Eduard David

Eduard David (1907)

Eduard Heinrich Rudolph David (born June 11, 1863 in Ediger on the Moselle , † December 24, 1930 in Berlin ) was a German politician of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

David has been on the right wing of the party since the 1890s. After his first political and journalistic experience in the Grand Duchy of Hesse , he called for the SPD to turn to rural and peasant groups of voters. In the revisionism dispute, David defended the theses of Eduard Bernstein , who had publicly questioned central social and revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx . Like other leading social democrats from southern Germany, David strove for a systematic alliance policy with moderate parties and groups of the bourgeoisie in order to enforce democratic and social demands. This position was officially rejected by the party until the beginning of the First World War .

David had the greatest impact in the years from 1914 to 1919. He is considered to be the central pioneer of the truce policy , which was intended to ensure that domestic policy remained silent during the war. David hoped for a reward for the social democratic standstill policy through the parliamentarization of the German Empire . With the October reform of 1918 he saw himself at the goal of his way. He also reached top political positions personally. He was first Undersecretary of State, and a short time later he became a minister several times in the Weimar Republic . It was not until 1919 that David gave up his assessment that Germany had fought a defensive war in the First World War . This assumption had previously formed the basis of his policy.

David held parliamentary mandates from 1896, first at the state level in Hesse, then for the German Reichstag . He also became a member of the National Assembly in 1919 . He was its first president and entered the Reich government on February 13, where he remained until June 1920.

Youth, studies, family

Eduard David was born as the son of a Prussian rent master , was baptized as a Protestant and grew up in an "arch-conservative civil servant family". In Krofdorf near Gießen he attended elementary school. The further school career led him to high schools in Gießen and Bielefeld . Before graduating from high school, he interrupted his school career and completed a commercial apprenticeship in Berlin.

After completing his apprenticeship, he made up his Abitur in Bielefeld and then began studying German , history and philosophy at the Ludwig University of Giessen . He finished his studies with the state examination for the higher teaching post. In 1891 David received his doctorate in philosophy with a thesis on "The word formation of the dialect of Krofdorf". During his studies he joined the Arminia fraternity in 1885, which had been newly founded in Gießen in November 1885. Their statutes were drawn up by David. In contrast to the practice of many other fraternities, it permitted the admission of Jews. He also worked on the formulation of the statutes of the liberal General German Boys' Union. He was also a member of the Neogermania Berlin fraternity .

In 1891 David took up a position as a senior teacher at the grammar school in Giessen. In March 1894 he asked for a leave of absence from school service, because his work for the SPD, which he had meanwhile taken up, was hardly compatible with the work of an official in the service of the Grand Duchy of Hesse. A few months later he was finally released by the authorities after he had answered positively a question whether he was committed to social democracy.

In 1896 David married Gertrud Swiderski, daughter of a wealthy Leipzig engineer and machine factory owner. From this marriage his daughter Sonja was born. Gertrud David worked from 1907 to 1916 in the editorial department of the Socialist Monthly Bulletin and also edited the Social Statistics Correspondence . Later she worked as a film director. In 1911 the marriage ended amicably after the couple had been separated since 1908. In July 1918 David married Hermine Schmidt, a doctor's daughter from Lahr in Baden . From this marriage his son Heinrich emerged.

Work for the SPD until the First World War

Politics in the Grand Duchy of Hesse

During his time as a high school teacher, David was committed to the SPD in Hesse. Together with his former college friend Simon Katzenstein , he founded the Mitteldeutsche Sonntagszeitung in 1893 . Their goal was to win over SPD voters and members from the rural population, especially among small farmers. The first edition of the newspaper was presented to the regional party leadership in Frankfurt am Main . David successfully countered the skeptical remark that this issue did not even contain the term “ class struggle ” with the argument that this is exactly what increases the attractiveness of the new paper among the rural population. Apart from that, the idea of ​​class struggle is hidden in every sentence in the newspaper. Two years after founding this weekly newspaper, David managed to win over the young Philipp Scheidemann as editor.

David moved to Mainz in 1896 to work there as editor of the Mainzer Volkszeitung . The participation in this social democratic party newspaper was also short-lived, because Eduard David won a seat in the Second Hessian Chamber of Estates in the constituency of Friedberg - Büdingen as early as 1896 . Against the background of the work associated with this parliamentary seat, the further party work as SPD party secretary for the Grand Duchy of Hesse from 1897 and his own writing activities, David left the Mainz editorial team in 1897. Mainz remained David's center of life until 1905. Here, together with his wife and other friends, he founded the local savings, production and consumption cooperative in 1899 .

In the Second Chamber of the Estates of the Grand Duchy of Hesse , to which he belonged from 1896 to 1908 (elected in the Mainz I constituency ), David attracted attention in particular in school and budget debates. Political friends recognized him as "our best man in the field". The more liberal political culture of the Grand Duchy of Hesse compared to Prussia and Saxony had a lasting impact on David, just as the less confrontational political culture in southern Germany formed, for example, Georg von Vollmar in Bavaria or Ludwig Frank in Baden .

Commitment to maternity protection and sexual reform

Together with the sex reformer Helene Stöcker , with whom he was friends until the First World War, Eduard David was committed to maternity protection and sex reforms . He published in the federal organ for maternity protection , the New Generation , and gave lectures on the subject. In the Reichstag, too, he repeatedly pleaded for these goals.

Agricultural politician

David considered it necessary to interest other sections of the population in the social democratic labor movement in addition to the industrial workers , especially in the predominantly agricultural parts of the country. With the founding of the Mitteldeutsche Sonntagszeitung , a direction was set that David would pursue for decades. His intensive studies of the special economic and social conditions in the country and in agriculture led him to theses on the agricultural question, which he emphatically articulated throughout the party in books, essays and speeches. The core of his assumptions was the thesis that the development tendencies in industry are not automatically those in agriculture. There are clear differences between these two economic sectors. Furthermore, small farms are by no means doomed to extinction in all branches of agricultural production by tendencies towards concentration and industrialization ; In certain agricultural fields of work, the small business is not a dying, but on the contrary a sustainable form of business. In David's opinion, small and family businesses also offer good opportunities for efficient business management. Supporting such farms is therefore not hopeless in the long term - on the contrary, the promotion of such types of farms is more sensible and necessary because these farms contribute to a better food supply for the population. After all, cooperative forms of organization in agriculture are a bridge to consumer cooperatives in the cities.

David spoke up on the agricultural issue at the SPD's Frankfurt party conference . This party congress, which met from October 21 to 27, 1894, was the first for which David had received a mandate. Together with like-minded people, he called for the Erfurt program to be supplemented by an agricultural program that should take up the interests of agricultural workers and smallholders. The party congress then decided to appoint a commission to draw up a draft program. You belonged to David. In the following months, this commission drew up a corresponding proposal on the basis of studies by three regional sub-committees. David belonged to the subgroup that, under the leadership of Georg von Vollmar, examined the smallholder structures in southern Germany. He presented the results and the programmatic conclusions of this subcommittee to the Breslau Party Congress (October 6-12, 1895). Although August Bebel had supported the program proposal of the Agricultural Commission and spoke out in front of the delegates for the acceptance of this agricultural program, it failed because of the majority of the party. She considered it wrong to offer farm workers and smallholders the prospect of improving their living conditions by supporting their private property. That is detrimental to the revolution, the “exploiting state” is only being given new means of power by demanding appropriate state support programs. The motion to reject the agricultural program was drafted by Karl Kautsky , the leading theoretician in the SPD at the time, and signed by Paul Singer , Ignaz Auer , Clara Zetkin , Richard Fischer and Arthur Stadthagen , among others . A consequence of this decision was that other parties were allowed to precede political agitation among the rural population for many years. Nevertheless, David did not give in in his agricultural policy efforts. In the spring of 1903 he published his ideas in book form. This work - socialism and agriculture - has received high praise from Bernstein. A year later it appeared in Polish translation and had a major impact on the agricultural program of the Socialist Party of Poland .

Revisionism dispute

Although David was “the real opponent” of Kautsky in the SPD's agricultural debate, he never openly challenged him with a fundamental questioning of the assumptions about society, the state and the revolution that prevailed at the time in the SPD. That was left to Eduard Bernstein. From 1896 to 1899 he had published a series of papers in which he called for the party's widespread ideas, expectations and hopes for revolution to be abandoned in favor of an affirmation of practical reform policy. A fundamental change in society is already possible in bourgeois society, not just after a revolution. At the party congress in Hanover in 1899 , Bebel violently attacked Bernstein, who was not present at the party congress, in a “condemnation speech”. He claimed that Bernstein could no longer be considered a social democrat. In the debate that followed, David was the first to speak and contradicted the party chairman at length. In his defense speech, David emphasized that Bernstein wanted - like every other socialist - to achieve the social organization of the production process, which amounts to overcoming the private appropriation of surplus value . That is decisive for the question of whether someone is a socialist or not. Bernstein also thinks that this goal can be achieved on the soil of the present state. He, David, agrees with this assessment. For him, too, practical steps in the present are not just a sedative, but building blocks for a better future. In this speech David openly criticized the poverty and collapse theory , according to which the working class participates less and less in social wealth. The closing words of his reply to Bebel were: "High the banner of hope, not only for a better future, but above all and above all for a better present." With this speech David established his reputation as one of the leading revisionists in the To be party. David did not mind this labeling, he considered the revisionism dispute to be a subordinate dispute about theories, practical reform steps were much more decisive.

Expansion of the party base

The SPD saw itself as a party of the industrial workers. Instead of this focus, David called for an expansion of the recruiting base. In his opinion, it was essential for the gradual conquest of political power to turn to other professional groups. To him, in this regard, anyone who did useful, productive work was interesting. In addition to industrial workers and employees in the craft sector , the majority of farmers should be included. He also counted small and medium-sized tradespeople as well as civil servants and the “intellectual professional workers”. According to David, this changed social party base should have been supplemented by an alliance with left-wing liberals in the fight against the discriminatory Prussian three-class suffrage .

Mass strike debate

From 1905 onwards, a debate about the relationship between the party and the free trade unions , the so-called mass strike debate, developed in the social democratic labor movement . It was about the extent to which the socialist unions should allow the SPD to impose political guidelines on them and to what extent they should act independently. The party left around Rosa Luxemburg asked the trade unions to view the strike not only as a means of setting wages, but also as a means of resolving political disputes. Such political trade union actions would have positive educational effects for a revolutionary class consciousness. The background to this was extensive political strike actions by trade unions in Belgium and Sweden, as well as the Russian Revolution of 1905 . David, like the party majority, opposed these considerations and warned against “throwing together the terms mass strike and street revolution”, especially if the political opponent had command over the military. He considered a close consultation between the party and trade union leadership to be right, and he did not want to rule out the mass strike as a last resort. The unions, however, should not be relegated to the party's executive body. For him, the party, trade unions and cooperatives were a "trinity" to be preserved.

Budget approval

Another point of contention within the SPD was the question of approval of funds, so the approval of the documents produced by the respective governments budgets . The Social Democrats in southern Germany, especially in Hesse, Baden and Bavaria, had approved such budget proposals. In the Grand Duchy of Hesse and Baden, this approval had already been given in 1891, without this giving rise to criticism in the party. Three years later, the Bavarian Social Democrats managed to implement some social and cultural goals in budget discussions, so that they finally voted for the entire budget. This sparked severe criticism at the Frankfurt party congress in 1894. Such a policy was hardly acceptable to Prussian and Saxon Social Democrats, because they were shaped by the harsh anti-social democratic policies of these countries. The compromise found at the party congress established the SPD in principle on fundamental opposition. In favorable situations, however, compromises are allowed. In 1908, the conflict came back on the agenda of the Nuremberg Party Congress because the Social Democrats in Baden had again approved a budget. David expressed his solidarity with the Baden Social Democrats before and during this party congress. It was his concern to keep the scope for a practical policy of reforms open, at least in southern Germany. To display an uncompromising opposition stance in the southern German states was “a theoretical quirk”. For him, the question of budget approval was not a question of principles, but rather a tactic that made strict party discipline a hindrance.

Member of the Reichstag

In 1903 David succeeded in gaining a seat for the Reichstag in the Mainz- Oppenheim constituency . The SPD entered into an alliance with liberal and democratic parties for the run-off election that was required . That secured the success against the center politician Adam Joseph Schmitt . Twice before, in 1896 and 1898, David had been left behind in these runoff elections, even though he had been ahead in the first rounds.

Eduard David around 1907

As a member of the Reichstag, David dealt with topics that were already familiar to him. In addition to cultural and agricultural policy, these soon became general economic and financial issues. Since he sat for his party in the committee for economic, tax and agricultural policy in 1907 , he was considered the tax expert of his group . In budget debates he was one of the main speakers of the SPD.

Foreign policy issues did not concern parliamentarian David until 1910. His positions here coincided with those of the party as a whole. They were characterized by high esteem for the political system and foreign policy of Great Britain , with which an understanding was to be sought that could lead to an improvement in relations with France on the European continent . The German-British arms race , for which the German naval construction policy is responsible, stands in the way of good relations with Great Britain . Russia, on the other hand, viewed David as a threat to peace. There, as in Austria-Hungary , he identified political circles that were pressing for a major war. If Russia attacks the German Reich, it has the right to military defense. In the event of an Austrian war of aggression , Germany is not obliged to show solidarity with its neighbors in the south, despite the dual alliance .

Against the background of this parliamentary activity, David was elected to the SPD parliamentary group in 1912. Within the party, that was his highest office before the First World War. Among the parliamentarians, he was considered someone who thoroughly familiarized himself with the subject matter to be negotiated. He was also said to be quick-witted and persuasive argumentative power. His joy in debates and lectures was also unmistakable - all qualities that were useful to him in Parliament, of whose central political importance he was convinced. A number of young politicians in the SPD saw David as their mentor and role model, such as Bernhard Adelung , Philipp Scheidemann, Carl Severing and Friedrich Stampfer .

Civil peace politician in the First World War

The politics of August 4th

David was instrumental in the decision of August 4, 1914. On this day, the SPD parliamentary group in the Reichstag approved the war credits demanded by the Reich government against the resistance of party and parliamentary group chairman Hugo Haase , as did the other parliamentary groups. In addition, the free trade unions had already committed themselves to a truce policy on August 2nd, so they deliberately refrained from strikes and promised to support the war mobilizations. A few days earlier, the SPD had called for numerous protest meetings against the impending war and against the irresponsible Austria-Hungary policy.

David believed that the German Reich was waging a legitimate defensive war against Russia and France. He saw the policy of cooperation with the Reich leadership and the other parties, which he helped formulate in a leading position, as the path to democratization and parliamentarization of the Reich. He hoped that this would help to overcome the various margins that the organizations and representatives of the socialist labor movement had experienced up to then. For him, this policy marked the decisive stage on the way for the SPD to become a people 's party . On February 4, 1916, he noted in his war diary: "If the party does not find its way from the Craftsmen's Party to the People's Party, its great mission has been missed." In his opinion, the yes to the credits increased the chances of later social and democratic demands being enforced, to which he counted a fundamental reform of the electoral law in Prussia. For such a reform of the electoral law he was ready to accept a monarch in a representative function at the head of a democratic-parliamentary system; the state did not have to be a republic for him, and the head of state did not have to be a president. David believed that criticism of the government would only have benefited Germany's war opponents. Obvious fundamental disputes in Germany would have strengthened the resistance against German troops and in this way prolonged the war; a constant demonstration of German unity and certainty of victory, David believed, would shorten the war, bring about German victory more quickly. In David's eyes, criticism of the government would also have endangered the position of Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , in whom he saw an antagonism to extreme ideas of annexation in the military and in politics until mid-1917.

David's voice was particularly important in the development and implementation of this policy, because he had solid support from the party base in the Grand Duchy of Hesse and had long since made a name for himself as a representative of the South German Social Democrats. He also had the best contacts with union leaders among the leading Social Democrats who belonged to the right wing of the party.

War target policy

The initial successes of the German military led to a broad discussion about the war aims that the German Empire was to achieve in the First World War. The public discussion of this catalog of often expansive and immoderate goals affected the military, the Reich leadership and large parts of the bourgeoisie. These debates were a political challenge for the Social Democrats, because for them only a defensive war that ended without annexations in favor of the German Reich was legitimate. The party leadership hesitated for a long time to express itself publicly in this discussion. A small but growing minority of leading Social Democrats under the leadership of SPD chairman Haase forced the party to take a position by going public in June 1915 without consulting the party committees and condemning the annexionist discussion of the objectives of the war. This unauthorized behavior was sharply criticized by the majority of the SPD parliamentary group in the Reichstag.

In an effort to preserve party unity and to find a unified attitude towards the rampant discussion of the war aims, the party executive commissioned Eduard Bernstein, who was one of the war opponents, and Eduard David to work out “guiding principles” for peace-building in early August 1915. Both authors presented different concepts on August 15, 1915. The draft by David was made the basis of the guiding principles, the content of Bernstein's draft was hardly discussed. The clear majority of both the Reichstag parliamentary group and the party committee accepted David's proposal after making a few changes. The guiding principles, which are divided into five points, called for the defense against all territorial claims directed against Germany, particularly those relating to Alsace-Lorraine . An open door policy in all colonies should serve the future economic development of the German people , as well as the dismantling of customs and trade barriers and the freedom of the seas and straits . The social security systems should be expanded with the same intention . The "smashing Austria-Hungary" was rejected, as was war aims directed against Turkey in 1915 . The guiding principles also condemned German annexation plans and considered the "restoration of Belgium to be necessary". In the post-war period, a permanent international court of arbitration was to be created for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and future war prevention.

David's draft differed significantly from the guiding principles that were finally adopted in three respects. On the one hand, David had demanded that Belgium should not be allowed to be a “ Vorwerk ” of Great Britain again after the war . However, after the discussions in the SPD's decision-making bodies, the demand for the restoration of Belgium was not made conditional. Second, the concept of the right of peoples to self-determination did not appear in David's draft . He feared that the war opponents in the party would use this formulation to push for referendums in Alsace-Lorraine, Northern Schleswig and Posen - that is, they would work towards possible territorial losses of the German Reich. Thirdly, finally, there was no word on the future position of Poland in the adopted paper . David had planned a formulation that aimed for a future Poland not to be closely linked to Russia, but to Austria-Hungary and Germany. In this way, it should act as a buffer against Russia. David withdrew this passage from his draft on August 15th. After the current state of the discussion, he considered it unenforceable.

The censorship prevented the publication of the “Guiding Principles”; it was particularly offended by the passage about Belgium. There was still the possibility of presenting it to the plenum of the Reichstag. A narrow majority of the parliamentary group, including David, however, voted against publishing the guiding principles via the Reichstag. So in the end they were in fact ineffective.

Even if David was the spiritual father of the guiding principles that spoke out against annexations, he himself has by no means rejected all considerations of annexation. In his opinion, a victorious Germany, which he had long reckoned with during the war, could hardly have been denied such territorial expansion. In his opinion, a consistent rejection of annexations would have been tactically unwise, as it would have restricted his party's opportunities for political participation. He absolutely wanted to avoid such a situation. He saw a possible way of increasing the area in the takeover of colonies of the war opponents, especially France, after a German victory. Changes to territorial boundaries in non-European territories would have the advantage that, in his view , conflicts in Europe would hardly be stirred up.

Reich Conference in September 1916

August 4, 1914 was unique. The demonstrative and unconditional unity of the Social Democrats in the approval of war credits was never achieved again. As the war continued, internal resistance grew. At first it was only Karl Liebknecht who openly voted against further war loans. In the course of 1915, however, the number of those who voted against increased significantly, although this deviating behavior was severely censured by the parliamentary group majority. By the end of 1915, the majority succeeded in preventing Social Democrats who voted against war credits from being able to openly justify their vote in the plenary session of the Reichstag. Until then, justifications were only given by representatives of the majority for their approval, for example by Eduard David on August 20, 1915. David did this on this occasion in a way that did not reveal where the difference to the statements of the other parties lay - so in any case, the criticism in the party organ read forward .

On December 21, 1915, however, the majority of the parliamentary group was no longer able to withhold the reasons given by the minority for their rejection of further war loans from the Reichstag plenum. Friedrich Ebert justified the approval for the majority, while Friedrich Geyer explained the no of 20 SPD parliamentarians. The argument against the consent was written by Hugo Haase . Together with the union leader Carl Legien , Eduard David immediately demanded the expulsion of these 20 parliamentarians, but did not find a majority in the parliamentary group.

In March 1916 the conflict repeated itself. This time an emergency budget was pending approval. While the majority of the parliamentary group saw no further approval of war spending and credits, the minority saw in this financial proposal a need for additional funds for the war. Without prior information to the majority in the parliamentary group, Hugo Haase took the floor on March 24, 1916 in the Reichstag to justify the rejection of the proposal by the parliamentary minority. This surprising statement was almost drowned in tumultuous scenes, caused by representatives of the party majority who wanted to prevent Haase from speaking. They felt betrayed. The parliamentary majority immediately excluded the minority around Haase from the parliamentary group. On March 24th, it formed its own social democratic group, the “ Social Democratic Working Group ”.

In the course of 1916, the party leadership began to consider holding a thorough, broad-based internal party debate on the policies of the SPD since the beginning of the war. The representatives of all wing of the party did not seem to be able to guarantee that an orderly party congress would be held. For this reason, a "Reich Conference " of the SPD was held in the Reichstag building from September 21 to 23, 1916 , attended by more than 300 delegates. However, there was no agreement on sustainable compromises during this conference. The only document passed was the resolution "On the Peace Question". It had been prepared by Eduard David. The opponents of the war boycotted the vote on this text because they wanted the conference to remain without any binding resolutions. David had summarized the known positions once again: The German Reich was waging a defensive war, “rapes” of other peoples were rejected, the government was urged to conclude peace as quickly as possible. In his war diary, David noted the result of the vote: “I am satisfied with the result; but the numbers should have been better. Still, the majority is a fairly solid block in itself; the first time that a resolution in principle of mine finds a majority. It contains nothing of class struggle and the proletariat. "

Unity or division of social democracy

Even before August 4, 1914, David had plans to leave the SPD in the event that the parliamentary group in the Reichstag would not agree to the war credits. After the approval was given, he concentrated on organizing the party rights and influencing the party center in the interests of the right. Some of the corresponding meetings took place in Berlin trade union houses, and some in the SPD party archives, which David took over in March 1914 and held until the beginning of 1917. Giving the party and factional leadership to those in the party who refused to approve the war credits appeared to David to be a mistake. He considered the talk of the necessary unity of the party to be an obstructive dogma. Instead, he pushed for a separation from the minority, but was unable to assert himself until March 1916. When it finally took place with the establishment of the Social Democratic Working Group , he welcomed it. If the minority in the party and faction had developed into a majority in the course of the war, David would have set about founding his own consistently reformist party to the right of the Social Democrats.

In his war diary he often used extremely aggressive phrases to characterize the party left. In this transcript, which is not intended for the public, there are also clearly anti-Semitic statements that David made to Jewish social democrats in the party minority, namely Hugo Haase.

Ebert, Scheidemann, David

After the SPD had finally split and the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) had emerged from the Social Democratic Working Group , i.e. since the beginning of April 1917, three men emerged as the leadership team of the majority SPD: Ebert, Scheidemann and David. Of these three, Ebert was most widely recognized in the party, not least because of his background in the working class. David was considered a tactician and a man with the best contacts to other parliamentary groups and government agencies. Scheidemann was less determined than Ebert and also thought less about the current politics of the day. However, he was not considered a man of the party right, but rather a man of the party center. His party support was greater than David's.

Socialist conference in Stockholm

It was not only the German Social Democrats who disagreed as to what the causes of the war were and which of the warring states was the aggressor. Internationally, too, the socialists had divided on this question. The socialists of the Entente Powers and the neutral states, however, saw the aggressor predominantly in Germany. An opportunity for the German majority Social Democrats to present their opposite point of view was provided in June 1917 by the Stockholm pre-conference of the socialists for a large Stockholm peace conference also planned in the capital of Sweden. Eduard David was a delegate at this pre-conference. He qualified for this delegation because he had already presented the views of the majority Social Democrats several times in publications.

David gave a speech in Stockholm on the question of war guilt . In it David firmly rejected the thesis of the German war guilt. Instead, he blamed the Entente powers, which he dubbed the "economic policy world distribution syndicate on the largest scale", responsible for the war. They would have circled Germany. Since August 1914, his party would never have had any doubts about this view of things. Germany was fighting against the threats of British imperialism in particular and was waging a defensive war "to maintain its possibility of life and development". With this assessment he contradicted his own statements before the world war. At the time, he had criticized Germany's naval construction policy and presented Britain's policy as a reaction to it. When, after the end of the First World War, David studied documents showing the German contribution to the outbreak of the war, he regretted and corrected his point of view. As Minister of the Interior, David campaigned in the spring of 1919 for files to be published which showed that the German Empire was largely responsible for the outbreak of war. But the majority of the Scheidemann cabinet decided against it.

Intergroup Committee

One month after the Stockholm session, in early July 1917, the Intergroup Committee was formed . The immediate reason for this were plans to draft a peace resolution for the German Reichstag. The intention was to sound out and formulate possibilities of a mutual peace. The key considerations for such a resolution were developed by the Center Member Matthias Erzberger , who was one of the most exposed annexationists at the beginning of the war, in the main committee of the Reichstag on July 6, 1917. More profound reasons for establishing this cross-party coordination body lay in the overall domestic and foreign policy situation. In the turnip winter of 1916/1917, the dramatically deteriorated supply situation for the German population was revealed. The democratization and parliamentarization of the empire had not progressed, although Wilhelm II had hinted at this in his Easter message of April 7, 1917, but no concrete steps were taken. In the empire itself, the economic and political situation provoked unrest and mass strikes. The politicians within the SPD who supported and defended the course of August 4th - Eduard David was one of their spokesmen - felt isolated by this situation. Their calculation - internal peace in exchange for significantly expanded opportunities for participation for the SPD - seemed to work less and less. The constitution and rapid establishment of the Intergroup Committee had a redeeming effect on them, because finally tendencies towards parliamentarization seemed to be clearly emerging. From July 6, David was a member of this committee, alongside Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann and Albert Südekum, as a representative of the majority social democracy . In October 1917 Otto Landsberg and Hermann Molkenbuhr joined them. Representatives from the left wing of the Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag were just as unrepresented as representatives from the USPD. Fixed cooperation partners of the SPD in the Intergroup Committee were the Center and the Progressive People's Party . The National Liberal Party wavered in terms of its cooperation.

Eduard David had clear ideas of what the main features of the peace resolution to be worked out should look like: A recourse to the policy of August 4th was to be made, as well as a clear rejection of the idea widespread in the Entente powers about the causes of war. Conquests should be rejected as well as compensation. The rights of life should be defended, but the rights of others should not be violated. It should be made clear that in 1917 the Germans were not driven by an addiction to conquest. If Germany's opponents attacked its rights to life, one would be ready to fight to the extreme. Together with Erzberger, Georg Gothein (Progressive People's Party) and Hartmann von Richthofen (National Liberals), David was elected to the subcommittee of the Intergroup Committee, which was to draft the resolution. The first draft bore clear traits of David's conception. The multiple revisions in the Intergroup Committee did not rub off his basic ideas. The parties that had come together to work together published this resolution against resistance from the government and the Supreme Army Command (OHL). The driving force against all concerns were the Social Democrats. It was also David who wanted to pull the new Chancellor Georg Michaelis , who succeeded Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been overthrown by the OHL, on July 14, 1917, to the side of the parliamentary majority. The new Chancellor should rely on the Reichstag in terms of foreign and domestic policy and first adopt the content of the peace resolution. Michaelis did not respond to this request, but treated it distantly. He stuck to those who had secured his appointment - Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff . The result was an immediate loss of confidence in the new Chancellor in the parties of the Intergroup.

David's optimism about a strengthened parliament was expressed in his term crypto-parliamentarism , which he used in autumn 1917 to describe the political relations between the Reichstag and the government. The government is not based on the confidence of the Reichstag and thus on the confidence of the people. On the other hand, it is no longer a pure government of officials, based solely on the Kaiser. Parliament is currently ruling behind the scenes . In this context David had the idea of expressing the influence of parliament in the government through parliamentary state secretaries or through parliamentary representatives as ministers without portfolio. This, according to David, quite conflicting interim solution must sooner or later lead to full parliamentarization, i.e. to a government that is solely dependent on the majority of the Reichstag. In fact, this co-government in the background - contrary to David's theses - did not have a wide range: Social democratic demands for constitutional changes remained unfulfilled up to this point in time. Representatives of the SPD and other Reichstag parties were also far removed from positions of power in the government and administrative apparatus. In addition, the peace resolution aroused strong resistance: Right-wing circles founded the German Fatherland Party , an extra-parliamentary gathering movement that agitated for a victory peace and was supported by government agencies. On the other hand, Parliament was now in a position to overthrow a chancellor. This became apparent at the end of October 1917, when the parliamentary groups in the Intergroup Committee pressed him, Michaelis resigned from the office of Reich Chancellor.

Peace in the east

At the end of 1917 there was a chance of a peace treaty in the east. With the October Revolution in Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power and pressed for an end to the war with the Central Powers, above all with Germany. In the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk , the OHL enforced a victory peace in March 1918. Soviet Russia had to give up more than a quarter of the former Russian territory in Europe. In the course of the negotiations it was by no means always clear whether these ceded areas would in future be governed according to the principle of the right of self-determination of the peoples or whether they would be closely linked to Germany.

Even before the armistice talks with Russia, which preceded the actual peace negotiations, Eduard David took the floor on November 30, 1917 in the main committee of the Reichstag. He strongly advocated the conclusion of an agreement and not a victory peace in the east. In the negotiations, the new Russian rulers should not suffer any political defeat, because that would strengthen the war party there again and thus the Entente. On the question of the border states between Russia and Germany, he called for a solution on the basis of the peoples' right to self-determination. This right of self-determination could only be articulated in these border states by genuine popular representations. In addition, David openly expressed the fear that it would not be the civil leadership of the empire that would lead the negotiations for Germany in Brest-Litovsk, but the OHL. On January 3, 1918, David took up the demand for a peace solution on the basis of the right to self-determination in the main committee of the Reichstag. In his speech to this body he sharply criticized all attempts to declare the state councils established in Lithuania , Courland and Livonia as the bearers of the will of the people. These councils were under the direction of the German government and military administration. On the question of Polish sovereignty, too, he formulated unreservedly: “The solution to the Polish question is a matter for the Poles”. Furthermore, on behalf of his party, he demanded that the Reichstag be convened to a session so that it could get a clear picture of the crucial political question of the peace negotiations and actively exercise its possibilities of participation and control. The other parties, including those of the Intergroup Committee, did not, however, agree to this demand. The parliamentary options for participation remained unused.

When the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified on March 22, 1918, the SPD faction abstained, while the USPD rejected this treaty as a dictated peace. A strong current within the SPD parliamentary group had previously pleaded for an acceptance, otherwise the approval of further war credits for the future could hardly be conveyed. Those who, like Eduard David, were in favor of abstaining in this internal parliamentary debate, however, narrowly prevailed. To reject the treaty outright, like the USPD, was out of the question for the vast majority of the majority Social Democratic parliamentary group in the Reichstag. A rejection would have finally broken the bond with the other parties of the Intergroup Committee that approved the peace treaty on March 22, 1918, which had already become thin in the weeks of the peace negotiations and the January strikes that broke out in the Reich . In this case, all hopes for an increase in power in the alliance with the majority parties of the Reichstag would have finally failed. This tactic was partially successful, because immediately before the parliamentary approval of the peace treaty, the Center, Progressive People's Party and SPD voted for a resolution calling for the self-determination rights of Poland, Lithuania and Courland to be respected. In this way, the Intergroup Committee experienced "a kind of re-establishment".

October reform and November revolution

The clearly emerging military defeat of the German Reich, the increasing fear of a revolution from below with political consequences similar to those in Russia, and the concern that the victorious powers would not be able to reckon with the harshest peace conditions without rapid state restructuring led to the parliamentarization of the Reich and the abolition of the three-class suffrage in Prussia. Only at the end of the war did the hopes that the SPD had cherished since the beginning of the war become reality. In the cabinet of the new Chancellor Max von Baden , which took office at the beginning of October 1918, representatives of all parties in the Intergroup Committee were represented. In fact, the state restructuring had already been completed with the formation of the Max von Baden government. It was enshrined in constitutional law on October 28, 1918 with the October reform, which now provided for a parliamentary monarchy .

Scheidemann initially warned against the SPD entering government, in his own words he did not want to join a “bankrupt company”. Eduard David saw such a step as an opportunity. He succeeded in convincing Ebert, as the meanwhile decisive man in the SPD parliamentary group, that one should not refuse now. It was then Ebert himself who vigorously advocated and enforced entry. This was also true after the Social Democrats were first given insight into the comprehensive military defeat in early October. A cooperation of the Social Democrats in the government seemed to Ebert and David as a signal to dissuade the war opponents of Germany from tough peace treaty provisions, as a way to a quick and tolerable peace. The later Treaty of Versailles did not fulfill these hopes.

At the beginning of October 1918 David himself flirted openly with the post of Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office . Ebert spoke out against it because he did not want to do without him in the parliamentary group. However, Ebert was unable to assert himself on this personnel issue; David achieved his goal. August Müller became Undersecretary of State in the Reich Economic Office . Robert Schmidt received the post of Undersecretary of State in the War Food Office , which Müller previously held. Another social democrat and union official, Gustav Bauer , took over the head of the Reich Labor Office . As State Secretary with no portfolio in the new government, Scheidemann had the highest rank of all Social Democrats. With the entry of Social Democrats into government, Eduard David achieved the goal for which he had fought for years: the road from August 4, 1914 to October 5, 1918 had been a long one, but now his party was pursuing a conscious policy of reform Soil of the given state.

During the short term of office of Max von Baden's government, David worked hard to achieve a swift armistice and also to end the reign of Wilhelm II by abdicating. With such an approach he promised himself to contain the unrest in the Navy before it grew into a revolution. Ebert and especially David were still legalistic in this situation, they believed in the possibility of the continued existence of the now parliamentary monarchy. On the morning of November 9, 1918, David negotiated with representatives of the National Liberals about their entry into the government in order to expand the parliamentary base of the cabinet. They underestimated the momentum of the events that would lead to the November Revolution. Because David believed for the longest of the leading Social Democrats in the chance of a consolidation of the new conditions on the basis of the October reform, which in his opinion would have prevented a revolution, he was not to be found in a leading position in the revolution weeks.

David kept his post as Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Office even after the Council of People's Representatives came to power . However, he had no influence on the politics of this office. Unaffected by the revolution, this office carried on its business in the usual way in the November days.

Work in the Weimar Republic

President of the National Assembly and Minister

Eduard David, 1919

First cabinet meeting of the Scheidemann cabinet on February 13, 1919 in Weimar. From left: Ulrich Rauscher , Press Officer of the Reich Government, Robert Schmidt , Nutrition, Eugen Schiffer , Finance, Philipp Scheidemann , Reich Chancellor, Otto Landsberg , Justice, Rudolf Wissell , Economy, Gustav Bauer , Labor, Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau , Foreign Affairs, Eduard David without Portfolio, Hugo Preuss , Interior, Johannes Giesberts , Post, Johannes Bell , Colonies, Georg Gothein , Schatz, Gustav Noske , Reichswehr

David only reappeared in the political arena when he was elected its first president by the National Assembly meeting in Weimar on February 7, 1919. The delegates elected him to this office with a clear majority of 374 out of 399 votes. After four days, however, due to an intergroup agreement, he had to cede it to the central politician Constantin Fehrenbach .

Subsequently, since February 13, David was a minister without portfolio of the Scheidemann government. This resigned on the night of June 19-20, 1919, because they could not agree on the rejection or acceptance of the Versailles Treaty. Scheidemann was one of those who rejected this contract, which the German public perceived as extremely harsh. At first there was no clear picture in the SPD parliamentary group on the question of acceptance or rejection. Together with others, David, as before in the cabinet, vehemently advocated the signing of the peace treaty because, in his opinion, there were only worse alternatives. The majority of the parliamentary group finally advised signing.

While Scheidemann resigned from government affairs, the other Social Democratic ministers remained in office in the newly formed Bauer government . David was involved in the previous coalition negotiations with MPs from the Center Party, which brought about the Weimar school compromise . In the new government he took over the Reich Ministry of the Interior as Minister . Internal group considerations to make David the new head of government, David rejected with reference to health reasons. As Minister of the Interior, he pleaded on behalf of the government in early July 1919 to the National Assembly for a change of the flag of the German Reich. The colors of the empire - black, white and red - were to be replaced by black, red and gold. These colors stand for the revolution of 1848 , they were used by the original fraternity and are also a symbol for the greater German traditions .

When the National Assembly passed the Weimar Constitution on July 31, 1919 , Eduard David welcomed it euphorically. Germany now has the most democratic constitution in the world. The Reich Minister of the Interior based his view on the elements of direct democracy : The constitution provided for the possibility of referendums and referendums . He also welcomed the direct election of the Reich President by the people.

On October 3, 1919, David handed over his ministerial office to Erich Koch-Weser from the German Democratic Party (DDP) after the latter had joined the Bauer government. He remained in the cabinet, again as a minister without portfolio. He also belonged to the successor government, the Müller I cabinet , in the same capacity. However, in none of his ministerial offices was David able to make a clear personal contribution to solving the political problems in post-war Germany, also because illness and old age complaints increasingly prevented him from doing so.

Envoy of the Empire in Hesse

After the resignation of the Müller cabinet on June 21, 1920, David remained a SPD member of the Reichstag for the constituency of Darmstadt and retained this mandate until his death. From 1921 on he was also the political envoy of the Reich in Hesse and in this function reported regularly from Darmstadt to Berlin on political events in Hesse and the Rhine-Main area . From this position, which was considered to be politically insignificant, David was put on hold when the legation was dissolved on April 1, 1927, with a pension. He moved to Berlin again. He died there at the age of 67. His grave and that of his wife Hermine David are located in the main cemetery in Mainz .

Publications, Academic Activities, and Honors

In 1922 David published a heavily revised version of his agricultural policy work Socialism and Agriculture . Furthermore, in the 1920s, he edited several times his instructions for socialist speakers, the so-called "Referentenführer", first published in 1907. In 1926 David published a work entitled The Peace of Europe , for which he was previously awarded by the American patron Edward Filene . In it, David described the pan-European idea as a long-term goal. "Economic solidarity" should be striven for as a short-term goal. The Inter-Parliamentary Union , in which David committed should this document be future firmly integrated into the institutionalized peacekeeping under.

In Darmstadt Eduard David taught from 1923 to 1927 at the city's Technical University , the young skilled political science after he habilitated 1,923th

From 1922 to 1930 David was a senator of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science . The Political Science Faculty of the University of Munich awarded him an honorary doctorate for his agricultural policy studies .

Commemoration and Judgments of Research

Gravesite of Eduard and Hermione David

Today streets named after him in Mainz and in Worms commemorate Eduard David . A sports hall in Krofdorf-Gleiberg is also named after him.

The official party historiography of the German Democratic Republic condemns the politician Eduard David because he exposed himself on the right wing of the party. David is dubbed as a representative of "open opportunism", as a "right-wing opportunist" or as a "leading social chauvinist". This criticism is explicitly linked to Lenin , who already sharply rejected Eduard David's agrarian theses and dubbed him as a spokesman for the “declining petty bourgeoisie”. In 1915 Lenin broadened the criticism of David. He claimed that David "dedicated his whole life to bourgeois corruption of the labor movement." Eckard Müller's studies on David's work that were published in the GDR remain attached to these lines of interpretation. They certify David a continued "opportunistic disintegration work" directed against Marxism and revolutionary political ideas. As early as 1907, David had developed a wide-ranging field of activity within the party and at that time was a "pillar of opportunism". It is therefore only logical that David landed “in the swamp of social chauvinism” at the beginning of the First World War, took “counter-revolutionary positions” in the weeks of the November Revolution and stood “ in the camp of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism ” in the Weimar Republic . Overall, David committed a “social-chauvinist betrayal of the interests of the working class”.

The West German historian Karlludwig Rintelen sees Eduard David at the center of an informal group of about twenty people from the right wing of the party. From 1909 to 1918 this group, which he called the “David Circle”, actively promoted an alliance policy to the right, the exclusion of the left minority from the party and the elimination of basic Marxist ideas about class struggle and socialization . For this reason, a necessary socialist transformation of the “capitalist bourgeois-feudal society” was not pursued in the November Revolution. A betrayal of the interests of the people or the workers did not take place after Rintelen. The possibilities of the redesign, however, were wasted by the “subjective incompetence” of the people involved from the “David circle”.

Historians who do not refer to Marxism or Marxism-Leninism come to different conclusions. According to Gerhard A. Ritter , David was a “teacher” for the next generation of social democratic politicians. According to Ritter, his agricultural policy work represented the first socialist attack on traditional Marxism. Because this attack took place before Bernstein's corresponding writings, this work made Eduard David “the party's first revisionist”. Because of these positions on agricultural policy, because of his prominent position on the reformist wing of the pre-war party and because of his participation in all of the key decisions of the SPD from 1894 to 1920, Ritter considers him a "personality of central importance for the history of the political labor movement in Germany".

In particular David's agrarian revisionism secures him a permanent place in the party history of the SPD after Susanne Miller . Gerd Schwieger shares this judgment. Miller and Schwieger both emphasize, however, that Eduard David had no intention of subjecting the theoretical foundations of Marxism to a total revision. David's contribution is described here as important but secondary in comparison with Bernstein's writings.

Susanne Miller also works out David's position in the party public. Like others, he did not always act in the foreground. Men like Philipp Scheidemann, Friedrich Ebert, Hugo Haase or Karl Liebknecht as well as women like Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin were ahead of him here. David stood in the second row in this regard and exerted his influence from there. After Miller, he wanted the SPD to change from a class to a people's party. David remained “almost pedantically true” to this “seamless line”. Miller considers David to be a typical representative of the specifically southern German variant of social democracy because of his inner-party orientation and his regional experience.

Wilhelm Ribhegge complements these characterizations. He emphasizes that of the parliamentarians in the Reichstag, it was Eduard David in particular who most clearly called for a mutual agreement with Russia in 1917/1918, parallel to the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. In this way he showed an alternative peace policy in a crucial situation. That is one of his lasting merits.

The limits of his work became clear with the change of the political system from the empire to the republic. In the opinion of non-Marxist research, Eduard David was unable to put his stamp on the ministries and German politics as a whole.

Works

• Literature by and about Eduard David in the catalog of the German National Library

literature

Overview representations

• History of the German labor movement. Volume 2: From the end of the 19th century to 1917. Published by the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the SED. Dietz, Berlin (O) 1966.
• Helga Grebing : labor movement. Social protest and collective advocacy until 1914 (= dtv 4507 German history of the latest time from the 19th century to the present. ). 2nd Edition. Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, Munich 1987, ISBN 3-423-04507-8 .
• Dieter Groh : Negative Integration and Revolutionary Attentism. The German social democracy on the eve of the First World War (= Ullstein book 3086). Unabridged edition. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1974, ISBN 3-548-03086-6 .
• Detlef Lehnert : Social democracy between protest movement and ruling party from 1848 to 1983 (= Edition Suhrkamp . Vol. 1248 = NF, Vol. 248, New Historical Library ). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1983, ISBN 3-518-11248-1 .
• Susanne Miller : truce and class struggle. The German social democracy in the First World War (= contributions to the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Vol. 53). Published by the Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and Political Parties . Droste, Düsseldorf 1974, ISBN 3-7700-5079-7 .
• Susanne Miller: The burden of power. The German Social Democracy 1918–1920 (= contributions to the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Vol. 63). Published by the Commission for the History of Parliamentarism and Political Parties. Droste, Düsseldorf 1978, ISBN 3-7700-5095-9 .
• Wilhelm Ribhegge: Peace for Europe. The policy of the German majority in the Reichstag 1917/18. Hobbing, Essen 1988, ISBN 3-920460-44-8 .
• Heinrich August Winkler : The suppressed guilt. Fear of the "madness for truth". The failure of 1914 remained unsolved. In: Die Zeit , March 17, 1989.
• Heinrich August Winkler: Controversial milestone. The Weimar Constitution of 1919. A step forward with fatal consequences. In: The Parliament , January 16, 1998.
• Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. Volume 1: German history from the end of the Old Reich to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-406-46001-1 .

Specific sources and literature

• Friedrich P. Kahlenberg (edit.): Eduard David's reports as Reich representative in Hesse 1921–1927 (= historical regional studies. Publications of the Institute for Historical Regional Studies at the University of Mainz. Vol. 6, ISSN  0072-4203 ). Steiner, Wiesbaden 1970.
• Friedrich P. Kahlenberg: Introduction. In: Friedrich P. Kahlenberg (edit.): Eduard David's reports as Reich representative in Hesse 1921–1927 (= historical regional studies. Publications of the Institute for Historical Regional Studies at the University of Mainz. Vol. 6, ISSN  0072-4203 ). Steiner, Wiesbaden 1970, pp. IX-XXI.
• Jochen Lengemann : MdL Hessen. 1808-1996. Biographical index (= political and parliamentary history of the state of Hesse. Vol. 14 = publications of the Historical Commission for Hesse. Vol. 48, 7). Elwert, Marburg 1996, ISBN 3-7708-1071-6 , p. 103.
• Susanne Miller (edit.), In connection with Erich Matthias : The war diary of the Reichstag deputy Eduard David 1914 to 1918 (= sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Row 1: From the constitutional monarchy to the parliamentary republic. Vol. 4, ISSN  0481-3650 ). Droste, Düsseldorf 1966.
• Susanne Miller: Introduction. In: Susanne Miller (edit.), In connection with Erich Matthias: The war diary of the Reichstag deputy Eduard David 1914 to 1918 (= sources on the history of parliamentarism and political parties. Series 1: From the constitutional monarchy to the parliamentary republic. Vol. 4 , ISSN  0481-3650 ). Droste, Düsseldorf 1966, pp. XI – XXXIV.
• Eckhard Müller: On the political work of the revisionist Eduard David in the German social democracy 1894–1907. In: Contributions to the history of the labor movement. Vol. 23, H. 4, 1981, ISSN  0005-8068 , pp. 569-582.
• Eckhard Müller: "Socialism and Agriculture". Eduard David and Agrarian Revisionism. In: Yearbook for History. Vol. 25, 1982, ISSN  0448-1526 , pp. 181-214.
• Klaus-Dieter Rack, Bernd Vielsmeier: Hessian MPs 1820–1933. Biographical evidence for the first and second chambers of the state estates of the Grand Duchy of Hesse 1820–1918 and the state parliament of the People's State of Hesse 1919–1933 (= Political and parliamentary history of the State of Hesse. Vol. 19 = Work of the Hessian Historical Commission. NF Vol. 29) . Hessian Historical Commission, Darmstadt 2008, ISBN 978-3-88443-052-1 , No. 124.
• Karlludwig Rintelen: The David Circle and the Left Minority. Comments on the problem of the “room for maneuver” of the majority Social Democratic leadership until 1918/1919. In: IWK. International academic correspondence on the history of the German labor movement. Vol. 26, 1990, ISSN  0046-8428 , pp. 14-34.
• Gerhard A. Ritter :  Eduard David. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 3, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1957, ISBN 3-428-00184-2 , p. 535 ( digitized version ).
• Gerd Schwieger: Between obstruction and cooperation. Eduard David and the SPD in the war. Kiel 1970 (Kiel, University, dissertation, June 20, 1970).

Web links

Commons : Eduard David  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• Literature by and about Eduard David in the catalog of the German National Library
• Newspaper article about Eduard David in the 20th century press kit of the ZBW - Leibniz Information Center for Economics .
• Eduard David in the database of members of the Reichstag
• Biography of Eduard David . In: Heinrich Best : database of the members of the Reichstag of the Empire 1867/71 to 1918 (Biorab - Kaiserreich)
• Eduard David in the online version of the Reich Chancellery Files Edition . Weimar Republic
• Entry on Eduard David in the Rhineland-Palatinate personal database
• Article about Eduard David in the context of the Rheinhessen biographies from regionalgeschichte.net
• David, Eduard Heinrich Rudolf. Hessian biography. (As of December 27, 2019). In: Landesgeschichtliches Informationssystem Hessen (LAGIS).
• Article about the politician and publicist from Ediger Eduard David by Gregor Brand in the Eifelzeitung on February 28, 2017

Individual evidence

1. ↑ So the son of Eduard David, Heinrich David. See Spirit of Progress , Letter to the Editor, printed in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on March 16, 1998.
2. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XII.
3. ^ Helge Dvorak: Biographical Lexicon of the German Burschenschaft. Volume I: Politicians. Sub-Volume 1: A-E. Winter, Heidelberg 1996, ISBN 3-8253-0339-X , p. 184.
4. ↑ On the study see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XII f and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 2 f.
5. ↑ Helmut Kraussmüller and Ernst Anger: The history of the General German Burschenbund (ADB) 1883-1933 and the fate of the former ADB fraternities. Giessen 1989 (Historia Academica, issue 28), pp. 59-60, 100.
6. ↑ On the teaching career see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XIII f.
7. ↑ On marriages and children see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XV, note 4.
8. ↑ On this, Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XIV and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 3 f.
9. ^ Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 45.
10. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XV.
11. ↑ Hans Georg Ruppel, Birgit Groß: Hessian delegates 1820-1933. Biographical evidence for the estates of the Grand Duchy of Hesse (2nd Chamber) and the Landtag of the People's State of Hesse (= Darmstädter Archivschriften. Vol. 5). Verlag des Historisches Verein für Hessen, Darmstadt 1980, ISBN 3-922316-14-X , p. 84.
12. ^ According to the Hessian social democrat Bernhard Adelung , quoted from Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XV.
13. ↑ On this, Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 92.
14. ↑ Helene Stöcker: Memoirs. The unfinished autobiography of a pacifist who was passionate about women . Edited by Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin and Kerstin Wolf in cooperation with the Archive of the German Women's Movement Foundation , Kassel. Böhlau, Cologne 2015, pp. 180-185, ISBN 978-3-412-22466-0 .
15. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XVII and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 64–69.
16. ↑ On this Andreas Dornheim: Social Democracy and Farmers - Agricultural Policy Positions and Problems of the SPD between 1890 and 1948. In: Yearbook for Research on the History of the Labor Movement , Issue II / 2003.
17. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 41 f and Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XVIII f.
18. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XIX f.
19. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XX.
20. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 58 and 60 f and Dieter Groh, Negative Integration , p. 67 f.
21. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XVII, note 3. Evidence for the effects of his thoughts in Russia, Hungary and Switzerland can be found in Eckhard Müller, Wirken , p. 577, note 27 as well as in the same, Socialism and Agriculture , P. 213 f.
22. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXI.
23. ↑ On the revisionism controversy, see Helga Grebing, Arbeiterbewendung , pp. 112-116.
24. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 24.
25. ↑ His speech lasted about three hours and thus had the length of a referee that was not intended at all. See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 24.
26. ↑ Quoted from Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXIII.
27. ↑ For David's answer to Bebel see Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 24–29 and Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XXI-XXIII.
28. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 22 and Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXIV.
29. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXIV. Miller also points out that David did not, however, publicly comment on the form of this alliance policy.
30. ↑ Quoted from Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Journal , p. XXV.
31. ↑ Quoted from Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXIV. For David's position on the trade union issue , see also Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 35, and Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , pp. 94–96. On the mass strike debate, see Helga Grebing, Arbeiterbewendung , pp. 117 f and Detlef Lehnert, Social Democracy , pp. 102-104.
32. ↑ On the budget approval question, see Detlef Lehnert, Sozialdemokratie , p. 87 f.
33. ↑ Quoted from Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Journal , p. XXVI.
34. ↑ On David's position on the budget approval question, see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XXV f.
35. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 5.
36. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXVIII.
37. ↑ On David's foreign policy ideas, see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XXVIII f. and Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 97.
38. ↑ On David's appreciation of parliament and his abilities as a parliamentarian, see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , pp. XXVII f.
39. ↑ See Eckhard Müller, Wirken , p. 578.
40. ↑ See: Speech by the SPD party chairman Hugo Haase on August 4, 1914 before the Reichstag . For the background, see Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 31–74 and Dieter Groh, Negative Integration , pp. 675–705.
41. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 48 f.
42. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XII.
43. ↑ Quoted from Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 104.
44. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 91 and 104–106. See also Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 188 and p. 197, note 74.
45. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 91 and 172.
46. ↑ On David's power resources see Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXXII.
47. ↑ This is the assessment by Wolfgang J. Mommsen , quoted in Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 195.
48. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 104–113.
49. ↑ Here is an overview of Heinrich August Winkler, Weg nach Westen , pp. 340–343.
50. ↑ Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 195 f.
51. ↑ See guiding principles of the SPD peace policy from August 1915 . Reprinted also from Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 196 f.
52. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 196, notes 25 and 208 f.
53. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 128 f.
54. ↑ The Poland passage from David's draft is printed in Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 233.
55. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 134.
56. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 199 f.
57. ↑ On David's personal position on the questions of the annexations and the colonies, cf. Gerd-law, obstruction , pp 106-111 and 136-139.
58. ↑ See Detlef Lehnert, Social Democracy , p. 115 f.
59. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 118.
60. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 123 f, there also note 59.
61. ↑ Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 124 and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 171.
62. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 125.
63. ^ Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 133-139.
64. ↑ See the entry in Franz Osterroth, Dieter Schuster: Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (Electronic ed.), 1. Until the end of the First World War. 2nd, revised and expanded edition Berlin (including), 1975. Electronic ed .: FES Library, Bonn 2001.
65. ^ Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 140.
66. ↑ Quoted from Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 193.
67. ↑ Although he regarded this office as time-consuming and burdensome, he was financially dependent on it. Cf. Mario Bungert: “To save what is otherwise irretrievably lost.” The archives of German social democracy and their history . ( Contributions from the archive of social democracy. Vol. 4), archive of social democracy of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn 2002 ISBN 3-89892-099-2 , p. 38.
68. ↑ On this, Gerd Schwieger: Obstruction. Pp. 170-188.
69. ↑ References to this from Karlludwig Rintelen: David-Kreis. P. 24, note 37.
70. ^ Documents from the war diary are provided by Karlludwig Rintelen: David-Kreis. P. 29, note 68. There also information on further secondary literature.
71. ↑ Schwieger suspects that these differences resulted in the political appointments at the beginning of the Weimar Republic: Ebert became Reich President, Scheidemann Reich Chancellor and David President of the Weimar National Assembly. See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 288 f.
72. ↑ See the extensive protocols on labourhistory.net. ( Memento from April 19, 2009 in the Internet Archive ).
73. ↑ See the corresponding list of writings in Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 357. Susanne Miller ( Burgfrieden , p. 185, note 8) mentions two of David's writings in particular: Social Democracy and Fatherland Defense , Speech d. Reichstag member Dr. Eduard David, Berlin, held on March 6, 1915 in Bielefeld, Gerisch, Bielefeld 1915 and Social Democracy in World War I , Vorwärts, Berlin 1915.
74. ↑ It was then published by the SPD party executive. See Eduard David: Who is to blame for the war? Speech given in Stockholm on June 6, 1917. Ed. Board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Vorwärts Berlin 1917.
75. ↑ ^{a b} Quoted from Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 186.
76. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 185 f, notes 10 and 11.
77. ↑ See Heinrich August Winkler, Displaced Guilt .
78. ↑ For the background to the Intergroup Committee and the SPD representatives in this committee, see Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 299–309.
79. ↑ See David's sketchy considerations, quoted in Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 268 f.
80. ↑ Final version of the peace resolution
81. ↑ On this, Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 269–272.
82. ↑ See Michaelis' position on the peace resolution .
83. ↑ See Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , pp. 182–189.
84. ↑ See Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 274–277.
85. ↑ On David's concept of crypto-parliamentarism see Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 320–323.
86. ↑ See on the limits of crypto-parliamentarism and the fall of Michaelis Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 326–329.
87. ↑ See Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 106.
88. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 359.
89. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 361.
90. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , p. 362.
91. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Burgfrieden , pp. 365–368.
92. ^ Heinrich August Winkler, Weg nach Westen , pp. 358 and 360. Quotation on p. 360.
93. ^ So the paraphrase of Scheidemann by Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 313 f and 318.
94. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 313–315.
95. ↑ On this briefly Susanne Mille, Bürde , pp. 34–37.
96. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 309.
97. ↑ Gerd-law, obstruction , pp 315-317 and Susanne Miller, burden , p. 48
98. ↑ On personnel issues cf. Susanne Miller, Bürde , pp. 44–48.
99. ↑ See Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 107 and Karlludwig Rintelen, David-Kreis , p. 19 f.
100. ↑ See Susanne Miller, Bürde , p. 96 and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 331 f.
101. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , pp. 327–329.
102. ↑ Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 329.
103. ↑ Susanne Miller, Bürde , p. 194.
104. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXXIII.
105. ↑ Susanne Miller, burden , pp 283-285 and 291. See also Gerd-law, obstruction , pp 344-346.
106. ↑ Susanne Miller, Bürde , p. 292.
107. ↑ See Heinrich August Winkler, Controversial Milestone .
108. ↑ Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, Introduction , p. XIV f. According to Karlludwig Rintelen, David-Kreis , p. 17, note 12, David fell seriously ill in November / December 1918.
109. ↑ See the source edition by Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, Reports .
110. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXXIII, Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 351.
111. ↑ Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, Introduction , p. XVII.
112. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXXIV.
113. ↑ The information on the habilitation comes from the article about Eduard David in: Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie (DBE). Edited by Walther Killy with co-workers. von Dietrich von Engelhardt ... Vol. 2: Bohacz - Ebhardt, p. 452. ISBN 3-598-23162-8 .
114. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XXXIV and Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 108.
115. ^ History of the German labor movement , Vol. 2, pp. 195, 217 and 248.
116. ↑ History of the German Labor Movement , Vol. 2, p. 63.
117. ^ Lenin, quoted from Eckhard Müller, Wirken , p. 569.
118. ↑ Eckhard Müller, Wirken , p. 575. In his essay “Socialism and Agriculture”, Müller speaks of “revisionist disintegration work” (p. 197).
119. ↑ Eckhard Müller, Wirken , p. 582.
120. ↑ Eckhard Müller, “Socialism and Agriculture”, p. 214.
121. ↑ Karl Ludwig Rintelen, David circuit , in particular, p 18 f and S. 34th
122. ↑ Article about Eduard David in: Neue Deutsche Biographie , p. 535.
123. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XVII and Gerd Schwieger, Obstruktion , p. 71.
124. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XI f. The two quotations on p. XII.
125. ↑ Susanne Miller, Introduction to the War Diary , p. XVI.
126. ^ Wilhelm Ribhegge, Frieden , p. 106.
127. ↑ Susanne Miller, Bürde , p. 194 and Friedrich P. Kahlenberg, Introduction , p. XIV f.

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on June 10, 2007 in this version .