its progress. The commander of the air force, Hermann Göring , was concerned about the fate of his encircled airborne troops and hoped to force an immediate surrender of the Dutch state through a much larger bombardment. His head of operations, General Otto Hoffmann von Waldau , described this option as a "radical solution". Despite Albert Kesselring's concerns about its size and necessity, Heinkels flew to an area bombing of downtown Rotterdam at 11:45 a.m.

German Heinkel He 111 bombers as they were used in Rotterdam.

Rotterdam Central Station after the German air raid on May 14, 1940

At 9:00 a.m., a German messenger crossed the Willemsbrücke to deliver an ultimatum from Schmidt to Colonel Pieter Scharroo , the Dutch commander of Rotterdam, and to demand that the city surrender. If a positive reply had not been received within two hours, the "most serious destruction procedure" would be used. However, Scharroo didn't get the message until 10:30 a.m. Even so, he did not feel inclined to surrender and asked Winkelman for orders. He heard that the document had neither been signed nor contained the sender's name and instructed him to send a Dutch envoy to clarify the matter and buy time. At 12:15 p.m., a Dutch master handed this request to von Choltitz . When the German envoy returned at 12:00 p.m. Schmidt had already sent a radio message that the bombing had to be postponed because negotiations had started. Shortly after the Dutch envoy had received a second ultimatum, which had now been signed by Schmidt, and with a new expiry time of 4:20 p.m., two formations of Heinkels arrived at around 1:20 p.m. who had not received a recall order. This was later explained by the Germans because they had already retracted their towed antennas.

Schmidt ordered red flares to be fired to signal that the bombardment should be stopped, but only the squadron that fired the bomb from the southwest abandoned their attack after their first three planes dropped their bombs. The other 54 Heinkels approaching from the east continued to drop their share of the total of 1,308 bombs, destroying the city center and killing 814 civilians. The fires that followed destroyed around 24,000 houses and left almost 80,000 residents homeless. At 15:50, Scharroo surrendered personally to Schmidt. In the meantime, Goering had ordered a second bombing of the city - a group of Heinkels had already left - unless news was received that all of Rotterdam was occupied. When Schmidt learned of the order, he hastily sent an unencrypted message at 5:15 p.m. claiming that the city was occupied even though it had not yet been. The bombers were called back just in time.

The surrender of the Dutch army

The situation on the Dutch front shortly before the air raid on Rotterdam . Legend:

Location of the Dutch defense lines and areas held by Dutch troops

Strong Dutch defensive positions against tank formations

Dutch positions on Zeeland

Belgian defense positions

French troops in the Netherlands

Positions of German troops and areas under German control

Dutch negotiator with a white flag runs towards the German positions on Noordereiland. Recorded on May 14, 1940.

Rotterdam, entry of motorized German troops

Winkelman initially intended to continue the fight, although Rotterdam had surrendered and German troops from there could now advance into the heart of fortress Holland. The possibility of terrorist attacks was considered prior to the invasion and was not seen as a cause for immediate surrender. Precautions had been taken to maintain effective government after the widespread destruction of the cities. The area around The Hague could still hold off a tank attack, and the New Holland Water Line had some defensive capabilities. Although it could be attacked from behind, it would take the Germans some time to deploy their forces in the difficult polder landscape. However, he soon received a message from Colonel Cuno Eduard Willem, Freiherr von Voorst, to Voorst, the commander of the city of Utrecht, that the Germans were demanding their surrender; Leaflets were dropped from propaganda planes announcing that only unconditional surrender would "save the fate of Warsaw". Winkelman concluded that it had apparently become German policy to devastate every city that resisted. Given his mandate to avoid unnecessary suffering and the hopelessness of the Dutch military position, he decided to surrender. All higher-ranking army corps were informed of his decision by telex at 4:50 p.m. and requested to first destroy their weapons and then offer their surrender to the nearest German units. At 5:20 p.m. the German envoy in The Hague was informed. At around 7:00 p.m., Winkelman gave a radio speech in which he informed the Dutch people. In this way, the German command also became aware that the Dutch had surrendered, that the Dutch troops had generally broken away from the enemy and had not yet established any contact. The Dutch surrender implied that in principle a ceasefire should be observed by both parties.

German troops on the advance in a devastated area of ​​Rotterdam.

the Dutch general Winkelman , in the center of the picture, leaves the school building after the surrender to the German armed forces.

German troops marching through Amsterdam

Winkelman acted both in his capacity as commander of the Dutch army and in his capacity as the chief executive of the home country. This created a somewhat ambiguous situation. On the morning of May 14, the commander of the Royal Netherlands Navy, Vice Admiral Johannes Fürstner, left the country to continue the fight. Dutch naval ships were generally not involved in the surrender. Eight ships and four unfinished Hulks had already left, some smaller ships were sunk, and nine others left for England on the evening of May 14th. The Mr. Mrs. Johan Maurits van Nassau was sunk by German bombers during the crossing. Counter Admiral Hoyte Jolles, the commander of the Dutch main port of Den Helder, concluded that his base with a fleet of 10,000 men, its own air service and extensive land defenses would continue Should resist. Winkelman found it difficult to persuade him to obey the surrender order. Large parts of the Dutch army were also reluctant to believe in or accept the surrender, especially those units that had barely seen fighting such as 3rd and 4th Army Corps and Brigade A.

On May 15 at 5:00 a.m., a German messenger reached The Hague and invited Winkelman to Rijsoord to meet von Küchler to negotiate the articles of a written surrender document. Both quickly agreed on most terms, and Winkelman declared that he had given up the Army, Navy and Air Force. When von Küchler demanded that the pilots who were still fighting for the Allies be treated as militants - viewed by the Germans as guerrilla fighters outside the war laws - Winkelman's refusal made it clear to the Germans that only the armed forces in their home country, with the exception of Zeeland , would capitulate but not the country itself. On other points a swift agreement was reached and the document was signed at 10:15 am.

The fighting in Zeeland

Military situation in central Zeeland on May 10, 1940

German machine gun troop in front of a wire obstacle in the Zanddijk position

The province of Zeeland was excluded from the surrender. The fighting continued there in a joint alliance with French troops. The Dutch armed forces in the province comprised eight full battalions of army and naval forces. They were commanded by Rear Admiral Hendrik Jan van der Stad, who as naval officer reported directly to Winkelman. The area was under sea command, as the seaport of Flushing predominated on the island of Walcheren , which controlled access to Antwerp via the Westerschelde . The northern islands of the province were only defended by a few units. The defense of Sea Flanders , the Dutch part of Flanders , was largely left to the Allies . The main Dutch armed forces would therefore concentrate in Zuid-Beveland, the peninsula east of Walcheren, in order to deny the enemy this approach to Vlissingen . Zuid-Beveland was connected to the coast of Noord-Brabant by an isthmus . At its eastern and narrowest end, the bathing position had been prepared and occupied by an infantry battalion. This was mainly intended as a collection line for possible Dutch troops withdrawing from the east. At the western end was the longer Zanddijk position, which was occupied by three battalions.

Military situation in North Zeeland on May 10, 1940

On May 10th three French GRDIs (Groupes de Reconnaissance of the Division d'Infanterie) arrived. These motorized units then left for Noord-Brabant, but from May 11 the area was reinforced by two French infantry divisions: the 60th Division d'Infanterie, a B-class division, and the newly formed 68th Division d'Infanterie. Some of their equipment was brought through the port of Vlissingen by ship . Most of the troops of these divisions remained south of the Westerschelde in Seeflandern , where two of the eight Dutch battalions and two border companies were also present. Only two French regiments were sent to the north bank. On May 13th, the Dutch troops were placed under the French command and the 68th Division d'Infanterie of the 7th Army. The cooperation between the two allies left much to be desired and was plagued by a lack of communication, misunderstandings and different strategies. The Dutch considered the Bath and Zanddijk positions to be very defensible due to the open polder landscape and extensive flooding. However, the French commander, General Pierre-Servais Durand, was not convinced of their worth and positioned his troops at more noticeable obstacles. On the evening of May 13, one regiment, the 271e of the 68th Division d'Infanterie, occupied the canal through Zuid-Beveland, and the other, the 224e of the 60th Division d'Infanterie, took up position on the Sloe Strait that ran across the island Walcheren separated from Zuid-Beveland, although there was not enough time for adequate anchoring. This prevented an effective concentration of Allied forces, which enabled the Germans, despite their numerical inferiority, to defeat them bit by bit.

On May 14th, the Germans occupied almost all of Noord-Brabant. The SS Standarte Deutschland, which was rapidly approaching the western Scheldt, reached the Bath position. This interrupted the withdrawal of the 27th reconnaissance group of the Division d'Infanterie, which was subsequently destroyed in the defense of Bergen-op-Zoom . The morale of the Bath position defenders, already shaken by stories of Dutch troops fling west, was seriously undermined by news that Winkelman had surrendered. Many concluded that it was useless for Zeeland to continue to resist as the last remaining province. A first artillery bombardment against the position on the evening of May 14th led to the fact that the commanders abandoned their troops, who then also fled.

On the morning of May 15, the SS Standard Germany approached the Zanddijk position. A first attack at around 8 a.m. on outposts in the northern sector was easy to repel, as the Germans had to advance through the floods over a narrow dike, despite the support of air strikes by Stukas. However, the bombing caused the battalions to flee in the main positions, and the entire line had to be abandoned around 2:00 p.m., although the southern part was supported by the French torpedo boat L'Incomprise.

On May 16, the SS standard approached Germany, a few kilometers west of the Zanddijk position, the canal through Zuid-Beveland, where the French 271e infantry regiment was present, only partially buried and now reinforced by the three withdrawn Dutch battalions. An air raid that morning had driven the defenders to flight before the ground attack began. The first German crossings around 11:00 a.m. led to a complete collapse. An attempt on the evening of the same day to force the eight hundred meter long Sloedam , over which most of the French troops had fled to Walcheren , failed. On May 16, the island of Tholen was conquered against slight resistance. On May 17th, Schouwen-Duiveland fell .

Military situation in Zeeland-Flanders on May 10, 1940.

While the commanders of the remaining Dutch troops on South Beveland refused direct orders from their superiors to threaten the German flank, a night attack over the Sloedam on May 17 at 3:00 a.m. failed. The Germans now demanded the surrender of the island; When this was refused, they bombed Arnemuiden and Vlissingen. Middelburg , the provincial capital, was heavily shelled by artillery and the city center burned down partially. The heavy bombardment demoralized the mostly French defenders, and the Germans managed to build a beachhead around noon. The few Dutch troops present on Walcheren, about three companies, ceased their resistance. In the evening, the invading Germans threatened to outflank the French forces that had fled in Vlissingen, but a delay, personally led by Brigadier General Marcel Deslaurens and in which he was killed, enabled most of the troops to be evacuated across the Westerschelde.

After the surrender of North Beveland on May 18, Zeeland-Flanders was the last unoccupied Dutch homeland. On the orders of the French, all Dutch troops were withdrawn to Ostend , Belgium on May 19 , as their presence would demoralize and confuse their own armed forces. On May 27th all of Seeflandern was occupied.

aftermath

After the Dutch defeat, Queen Wilhelmina founded a government in exile in England. The German occupation officially began on May 17, 1940. It lasted five years before the entire country was recaptured by the Western Allies. During this period, over 210,000 Dutch residents became victims of war, including 104,000 Jews and other minorities who were victims of genocide. Another 70,000 may have died from indirect consequences such as poor diet or reduced medical services.

literature

• Amersfoort, Herman; Kamphuis, Piet, eds. (2005), May 1940 - De Strijd op Nederlands grondgebied (in Dutch), The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, ISBN 90-12-08959-X .
• Schulten, CM; Theil, J. (1979), Nederlandse Pantservoertuigen (in Dutch), Bussum: Unieboek BV, ISBN 90-269-4555-8 .
• Star Busmann, CW Partworks and Encyclopedia of World War II
• De Jong, Louis (1969), Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 1: Voorpel (in Dutch), Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
• De Jong, Louis (1969), Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 2: Neutraal (in Dutch), Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
• De Jong, Louis (1970), Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel 3: Mei '40 (in Dutch), Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
• Hooton, ER (1994), Phoenix Triumphant: The Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe, Brockhampton Press, ISBN 1-86019-964-X .
• Hooton, ER (2007), Air Force at War, Volume 2; Blitzkrieg in the West 1939–1940, London: Chevron / Ian Allan, ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6 .
• Thomas L. Jentz : Die deutsche Panzertruppe 1933–1942 - Volume 1 (in German), Wölfersheim-Berstadt: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, ISBN 3-7909-0623-9 .
• Karl-Heinz Frieser : Blitzkrieg legend - The western campaign 1940 (in German), R. Oldenbourg Verlag Munich
• Shirer, William L. (1960), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, New York: Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-671-62420-2 .
• Powaski, Ronald E. (2003), Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940, John Wiley, ISBN 9780471394310 .
• Powaski, Ronald E. (2008), Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940, Book Sales Inc., ISBN 9780785820970 .
• Goossens, Allert MA (2011), History Site "War Over Holland - the Dutch struggle May 1940"
• Grimm, P. ea (2008), dungeon register 1939–1945. All militaire violently in Nederland tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Dungeon register 1940, Studiegroep Luchtoorlog 1939–1945, Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie