Front Pembela Islam

Habib Rizieq Syihab, the "Grand Imam" of the FPI, at a sermon in January 2017.

The Front Pembela Islam (“Front of the Islam Defenders, Islamic Defenders Front”), abbreviated FPI , is a militant Islamic mass organization based in Jakarta that fights for the introduction of Sharia law in Indonesia and uses violence against those who it believes Violate Sharia law or attack Islam. In doing so, it is based on the Koranic principle of the domain of what is right and prohibition of what is reprehensible . Other goals of the organization are Daʿwa , Jihad and the establishment of an international caliphate . The FPI has an anti-communist , anti-Zionist and anti-American orientation and also fights against Ahmadiyya and liberal Islam .

The FPI was founded on August 17, 1998 a few months after the resignation of President Suharto and has branches in 28 Indonesian provinces. There is very different information about the number of its members, varying between 100,000 and seven million. Most of the FPI members live in the Jakarta metropolitan area . The spiritual leader of the FPI is the Arab scholar and prophet descendant al-Habib Rizieq bin Hussein Syihab, whose family comes from the Hadramaut . He is venerated by his followers as the “Grand Imam ” (imam besar) . After various criminal charges were brought against him, he fled to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 .

The International Crisis Group ruled in 2008 that the FPI is actually an “ urban thug organization” . Within Indonesian society, however, the opinion on the FPI is divided: Although the majority of the population rejects the FPI because of its militancy and religious intolerance, the organization also has many sympathizers in state institutions ( army , police and judiciary) and works closely with it different Islamic parties together. Because of the FPI's religious justification for its organized violence, the state has difficulty treating its activities as purely criminal activities. One of the fiercest opponents of the FPI was Basuki Tjahaja Purnama , also known as Ahok, governor of Jakarta from November 2014 to May 2017. On May 9, 2017, he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for blasphemy on the basis of a complaint supported by the FPI . On January 24, 2019, he was released early from prison for good conduct.

Foundation and name

The FPI was founded on the evening of August 17, 1998 in the Pesantren School al-Umm in Kampung Utan, Ciputat. The place is in the south of Jakarta , but today belongs to the province of Banten . A total of 20 Muslim preachers and religious scholars attended the founding meeting, most of whom were relatively young at the time. This included in particular:

• Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Syihab, who pioneered the founding of the organization and is now at the head of the organization.
• Habib Idrus Jamalullail, a well-known Jakarta preacher.
• KH Cecep Bustomi. However, he left the organization again in 1999 because he thought it was too indulgent and founded the group Laskar Hisbullah together with other FPI members who were loyal to him.
• KH Misbahul Anam, a preacher who received his religious training from the Nahdlatul Ulama . He was the head of the Pesantren al-Umm where the group met and was also appointed the organization's first general secretary. The first secretariat of the FPI was also located in his Pesantren in Ciputat until it was relocated to Tanah Abang in central Jakarta in 1999. Misbahul Anam is originally from Brebes in northern Central Java, is the Tijaniyyah -Orden on.
• Habib Husein Al-Habsyi, who had bombed the Borobodur in 1985 and then served a long prison sentence.

Further founding members were Habib Idrus Jamalullail, Habib Muhsin Ahmad Alatas, KH Salim Nasir, H. Tubagus Muhammad Shiddik, KH Didin Damanhuri, KH Fahrul Razi Ishak, KH Amin Sarbini, Habib Muhdor al-Muhdor, KH Oemar Syahroeni, Habib Abdurrah , KH Zuhri Yakub and KH Sumarno Syafii. The religious scholars in this list can be recognized by the fact that their names are preceded by the abbreviation KH (= Kiai Haji). Kiai is an Indonesian form of address for venerable Islamic scholars, Haji means Mecca pilgrim .

Initially, the FPI members consisted mainly of the supporters of these founding members. For example, all students of Pesantren al-Umm were called upon to support the FPI. According to Rizieq Syihab, the FPI was founded spontaneously, without a formal process preceding it. However, the formation of the organization was unconsciously initiated by the founding members during the rule of Suharto in the 1990s.

When it was founded, the FPI was suspected of being a political instrument of the recently overthrown Suharto regime. However, Rizieq Syihab rejects this as "infamous propaganda" (propaganda keji) . According to Purnomo, most of the FPI founders had previously fought the Suharto regime. Habib Idrus Jamalullail in particular had sharply criticized the Suharto regime. According to FPI members interviewed by Purnomo, the Orde Baru period was actually an “order of thieves” (Orde Maling) . Rizieq Syihab names two reasons as the background for founding the FPI:

1. the long suffering of Muslims in Indonesia caused by the weakness of social control by civil and military authorities, resulting in human rights violations and repression by officials of these authorities.
2. the existence of a duty to defend the dignity of Islam and Muslims.

In the statutes of the FPI adopted in 2003, the composition of its name is explained as follows:

• Front means that the organization strives to be in the forefront and take a firm stance at every step of the struggle.
• Pembela ("defender") pointed out that the organization wanted to take an active role in the defense of the rights of Islam and the Islamic ummah .
• Islam expresses that the struggle of the organization is not detached from the commitment to the teaching of the straight and true Islamic Sharia.

Ideological development

Defense of Muslims, defense against the "Christianization" of Indonesia

The idea that the FPI serves as an organization for the defense of Muslims was particularly strong in the early days. Shortly after it was founded, the FPI sent an investigation team to Banyuwangi in East Java to investigate the murders of Islamic clergymen that had occurred there. She came to the conclusion that these murders were mainly committed by people disguised as ninja warriors. Therefore, on October 28, 1998, she declared jihad in a fatwa for this ninja group . One month later, on November 22, 1998, the FPI was involved in a bloody confrontation with a Christian Ambonese militia in Ketapang, central Jakarta. According to the FPI, this dispute began when, after an argument at a gambling hall, several hundred Ambonese attacked the place in the early morning and burned down a mosque. When the news spread in Jakarta, several thousand Muslims came to Ketapang, including 300 FPI fighters. They repulsed the Ambonesian security guards and killed 15 of them. After this incident, the FPI began to recruit new members. A week later, when Christians in Kupang , the capital of the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur , burned down mosques and also killed some Muslims, the FPI issued a statement in which it strongly condemned these actions.

In addition, the FPI demanded that human rights violations against Muslims be dealt with during the Orde Baru period. The FPI leadership sees this period very negatively: The government was dominated by Christians and with their help a Christianization of Indonesia took place. 80 percent of the bribery offenses of officials during this time were committed by Christians. On March 29, 1999, the FPI issued a public statement calling for an investigation into the role of Christian General Leonardus Benyamin Moerdani in connection with certain civil unrest. This referred to the Tanjung Priok massacre , an incident in September 1984 near Jakarta in which the Indonesian army killed large numbers of Muslims. The army was commanded by Moerdani.

On January 10, 2000, 200 FPI members held a demonstration in front of the headquarters of the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in Menteng Jakarta, demanding that it be disbanded. On the occasion they hung up a banner on the building that read : "The Komnas HAM is sealed by the FPI" (Komnas HAM Disegel oleh FPI) . The FPI criticized the fact that the commission 1. ignores human rights violations against Muslims, as in the Muslim-Christian conflicts on Ambon, the massacre of Tanjung Priok and the military operation in Aceh and 2. focuses solely on human rights violations in East Timor and only Muslim top generals suspicious. She viewed this as discrimination against Muslims. In addition, the FPI demanded the dismissal of five members of the commission who it considered to be the cause of the problem. Because of the large number of Christians represented on the commission, the FPI was of the opinion that this body was partisan.

The FPI sees Indonesia's Muslims as being threatened primarily by Christianity. In a position paper that the organization adopted at its first national assembly in December 2003, the FPI is asked to take measures to prevent Christianization. Several of the previous FPI actions were also directed against Christian churches. On November 2, 1999, several hundred FPI activists set fire to a Protestant church south of Jakarta. In addition, the FPI repeatedly took action against so-called “wild churches” (reja liar) , churches that were built in Muslim settlement areas without permission. In June 2007, the FPI attacked an Assemblies of God church in Katapang, Soreang, West Java . On August 8, 2010, hundreds of FPI supporters attacked members of the Christian Protestant Batak Church (HKBP) in Bekasi during the service. When the worshipers went home, they were followed and beaten by the FPI supporters. The FPI was of the opinion that the HKBP church had been improperly established and had already disrupted the service several times.

Rizieq Syihab, however, protests against the accusation that the FPI is intolerant and is hostile towards the unbelievers . Rather, the FPI holds the principle expressed in sura 109: 6 “You have your religion, and I mine” very highly. After the suicide attacks on three churches in Surabaya in May 2018, the FPI published a press release in which it criticized these attacks and stated that it opposed terrorist violence against other religious communities. At the same time, however, she also called on the public not to associate the attacks with any particular religious doctrine and its followers.

Anti-communism and anti-Zionism

Since it was founded, the FPI has viewed communism in particular as an enemy. When the FPI first appeared in public on September 24, 1998, it did so with an attack on student activists at the Catholic Atmajaya University. This was intended to challenge "leftist and Christian students who are funded by American Jews". In the early days, the FPI had its own committee that was responsible for the infiltration of student organizations that were viewed as “communist”. In March 2000, she held a rally in central Jakarta where she displayed banners with slogans such as, “We are ready to slaughter communists” and “We are ready to behead communists.” In March and April 2001, the FPI adopted participated in a campaign of anti-communist actions in which left-wing students were attacked and bookshops selling socialist literature were ransacked. On one of its websites, it describes itself as an anti-communist organization. According to Rizieq Syihab, the FPI sees it as obvious stupidity and aberration when a Muslim orientates himself towards the prophet in prayer, fasting and pilgrimage, but in social theory towards Karl Marx , because for the FPI Mohammed is a perfect example not only in worship and interpersonal relationships, but also in politics.

To this day, anti-communism is an important element of the FPI ideology. In January 2017, Rizieq Shihab gave a speech calling on the government to withdraw the newly issued rupiah banknotes because they had an image that resembled the hammer and sickle symbol of the defunct Indonesian Communist Party.

Anti-communism was linked to anti-Zionism from the start . In 1999, the FPI hung a banner in front of the Tarumangara University campus with the text: “Caution! Zionism and communism have invaded every area of ​​life. ”Rizieq Syihab describes the FPI as an organization with an anti-Israel orientation. The FPI regards Israel as a colonial power in Palestine and justifies the fight against Israel with the Indonesian constitution, which defines the fight against colonialism as a national duty in the preamble. The FPI even introduced itself as an anti-Jewish organization on one of its websites.

The FPI's anti-Israel activities peaked between 2000 and 2002. On October 1, 2000, the FPI issued a statement calling for the liberation of al-Aqsa Mosque , i.e. H. of the Jerusalem Temple Mount , demanded. After the Inter-Parliamentary Union announced that it would hold its 104th conference in Jakarta , on October 10, 2000, hundreds of FPI fighters announced their readiness to kill the members of the Israeli delegation that was to attend the conference. The FPI threatened to block Soekarno-Hatta Airport in the event that the organizers of the conference held on to an invitation from the Israeli delegation. On March 22 and 25, 2002, the FPI issued public statements calling for a ban on all trips to Israel that are not related to the efforts to liberate al-Aqsa Mosque, as well as a ban on entry for Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres . In the days that followed, the FPI militia carried out anti-Israel patrols at international airports and tourist spots.

Fight against sin, areas of justice, prohibition of reprehensible

The FPI was founded after Rizieq Syihab as a national anti-Maksiat movement in order to realize the Koranic principle of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar . The Indonesian term maksiat is derived from the Arabic word maʿṣiya , which denotes the violation and opposition to the commandments of God as well as sin. In the early days of Maksiat, the FPI primarily understood the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages, gambling and prostitution . The reason for the founding of the organization was that Maksiat was rampant in Indonesia in all areas of life and had reached an unacceptable level. The aim of the FPI is to anchor the national anti-maksiat movement in all areas of society by using the various means of communication.

The fight against Maksiat also played a large role in public statements by the organizations. In December 1998, during a demonstration, the FPI called for all Maksiat sites to be closed during the month of Ramadan. At a meeting with the Governor of Jakarta in November 1999, a delegate from the FPI said: “We, the Islamic umma , feel it is impossible to find the peace necessary for fasting, according to the tenets of our faith, while these places of opposition are in place (tempat maksiat) exist in our society. ”In the early 2000s, the FPI also made a public statement to the Indonesian government and parliament requesting that 1) public advertising for Maksiat activities be banned ; 2) companies that engage in overtly reprehensible practices will be closed; and 3) companies that are likely to engage in often reprehensible practices will be closed at least on Islamic holidays. The FPI also called on the president and central government to introduce an anti-maksiat law. Rizieq Syihab justifies the limitation of her demand for the closure of dubious companies to the Islamic holidays with the fiqh maxim : "What one cannot fully achieve, one should not drop completely" (mā lā yudrak kullu-hū lā yutrak kullu-hū ) . Overall, the FPI demands that companies with "dubious activities" close 98 days of the year, namely on all Fridays during the month of Ramadan, in the first seven days of Shawwāl , during the six days of Hajj and on Islamic New Year's Day, on schūrā Day, on the Prophet's birthday , on the 27th Rajab and on the 15th Shabān .

In the fight of the FPI against Maksiat, the enforcement of the Islamic alcohol ban is of particular importance. One of the earliest actions to do this came on December 13, 1999, when 30 FPI members confiscated 1,500 bottles of spirits from a warehouse in southern Jakarta in order to force the trader to stop selling alcoholic beverages. They then took the bottles to the local police station. On May 5, 2000, 3,000 FPI fighters demonstrated in Pamekasan and threatened to set fire to hundreds of shops selling alcoholic beverages. One of the usual activities of FPI activists is tearing down billboards for alcoholic beverages. Another important aspect of the FPI's ideology is the fight against gambling (practice perjudian) . In the opinion of the FPI, the Islamic ban on gambling also includes the drawing of tickets in lotteries . In May 2004, for example, the FPI held a rally in which it called for the cancellation of a lottery game at Metropolitan Magnum Indonesia.

The theological basis for the fight of the FPI against Maksiat is the doctrine of the domain of the right and the prohibition of the reprehensible (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-n-nahy ʿan al-munkar) . As early as December 1998, the FPI issued a declaration in which it declared its support for all citizens who exercise this principle. Rizieq Syihab has written his own book on this principle, which contains a comprehensive theological justification for the violent actions of the FPI and tries to show that these are in accordance with the teaching of Muhammad . In the book, Rizieq Syihab writes that the FPI was founded as an organization for the collaboration of ʿUlamā ' in the execution of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar (AMNM) in all areas of life and positioned itself as an AMNM organization.

According to Rizieq Syihab, AMNM means making systematic efforts to encourage Muslims to fully comply with the precepts of their religion and to prevent them from committing acts that destroy their morality and belief. Since other Islamic organizations in Indonesia such as the Nahdlatul Ulama , the Muhammadiyah and the Indonesian Council for Islamic Daʿwa (DDII) do not implement the principle of the domain of the right and the prohibition of the reprehensible, the need to establish a separate organization for this was seen. When carrying out AMNM measures, the FPI adheres to the classic Hisba rules. For example, it limits the prohibition of reprehensible things to reprehensible things that are clearly revealed and clearly proven. In the latest version of its statutes, the FPI also explicitly uses the term Hisba instead of the expression “territories of the right and prohibition of the reprehensible.” Muchsin al-Attas, the current chairman of the FPI, emphasized in 2014 that the FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar also try to enforce in the areas of politics, economy, society and education.

Introduction of Sharia law in Indonesia as a political goal

The Jakarta Charter , which the FPI calls for reinstatement.

Since 2000 the FPI has been calling for the restoration of the Jakarta Charter , which obliges Muslims in Indonesia to obey Sharia law . In August 2000, it published a statement on this and held a Jakarta Charter parade in which the FPI activists marched in front of the Indonesian parliament. In a book published in October 2000, Rizieq Syihab argued that the omission of the Jakarta Charter by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta in August 1945 was a betrayal of democracy and an overturning of the constitution. Reintroducing the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution is a medicine that will restore their stolen rights. In this way a chronic ideological conflict could be resolved. In order to emphasize its demand for the reintroduction of the Jakarta Charter, the FPI held “Islamic Sharia Parades” (Pawai Syariat Islam) in August 2000 and 2001 . The slogan at the FPI rally in August 2001 was: "Better to die defending Sharia than to live without Sharia."

In a policy text posted on the FPI website in 2007, Rizieq Syihab stated that the FPI was a kind of pressure group in Indonesia urging state leaders to “improve the morals and beliefs of the Muslim community and harm it and at the same time to set in motion the construction of a social, political and legal order that is in line with the values ​​of the Islamic Sharia. ”The application of the Sharia in Indonesia, both substantively and formally, is the vision that the FPI wants to implement. Implementing Sharia law means, for example, introducing laws that clearly prohibit prostitution . The aim of the FPI is the "application of Islamic Sharia in a comprehensive way" (penerapan syariat secara kâffah) . A passage in the new version of the FPI-Stauten, quoted by Gumilang, explains that the application of the Sharia “in a comprehensive way” means its application in all areas of life. H. in Akidah , the Ibadah , marital relationships, interpersonal relationships (Muamalat) and the Criminal Law (jinayat) . According to Rizieq Syihab, the AMNM is the lever used by the FPI to implement the values ​​of Sharia law in Indonesia. It represents the alternative way chosen by the FPI to apply Sharia law.

However, Sobri Lubis, the FPI General Secretary, stated in an interview in 2001 that the struggle for the application of Sharia law was being carried out constitutionally. In contrast to other Islamist groups that operate in Indonesia, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia, the FPI is loyal to the Republic of Indonesia and has never questioned the presence of this state. The founding of the organization on the 35th anniversary of the Indonesian declaration of independence already expresses this. This loyalty is also evident in many of their documents and in the oath that FPI members swear. Every year on Independence Day, thousands of FPI members flock to the city with the red and white flag of Indonesia . This flag has a special meaning for the FPI because, in their opinion, it is based on a hadith , according to which an invincible Islamic state with a red and white flag should emerge at the end of time. The FPI also advocates the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila as the ruling ideology of the state. However, the FPI argues that the actual Islamic foundations of the pancasila have been misunderstood. At a public event in Bandung in February 2012, Rizieq Syihab summed it up in drastic terms: "With the Pancasila of Sukarno, belief in God is screwed, while with the Pancasila of the Jakarta Charter it is in the head" (' Pancasila Sukarno ketuhanan ada di pantat, sedangkan Pancasila Piagam Jakarta ketuhanan ada di kepala ').

Since 2013, FPI has been using the catchphrase NKRI Bersyariah (“The unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia based on Sharia ”) for its state concept . NKRI ( Negara Kesatuan Republic of Indonesia = "Unified State of the Republic of Indonesia") is an abbreviation that is mainly used by the Indonesian military for the state of Indonesia and is associated with efforts that lost its central role in the country after the collapse of the Suharto regime Regain state. The concept NKRI Bersyariah assumes that the Sharia is compatible with the principles of the Indonesian state.

Anti-americanism

Rizieq Syihab describes the FPI as an anti-American organization that openly opposes "US hegemony". The anti-American orientation of the FPI first became apparent after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , when the organization used the widespread opposition to Washington's war on terror to mobilize larger numbers of supporters. On October 8, 2001, the FPI called for a jihad "against US aggression against Afghanistan". A little later, on October 15, with the support of foreign donors, she organized a demonstration against the imminent US invasion of Afghanistan in front of the Indonesian parliament, which was attended by around 10,000 supporters. On this occasion, the FPI threatened to close the American embassy and demanded that diplomatic relations with the "terrorist state" USA be broken off.

In November 2001, the American Time magazine published a report that covered the FPI's threats against US citizens and alleged that the organization was receiving financial support from the al-Qaeda network. This report sparked great indignation among Rizieq Syihab. In his FPI book, which he published for the first time in 2004, he replied that everyone knew that the United States and England were the greatest terrorist and that they always fought against Islam. In 2004 the FPI organized demonstrations against George W. Bush's visit to Indonesia. In addition, she chose the motto “Apply Sharia - Avoid Sins - Fight the USA” (Tegakkan Syari'at - Tolak Ma'siat - Lawan America Serikat) for the parade on the anniversary of its foundation in August 2004 .

A new wave of anti-American FPI demonstrations occurred when the American President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in early December 2017. In response, the FPI held a protest rally in front of the US embassy in Jakarta on December 11, 2017. American flags were also burned on this occasion. The FPI also threatened to destroy the US embassy. In May 2018, the FPI again called on Muslims to take up arms and attack the US embassy.

Defending the Prophet and His Family

The FPI regards not only the Mohammed cartoons , but also the portrayal of Mohammed in the United States Supreme Court Building as an insult to Islam.

The FPI has been active several times in the past to defend the Prophet Mohammed and his family against alleged insults. On February 3, 2006, hundreds of FPI members gathered in front of the Danish embassy in Jakarta and protested against the publication of the Muhammad cartoons . Three days later, on February 6, hundreds of FPI members from East Java protested the cartoons in front of the Danish consulate in Surabaya . The demonstrators then tried to get to the US consulate to protest against the representation of Muhammad on the United States Supreme Court Building . The FPI regards this representation, although it is supposed to honor Mohammed as a legislator, as an insult to Islam. On February 19, 2006, hundreds of FPI members again protested in front of the US Embassy in Jakarta against the depiction of Muhammad in the Supreme Court building. They carried banners with inscriptions such as “Stop the depiction of the Messenger of God” (Stop Visualsiasi Rasulullah) and “Come, destroy the offenders of the Messenger of God” (Ayo Ganyang Penghina Rasulullah) . They also requested the removal of the relief on the building that depicts the prophet Moses .

A few years earlier, in May 2001, FPI supporters attacked the headquarters of the television broadcaster SCTV because it had broadcast the telenovela Esmeralda , in the plot of which a malicious woman named Fatima appears. The FPI saw this as an insult to the daughter of the prophet of the same name, Fātima bint Muhammad, and asked the television station to stop broadcasting the telenovela. In early July 2018, 9 FPI members attacked Surabaya Zoo because the zoo staff named a young camel Āmina, which was also the name of Muhammad's mother . The leader of the FPI militia in Surabaya justified the attack by saying that it was immoral to name an animal after the mother of the Prophet. The zoo admitted to the media that it had made a mistake and changed the name of the animal.

The fight against sexual permissiveness and "pornography"

The fight against sexual permissiveness and “pornography” also plays an important role in the ideology of the FPI. As early as July 1999, 500 FPI members marched in front of the headquarters of the capital city police and demanded measures against gambling and pornography . In the policy text published on the FPI website in 2007, Rizieq Syihab explains that the FPI combats all forms of social crime (kejahatan sosial) that are structural in nature and threaten Muslim society. This includes pornography and the gambling industry. On its website, the FPI campaigns for approval with the argument that it "teaches fear to prostitutes, transvestites (Waria), drunkards, gamblers, adulterers and other sinners."

The FPI rejects all types of beauty pageants , be it for women or transvestites (waria) . On June 27, 2005, FPI activists attacked a transvestite beauty pageant at Sarinah House in Jakarta. In September 2005, the FPI charged several Indonesian actors with pornography for posing naked for a work of art that was shown at the Centerpoint Biennale in Jakarta. On April 12, 2006, 150 to 200 FPI supporters destroyed the editorial office of the Indonesian edition of the men's magazine Playboy in South Jakarta and set it on fire after a leading FPI member had previously reported the publisher Erwin Arnada and two Playboy models to the police for shamelessness had indicated. In June and July 2006, the FPI then announced further Playboy models. Other actions that go in this direction were the sealing of the Fahmina Institute in Cirebon , which rejected the draft law against pornography and pornography campaigns, on May 21, 2006 and the demonstration in front of the Maxima Picture production house, which the Japanese porn actress Maria Ozawa wanted to invite on October 9, 2009.

Another enemy of the FPI is the LGBT movement. On September 28, 2010, supporters of the organization marched in front of the Goethe Institute in Jakarta and ultimately demanded the termination of the queer Q! Film festival supported by this institute with the argument that the promotion of free sex, sexual deviation, homosexuality and Lesbianism must be stopped. On May 4, 2012, the FPI protested outside the Salihara Theater in Jakarta, while the liberal Canadian Muslim activist Irshad Manji presented her new book Allah, Liberty, and Love . When she had spoken for 15 minutes, she was interrupted by the police, who said that the event had to be canceled because hundreds of FPI supporters had gathered to call for an end to the event. Habib Novel, the general secretary of the FPI in Jakarta, commented on the action the following day: “Irshad Manji is a gay and lesbian activist. She wants to open Islam to gays and lesbians. However, Islam will never accept gays and lesbians. ”The government then expelled Manji from the country, arguing that it was trying to promote homosexuality among Indonesian Muslims. At the same time, the FPI threatened to mobilize 30,000 of its members to prevent a Lady Gaga concert that was scheduled for early June 2012 at the Gelora Bung Karno Stadium . Lady Gaga then canceled her concert.

The FPI is campaigning for women to wear jilbāb clothing in all government institutions . She considers jilbāb bans in hospitals and in the army and police to be illegitimate. She rejects bans on polygamy , female circumcision and marriages with underage girls, as demanded by international organizations, as “anti-Islamic programs”. She believes it is legitimate for girls to be married as soon as menstruation has started.

Jihad and Martyrdom

According to Rizieq Syihab, the designation as Front Pembela Islam should give the organization a combat identity (identitas perjuangan) . The priority of the FPI's struggle is the “war on sin” (perang melawan ma'siat) . The fighting philosophy (filsafat juang) of the FPI says, according to Rizieq Syihab: "For the mujahid , slander is a habit, killing is martyrdom, imprisonment is seclusion and displacement is travel." This philosophy should not only increase the willingness of the FPI activists to take risks, but also make toil and suffering bearable for them.

As Rizieq Syihab explains in his book on the FPI, the FPI has adopted the five principles of the Islamic struggle from Hasan al-Bannā , the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood , and made them its guiding principle. The five principles are: 1. God is our Lord and goal; 2. Mohammed , the Messenger of God, is our power; 3. the noble Koran is our guideline ; 4. Jihad is our way; and 5. Martyrdom is our goal. In the FPI, jihad is understood primarily as a struggle to realize what is right and to prohibit what is wrong. The independence of responsibility is important for the identity of the FPI's struggle. This means that every FPI activist takes on the full moral and legal action for the AMNM actions that he carries out himself and also all associated risks, without being allowed to involve other activists.

The great importance of martyrdom is particularly evident in the FPI's slogan. It reads: "Live venerably or die as a martyr" (Arabic: ʿIš karīman au mut šahīdan ; Indonesian: Hidup mulia atau mati syahid ). As Rizieq Syihab explains, this slogan comes from Sayyid Qutb . He is said to have said this before he was hanged by the Nasser regime. The five principles of the Islamic struggle and the FPI slogan also form the main content of the text of the FPI march, which the FPI uses as one of its identifying marks.

At the international level, the FPI sees it as its task to support the jihad fighters in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, southern Thailand, southern Philippines, Mindanao , Kashmir and other parts of the world. At the time of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the FPI opened recruiting offices for jihad fighters who wanted to go to Iraq at its headquarters in Tanah Abang ; more than 5000 people answered.

On August 8, 2014, the FPI published a five-point declaration on the IS organization in which it expressed its loyalty in supporting the Islamic jihad movement around the world "in the fight against all forms of tyranny of global hegemony (New Imperialism) “Announced. However, it rejects sectarian violence and warfare between Muslims on the basis of madhhab differences that are not rooted in the foundations of religion (ushuluddin) and does not allow these to be called jihad. In its declaration, the FPI calls on all Islamic jihad movements to unite and support one another in carrying out Sharia-compliant jihad without killing or mistreating civilians who are not involved in the war, regardless of theirs Madhhab and their religion. In the last point, the FPI expresses its support for the appeal of al-Qaeda leader Aiman ​​az-Zawahiri , who supports the jihad groups of Abu Muhammad al-Jaulani in Syria, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq and other groups from Al-Qaeda had called to unite and fraternize with all other Islamic mujāhidūn worldwide in order to continue the jihad in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and other oppressed Islamic countries. The declaration is signed by the FPI Chairman Muhsin al-Attas, Rizieq Syihab and the FPI General Secretary and, as stated in the last sentence, is addressed to all FPI leaders, activists, fighters, members and sympathizers of the FPI worldwide.

Ahmadiyya and liberal Islam as enemy

Since 2007 the FPI has been agitating against the Ahmadiyya and liberal Islam. The FPI believes that Islam has been betrayed by the Ahmadiyya and liberal reformers such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid and the Liberal Islam Network ( Jaringan Islam Liberal ; JIL). On February 14, 2008, Sobri Lubis, then General Secretary of the FPI, declared war at a large gathering of the Ahmadiyya Organization. At this meeting in a pesantren in Kota Banjar, West Java, he said, “If the government does not eliminate the Ahmadiyya, we will call on Muslims to fight against the Ahmadiyya supporters: kill them wherever they live ... kill them. This is because you, Ahmadiyya, violate our beliefs. Their blood may be shed. ”On this occasion, Sobri Lubis also explicitly acknowledged his responsibility for this call to kill the Ahmadiyya. In July 2008 the FPI published a declaration in the magazine Suara Islam ("Voice of Islam") to prove the Ahmadiyah's disbelief (Maklumat FPI tentang bukti kekafiran Ahmadiyah) .

The FPI has already acted violently against the Ahmadiyya on several occasions. On June 20, 2008, a local FPI contingent forcibly closed the Ahmadiyya headquarters in Makassar . And on April 20, 2012, an FPI group attacked an Ahmadiyya mosque in Tasikmalaya, western Java. The FPI's aggression in the Monas incident (see below) was also directed against the Ahmadiyya.

As far as liberal Islam is concerned, the FPI declared in its 2007 declaration that attempts to liberalize the teaching of Islam from within the Islamic community itself must be resolutely opposed. An FPI banner that was seen near the FPI headquarters in Jakarta in 2012 read: “Liberal is not Islamic, Islam is not liberal.” Another FPI poster read: “Destroy the Liberals. Dissolve the Ahmadiyya. Liberals and Ahmadiyya are stray people, apostates , infidels , but not Islam. ”Liberal Muslims and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad , the founder of Ahmadiyya, are depicted on the poster as the vampire-like forces of Satan .

Since 2008 , the FPI has viewed secularism , pluralism and liberalism , which it collectively abbreviates as SEPILIS in reference to the disease syphilis , as “imported negative ideologies” that must be eradicated and removed from state teaching materials. Rizieq Syihab stated in a fatwa that it is forbidden to vote for political parties that are SEPILIS-oriented or that do not support the dissolution of the Ahmadiyya. An action by the FPI, which specifically served to combat pluralism, was your protest against the broadcast of the film ? (sic!), which deals with the concept of religious pluralism in Indonesia. On August 27, 2011, one hundred FPI supporters gathered in front of the SCTV headquarters in Senayan and demanded that the broadcast of the film be stopped.

Endeavor to establish an international Islamic caliphate

At its second National Assembly in 2008, the FPI decided that the organization should play an active role in the establishment of an international Islamic caliphate “in accordance with Sharia law” through “elegant and responsible logical and realistic steps” that “lead to the progress of the Fit the world ”. This should include:

1. Strengthening the function and role of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation ,
2. Formation of a common parliament of the Islamic world,
3. Formation of a common market for the Islamic world,
4. Formation of a common defense pact for the Islamic world,
5. Unification of the coins of the Islamic world,
6. Abolition of passports and visa requirements within the Islamic world,
7. Facilitating marriages within the Islamic world,
8. Standardization of school curriculum, especially in the area of ​​religious education, within the Islamic world,
9. Establishing a common satellite system for communication within the Islamic world,
10. Establishment of an International Islamic Court of Justice.

In its declaration of August 2014 on the IS organization, the FPI defined the “establishment of the Islamic caliphate through Daʿwa, Hisba and Jihad according to the model of prophecy (sesuai Manhaj Nubuwwah) ” as its vision and mission. With this expression she has aligned herself with the IS organization, because this organization also calls her caliphate the caliphate “according to the model of prophecy” (ʿalā manhaǧ an-nubūwa) .

In a YouTube video entitled “The FPI and the Islamic Caliphate”, which the FPI published in June 2015, it committed itself even more clearly to the concept of the caliphate. In the version of the FPI statutes shown in the opening credits of the video, the vision and mission of the FPI is stated: “The application of Islamic Sharia law in a comprehensive manner under the protection of the Islamic caliphate according to the model of prophecy, through the implementation of Daʿwa, upholding the Hisba and carrying out jihad. ”In a text that is shown in the video afterwards, it is stated that the Islamic caliphate that the FPI is fighting for is not the abolition of the Republic of Indonesia and other states such as Saudi -Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia and Brunei mean, but rather the expansion of the cooperation relations of all Islamic countries, especially those that are united in the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, in order to remove all obstacles that stand between these countries, to eliminate. In his speech, Rizieq Syihab makes it clear that he sees the European Union and NATO as models for the Islamic caliphate. Unlike the organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia , which is also working towards a caliphate, the FPI does not reject the existing states because it is more realistic. Despite this strategic direction, the FPI will remain loyal to the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. Indonesia will even take over the leadership of the Islamic world in the future, because it is the largest Islamic country and most Muslims live in it.

Clarification of the dogmatic position: Between Shiites and Wahhabis

Some scientific authors have described the FPI as a Salafist organization. According to Al-Zastrouw, the teaching of the FPI is close to the Salafism of the Laskar Jihad group led by Ja'far Umar Thalib. However, this classification cannot be maintained, because the statute of the FPI mentions that the organization follows the Ashʿarīya in the ʿAqīda and the Shafiite teaching direction in Fiqh . Salafist teaching, on the other hand, rejects such affiliations. Rizieq Syihab himself says in his FPI book that there is no place in the FPI for opponents of Madhhab because the FPI venerates the imams and followers of the various disciplines. In addition, litanies of Tarīqa ʿAlawīya are recited at the weekly teaching sessions of the FPI on Thursday evenings . To the prayers that the FPI for solicitation of divine assistance (istiġāṯa) recommends that belongs invocation of hadramautischen Sufis Abu Bakr ibn Sālim (d. 1584). This shows that the FPI has a more Sufi orientation.

After repeatedly speculating about the dogmatic orientation of the FPI and accusing it of being a Wahhabi organization, the FPI published its dogmatic position and its position against Shiites and Wahhabis in a text published on its website in 2010 clarified. The text is based on a statement that Rizieq Syihab made at an FPI training day in late 2009. Accordingly, the FPI is committed to the doctrine of the Sunnis (Ahlusunah Waljemaah) and follows the Shafiite teaching direction in Fiqh . She is neither Shiite nor Wahhabi.

As far as the FPI's point of view towards the Shiites is concerned, it distinguishes between three groups: 1. The ghouls who deify ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib and who consider the Koran to be falsified ; 2. the Rāfidites , who slander the Sahāba such as Abū Bakr and ʿUmar ibn al-Chattāb and the wives of the prophets such as Aisha bint Abī Bakr and Hafsa bint ʿUmar ; and 3. The moderate Shiites, the ʿAlī ibn Abī Tālib and the traditions of the Ahl al-bait give special priority, but treat the Sahāba with respect, even if they criticize them. While the first group, in the opinion of the FPI, fights as unbelievers, and the second group must be rebuked, the third group should be met with Daʿwa and dialogue. Here the FPI cites the scholars Muhammad Saʿīd Ramadān al-Būtī , Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī , Wahba az-Zuhailī and ʿAlī Jumʿa , who have declared the moderate Shiites to be a recognized Islamic discipline. In the same way, the FPI distinguishes between three groups among the Wahhabis. The first group are the Takfīrī Wahhabis, who declare all Muslims who do not agree with their views to be unbelievers and ascribe physical attributes to God; they are to be fought as unbelievers. The second group were Wahhabi Kharijites who insulted the Prophet's family. This group has strayed; she must be confronted and corrected. Finally, there are the moderate Wahhabis who do not hold any Kharijite or Takfīritic positions. One must approach these in dialogue and in Islamic brotherhood.

organization structure

The “Grand Imam”: al-Habib Rizieq Syihab

Habib Rizieq Syihab, the "Grand Imam" of the FPI

At the head of the FPI has been the scholar al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Syihab (born August 24, 1965 in Jakarta). Habib Rizieq is venerated by his followers as the Imam Besar ("Grand Imam") and has a quasi-holy rank among his followers due to his descent from the Prophet. However, he is also highly regarded by them for his simple and humble lifestyle and courage. The title Habib shows that he belongs to the Habaib (see below), but is also meant to mean that Rizieq is the “darling” (Arabic ḥabīb ) of his followers. The FPI describes itself as the “community of those who love Habib Rizieq Syihab” (Komunitas Pencinta Habib Rizieq Syihab) .

Rizieq's father Sayid Husein was the founder of the Panda-Arab movement, a kind of scout movement for Arab Indonesians. Rizieq Syihab studied at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia from 1984 to 1990 on a scholarship from the Organization of the Islamic Conference and then spent a year at the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur . Before founding FPI, he was a preacher and teacher in an Islamic school in central Jakarta . The Third National Assembly of the FPI in 2013 confirmed him in his post as Imam Besar for life.

Habib Rizieq's book Dialog FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar: menjawab berbagai tuduhan terhadap gerakan nasional anti ma'siat di Indonesia (“Dialogue FPI, the territorialization of the right and the prohibition of the wrong: response to some accusations against the national anti-sin movement in Indonesia “) Is today the religious standard work for FPI members and contains everything you need to know about the FPI.

After various criminal charges were brought against Rizieq Syihab between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2017, he fled to Saudi Arabia via Yemen in May 2017. At the end of September 2018, the FPI announced that Rizieq Syihab was in a condition similar to house arrest. He is not allowed to leave his domicile. On September 26, 2018, the FPI asked the Deputy President of the Indonesian Representative Council, Fadli Zon, to contact the National Police Commissioner, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Mission in Saudi Arabia to find out the reason for the treatment of Rizieq Syihab.

On November 8, 2018, Rizieq Syihab was arrested by the Saudi police for holding a flag on his home in Mecca that resembled the IS flag. FPI officials alleged on November 9, 2018 that the Saudi Arabian police were looking for perpetrators who are believed to have displayed the IS flag on the home of Rizieq Shihab, and suggested that intelligence services were involved in the case. Rizieq Syihab had previously been detained twice - in 2003 and 2008 - for several months in Indonesia. During his absence, the activities of the FPI declined sharply.

The central management structure

The highest body of the FPI is the National Assembly ( Musyawarah Nasional ; MUNAS), which, however, only meets every five years. So far it has only met three times, namely the first time from December 19 to 21, 2003 in Jakarta, the second time from December 9 to 11, 2008 in Bogor and the third time on August 22 to 24, 2013 in Bekasi . In the meantime, the FPI is headed by the Central Leadership Council ( Dewan Pimpinan Pusat ; DPP), which is composed of two bodies, the Consultative Council (majelis syura) and the Executive Council (majelis tanfidzi) . The consultative council has the task of appointing and advising the chairman of the executive board and of monitoring all activities of the FPI. It consists of five Dīwānen, each of which includes several religious scholars from different regions: 1. the Sharia-Dīwān (dewan Syariah) ; 2. the constructive Dīwān (dewan pembina) ; 3. the advisory Dīwān (dewan penasihat) ; 4. the controlling Dīwān (dewan pengawas) and 5. the honor-Dīwān (dewan kehormatan) . The current chairman of the Consultative Council (2015-2020 period) is KH Misbahul Anam, who previously served as the organization's first general secretary.

KH. Ahmad Sobri Lubis, current chairman of the FPI Executive Board

The Executive Board, which is responsible for the day-to-day organization, consists of the Chairman, the Secretary General, the Treasurer and various other members with specific responsibilities. According to a report that the FPI published on its website at the beginning of May 2015, the Executive Board for the period 2015 to 2020 consists of the following nine people:

1. Chairman: KH. Ahmad Sobri Lubis
2. Deputy Chairman: KH. Ja'far Shiddiq
3. Secretary General: Haji Hasanuddin
4. Treasurer: Ustadh Haris Ubaidillah
5. Head of the Daʿwa department: KH. Zainudin Ali
6. Head of Hisba Department : Ustadh Slamet Ma'arif
7. Head of the Jihad Department : KH. Abdul Qodir AKA
8. Head of the Department for Enforcement of the Caliphate: KH. Tb. Abdurrahman Anwar
9. Head of Organization Department: H. Munarman

The appointment of Lubis came because the previous chairman Rizieq Syihab was "permanently prevented". The chairman of the executive board is subordinate to various departments, which are supposed to support him in the execution of his office. He also has the right to set up various committees, commissions, and branches as needed.

Since 1999 the head office of the Central Leadership Council of the FPI has been located at Jalan Petamburan III No. 17 in the Tanah Abang district in Central Jakarta.

Branches

At the horizontal level, the FPI is organized in the Central Leadership Council ( Dewan Pimpinan Pusat ; DPP) at the national level, the Provincial Leadership Councils ( Dewan Pimpinan Daerah ; DPD) at the provincial level, and the Regional Leadership Councils ( Dewan Pimpinan Wilaya ; DPW) at the city level and Regencies, the Branch Leadership Councils ( Dewan Pimpinan Cabang ; DPC) in the subdistricts and the command posts at the village level. There is different information about the number of Indonesian provinces in which the FPI is active with its own branches. While Ahmad Sobri Lubis, the general secretary of the FPI, gave it 22 in December 2003, Efendi / Pramuko and Wilson, whose books were published in 2006, speak of 18 and 26 provinces with FPI branches, respectively.

According to Jahroni, many of the FPI branches are closely linked to the headquarters in Jakarta. Rizieq Syihab himself emphasizes, on the other hand, that all regional and local FPI branches operate largely independently and were set up in Jakarta without the help of the Central Management Council. The head office only finances the sending of a delegation to the inauguration and cannot provide any construction assistance. In the past, the two branches in Surakarta and Yogyakarta in Central Java have shown particularly great independence . Front Pembela Islam Surakarta (FPIS) is one of the most active offshoots of the organization and is heavily influenced by the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (“Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters”) from Abu Bakar Bashir . The FPI units outside the capital were notorious in the early days for their militancy, poor coordination and lack of discipline. According to R. Hefner, this has to do with the fact that in the months after Suharto's fall the national organization was brought together through alliances between bosses of already existing paramilitary units, some of which had only nominal connections with the leadership in Jakarta.

Jamaah and Laskar: the dual structure of the FPI

The scientific literature emphasizes that two major organizational structures co-exist in the FPI, Jamaah (“community”) and Laskar (“army, troop”). The Jamaah is responsible for the “area of ​​the right” (Amar ma'ruf) , which manifests itself in the Daʿwa and in encouraging the local population to attend the FPI prayer meetings and to fulfill their religious duties. The Laskar militia, also known as Laskar Pembela Islam (“militia of the Islam defenders”; LPI), is responsible for the “prohibition of the reprehensible” (nahy munkar) .

According to the FPI statutes, which were adopted at the National Assembly in 2003, the LPI militia is one of the four branch organizations (Anakorganasi) of the FPI. The other three branch organizations are the women's branch of the Islamic Defenders (Mujahidah Pembela Islam) , whose activities focus on social issues and are also committed to the principle of Amar bi-l-maʿrūf, the union of the workers' front (Serikat Pekerja Front) and the "Islamic Student Front" (Front Mahasiswa Islam) , which has the task of leading the intellectual struggle in defense of Islam. The LPI is, however, much better known than the other three branches because it has often been involved in violent activities in the past. According to Rizieq Syihab, the LPI is "the spearhead of the FPI's moral struggle".

The seven hierarchical levels of LPI according to Jahroni
level	Item designation	Number of subordinates
1	Imam Besar	All of the military personnel
2	imam	26400 people (25000 Jundi + 1250 Rais + 125 Amir + 25 Qaid + 5 Wali)
3	Wali	5280 people (5000 Jundi + 250 Rais + 25 Amir + 5 Qaid)
4th	Qaid	1055 people (1000 Jundi + 50 Rais + 5 Amir)
5	Amir	210 people (200 Jundi + 10 Rais)
6th	Rais	20 people
7th	Jundi	1 person

The LPI is strictly hierarchical in itself, the hierarchy reflecting the territorial command structure of Indonesia 's armed forces , with a chain of command that extends from the national level down to the subdistricts. According to Jahroni, the FPI's military command structure is divided into a total of seven hierarchical levels:

People wishing to join the LPI typically go through three days of paramilitary training. This usually takes place in Bumi Perkemahan Karang Kitri in Bekasi . After the training is over, the new members have to speak the Baiʿa . It reads: "Ready to give up sinful behavior (maksiat) , ready to defend oppressed Muslims, ready to die as martyrs in God's way " (Siap meninggalkan maksiat, siap membela muslim yang dizalimi, siap mati syahid di jalan Allah) . The militia is not armed with firearms, only with knives and swords. When a member of the LPI dies, all other members are required to attend to their funeral.

The members

According to its statutes, any Muslim who has a good character, is godly , possesses the spirit of jihad, is brave and has a high sense of loyalty can become a member of the FPI . With regard to the number of members of the FPI, there are very different statements. Efendi / Pramuko and Rosadi speak of 7 million members for 2006 and 2008 respectively. Muchsin Alatas, the former FPI chairman, named the same number in 2014. In August 1999, Rizieq is said to have claimed to have a total of 13 million followers. The number of followers in Western scientific literature, on the other hand, is considerably lower. According to Robert Hefner, the organization had only 40,000 to 50,000 active members in 2004, most of whom were concentrated in a handful of larger cities. According to Ian D. Wilson, the number of followers in 2006 was 100,000. Ahmad Sobri Lubis, the general secretary of the FPI, stated in December 2003 that the FPI had around 870,000 members. According to a survey by Lembaga Survei Indonesia in 2007, 0.7 percent of all Indonesians were members of FPI. With a total population of 232.5 million in Indonesia, this corresponds to a number of 1.6 million.

The uncertainty regarding the number of members is related to the fact that the FPI has more of the character of a community or movement than that of an organization and cares little about formalities. Accordingly, membership is hardly formalized: In contrast to being accepted into the LPI, admission into the organization takes place without Baiʿa and without organizational procedures. If someone takes part in the activities of the FPI, they are considered an FPI member. The main bond that unites FPI members is their dedication and loyalty to the leader. People who are accepted into the organization are usually known to another FPI member beforehand. In addition to this informal way of recruiting members, there is a more formalized way of laying out and distributing registration forms for new members in universities and religious schools, but this is more of an exception.

Distinguishing marks: FPI logo and FPI uniform

The FPI has its own logo, which is intended to remind FPI activists of the character of their organization. It consists of a five-pointed star surrounded by an isosceles triangle prayer chain . Above the star there is a crescent moon, below is al-Ǧabha al-islāmīya ad-difāʿīya ("Islamic Defense Front ") in Arabic script , below it in Latin script Front Pembela Islam . The star is formed from the Shahada , the crescent from the Basmala . The star, crescent and prayer beads are green, the writing is black and the background is green. The triangle is intended to indicate the strength of the bond of brotherhood, the prayer beads to the Dhikr and religiosity, its 99 pearls to the beautiful name of God , and the dome-like shapes in the three corners to the attachment of the FPI members to the mosque. The five points of the star symbolize the five pillars of Islam and the five compulsory daily prayers. The white background is supposed to symbolize purity, the green color Islam and the black color of the writing on determination in battle. The Arabic lettering should refer to the “Spirit of the Koran” (semangat Qur'an) , the Indonesian lettering to the love for the fatherland.

The FPI also has its own uniform. It consists of a shirt and long trousers in white color and a pilgrim's cap or a turban also in white, which are completed by a scarf and a sash or a belt buckle in green color. Rizieq Syihab calls this uniform Taqwā clothing and declares that it should morally strengthen FPI activists and, conversely, demoralize their opponents. Wilson says that it resembles traditional Arabic clothing and is based on popular representations of the Wali Songo, the nine Muslim saints who are said to have spread Islam in Java . Efendi / Pramuko, on the other hand, emphasize that the FPI wants to use this clothing to express that it has a police-like character. In most of their actions, the FPI members identify themselves with this uniform with the green FPI label and the FPI logo.

financing

For their own financing, some branches of the FPI levy membership fees from their members. In addition, FPI often receives donations from outside donors for their demonstrations. Rizieq Syihab himself writes that the willingness to sacrifice one's fortune for the FPI's struggle has been the most important model of funding since the organization was founded. The principle of financing the FPI is the principle: “By the umma , through the umma and for the umma.” All AMNM activities, explains Rizieq Syihab, are financed through joint contributions of the FPI activists. From time to time there is also support from FPI sympathizers. However, the FPI has no external donors who are permanently involved in the financing of the organization. In the report that the FPI submitted for its Second National Assembly in 2008, it stated that the amount of donations for the FPI in the years since 2003 has been very low. Even the amount of money for the purchase of the small building in Petamburan in which the FPI Secretariat is located was difficult for the FPI to raise. Until 2008 the loan had not been paid off. After Hasani / Naipospos, the FPI opened individual companies. In addition, she receives income from the sale of her uniforms and attributes.

activities

Munajat, who carried out a more extensive study of FPI activities from 1998 to 2010, found that more than half of these activities took place in Jakarta, while the rest were spread across the zones of influence of other FPI associations. The Jakarta Association is thus by far the most active of all FPI associations. Overall, the FPI activities can be divided into the following categories:

Sweeping: The fight against sin

According to Munajat, a total of 45.5% of all activities of the FPI fall into the category "Action against immorality / Maksiat". Activities of this kind took place shortly after the organization was founded. On November 7, 1999, 300 masked FPI fighters attacked the Larangan Plaza Hotel in Pamekasan on Madura Island . They broke into the hotel rooms, hunted prostitutes and beat them. As of late 1999, the FPI carried out dozens of attacks on nightclubs, billiard halls, brothels, gambling halls, and other sites of “sinful” activity.

The actions in which supporters of the FPI attack "places of sin", destroy them and threaten the owners, are also called sweeping (literally "turning away, sweeping away"). To a certain extent, sweeping is the implementation of the principle of "prohibiting the reprehensible" (nahy munkar) . During these actions, the FPI supporters are usually armed with batons. In December 2017, for example, four FPI members armed with batons broke into a hotel in Klaten, central Java, and hunted down unmarried couples there. In February 2012, the Tangerang FPI threatened sweepings against small supermarkets selling alcohol. The local leader of the FPI described the sweeping as "procedure in the style of the FPI" (penertiban ala FPI) . On the eve of Ramadan 2012, the FPI also carried out a spirits sweeping in several regions of Bandung .

Sweeping actions are preferably held in the month of Ramadan because this most strongly symbolizes the purification of the Islamic community. During Ramadan 2002 alone, 20 such actions took place. Activities usually begin in the evening after the Tarāwīh prayers. For example, the FPI of East Kalimantan carried out a comprehensive sweeping action in Samarinda in Ramadan 2007 . First a car convoy drove through the city and called on the people to “preserve the holiness of Ramadan”. FPI supporters then went en masse to the banks of the Mahakam River, drove couples apart and searched parked vehicles. Later, the FPI supporters engaged in a chase with young people they had caught drinking alcoholic beverages on the roadside. A young man they found drunk in Harapan Baru beat them. After dispersing other teenagers they found drinking, they demolished a large party tent and set it on fire. The FPI supporters threw stones at the people who had celebrated in the tent, so that they eventually fled. The local FPI chairman said after the incident that the supporters had originally only intended to conduct a peaceful convoy. Due to the observed misconduct of the citizens, they would then have been forced to pursue sweeping activities.

According to the FPI leadership, the targets for sweeping actions are identified by a separate commission for monitoring sins. This allegedly follows strict procedural guidelines. She should first check reports from local residents and only then, after confirmation, file a formal report with the police. The LPI militia is responsible for carrying out the sweeping operations. Even if the LPI has not made such a strong impact in recent years, it still exists today. In January 2018, CNN reported that a sweeping action against prostitution in Pamekasan had been coordinated by the LPI General Staff in Jakarta.

Various reports indicate that sweeping activities by FPI members were also used for self-enrichment in the past. Rosadi reports on cases of people collecting money from hotels on behalf of the FPI. According to Al-Zastrouw, operators of entertainment venues in Mangga Besar and Kemang were asked for "donations" (sumbangan) to serve as a guarantee of safety. In the event that the businessmen did not pay these donations, they were threatened with attacks in the name of the fight against Maksiat. In other cases, FPI activists attacked a café and only moved after the café owner handed them a sum of money. When the Indonesian Entertainment Industry Association, Aspehindo, publicly complained in December 2003 that the FPI had destroyed recreational facilities of business people who had refused to pay the FPI money, the FPI reported him to Jakarta Police for defamation. Rizieq Syihab admits in his FPI book that there was collusion between individual FPI members and owners of entertainment venues in 2000 , but argues that the FPI reacted to these incidents by excluding the members concerned. Otherwise, he explains, the actions of the FPI to close Maksiat places followed certain standard procedures, which depended solely on whether the Muslim population in the area had complained to the FPI about the places in question or not.

At the FPI, sweeping is not limited to the “fight against sin”, but is sometimes threatened to achieve other goals. For example, before the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the FPI threatened to carry out sweeping operations at hotels in order to track down American and British spies. In the same way, the FPI threatened sweeping activities against American citizens in Indonesia after the beginning of December Donald Trump announced that he would move the US embassy to Jerusalem.

Protest rallies

Protest rallies are another important activity of the FPI. As a rule, the FPI activists march in front of the headquarters of the organization concerned and use loudspeakers to speak to those responsible in order to express their protest and possibly to demand an apology. At the FPI rally against the National Human Rights Commission in January 2001, FPI members gave speeches in front of the building explaining why the commission had to be dissolved and handing out leaflets. Other FPI members hung a banner on the commission building that read : “The Komnas HAM is sealed by the FPI” (Komnas HAM Disegel oleh FPI) . The action only ended after two members of the commission agreed to meet representatives of the FPI. A member of the commission, Benyamin Mangkoedilaga, then made a statement from an FPI vehicle expressing his approval of the FPI's demands and promising to forward them to the head of the commission. After that, the FPI people left, but on the way back they threw stones into various cafes and bars. During the protests against the publication of the Muhammad cartoons in February 2006, FPI activists protested in Surabaya until ten representatives were allowed to speak to staff at the Danish embassy. However, since they were not satisfied with the conversation, they threw stones, rotten tomatoes and rotten eggs at the consulate.

Pengajian: Religious instruction for members

All FPI members and followers usually attend sessions of Quran recitation (pengajian) and instruction in Islamic teachings hosted by the scholars of the Consultative Council and other FPI leaders. The FPI's Pengajian religious events usually include shalawat, chants accompanied by drums in praise of the Prophet Muhammad. Was the time when Misbahul Anam General, he gave lessons in the rules of jihad (fiqh al-ǧihād) , but also conveyed litanies of Tijaniyyah -Ordens in which he as a spiritual leader (muršid) worked. The Jamaah branch of the FPI is responsible for the organization of the Pengajian activities and the religious education of the members. LPI members usually only take part in the Pengajian meetings in a subordinate role. The connection of people to a specific LPI department depends on which Pengajian teaching circle they participate in.

Before leaving for Saudi Arabia, Rizieq Syihab also held a teaching circle (Majelis Ta'lim) with Pengajian twice a week , on Wednesday in the Al Ishlah mosque in Petamburan in Tanah Abang and on Thursday evening in his own house. These teaching circles could be attended by all members. The audience usually consisted of about 2500 people, making his Pengajian particularly large. Most of the visitors were FPI supporters. They came regularly in motorcycle convoys from other parts of Greater Jakarta. Rizieq Syihab's teaching circle at the Al Ishlah Mosque, which was also open to the general public, also played an important role in recruiting new members. People who had attended this teaching circle and brought the recommendation of another FPI member with them could become members directly. The mosque al Ishlah forms the actual religious center of the FPI and serves as a meeting place for the members at rallies.

Tabligh Akbar and Takbir Keliling: mass religious events

Also important on the religious level are the public sermon events called Tabligh akbar (“Great Transmission”). The FPI activists held such events before the FPI was officially founded. At these mass celebrations, attended by thousands of FPI supporters, the FPI anthem is usually sung and the FPI march played. It was also a Tabligh-akbar event at which Sobri Lubis, the then General Secretary of the FPI, declared war on the Ahmadiyya on February 14, 2008.

Another form of religious mass celebrations are night tours or marches through the city. They are called takbir keliling . On the night of June 13, 2018, for example, the FPI held a takbir keliling around Jakarta on the occasion of the celebration of the breaking of the fast . On this tour, the members of the FPI started walking from the organization's headquarters in Tanah Abang and wandered through the city until morning prayers , heading for various mosques.

Milad: the organization's self-celebration

Traditionally, the FPI celebrates its birthday every August with great effort ( Milad , from Arabic mīlād ). In the early years she also held large parades on this occasion. In 1999 the event was called “Great Anti-Maksiat Parade” (Pawai Akbar Anti Maksiat) , in 2000 “Jakarta Charter Parade” (Pawai Piagam Jakarta) , 2001 “Islamic Sharia Parade” (Pawai Syariat Islam) , 2002 “Parade of Islamic Law ” (Pawai Hukum Islam) and 2003“ Parade of God's Law ” (Pawai Hukum Allah) . The parades from 2000 to 2002 led from the FPI headquarters in Petamburan to the parliament building and from there back to Petamburan. The 1999, 2003 and 2004 parades took the form of motorized processions around the city. 5,000 FPI activists from various regions of Indonesia took part in the 2001 parade, in which the demand for the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter was in the foreground.

In the years that followed, the FPI began to celebrate the anniversaries of its foundation with a Tabligh akbar. In August 2013, to celebrate the organization's 15th anniversary, a Tablig akbar was held, attended by thousands of FPI members. The street from Petamburan, in which the FPI headquarters are located, was partially closed. Then the FPI members organized a tour around Jakarta in a car parade . The third national assembly of the FPI took place on this occasion.

Humanitarian action

Flood in Jakarta

Leading representatives of the FPI pointed out in press interviews that their organization also pursues a humanitarian program that includes tree-planting campaigns and participation in village rehabilitation programs. The most important humanitarian action of the FPI so far has been its involvement in the devastating tsunami that struck the province of Aceh on December 26, 2004 . After this disaster, hundreds of FPI volunteers and Habib Rizieq poured into Banda Aceh within two days , with the transport organized by the government. The FPI made a name for itself mainly by recovering and burying the bodies. In total, the FPI is said to have recovered 100,000 bodies after the tsunami.

In November 2014, the Indonesian newspaper Republika reported that the FPI is participating in flood control efforts in Jakarta by carrying out reforestation work in the upper area of ​​the Ciliwung , the river that flows through Jakarta. In January 2014, the FPI planted 40,000 trees in Puncak, where there are four inlets for the Ciliwung. Habib Rizieq Sihab plans to plant another 300,000 trees there in December. The FPI's Daʿwa Committee organized a public breaking of the fast on June 13, 2018 in Petamburan with an aid event for orphans.

Use of force

According to Munajat, the collective activities of the FPI can be divided into four different types:

1. violent actions in which people or property are harmed;
2. Actions in which the FPI threatens violence to people or groups of people armed with wooden sticks or other simple weapons in order to enforce claims without harming people or property;
3. Actions in which the FPI only verbally threatens to use violence in order to enforce demands, for example against the government;
4. other non-violent actions, e.g. submitting petitions or dialogue with authorities.

Of the 233 collective actions of the FPI between 1998 and 2010 that Munajat learned about from newspapers, 64 cases (27%) belong to category 1, 34 cases (14%) to category 2; 18 cases (8%) in category 3 and 118 cases (approx. 50%) in category 4. 40 percent of the violent activities of the FPI were associated with crackdown on immorality (Maksiat).

According to Rizieq Syihab, the FPI obliges each of its activists to learn martial arts for self-defense . In an interview with Ian Wilson, the former FPI General Secretary Ahmad Sobri Lubis once emphasized that violence is only the last resort that the FPI uses when the local authorities or the police fail to comply with their demands against violations of existing law or to proceed with the "moral order". In December 2003 Lubis announced a paradigm shift in the FPI's struggle away from mass action and militancy (kelaskaran) towards education. In the future, the FPI will take legal action to stop practices of immorality such as gambling and prostitution. The new paradigm was to be adopted at the First National Conference of the FPI on December 19-23, 2003 in Jakarta. But the FPI did not keep this promise. In the FPI statutes, which were adopted at this conference, a distinction is made between gentle Amar Ma'ruf and determined Nahi Munkar , but the latter advocates the use of force and in no way renders violent action. As early as October 2004, the FPI showed with attacks on cafes in southern Jakarta that it was not prepared to forego violence.

The Monas on Merdeka Square in Jakarta, where the "Monas Incident" occurred on June 1, 2008.

One of the violent actions of the FPI, which aroused a lot of outrage and criticism of the FPI in Indonesia, was its attack on activists of the "National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief " ( Aliansi Kebangsaan Untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan ; AKKBB) on June 1, 2008 at Monas in Jakarta's central Merdeka Square, also known as the "Monas Incident" (Insiden Monas) . The AKKBB was an amalgamation of around 50 Indonesian religious and interreligious organizations and institutes that campaigned for freedom of religion, particularly with regard to the Ahmadiyyah. The background to the attack by the FPI was that the AKKBB had published a full-page statement in several Jakarta newspapers on May 10, 2008, in which it pointed out that the Indonesian constitution guarantees religious freedom for its citizens and criticized the groups that violate this principle. This statement angered the FPI, and on June 1, the day of the celebration of Pancasila , the Monas incident occurred: when around 1,500 members of the AKKBB, including members of the Ahmadiyyah, demonstrated for religious freedom, they became activists attacked the FPI, who were demonstrating there with other groups against the increase in fuel prices. According to the FPI, the trigger for this was that the AKKBB called them "Satan's militia" (Laskar Setan) at their rally . The FPI activists beat the protesters with bamboo sticks AKKBB one, they pelted with stones; they found Takbeer shouts out. At least 70 people from AKKBB, including women, were injured in the incident, 29 of them seriously. Among the victims of the FPI attack were the director of the International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) Syafii Anwar and the director of the Wahid Institute Ahmad Suaedy.

The FPI and the Indonesian Society

The FPI is very well known in Indonesia. A survey by the Alvara Research Center in 2017 showed that 68.8 percent of all Indonesians are familiar with the FPI. It is better known than many other Islamic organizations that were founded much earlier. The respondents mainly associate the FPI with rigidity and violence. As Rizieq Syihab himself admits, the violence orientation of the FPI is rejected by many people in Indonesia. They regard this as "violence under the guise of religion" (kekerasan berkedok agama) . According to a survey by the Indonesian polling institute Lembaga Survei Indonesia in 2005, only 16.9 percent agreed with the activities of the FPI. However, the population's approval of the FPI was greater than that of groups from the liberal Islamic camp. Between 2005 and 2007, an average of 17 percent of Indonesians agreed with the goals for which the FPI is fighting.

The social structure of the FPI

Rizieq Syihab points out in his FPI book that the following of his organization is very heterogeneous and includes Abangan as well as Santri . A total of four large social groups can be distinguished within the FPI:

1. The first group are the Habaib (see below) and the ʿUlamā ' . They provide the members of the Consultative Council and also occupy the most important posts on the Executive Council and its subdivisions. Habib Rizieq himself regards the Kyai Kampung , the Islamic neighborhood clergy, as the most important elements in the FPI movement. Numerous Kyais are represented in the organization who have been running their own pesantren schools for a long time. At the social base, the organization also receives support from volunteer religion teachers of the Ustadz type.
2. The second group are academics and students. Most of them come from technical and scientific subjects and have no religious education. They joined the FPI because they have a great passion (ghiroh) for Islam and see the FPI as the Islamic organization that most strongly defends the Muslim community. The involvement with the FPI gives them quick recognition as fighters for Islam. They typically work in departments of the organization that are not related to religion. Similarly, Jahroni names young, educated Muslims from the middle and lower classes as the second component of the organization.
3. The third group are the fighters of the LPI. The FPI leadership recruits them from poor neighborhoods and especially from the ranks of petty criminals and political rioters, so-called premans . As sociological studies have shown, some of the premans did not join the FPI for ideological, but rather for socio-economic reasons: they hope that this will give them a better reputation and a better negotiating position with potential employers who particularly trust FPI supporters. A leading member of the FPI explained the special composition of the FPI militia in 2003 by saying that it had grown extremely quickly and that one could not pay attention to the quality of its recruits. Rizieq Syihab admits that among the FPI members who engage in AMNM activities there are still many who are badly behaved and have no religious knowledge. The FPI leadership makes no secret of the proletarian-populist background of its militia, because this image means that it is very feared by its opponents as the “power of the streets”. However, she sees no real problem in the criminal background of many of her fighters, because in her opinion a criminal who has performed the tauba is better than a lukewarm Muslim without a firm religious attitude.
4. The fourth group are small traders and white-collar workers who are ordinary members of the FPI. They joined the organization because they were fascinated by the sermons of the FPI leaders. The fact that the leading figures of the FPI are Haba'ib also attracts part of this group. On the other hand, they do not take part in the violent activities and rallies of the FPI.

Resistance to sweeping actions

Rizieq Syihab divides the FPI's fight against Maksiat into two types: “areas of the right” (amr bil ma'ruf) and “prohibiting the reprehensible” (nahi al-munkar) . The first kind of struggle should be carried out in such places where the local population does not feel disturbed by the reprehensible activities and even supports them if necessary. In these places the FPI should refrain from violence and limit itself to Daʿwa with admonitions and dialogue in order to avoid "horizontal conflicts" with society. The second form of struggle is to be used in those places where the Maksiat activities are rejected by the local population because they already have a strong religious consciousness. In these places, in accordance with a well-known hadith , the FPI is supposed to take action against the reprehensible activities “by hand and with force”. Rizieq Syihab also claims that the FPI only takes AMNM actions against "places of sin" if the local population asks them to.

In reality, however, FPI sweeping campaigns often lead to disputes with the local population or, depending on the interpretation, with the guards at the amusement facilities concerned. In December 2000, when FPI members raided a brothel in Subang, West Java , killing a security guard, angry locals responded by burning down the FPI district leader's house. Similarly, in October 2001, citizens in Jalan Jaksa in central Jakarta resisted a sweep by the FPI. When FPI members damaged a café in Kemang, South Jakarta on October 23, 2004, injuring a number of people with bamboo and wooden sticks, the Forum Masyarakat Kemang ("Kemang Society Forum") held a meeting at which it rejected of the FPI action. On November 1, 2004, there was a clash between the FPI and the forum.

One of the worst clashes between the FPI and the local population occurred in 2013 in Kendal in the Sukorejo district of central Java. When FPI supporters carried out a sweeping action in several entertainment venues on July 17, 2013, local residents resisted. Two people from the FPI suffered minor injuries. When the FPI supporters returned to the village the next day at noon, the villagers met them collectively, whereupon the FPI fled the town again after minor clashes. An FPI vehicle rammed a motorcyclist from the village. The residents of the village followed the vehicle, stopped it after two kilometers and set it on fire. In total, one woman was killed and three people injured in the incident. Central Java police arrested seven people, three FPI supporters and four Sukorejo residents after the clash. Rizieq Syihab later defended the action on the FPI website. He claimed that in Kendal the FPI did not carry out sweeping, only peaceful monitoring without weapons. In reality, hundreds of "brothel crooks" carried out a sweeping action against them.

The FPI and the different ethnic groups

Betawi and Habaib as the social base of the FPI

Various Indonesian studies emphasize that the Muslim community of the Betawi, the indigenous population of Jakarta, is the actual social base of the FPI. As early as 1998, the FPI defended the Betawi Muslims in conflicts and in the time thereafter has repeatedly advocated the interests of the Betawis, who feel ousted by other population groups in their neighborhoods. According to Purnomo, the orientation of the FPI to the ethnic traditions of the Betawi can be recognized by the organization's attributes. When the FPI was founded, based on the Betawi hero Si Pitung, the official weapon used was a golok, a kind of machete . According to Purnomo, the clothing of the FPI members with white shirts and belts is based on typical Betawi clothing.

The special role of the Betawi explains why Jakarta is the actual stronghold of the FPI. According to Wilson, the broad mass of FPI members are recruited from the youth of economically weak districts of Jakarta such as Tanah Abang and Depok. According to Robert Hefner, 5,000 of the most coordinated and aggressive FPI units were active in and around the capital Jakarta. In addition, the organization is also very strong in the northern cities of West Java such as Bekasi , Karawang and Subang, as well as in some cities in western Central Java such as Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang.

While the broad mass of FPI members belong to the Betawi, the top management of the organization with the Consultative Council is dominated by the so-called Habaib (from Arabic ḥabāʾib , so-called Habib, from Arabic ḥabīb "beloved, darling"). The Habaib are a group of Saiyids of Hadramitic- Arabic descent who are highly regarded as descendants of the prophets by the Betawi and other Muslim Indonesians. They all belong to the Baʿalawī family. Jahroni assumes that the FPI is, so to speak, a representation of the interests of Habaib. In contrast to the simple FPI members who wear white caps, the Habaib wear turbans. The high reputation that the Habaib enjoy in Indonesian society is one of the main reasons for the popularity of the organization and also helps the FPI leaders maintain contacts with Indonesia's political elite.

The Habaib were already many of the founding members of the FPI. Over time, their influence in the organization has increased even further, with the result that they occupy almost all important management positions. Mujahida, the women's branch of the FPI, was also temporarily headed by a member of the Baʿalawī family. Habaib's dominant position in the FPI leadership has occasionally created tension within the organization in the past, and some non-Habaib leaders have left it. However, by no means all Habaib in Indonesia agree with the militant activities of the FPI. Rizieq Syihab himself mentions in his monograph a group of Habaib who accuse the organization of having distanced themselves far from the Tarīqa of the Habaib. They are said to have pointed out that the ancestor of the Habaib, al-Faqīh al-Muqaddam Muhammad ibn ʿAlī Bā ʿAlawī (d. 1255) broke his sword as a sign of the cessation of all forms of violence.

Due to the dominant role of the Habaib within the FPI, the view is widespread in Indonesian society that the FPI is an organization with Arabic characteristics. However, Rizieq Syihab rejects this view as exaggerated. The supposedly Arab culture, which is shown in the clothing and jargon of the FPI activists, has in fact become general Islamic culture, which is common to all Muslim peoples. The FPI uniform, which is believed to be Arabic, is actually the clothing of the Indonesian Santri . He regards the interpretation of the FPI as an Arab organization as an attempt to isolate this organization from Indonesian society and prevent its spread to other ethnic groups in Indonesia, and emphasizes that the proportion of Habaib within the FPI is below 5 percent.

Resistance from other ethnic groups to the FPI

Some of the clashes in which the FPI is involved have an ethnic background. For example, the bloody conflict between the FPI and a militia in Ketapang in 1998 began with the early morning Ambonese raiding a place where many Betawi Muslims lived. Since 2012, ethnic groups have been increasingly resisting the activities of the FPI. The most spectacular action of this kind took place in 2012 on the part of the Dayak .

The Dayak Action Against the FPI (2012)

At the beginning of 2012, the FPI decided to open a new FPI branch in Central Kalimantan . This plan was rejected by the organizations of the Dayak who lived there. They justified their rejection of the FPI by saying that this organization was a cause of violence and that it would cause chaos in Palangka Raya and provoke interreligious disputes. The FPI is also not compatible with the Dayak culture, especially not with the philosophy of the Huma Betang (“Betang House”), which upholds non-violence, tolerance and a “peaceful coexistence” of the various religious groups. Yansen Binti, the chairman of the Dayak youth movement, emphasized in an interview that the Dayak belonged to very different religions (Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Kaharingan), which is incompatible with the intolerance of the FPI.

When Habib Rizieq traveled with his entourage to Palangka Raya on February 11, 2012 to attend the opening ceremony for the new FPI branch, he was welcomed by around 800 supporters of the “ Adat Council of Dayak” ( Dewan Adat Dayak ; DAD), who had gathered there with red headbands and some traditional weapons such as lances and mandau with them to drive out the FPI group. The DAD supporters also blocked the Sriwijaya Air plane in which the five-person FPI delegation was sitting. The passengers could not get out because the apron was occupied by the DAD supporters, who demanded that the FPI delegation should be brought back. The blocked FPI delegation was finally flown on to Banjarmasin for their own safety .

Protest rallies against the FPI also took place in the great ring of Palangka Raya. Hundreds of Dayak youth declared the establishment of the Dayak Local Defense Community of Central Kalimantan. The rallies were also attended by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Dayak National Council of Natives ( Majelis Adat Dayak Nasional ; MADN). The Dayak Adat Council sent a letter to the Central Kalimantan Police Department asking them to ban the establishment of an FPI branch. The next day, the chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly , Taufiq Kemas, defended the Dayak against criticism and justified their rejection of the FPI with their own local wisdom tradition (kearifan local) , which the FPI also had to respect.

On February 20, 2012, demonstrations by youth organizations against the FPI took place in Balikpapan in East Kalimantan , arguing that this organization is endangering peace between the religious communities. The demonstrators urged the mayor and the city council to reject any plan to set up an FPI branch in Balikpapan. The chairman of the Adat Council of the Dayak in Balikpapan told the BBC that the residents of Balikpapan had always rejected the FPI. The FPI, on the other hand, filed a complaint with the police against several people it suspected to be behind the Palangka Raya protests and lodged a complaint with the National Commission for Human Rights. She also accused Yansen Binti, who organized the Dayak protest against the FPI, of being a drug baron and called on the National Drug Administration to arrest him at a rally.

Conflicts with Sundanese and Balinese (2016/17)

In November 2016, Rizieq Syihab sparked heated controversy because, at a sermon in West Java, he criticized and ridiculed the appeal by the district chief of Purwakarta, Dedi Mulyadi, to use the Sundanese greeting, Sampurasun . On his blog, he accused Mulyadi of "not only promoting the Sundanese culture, but also corrupting the Muslim believers in Purwakarta with a poison mixture." The word he used for poison mixture (campur racun) was a corruption of the Sundanese Greetings. Mulyadi said in an interview a few days later that the Sundanese people were seriously offended by Rizieq Syihab's statements and called on Rizieq Syihab or the FPI to apologize to the Sundanese people. For its part, the FPI referred to Dedi as Muschrik after he had statues of Sundanese dolls displayed in a number of Purwakarta parks. The FPI also claimed that Dedi was married to Nyi Roro Kidul, the mythical queen of the South Seas, because he held an annual parade around Purwakarta using a decorated float. At the end of December 2015, the FPI attempted to prevent Dedi Mulyadi from attending an award ceremony in central Jakarta by carrying out a vehicle inspection.

Rizieq Syihab's remarks are one of the reasons that there are reservations about him among the Sundanese West Java people. On January 17, 2017, 13 organizations from West Java submitted a petition to the government demanding the dissolution of the FPI. Fauzan Rahman, the chairman of an organization, justified the petition by saying that the FPI had created division in society and violated pancasila and the values ​​of Sundanese culture.

On January 16, 2017, representatives of various mass organizations in Bali also reported the FPI spokesman Munarman to the police for defaming the Pecalang, the traditional Balinese village guards. Munarman claimed in 2016 that the Pecalang attacked Muslim homes and prevented them from attending Friday prayers. In mid-February 2017, Munarman was interrogated by police in Bali about this complaint.

The FPI and Indonesian civil society

Cooperation and associations with other Islamic organizations

The FPI often collaborates with other Islamic organizations in its activities. For example, on April 1, 2002, she founded the Al-Aqsa Liberation Committee ( Pembebasan Al-Aqsha Committee ; KPA) with a number of other Islamic organizations . This should coordinate the sending of jihad fighters from the FPI and other mass organizations to Palestine. The Liberation Committee seems to continue to this day. After Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the FPI and the KPA held a protest rally in front of the US Embassy in Jakarta on December 11, 2017.

In addition, the FPI maintains close relationships with Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir . Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of the MMI and Muhammad Al-Khaththath, the leader of the HTI, were also present at the Tabligh-akbar event in Kota Banjar in February 2008, at which the FPI General Secretary Sobri Lubis declared war on the Ahmadiyya .

There is a particularly close relationship with the Council of Indonesian Religious Scholars ( Majelis Ulama Indonesia ; MUI), a sub-state institution that issues fatwas. As early as 2000, the FPI received support from the Forum of the Islamic Brotherhood ( Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah ; FUI), a branch organization of the MUI, when it took action against the National Human Rights Commission and called for its dissolution. In addition, the FPI frequently invokes the MUI's fatwas to justify its violent actions. The basis for their fight against the Ahmadiyya, for example, was a fatwa of the MUI from July 2005, in which the MUI classified the Ahmadiyya as “standing outside of Islam” and condemned its members as apostates . Just a few days after the publication of this fatwa, on July 15, young people from the FPI, together with members of Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI) and Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI), launched an attack on the annual Ahmadiyah meeting on the Mubarok campus in Parung, a district of Bogor . Another point where the FPI relies on fatwas from the MUI is the fight against secularism, pluralism and liberalism. When on August 27, 2011 FPI supporters in front of the SCTV headquarters in Senayan demanded that the film be broadcast ? (sic!), they cited the fact that the MUI had previously declared that the film was harmful to Islamic values.

The FPI has established alliances with other Islamic organizations to enforce the MUI's fatwas. The first alliance of this kind is the Allianz Forum Umat Islam (FUI), founded on August 5, 2005 together with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and 30 other organizations to implement the MUI's Ahmadiyya fatwa. On April 20, 2008, the FPI, together with FUI, held a mass rally in which the two groups demanded that the Ahmadiyya must be disbanded at all costs. As a result of the Monas incident on June 1, 2008 and the imprisonment of Rizieq Syihab, the HTI resigned from the FUI because it no longer wanted to be associated with the violent FPI. The MUI, which defended the FPI after the Monas incident, behaved differently. He published a statement on June 2, in which he partially apologized to the FPI for having been provoked by the Ahmadiyya.

Habib Rizieq Syihab (left) and representatives of the GNPF MUI at a meeting with Minister Wiranto (center) in February 2017

Another association of this type is the “National Movement of the Guardians of the MUI Fatwa” ( Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa - Majelis Ulama Indonesia ; GNPF-MUI). It was founded after the MUI issued a public statement on October 11, 2016, demanding that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama should be punished for insulting the Koran and the ʿUlamā ' in a speech in Kepulauan Seribu the previous month . The GNPF-MUI was joined by the FPI, the HTI, the Council of Young Muslim Scholars and Intellectuals (MIUMI) and Wahda Islamiya. In March 2018 the GNPF-MUI changed its name to GNPF-Ulama.

The position of Muhammadiyah and the NU network on the FPI

In the early years of the FPI, there was relatively little criticism of it from other Islamic organizations. One of the few representatives of organized Islam who voiced criticism was Nadjamuddin Ramly, a leader of the youth organization of the Muhammadiyah . In early December 2000, he described the FPI's behavior as “criminal” and demanded that the police arrest people who commit acts of violence like them. At the beginning of 2001 there were also tensions with Banser (Barisan Ansor Serbaguna), the paramilitary unit of the youth organization of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The tensions arose from Banser's support for NU politician Abdurrahman Wahid aka Gus Dur President, who became president that year, while the FPI opposed him.

The relationship between the FPI and the two Islamic mass organizations deteriorated considerably after the Monas incident on June 1, 2008. At that time, the FPI was also criticized by Din Syamsuddin, the head of the Muhammadiyah . However, various members of the NU network reacted particularly sharply . On the evening after the event, members of the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement ( Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia ; PMII) and the Ansor youth movement, two organizations belonging to the NU, tore down an FPI board in Cirebon and pulled it in front of the FPI office there. The FPI supporters used clubs to position themselves to fend off a possible attack. The police prevented the two groups from clashing. A. Malik Haramain, the general secretary of Ansor, stated publicly on June 2nd that if the government did not react decisively to the incident, his organization would plan steps to force the dissolution of the FPI because it violated the Violate the constitution and behave barbarically. The FPI has been shown to be a threat to NU members and citizens in general. Malik Haramain's statement was particularly significant because he also made his statement in his capacity as spokesman for all of the NU organizations.

Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of the NU, was somewhat more reserved. He stated that no sub-organization of the NU should pursue the dissolution of the FPI because this was the responsibility of the state. He also alleged that Ahmadiyyah was partly to blame for the FPI's outbreak of violence because it had provoked the FPI by attacking Islam. Apparently, this gave rise to the public perception that the FPI and NU are linked. KH Sahal Mahfudz, the spiritual leader of the NU, opposed this view in an interview with the Indonesian magazine Tempo in September 2008 . In it he emphasized that the FPI had nothing to do with the NU. While the FPI is based on Wahhabi ideas that do not fit in with Indonesia, the NU is a Sunni organization.

Rizieq Syihab is very interested in a friendly relationship with the two major Islamic organizations despite the rejection the FPI has received from the two major Islamic organizations. In his FPI book he emphasizes that the FPI has a duty to treat them with generosity, friendliness and appreciation, however great the differences of opinion may be. In February 2011, Rizieq Syihab attended an NU event and on that occasion referred to the NU as the "home of the FPI". The FPI forms part of the NU, but it is to a certain extent a hardliner NU.

The relationship between the two organizations also seems to have improved since then. After the Dayak action in February 2012, the Ansor youth organization of the NU in North Sulawesi again demanded the dissolution of the FPI and on April 17, 2017 clashes between the FPI and Banser occurred again in central Jakarta, but in May 2017 the NU website a very FPI-friendly opinion article has been published. In this article by Kholid Syeirazi, the general secretary of the NU scholarly organization ISNU, the closeness of the FPI and NU is emphasized on the worship and theological level and the idea is formulated that this holds potential for strategic alliances between the two organizations.

Spontaneous protest rallies against the FPI

After the Monas incident, there were repeated spontaneous protests against the FPI in Indonesia. On June 3, 2008, students in Semarang protested against the existence of the FPI in Indonesia, arguing that they were no longer "gangsters in Islamic robes" (preman berjubah Islam) . During their action, they urged the government to dissolve the FPI on the grounds that it had damaged the name of Islam with its gangster actions. The actions of the FPI against the AKKBB in no way reflect the values ​​of Islam. Rallies calling for the dissolution of the FPI were also held in Cirebon , Surabaya and Bogor .

Criticism also came from various Habaib, such as Habib Saggaf Al-Mahdi Syekh Abubakar, the director of a Pesantren school in Parung near Bogor. On August 3, 2008, in a public sermon to his students, he described the FPI as a corrupt organization that is damaging the image of Islam and destroying the diversity of Indonesia, and called Rizieq Syihab a provocateur who incites Indonesians against one another. He also issued a ban on participating in the FPI's actions, which his students responded with a takbīr . The FPI, he said, appears in jubba and turban, but behaves anarchically. Therefore, the Indonesian government, the Indonesian army and the national police chief must dissolve the FPI immediately. In the event that the government was unable to do so, he threatened to take action against the FPI with his students and GP Ansor himself. At the same time, he urged his students to equip themselves with sticks and other self-defense means to fend off a possible attack by the FPI.

Another wave of protests against the FPI was triggered by the Dayak action in February 2012. For example, on February 14, 2012, around 100 people who called themselves “anti-violence community” (komunitas anti kekerasan) held a demonstration in Jakarta with the slogan “Indonesia without FPI”. They shouted “Reject the FPI. Indonesia is peaceful ” (Tolak FPI. Indonesia damai) and sang the Indonesian national anthem . According to another report, the demonstrating group called itself “People's Coalition Indonesia without FPI” (Koalisi Rakyat Indonesia tanpa FPI) . She called for support to the Central Kalimantan indigenous people who protested the FPI's presence and called on the government and state institutions to thoroughly investigate the violence committed by the FPI and the groups that support it. One speaker said denying an FPI branch in central Kalimanten would save Indonesia from the fascist threat.

Demonstrations against the FPI also took place in November 2013 in Padang , in May 2014 in Demak , in August 2014 in Samarinda and in October 2014 in Tulung Agung in East Java . In Balikpapan , around 100 people from various youth and student organizations held another demonstration on January 10, 2017, calling on the city's mayor not to allow the FPI to take any activities in the city.

Voices from science

The social controversy surrounding the FPI in Indonesia is accompanied by discussions in which scientists take sides for and against the Pembela Islam front. Saeful Anwar of the Islamic University of Surabaya said that the national anti-maksiat movement proclaimed by the FPI was a must because of the great danger that sin poses to the lives of individuals, society and the state. The anthropologist Andri Rosadi, on the other hand, made very negative comments about the FPI. He said that as a result of the activities of the FPI, the image of Islam was very negative, so that the perception had spread that Islam was identical with anarchism, violence and terror. The Indonesian religious scholar Fachrudin Faiz judged in 2014 that the FPI's propensity for violence shows a “religious immaturity”. The violence strategy she developed leads to stigmatization , not only of the FPI, but of all of Islam. The forms of violence used by the FPI could be used by Islamophobic persons as evidence that Islam is a religion that supports violence.

Wawan Purwanto has a middle position. Although he expresses understanding for the efforts of the FPI to create an Islamic society by closing amusement facilities, he believes that the clashes caused by the FPI with groups who think differently had a negative impact on the image of Indonesian Muslims as a whole. He therefore advises the authorities to take decisive action against violent FPI members and, conversely, recommends that the FPI enforce their demands through parliamentary channels.

The advertising campaign against Rizieq Syihab (2016/17)

After the start of the campaign against Ahok (see below), opponents of the FPI covered representatives of this organization with reports to the police. They hoped that this would strengthen Ahok in the upcoming gubernatorial elections. The first advertisement was placed on October 27, 2016 by Sukmawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of the state founder Sukarno . In it, she accused Rizieq Syihab of mocking the pancasila. She was referring to the video of a tablig akbar in front of the Gedung Sate in Bandung, where Rizieq Rede had said: “With the Pancasila of Sukarno, belief in God is on the ass, while with the Pancasila of the Jakarta Charter it is in the head is ". The Indonesian police referred the case to the Jawa Barat Province police on November 22nd , because the crime of Rizieq Syihab had occurred in that province.

In December 2016, the Society of Indonesian Catholic Students (PMKRI) and the Student Peace Institute (SPI) also filed charges against Rizieq Shihab for blasphemy. They base their decisions on a 22 second video on Twitter and Instagram of a speech Rizieqs into which one it hears say, "If God would give birth, who would be the midwife." On January 12, 2017 Rizieq Shihab was in Bandung for Sukmawati's complaint was interrogated by provincial police. Habib Rizieq denied any guilt in connection with Sukmawati's complaint. FPI spokesman Slamet Maarif said the allegations were made by the authorities "to silence Muslims who are demanding justice".

After Rizieq Shihab gave a speech calling on the government to withdraw the newly issued rupiah banknotes because they showed an image resembling the hammer-and-sickle symbol of the defunct Communist Party of Indonesia, the anti- Defamation network of young intellectuals ( Jaringan Intelektual Muda Anti-Fitnah ; Jimaf) for mocking the national currency. Jimaf argued that the FPI leader's statement was inciting hatred and could spark public unrest. Rizieq had to face an interrogation by the Jakarta police on January 23, 2017.

On January 31, 2017, Rizieq Syihab was also charged with violating the Anti-Pornography Act by a group of students called the Student Alliance Against Pornography (Aliansi Mahasiswa Anti-Pornography) . The basis was various photos and videos by Rizieq and the Islamic activist Firza Husein that were circulating on social networks. When Rizieq Syihab was summoned by Jakarta police on April 25, 2017, he did not appear. The FPI's legal department justified this with the fact that he had another important appointment. In May 2017, a total of seven lawsuits were pending against Rizieq Syihab. A few days later he fled to Saudi Arabia, under the pretext of wanting to carry out the Umra . The private opinion research institute Lingkaran Survei Indonesia estimates that the social influence of the FPI imam Rizieq Syihab has decreased significantly since the end of 2016 as a result of his legal problems.

The GMBI campaign in Bandung (January 2017)

In January 2017, the FPI was also involved in a conflict with the "Indonesian Grassroots Movement" ( Gerakan Masyarakat Bawah Indonesia ; GMBI). This is a youth organization with around 1.5 million followers across Indonesia, which welcomes former prisoners into its ranks, acts on behalf of the common people and was also known for its militancy in the past. The reason for the clash was the interrogation of Rizieq Syihab on January 12, 2017 in Bandung for the slander of Pancasila. There were clashes between supporters of the FPI and GMBI in front of the police building. The following morning, a GMBI office in Ciampea district near Bogor was set on fire by strangers. The police then arrested 20 FPI members. Although the FPI legal team denied any involvement of the organization in the attack, the West Java Police Chief, Inspector General Anton Charliyan, stated that the evidence found at the scene of the crime made it certain that the FPI would be involved.

Following further attacks and arson attacks on GMBI offices in Ciamis and Tasikmalaya by FPI supporters, the GMBI submitted a petition to the government on January 17, 2017 calling for the FPI to be dissolved. The petition was signed by twelve other organizations. The reason for this demand was, among other things, that the FPI had divided society and, in addition to the values ​​of the Sundanese culture, had also violated the pancasila. On January 19, 2017, thousands of people from various organizations again called for the dissolution of the FPI at a rally in Bandung and then presented a petition to the governor of West Java, Ahmad Heryawan.

This was followed by solidarity rallies with the GMBI in other parts of Indonesia, including a demonstration in Denpasar on January 22nd and in Manado on February 11th , where not only the dissolution of the FPI but also that of other radical mass organizations was called for. At a rally in front of the parliament of East Nusa Tenggara province in Kupang on January 26, hundreds of students from the Alliance of the Four Pillars of Nationalism demanded the arrest of Rizieq Syihab in addition to the dissolution and ban of the FPI.

The FPI and the Indonesian media

The FPI does not have its own newspaper, but uses the Suara Islam newspaper from the umbrella organization Forum Umat Islam, of which it is a member, to spread its ideas.

The FPI as a "victim of the media"

For the most part, the Indonesian media reported very critically about the FPI, especially since the Monas incident in 2008. Sympathizers and supporters of the FPI have complained since its early days that the mass media reported on it in a way “that the organization is being cornered ". When clashes arise between the FPI and hooligans, the media reports that the FPI militia beat up citizens, not hooligans.

The FPI itself attributes the public rejection to the fact that the secular media have given it a “negative label” and thus influence society. In public statements, however, she emphasizes that society is very grateful to the FPI for fighting sins. One complaint was that the FPI was perceived by society as a violent and anarchist organization because of its "negative excesses" being reported more often than its positive activities such as devotion (kerja bakti) and disaster relief. The FPI General Secretary Ahmad Sobri Lubis described the FPI in 2010 as a “victim of the mass media”. In October 2014, FPI chairman Muchsin Alatas pointed out in an interview that his organization, in addition to fighting activities, also pursues a humanitarian program that includes tree-planting campaigns and participation in a village renovation program. But this is not "sexy" for the media, which is why they remain silent about it.

FPI attacks and threats against media

One of the reasons for the predominantly negative reporting by the Indonesian media about the FPI is that the FPI has repeatedly acted violently against the media. The two actions of the FPI against the television broadcaster SCTV can be cited as examples . The first action took place in May 2001 in connection with the telenovela Esmeralda : FPI supporters attacked the SCTV headquarters in Senayan and demanded that the series be canceled. The television station then actually stopped broadcasting the telenovela. The second action happened in August 2011, when FPI supporters in front of the SCTV headquarters canceled the film ? demanded. The broadcaster followed suit this time, which aroused wide criticism within Indonesian society.

One of the most sensational FPI actions against the media took place on March 16, 2018. On this day, hundreds of FPI supporters coated with loud Takbeer chants against the editorial office of the magazine Tempo in Jalan Palmerah, Jakarta. They demanded an apology from the editorial staff for a cartoon that had been reprinted the month before that allegedly insulted their "Grand Imam" Rizieq Syihab. LPI commander Maman Suryadi publicly announced that if the editor did not receive an FPI editorial staff to explain the purpose of the cartoon, he would occupy Tempo 's editorial office. At the requested reception and discussion with the FPI delegates, the editor-in-chief Zulkifli apologized for the effects of the caricature and gave the FPI the opportunity to respond to the caricature in the next issue of the magazine. In the days that followed, the FPI's action was harshly criticized by various Indonesian organizations, including the Legal Aid Institute of the Press and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI), as intimidating and threatening press freedom.

In February 2019 there were again reports of attacks by FPI supporters on journalists: When on February 21, various Islamic organizations in Jakarta near the Monas held a public prayer in support of Prabowo Subianto and wanted to report to journalists about it, they were from FPI - Followers harassed and beaten, and their footage deleted. The AJI issued a public statement condemning the FPI's acts of intimidation and violence.

The media as "sponsors of the FPI"

Habib Rizieq Syihab is a sought-after media interview partner in Indonesia

While the FPI sees itself as a “victim of the media”, conversely the Indonesian news portal Alinea suspects that the popularity of the FPI is strongly promoted by the massive reporting about it in the online mass media. Indonesian online media outlets regularly reporting on FPI activities include Liputan 6, Republika, Okezone, Kumparan, Detik and Tribun News. The news portal that reports on the FPI most frequently is Liputan 6. The media coverage of the FPI is also very intense.

The media also frequently report that victims of FPI attacks admit their mistakes. For example, when FPI members attacked Surabaya Zoo in early July 2018 because a young camel had been given the name of Muhammad's mother there, the zoo later admitted this to the media as a mistake.

Internet and social media

The social controversy surrounding the FPI is also very much conducted on the Internet . Rizieq Syihab reports frequent hacking attacks on his organization's website in the early years. After the Dayak campaign against the FPI in February 2012, a larger front against the FPI formed for the first time on social media , including on Twitter with the hashtag #BubarkanFPI (“dissolve FPI”). The same applies to the platforms Facebook and Change.org , where a signature campaign against the FPI was started.

Conversely, FPI members started sweeping activities on the Internet in May 2017. They were directed against anyone who posted statements that were deemed to be insults to Islam or Islamic persons. The aim was to hunt down social media users who insult Rizieq Shihab. Sometimes excuses were forced through threats of violence. The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) sharply criticized these activities and called on the Indonesian police to take action against the arbitrary online persecution of the FPI.

In one prominent case, FPI supporters took action against a 40-year-old doctor from Padang who allegedly insulted Rizieq with comments on Facebook. On May 23, she was coerced by FPI members at her workplace to delete her comments and to express her repentance in an official letter. The action was supported by the FPI leadership, as the FPI spokesman Slamet Maarif made clear to the Jakarta Post on May 29, 2017 . A few days later there was a similar case with a 15-year-old boy of Chinese origin, which was documented on video.

Social media has not been idle; On January 15, 2017, Twitter deleted the Twitter accounts of Rizieq Syihab, the FPI's public relations office and the FPI's Central Management Council. The FPI did not give up, however, and opened several new Twitter accounts. On December 19, 2017, Facebook, Twitter and Instagram then carried out a concerted action and blocked all official FPI accounts. In response, the FPI asked the Muslims of Indonesia to stop using this social media with immediate effect. In January 2018, supporters of the FPI marched outside the Facebook office in southern Jakarta and condemned the blocking of their accounts as a discriminatory act.

The relationship with the parties

The initial claim to neutrality

In the run-up to the June 7, 1999 elections, the FPI published a fatwa in which it forbade the election of parties with more than 10 percent non-Muslims as candidates. Otherwise, the FPI paid more attention to party-political neutrality. On the same day that she published the fatwa, May 30, 1999, she declared herself neutral on the election. In an interview with Purnomo, Rizieq Syihab said that the FPI had also maintained neutrality when a conflict between the “United Development Party ” ( Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ; PPP) and the “National Awakening Party” ( Partai ) broke out during the 1999 election campaign in Brebes in central Java Kebangkitan Bangsa ; PKB) occurred. In the interview he pointed out that members of the Democratic Party of the Struggle of Indonesia (PDI-P) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional; PAN) were also represented in his organization.

In a basic text that was published on the FPI website in 2007, Rizieq stated that the FPI, in order to preserve the "purity of its struggle", does not interfere in practical politics and also not politically for any side in relation to the state power seize. The FPI is not affiliated with any local or international organization, nor does it work structurally with such an organization.

Cooperation with the Islamic parties

In the course of time, however, the FPI broke away from its initial claim to neutrality. The first FPI National Assembly in December 2003 recommended supporting those parties in the 2004 elections that are fighting for the Sharia of Islam. In an official statement issued in August 2013, the FPI then stated that the 2014 elections represented a predicament in the sense of Darūra , as there was a risk that those who were given political control could spread apostasy (kemurtadan ) promoted. Therefore it is necessary that the Muslims elect candidates and support such political parties that campaign for the implementation of Sharia law and for the concerns of the Ummah . With this in mind, the FPI encouraged its supporters to vote. At a Pengajian on June 4, 2014, she finally asked her supporters to vote for one of the three Islamic parties that are united in the Red-White Coalition, namely the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) , the “United Development Party ” ( Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ; PPP) or the "Crescent Star Party" ( Partai Bulan Bintang ; PBB).

The PPP chairman Suryadharma Ali

The PPP is the party that gives the FPI the most support. According to anecdotal reports, the FPI was originally intended as an Indonesian-wide support base for the PPP, following the Banser model. However, after the emergence of the PPP-affiliated Kaaba youth movement, this plan was abandoned. The FPI also had very close relationships with the PPP chairman Hamza Haz. During the time when he was Vice President of Indonesia (2001-2004), he attended several meetings of the FPI. Haz received a delegation from the FPI at his office on December 18, 2003 and a few days later was a speaker at the first FPI National Assembly. Hamzah Haz also wrote a foreword to Rizieq Syihab's FPI book in September 2004. The PPP stayed with the FPI even in the difficult time after the Monas incident. Teuku Taufiqulhadi, the deputy general secretary of the PPP, said at the time that the position of the FPI towards the Ahmadiyah represented the position of the majority of the Muslims in Indonesia. Suryadharma Ali , who succeeded Hamza Haz in his office as PPP chairman and was minister of religion from 2009 to 2014, later campaigned publicly for the FPI on several occasions. In 2014 he asked the FPI spokesman Munarman to run for the party in the elections for the Legislative Council.

The FPI also has a friendly relationship with the PKS. When a Molotov cocktail was thrown at PKS politician Mardani Ali Sera in July 2018 , the FPI announced that it would keep a guard at the politician's house to ensure his safety.

As early as the spring of 2000, the FPI received support from the PBB, a successor to the former Masyumi party, in its demands regarding the National Human Rights Commission. The PBB has been suffering from a decline in membership for some time. That is why in March 2018 the PBB Association of Bengkulu decided to put forward FPI cadres as candidates for the 2019 parliamentary elections. The PBB chairman, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, specifically addressed the FPI supporters in May 2018, asking them to join the party. PBB General Secretary Afriansyah Ferry Noer included former FPI chairman Al-Habib Muchsin Alatas in the party's candidate list for the 2019 parliamentary elections.

Parties with which there is an antagonistic relationship

There is a rather contradicting or tense relationship with the following parties:

The PDI-P

The Democratic Party of the Struggle of Indonesia (PDI-P) is considered to be one of the parties that is least willing to make concessions to the FPI. Even before the 1999 elections, the FPI had a clash with supporters of the PDI-P near the police headquarters in East Jakarta . From 2000 Rizieq Syihab regarded the PDI-P as a "cave of apostates" and its chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri as his personal enemy. After the Monas incident in June 2008, the PDI-P turned to the National Police Chief and asked for assistance in disbanding the FPI. But when, after the Dayak action in early 2012, there were renewed calls for the dissolution of the FPI, Megawati expressed himself more cautiously and pointed out that the central government would decide this, but must treat all organizations equally.

PKB

The relationship between the FPI and the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), which was founded by Abdurrahman Wahid and is part of the NU network, is particularly tense . The open conflict with Wahid arose in 2006 when he criticized the draft anti-pornography law, which was endorsed by the FPI. On May 23, 2006, Abdurrahman Wahid was invited to Purwakarta, West Java, to take part in a public interfaith discussion with supporters of the FPI and Hizb ut-Tahrir in the audience. Wahid took the opportunity to criticize the draft anti-pornography law again, saying that some participants in the so-called march of the millions of Muslims who demonstrated for the law had been paid by generals. The head of the local FPI branch stood up and asked Wahid to either apologize or leave Purwakarta. Wahid then left the room under wild abuse, which was later portrayed by the media in such a way that he had been forced to leave by enthusiastic supporters of the draft law, including people from the FPI.

In the days following this incident, serious clashes broke out between the FPI and the PKB Garda Bangsa militia in Jember, East Java and other places. On June 15, 2006, Garda Bangsa prevented FPI leader Rizieq Syihab from speaking in a pesantren ("Islamic boarding school") in Demak , threatening to burn down the school if he showed up. Banners calling for the dissolution of the FPI were displayed at headquarters. On June 26, several dozen young men from Garda Bangsa made their way to the FPI headquarters in Jakarta, and members of the FPI, supported by two other groups, prepared to defend themselves. The police eventually diverted the Wahid supporters so that there was no outbreak of violence.

However, tensions between the FPI and Garda Bangsa continued and reached a new high in June 2008 when it was found that Maman Imanulhaq, an Islamic scholar on the PKB's board of directors, was among the victims of the Monas incident. On the evening of June 1, the Garda Bangsa issued a statement accusing FPI supporters of being unscrupulous “gangsters with jubba” (preman berjubah) and calling on the government to dissolve the FPI on the grounds that this organization with its anarchist actions endanger the peaceful coexistence in Indonesia. It has been shown that the FPI often breaks laws and stands up to judge people who do not agree with them. In the statement, Garda Bangsa also called on police to arrest FPI leader Habib Rizieq.

In Jember, where there had already been clashes between Gus-Dur supporters and the FPI in 2006, Wahid supporters with PKB attributes ran through the streets on June 3, 2008, demanding the dissolution of the FPI and besieging the house of their local leader Habib Abubakar. After a conversation with representatives of the protesters, he was forced to make a written declaration in which he expressed the willingness of the FPI of Jember to dissolve and to look at the society and the victims of their violence on Monas Square and at Gus Dur to apologize. The Gus major supporters then withdrew and hung a white banner on a pedestrian bridge near the central square of Jember, on which was sprayed red: “The FPI is forbidden in Jember” (FPI HARAM DI JEMBER). The PKB itself also supported the call for the FPI to be dissolved, on the grounds that the FPI was a civil militia that was fundamentally prohibited in Indonesia.

Until his death in 2009, the FPI was one of Abdurrahman Wahid's fiercest opponents. After that, the relationship between FPI and PKB relaxed. In February 2012, when several Indonesian organizations demanded the dissolution of the FPI after the Dayak campaign, Lukman Edy, the former PKB General Secretary, rejected these demands as unjustified.

PSI

In March 2018, the still young “Indonesian Solidarity Party” ( Partai Solidaritas Indonesia ; PSI) took a front line on the FPI when representatives of the party sharply criticized the FPI's action against the magazine Tempo. They said neither the FPI nor any other organization in Indonesia has the right to take the law into their own hands. The FPI has the right to express its indignation and anger, but it must remain in the corridors of the law and must not violate human rights. PSI recalled that the implementation of the goals of the mass organizations was regulated in Article 59 of the Mass Organization Act of 2013, which forbids mass organizations to take violent measures or to disturb the peace. The FPI's actions threaten democracy and the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution . In its statement, PSI also called on the government and law enforcement agencies to take decisive action against the FPI and other organizations that “intimidate the mass media and Indonesian citizens”. The FPI Imam Muhsin Alatas rejected this criticism and threatened to take action against political parties such as the PSI “if they insulted Islam and Islamic scholars”.

Considerations for founding your own party

Even if Rizieq Syihab expressed his hope in his FPI book, which he wrote in 2003, that the FPI would never become a party, the organization has already given several considerations to founding its own party. On December 11th, 2008, as a result of its Second National Assembly in Bogor, the FPI published the recommendation to examine the establishment of an Islamic party under the control of the FPI. Its main goal should be the "full application of Islamic Sharia in the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia". The party should also become the organization for channeling the political aspirations of FPI members and sympathizers across Indonesia. The topic was also discussed in detail at the third National Assembly in 2013. According to a poll by Indonesian polling firm Lembaga Survei Indonesia, if the FPI entered the 2019 parliamentary elections as a party, it would get about 13 percent of the vote of Muslim voters.

Relationship to the state actors

military

In the early days of its existence, the FPI had very close relationships with high-ranking military personnel. The organization itself extolled these relationships. Rizieq Syihab states in his FPI book that several Indonesian generals were present at the celebration of the FPI's one year anniversary on August 17, 1999, including Wiranto , Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono , Jaya Suparman, the military commander of Jakarta, and Nugroho Jayusman, the Jakarta Police Commander. Their presence established friendly relations between the FPI and the military and at the same time symbolized recognition of the young organization by the military. According to R. Hefner, the background to this close relationship was that General Wiranto had asked the FPI in November 1998 to mobilize a 100,000-strong "voluntary guard" (Pamswakarsa) to protect the People's Consultative Assembly and the government of President Habibie. Other military personnel who were involved in the organization of the Pamswakarsa and who were said to be close to the FPI were Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim and Habibie's brother-in-law Mochsin Mochdar, who organized the transport of the Pamswakarsa units.

Jakarta journalists interviewed by R. Hefner in 1999 and 2000 claimed that General Wiranto and Nugroho Jayusman were even responsible for creating the FPI. Rizieq Syihab rejects the argument that the FPI was created by the military as incorrect. According to him, a rapprochement between the FPI and the Indonesian army did not come about until July 1999, when the Central Leadership Council of the FPI submitted a proposal to the army for a non-violent solution to the Aceh problem and then direct talks between the two sides took place. Wiranto and his staff took part in the FPI birthday. The International Crisis Group suggested in 2000 that Wiranto and the other military did not share the FPI's goals, but found it useful to maintain contact with Islamic organizations that have the ability to mobilize their supporters on the streets.

The links between the FPI and the army improved even further in 2000. Among other things, this had to do with the fact that the FPI sent a small contingent of voluntary battles to the Moluccas and participated in the battles with Christians there. In addition, there was an overlapping of interests in that both the FPI and the military sought to overthrow President Abdurrahman Wahid . Most of the military rejected Wahid because he had ousted General Wiranto in February 2000. In March and April 2001, the FPI, along with conservative members of the military and the ruling Golkar party, took part in a campaign of anti-communist actions in which it attacked left-wing students and looted bookshops selling socialist literature. After that, reports of links between the FPI and the military fell sharply.

It caused a sensation when in January 2017 the FPI uploaded pictures to their Instagram account, which FPI members showed in Banten during military training with the Indonesian army. After the army leadership had been criticized for this, an army spokesman announced that the Indonesian military had banned national defense training (Bela Negara) for members of the FPI. The army command had forbidden the regional commanders to give the FPI military training. However, the Indonesian military commander Gatot Nurmantyo defended the FPI's right to participate in military training courses a day later, arguing that the FPI's hostility to pancasila was controversial. He also emphasized that the regional commanders were encouraged by the country's military order to propose groups to the army command for military training. The army command then decides whether the group in question is Pancasila-hostile or not.

National government

The individual presidents and governments of Indonesia have adopted very different attitudes towards the FPI.

Bacharuddin Habibie presidency (1998–1999)

The relationship between Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (ruled May 1998 - October 1999) and the FPI seems to have been relatively friendly. On November 14, 1998, the FPI registered with the Ministry of the Interior as a mass organization. According to Jahroni, Habibie donated large sums of money to the FPI, along with other Muslim groups, to secure his presidency. Habibie banners were waved at the organization's one-year parade in August 1999. During this time, the media reported that the FPI supported Habibie's presidential candidacy in the People's Consultative Assembly. However, the FPI rejected this representation as incorrect. Rizieq Syihab himself admitted that a man close to Habibie had offered large sums of money to the FPI if it held rallies in support of Habibie, but the FPI rejected this offer. The fact that Habibie banners were waved at the FPI parade in August 1999 was due to the fact that members of the Kaaba youth movement who supported the Habibie candidacy had mixed with the demonstrators.

Presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2001)

The relationship with President Abdurrahman Wahid (ruled Oct. 1999 - July 2001) was tense from the start. The FPI believed that Wahid was betraying Islam because he tried to forge ties with Israel , build bridges with Christians and Indonesian Chinese, and bring about reconciliation with former communists. Wahid, conversely, accused Habib Ali Ba'aqil, one of the FPI's leading members, of collaborating with Tommy Suharto, the former president's criminal son. On December 24, 2000, Wahid threatened in a television broadcast that the FPI would be dissolved. The FPI responded by running several campaigns against Wahid. This was also the reason for the tension between FPI and Banser, because the latter supported Wahid. In March and April 2001, the FPI took part in a campaign in which it accused Wahid of inadequate action against communists.

Presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004)

The relationship with Megawati Sukarnoputri (ruled July 2001 to October 2004) was strained from the start because the FPI categorically rejected a female president. Shortly after Sukarnoputri was sworn in in July 2001, the FPI issued a political statement in which it rejected a female president. In doing so, the FPI stood up against all other Islamic organizations and parties in Indonesia, because they agreed with a female president. In the opinion of the FPI, the rule of a woman is not legally valid. On January 6, 2002, the FPI called for Megawati to resign at a rally. After the attack in Bali on October 12, 2002, the government cracked down on radical Islamic groups for the first time. On October 16, 2002, Rizieq Shihab himself was arrested on charges of inciting public unrest.

Vice-president and former PPP chairman Hamzah Haz, with whom the FPI had close ties.

During this time, however, the FPI maintained very close relationships with Vice President Hamza Haz, who attended FPI meetings several times, and was also able to develop good contacts with the Indonesian Ministry of Religions at times. The first national assembly of the FPI was opened in December 2003 by the Indonesian minister of religion, Said Agil Husin Al Munawar. Al Munawar also wrote a foreword to Rizieq Syihab's FPI book. The FPI also had good contacts with Minister of Social Affairs Bakhtiar Chamsyah from the PPP, who was in office from 2001 to 2009. He also wrote a foreword to Rizieq Syihab's FPI book. When the FPI carried out violent protests in May 2004 against a program of sporting events organized by Metropolitan Magnum Indonesia because they were supposed to host sports betting , which the FPI believed were against Sharia law, the Minister of Social Affairs unceremoniously stopped the company's program of events.

Presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014)

During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (October 2004 to October 2014), there was widespread silence between the president and the FPI. In the 2004 elections, the FPI supported General Wiranto and mobilized its Dāʿīs in the various regions to discredit Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). In the 2009 elections, the FPI supported the presidential candidacy of Muhammad Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, both of whom allegedly approved the FUI's “Charter of the Islamic Community” (Piagam Umat Islam) published before the elections and an Islamic one based on Sharia law State demanded.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) commented on FPI actions only twice during his presidency. The first came in response to the Monas incident in June 2008. SBY said that “such violence will not be tolerated” but avoided naming the FPI directly. When the Chief Police Officer asked all FPI members involved in the incident to present themselves to the police by June 3, Habib Rizieq responded to this ultimatum by asking the President to dissolve the Ahmadiyya by decree, since he was the one Otherwise sue the FPI. He also announced that the LPI was ready to wage war against the Ahmadiyya.

The government responded to this on June 9, 2008 with the so-called SKB-3, a joint decree by the minister of religion, interior minister and attorney general, in which the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community was warned and asked not to claim that another prophet had appeared after Mohammed . However, a few days later the FPI published a proclamation in which it ridiculed this Ahmadiyah decree as an “effeminate decree” (SKB banci) . She also called on the Muslims to jointly call on the Indonesian President to dissolve the Ahmadiyah by presidential decision.

The second statement on the FPI was given by Yudhoyono after the FPI's actions in Kendal in July 2013. In it he expressed his hope that the FPI would stop its violent activities and no longer take the law into its own hands. He also said, “I have instructed the National Police and other law enforcement agencies not to allow such incidents again. The law must be upheld to prevent horizontal conflict and prevent all elements, including the FPI, from committing crimes. ”Habib Rizieq, angry with the statement, issued a press release shortly thereafter calling Yudhoyono a“ loser ", Who" spreads defamatory statements and is silent about Maksiat. "In addition, he asked why the President was talking about the FPI, but about armed" brothel crooks "and the red light district that was open during Ramadan .

In general, President Yudhoyono was seen as "powerless against the FPI". The chairman of the Ansor youth movement in North Sulawesi said in February 2012 that the FPI's actions, which were received very critically by Indonesian society, were evidence of the weakness of the SBY presidency.

The interior ministry's warnings

Stronger reactions came from the Interior Ministry alone during the SBY presidency. This has warned the FPI three times and threatened to withdraw its approval. The first warning came shortly after the Monas incident in June 2008. In the relevant letter, the organization was reminded that, under the 1985 Mass Organization Act, the ministry could ban organizations that could disrupt security and public order with their activities, and you communicated that the FPI had fulfilled this fact with its attacks and mistreatment against the AKKBB. Copies of the letter have been sent to all authorities in the country.

The second warning came in early 2012. The background to this was that the Indonesian government had disclosed its plan to repeal alcohol prohibition laws that had been introduced in nine Indonesian regions, arguing that it was in contravention of President Decree 3/1997 on control of alcoholic beverages. The FPI held a protest against this plan in January 2012 in front of the Ministry of the Interior. Hundreds of FPI supporters approached the building of the Ministry of the Interior on Jalan Medan Merdeka Utara and pelted a building of the ministry with stones, rotten eggs and water bottles. The FPI called for the alcohol ban laws not to be repealed, arguing that they did not contradict the presidential decree. Gamawan Fauzi warned the organization again and threatened to disband it in accordance with Law No. 8/1985 in the event of renewed use of force. However, the FPI was able to record a success against the ministry shortly afterwards. After the ministry implemented the plan to repeal regional alcohol bans, the FPI filed a petition for judicial review with the Indonesian Supreme Court. The court granted that motion in July, repealing the 1997 presidential decree preventing local administrations from banning the sale of alcoholic beverages.

The third warning from the FPI came after their actions in Kendal in July 2013 and their clash with the local population there. During this time, members of the Indonesian House of Representatives called on the Interior Ministry to take measures against the FPI on the basis of the newly passed mass organization law. On June 26, 2013, the Ministry of the Interior issued another warning against the FPI for disturbing public order and security. The FPI was asked in two letters not to carry out sweeping actions or the like with immediate effect because they disrupt public order and security.

Attempts to involve the FPI politically

In September 2012, the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs signed an agreement with the FPI, which enables it to participate in the social program Rehabilitasi Sosial Rumah Tidak Layak Huni (RS-RTLH), which aims to restore crumbling and unsuitable homes for the needy. As clarified in the Ministry's press release, the agreement was made with the aim of enhancing the FPI's image in the media and proving that the organization can make a positive contribution to society. Suryadharma Ali , who was minister of religion from 2009 to 2014, has also campaigned publicly for the FPI on several occasions.

Interior Minister Gamawan Fauzi proposed that the government collaborate with the FPI in October 2013.

In October 2013, Interior Minister Gamawan Fauzi followed the Suryadharma line and stated that the FPI was a national good that should be preserved and that it could work with the government, especially in religious activities on the major Islamic holidays. The cooperation between the government and the FPI will create a modern form of government, namely a strengthening of civil society . General Prabowo Subianto , who ran for the 2014 presidential election, responded positively to Gamawan's call for government-FPI collaboration, recommending that the FPI could and should be “embraced”.

Ahok, the governor of Jakarta, publicly ridiculed Gamawan's proposal. When the FPI carried out violent protests against Ahok in Jakarta in October 2014 and the latter demanded that it be dissolved, the Interior Ministry reacted hesitantly: A spokesman announced that the dissolution of a mass organization would be a lengthy process. The ministry finally issued a warning against the FPI and again obliged it to cease its activities. When Ahok claimed in his dispute with the FPI that it was not registered with the Ministry of the Interior, the Indonesian Ministry of the Interior contradicted him, stating that the organization had applied for an extension in April 2014 and was regularly registered until 2019.

In the 2014 presidential election , the FPI officially declared its support for the presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Hatta Rajasa at a Pengajian on June 4, 2014 . The FPI explained to the Pengajian that the support should not be given directly, but through the three Islamic parties PKS, PPP and PBB, which belong to the red-white coalition. However, the FPI tied its support to ten orders that it gave to the red-white coalition. Among other things, the FPI asked the future government to allow the introduction of alcohol bans at provincial and district level and to reject secularism, pluralism, liberalism, capitalism and communism. An envoy from the Prabowo Hatta team, who was present at the meeting, accepted these orders and asked for the prayers of the FPI supporters for the election success of the two candidates.

Presidency of Joko Widodo (2014-2019)

Since the FPI supported Prabowo in the 2014 presidential election, the relationship between Joko Widodo and the FPI was relatively cool from the start. Interior Minister Tjahjo Kumolo confirmed in May 2017 that the FPI was in accordance with the Indonesian Pancasila ideology. However, the FPI held the government responsible for the criminal proceedings against Rizieq Syihab, who had caused him to flee to Saudi Arabia. In early July 2017, in a recorded speech published by FPI spokesman Slamet Maarif, Rizieq Syihab issued an ultimatum to the government: Either they begin a reconciliation process or they must expect a revolution. Around the same time, the GNPF MUI and Joko Widodo met to discuss the case of Rizieq Syihab.

In April 2018, at a meeting with President Joko Widodo in Bogor Palace , several Islamist groups, including the FPI, demanded that he cease criminal investigations into their leaders. In early May 2018, West Java police actually dropped charges against the FPI leader for defaming the Pancasila for lack of evidence. The FPI was also able to successfully exert pressure on the Ministry of Religions. When Ujang Ruhiyat, the head of the Department for Islamic Religious Information, Zakat and Pious Foundations in the Ministry of Religions, wrote an article on “Dealing with Islamic Radicalism in Higher Education Institutions” in early 2018, in which he, alongside organizations such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Laskar Jihad also dealt with the FPI, the FPI, which saw itself defamed by the designation “radical mass organization”, held a demonstration in front of the office of the Ministry of Religions in Bogor. Ujang Ruhiyat then felt compelled to apologize to the FPI for the article.

In mid-2018, the FPI joined the political movement Ganti Presiden , which is aiming for a change of president in the 2019 elections. The FPI Deputy Chairman Ja'far Shodik already mentioned this movement on May 11, 2018 at a mass rally that the FPI held together with other organizations on Monas. And at the celebration of the FPI's 20th birthday in August 2018, which was held in East Java, Ja'far Shodik repeatedly shouted “Ganti Presiden” (German: “Change the President!”), Which the FPI supporters present with Takbīr -Call was answered. However, Rizieq Syihab asked the FPI to wait until the Second Assembly of Scholars (Ijtima Ulama II) of the GNPF in September 2018 before making a final political decision on a presidential candidate . On September 16, 2018, this assembly concluded the so-called “Integrity Pact” with the presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto , which obliges Prabowo to implement 17 demands of the GNPF, but at the same time assures him of the support of this organization.

Regional Governments

Jakarta Capital Region

In the capital region of Jakarta, the actual stronghold of the FPI, the organization has already successfully put the government under pressure several times.

Development until 2014

Governor Sutiyoso met the FPI at times

On December 13, 1999, 4,000 FPI fighters occupied the office of the Jakarta Regional Government for more than ten hours and asked Governor Sutiyoso to close all discos, cinemas, restaurants and massage parlors during the month of Ramadan. The action came in response to a government decree that provided that entertainment venues would only close during the first two days of Ramadan. After a long meeting with the FPI, which was also attended by the police chief Nugroho Jayusman, the governor declared his support for the demands of the FPI and banned the opening of the entertainment venues for the entire month of Ramadan in a circular. The governor's concession was a brilliant strategic success for the FPI, especially since the FPI issued a circular to close the amusement parks in Jakarta in Ramadan the next year.

Governor Fauzi Bowo (2007–2012) also maintained good contacts with the FPI

In early 2001, however, under pressure from the entertainment industry, Sutiyoso revised the rules regarding opening times in Ramadan and allowed the pubs in question to reopen in the evening. The FPI responded by threatening to enforce a total ban. In October 2003, the FPI sent a letter to the governor of Jakarta, in which it again demanded the closure of all entertainment venues during Ramadan and the first week of Schauwāl . During Ramadan in October 2004, she raided cafes and bars in the Kemang district of southern Jakarta. The organization told the media that it was forced to raid nighttime entertainment venues as an expression of disappointment with the Jakarta Provincial Government, which allowed these entertainment venues to open during Ramadan. She also announced raids in other areas of the capital. Conversely, the police in the metropolitan area announced that they would deploy hundreds of police officers to prevent the FPI raids on the amusement venues from being repeated.

Fauzi Bowo , who was governor of Jakarta from 2007 to 2012 and belongs to the Democratic Party of Indonesia, maintained good contacts with Rizieq Syihab and other FPI leaders. At the beginning of August 2010, he and the Jakarta Police Chief took part in the celebration of the FPI's 12th anniversary. A leading politician of his party denounced this as a “blessing of the existence” of the FPI and pointed out that the FPI was criticized by the broader society for its illegal, police-like actions.

The argument with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama

Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama , known as Ahok, who was fought by the FPI.

From 2012 to 2014 Joko Widodo of the PDI-P held the office of governor of Jakarta. After he won the presidential election in July 2014 , his deputy, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama , also known as Ahok, would succeed him in his office. However, the FPI rejected him because he is not a Muslim. To prevent Ahok from taking office, she organized a series of protest rallies. At a rally on September 25, 2014, the FPI labeled Ahok a "Chinese kāfir " and declared that as such he was not worthy to rule the Muslim and indigenous majority of Jakarta's citizens. Although the Jakarta Legal Aid Organization made it clear that the FPI's racist remarks violated the Indonesian Constitution and various laws, the FPI was not prosecuted. Muchsin Alatas, the spokesman for the FPI, said in a newspaper interview that there can be no leaders who are not Muslims. He also accused Ahok of banning Tabligh Akbar events on Monas, takbir keliling processions and the sale of sacrificial animals for the festival of sacrifice in the usual places. A protest rally by the FPI on October 3, 2014, which ended in violent tumult, caused a particular stir. Ahok gave a press conference on October 7, 2014 calling on the National Police to disband the FPI. The police then announced that they were preparing a recommendation to the Interior Ministry to ban the FPI.

The FPI and FUI held further rallies against Ahok in front of the Jakarta Provincial Government building in the weeks that followed. The FPI chairman Muchsin Alatas described Ahok as part of a dragon mafia (Mafia Naga) . At the rallies against Ahok, the FPI no longer acted as an organizer, but hid behind a "Jakarta Community Movement " ( Gerakan Masyarakat Jakarta ; GMJ) founded by it. Ahok responded to the protests by sending two official letters to the Interior Ministry and the Justice Department on November 10, recommending the dissolution of the FPI. He pointed out that the FPI organized protests against his inauguration and that this violated the Indonesian constitution. He also stated that the FPI tends to be racist because it problematizes his membership of the Chinese ethnic group. In return, the FPI reported Ahok to charges of defamation and improper conduct on November 13, 2017. However, other groups supported Ahok's recommendation. The Silat Action Movement of the Muslims of Indonesia (Gerakan Aksi Silat Muslimin Indonesia) stated that the violence-related sermon of the FPI “does not reflect the principles of the Messenger of God” and its dissolution is therefore not a problem.

After Ahok was appointed governor on November 19, 2014, the GMJ held another rally against Ahok at the beginning of December 2014, demanding his removal. In order to humiliate Ahok, the FPI elected Fahrurrozi Ishaq, the coordinator of the GMJ, as its “counter-governor” on December 1, 2014 in a protest.

The December 2, 2016 protests, known as Aksi212 in Indonesian.

In November 2016, the FPI spearheaded protests against Ahok's candidacy for governor of Jakarta, accusing him of blasphemously insulting the Koran as a Christian . The protests culminated in two mass rallies in Jakarta on November 4 and December 2, 2016. The FPI brought supporters from all over Indonesia to Jakarta for the first demonstration. The first rally was attended by 150,000 to 250,000 people, and the second, also known as Aksi Bela Islam III ("Islamic Defense Action III"), was attended by 500,000 to 750,000. However, the action also met with rejection. In Medan , the capital of Sumatra Utara , the so-called Youth Forum Indonesia held a rally against Rizieq Syihab and the Aksi Bela Islam III.

Under Anis Baswedan

With its calls for the prosecution of Ahok, the FPI made a significant contribution to the victory of his rival Anies Baswedan in the 2017 gubernatorial election. Ahok was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for blasphemy on May 9, 2017. Baswedan himself is friendly and distant from the FPI. In August 2017, he attended the celebration of the 19th anniversary of the FPI and called on the organization to improve its image, to participate in efforts to promote national unity and to uphold Pancasila as the ideology of the state. The FPI must prove to be one of the organizations that serve as guardians of the country's diversity and help to solve the problem of inequality and injustice in society.

Baswedan also attended the celebration of the FPI's 20th anniversary in August 2018. On this occasion he expressed his blessings to Rizieq Syihab and said that the FPI could become a pillar of the unity of Indonesia on its 20th anniversary. He also paid tribute to the role the FPI plays in “bringing justice and unity directly to the ground in problems such as natural disasters.” The Jakarta Provincial Government welcomed the FPI's initiative to help overcome the social and economic problems in Jakarta and will support all FPI activities that could benefit society.

Other regions

Just as the FPI is fighting for the introduction of anti-maksiat laws at the national level, the regional FPI branches are fighting for anti-maksiat laws at the provincial level. As early as November 1999, the Pamekasan FPI mobilized 5,000 supporters on the island of Madura for a long march to the regional parliament ( Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah ; DPRD), during which it demanded that this parliament do something about gambling, prostitution and inappropriate behavior in public places . On January 3, 2002, around 200 members of the FPI gathered in front of the Banten Provincial Parliament office and demanded that the DPRD pass anti-sin laws. After members of the provincial parliament had held a conversation with them and had promised to pursue the FPI demands, the head of the FPI von Banten stated that the FPI would monitor the work of the provincial parliament and, in the event of non-implementation of their demands, until the end of the year would enforce anti-sin rules himself.

After the Dayak's action on February 11, 2012, the FPI took offense at the fact that the governor of central Kalimantan, Agustin Teras Narang, had supported the protests against the FPI. She claimed that this action was not initiated by the Dayak Society, but by the governor. On February 13, the FPI reported Teras Narang to the National Police for destruction, deprivation of liberty and planning a murder. On February 17, 2012, she also protested against the provincial government there with a motorcycle parade in front of the Central Kalimantan Liaison Office in Jakarta.

In May 2012, FPI supporters protested against “illegal” churches in Singkil, southern Aceh , and demanded that the government shut them down. The Singkil government complied with the FPI's request and sealed 19 churches and one animistic cult building within a week. The FPI also began issuing political declarations (maklumat politik) supporting certain candidates and giving teachings on how good Muslims should vote. An example of such an arrangement is the cooperation between the FPI and Ahmad Heryawan, the governor of West Java during the provincial election campaign in February 2013. Before the election, Heryawan is to agree to the FPI's request to pass a gubernatorial ordinance (Pergub), which completely bans Ahmadiyah have, for which the FPI assured their electoral support in return. An agreement on this was signed on February 21, 2013 by Heryawan and the FPI chairman of West Java.

police

The police in Indonesia is divided into three levels: the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), the Provincial Police (POLDA) and the City Police (POLRES or POLSEK). If in the following the police is mentioned without specification, the provincial police are meant.

Cases of police passivity in FPI actions

In many of the violent acts of the FPI, for example in its attacks on the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in 2000, the police remained passive and did not prevent the acts of violence. When the FPI attacked the HKBP congregation in Bekasi on August 8, 2010 , hundreds of police officers were standing in front of the entrance to the church, but they did not prevent FPI supporters from entering the church. This is why there was a suspicion among HKBP members that the police themselves were involved in preparing the attack. When the "Indonesia without FPI" movement demonstrated in Jakarta on February 14, 2012, the police made a prior statement that they could not guarantee the safety of the protesters in the event that the FPI showed up. The experience that the police often do not interfere in FPI actions gives the organization confidence that the use of force will ultimately enable it to achieve its goals.

In some cases, however, Indonesian society is no longer prepared to accept the passivity of the police in FPI actions. At the end of December 2015, a petition was started on Change.org calling for the dismissal of the police chief of Central Jakarta, Hendro Pandowo, on the grounds that he supported FPI sweeping operations. Previously, hundreds of FPI supporters had checked vehicles at the entrance gate of the Taman Ismail Marzuki site, where the award ceremony of the Theater Federation was taking place, in order to prevent Dedi Mulyadi, the district chief of Purwakarta (see above), from attending the award ceremony. The police were present with 200 people, but did not prevent the FPI from inspecting the vehicle.

Reports on cooperation between the FPI and the police

According to WikiLeaks documents published in 2006, the FPI, at least in its early days, received regular financial support from the police and the State Intelligence Service because it was considered extremely useful as a "watchdog". The Indonesian police supported the FPI logistically and financially in the early days in order to counterbalance the “extremists” of the student reform movement. Jayusman, the Jakarta police commander, stated in an interview that after the fall of Suharto, the earlier “iron fist” policy against the citizen militias was no longer enforceable. Because of this, the police tried to contain and control the FPI by sending donations to the leadership from the Jakarta business community. The FPI later admitted that it had coordinated all its actions with the police for the first two years of its existence.

Timur Pradopo, head of the Indonesian National Police from 2010 to 2013, had good relations with the FPI

The FPI also maintained contacts with influential people in the police in the subsequent period. In a speech in Luwuk in central Sulawesi on November 29, 2006, Rizieq Syihab said that the FPI and the police are like husbands and wives who work together to maintain order. There was a particularly close relationship with Timur Pradopo, who was chief of the Indonesian National Police from October 2010 to October 2013. During the time when Timur was chief of police in Greater Jakarta, he “hugged” the FPI to keep order in Jakarta in Ramadan. Habib Salim Umar Alattas, Chairman of the FPI Jakarta, confirmed the good relationship the FPI had with him and praised the strength of his Islam and the zeal in his religious practice. In August 2010, he and the Governor of Jakarta took part in the celebration of the 12th anniversary of the FPI. A few days before he was appointed police chief of Indonesia in October 2010, he told a parliamentary commission that he believed the FPI could be empowered to assist the security forces. But he rejected the notion that he would be soft in a confrontation with the FPI.

According to Woodward et alii, the FPI police also provided logistical support for some actions and were then seen eating with the FPI fighters. Police commanders are also said to have repeatedly blamed victims of violent FPI acts for the attacks. The International Crisis Group has suggested that the FPI has announced its intention to raid certain amusement venues to the police in advance, so that they have the opportunity to approach the target and negotiate protection money . Some of this money will then flow back to the FPI. The phenomenon of police officers using the announcements of FPI attacks to extort protection money from the groups whose objects were targeted is also mentioned by Indonesian scientists. This is how police officers are said to have acted when the FPI militia targeted the office of the Liberal Islam Network ( Jaringan Islam Liberal ; JIL) on August 5, 2003 : They approached the people in the network and made demands of them Money if they wanted to be safe from the FPI attacks.

Rizieq Syihab (right) with Tito Karnavian, the head of the Indonesian National Police (center), and the Islamic preacher Arifin Ilham (left) at the rally on December 2, 2016.

Relations between the FPI and the police are particularly cultivated in connection with Islamic festivals. In September 2017, the news portal republika.co.id quoted a member of the Central Leadership Council of the FPI as saying that the provincial police of the Greater Jakarta metropolitan area give the FPI a sacrificial animal every year for the festival of sacrifice. In some years the departmental police also donate a sacrificial animal. On December 31, 2017, police officers and FPI activists even held a joint dhikr in the city of Lhokseumawe, Aceh province . The event was chaired by the leader of the FPI in Aceh, with not only the provincial police chief present, but also the regional representative from Bank Indonesia.

Clashes between the FPI and the police

Relations between the FPI and the local Jakarta police force have not always been good. This relationship experienced its first serious crisis at the end of 2000. After the FPI destroyed an arcade with pinball machines during Ramadan on December 8, 2000 and injured six security guards, the police arrested 58 FPI members. Three days later, police shot the tires of a truck carrying FPI activists that had just completed a sweep in West Java. In response to the Jakarta Police Department's announcement that it would no longer tolerate FPI actions against cafes, restaurants and bars, FPI members armed with machetes broke into a government complex in northern Jakarta. They could only be pushed back by the residents. Three days later, hundreds of FPI fighters attacked a police station in Karawang, 90 kilometers east of Jakarta, seriously injuring three officers.

As the police pressure increased, the FPI scaled back its attacks on the "places of sin". The well-known connections between the FPI and high-ranking military led to speculation at this time that the conflict between the FPI and the police was part of a larger turf war between the police and the army; The latter had lost many of its lucrative protection contracts with the entertainment industry after the formal separation of the police from the army in 1999. Sofjan Jacoeb, who served as the Jakarta Police Chief from May to December 2001, was adamant about the FPI. When FPI supporters demonstrated against the US in October 2001, police cracked down on the demonstrators and raided the FPI headquarters in Tanah Abang the day after. The FPI took legal action against the Jakarta police chief because it saw its right to demonstrate restricted. The dispute was finally ended with a peace agreement between the police chief and the FPI.

In the following years the police cracked down on the FPI several times. On April 20, 2003, Rizieq Shihab was arrested by the Jakarta Provincial Police for making fun of the police institution on a television program. Although his followers helped him escape the prosecution office, he surrendered to the police the next day and was detained again, this time in Salemba Prison, where he remained until November 2003. A few days after the Monas incident in June 2008, 1,000 police officers were brought into the area around the FPI headquarters. They arrested more than 50 FPI members, including Rizieq Syihab, and seized dozens of sticks and a number of sharp weapons. Rizieq was identified as a suspect along with nine other people after interrogation.

A particularly violent clash between the FPI and the police also arose at the protest rally against Ahok on October 3, 2014, which ended in violent tumult: the protesters threw animal droppings and stones at the police officers, of whom they injured ten. Twenty-two FPI supporters were arrested and the general secretary of the FPI office in Jakarta Novel Bamu'min was put on an alert.

In the past, the police were powerless to take part in some of the FPI's actions because they did not have sufficient personnel. For example, when the FPI carried out its sweeping action in Samarinda with hundreds of supporters in September 2007, only a few dozen police officers were present. They couldn't do much and just watched the goings-on of the FPI people. The chief of the city police (Polsekta) was beaten himself when he tried to defend the citizens of his city against attacks by FPI supporters. In some cases the FPI also disregards police instructions. For example, when the Bogor police made it clear in Ramadan 2014 that they would not tolerate religious vigilantism , the local FPI group nonetheless vowed to take action against shops "that do not adhere to the rules of Ramadan."

Pressure from the FPI on the police

In recent years the FPI has put pressure on the police several times through large rallies. For example, after the Dayak anti-FPI campaign in February 2011, Rizieq Syihab called on police general Timur Pradopo to dismiss the chief of police in Central Kalimantan, who he believed had supported the campaign. And on January 16, 2017, the FPI held a rally in front of the headquarters of the National Police in South Jakarta, during which they gave a speech calling on Rizieq Syihab to remove Anton Charliyan, the police chief of West Java, immediately from his post because he was involved in the conflict between FPI and GMBI in Bandung for the latter organization. The police deployed 2,800 police officers to secure the rally. The FPI also reported Charliyan to the Internal Affairs Department, arguing that he had violated police ethics by taking sides with the GMBI. At the rally, the FPI also called for the chief police inspector of Jakarta and the police chief of West Kalimantan to be dismissed. The Setara Institute for Democracy and Peace , a non-governmental organization based in Jakarta, criticized the FPI's threats against the police as "a form of terror". The police also denied allegations of unfair treatment of the FPI in the Bandung incident.

Sometimes the FPI also exerts pressure on the police when its members are arrested. For example, at the end of December 2017, when the Bekasi Polres arrested an FPI member for destroying a drug shop, dozens of FPI members came to a rally in front of the police headquarters demanding his release.

Judiciary

The FPI as "Helper of Justice"

Rizieq Syihab stated in a policy paper in 2007 that the FPI has the position of a member of society who wants to help the judiciary (para penegak hukum) in a proactive manner through information, direct support, political pressure and law enforcement in order to bring about the law in this way Better enforce Indonesia. The better the quality of the law and the commitment of the law enforcement authorities in Indonesia, the less the FPI has to fight for it and the less it participates in monitoring legal violations. The FPI presents itself as a helper of the judiciary.

In fact, there have already been several cases in which the FPI has appeared “as an assistant to the judiciary”. In April 2005, for example, the FPI reported the rock group Dewa to the police for blasphemy because they had used an eight-pointed star on the cover of their music album Laskar Cinta ("Army of Love"), in which the eight points were separated by the divine name Allah were formed. The FPI considered it particularly reprehensible that the group had placed this star on the stage floor at a concert. The FPI saw the fact that the musicians trampled the name of God at the concert as an insult to Islam. Due to the advertisement, the rock band apologized for their behavior at a press conference and changed the appearance of their star logo slightly so that it no longer displayed the name of God.

In April 2006, Baharuzaman, a senior member of the FPI, reported Erwin Arnada, the editor of the Indonesian edition of Playboy and two Playboy models, to the police for shamelessness. In June and July 2006, FPI advertisements against other Playboy models followed. Baharuzaman himself appeared as a witness in the trial of Arnada, claiming that Playboy is the world icon of pornography and that it violates norms of morality and courtesy. The first meetings were attended by 50 members of the FPI, who occasionally made themselves heard by shouting takbīr. When the public prosecutor demanded a two-year prison sentence for Arnada in March 2007, the FPI members present booed him because they thought the sentence was too mild and wanted Arnada to be sentenced to death. The FPI also demonstrated outside the judiciary at this meeting.

The campaign against Ahok at the end of 2016, in which the FPI took part, triggered a blasphemy trial against him, in which Rizieq Shihab himself was heard as a witness on February 28, 2017. During the trial, the FPI expressed disappointment with the prosecution's sentence (18 to 24 months) and asked the court to sentence Ahok to five years' imprisonment.

FPI sympathizers in the judiciary

Two cases show that the Indonesian judiciary is partly interspersed with supporters of the FPI. For example, the sentence of the Indonesian Supreme Court against Playboy publisher Erwin Arnada was announced in July 2010 "as a gift for the FPI" in the middle of Ramadan. The court did not publish the judgment itself, but instead delegated this task to the FPI, which, through its representative Munarman, had copies of the judgment distributed to the press. The second case is the blasphemy trial against Ahok. When Ahok filed a motion for judicial review of the sentence against him in early 2017, the FPI urged the Supreme Court to deny the motion, which it did. Rizieq Syihab later announced that Artidjo Alkostar, the Supreme Court judge who denied the application, was a long-time companion of his and had served the FPI regularly as legal advisor prior to his appeal to the Supreme Court. Alkostar himself denied a leading role in the FPI.

Prosecution of FPI members

FPI members themselves have also often been the subject of criminal investigations. Between 1998 and 2010, more than 150 members of the FPI were arrested. Such cases are also known from more recent times. For example, when four FPI members carried out a sweeping action in a hotel in Klaten in central Java in December 2017, the hotel brought charges against them for repulsive behavior in accordance with Section 335 of the Indonesian Penal Code. The police then arrested the four FPI members in February while they were carrying out another surveillance operation and initiated legal proceedings against them.

If members of the FPI militia come into contact with the law enforcement authorities during an action, the LPI leadership is obliged to defend them with professional legal assistance. The FPI has its own legal aid department, the Bantuan Hukum Front (BHF). This usually takes on the defense of FPI members who are under criminal investigation. For example, when Lampung's FPI leader Habib Hasan Al Djufri was charged in March 2003 with the demolition of the Evangelical Bethany Church in Bandar Lampung , the BHF managed to get him acquitted of all charges. After the Monas incident in 2008, the FPI activated a total of 30 lawyers to defend the arrested FPI members. If an FPI activist is detained, all other activists are required to support their family while they are serving their sentence.

Rizieq Syihab himself has also been sentenced to prison terms twice. On October 16, 2002, after clashes between the FPI and police, he was arrested on charges of insulting the government and inciting public unrest. After a short time, however, he was released and placed under house arrest on the condition that the FPI stop its raids . The FPI was thus forced to refrain from violent activities, at least temporarily. After Rizieq traveled to Jordan on April 8, 2003 to provide "humanitarian aid" in Iraq, he was arrested again on April 20 by Jakarta Provincial Police on his return for violating the detention requirements. In July he was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment and served in Rutan Salemba Prison. While the FPI continued to exist as an organization during his detention, it had to suspend the activities of its paramilitary wing. As a result, the number of violent activities by the FPI fell very sharply in 2003.

The second time Rizieq Syihab was sentenced to imprisonment in 2008 in connection with the attack on the AKKBB am Monas. In this case, the sentence was 18 months. Along with him, Munarman, the commander of the LPI, was convicted. The FPI, however, did not accept the verdict against Rizieq Syihab and afterwards published a press release in which it denounced this judgment as injustice (kezaliman) . In the ongoing trial against Rizieq Syihab for mocking the Pancasila, it is BHF chairman Sugito Atmo himself who takes on the defense.

Conduct of the FPI in criminal proceedings

The FPI usually shows a strong presence in criminal proceedings against its own members. For example, hundreds of FPI supporters attended the trial of Habib Hasan Al Djufri in March 2003. Around 200 FPI members from Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi were present at the opening session of the trial against Rizieq Syihab after the Monas incident in 2008. During the trial, they demanded Rizieq's release, arguing that he had not violated the law. Some FPI members forcibly forced their way into the courtroom even though the door was already closed. The police, unable to cope with the situation, finally let them pass. When Rizieq Syihab was interrogated on charges of sedition in January 2017, FPI members and supporters demonstrated in front of police headquarters against the interrogation, which they viewed as an unlawful attempt to criminalize ulema . And when an FPI member in Surabaya was charged with spreading hate speech on social media on July 19, 2018 , dozens of FPI members accompanied him into the courtroom. After the end of the trial, during which the defendant was sentenced to seven months in prison, the FPI members escorted him out of the courtroom with loud takbīr shouts.

Litigation against FPI members has also resulted in conflicts with other groups on several occasions. In the criminal case against Rizieq Syihab and Munarman after the Monas incident, for example, FPI members assaulted members of the AKKBB in the courthouse without the police intervening. Liberal NU activist Guntur Romli was surrounded by the FPI supporters present and forced to flee the courtroom, whereupon other FPI members chased after him. Liberal activist Nong Darol Mahmada was beaten and sexually harassed by FPI supporters. In some cases, police officers even incited the FPI supporters to use violence and intimidation. The AKKBB was then protected by Banser, the paramilitary wing of the NU, and Ansor, the youth wing of the NU, at the next trial date on September 25, 2008. The two sides engaged in a violent conflict in which several people from the FPI and AKKBB were seriously injured. The police separated the two groups and took 12 FPI fighters and 1 Banser member into custody.

A clash with Jakarta police occurred when Rizieq was sentenced to one and a half years in prison on October 30, 2008. 500 people, part of the FPI and part of other organizations, gathered in front of the Central Jakarta District Court and threw stones at the police, whereupon the police used tear gas against them. The crowd only broke up after some members of the FPI leadership intervened. A senior FPI member later claimed that those who threw stones at the police were not FPI members but provocateurs who used the FPI's attributes to discredit the organization.

The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM)

The FPI has a particularly tense relationship with the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) of Indonesia. When the commission submitted its investigation report into the Tanjung Priok massacre in June 2000 , the FPI was dissatisfied with the result of the report because it exonerated the government and, according to the FPI, indicated the number of victims as far too low at 23. The FPI itself assumed 400 to 500 victims. Therefore, on June 23, 300 FPI activists stormed the commission headquarters and demolished their premises. This was one of the most sensational actions in the early days of the FPI. The FPI attack on the Commission also had to do with the fact that it had announced that it would investigate Wiranto's role in the human rights abuses in East Timor. On June 24, 2000, the FPI also issued a public statement calling for the dissolution of Komnas HAM.

In the following years, the FPI took a stand against the Commission several times. In 2008 and 2011, she and other Islamic organizations called on the Commission not to protect the Ahmadiyya. In 2010, she disbanded an information event organized by the Commission on human rights for Waria and transgender in Depok .

Conversely, the chairman of the commission, Imdadun Rahmat, criticized the FPI for the fact that religious tolerance is often endangered in the areas in which it operates. That is why it sparked a debate when, in May 2017, the chairman of the legal department of the FPI in Central Jawa Zainal Petir registered himself on the list of candidates for a commissioner position in the Commission. Zainal stated that he was trying to build a "humane FPI" himself. As evidence, he pointed out that he had previously banned FPI members from sweeping and even threatened to fire them. However, human rights activists considered this avowal to be dishonest and warned against including a member of the FPI on the commission because this organization does not support the prohibition of discrimination and the principle of non-violence .

Scientific interpretations

Since its inception in 1998, the FPI has been the subject of numerous scientific studies, which have come to different interpretations. An article that appeared in the Indonesian Criminological Journal in 2003 interpreted the FPI in the sense of Albert K. Cohen as a deviant subcultural group that, as a result of status frustration, commits acts that violate the applicable legal norms of society. The Australian scientist Ian Wilson described the FPI in 2014 as a vigilantist group that practices a form of organized crime with a moral undertone (morality racketeering) . Munajat sees a similarity between these violent actions and what Charles Tilly calls “collective violence as contentious politics”.

The sociologist Al-Zastrouw rejects the widespread view that the FPI is a fundamentalist group on the grounds that the FPI does not outright reject modernity and also has a relatively flexible theology to do justice to different social groups . The actions of the FPI are in reality not determined by Islamic ideology, but by individual economic and political motives.

Mark Woodward and a number of other scholars, who wrote an article on the FPI in Contemporary Islam in 2014 , believe that the FPI is actually a terrorist organization, even if it does not classify it as a terrorist organization in Indonesia or internationally becomes. In doing so, they argue that the FPI meets the criteria of the US Army's definition of terrorism . This is the use of unlawful violence or the threat of unlawful violence in a calculated manner to generate fear in order to put pressure on or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of political, religious or ideological goals. In order to be able to fight the FPI more effectively, they recommend that the international community classify it as a terrorist organization.

The Czech Southeast Asia scholar Tomáš Petrů said that there are some similarities between the FPI and Ernst Röhm's SA troops . Like this, the FPI is anti-democratic, is used as an instrument of power to disrupt peaceful meetings of political opponents, and needs violence to achieve its goals. Petrů made it clear that he had the verdict of the Indonesian columnist Julia Suryakusuma, who published an article in The Straits Times on July 12, 2008, shortly after the Monas incident , in which she described the FPI supporters as Islamofascists , believes that it is not entirely unjustified.

literature

FPI texts

• Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husein Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar: menjawab berbagai tuduhan terhadap gerakan nasional anti ma'siat di Indonesia . 2nd expanded edition. Pustaka Ibnu Sidah, Jakarta, 2008.
• Al-Habib Rizieq Syihab: Tentang FPI: Perspektiforganasi 2007 Memento Archive.org - Engl. Transl. Organization Perspective Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam)
• Hasil-hasil Musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun , published in the appendix to Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008. (Results of the Second National Assembly of the FPI in 2008)
• FPI: Sikap FPI terhadap Syiah dan Wahabi February 19, 2010. (Declaration of the FPI about its dogmatic orientation)
• FPI: Maklumat FPI tentang ISIS (Declaration of the FPI on the IS organization from August 2014) - English translation

Secondary literature

• Saeful Anwar: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar Front Pembela Islam (FPI) di Indonesia 1989–2012. In Teosofi 4/1 (October 2015) 220-250. Digitized
• Chaider Bamualim: Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and His Islamic Defenders Front. In Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31/2 (2011) 267-281. Digitized
• Romain Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's “Wars on Vice”: Criminal Enterprises, Islamist Militias, and Political Power in Jakarta. In Jean-Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues (Eds.): Organized Crime and States. The Hidden Face of Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010. pp. 73-96. Here: pp. 84–87.
• Michael Buehler: The Politics of Shari'a Law. Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016.
• Syahrul Efendi D., Yudi Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy?!: Rahasia sukses dakwah. Yudi Pramuko, Ciputat, 2006. (Book by two FPI sympathizers about the secret of the FPI's success)
• Fachrudin Faiz: Front Pembela Islam: antara kekerasan dan kemetangan beragama. In Kalam 8/2 (February 2014) 347-366. Digitized
• Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos: Wajah para 'pembela Islam': radikalisme agama dan implikasinya terhadap jaminan kebebasan beragama / berkeyakinan di Jabodetabek dan Jawa Barat Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, Jakarta, 2010. pp. 148–159. - Engl. Transl. The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. Religion Radicalism and Its Implications on Assurance of Religious / Beliefs Freedom in Jabodetabek and West Java Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, Jakarta, 2010. pp. 133–143. Digitized
• Robert Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. In Robert W. Hefner (Ed.): Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization . Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004. pp. 273-301; here: pp. 284–286.
• Human Rights Watch : In Religion's Name. Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia. February 2013.
• Jajang Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam. In: Studia Islamika 11/2 (2004) 197-256. Digitized - A revised version was published in 2008 by Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai. It was used here.
• Rebecca Lunnon: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's Struggle for Democracy. Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies - PAKAR August 16, 2013.
• Fahlesa Munabari: Islamic Activism: The Socio-Political Dynamics of the Indonesian Forum of Islamic Society (FUI). PhD thesis University of Canberra 2016. Digitized
• William Alex Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement in the New Democracy of Indonesia. PhD Thesis, Texas A&M University 2012 digitized
• WA Munajat: How Democracy and Religion Foster Violence: A Case Study Using the Example of the Indonesian Islamic Defender Front. In Samuel Salzborn; Holger Zapf (ed.): War and Peace: Cultural Interpretation Patterns. Peter Lang Ed., Frankfurt am Main, 2015. pp. 183–208.
• Ngatawi Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam symbolic: politik kepentingan FPI. LKIS, Yogyakarta, 2006.
• Helen Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law: Enforcing Islamic Norms in Post-Soeharto Indonesia? In: Australian Journal of Asian Law 13/1 (2012) 1-20. Digitized
• Helen Pausacker: Pink or Blue Swing? Art, Pornography, Islamists and the Law in Reformasi Indonesia. In Helen Pausacker, Tim Lindsey (Eds.): Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia. Routledge, 2016.
• Tomáš Petrů: The Front Pembela Islam: well-connected Indonesian radicals: a threat or a spent force? In the S. (Ed.): Graffiti, converts and vigilantes: Islam outside the mainstream in maritime Southeast Asia. Caesarpress, Vienna, 2015. pp. 53–76. Digitized
• Alip Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. Mediatama Indonesia, Jakarta, 2003.
• Wawan H. Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. CMB Press, Pasar Rebo, Jakarta, 2009.
• Andri Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI: Mengungkap rahasia-rahasia mencengangkan ormas keagamaan paling controversial. Well Publisher, Jakarta, 2008.
• Ian Wilson: Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia. In Critical Asian Studies 38/2 (2006) 265-297. Here pp. 282–289.
• Ian Douglas Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. In Greg Fealy, Sally White (ed.): Expressing Islam: religious life and politics in Indonesia. ISEAS, Singapore, 2008. pp. 192-210; here: pp. 199–203.
• Ian Wilson: Morality Racketeering: Vigilantism and Populist Islamic Militancy in Indonesia. In Khoo Boo Teik (Ed.): Between dissent and power: the transformation of Islamic politics in the Middle East and Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014. pp. 248-274; here: pp. 256–258.
• Ian Wilson: Resisting Democracy: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's 2014 Elections. In ISEAS Perspective 10 (2014) 1-8. Digitized
• Ian Douglas Wilson: The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia. Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics. Routledge, London, 2015. pp. 151-157.
• Mark Woodward et al. a .: Hate Speech and the Indonesian Islamic Defenders Front. Center for Strategic Information, Arizona State University, 2012. pp. 2-25. Digitized
• Mark Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front: Demonization, Violence and the State in Indonesia. In: Contemporary Islam 8/2 (2014) 153-171. Digitized

Media reports

• Heyder Affan: Mengapa warga Balikpapan menolak FPI dan GNPF-MUI? BBC Indonesia January 11th, 2017.
• American Foreign Policy Council: World Almanac of Islamism. Indonesia website update p. 5f.
• Alexander R. Arifianto: The rise of Indonesia's FPI and its push for syariah law. In Today online, December 18, 2017.
• Agustinus Beo Da Costa: Indonesia names Islamist leader a suspect for insulting state ideology. Reuters January 30, 2017.
• Arya Dipa: Petition calls for disbandment of FPI. Jakarta Post January 18, 2017.
• International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims. Indonesia Briefing October 10, 2001
• International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. July 7, 2008, Asia Briefing No. 78
• Abdul Khalik: Government slammed for inaction against FPI. In The Jakarta Post June 4, 2008.
• Lembaga Survei Indonesia: Trend orientasi nilai-nilai politics Islamis vs nilai-nilai politics sekuler dan kekuatan Islam politik. Jakarta, October 2007.
• Megiza: Controversy FPI Muchsin Alatas: 'Jumlah kami sudah 7 juta'. In CNN Indonesia October 8, 2014. (Interview with FPI Chairman Muchsin Alatas)
• Sapto Pradityo: FPI Ubah Paradigm Perjuangan. Tempo.co December 18, 2003.
• Hermawan Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. Tempo.co October 10, 2014.
• The Jakarta Post: FPI attacks HKBP church members in Bekasi. August 8, 2010.
• The Jakarta Post: Police under fire for allowing sweeping FPI raids. December 31, 2015.
• Viva News: FPI Titip Sepuluh Pesan untuk Prabowo-Hatta. 5th June 2014.
• Wahid Institute: Monthly Report on Religious Issues 40 (February 2012) 1-5. PDF
• Dewanti A. Wardhani and Yuliasri Perdani: Police respond to Ahok's challenge to ban FPI. In The Jakarta Post October 8, 2014.

Web links

• Website FPI
• Youtube channel of the FPI
• REFLEKSI 10 TAHUN KIPRAH FPI DI MASYARAKAT (1998–2008) (Youtube film by the FPI on the occasion of the organization's tenth anniversary)
• FPI dan Khilafah Islamiyyah, Kajian Habib Rizieq (Youtube video of the FPI on the Caliphate from June 2015)
• Personnel composition of the FPI management 2015–2020

Individual evidence

1. ^ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 13.
2. ^ ^{A b c} Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 288.
3. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 62.
4. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 133.
5. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 18.
6. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 371.
7. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 89.
8. ↑ ^{a b} Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 113.
9. ^ ^{A b c d e} Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 282.
10. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 96.
11. ↑ ^{a b} Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 104.
12. ^ Woodward et alii: Ordering what is right. 2012, p. 133.
13. ^ ^{A b} Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 67.
14. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 103 f.
15. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 62 f.
16. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 373.
17. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 129.
18. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 103.
19. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 119.
20. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 589.
21. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 602.
22. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 306.
23. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 27.
24. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 130 f.
25. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 74.
26. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 27 f.
27. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 117 f.
28. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 208, 592.
29. ↑ Munajat: How Democracy and Religion Foster Violence. 2015, p. 201.
30. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 50.
31. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 134 f.
32. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 26.
33. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 646.
34. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 286.
35. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 315.
36. ^ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 14.
37. ^ The Jakarta Post: FPI attacks HKBP church members in Bekasi . August 8, 2010.
38. ↑ ^{a b} Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 133.
39. ↑ Bimo Wiwoho: FPI Minta Publik Tak Kaitkan Bom Surabaya dengan Ajaran Agama . CNN Indonesia, May 14, 2018.
40. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 284.
41. ↑ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Indonesia: Violence and and Radical Muslims. 2001, p. 9a.
42. ↑ ^{a b c} Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 285 f.
43. ↑ Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law. 2012, p. 3.
44. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 145 f.
45. ↑ Safrin La Batu: FPI leader calls for withdrawal of banknotes with 'communist symbol'. In: The Jakarta Post. 23rd January 2017.
46. ↑ Awas waspada! Zionisme dan Komunisme masuk di segala sector kehidupan , see Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 592.
47. ↑ Jabbar Ramdhani: FPI Kecam Australia yang Berniat Pindahkan Kedubes ke Yerusalem. In: detiknews, November 23, 2018.
48. ↑ Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law. 2012, p. 3.
49. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 210.
50. ↑ M. Nasir Ridlwan: Live in Destiny or Die as Martyr. The Venture of Front Pembela Islam in Contemporary Indonesia. In Journal of Indonesian Islam 2/1 (2008) 217-221; here: p. 219 ( online ).
51. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 210 f., 598 f.
52. ↑ ^{a b} Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 418 f.
53. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 591.
54. ↑ ^{a b} Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 281.
55. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 85.
56. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 279.
57. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 280.
58. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 282.
59. ^ ^{A b} Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's “Wars on Vice”. 2010, p. 84.
60. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 94 f.
61. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 287.
62. ↑ FPI Minta Undian Magnum Dibubarkan. In Tempo.co, May 18, 2004.
63. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 591.
64. ↑ Munajat: How Democracy and Religion Foster Violence. 2015, p. 203.
65. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 127.
66. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektiforganasi 2007.
67. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 31.
68. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 269.
69. ↑ ^{a b c} Prima Gumilang: Seruan Khilafah Rizieq Shihab di Jantung FPI. CNN Indonesia August 18, 2017.
70. ↑ Megiza: Kontroversi FPI . October 2014.
71. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 209, 317.
72. ↑ Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker: Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia. A Contemporary Sourcebook. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006. p. 236.
73. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 4.
74. ↑ Lebih baik mati membela syariat Islam daripada hidup tanpa syariat, cf. Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 27.
75. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektiforganasi 2007.
76. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 142.
77. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektif Organisasi. 2007.
78. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 154.
79. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 41.
80. ↑ Megiza: Kontroversi FPI . October 2014.
81. ^ Wilson: Resisting Democracy. 2014, p. 3 f.
82. ↑ The video from February 15, 2012 is available on the FPI YouTube channel Habib - Pancasila Soekarno & Pancasila Piagam jakarta (ASLI) .
83. ↑ Arifianto: The rise of Indonesia's FPI and its push for syariah law. 2017.
84. ↑ Yandry Kurniawan: The Politics of securitization in Democratic Indonesia. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018. p. 116.
85. ↑ Arifianto: The rise of Indonesia's FPI and its push for syariah law. 2017.
86. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 133, 375.
87. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 98.
88. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 211.
89. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 98.
90. ↑ ^{a b c d} Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 286.
91. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 336.
92. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 5.
93. Jump up ↑ Asfa Widiyanto: Violence in Contemporary Indonesian Islamist Scholarship: Habib Rizieq Syihab and 'enjoining good and forbidding evil'. In: Heydar Shadi (Ed.): Islamic peace ethics: legitimate and illegitimate violence in contemporary islamic thought . Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017. pp. 87–112; here: p. 98. ( digitized version ).
94. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 319.
95. ↑ Gloria Safira Taylor and Bimo Wiwoho: Polisi Imbau FPI Tak Anarkis Berdemo di Kedubes AS. CNN Indonesia, December 11, 2017.
96. ↑ Bimo Wiwoho: Protest Trump soal Yerusalem, FPI Ancam Sweeping Warga America. CNN Indonesia, December 11, 2017.
97. ↑ FPI Klaim Siap angkat Senjata Serbu Kedubes AS di Aksi 115 . CNN Indonesia, May 11, 2018
98. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 151.
99. ↑ FPI Lempari Kedutaan AS dengan tellurium busuk. Tempo.com, February 19, 2006.
100. ↑ Ratusan Anggota FPI demo di Kedubes AS. Antaranews.com, February 19, 2006.
101. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
102. ↑ Deni Prasetyo Utomo: Digeruduk FPI Soal Nama Unta, KBS Mengaku Salah Sebut ke Media. Detiknews, July 9, 2018.
103. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 84.
104. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektif Organisasi. 2007.
105. ↑ Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law. 2012, p. 3.
106. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam. 2008, p. 32.
107. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
108. ↑ Pausacker: Pink or blue swing? Art, Pornography, Islamists and the Law in Reformasi Indonesia. 2016, pp. 290 f., 295–298.
109. ↑ Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law. 2012, p. 10 f.
110. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
111. ↑ FPI Ultimatum Goethe Institute 1 X 24 Jam Stop Film Gay. Detiknews, September 28, 2010. See the video about this event FPI mob threatens Q! Film Festival Jakarta 2010 by WatchIndonesia.
112. ^ Human Rights Watch: In Religion's Name. 2013, p. 90.
113. ^ Ardi Mandiri: Indonesian Hardline Group Urges Govt to Deport Liberal Canadian Muslim Activist. In: The Jakarta Globe. May 5, 2012.
114. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
115. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam. 2008, p. 32 f.
116. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 129.
117. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 390.
118. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 165.
119. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 638.
120. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 142-161.
121. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 142-154.
122. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 221.
123. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 161 f.
124. ↑ sound sample . See Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 567-571.
125. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun. 2008, p. 38.
126. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j} Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 287.
127. ↑ FPI: Maklumat FPI tentang ISIS. 2014.
128. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 200.
129. ↑ A video of the event is available here .
130. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 118.
131. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, p. 164.
132. ↑ The text is from Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, pp. 240-244.
133. ^ International Crisis Group: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 8.
134. ↑ FPI serang masjid Ahmadiyah in BBC News Indonesia April 20, 2012.
135. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektiforganasi 2007.
136. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, p. 160.
137. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, p. 161.
138. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun. 2008, p. 31 f.
139. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun. 2008, p. 38.
140. ↑ SCTV Widely Criticized for Giving In to FPI. In: Jakarta Globe. August 29, 2011.
141. ↑ FPI: Maklumat FPI tentang ISIS. 2014.
142. ^ FPI dan Khilafah Islamiyyah, Kajian Habib Rizieq. 2015.
143. ↑ So z. B. Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 200.
144. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 96 f.
145. ↑ ^{a b} Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 100.
146. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 141.
147. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 192.
148. ↑ See also American Foreign Policy Council: World Almanac of Islamism. P. 5.
149. ↑ FPI: sikap FPI terhadap Syiah dan Wahabi. 2009.
150. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, before p. 534.
151. ↑ Bamualim: Islamic militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis. 2011, p. 270a.
152. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 202.
153. ↑ See the photo in the article by Safrin La Batu: FPI leader denies allegations of provoking public unrest with communism symbol claim. In: Jakarta Post. 23rd January 2017.
154. ^ Wilson: Morality Racketeering. 2014, p. 256.
155. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 84.
156. ^ American Foreign Policy Council: World Almanac of Islamism. P. 5.
157. ↑ Dian Fath Risalah El Anshari: Rizieq Shihab Imam Besar FPI Seumur Hidup Kompas.com, August 25, 2013.
158. ↑ Munajat: How Democracy and Religion Foster Violence. 2015, p. 293.
159. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 205.
160. ↑ FPI Sebut Rizieq Shihab Diperlakukan Seperti Tahanan Rumah. In: Tempo.co. 29th September 2018.
161. ^ Lani Diana Wijaya: FPI Adukan Dugaan Pencekalan Rizieq Shihab ke DPR. In: Tempo.co, September 26, 2018.
162. ↑ Gibran Maulana Ibrahim: FPI: Habib Rizieq Sedang Sakit Saat Orang Misterius Pasang Bendera. Detiknews.com, November 8, 2018.
163. ^ Francisca Christy Rosana: FPI Klaim Setor Nama Terduga soal Bendera di Rumah Rizieq Shihab. Tempo.co, November 9, 2018.
164. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 19.
165. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 586, 607.
166. ↑ ^{a b} Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 586.
167. ↑ See the overview of theorganizasi structure on the FPI website www.markasyariah.com.
168. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 587.
169. ↑ PERUBAHAN STRUCTURE PENGURUS DPP-FPI 2015
170. ↑ Ibnu Manshur: Ini Ketua Umum FPI yang Baru Ust. Ahmad Shobri Lubis. Muslimedianews.com May 6, 2015.
171. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 587.
172. ↑ View Google Street View
173. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 4, 51.
174. ↑ Pradityo: FPI Ubah Paradigm Perjuangan. 2003.
175. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 75.
176. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 279.
177. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 50.
178. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 220 f.
179. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 94 f.
180. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 283.
181. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 69.
182. ^ Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 284 f.
183. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 95.
184. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 199.
185. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 619.
186. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 200-202.
187. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 72.
188. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 250.
189. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 284.
190. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 53.
191. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: Wajah Para Pembela Islam. 2010, p. 136.
192. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 54.
193. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 254.
194. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 603.
195. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 75.
196. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, pp. 22, 27 f.
197. ↑ Megiza: Kontroversi FPI. October 2014.
198. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 283.
199. ^ Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 274.
200. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 279.
201. ↑ Pradityo: FPI Ubah Paradigm Perjuangan. 2003.
202. ↑ Lembaga Survei Indonesia: Trend orientasi. 2007, p. 25.
203. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 92 f.
204. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 71 f.
205. ↑ Anwar: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar. 2015, p. 242 f.
206. ↑ Anwar: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar. 2015, p. 248.
207. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 230.
208. ↑ Image of the FPI logo
209. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 230 f., 602 and Hasil-hasil Musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun. 2008, p. 9.
210. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 231.
211. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 233.
212. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 283.
213. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 162.
214. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 2.
215. ↑ ^{a b} Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 98 f.
216. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 187.
217. ↑ Hasil-hasil musyawarah Nasional II Front Pembela Islam Tahun. 2008, p. 9 f.
218. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 125.
219. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 120.
220. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 84.
221. ↑ Lunnon: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's Struggle for Democracy. 2013, p. 5.
222. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 199.
223. ↑ Andry Haryanto: Tangkap 4 Anggota FPI Klaten, Polisi Dapati Alat Pemukul. Liputan6, February 7, 2018.
224. ↑ Joniansyah: FPI Akan Sweeping Minuman Keras di Mini Market. Tempo.co, February 8, 2012.
225. ↑ Aria Basuki: FPI sebut razia miras di Bandung cuma bantu polisi. Merdeka.com, July 26, 2012.
226. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
227. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 285.
228. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 87.
229. ↑ Maurisa Zinira: The Movement of Islamic Defenders Front and Its Socio Political Influence on Indonesian Society. In: Religió: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama 5/2 (2016), pp. 245–263; here: p. 257. Digitized version
230. ↑ convoy Ratusan Massa FPI Kaltim Ricuh. Antaranews.com, September 29, 2007.
231. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 202.
232. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 95.
233. ↑ Prima Gumilang u. Wishnugroho Akbar: Sweeping Laskar FPI di Pamekasan Atas Coordinasi Mabes LPI. CNN Indonesia, January 22, 2018.
234. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 202.
235. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 147 f.
236. ↑ FPI Laporkan Pencemaran Nama Baik oleh Aspehindo. In Tempo.co December 5, 2003.
237. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 327.
238. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 279, 322 f.
239. ↑ Bimo Wiwoho: Protest Trump soal Yerusalem, FPI Ancam Sweeping Warga America. CNN Indonesia, December 11, 2017.
240. ^ ^{A b c} Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 136 f.
241. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 50.
242. ↑ See Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 151.
243. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 96.
244. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, p. 160.
245. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 52.
246. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 95.
247. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 135.
248. ↑ ^{a b} Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 96 f.
249. ^ Woodward et alii: Ordering what is right. 2012, p. 134.
250. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 87.
251. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 89.
252. ↑ See the YouTube video from Tabligh Akbar on September 29, 2018 at the Monas Memorial.
253. ↑ A video of the event is available here.
254. ↑ Tiara Sutari: FPI Akan Gelar Takbir Keliling Jakarta. CNN Indonesia, June 13, 2018.
255. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 51.
256. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 317 f.
257. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 318 f.
258. ↑ FPI Menuntut Pemberlakuan Piagam Jakarta. Liputan6, August 28, 2001.
259. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 318.
260. ↑ Dian Fath El Risalah Anshari: Ribuan Orang padati Markas FPI di Petamburan. Kompas.com, August 25, 2013.
261. ↑ Muchsin Alatas in Indonesia CNN: Kontroversi FPI. October 2014.
262. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 288 f.
263. ↑ ^{a b} Winda Destiana Putri: Selalu Terlihat Anarkis, FPI Bekerja dalam Diam. Republic of November 29, 2014.
264. ↑ Tiara Sutari: Menantu Rizieq Shihab Ramaikan Acara Buka Puasa FPI. CNN Indonesia, June 13, 2018.
265. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 114 f.
266. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 122.
267. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 191.
268. ^ Wilson: Morality Racketeering. 2014, p. 256.
269. ↑ Pradityo: FPI Ubah Paradigm Perjuangan. 2003.
270. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 585.
271. ↑ Bamualim: Islamic militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis. 2011, p. 274b.
272. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 100.
273. ↑ Video of the attack .
274. ↑ See the overview at Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, pp. 115-117.
275. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 141.
276. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 278.
277. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, pp. 89, 93.
278. ↑ Khalik: Government slammed for inaction against FPI. June 4, 2008.
279. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 92 f.
280. ↑ Director Eksekutif ICP dan Wahid Institute Dipukuli Massa FPI. Kompas.com, June 1, 2008.
281. ↑ Survei: NU Tradisionalis, Muhammadiyah Moderat, FPI Keras. Liputan6, January 30, 2017.
282. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 360.
283. ↑ Lembaga Survei Indonesia: Radikalisme Islam dan Sikap Publik Indonesia. Jakarta, 2005. p. 16 and 22nd
284. ↑ Lembaga Survei Indonesia: Trend orientasi. 2007, p. 24.
285. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 203.
286. ↑ The following list is based on Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 136 f., But also includes the results of other studies.
287. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 135.
288. ↑ ^{a b} Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 51.
289. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 390.
290. ↑ See Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 75.
291. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 118.
292. ↑ ^{a b c} Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 55.
293. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 122.
294. ↑ ^{a b} Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 201.
295. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 123 f.
296. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 275.
297. ^ Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 284 f.
298. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 124 f.
299. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 243-249.
300. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, pp. 243-249.
301. ↑ Anwar: Pemikiran dan Gerakan Amr Ma'rûf Nahy Munkar. 2015, p. 232.
302. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 163.
303. ↑ Forum Masyarakat Kemang Menentang Aksi FPI. Liputan6 October 24, 2004.
304. ↑ Setyanto: Ini Rekam Jejak Perilaku FPI. 2014.
305. ↑ Ini Kronologi Bentrok Warga dengan FPI di Kendal. Kompas.com, July 19, 2013.
306. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Yuliasri Perdani and Suherdjoko: Deriding calls for ban, FPI calls SBY 'loser'. In: The Jakarta Post , July 23, 2013.
307. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 22.
308. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 27.
309. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 161.
310. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 106.
311. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. Xxi.
312. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 283.
313. ^ Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 274.
314. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, pp. 22, 52.
315. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: Hate Speech and the Indonesian Islamic Defenders Front. 2012, p. 9.
316. ↑ Bamualim: Islamic militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis. 2011, p. 269a.
317. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 54.
318. ↑ See Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 75.
319. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 105.
320. ^ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims. 2001, pp. 12b-13a.
321. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 201.
322. ↑ Bamualim: Islamic militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis. 2011, p. 269a.
323. ↑ Bamualim: Islamic militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis. 2011, p. 271b.
324. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 56.
325. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 331.
326. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 235.
327. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 240 f.
328. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 27.
329. ↑ Karana WW: Alasan Warga Dayak Tolak FPI. Tempo.co, February 11, 2012.
330. ↑ M. Andi Perdana: Dikira FPI, Akbar Faisal Disergap Warga Dayak. Tempo.co, February 11, 2012.
331. ^ Rina Widiastuti: Rizieq: Ada yang Ingin Adu Domba FPI. Tempo.co, February 12, 2012.
332. ↑ Karana WW: Warga Dayak Tolak Ketua FPI Habib Rizieq. Tempo.co, February 11, 2012.
333. ↑ Aksi unjuk rasa Indonesia Tanpa FPI di Jakarta. BBC Indonesia, February 14, 2012.
334. ↑ Afrilia Suryanis: Taufiq Kiemas Minta FPI Hormati Kearifan Local Dayak. Tempo.co, February 13, 2012.
335. ↑ Warga Balikpapan Tolak FPI. BBC Indonesia, February 21, 2012.
336. ^ FPI Refused Entry at Tjilik Riwut Airport in Wahid Institute: Monthly Report on Religious Issues. 2012, p. 4.
337. ^ Wahyu Aji: Massa FPI Geruduk Kantor BNN. Tribunnews, February 20, 2012.
338. ↑ FPI Cleric Slammed for belittling Sundanese Culture Over Arabization. In: Jakarta Globe. November 26, 2015.
339. ↑ Police under fire for Allowing sweeping FPI raids. In: The Jakarta Post. December 31, 2015.
340. ^ Dipa: Petition calls for disbandment of FPI. 2017.
341. ↑ I Nyoman Mardika: Mass Groups Report FPI Munarman for Alleged Defamation. In: Jakarta Globe. January 16, 2017.
342. ^ Mass Organizations in Bali Say No to FPI. In: Jakarta Globe. 22nd January 2017.
343. ↑ Ni Komang Erviani: FPI spokesman Questioned as suspect. In: The Jakarta Post. February 13, 2017.
344. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 210 f., 598 f.
345. ↑ Gloria Safira Taylor and Bimo Wiwoho: Polisi Imbau FPI Tak Anarkis Berdemo di Kedubes AS. CNN Indonesia, December 11, 2017.
346. ^ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 6.
347. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 135.
348. ↑ Woodward et al. a .: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, p. 165.
349. ^ ^{A b} International Crisis Group: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 3, 10.
350. ↑ Syafiq Hasyim: The Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI) and ʿaqīda-based Intolerance. A Critical Analysis of its Fatwa on Ahmadiyah and 'Sepilis'. In: Helen Pausacker, Tim Lindsey (Eds.): Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia. Routledge, 2016. pp. 211-234; here: p. 226.
351. ↑ SCTV Widely Criticized for Giving In to FPI. In: Jakarta Globe. August 29, 2011.
352. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 141.
353. ↑ Munabari: Islamic Activism. 2016, p. 108 f.
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382. ↑ Erna Mardiana: Ini Kronologi Kasus Dugaan Penodaan Pancasila oleh Habib Rizieq. In: Detik News. January 30, 2017.
383. ↑ Ahok detained for blasphemy, police continue probe into FPI officials. In: The Jakarta Post. May 10, 2017.
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390. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Pijar Anugerah: Pantaskah anggota FPI menjadi komisioner Komnas HAM? BBC Indonesia May 17, 2017.
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396. ↑ BBC: Ribuan orang di Bandung tuntut pembubaran FPI BBC News Indonesia, January 19, 2017.
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410. ↑ Bimo Wiwoho: Dikecam soal demo di pace, FPI Bergeming. CNN Indonesia, March 19, 2018.
411. ↑ Gisela Swaragita: 'Tape the good side, not the bad side!': Journalists intimidated, assaulted while covering 212 prayer. In: Jakarta Post. February 22, 2019.
412. ↑ Purnama Ayu Rizky: Melihat citra FPI dari pemberitaan media. alinea.id March 16, 2018.
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417. ↑ Police should thank us for 'educating' people who insult Muslims: FPI. Jakarta Post May 30, 2017.
418. ↑ Video shows 15-year-old boy harassed for allegedly insulting FPI leader. In: The Jakarta Post. June 1, 2017.
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427. ^ Wilson: Resisting Democracy. 2014, p. 5 f.
428. ↑ Viva News: FPI Titip Sepuluh Pesan untuk Prabowo-Hatta. 5th June 2014.
429. ^ ^{A b c d e} Wilson: Resisting Democracy. 2014, p. 6.
430. ^ Wilson: Morality Racketeering. 2014, p. 256.
431. ↑ Pradityo: FPI Ubah Paradigm Perjuangan. 2003.
432. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 107.
433. ↑ Adi Warsono: Moulay Malam Ini Rumah Mardani Ali Sera PKS Dijaga FPI. Tempo.co. 20th July 2018.
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435. ↑ Wishnugroho Akbar: PBB Bengkulu Terbuka recruit squad HTI dan FPI sebagai Caleg. CNN Indonesia. March 13, 2018.
436. ↑ Rangga Pandu Asmara Jingga: Yusril mengatakan PBB disepelekan dan dianggap tidak ada, ajak FPI-HTI downhill. Antaranews.com. 4th May 2018.
437. ↑ PBB Ajukan Bekas Ketua FPI dan Anggota HTI Jadi Caleg. CNN Indonesia. 18th July 2018.
438. ^ Wilson: Resisting Democracy. 2014, p. 7.
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440. ↑ Bertrand: Governor Sutiyoso's "Wars on Vice." 2010, p. 86.
441. ↑ Khalik: Government slammed for inaction against FPI. June 4, 2008.
442. ↑ Rachmat Hidayat: Megawati: Bubarkan FPI Terserah Pemerintah. Tribunnews February 14, 2012.
443. ^ ^{A b c} International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 4.
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449. ↑ Tiara Sutari: PSI Kecam FPI 'Geruduk' Tempo karena caricature. CNN Indonesia March 18, 2018.
450. ↑ Bimo Wiwoho: Dikecam soal demo di pace, FPI Bergeming. CNN Indonesia March 19, 2018.
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452. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 143.
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455. ↑ Anugerah Perkasa: Warga Coblos FPI Jika Jadi pada Parpol Pemilu 2019. CNN Indonesia November 21, 2017.
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457. ↑ ^{a b} Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 285.
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459. ^ International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 13b.
460. ↑ Margareth S. Aritonang: State defense workout for FPI not allowed: TNI. In: The Jakarta Post. January 10, 2017.
461. ↑ Margareth S. Aritonang: Indonesia Military commander defends military-style workout of FPI. In: The Jakarta Post. January 11, 2017.
462. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 70.
463. ↑ Jahroni: Defending the Majesty of Islam. 2008, p. 20.
464. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. 51 f.
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470. ↑ Purnomo: FPI disalahpahami. 2003, p. Xvii.
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474. ^ Buehler: The Politics of Shari'a Law. 2016, p. 147.
475. ↑ Lunnon: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's Struggle for Democracy. 2013, p. 7.
476. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 155.
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478. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, pp. 32, 237-239.
479. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 33.
480. ↑ SBY 'Warning' FPI, Ini Tanggapan Rizieq Shihab. Kompas.com July 23, 2013.
481. ↑ Wardhani / Perdani: Police respond to Ahok's challenge to ban FPI. October 8, 2014.
482. ↑ Anzor Sulawesi Utara Dukung Pembubaran FPI. Tribunnews.com, February 19, 2012.
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484. ^ Wahid Institute: Monthly Report on Religious Issues. 2012, p. 2.
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486. ↑ Deytri Robekka Aritonang: FPI Cuma dapat Sanksi Teguran. Kompas.com, July 26, 2013.
487. ↑ Munabari: Islamic Activism. 2016, p. 130, and Kementerian Sosial Republic of Indonesia: Front Pembela Islam (FBI) Lakukan MOU dengan KEMENSOS RI September 12, 2012 Memento
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519. ^ Carlos Roy Barus: FPI-Backed Group Demonstrates Against Ahok as Jakarta Governor. In Jakarta Globe December 1, 2014.
520. ^ Petrů: The Front Pembela Islam. 2015, p. 70f.
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525. ↑ Anies wants FPI to improve its image. Jakarta Post August 20, 2017.
526. ↑ Justice presiding over Ahok's case review petition denies FPI link. Jakarta Post May 31, 2018.
527. ↑ Anies wants FPI to improve its image. Jakarta Post August 20, 2017.
528. ↑ Pesan Anies untuk Rizieq pada Ulang Tahun FPI. CNN Indonesia August 19, 2018.
529. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 280.
530. ↑ Bertrand: "Governor Sutiyoso's" Wars on Vice "". 2010, p. 84f.
531. ↑ See Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 117f.
532. ^ FPI Refused Entry at Tjilik Riwut Airport in Wahid Institute: Monthly Report on Religious Issues. 2012, p. 4.
533. ↑ Theresia Felisiani: FPI Tegaskan Kejadian di Kalteng Tidak Libatkan Warga Dayak. Tribunnews February 13, 2012.
534. ↑ Adi Suhendi: FPI: Copot Kapolda Kalteng. Tribunnews.com February 13, 2012.
535. ↑ Imanuel Nicolas Manafe: Massa FPI Datangi Kantor Pemprov Kalteng di Jakarta. in Tribunnews.com February 17, 2012.
536. ^ Human Rights Watch: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia. 2013, p. 57.
537. ^ Buehler: The Politics of Shari'a Law. 2016, p. 147.
538. ↑ Arifianto: The rise of Indonesia's FPI and its push for syariah law. 2017.
539. ↑ Primus Dorimulu: Ahmad Heryawan: Tak Ada Persetujuan Perda Syariah Islam dengan FPI. Beritasatu February 22, 2013.
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541. ^ The Jakarta Post: FPI attacks HKBP church members in Bekasi. August 8, 2010.
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544. ^ The Jakarta Post: Police under fire for allowing sweeping FPI raids. December 31, 2015.
545. ^ Wilson: The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia. 2015, p. 152.
546. ^ Wilson: 'As long as it's halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta. 2008, p. 201.
547. ^ ^{A b} International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 14.
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550. ↑ Lunnon: Front Pembela Islam and Indonesia's Struggle for Democracy. 2013, p. 7.
551. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 203.
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553. ^ Esthi Maharani: Polisi-FPI Dzikir Bersama. Republika.co.id. 1st January 2018.
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555. ↑ Quoted from Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 66.
556. ^ Hefner: "Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence". 2004, p. 286.
557. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 285 f.
558. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 203.
559. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 64f.
560. ^ Wilson: Continuity and Change. 2006, p. 286.
561. ↑ Efendi / Pramuko: Habib-FPI gempur Playboy. 2006, p. 65.
562. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, pp. 198-200.
563. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 97.
564. ^ International Crisis Group: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree. 2008, p. 7 u. 14th
565. ↑ Wardhani / Perdani: "Police respond to Ahok's challenge to ban FPI" October 8, 2014.
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567. ^ Bogor FPI To Conduct Ramadan Raids Despite Police Warning. in Jakarta Globe June 30, 2014.
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570. ↑ Police deploy 2,800 to secure FPI rally against West Java Police chief. The Jakarta Post January 16, 2017.
571. ↑ Safrin La Batu: FPI rally demands dismissal of West Java Police chief. The Jakarta Post January 16, 2017.
572. ↑ Alin Almanar: By Demanding That Police Chiefs Be Sacked, FPI commits a form of Terror: Setara Institute. In Jakarta Globe January 17, 2017.
573. ↑ Safrin La Batu: Police refute FPI's accusation of unfair handling of Bandung clash. The Jakarta Post January 17, 2017.
574. ↑ Anggota FPI Ditangkap Aparat Polrestro Bekasi. Republika December 31, 2017.
575. ↑ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektiforganasi 2007.
576. ↑ An image of this original cover is here visible.
577. ↑ Rosadi: Hitam putih FPI. 2008, p. 212 f.
578. ↑ Pausacker: Pink or blue swing? Art, Pornography, Islamists and the Law in Reformasi Indonesia. 2016, p. 290 f.
579. ↑ Pausacker: Playboy, the Islamic Defenders' Front and the Law. 2012, p. 10 f.
580. ↑ Pemred Playboy Dituntut 2 Tahun Bui, Massa FPI Teriak Huuu ... In: Detik News. March 13, 2007.
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585. ↑ Irsyan Hasyim: PK Ahok Ditolak: FPI Jelaskan Kedekatan Dengan Artidjo Alkostar. Tempo.co, March 29, 2018.
586. ↑ Pribadi Wicaksono: Soal Isu Dekat dengan FPI, Hakim Artidjo Alkostar: Ngawur Sekali. Tempo.co, March 31, 2018.
587. ↑ Munajat: How Democracy and Religion Foster Violence. 2015, p. 198 f.
588. ↑ Amankan Pasangan Mesum, 4 Anggota FPI Ditangkap Polisi. Liputan 6. February 2, 2018.
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591. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 97.
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593. ^ Hefner: Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence. 2004, p. 274.
594. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 600.
595. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 348.
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597. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 142.
598. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 156.
599. ↑ Ahmad TORIQ: FPI: Kapitra Tak Terlibat SP3 case Penghinaan Pancasila Habib Rizieq. Detiknews. 20th July 2018.
600. ↑ Ketua FPI Lampung Divonis Bebas Liputan6, March 19, 2003.
601. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 145.
602. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 158.
603. ↑ Safrin La Batu: FPI leader denies allegations of provoking public unrest with communism symbol claim The Jakarta Post January 23, 2017.
604. ↑ Deni Prastiyo U: 'Sharing' Ujaran Kebencian, Anggota FPI Divonis 7 Bulan Penjara Detiknews.com July 19, 2018.
605. ^ Witnesses claim attacked, intimidated during FPI trial in The Jakarta Post September 15, 2008.
606. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 160.
607. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 162.
608. ↑ 12 Laskar FPI dan Satu Banser NU Diamankan Republika.co.id September 26, 2008.
609. ↑ Andikey Kristianto: Rizieq Divonis 1.5 Tahun, FPI Polisi Bentrok Okezone News October 30, 2008.
610. ↑ Purwanto: Mengurai benang kusut konflik FPI-AKKBB. 2009, p. 156.
611. ^ Maria Ulfa Eleven Safa: Bentrok FPI-Polisi, Ada Provokator Beratribut FPI Okezone News October 30, 2008.
612. ↑ Hasani / Naipospos: The Faces of ISLAM 'Defenders'. 2010, p. 138.
613. ^ Rizieq Syihab: Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 2008, p. 209.
614. ↑ FPI dilaporkan ke Komnas dan Polri. BBC Indonesia. June 28, 2010.
615. ↑ Ninin Prima Damayanti et al. a .: Radikalisme Agama sebagai salah satu bentuk perilaku menyimpang: Studi Case Front Pembela. In: Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia 3/1 (June 2003) 43-57. Here especially p. 48 and 55. Digitized
616. ^ Munajat: FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement. 2012, p. 3.
617. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, pp. 140-142.
618. ↑ Al-Zastrouw: Gerakan Islam simbolik. 2006, p. 160 f.
619. ↑ Woodward et alii: The Islamic Defenders Front. 2014, pp. 154, 164.
620. ↑ Woodward et alii: Hate Speech and the Indonesian Islamic Defenders Front. 2012, p. 21.
621. ↑ Julia Suryakusuma: Indonesia's Islamofascists. Zero tolerance for bullies and thugs. In: The Straits Times. June 12, 2008, p. 35.
622. ^ Petrů: The Front Pembela Islam . 2015, p. 65 f.

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on March 15, 2019 in this version .