French artillery in World War I

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A Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 with the ammunition trolley. French artillerymen and Scottish officers during the Battle of Armentières on October 21, 1914.
The field artillery was unable to fight the rear positions. The French therefore acquired modern heavy artillery. At the end of the war they had 1500 to 2000 cannons of the Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 S model , here on September 3, 1918 in use at Champien .
A French 24 cm G modèle 1876 cannon mounted on a center pivot mount in 1915 on the Gallipoli peninsula. Four of these cannons were used to bombard the Asian bank during the Battle of Gallipoli . They were made unusable and abandoned in January 1916. They are still in a desperate condition in their former positions on Cape Helles .

The French artillery in World War I played a major role in the French army during this conflict . Even though at the beginning it was mainly equipped with light gun material to support the infantry, the freezing of the front and the transition to trench warfare forced this branch of arms to change and to assume a leading role.

The strength and firepower of the guns increased considerably, the caliber of the cannons grew larger and larger, while the doctrine of the task was adapted to the new conditions of the fight: it was now also about massive preparations over several days, permanent interference, barrages, fire summation, etc.

The development of high-performance artillery was therefore necessary, but also of trench artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, chemical artillery, special artillery for installation in tanks, anti-tank artillery and, finally, motor - driven self-propelled guns .

The French artillery fired about three hundred million shells during the war. Such a development had required considerable industrial effort.

Situation at the start of the war

At the beginning of the war, the artillery was considered an auxiliary force to the infantry and supported them with their fire. The infantry was considered the "queen of the battlefield", except in the case of a fortress siege. The armament, the organization and the doctrine of the use of the French artillery were determined by these principles, it was therefore essentially only light and mobile artillery. Despite this quasi-subordination to the infantry, the artillery enjoyed a high reputation. Together with the pioneers, it was the weapon with the highest training demands. In 1913, 70% of the officers had a diploma from the École polytechnique , and a specialization at the “École d'application de l'artillerie et du génie” in Fontainebleau.

The uniform was traditionally dark blue with scarlet stripes on the long trousers and breeches for the mounted artillerymen. The equipment differed slightly between the men in the foot artillery and the mounted artillery. The former leaned more towards the infantry, the latter more towards the cavalry. A kepi was generally worn as headgear. Only the 11th and 12th batteries of the 13th RAC (Régiment d'artillerie de campagne - 13th field artillery regiment) and the 25th and 32nd RAC wore a helmet à la Bourguignotte modèle 1901 for experimental purposes, but it disappeared again in October 1914 .

The personal armament for the officers , NCOs and mounted crews consisted of a saber "Modèle 1822/1899" and a revolver Modèle 1892 8 mm . All the others ran the Mousqueton d'artillerie modèle 1892 Berthier with the saber bayonet.

Gun material

The guns were divided into classes according to caliber . The field artillery was measured in millimeters and the coastal artillery in centimeters.

The Mortiers ( German  mortars ) were pieces with a very short barrel that shot at a high angle with a very low muzzle velocity. They were replaced by the howitzers . In addition, there were the long barrel guns (canons longs) with high muzzle velocity and long range.

Basic equipment models

Demonstration of the new French Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 in front of Tsar Nicholas II on the occasion of the great maneuvers in the east of 1901

The equipment of the French field artillery in 1914 consisted almost exclusively of the Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 , of which 4986 pieces were available at the beginning of the war - 3680 in the field artillery regiments, 364 in the forts and forts and the rest in training and in the reserve. This brought great advantages in logistics.

In addition there were 128 mountain guns Canon de 65 mm de montagne modèle 1906 and an unknown number of Canons de 75 mm modèle 1912 tailors for mounted artillery.

The heavy artillery was only weakly available in 1914, this particularly affected the relationship to the heavy artillery of the Germans. There were only 84 howitzers Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 (C for "court"), 126 more in the reserve and 104 Obusiers de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 (CTR for "court à tir rapide" - short, rapid fire), called "155 mm Rimailho" are available.

The prototype of the first French anti-aircraft gun 75 mm De Dion-Bouton modèle 1913

The siege artillery was assigned to the field army and had current artillery as well as outdated ones from the "Système de Bange" on mount SP ("de siège et de place"): 60 canons de 120 mm L modèle 1878 (L for "long") and 24 Mortiers de 220 mm modèle 1880 .

The fortress artillery that time was called "artillery de place" and put the gun material for the forts and batteries Système Séré de Rivières  - especially for the festivities Place Verdun , the firm position Toul , the firm position Epinal and firm position Belfort . In the fixed places, however, there were also modern guns such as 73 twin turrets Tourelle de 75 mm R modèle 1905 (R for “raccourci” - abbreviated), 67 of which were installed and the rest were still in storage. In addition there were 44 spaces between Casemate de Bourges , each with two cannons 75 mm modèle 1897, equipped on a fortress carriage. Furthermore, 700 pieces of outdated 80 mm field, fortress / siege and mountain guns of the models Canon de 80 modèle 1877 and Canon de 80 de montagne mle 1877 were available.

Most of the fortress guns, however, consisted of old pieces of the "System de Bange" - of which 3994 Canons de 90 mm modèle 1877 , 1524 Canons Lahitolle de 95 mm , 2296 Canons de 120 mm L modèle 1878 , 1392 Canons de 155 mm L modèle 1877 , 331 Mortiers de 220 mm modèle 1880 and 32 Mortiers de 270 modèle 1885 or Mortiers de 270 modèle 1889 . Five Casemates de Bourges were each armed with a "Canon Lahitolle de 95 mm modèle 1888" on a coastal carriage.

In addition, there was the coastal artillery to protect the naval ports in the motherland and in the colonies. The caliber used here was between 37 mm and 37 cm. A dozen of the 75 mm caliber cannons were also used. The air defense initially consisted of only one gun as a prototype on a truck and eight others, which were in production in 1914. For such a use some old cannons of the types “Canon Lahitolle de 95 mm modèle 1875”, “Canon de Bange de 90 modèle 1877” and “Canon de Bange de 80 modèle 1877” were kept.

description

The Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 was introduced in 1897 and was the most modern gun of its time. Like the other guns of its generation, its barrel was made of steel with trains and fields. There was one-piece cartridge ammunition used: The grenade was determined as in a gun cartridge with the cartridge case of brass connected; thus both could be pushed into the barrel together, which increased the rate of fire:

  • Improvement of the lock: In contrast to the locks of the System de Bange used until then , the lock could be opened and closed again with a single movement.
  • Use of a re-cocking trigger which was relaxed in the rest position and which was only cocked automatically when the trigger was pulled (prevented unintentional firing)
  • A mount with a ground spur that stopped the return of the gun. With the first shot, this dug into the ground and additionally stabilized the gun with all subsequent shots. The spur could also be buried in order to increase the barrel elevation and thus the range of the gun.
  • Use of a hydraulic reverse brake

Originally designed for horse-drawn carts, a field artillery battery required 168 horses, of which 36 were riding horses and 132 were draft horses. A battery of mounted artillery required 215 horses, including 82 riding horses and 133 draft horses. Each battery carried 22 vehicles, and each cannon was drawn by six horses.

The flight path of the 75 mm cannon was very flat, which meant that ricocheting and behind cover could take effect. The ammunition equipment therefore provided for the use of a reduced powder charge, which allowed a much more curved firing path and thus a shorter firing range (the average combat distance was 2500 m). The gunners had several projectiles to choose from: a shrapnel, an HE grenade, a smoke grenade, an anti-aircraft grenade with delay detonator, an incendiary grenade, a flare grenade and a tear gas grenade.

Field guns assigned in August 1914
gun Weight in firing position fire rate Range Bullet weight
Canon de 65 mm de montagne (mountain gun ) 400 kg 10 to 15 rounds / min 5.5 km Shrapnel: 4.4 kg, HE grenade: 3.8 kg
Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 1140 kg 12 to 18 rounds / min 6 to 10 km Shrapnel model 1897: 7.2 kg
1900 modèle high explosive grenade: 5.5 kg
Canon de 75 mm modèle 1912 Schneider 960 kg 12 to 18 rounds / min 7.5 km Shrapnel: 7.2 kg, HE grenade: 5.5 kg
Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 1475 kg 2 rounds / min 5.7 km Shrapnel: 19.2 kg, HE shell: 18.7 kg
Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 3200 kg 5 to 6 rounds / min 6.3 km Shrapnel: 40.8 kg, HE grenade: 41.3 kg
Fortress and siege guns
Guns Weight in firing position fire rate Shooting range Bullet weight
Canon de 90 mm modèle 1877 1210 kg 1 to 2 rounds / min 6.8 km Shrapnel: 8.6 kg, HE grenade: 8 to 8.4 kg
Canon Lahitolle de 95 mm 1450 kg (C field mount) or 1850 kg (SP fortress mount) 1 shot / min 6.4 km Shrapnel: 12.3 kg, HE grenade: 11 kg
Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878 2750 kg 1 shot / min 8.9 km HE grenade: 18.7 kg, shrapnel: 19.2 kg
Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1877 5800 kg 1 shot / min 9.6 km Shrapnel: 40.8 kg, HE grenade: 41 kg
Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880 4145 kg 1 shot / 3 min 7.1 km HE shells: 98.4 to 102.7 kg
Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1901 (1880–1891) 8500 kg 1 shot / 2 min
Mortier de 270 modèle 1885 and Mortier de 270 modèle 1889 16,500 kg 1 shot / 3 min 7.9 km HE grenade: 149.5 kg

organization

The smallest tactical unit of the artillery was the battery , which was commanded by a captain . He was assisted by two battery officers, lieutenant or sous-lieutenant . Gun commander was a Maréchal des logis , plus two brigadiers . The battery's crew was a total of 171 men.

Three batteries formed a group under the command of a chief d'escadron , three or four groups formed a field artillery regiment under the command of a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel as his representative.

When the war began, there was no larger tactical unit than the regiment.

Pre-war period

The organization of the French artillery during mobilization on August 2, 1914 was determined by the 1909 law. It was modified in 1914:

  • 62 field artillery regiments (RAC), 32 of them with nine batteries as divisional artillery, and 30 regiments of 12 batteries (20 as corps artillery regiments), the remaining six were also subordinate to the divisions as a group of mounted artillery (Groupe d'artillerie à cheval).
  • Nine foot artillery regiments (Régiments d'artillerie à pied - RAP) formed the batteries in the fortified places and on the coasts.
  • Five heavy artillery regiments (Régiments d'artillerie lourde - RAL) formed the army's artillery.
  • Seven regiments of colonial artillery (Régiments d'artillerie coloniale - RA col.). Four of them were in the French colonies and three in the mother country. The latter formed the artillery of the three colonial divisions.
  • Two mountain artillery regiments (Régiments d'artillerie de montagne - RAM) formed the artillery of the mountain troops.
  • Ten independent artillery groups, called "Groupes d'artillerie d'Afrique", of which two groups of foot artillery and eight groups of field or mountain artillery.

In peacetime most of the units were stationed in a belt along the German border. Exceptions were the 4th colonial artillery regiment in Tonkin , the 5th in Cochinchina , the 6th in Senegal and the 7th, which was stationed in Madagascar . The regiments, which were stationed in the military regions and referred to as "RA" for short, were administratively grouped into 20 brigades. In peacetime, each brigade had the number of the respective military region. Exceptions were the 19th military region in Algeria, which had no brigade, and the 21st military region in Épinal, here the brigade led the number 19. These brigades were each commanded by a general de brigade of the artillery.

Each infantry division was assigned a field artillery regiment (Régiment d'artillerie de campagne - RAC) with three groups of a total of nine batteries with a total of 36 guns of the standard type " Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 ". Two infantry divisions each (except in the 3rd military region with three infantry divisions) formed an army corps, each of which was subordinated to an additional field artillery regiment with four groups of twelve batteries with 48 guns "Canon de 75 mm".

The ten cavalry divisions each had only one group of mounted artillery, each consisting of three batteries. The field artillery regiments were equipped with a workers 'department, and the foot artillery regiments also had a workers' company. The mountain batteries used mules instead of horses , and a group of the 4th heavy artillery regiment (4 e régiment d'artillerie lourde) used trucks to pull the 120 mm L guns .

mobilization

During the mobilization phase in August 1914, the strength of the French artillery was increased from 855 to 1527 batteries in accordance with Plan XVII through reserves and territorial forces. No new regiments have yet been set up.

The batteries that were additionally installed were allocated to the newly established divisions in the course of mobilization. The 44th Infantry Division received twelve batteries (divided into three groups). In addition there were the six field artillery regiments of the 37th Infantry Division, the Moroccan Marching Division (Division de marche du Maroc). The 45th Infantry Division, formed from the Armée d'Afrique, received its batteries from the African artillery groups. The 38th Infantry Division, embarked in Algiers on August 4th and landed in Cette on August 7th, was assigned to three groups of the 32nd Field Artillery Regiment from Fontainebleau in Chimay on August 14th, 1914 . In total, the active divisions were assigned 405 batteries with the 75 mm cannon with a total of 1620 guns.

The reserve divisions that were set up during the mobilization each received three groups, each of which was newly set up by a field artillery regiment. The four reserve divisions set up by the 14th and 15th Military Regions each had three batteries of 75mm cannons and six batteries of 65mm cannons (instead of the 75mm cannons). Altogether there were 201 batteries with 804 guns. The territorial divisions were established at the end of the mobilization and each had one (for the territorial divisions of the fixed places) or two (for the territorial field divisions) groups of artillery. A total of 48 batteries with 192 guns were available here. Furthermore, groups with the 75 mm field cannon were set up in the territorial artillery.

Above the division level, each army corps had an additional field artillery regiment in four groups with a total of twelve batteries - i.e. with 48 guns of 75 mm caliber. In total, that was an additional 264 batteries with 1056 guns. At an even higher level, each army was reinforced by several groups (one to five) with the " Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 " and the " Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 ". Furthermore, the General Staff (Grand Quartier général) set up a “Mobile Heavy Artillery” (Artillery lourde mobile) for the northeast area. It consisted of 15 batteries with "120 mm L" cannons and six batteries with the " Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880 ".

Allocation of artillery to the armies on August 5, 1914 (excluding artillery parks)
Associations Field batteries heavy army batteries Foot artillery batteries
1 re armée 159 12 (6 × Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 , 6 × Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 ) 0
2 e armée 183 17 (7 × Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904, 6 × Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 , 4 × Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878 ) 0
3 e armée 129 18 (3 × Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904, 3 × Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890, 12 × Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878) 0
4 e armée 93 3 × Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 0
5 e armée 178 17 (7 × Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904, 6 × Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890, 4 × Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878) 0
Corps de cavalerie Sordet 9 0 0
in reserve 230 21 (15 × Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 L, 6 × Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880) 0
Northeast fortifications 40 0 132

In addition, each of the major units (divisions, corps and armies) received an artillery park for ammunition supplies. 284 for the field artillery, 121 artillery park divisions, 13 mixed mountain ammunition divisions, 47 light ammunition columns for 120 mm shells and 26 divisions for 155 mm shells, 137 divisions for infantry ammunition, the same for the reserve artillery were established. In the artillery parks there were 246 guns of the 75 mm caliber to replace those that had been lost. In addition there were the guns that were kept in the regimental depots for training purposes.

Painting by Étienne-Prosper Berne-Bellecour: Le canon de 90 de Bange aux écoles du feu , 1898. In 1914, the "Canon de Bange de 90" was already completely out of date, but there was still a large number of them in the fixed places in Use. The painting shows the dark blue peace uniform of the artillerymen.

The fortress artillery (artillerie de place) was reinforced by the territorial artillery groups. It was under the command of the governor of the respective fixed place and was not part of the field army. In the 1st military region Dunkirk was equipped with three batteries, the Maubeuge fortress received 16 batteries of the 1st foot artillery regiment. In the 2nd Military Region, two batteries were moved to Fort de Charlemont , one to Fort des Ayvelles , one and a half batteries to the Citadel of Longwy and one to Montmédy . In the 6th military region, the Verdun fixed place was equipped with 27 batteries of the 5th foot artillery regiment and nine newly set up batteries. The forts on the heights of the Meuse received three batteries. In the 20th military region, 26 batteries of the 6th foot artillery regiment and nine additional, newly set up batteries were assigned to the fixed place in Toul ; the forts des Trouée de Charmes (between Toul and Épinal) were defended by four foot artillery batteries. In the 21st military region, 23 batteries of the 8th foot artillery regiment and nine newly established batteries were allocated to the fixed place Épinal ; likewise the forts on the crossbar of the Upper Moselle (rideau défensif de Haute Moselle) , to which three foot artillery batteries were allocated. In the 7th military region, the Belfort Square was equipped with 24 batteries of the 9th foot artillery regiment and nine newly set up batteries. The section was completed by the stationing of a foot artillery battery in Fort du Mont Bart . The Alpine front was covered by the 7th and 11th foot artillery regiments and the 1st and 2nd mountain artillery regiments.

Each of the forts in the east was equipped with 500 to 600 guns in the forts. There was also a reserve division, as well as the fortifications of Paris with around 1,700 guns. Not included was the artillery of the seven reserve and territorial divisions, which were intended to reinforce the Paris garrison.

Finally, the coastal artillery has to be mentioned, which was subordinate to the War Ministry in peacetime, but was placed under the responsibility of the Navy during mobilization. The main task was the protection of the large naval ports (operational readiness could not be established until September). For this reason, the 1st foot artillery regiment took command of the artillery positions in the ports of Dunkirk, Boulogne and Calais . The others supplemented their personnel from the active, from reservists and from territorial forces. The 4th foot artillery regiment provided five batteries for Cherbourg and four for Brest , the 7th foot artillery regiment three batteries in Nice , one in Ajaccio and one in Bonifacio , the 10th foot artillery regiment six batteries in Toulon and one in Porquerolles . Batteries were also provided by the colonial artillery groups in Havre , Lorient , Quiberon , Belle-Isle , Saint-Nazaire , Ré , Aix , Oléron , Rochefort , at the mouth of the Gironde and in Marseille .

Tactical development

Before the First World War, the task of the field artillery was to support its own infantry with their firepower against enemy infantry that was protected by covers, walls or entrenchments. During an offensive phase, the artillery had to open the way and fight any units that could prevent the infantry from advancing. On the defensive, the artillery covered its own infantry and prevented the enemy infantry from advancing. An effective combat distance with a direct shot was therefore three to four kilometers, in addition, the accuracy was lower.

“The close cooperation between the various weapons is crucial for the success of an attack. […] The main task of the artillery is to support the forward movement of the infantry. In particular in the time of the crisis that precedes the attack, it fights the targets of the attack. "

The ordinance recommended placing batteries in a surveillance position and limiting the number of shots so that enemy troops and artillery could be recognized so that they could be fought with a minimum of effort and thus reserves were always available. The regulations assumed that opposing units would try to hide from the firepower of the field artillery in entrenchments or to hide from artillery observers. They would have to be kept under cover by interfering fire and thus switched off or destroyed. These recommendations related to the initially poor supply of ammunition compared to the performance and throughput of the equipment used. Each 75 mm cannon had a reserve of 1000 to 1300 rounds at the beginning of the conflict. In fact, this amount corresponded to four days of continuous fire from this gun.

With regard to heavy artillery, in 1914 everything was so new and poorly defined that its use and properties were not even mentioned in the artillery regulations.

“The identification of targets and the cessation of shots are of the utmost importance for the use of artillery. The 1913 ordinance advocates the use of observers at the highest points of the battlefield, if available and accessible. An observation ladder can also be used, which can be attached to the ammunition gun and reaches a height of up to 4.2 m. In the case of direct fire, the captain stands on the ammunition head and observes the target through his binoculars , which are mounted on a battery tripod and with which one can carry out a precise target observation. "

In order to establish communication between the batteries and the observers or the group commander, the ordinance suggested the use of hand signals or flags for distances between 700 and 2500 m. Detectors or field telephone systems should be used up to 500 m. The ordinance recommended two ways to ensure the transmission of information in the event of a long-range order being transmitted.

“The use of airplanes is recommended by the 1913 ordinance when the location of the targets is known only from the observation of muzzle flashes or from inaccurate information at average combat distances for the artillery. The aircraft can move along the battery's axis of fire to watch the shells hit, and it can also identify troops hidden by depressions in the ground. These observations must be transferred to a bulletin to be sent to the battery or batteries that requested assistance from the aircraft. "

The belligerents

The French army from 1871 to 1914 continued to compare itself with its powerful neighbor, the German army , which itself also constantly observed the French. In the field of artillery, this comparison was made on the one hand between the two main weapons of field artillery, the French "Canon 75 mm model 1897" and the German 7.7 cm field cannon 96 n. A. , where the French model is particularly related had a strong advantage on the cadence.

With the heavy artillery, however, the German side had a clear advantage. After the first appearance of the 75 mm cannon in the 20th artillery regiment during the Boxer Rebellion 1900-1901, in which the gun had made a strong impression, the German artillery had equipped their 7.7 cm cannon with a similar return brake. The German batteries consisted of six guns instead of four for the French. The Germans also had field howitzers to switch off covered French batteries in the medium range. On the other hand, fighting the line of fortifications that made up the Séré de Rivières system required effective siege artillery. Therefore, in Germany, the 10.5 cm field howitzer 98/09 was assigned directly to the divisions, the 15 cm field howitzer 02 to the army corps, and the 21 cm mortar 10 to the armies.

If the French Army Corps had 120 75 mm cannons in August 1914, the German Army Corps had 108 field cannons 7.7 cm, 36 field howitzers 10.5 cm and 18 howitzers 15 cm. The strength of the German artillery (one eighth of the German forces was directed against Russia) consisted of between 4,350 and 4,690 guns of 7.7 cm caliber, 40 cannons 10 cm, 950 to 1450 howitzers 10.5 cm, 44 howitzers 15 cm and 140 Mortars 21 cm. In addition, there was the siege artillery: 176 cannons 10 cm, 32 cannons 13 cm, 400 howitzers 15 cm, 80 mortars 21 cm, ten heavy 30.5 cm coastal mortars and seven mortars fat Bertha . The fortress guns in the fortress belt of Strasbourg , in Mutzig and in Thorn are not listed . (The information on the number of guns in the German army varies greatly depending on the source.)

German field artillery in August 1914
Guns Weight cadence Maximum range Bullet weight
7.7 cm field cannon 96 n.A. 971 kg 10 to 12 rounds / min 8.4 km Field cannon projectile 11 (standard projectile; adjustable shrapnel or high explosive grenade): 6.8 kg
10.5 cm field howitzer 98/09 1225 kg 4 rounds / min 6.3 km Shrapnel: 12.8 kg or HE grenade: 15.7 kg
15 cm heavy field howitzer 13 or 02 2100 kg 2 to 3 rounds / min 7.4 km Shrapnel: 39 kg or HE grenade: 40.5 kg
German siege guns in August 1914
Guns Weight cadence Maximum range Bullet weight
10 cm cannon 1904 2755 kg one shot / 2 min 10.4 km Shrapnel: 17.8 to 18.7 kg or HE grenade: 15.7 kg
13 cm cannon 1909 5800 kg 16.5 km Shrapnel or HE grenade: 40 kg
21 cm mortar 1910 6630 kg 2 rounds / min 9.4 km HE shell: 119 kg
28 cm mortar 6200 kg ? 11 km HE shell: 338 kg
30.5 s.Kst.Mrs. (heavy coastal mortar) 1896 or 1909 30,000 kg 8.2 km Tank shell: 410 kg or long shell: 335 kg
42 cm short marine cannon 1912 (Gamma)
42 cm short marine cannon 1914 (M)		 2 rounds / h 14.2 km (Gamma)
9.2 km (M)		 HE shells: 795, 930 or 1160 kg

So the Germans had a heavy artillery that was more numerous and more modern than that of the French. Their operational doctrine was also different. The regulations of the heavy German field artillery of June 28, 1905 provided for immediate use in the event of enemy contact, always moving forward, also to combat enemy marching columns that had been discovered by airplanes, as well as recognized batteries. Finally, they prepared the infantry attack by destroying the obstacles and entrenchments (while the light artillery was used for direct support).

In the Second Boer War 1899–1902, in the Russo-Japanese War and in the Balkan Wars 1912–1913, the German method (including by the Japanese and the Turks) and the French method (including by the Russians, Serbs and Bulgarians) were used. The gun material from Krupp and Skoda as well as from Schneider also faced each other.

The missions, supported by the two future belligerents, produced some alarming reports, but by and large this did not detract from the anticipation of their respective general staffs for the impending conflict.

Outbreak of war

In August and September 1914, materials and methods from the pre-war period were put to the test. The disappointment with a new form of war was numerous and included cavalry , infantry and artillery of all fighting armies.

First fights

The difficulties in the activities of the French artillery in August 1914 can be illustrated by some examples recorded in the marching records of the artillery regiments. In summary: In the border battles , the German infantry was fought intensely by the French artillery, but they too had to accept strong counterfire from their German opponents. For the fortifications, the outdated French artillery positioned there was unable to counter the modern pieces that the Germans used against them.

The first shot was fired on August 4, 1914 in Philippeville , Algeria, where two cannons of the 19 cm model 1878 of the battery of El Kantara, manned by some men of the "6 e groupe autonome à pied d'Afrique", fired on the SMS Goeben opened. The fourth shot (the rangefinder was not operational) hit the stern, whereupon the cruiser took off at high speed.

The 4 e RAC in Alsace

On the morning of July 31, 1914 - two days after the start of mobilization - the units stationed along the eastern border received the order to activate the shields in accordance with Plan XVII in order to conceal the deployment of their own troops. This affected nine infantry and seven cavalry divisions with 138 field artillery and 21 mounted batteries. The extreme right wing included the central Vosges and the gap at Belfort and was supported by the 7th Corps with 120 cannons of the 4th, 5th and 47th field artillery regiments, reinforced by the 8th Cavalry Division with twelve guns from the 4th Mounted Group of the 4th RAC and a battery with “Canons de 155 mm L modèle 1877” of the “9 e régiment d'artillerie à pied” from Belfort, defended.

On August 7, 1914, the French forces advanced. On the same day, the 4th Artillery Regiment opened fire for the first time as a division artillery of the 41st Division. After passing the Büssing and Oderen Passes at 4:30 a.m., the regiment sent one of its 75 mm cannons to support the head of the infantry column , which was stopped by a German machine gun at the exit of Wesserling . The bombardment was successful, but was carried out at such a short distance that the operating team was shot at with rifles by German infantrymen.

On August 9, 1914 there was a new assignment at Sennheim ; two batteries of the 3rd group of the 4 e RAC, set up on the south-eastern slope of the foothills of the Vosges, fired from a rear slope position at a German attack that had originated from Wattweiler that morning . After the evacuation of Sennheim at the beginning of the afternoon, the third battery of the group, which was positioned on the northern edge of the Nonnenbruch forest, attacked the German artillery east of Uffholz . The 2nd group of the 4 e RAC east of Lutterbach fired again at German infantry, but received heavy artillery fire. The battle at Sennheim ended with the French retreat. From August 11th, the division went on the defensive along the border east of Belfort . On the morning of the 12th, one of the batteries was covered with a few shells from a 10.5 cm field howitzer.

The 39 e RAC on the Moselle

On August 14, 1914, five army corps of the 1st and 2nd Army began an offensive operation through Lorraine. The 20th Army Corps on the left wing under the command of Général Foch had the 60 e RAC as corps artillery and the 8 e RAC as divisional artillery of the 11th Division and the 39 e RAC as divisional artillery of the 39th Division . After the German counterattack on the morning of August 20, 1914, the entire army withdrew. In the 39 e RAC at 06:00, two groups were initially taken under crossfire by enemy artillery, several limbs of ammunition exploded and the ammunition was running low. At 8:30 a.m. the enemy infantry approached unmolested, the 1st group gave the order to revive the guns. The 3rd group could not do anything of the kind, as it was under heavy fire in enemy sight. Their staff only withdrew after the infantry had withdrawn and under German rifle fire. The 1st group was able to prevent the teams from being carried away in the general retreat, six cannons and four ammunition limbs from the 2nd battery could be brought to safety.

The second group was isolated three kilometers away and was beaten up around noon, the situation had become untenable and the order to withdraw was given. In a first attempt, three drivers and several horses were incapacitated. In the second attempt, vehicle after vehicle - quarter hour and quarter hour at a gallop -, two guns and four ammunition limbs south of point 272 were brought to safety.

The right gun was in enemy sight and was switched off. A gun had to be left behind. Capitaine S., injured in the thigh, was the last to go back with his men. [...] At 2:00 p.m. the 4th and 5th batteries had withdrawn, the 49th Colonial Regiment and parts of the 146th Infantry Regiment remained trapped at point 272. The 4th battery fired at the Germans who had just left Fontenoy-sur-Moselle and stopped their attack. The 5th battery stopped the attackers in the woods of Viviers (Moselle) and Oron (Moselle) . The 49th colonial regiment, decimated by shrapnel, cleared height 270 at the end of the battle. The 2nd battery retreated through the forest.

A captured French 75mm cannon is viewed by German civilians. Several of these guns were reamed to the German 7.7 cm caliber and used as anti-aircraft guns in a special mount with a tube elevation of 50 °. The German name was "7.7 cm L / 35 Flak (French)".

Balance: The regiment lost 23 of its 36 guns, as well as 26 ammunition limbs. The regimental commander fell.

Abandonment of fortifications

The French defeat in the border battles led to the withdrawal of the armies, which led to the isolation of the fortifications on the northeast border. The German troops besieged and took the Citadel of Longwy (August 8-26 ), Fort de Manonviller (August 23-27 ), Fort de Charlemont (August 24-31 ), Fort des Ayvelles ( August 25-27), Montmédy (August 25-28 ) and the forts of the fixed square of Maubeuge (August 24th to September 7th). The fixed place in Lille was disarmed and evacuated on August 24th. The fixed places of Calais and Dunkirk remained isolated, protected by preventive flooding of the surrounding plains.

In all cases the German siege artillery was more modern and more numerous. It immediately dominated the French fortress guns. One example is Fort de Manonviller. It had been modernized as a blocking fort in the course of the construction work on the Système Séré de Rivières and had received massive artillery reinforcements:

All guns were operated by teams of the "6 e régiment d'artillerie à pied".

German bombardment began on August 25, 1914 with 21-cm howitzers. On the very first day, one of the 155-mm turrets was put out of action and an ammunition depot with 2,200 57-mm and 80-mm shells was blown up. On August 26, two more 155 mm turrets were destroyed and another ammunition depot containing 800 155 mm caliber shells exploded. Two 42 cm howitzers were deployed at 4:20 a.m. on August 27 . The fourth 155 mm tower was blocked, the crew could no longer hold out psychologically, and at 3:30 p.m. the white flag was hoisted. In total, the fort was shot at with 979 15 cm shells, 4,596 21 cm shells, 134 30.5 cm shells and 59 42 cm shells.

Before the German advance it was ordered to restore the defunct fortifications of the second line of defense. From August 15 to 25, Fort d'Hirson received new guns and a garrison to support the "4 e groupe de divisions de réserve" (4th group of reserve divisions), but it was then abandoned and on August 27 blown up. On August 26, 1914, the former La Fère and Laon fortress squares , abandoned as such by the decree of April 28, 1914, came under the command of the General of the 5th Army. The old “Canons de 90 mm modèle 1877” were to be removed from the arsenals of the towns (26 in La Fère and 22 in Laon) to be placed in artillery batteries. The whole thing was finally abandoned before the arrival of the German troops.

experience

“[...] the enemy offensive is developing more and more towards the south, reinforced by incessant shots of howitzers, which are impossible to see and as a result cannot be fought. The very precise fire gradually destroys part of our artillery, which is stationed on the heights west of Wahlscheid. The colonial brigade renounced the offensive and limited its efforts to occupying the heights of the left bank of Bièvre. […] The brigade, after suffering heavy casualties, gives up territory and its units, without communication with one another, retreat to the heights west of Valletta (report from Général Legrand, commander of the 21 e corps d'armée, at Attack on Harreberg on August 20th). "

“The attacks of yesterday only failed because they were neither prepared by the artillery nor by the fire of the infantry. It is important that the infantry never attack unless the artillery has prepared this attack and is ready to support it. Bayonet attacks cannot be accepted under the circumstances in which they were carried out most of the time (instructions from Général Ruffey, Commander of the 3rd Army, to his units during the fighting on August 22nd at Longwy ). "

During the War of Movement, the German howitzers fought several times against the French artillerymen, who could only survive thanks to the mobility of the 75mm batteries (it took too much time to regulate indirect fire). While some of the battles in the Battle of the Ardennes (August 20-25, 1914) were limited to infantry encounters, the border battles were a turning point. Artillery now dominated the battlefield and their shells became the main source of casualties.

As predicted before the war, the French batteries with four 75 mm guns to support the infantry or for barrage were just as effective as the German batteries with their six guns 7.7 cm FK 96. The French guns had a higher rate of fire, and their grenades were more explosive. The rare cases of a successful fire attack related to direct shooting, so two groups of the 5th Artillery Regiment (artillery of the 7th Army Corps) had success on August 19, 1914 when they destroyed a German detachment at a distance of 4,875 meters south of Brunstatt . Eighteen cannons were captured.

The front stabilized in upper Alsace at the end of August, in the center in mid-September and in October in the north. A new way of fighting developed:

"[...] when the infantry digs in to survive, the heavy artillery occupies a dominant place; one scanned the heights, fired at ever greater distances, fired indirectly from fixed positions, concentrated the fire while the consumption of grenades far exceeded forecasts. "

The field artillery slowly adapted thanks to some individual initiatives. For example, Colonel d'Estienne came as a commander to the 22nd field artillery regiment and brought two Blériot XI's for artillery observation, which he used during the Battle of Charleroi. The observations were also important during the Battle of Deux Morins. However, since the French did not have enough heavy artillery to fire on the entrenchments and defeat the German artillery, the Minister of War provided Général Joffre with 108 pieces of the "155 mm court modèle 1881–1912 de Bange" on September 23, 1914 ( the modification "1912" referred to a wooden gun platform that was easier to transport than the original fortress carriage). Furthermore, 120 mortars "220 mm modèle 1881-1891" were provided (the modification "1891" consisted of the installation of a hydropneumatic brake on the carriage).

“It is no secret that we are in a state of marked inferiority to our opponents, especially with regard to the heavy artillery, which with us only existed in an embryonic state. Many of us remember those grave hours when the feeling of helplessness came to light in the face of cannons that, protected from our attacks, did not even bother to camouflage themselves because they were perfectly safe as they destroyed us . "

Ammunition crisis

At the beginning of the war, there were 4,866,167 rounds of ammunition available for the 75 mm field cannons, i.e. a little more than 1,000 rounds per gun. For the heavy artillery, for which a lower consumption had been assumed, 1,280,000 rounds of 120 mm shells were available for the 120 mm Obusier Baquet and the 120 mm Canon de Bange , which equates to 400 to per gun in the field army Turned out 450 rounds. The 155 mm Canon Rimailho was equipped with 78,000 rounds or 450 rounds per gun. For the 155 mm de Bange in the forts and fixed places, 1,400,000 grenades of 155 mm caliber were held.

The General Staff had planned an additional production of ammunition in order to replenish supplies. To this end, 800,000 shells (25,000 per day) should be produced in the arsenals of Bourges , Lyon , Tarbes and Rennes . From the 65th day after the mobilization, 13,600 shells were to be produced per day (3500 of them in private factories). All of these crowds were designed for war of movement.

In reality, half of the ammunition supplies for the 75 mm field guns were used up during the border battles and the Battle of the Marne . As early as September 9, 1914, Edouard Laffon de Ladebat (General Director of Supply) informed the Minister of War, Alexandre Millerand, that the six general reserve depots in (Bourges), Angers, Rennes, Clermont-Ferrand, Lyon and Nîmes were almost empty. On September 19, 1914, the average consumption since the beginning of the war was estimated at 700 rounds for a 75 mm field gun (for a single month of combat); there were around 650 rounds per gun in the transports and artillery parks, plus 45 shells per gun in the camps, stations and arsenals. On the 20th, Joffre wrote to the Minister:

"[...] the production of artillery ammunition must be increased considerably, or we can no longer actively continue the war after November 1st."

He estimated the minimum amount to be 50,000 rounds a day, an average of twelve shells per gun per day (when in reality it was 100 per quarter of an hour). On the same day, the Minister of War gathered in Bordeaux the main manufacturers of the metalworking industry to demand production of 20,000 shells a day at the end of October and 40,000 at the beginning of December. It was actually 23,400 a day in October, which then fell to 11,300 in November due to a lack of workers, machine tools and materials.

On September 22, 1914, headquarters tried to limit the use of ammunition on the stabilized front (but this did not apply to the troops in the north of the Oise ), according to an army notice:

“The artillery must never fire without precisely defined targets, not even over large areas, if such fire is not necessary to facilitate the advance of our infantry or to stop enemy attacks. In other words, it is necessary to prohibit firing without aim. "

It was also requested that shrapnel should be used as preference , which had previously been neglected in favor of HE shells . On September 24, 1914, Joffre asked the army commanders:

"[...] to forego the general attacks carried out by the force without obtaining sufficient advantage and instead to proceed with localized attacks carried out by concentrating the means of action on the chosen points one after the other."

Rather, he called for night attacks to save artillery ammunition.

Then on the same day:

"[...] camp currently exhausted. If consumption stays the same, it will be impossible to continue the war in two weeks due to a lack of ammunition [...] All available ammunition can be obtained for a violent offensive if it becomes possible. I cannot direct your attention enough to the vital importance of this process on which the salvation of the land depends. "

Rationing began on September 27, 1914 . The armies' supply was now limited to 300 rounds per gun (including ammunition that was stored in the artillery parks), with the remainder held in reserve during the stage. In addition, no ammunition replenishment was planned before October 20, 1914 in order to concentrate supplies on the units involved in the race to sea . As a result, attacks by the 9th Army in Champagne had ceased on October 27th, due to a lack of ammunition.

“In order to limit the consumption of artillery ammunition during the defense period, which should allow the development of the maneuver of our left, the corps will generally maintain a defensive stance.
[...] The artillery batteries will not shoot themselves in, but will only fire shots with individual guns that are aimed at precisely defined targets and can be easily observed. You will avoid any area fire.
[…] Consumption must be regulated with the strictest economy, it is necessary to limit it until further notice in order not to exceed the average value of 13 rounds per gun and per day (Général Ferdinand Foch: Instruction personnelle secrète. 27. September 1914). "

On September 28, 1914, the High Command ordered that every army should inform the Director of Supply Services by encrypted telegram every evening or night before 6 a.m. the number of 75 mm shells used during the day.

Daily consumption was then set in October in the order of 38,000 shells per day (one million shells per month), half of which were assigned to the 2nd Army. On October 2, 1914, of the 38,759 shells fired during one day, 31,300 shells were used by the 2nd Army in Picardy alone , while their neighbors, the "Groupement de divisions territoriales" (GDT - grouping of territorial divisions), 950, with the 6th and 5th Army on the Oise 1088 and 191, with the 9th Army around Reims 483, with the 4th Army in the Argonne 1259, with the 3rd Army on the Meuse Heights 658 and with the 1st Army. Army in Lorraine and the Vosges amounted to only 2,830 shells. Orders were now given to bring the stocks of ammunition from the fixed places and from the colonies to the front. Some of the 75 mm cannons were replaced in the autumn by 500 outdated "Canons de 90 mm", which fired more slowly and of which ammunition was still in stock. These stocks of 90 mm ammunition quickly dwindled despite a production of 2000 rounds per day, so that the guns were decommissioned from April 1915. It was not until the first few months of 1915 that French production covered the needs of the artillery and also supplied the Belgian, Serbian and Russian armies with artillery shells.

Defective ammunition

With the chronic shortage of 75mm shells, another problem quickly arose - shells of this caliber were of poor quality. They did not explode, exploded too quickly or - worse - as a bolt crack , destroying the gun barrel and possibly killing the crew. These incidents accumulated from December 1914 and alerted the responsible authorities. According to six reports between August and December relating to 500,000 shells, 236 were damaged between December 20, 1914 and March 20, 1915, 176 in the 4th Army alone. The use of the trigger cord on the cannons was then introduced to keep the gunners at a distance when the shot was triggered.

Despite the measures taken, the problems continued throughout the conflict: incomplete detonations (due to the setting or crystallization of the explosive during the filling of the grenades), duds due to failed ignition processes, cracks due to fatigue in the cartridge cases, which occurred up to eight times before the Sorting out were reused, grenades that only reached a third of their firing distance (due to an incomplete or moist propellant charge), unpredictable influences (wear and tear, contamination), foreign bodies were found in the cartridges (nails, screws, pieces of wood, cords, rags, gloves ...) etc.

The tolerances in the filling of the explosive charges and the processing of the grenades were so important that from the spring of 1915 the cartridges of the artillery of the same caliber were sorted according to their mass in order to achieve a little more precision with the shots. For example, of the 75 mm shells, those from 4.85 to 5 kg were now marked with the letter “L”, those from 5 to 5.15 kg with a cross, those from 5.151 to 5.3 kg with two crosses and those from 5.301 to 5.45 kg marked with three crosses. The projectiles of the heavy artillery were marked directly with the weight in kilograms.

Agility and effectiveness

After the war of movement changed into a trench warfare in autumn 1914, which developed into a kind of gigantic siege, the artillery had to adapt to the new circumstances with its material and tactics.

More guns

While waiting for new, more modern models to be built, the French artillery relied on resources. First the old guns were sent to the front, as well as naval and coastal artillery, improvised mortars and confiscated cannons intended for export (for example, the model of the 75mm cannon supplied to the Russian army under the name Schneider PD07 should be). Through successive programs that became more and more extensive, more and more artillery could be delivered. So by the ministerial decision of October 24, 1914 ("Barrier Bange"), of July 27, 1915 (reorganization of the heavy artillery) and of May 30, 1916 (tripling the number of howitzers 155 mm short).

First solutions

A Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1877 with the shutter open on a 3.2 t heavy fortress / siege carriage. You can see the wheel extensions and the wedges to slow down the return. The installation of such a gun took an hour without the construction of the position.

On September 22, 1914, Headquarters asked the War Department to provide the artillery for the fortresses. (The “Ordinance on the Service in Permanent Places”, which was issued by the decree of October 7, 1909, gave the governors of fortresses a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the Commander-in-Chief, in particular through Article 151: The decree of August 5, 1915 changed this regulation by submitting the fortifications located in the respective zone of the armies to the Commander-in-Chief, who now has unlimited control of the entire garrison of fortresses and all reserves and supplies and then made them available to commanders of the various armies on August 24th.

The guns were old models, many on non-mobile fortress / siege mounts with low cadence, without barrel return, but available in large numbers: the "Canon de Bange de 90 modèle 1877" had the 75 mm cannons in a hundred Replace field batteries in order to save 75 mm ammunition, the "Canon de 95 mm Lahitolle" and the "Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878" were used to set up new field batteries in the army corps, while the "Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1877 ”and the“ Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880 ”remained with the foot artillery and were assigned to the heavy batteries of the armies for fighting entrenchments and the like. Nonetheless, this "barrier fear" of old cannons helped the army hold the front while it waited for more modern heavy artillery to arrive.

In the fall of 1914 a number of heavy siege guns arrived at the major formations. The high command decided on November 27th to subordinate each army corps and each reserve division group to a group of two batteries with four guns each (105 mm, 120 mm or 155 mm long). Other heavy batteries were reserved for the army, which kept them in reserve or used them temporarily as needed. For example, on December 1, 1914, shortly before taking part in the autumn battle in Champagne, the 4th Army (consisting of five corps) had a total of 488 75 mm cannons (instead of 600), 144 90 mm cannons, 16 cannons 65 mm, 14 cannons 80 mm, 30 cannons 120 mm "long", 16 howitzers 155 mm "court tir rapide", 34 cannons "155 mm court modèle 1912", 26 smooth mortars 150 mm and six auto cannons. General de Langle requested reinforcements on December 11th with four 155 mm long guns and two heavy 220 mm mortars.

From February 1916, 120 of the "Canon de 155 mm long modèle 1877" were placed on a new mount designed by Schneider (the same as for the Canon de 105 mm modèle 1913 ), with a tube return brake and a tube elevation of up to 42 °. These modernized guns were called "Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1877-1914" and allowed a rate of up to three rounds per minute. All these parts still had to be equipped with harness for the limbers and ammunition wagons. For this purpose, the necessary personnel had to be transferred from the permanent places, the coastal fortifications or the depots. These reorganizations affected the rear fortress places Langres , Besançon , Dijon, Lyon, Grenoble, Toulon and Brest. In addition there were the fortifications of Paris, Verdun, Toul, Épinal and Belfort.

Reactivated guns
Type Weight cadence Maximum firing range Bullet weight
Canon de 80 modèle 1877 955 kg one to two rounds / min 8.7 km Shrapnel: 6.3 kg or HE grenade: 5.9 to 6.1 kg
Canon de 80 mm M (de montagne) modèle 1878 de Bange 305 kg one to two rounds / min 4.1 km
155 C modèle 1881 de Bange 2080 kg one shot / min 6.2 km Shrapnel: 40.5 to 40.8 kg or HE grenade: 41.3 to 43.7 kg
155 C modèle 1881–1912 Filloux 4660 kg one to two rounds / min 7.8 km
155 C modèle 1890 Baquet 3115 one to two rounds / min
Old guns in use
Type Nov 30, 1914 May 1, 1915 Oct. 1, 1915 Feb. 1, 1916 Aug 1, 1916 Dec. 1, 1916 Aug 1, 1917 Nov 5, 1918
Canon de 80 mm M (de montagne) modèle 1878 88 168 455 467 408 407 494 32
Canon de 90 modèle 1877 de Bange 587 612 1570 1783 1452 1349 1193 144
Canon Lahitolle de 95 mm modèle 1875 243 435 900 857 894 896 1094 241
Canon de 120 mm L modèle 1878 286 540 1480 1335 1338 1110 1407 526
Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1877 112 328 630 629 738 669 943 ?
Mortier de 220 mm modèle 1880 14th 63 190 169 306 200 193 ?
Mortier de 270 mm modèle 1885 0 4th 51 46 53 66 24 14th

New field guns

The 75mm cannon was retained as a main piece of French artillery. Series production was therefore resumed in autumn 1914 in order to make up for the losses (447 cannons were abandoned or captured by the enemy between August 1914 and February 1915) and to meet the needs of new batteries. 160 75 mm model 1897 guns and 80 model 1912 guns had been ordered from Schneider et Cie; delivery was to take place from spring 1915. Meanwhile, on September 25, 1914, 240 75-mm guns were concentrated in Algeria. In February 1915 the batteries were temporarily equipped with only three instead of four guns. In May 1915 another 200 guns 75 mm modèle 1912 were ordered from Schneider and 200 guns M 1915 from the "Compagnie des forges et aciéries de la marine et d'Homécourt" in Saint-Chamond . In 1915 200 of these guns were delivered every month, in 1916 and 1917 that increased to 500 and in 1918 to 700 guns per month. A total of 27,000 of these cannons were made during the war. But these cannons lacked the power and range to destroy entrenchments and successfully fight the enemy artillery; the French artillery therefore also needed more heavy artillery.

Fortunately, the Schneider company had developed modern models for export that were to be delivered to the Russian army and of which the French army had also ordered a certain number since 1913. The Canon de 105 mm long modèle 1913 (the Russian caliber was 106.7 mm) went into production in August 1914 . The first 12 of the 220 guns ordered had been delivered just in time for the mobilization. They arrived on September 16, 1914 with the 6th Army and were assigned to the 4th group of the 2nd heavy artillery regiment. The same manufacturer had received an order from Russia for 18 Mortier de 280 modèle 14/16 mortars in November 1913 , deliveries of which were to begin in 1915. In addition, the army in Le Creusot was able to hold back eleven batteries of 120 mm mortars destined for Bulgaria. They were ultimately used in the French Army of the Orient.

The Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 S was developed to destroy entrenchments with its curved trajectory (the V0 was 450 m / s, and the M 1915 projectile with delay fuse weighed 43.55 kg, of which 4.8 kg explosive mass)

In June 1915, Joffre requested 155mm howitzers to combat field entrenchments. As a result, 512 of these guns were ordered in October as "Canon C Model 1915 and 1917 S". The gun was derived from a Saint-Chamond 150 mm howitzer developed for Russia and the "Canon 155 mm C Saint-Chamond 1915 CH" for Mexico. By the summer of 1916, however, only 60 guns could be delivered, which was far from what was needed. Also in October 1915, 40 copies of the heavy 220 mm TR mortar model 1915 (an adaptation of his Russian 9 inch mortar) were ordered from Schneider, which were delivered in the winter of 1916/1917.

The army also called for long-range guns. Until these new cannons were developed, 48 “Model 1897 100 mm TR” naval cannons, which had previously been used by the coastal artillery, had been removed from their concrete platforms to be mounted on siege mounts. This reduced the rate of fire from six to just one shot. But the strength of their propellant charge and the length of their tubes offered a muzzle velocity of 760 m / s, that is, with the maximum orientation of + 28 ° a range of 9.5 km with the model 1898-1908, then 13.5 km with the 1915 grenade type D (Desaleux). Six groups of 100 mm (two batteries of four pieces) were gradually formed from spring 1915 to spring 1916, then five of the groups were discarded in late 1916 due to the wear and tear of the pipes. Three groups were converted to 24 105 mm cannons in the spring of 1917, only to be returned to the coastal batteries at the end of 1917

To further increase the range, 39 naval cannons of 140 mm caliber (actually 138.6 mm) - 15 of which were barrels - were used. Twelve came from the old battleships "Carnot" and "Charles Martel". Twelve others, too worn, were reamed to 145mm caliber to mount on purpose-built field artillery mounts. These guns were ordered in January 1916 and delivered from September 1916 to July 1917.

After this experience, 200 new guns of this type were ordered in 1916 under the name "Canon de 145 mm modèle 1916". The pipes were made in the foundry in Ruelle-sur-Touvre , while assembly took place in Saint-Chamond. The deliveries were completed by early 1918. The muzzle velocity of 794 m / s was so satisfactory that the bore to the 155 mm caliber was planned for autumn 1918. In 1916 two models of the "Canon de 155 mm L modèle 1917 S" (on a mount "155 modèle 1877-1914") and the Canon de 155 mm GPF modèle 1917 (GPF = grande puissance Filloux) were placed on a mount with the possibility of raising the tube mounted from 60 °. But this model did not come to the front until 1917.

New gun models
Type Weight cadence Maximum range Bullet weight
75 mm modèle 1914 S (Schneider) 1096 kg 12 to 18 rounds / min 6.3 km Shrapnel: 7.2 to 7.4 kg or HE shells: 5.5 to 7.2 kg
75 mm modèle 1915 CH (Saint-Chamond) 1090 kg 12 to 18 rounds / min 6.5 km
100 mm TR modèle 1897 6000 kg 1 shot / min 13.5 km HE grenade: 13.3 to 14.3 kg
Canon de 105 modèle 1913 tailor 2350 kg 6 to 8 rounds / min 12.5 km Shrapnel: 16.9 kg or HE shell: 15.4 to 16 kg
120 mm modèle tailor 2150 kg 2 rounds / min 8.1 km HE grenade: 19.7 to 21 kg
14 cm modèle 1891 10,940 kg 1 shot / min 15.8 km HE shell: 30.5 to 36.5 kg
14 cm modèle 1910 11,935 kg 1 shot / min 17.4 km
145 mm modèle 1910 12,000 kg 2 rounds / min 17.6 km HE shell: 33.7 to 36 kg
145 mm modèle 1916 ? 3 shots / 2 min 18.5 km Shrapnel: 36.4 kg, HE grenade: 33.7 to 36 kg
Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 S (C modèles 1915 and 1917 S) 3220 and 3300 kg 4 rounds / min 11.9 km HE shell: 41 to 44.8 kg
Canon de 155 mm C Saint-Chamond 2860 kg 3 rounds / min 9.3 km
155 mm L modèle 1917 S 8710 kg 3 rounds / min 15.9 km
Canon de 155 mm GPF 11,200 kg 3 to 4 rounds / min 16.3 km
220 mm TR modèles 1915 and 1916 S (Schneider) 7455 and 7792 kg 2 rounds / min 10.8 km HE grenade: 100.5 kg
Mortier de 280 modèle 14/16 16,000 kg 1 shot / min 10.9 km HE shell: 202 to 275 kg
Number of modern guns at the front
Calibres 30/11/1914 1/05/1915 1/10/1915 1/02/1916 1/08/1916 1/12/1916 1/08/1917 5/11/1918
37 mm TR modèle 1916 34 138 140 149 195 483 ? ?
Canon de 65 mm de montagne M modèle 1906 80 84 85 79 72 36 183 136
Canon de 75 mm modèle 1897 , modèle 1912, 14 and 15 3539 3071 3524 3819 4029 4446 5890 5145
100 mm TR modèle 1897 0 4th 24 48 45 27 48 0
Canon de 105 mm modèle 1913 tailor 24 51 79 83 79 105 327 576
Obusier de 120 mm C modèle 1890 Baquet 59 43 150 143 131 125 141 10
Canon de 155 mm C Saint-Chamond CH 0 0 0 0 0 72 ? ?
Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider 0 0 0 0 46 136 433 ?
Obusier de 155 mm CTR modèle 1904 Rimailho 101 97 93 90 81 50 33 0
155 mm C modèle 1881–1912 102 161 330 329 372 314 387 ?
155 mm L modèle 1877–1914 p 0 0 0 0 23 60 105 ?
220 mm TR modèle 1915 and 1916 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 ?
Mortier de 280 modèle 14/16 TR modèle 1914 0 0 2 6th 16 18th 32 65

Artillerie de grand puissance - artillery of great effect (high-performance artillery)

Canon de 164 mm modèle 1893 in camouflaged position near Thury-en-Valois (1918)

In September 1914, the high probability of an attack on the entrenched camp in Paris justified the use of long-barreled marine batteries (as during the siege of Paris (1870–1871) ). The first guns with their service of naval gunners finally arrived at the Verdun arsenal in October. They were intended for use in the fixed places of Verdun and Toul as well as in Grand-Couronne near Nancy . It was the "Canon 138 mm model 1910" (actually 138.6 mm, originally intended for the Brittany class ) and the "Canon 164 mm model 1893" (164.7 mm) from the République class and the ships of the line Suffren and "Iéna". Since these guns were delivered on their ship mounts, they had to be installed in fixed positions, sometimes semi-underground in casemates . Several were therefore captured in February 1916, for example in the forest of Le Fays and La Vauche .

In September, a battery with two short 200 mm cannons on railroad carriages was confiscated at Le Creusot. The guns had been ordered by Peru in 1908 but not yet delivered. These first two heavy railway guns (ALVF) opened fire on October 5, 1914 to cover the withdrawal of the Belgian army at the end of the siege of Antwerp .

On October 14, 1914, the headquarters made an application to the Minister of War to use the very extensive naval artillery. These included the coastal artillery and the guns that were still stored in the Schneider et Cie factories and in Saint-Chamond. These should be used as railway guns or on fixed concrete platforms. A first group of 19 cm coastal guns was formed and then reinforced by the allocation of 240 mm or 270 mm coastal guns and immediately commanded to the front. In November 1914, a large "Canon G de 240 mm modèle 1884" (with a total weight of 53 tons) was transported on a central pivot carriage from Calais to Perugia and set up in the Fourches forest east of the Fort de la Justice. In the event of a siege, it was intended to defend the Belfort Fortress. In December 1914 another four "Canons de 24 cm modèle 1870-1887" were sent to the front by the battery of the Couplet in Cherbourg , despite the opposition of the Admiral-Prefect.

On October 25, 1914, the high command made a list of the high-performance guns it wanted. This program was approved by the Minister of War on October 31, 1914, who placed an order for the arsenals and industry: one 30.5 cm naval cannon, two 27.4 cm naval cannons, eight 24 cm coastal guns and twelve 19 cm coastal guns. Since the ship's guns were intended for use in turrets, they all had to be converted so that they could be used on railway or fixed wooden carriages. These weapons did not arrive at the front until the beginning of 1915, when they formed either batteries in the foot artillery regiments or independent groups. If necessary, they were temporarily assigned to the various armies by the high command. This list was completed by four guns mounted on barges since November 1914 and by 16 more 240 mm guns in February 1915. A new construction program was launched on March 9, 1915, in order to achieve a total of 201 pieces (of which eight 400 mm howitzers). The orders were increased on June 22, 1915, May 30, 1916, June 22, 1916 and February 24, 1917, so that the last 318 new pieces were ordered. However, the manufacturers were not able to deliver this mass of heavy artillery within two years. On June 28, 1915, a command of the "Artillerie lourde à grande puissance" (heavy artillery of great effect - high-performance artillery) was set up, in which the railway artillery and the guns on barges and other heavy guns were combined and subordinated to the Général Vincent-Duportal. He was commissioned to create the training requirements and to coordinate the operations. This troop was assigned with the reorganization of the "General Reserve of Heavy Artillery" on February 14, 1917. First six, then eight regiments (No. 70 to 78) “heavy artillery of great effect” (RALGP) were set up.

For the heavy artillery on the rails, the type of mount (often referred to as "truc" at the time) depended on the mass of the gun. Cannons up to 240 mm were anchored in the ground and were usually rotatable through 360 °. The heavier parts stood freely on the rails and could only shoot in the axis of the track, a curved section called the spur served as the aiming circle. For the latter models, the recoil was slowed down by chocks on the rails. In the firmly anchored models, the recoil was absorbed solely by the return brake. The three most frequently used calibers for the "heavy artillery of great effect" were the 19 cm, 24 cm and 32 cm, mostly modified coastal cannons (the casings of the tubes were made of cast iron, only the souls were made of steel). There were eight howitzers "370 mm modèle 1915" and twelve howitzers "400 mm modèle 1915 and 1916", the naval cannons were 30.5 cm and 34.0 cm "45 modèle 1912". They broke through the roof of Fort Douaumont in October 1916 , the Mont Cornillet tunnel in May 1917 and that of Cumières-le-Mort-Homme in August 1917.

When the armistice came into force, a "520 mm modèle 1916" howitzer was available (a second gun exploded on July 27, 1918 during a test bombardment at Saint-Pierre-Quiberon). The conversion as a gun with a very long range by pulling in a 340 mm tube had been considered while the new "Canon 220 mm long modèle 1917 Schneider" was already being delivered.

Heavy artillery of great impact
caliber 30/11/1914 1/05/1915 1/10/1915 1/02/1916 1/08/1916 1/12/1916 1/07/1917 1/01/1918 11/11/1918
14 cm modèle 1887, 1891, 1893 and 1910 0 22nd 18th 24 16 28 12 3 4th
16 cm modèle 1887, 1891, 1893 and 1893/96 0 5 17th 22nd 20th 28 30th 30th 37
19 cm modèle 1870/93, 1916 and 1917 0 0 16 24 23 24 46 78 100
200 mm modèle Pérou 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
240 mm modèle 1870/87, Canon de 240 mm modèle 1884, 1893/96, 1903, 1916 and 1917 0 2 8th 23 33 40 112 148 213
270 mm modèle 1889 0 0 12 24 24 48 68 80 84
274 mm modèle 1887, 1893 and 1893/96 0 0 2 4th 9 6th 10 10 7th
293 mm modèle danois 0 0 0 6th 4th 6th 6th 6th 6th
Canon de 305 mm modèle 1893/96 and 1917 0 0 2 6th 10 13 11 11 10
Canon de 320 mm modèle 1870/81, 1870/84 and 1870/93 0 0 0 0 24 40 44 44 44
Canon de 340 mm modèle 1893 and Canon de 340 mm / 45 modèle 1912 0 0 0 0 2 4th 4th 4th 6th
Canon de 370 mm modèle 1915 0 0 4th 10 10 10 6th 8th 4th
Obusier de 400 mm modèle 1915/1916 0 0 0 0 8th 8th 8th 8th 12
Obusier de 520 modèle 1916 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Trench mortar

At the end of September 1914, the French infantrymen in the Argonne were confronted for the first time with the German trench mortars , which the pioneers of the German XVI. Army corps under General Bruno von Mudra from the fortress of Metz . They were an important weapon in this wooded mountain range, the gorges limiting observation and the fire of the cannons. The French 2nd Army Corps saw its losses grow and wanted a weapon of equal value.

58 mm winged mine launcher in front, behind it the barrel of a 240 mm LT mortar

The first answer was a hundred old mortars "15 cm modèle 1838" (with bronze tubes), called "Crapouillots" because of their stocky silhouette, reminiscent of a toad. They fired a grenade that was still loaded with black powder . Many other improvised mortars quickly appeared at the front, assembled from salvaged materials (grenade cartridges, pipes of old weapons, etc.). The development of the specific equipment began in the winter of 1914-1915, in January 1915 the first 70 mortars 58 mm T were sent into the trenches of the Artois Front, these were the so-called winged mine mortars. Several thousand examples of the "58 mm T No. 1 bis" ("bis" = improved) and the "58 mm T n ° 2" (larger) mortar were manufactured in the Leflaive factories in La Chaléassière in Saint-Étienne . From February 1915, the high-performance trench mortars were assigned exclusively to the artillery (in a battery of twelve pieces), while the less powerful were entrusted to the Bombardier platoons of the infantry (37 mm guns, Stokes mortars of 81 mm, etc.). The Trench Artillery Training Center (CIAT) was set up in Bourges that same year . In view of the disregard and rejection of the other artillerymen for these units, some of the personnel of the trench artillery were forcibly assigned by the military courts. The officers were volunteer reserve officers who had not received a call to be active officers.

The very short range of these pieces of trench artillery was compensated for by the low muzzle velocity (70 m / s for the "57 mm T trench mortar n ° 1 bis"). The use of projectiles with thin walls allowed a large amount of explosives, a 75 mm shell theoretically weighed 5.4 kg, including 0.775 kg of explosives, while the explosive charge of the "LS mortar 58 mm T n ° 2" totaled 18 kg which were 5 kg of explosives. In addition, around 1,500,000 defective 75 mm HE shells (manufactured in the winter of 1914-1915) were reused as projectiles for the 75 mm Schneider mortar from October 1915.

Mortar of the trench artillery
Type Weight cadence Maximum range Bullet weight
15 cm modèle 1838 150 kg 1 shot / 2 min 600 m Ball bomb: 7.5 kg, 0.3 kg of which is explosives
450 m Wing bomb: 10 kg, of which 6 kg are explosives
225 m Cernesson bomb: 16 kg, of which 7 kg are explosives
Lance-mines Gatard 105 kg 1 shot / 3 min 174 to 480 m Mines Gatard: 40 to 102 kg
58 mm T n ° 1 114 kg 1 shot / min 300 m Bomb: 16 kg, of which 6 kg are explosives
58 mm T n ° 1 to 181 kg 1 shot / min 450 to 530 m Bomb: 16 kg, of which 6 kg are explosives
Mortier de 58 mm T n ° 2 417 kg 1 shot / min 650 m Bombs type A and B: 16 kg, of which 6 kg are explosives
1250 m LS bomb: 18 kg, of which 5 kg are explosives
450 m Bomb D: 40 kg, including 10 kg of explosives
70 mm Van Deuren modèle 1915 350 kg 3 to 4 rounds / min 600 m VD bomb: 19 kg, of which 6 kg are explosives
75 mm modèle 1915 type A cutter 300 kg 4 rounds / min 1700 m Bomb modèle 1900: 5 kg, including 0.8 kg of explosives
150 mm T modèle 1916 510 kg 3 rounds / min 1900 m Bomb modèle 1915: 21 kg, including 8 kg of explosives
1930 m Bomb modèle 1916: 18 kg, including 5 kg of explosives
2120 m Bomb modèle 1917: 17 kg, including 5 kg of explosives
150 mm T modèle 1917 Fabry 615 kg 4 rounds / min 1980 m
240 mm CT modèle 1915 1003 kg 1 shot / 6 min 1025 m Bomb M: 87 kg, 47 kg of which are explosives
1440 m Bomb T: 83 kg, of which 42 kg were explosives
240 mm LT modèle 1916 3600 kg 1 shot / 6 min
2140 m Bomb S: 85 kg, of which 42 kg were explosives
2150 m Bomb AB modèle 1918: 83 kg, of which 40 kg were explosives
2850 m DH modèle 1918 bomb: 50 kg, including 22 kg of explosives
340 mm d 2260 kg 1 shot / 6 min 2375 m Bomb modèle 1915: 195 kg, including 93 kg of explosives

Increasing the amount of ammunition

During the "War of Movement", artillery fire was limited to fast, but few shots fired by light and highly mobile artillery. The transition to trench warfare increased the ammunition consumption considerably, and the bombardment now lasted several hours a day or even lasted for several days in a row. Batteries were now used that were not very mobile and were getting heavier and heavier. The consumption of artillery shells experienced a very strong growth. The documents spoke of a flood of grenades, continuous fire or barrage.

“To the numerous, thin and smooth sound of the 75s, which resembled the rustling of torn silk, the serious and uninterrupted breath of the 155s and the slower of the 120s mingled. Above it, like in a large wind orchestra without a conductor, the heavy grenades of the 220s cut hastily through the high layers of air, they snored as hard as a man with a cold. And much higher, the eye, drawn attention by the ear, followed without surprise the tracks of the heavy 270s, which seemed to move jerkily and whose accelerated fall ended in a color palette in which a monstrous fan made of blocks was torn from the dry chalk ( Description from the autumn battle in Champagne 1915). "

Examples of ammunition consumption
caliber December 1914 June 1915 September 1915 December 1915 June 1916 September 1916
65 mm 780 1.002 1,000 780 1,150 569
75 mm 24,077 62.160 148,404 20,330 171,610 226.290
80 mm 340 710 1,058 335 1,804 975
90 mm 6350 2,636 7,600 1,630 6.119 8,920
95 mm 2,080 3,020 3,890 1,760 8,352 11.210
105 mm 150 1,291 1,895 125 5,754 4,206
120 mm 2,760 3,740 9.130 1,564 13,635 12,818
155 mm 3,080 5,697 11.210 1,787 19,456 28,230
220 mm 70 541 1,586 157 1,420 2,475

New types of ammunition

A 155mm type D grenade (Desaleux). Slim shape without detonator and with Finnish lettering.

The ballistic performance of the French projectiles was improved by stronger propellant charges as well as by elongated profiles and (frustoconical) tips of the grenades, as well as by more powerful explosives. The Desaleux grenade of the 75 mm cannon model 1917 now achieved a maximum range of 11 km instead of the 8 km of the 1900 and 1915 models. The effectiveness of the grenades was carefully studied; from the end of 1914 the grenades were made of cast iron instead of steel produced, once because of the economy, but also because they disintegrated into more fragments.

New fuses were made, especially those with double action, which made it possible to choose the type of fire (spring fuses were used to set the detonation time), or with the same grenade the DE (double effet) 24/31 mm model 1915, which made the Replace DE 22/31 from 1897 with adjustment from 0 to 24 seconds. These had to be adapted to the Desaleux grenades (detonator DE 24/31 A for long grenades 1916 and 1918, with adaptation to 32 s) and to the long range of heavy artillery (LD - longue distance - 24/31 1917 and 1918, up to 51 s). Most of them differed between the impact fuses I (instantanée) 24/31 model 1914 and the delay fuses IA (instantanée allongée) 24/31 1915 (replaced the model 24/31 from 1899) and those with delays of 0.05 or 0.15 s, with depth effect.

If shrapnel was the primary use of shrapnel during the War of Movement in August and September 1914, the HE shells were more useful in trench warfare. Each lot of ammunition delivered by the artillery parks theoretically consisted of 664 boxes of nine cartridges each - that is, 5976 rounds. In November 1914, 5688 HE shells and 288 shrapnel were delivered per lot and 5391 HE shells and 585 shrapnel in June 1915.

The artillery fired millions of HE grenades, supplemented by shrapnel, but also smoke grenades, phosphorus grenades, incendiary grenades with magnesium , tear gas grenades with thin shells and weak explosive charges, thick-walled grenades with bottom detonators (type G) and light grenades with the illuminant on the parachute.

Chemical ammunition

The development of chemical weapons in the years 1914–1918 led to a race between the belligerents who tried to outdo each other. In October 1914, the French infantry used tear gas grenades containing the irritant ethyl bromoacetate to combat the resistance in the trenches. On October 27, 1914, the German artillery fired 3,000 7.7 cm tear gas grenades in the Neuve-Chapelle area. The first massive poison gas attack on the Western Front was carried out on April 22, 1915 in the Second Battle of Flanders . German troops released chlorine gas from steel cylinders on a three-kilometer strip between Steenstrate and Langemarck in order to achieve a breakthrough. During this attack, the French artillery lost 29 90 mm cannons of the divisional artillery of the 87th Territorial Infantry Division, 16 75 mm cannons of the divisional artillery of the 45th Infantry Division, plus six 95 mm and four 120 mm L guns (these were launched on Recaptured April 25). A week after this attack, headquarters ordered equipment and projectiles for gas combat. In July 1915 the first chemical attack by chlorine gas took place on the French side.

All belligerents then developed chemical artillery, a more practical and precise solution than drifting gas clouds (which were too dependent on the wind). The first “special grenades” (called “obus n ° 1” in French) were produced in June 1915. The inner part of the 75mm HE grenade was isolated and filled with trichloromethanesulfenyl chloride , a smothering molecule. The first "special grenades n ° 1" were fired on July 14, 1915 on the forest of Fricourt occupied by the German 151st Infantry Division and in large numbers in September 1915 during the autumn battle in Champagne . The interrogation of prisoners showed that the grenades only stabbed the eyes and caused hardly any breathing problems. The shell of the 75 mm shell did not have sufficient capacity to achieve a toxic concentration of the gas. At the same time, new special grenades, called n ° 2 and n ° 3, were developed on the basis of the 75-mm high explosive shell. The special grenade n ° 2 was a combined incendiary / gas grenade, filled with white phosphorus and carbon disulfide , the special grenade n ° 3 was only filled with phosphorus.

Given the French use of asphyxiating gas, the Germans switched to phosgene (called "Green Cross" because of the markings on the grenades), which they used in gas attacks around Verdun in May 1916. The French responded with the special rounds n ° 4 and n ° 5, developed in 1915 but kept in reserve, from February 1916 with the grenade n ° 5 at the Battle of Verdun and in July 1916 with the grenade n ° 4 during the Battle of the Somme . The grenade n ° 4 was loaded with “Vincennite”, a mixture of hydrogen cyanide , arsenic chloride , chloroform and tin chloride, the latter in order to weigh down the gas cloud during the explosion and thus keep it on the ground. The grenade n ° 5 was filled with "collongite", phosgene mixed with arsenic chloride.

In the years 1917–1918 the gas bombardment multiplied while the escalation continued. In July 1917, the Germans began to use arsenic ( called the Blue Cross ), and in 1917 mustard gas was used by the British and French at Passchendaele and Ypres . On October 15, 1917, the French artillery fired seven days and seven nights of phosgene in preparation for an attack on the Chemin des Dames . In 1918 the French used some grenades as n ° 7, those with chloropicrin (a suffocating, high-dose, lethal substance), and grenades n ° 16 with "Rationite" (immediate lethal effect) and grenades n ° 20, those with dichloro -Ethyl sulfide were loaded, but the latter only from June 1918.

In the period from July 1915 to November 1918, the French fired 18.2 million wing mines and grenades with 75, 90, 105, 120, 155 mm chemical warfare agents. Of these, 9.2 million were n ° 4 and n ° 5. 4.4 million were gas grenades; 2.3 million contained yperite, 870,000 tear gas, 1,140,000 had a suffocating effect. 200,000 German soldiers were incapacitated, 9,000 of them died. 190,000 French were poisoned with gas, 8,000 of them died.

“This is undoubtedly the most extraordinary feat of strength that has ever been carried out: an industry without personnel, without raw materials, without manufacturing practice had to improvise. Laboratory processes had to be converted into industrial processes in just a few months. "

- Alexandre Millerand, Minister of War from August 1914 to October 1915, on the French chemical industry

Manufacturing problems

Storage of 75 mm cartridges

When the War Department ordered the massive production of artillery cartridges to begin, everything was quickly missing, the raw materials (steel, copper, explosives and powder), the machine tools, factories and personnel. The aggravating factor was that most of the northeast industrial zones were behind the front (France thus lost 63% of its steel production and 81% of its cast iron production), on the other hand, before the war, Germany was the main supplier of such heavy products.

After almost all stocks were used up, the steel was initially replaced by cast iron, which was cheaper and faster to produce. The explosive used was "Crésylite" ( trinitrocrésol ), which was replaced from October 1914 by "Schneidérite" (made from ammonium nitrate and dinitronaphthalene) or made from trinitrotoluene and trinitrophenol and by "xylite" made from trinitrométaxylène and cheddite . The smokeless powder used as the propellant was in part imported from the United States; Phenol was made from town gas, the industrial production of ether , nitroglycerin and sulfuric acid was started, even if the French chemical industry had to be partially relocated to the south-west; so to Angoulême , Bassens , Toulouse , Saint-Médard , Bergerac , etc. Sodium nitrate , Chilean and ammonium nitrate depended on deliveries from Norway.

The armaments industry used mostly newly assigned military personnel (for “special tasks”, half a million in 1918) and 430,000 women at the end of the war in ammunition production. Most of them were former textile workers and civil workers, supplemented by young people, foreigners (mainly Chinese workers), people from the colonies (mostly Algerians, Indochinese , Moroccans and Tunisians), voluntary prisoners of war and war invalids.

Annual grenade production in France
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918
3,396,000 24,152,000 80,319,000 101,341,000 70,588,000

Logistic problems

Transport of 220 mm shells, each weighing 100 kg. Narrow-gauge railway near Quesnel in August 1916.

The enormous consumption of ammunition required an adapted logistical infrastructure; Keeping enough ammunition available for an offensive was so important that responsibility was transferred from the rear service management to the 1st office of the headquarters. The factories delivered the shells or parts of them to the general reserve stores in Besançon, Lyon, Clermont-Ferrand, Bourges, Angers, Rennes and Nevers. These warehouses were enlarged in August and September 1915 (with the addition of rail hangars) and then those in Héricy (for ammunition 75 and 105 mm), Cosne-sur-Loire (for trench artillery) and Vincennes (for “special” shells ) added. Each of these depots was connected to one of the armies by at least one railway line with at least four trains a day. Each train consisted of 30 to 35 wagons with a capacity of 300 to 350 tons. The armies stored their reserves as "mobile camps"; H. the loaded trains were parked on sidings for immediate use. These railway depots were located in Vaivre-et-Montoille, Gray (Haute-Saône), Brienne , Noisy-le-Sec , Le Bourget , Creil and Dunkirk in August 1915 , a total of 3440 wagons, to which the stocks of the permanent places are added could, which were in the range of the respective armies.

For the autumn battle in Champagne in October 1915, for example, the rear services had been making all the necessary preparations since August. The railroad network and roads were improved and huge stacks of supplies were built. In the event of a breakthrough, convoys of automobile ammunition wagons and horse-drawn carts were provided for supplies from the depot stations to those of the corps and armies. The artillery park northeast of Brienne, on the Jessains-Sorcy railway line, was expanded to include a marshalling yard with 20 tracks for the reserve ammunition trains (800 to 1000 wagons), plus six large ammunition halls (each 16 m × 200 m) with siding, each with one average capacity of 700,000 75 mm shells and 200,000 shells for heavy artillery, erected. A company of a regiment of the Territorial Infantry was responsible for the security of two divisions. Only simple walls made of sandbags were built between the ammunition stacks. There were hand pumps and a motor pump in case of fire. From mid-1916 a cavalry anti-aircraft platoon was assigned to protect against aircraft. In addition to this artillery park, the Saint-Dizier, Résigny and Chalons-en-Champagne stations served other parks (each with two hundred wagons). Directly behind the front, the two-lane line from Saint-Hilaire-au-Temple to Hagondange (line Suippes to Sainte-Menehould) was supplemented six kilometers further south by a new, 33.8-kilometer line from Cuperly to Dommartin-Dampierre .

Deliveries of grenades during the 1915–1916 offensives
caliber Autumn battle in Artois and autumn battle in Champagne
(August – October 1915)		 Battle of Verdun
(February – July 1916)		 Battle of the Somme
(May – October 1916)
58 mm trench mortar 0 13,598 653.968
75 mm trench mortar 239,350 0 196,000
150 mm trench mortar 0 0 98,780
240 mm trench mortar 1,950 1,220 36,430
65 mm 9,648 55,476 0
75 mm 5,497,920 12,513,744 17,378,208
75 mm gas grenades 460,000 180,000 1,329,000
80 mm 39,700 103,500 13,400
90 mm 285,800 368,800 290,500
95 mm 104700 556000 740800
100 mm 8,400 33,100 33,600
105 mm 112,200 508,000 415,500
120 mm 430,500 1,361,200 902,900
120 mm gas grenades 0 5,200 88,200
155 mm 535,000 1,425,200 2,310,000
155 mm gas grenades 0 0 269,000
220 mm 75,460 55,120 36.0390
270 mm 9,900 700 24,150
Number of wagons required
(average per day) 		13,297
(200)		 27,671
(211)		 46,483
(263)

New structures

The French artillery increased during the conflict from 434,000 men in August 1914 (16% of the army staff) to 771,000 men in 1918 (26% of the army staff), not counting the artillery train for the ammunition supply.

List of units

In order to provide the artillery necessary for the creation of new divisions (up to the formation of the 170th Infantry Division in December 1916) and the new army corps (up to the 40th Corps, which were also created during the same period), realignments were carried out by adding the fourth groups the regiments of existing corps and the 75mm batteries from the colonies used. There were also old "Canons de Bange de 80 modèle 1877" and "Canons de Bange de 90 modèle 1877" from the stock. From all these resources, new field artillery regiments were formed by April 1, 1917, numbered 201-276.

The heavy field artillery, which had increased disproportionately in the winter of 1914–1915, was reorganized on October 1, 1915. Twenty regiments of heavy horse-drawn artillery (Régiments d'artillerie lourde hippomobile - RALH 101 to 121) and five (from November 1, 1915 ten) motor-drawn artillery regiments (Régiments d'artillerie lourde tractée - RALT 81 to 90) were created. This regimental designation was purely administrative and had no tactical meaning; the “RALH” were assigned to the army corps and armies with groups of two batteries each, while the “RALT” (the industry was able to provide these weapons just in time) were theoretically available with 24 batteries for offensives and as a mobile reserve. On May 20, 1916, the "RALH" on paper were increased to 36 groups and formed the heavy divisional artillery groups of the new armies. They were equipped with the 155 mm C howitzer, and further reinforcements were to be made by 1918. On October 1, 1917, the instruction was issued to double the number of "RALT". The new regiments were assigned the numbers 281-290 (numbers 289 and 290 but not until the beginning of 1918). On December 28, 1917, the drawn regiments "RALH" were increased from 20 to 32 (No. 130 to 145), with some numbers remaining vacant. They were assigned to the army corps. In February 1918 four groups were pulled out of each “RALH” and used to set up 30 new hauled heavy artillery regiments. They were assigned to the general reserve and were given a number that was 200 times their original regimental number. It was regiments No. 301 to 456.

In 1917 the infantry divisions were regrouped : the brigades were disbanded, the divisions were reduced to three infantry regiments (instead of four previously), while the divisional artillery was replaced by a group of drawn artillery with the "Canon 155 C Model 1917 Schneider" (order of July 12 1917, with the implementation by the summer of 1918) and the 75 mm field artillery regiments were assigned an additional battery of trench artillery. The army corps were assigned an additional 75 mm field artillery regiment on trucks and two groups of heavy artillery with "Canons de 105 mm modèle 1913 Schneider" and 155 mm as a replacement for the outdated "Canons de 120 mm L modèle 1878".

The recruitment of personnel caused fewer problems than with the infantry, although the allocation was much weaker anyway. The artillery regiments on foot, the depots and the conscription classes from 1914 to 1919 (the latter in advance in April 1918) covered the needs. All social classes were affected, with preference given to the urban population with technical training as workers, mechanics, drivers, etc., as well as members of the rural population who looked after thousands of horses and were employed as drivers, carters, farriers, etc.

From January 1915 onwards, the French high command had to do something to compensate for the losses of artillery officers and at the same time to train and provide enough officers for the newly established regiments. Between January 1915 and December 1917, 6,000 NCOs were promoted to officers directly from the commander in chief. The NCOs had to have held their rank for at least ten months and have been able to show at least twelve months of active service. They then received further training at the Fontainebleau School. Between January 1915 and December 1917 this allowed the creation of 4,000 lieutenants and 800 lieutenant specialists in the trench artillery in 14 courses. The non-commissioned officers with less than eight months of non-commissioned officers' service time were sent to the courses for "Élève-aspirants" (officer candidates), where they were trained together with the newly called up soldiers for twelve months. This latter method of recruiting allowed the creation of 3,500 non-commissioned officer and 5,000 officer candidate positions.

General Artillery Reserve (Réserve générale d'artillerie - RGA)

On March 28, 1916, the "heavy artillery of great effect" (ALGP) was created, summarized in units with ship guns or other guns with very large calibers, including the railway guns (ALVF). Building on the experience of the fighting in 1915 and 1916, Général Edmond Buat recommended the creation of reserve units for "mobile artillery"; General Robert Nivelle became the head of the new command . The "General Reserve Heavy Artillery" (Réserve générale d'artillerie lourde - RGAL) was created in January 1917 and gradually organized as determined by the February 14, 1917 order. This reserve was directly subordinate to the General Staff and contained a staff department under the leadership of Général Buat (replaced by Général Herr in 1918). All large-caliber artillery units were combined, a training center was set up in Mailly-le-Camp (Camp de Mailly) and air squadrons were set up for observation and fire control. It also had its own transport services (including groups of railway workers, equipment depots, a school for drivers and mechanics in Langres, a car service, etc.).

The reserve was divided into three divisions: the 1st with the "artillery of great effect" (ALGP) including the railway guns, the 2nd with the motor-drawn heavy artillery and the 3rd with the guns which were operated by sailors. On January 26, 1918, the designation "General Reserve of Artillery" (Réserve générale d'artillerie - RGA) was introduced, and all heavy and heaviest units were combined. There were 3200 field artillery pieces in the motor train, 4400 heavy artillery pieces in the hauled or motor train and 200 heavy artillery pieces of great effect (ALGP). With the integration of the foot artillery and the groups of the trench artillery, a 4th division was created:

  • The 1st Division, commanded by Colonel, then Général Louis Maurin , consisted of the artillery of great effect and the railway guns - artillery regiments No. 70 to 80.
  • The 2nd Division, formed from the regiments with motor train No. 61 to 90 (equipped with long-barreled guns) and the regiments No. 281 to 290 (equipped with short-barreled guns). They were replaced by the groups of self-propelled guns and tractors with crawler chassis; likewise in 1918 the drawn regiments No. 101 to 108, 120 and 121, 130 to 138, as well as 141 and 142.
  • The 3rd Division (commanded by a rear admiral) was formed from the naval gunners who operated the motor-drawn naval guns and the naval guns on the gunboats and barges that operated on the canals and rivers.
  • The 4th Division was formed from the foot artillery regiments No. 1, 3, 5 and 11, from the foot artillery batteries of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd colonial artillery regiments and the trench artillery regiments No. 175 to 178.
  • A 5th division was formed in June 1918 with the reinforced field artillery regiments withdrawn from the army corps.

The procurement of materials was the responsibility of the armies for the 2nd and 4th divisions and the Réserve générale d'artillerie (RGA) for the 1st and 3rd divisions. A general inspection of the artillery was created in January 1918 and subordinated to a Général de division , who was responsible for the supervision of the artillery training in the armies and at the same time held the command of the Réserve générale d'artillerie (RGA).

New uniforms

The Adrian helmet modèle 1915 of the artillery: two crossed cannon barrels under a flaming grenade with the initials RF for République française

The new uniform of the artillerymen ( called “Artiflot” in Argot ) was introduced during the war and corresponded to the general development in the French land forces. It had been in horizon blue wool since 1915, plus the helmet made of 0.7 mm thick sheet steel - first in so-called artillery gray paint, from 1916 in matt gray. Some of the features of the old uniform have been preserved, such as the scarlet collar and the same piping on the trousers. Since the gunners were exposed to heavy physical exertion in practice (handling the ammunition during hours of artillery fire), they were allowed a light version of the uniform. The trousers and a blouse were made of strong linen instead of wool. At the beginning of the regulation no uniformity could be established due to a lack of the intended material, the color of the clothing fluctuated between brown, beige or blue-gray. During the cold season, civilian equipment (scarves, sweaters, gloves and hats) was in use.

New developments

In view of the inability of the French infantry to break through the German lines, the high command ordered a higher concentration of artillery and ammunition in order to better prepare the battle, for example in the autumn battle in Champagne (1915), in the battle of the Somme (1916) and at the Battle of the Aisne (spring 1917). The French army increased its artillery considerably and, above all, changed the way it was used. This adjustment was progressive because each offensive brought a new experience for the next battle, but also because the application of these innovations was carried out against the conservatism of some staff officers, including the gunners.

1915

The new doctrine on the use of artillery was implemented in several large units as early as the fall of 1914. Their experiences went to the staffs of the various armies and to the Great Headquarters, which they published under the title "Instructions on the Use of Artillery" on November 9, 1914 and then through the "Instructions on the Role of Assault Artillery" of February 14, 1915 passed on to the troops. Accordingly, the artillery now had four tasks:

  • the preparation to destroy the barbed wire barriers and neutralize the line of the opposite trenches (with a theoretical density of one gun at ten meters);
  • to place barrages on the flanks and at 100 to 200 meters in front of one's own lines in the event of one's own attack in order to prevent counter-attacks and enemy reinforcements;
  • the destruction of machine guns flanking one's own attack at a distance of 700 to 800 meters;
  • to silence or destroy enemy artillery with reconnaissance and fire control by airplanes or balloons.

From 1915 every corps and every army had an artillery reconnaissance service (SRA), which collected information from ground-based intelligence search areas (SROT), sound measurement methods (SRS), tethered balloons and through observation and control with airplanes (with one squadron per corps). The artillery of each division and each corps was now led by a small staff, which was supported at the army level by a fire control group (composed of members of the Service geographique de l'Armée , responsible for the cartographic work). Telephone networks connected groups, batteries, staffs, airfields, observation posts, etc. From now on, plans for the use of artillery were drawn up before each attack. Two examples of these plans show the application of these guidelines. On February 15, 1915, the 5th Army Corps attacked Vauquois , Bourouilles and Height 263. According to the orders, a two-hour artillery preparation was carried out before the infantry attack, with two interruptions of ten minutes to lure the German infantrymen out of their cover.

"As soon as the infantry has started moving, the artillery will advance its fire to reach the enemy's second line and prevent counterattacks."

At the end of February 1915, the 21st Army Corps prepared for a new attack on Souchez , which was captured by the Germans at the beginning of March and not retaken by the French until May. Two hours before the attack, the artillery preparation was carried out with 120 artillery pieces from the 21st Corps artillery, the 43rd, 58th and 92nd division artillery and an artillery group of the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the 106th Heavy Artillery (northern group of the 10th Army). The field artillery batteries were positioned an average of only 2600 meters from their targets, the minimum distance was 1600 meters and the maximum distance 4000 meters, while the heavy batteries were up to six kilometers away. The fire was observed by forward observers and from two aircraft.

In the autumn battle in Champagne, the artillery preparations were massively strengthened. They lasted from September 22nd to 27th and covered a front width of 35 kilometers. 872 heavy guns were used (one gun every 40 meters), plus a 75 mm field gun every 33 meters. 300,000 heavy shells and 1,300,000 75 mm shells were fired. Only the first German trench could be taken, as the second was still completely intact - the reason was a lack of ammunition, there was nothing left to continue the fire.

1916

The French offensives of the spring and autumn of 1915 were analyzed again (reports by Ferdinand Foch on the Battle of Artois and Philippe Pétain on the autumn battle in Champagne) with the transfer of the conclusions during the quieter winter to the instructions of November 20, 1915 regarding the operation of the heavy artillery and of January 16, 1916 on the purpose and conditions of a comprehensive offensive.

The first day of the Battle of Verdun (February 21, 1916) saw the use of a new tactic; Since the German artillery preparation was even stronger than the French in 1915 in Champagne, it was still no less shorter - nine hours instead of three days, which completely surprised the French high command. The lessons from the first phase of the fighting for Verdun were laid down in the instruction of May 27, 1916 on the use of artillery in defense, with the "preparation for the counter-offensive" (CPO). It was to be carried out during the enemy preparation, shortly before the attack, at the moment when the frontmost trenches of the enemy were fully occupied. Every preparation of artillery triggered a counter-attack, every increase in shooting led to an artillery duel (war of attrition), and every artillery hit the opposite lines.

The attack of the 6th Army under Général Marie Émile Fayolle in the Battle of the Somme took place on a section of the front only 15 kilometers wide. The artillery preparation lasted a whole week. In order to be able to carry out the attack successfully, heavy artillery was supplied to every division and every army corps. A total of 444 field guns, 360 trench mortars, 228 short cannons (howitzers) and 300 long-barreled heavy artillery guns were assembled. In addition there were 56 mortars and 61 long-barreled heavy artillery cannons with great effect. The 400 mm howitzers literally swept away the villages of Herbécourt , Estrées and Belloy-en-Santerre . For this reason, the first German trench could be taken with the infantry attack on July 1, 1916.

"Thanks to the preparation by the artillery, the defenses were completely destroyed, the trenches leveled, the shelters shaved away."

1917

The "Center d'études de l'artillerie" (CEA, Center for Artillery Studies) set up in Châlons-sur-Marne on June 27, 1916, was commissioned to develop the doctrine on the use of combined arms and was supported by the Artillery School in Fontainebleau quickly adopted for the training of the new officers. The experience on the Somme resulted in the instruction of December 16, 1916, applied in the second battle of the Aisne, which was 50 kilometers wide, and in which 4,000,000 shells of 75 mm and 1,200 caliber from April 7 to 17, 1917 .000 heavy grenades were fired. A 75 mm field gun and a heavy cannon each stood on a section of 20 meters each. The resulting failure was partly attributed to the bad weather. It was very difficult and sometimes impossible to move the 1650 pieces of trench artillery to the infantry in the unfavorable terrain.

Rapid fire mortar 220 mm Schneider on the Côte du Talou in August 1917: loading of the 100 kg grenade

In 1917 the offensives were prepared by an enormous concentration of artillery. The 2nd Army north of Verdun had been equipped with 600 batteries. These were 2,256 guns with 60,000 men to operate. All of this to support 50,000 infantrymen from eight divisions on a front width of only 18 kilometers (that is, one gun on an eight meter front width). There were a total of 1195 75 mm field guns (one group for each battalion), 1016 trench mortars, 435 cannons 155 mm short (160 of the de Bange type, 140 of the Schneider type and 135 of the Saint-Chamond type), 122 220 mm, eight mortars of caliber 270 mm, 16 cannons 100 mm, 50 cannons 105 mm, 140 cannons 120 mm long type de Bange, 24 cannons 145 mm, 250 long barrel cannons 155 mm type de Bange, 55 long barrel cannons 155 mm type Schneider and eight 155 mm high-performance Filloux cannons in action. In addition, around 100 other high-performance heavy artillery cannons - 17 of the 240 mm caliber, 28 of the 270 mm caliber, 16 of the 320 mm caliber, four of the 370 mm caliber and four 400 mm caliber howitzers. The deployment of the entire heavy artillery required a period of five weeks. The preparatory fire started on August 13th and was supposed to last until the 17th. It was eventually extended until August 20th. The bombardment reached the peak of intensity on August 19 and 20 and continued until August 23. During these eleven days, 3,500,000 shells (including 311,000 with chemical warfare agents) with a total weight of 82,400 tons were fired.

Use of gas

The French doctrine on the use of gas grenades evolved over time and with the availability of new types of gas. The effectiveness of gas grenades depended on weather conditions, the main parameters of which were wind, temperature, humidity and solar radiation. Should the wind speed exceed 3 m / s, the gases were diluted too quickly and could not reach lethal concentrations. The first shots, aimed at eliminating the occupants of the trenches, were fired in Champagne in July 1915, but the low toxicity of the products used did not allow any result. Only the use of phosgene from May 1916 brought success. At first, small targets were fought: batteries, trench sections, shelters or supply points. The gas grenade attack had to take place quickly. In the time in which a soldier could put on his gas mask, i.e. between two and five minutes, 200 to 500 grenades of 75 mm or 50 to 100 grenades of 155 mm or 20 to 50 gas grenades should be fired from the 58-mm wing mine launcher become. The surprise for the opposing force came first.

During 1916, the toxic grenades were only used to temporarily eliminate the enemy. There wasn't enough ammunition to kill soldiers in the target areas, but they forced them to wear protective masks, which was extremely cumbersome. This slow and monotonous disruptive fire between four and twelve hours was intended to hinder the opponent's movement and demoralize him. To cover a front width of 100 m, 500 grenades 75 mm, 250 grenades 120 mm or 200 grenades 155 mm had to be used. This technique was perfected by sprinkling HE shells into the gas bombardment.

Tear gas grenades were used for area bombardment in 1916, and the effect was lasting. It was calculated that a 75 mm shell would cover an area of ​​5 m², while a 155 mm shell would cover an area of ​​50 m². The use of "Yperite" from June 1918 made it possible to improve the use of area lights. "Yperit" attacked the respiratory tract and the skin, the area in which it was used was contaminated for several weeks.

Protective measures

Four old 155mm cannons at the Ferme des Wacques at the beginning of 1916

The invention of smokeless powder at the end of the 19th century brought an advantage to the artillery, it made the gun emplacements far less recognizable than with the use of black powder. At the beginning of the war, all the old equipment was painted in matte olive green, while the new parts were painted in pearl gray (referred to as "artillery gray") in accordance with the order of December 21, 1896. This pearl gray should also prevent excessive heating of the ammunition limbs in the sun.

The transformation of the conflict into a trench warfare led to the development of camouflage. From October 1914, several artillerymen of the 6th heavy artillery regiment made attempts to camouflage their equipment individually. On February 12, 1915, the War Ministry had a group of painters who were not mobilized to create a camouflage pattern. In view of aerial observation, the aim was to achieve invisibility by painting guns with irregular patterns that were adapted to the environment (ocher yellow, rust brown, sienna red, dark green, black, etc.), above all to break the regularity of the shapes. The new device became olive green again, which the painters masked with various other colors. Other solutions included woven camouflage nets or just twigs, branches or bushes.

In order to survive the shots that were still on the positions despite everything, the construction of shelters was ordered next to the guns. Their ceilings were reinforced with beams, tree trunks or railroad tracks. Finally, wooden sham guns were used to provoke enemy fire or to simulate heavy guns.

The culmination

By the end of the conflict, the French artillery had peaked in terms of gun numbers, but it was already showing some signs of decline, especially for long-barreled guns. The wear and tear of the cannons, which took part in all major battles, was high due to the high initial speeds and their intensive use, while the industry could not supply replacements at the same pace. At the end of 1918, the loss due to wear and tear was 30 high-performance guns 155 mm per month, while the 100-mm guns were reamed to 105 mm and the 145-mm guns to 155 mm. Old guns of the "155 mm L modèle 1877" type had to be used again. The wear and tear also required boring the “Canon 305 mm modèle 1893/96” to 320 mm (the so-called model 1917) and the “274 mm modèle 1893/96” to 285 mm (in one case there was a second boring to 288 mm).

Final improvements

Special artillery

The appearance of the first armored vehicles before the start of the conflict had led to the birth of anti-tank artillery in the form of autocannons designed to destroy enemy armored vehicles. This idea was proposed by Capitaine Lesieur Desbrières, then accepted by the Governor of Paris Joseph Gallieni on September 6, 1914; the first department was opened on September 19, 1914 in Vincennes (where the automobile park of the fortified camp of Paris was housed) with "Canons de 37 mm modèle 1885" or "1902 TR" ("Tir rapide") of the Navy on the Peugeot Type 146 (with 19 HP engine) erected and assigned to the cavalry. In early 1915, a group of four "SNC 422 Model 472" auto cannons was built on a Renault chassis. These vehicles were also subordinate to the cavalry.

The idea of ​​an infantry support vehicle that was able to open a breakthrough in the barbed wire obstacles and silence the opposing machine guns was already relevant at the beginning of the war. In 1914, the artilleryman Colonel Estienne said:

"The victory in this war will belong to that of the two belligerents who will be the first to put a 75 mm cannon on a car that can move in the field."

Research began in 1915, led by Eugène Brillié (engineer at Schneider et Cie) and Jules-Louis Breton (Member of Parliament and soon to be Undersecretary of State for Inventions). There was particular interest in Holt Manufacturing Company crawler tractors . On January 31, 1916, Général Joffre asked the State Secretary for Artillery and Ammunition to order “land battleships”:

"These machines must consist of a 75 mm cannon mounted on a crawler tractor, which is protected by armor."

The Chef d'escadron Louis Bossut (a former dragoon ) in front of his Char Schneider CA1 , the trompe la mort . On April 16, 1917, after crossing the second German line, he was burned at the head of his armored unit in his vehicle.

After functional tests by the technical automobile service in 1916, two models of armored vehicles (Char de combat) were developed and 400 of each version, the Char Schneider CA1 and the Char Saint-Chamond , were ordered. On September 30th, the special artillery (Artillerie spéciale - AS) was officially put into service. The current Général de brigade d'Estienne became the commanding officer . On October 9, d'Estienne set up the tactical bases for the assault artillery. The machines went to the 80th, 81st and 82nd batteries of the 81st heavy artillery regiment. These units were made up of volunteers trained in the “Camp de Champlieu” in the Compiègne forest . The new weapon appeared for the first time in the Battle of the Aisne. The "Chars Schneider CA1" attacked the front at Juvincourt (north of Berry-au-Bac ) on April 16, 1917 and then on May 5, 1917, the Saint-Chamond at the Moulin de Laffaux. The result was not very encouraging: of the 128 "Chars Schneider CA1" deployed, 52 were destroyed by the German artillery (15 of them under direct fire), 35 burned out because the fuel tank had caught fire, and a further 21 were left with technical problems.

In view of the possible appearance of German tanks on the Western Front, the French army began to think about a defensive weapon in late 1916; the 37-mm rapid-fire cannon “modèle 1916 TR” and the 75-mm field gun “modèle 1897” were provided. The latter could be installed on a platform that enabled a lateral directional range of 60 ° and fired a marine grenade "modèle 1910". In December 1917, 35 anti-tank batteries had been set up at the front, all of them under the 176th Trench Artillery Regiment.

Chars Renault FT , occupied by American soldiers at the front on September 26, 1918

Général Estienne was heard by both the high command and the industry, he received confirmation from Louis Renault that from July 1916 the study for the construction of a light tank would begin, faster than the previous ones, but more lightly armed. 150 of these machines were ordered on February 22, 1917, the order was increased to 1000 after the first tests on April 9, 1917. Mass production of the Renault FT Model 1917 weighing 6.7 tons began at the end of the year with a single weapon in a turret (a Hotchkiss model 1914 machine gun or a 37 mm SA-18 cannon (SA for "semi -automatique "- semi-automatic)) recorded. The first use of the Renault FT tanks took place on May 31, 1918 off Saint-Pierre-Aigle during the Third Battle of the Aisne .

Other models were considered: the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM) proposed a tank weighing 40 tons with a cannon of 105 mm or 75 mm in the turret; Peugeot made an eight-ton prototype; a Mark V weighing 26 tons was bought by the British . A "breakthrough tank" was examined and 300 copies ordered for 1919. However, only ten of these were delivered after the end of the war under the designation FCM 2C . The vehicle weighed 69 tons and was armed with four machine guns and a 75 mm cannon.

Anti-aircraft artillery

75 mm cannon as an anti-aircraft gun on a platform modèle 1915, in use near Saloniki

The defense against airships (Défense contre les aéronefs - DCA, soon to be renamed "Défense contre avions" - anti-aircraft defense) consisted of 75 mm cannons, mounted on De Dion-Bouton modèle trucks in 1913. The guns had an elevation range of up to 85 °. In addition, there were the same guns on fixed platforms "modèles 1915" and "modèle 1917" with an elevation range of up to 75 °. Among other things, a special anti-aircraft grenade "modèle 1917" was fired. The 75mm guns were also available on trailers and 105mm guns on platforms. In 1918, the French army had 760 anti-aircraft guns of 75 mm caliber and 70 105 mm caliber guns. 218 kills were reported, even if the cannons became increasingly unsuccessful due to the insufficient muzzle velocity with ever faster aircraft.

These anti-aircraft guns were divided into a variety of positions (consisting of one gun) and sections (two guns). In September 1916 they were all under the 62nd Artillery Regiment, with the exception of the guns of the entrenched camp in Paris, which belonged to the 12th Artillery Regiment. In September 1917, three regiments of air defense artillery (RADCA) were created to regroup them (without a tactical function): the 63rd for the air defense of the armies, the 64th for the air defense around Paris and the 65th for the Paris hinterland. In August 1918, with a view to increasing effectiveness, the 63rd Regiment was used to form three new regiments, the 63rd RADCA with stationary 75mm guns, the 66th RADCA with mobile 75mm guns and the 166 RADCA with 105 mm guns. Then there were machine gun departments, headlight departments and blocking balloon departments. All of these regiments were reorganized in 1919 and separated from the artillery.

Element of surprise

The German offensives of the second half of 1917 (Riga) in August and the Battle of Caporetto in October and, in early 1918, the Michael’s offensive in March, in the Fourth Battle of Flanders in April, in the Battle of the Aisne in May The Battle of Montdidier in June and the Battle of Champagne in July were marked by artillery preparations that were much shorter (only a few hours) but significantly more intense (many rapid fire guns were used) and were characterized by a very high consumption of gas grenades. Another feature was the cordoning off of the attacked sectors (to prevent any support from neighboring sectors) and the action of storm troops behind the fire roller (which had been tactically developed by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller , who commanded the artillery of Oskar von Hutier's army ). The British also made a surprise attack in November 1917 at the Battle of Cambrai , overcoming the Hindenburg Line with the help of tanks. These practices were imitated by the French and then adopted in the instruction of November 19, 1917 on artillery fire.

The batteries were now set up for an attack during the night, the targets were set on the map, and there was no need to zero in or use the telephone in order to maintain the surprise effect. The preparation was only short, up to an hour of preparatory fire, which passed into the rolling barrage and should theoretically be only 200 m in front of the storm waves. The enemy artillery was supposed to be eliminated by gas fire. After the breakthrough through the first line, part of the artillery (including the trench mortars) was brought in to support the attack. Due to the short artillery deployment, the area was not so broken up and thus remained more passable.

The improved mobility of the French artillery with their trucks and tractors made it possible to concentrate their forces quickly and to take advantage of the element of surprise. The German breakthroughs of the spring and summer of 1918 failed because of this tactic. This strategic mobility was a determining factor in the rapid succession of the three offensives of the Allied armies in the summer and autumn of 1918. The German artillery had been in theirs since 1917 due to the lack of horses Movements restricted. It was largely dependent on the railroad for strategic movements and was therefore much less mobile than the French artillery, with a sizeable fleet of around 80,000 vehicles in 1918.

Marching speed
landing gear object Average marching speed in the column Average stage per day
Wooden wheels with iron bandage heavy, strung battery 5 km / h 20 to 40 km
light, strung battery 5 (in step) to 7 km / h 20 to 40 km
Cavalry battery 5 to 8 km / h (alternating walk / trot) 25 to 50 km
Wheels with rubber bandage heavy battery in the caterpillar tractor 6 to 10 km / h 50 to 70 km
light battery in the truck train 10 to 15 km / h 70 to 100 km
Rail transport heavy or light batteries 15 to 20 km / h 150 to 200 km
Pneumatic tires 20 to 25 km / h 200 to 250 km

Motorized artillery

Experience reports from the offensives of 1915, 1916 and 1917 indicated that the infantry attack on the enemy trenches in the second and third rows failed due to a lack of artillery support as the guns were unable to follow infantry on funnel grounds. Initially, the use of mountain batteries on pack animals, the use of artillery tractors and the development of the first self-propelled guns on wheels and then on caterpillars were considered. The latter, called "Artillery of Exploitation" and intended to form the divisional artillery of the 7th Division, were intended for use in the 1919 offensives.

At first, attempts were made with the 75mm and 105mm cannons on the chassis of the Renault FT , but the heavier calibers were then preferred. 130 crawler tracks for the caliber 155 mm (plus 150 more that were to be pulled by chain tugs), 50 of the caliber 194 mm, 20 of the caliber 220 long barrel (Schneider et Cie), 75 of the caliber 220 mm rapid fire (Saint-Chamond) and 25 mortars of 280 mm rapid fire (Schneider et Cie) ordered. Only one self-propelled gun for the 194 mm caliber and one for the 280 mm mortar were manufactured. All orders were initially shortened on November 12, 1918 and then canceled except for a few copies.

Type Weight cadence Maximum firing range Bullet weight
Canon de 194 mm GPF on Saint-Chamond chain drive 28,000 kg 2 rounds / min 18 km HE shells: 80.8 or 83 kg
Mortar 280 mm on Saint-Chamond track drive 28,000 kg 2.5 rounds / min 10.9 km HE shell: 202 to 275 kg

Existed at the end of the war

On November 11, 1918, the French artillery consisted of 105 field artillery regiments (RAC) and 84 heavy artillery regiments (RAL). This meant that 4968 field guns 75 mm, 5128 heavy guns and 112 mountain guns were in use at the front.

The divisional artillery (AD) consisted of the 105 field artillery regiments (RAC) with the numbers 1 to 62 and 200 to 280, each in three groups of three batteries each with field guns 75 mm and 105 mm, and the division groups with howitzers "155 mm court ". These were assigned to the "Régiments d'artillerie lourde hippomobile" (RALH) with the numbers 101 to 145. The heavy artillery of the Army Corps (ALCA) formed 32 groups with 105 mm long barrel guns (or "120 mm L de Bange") and one group with "155 mm long" (RALH No. 101 to 145, the 141st, 142nd) . and 143. were colonial regiments).

The general reserve contained the bulk of the mobile artillery:

  • 10 heavy artillery regiments with long barrel cannons in a caterpillar tractor train (regiments 81 to 90)
  • 10 regiments with howitzers in a caterpillar tractor train (regiments 281 to 290)
  • 5 regiments of heavy artillery with 105 mm cannons in a horse train (regiments 451 to 456)
  • 5 regiments of heavy artillery with 155 mm cannons in a horse-drawn train (regiments 407 to 421)
  • 17 regiments of heavy artillery with 155 mm C cannons in a horse-drawn train (regiments 301 to 345 - of which the 343rd as a colonial regiment)
  • 8 regiments of high-performance artillery (regiments 71 to 78 - No. 72 in the list)
  • 5 regiments of trench artillery (regiments 175 to 179)
  • 3 regiments of mountain artillery (regiments 1 and 2, plus the 13th colonial mountain regiment)
  • 10 colonial field artillery regiments (regiments 1, 2, 3, 21, 22, 23, 41, 42 and 43 and the Moroccan colonial artillery regiment)
  • 13 foot artillery regiments (regiments 151 to 161, plus the 182 and 183 colonial foot artillery regiments)
  • 2 regiments on the 60 cm narrow-gauge field railway "Système Péchot" (the 68th regiment in formation, the 69th regiment in action)
  • 1 long-range reconnaissance regiment (Regiment 163)
  • 10 African independent groups (No. 1 to 10)
  • 8 regiments of assault artillery (regiments 501 to 508)
  • 6 anti-aircraft regiments (regiments 63 to 66 and 167 - regiment No. 67 was a searchlight regiment)
  • 20 squadrons of artillery aircraft
  • 21 Escadrons Supply and Automobile Service
  • 20 Péniche gun crews were returned to the Navy in November 1917 (four were re-established in November 1918 to position the Rhine flotilla).

At its height, the German artillery had 243 divisional field artillery regiments, each with nine batteries, each with four guns and a total of 8748 field guns. In addition, a mixed battalion with two 15 cm howitzer batteries and a 10.5 cm gun battery - together another 270 guns. The 30 units of the corps artillery consisted of two mixed battalions with 21 cm mortars and one battalion with 15 cm cannons, a total of 480 guns. The reserve artillery regiments had 3200 field guns, 4480 heavy guns and 200 rail guns.

Several hundred French guns were captured by the Germans. In 1914 447 75-mm guns fell into German hands - 36 of the 2nd Colonial Artillery Regiment alone during the Battle of Rossignol on August 22, 26 in 1915, 14 in 1916, 0 in 1917 and 383 in 1918 (during the German offensives). Here, too, on May 27th, some heavy cannons were captured that could not be brought to safety in time:

  • 2 cannons 16 cm
  • 6 cannons 19 cm
  • 14 guns 240 mm
  • 3 cannons 274 mm
  • 1 cannon 305 mm
  • 4 cannons 340 mm

They also captured 460 fortress guns in the Maubeuge fixed place.

After the armistice, the Germans had to give the Allies 5,000 cannons, 2,500 heavy and 2,500 field guns - all in operational condition.

After the armistice

Photo noir et blanc d'un tas de canons.
Victory trophy from German guns at the "Rond-point des Champs-Élysées-Marcel-Dassault" in Paris on the occasion of the victory parade on July 14, 1919. According to the armistice agreement, the Germans had to surrender part of their artillery.

The war officially ended after the various peace treaties were signed in 1919–1920; the artillery then adapted to the new situation, initially by disbanding almost all trench artillery units. The demobilization reduced the number of guns, which led to the gradual dissolution of several field artillery and heavy artillery regiments as well as the merging of the heavy railway artillery (ALVF) into a single regiment. Surplus equipment was stored in warehouses or even temporarily outside.

As a lesson from the conflict, a military doctrine was drawn up in which the experiences were listed as new regulations. The "Instruction provisoire sur le service de l'artillerie en campagne" (Provisional instruction for the service of field artillery) of June 15, 1919 stated:

“Firepower is the predominant success factor in modern battle. Attacking a position held by an enemy who has well-directed fire on the attack site until the last moment is doomed to failure. "

Tactically, the artillery preparation could be short, the "moving fire curtain" (fire roller) and the concentration of fire on a resistance core were emphasized. Operationally, the emphasis was placed on the provision of a general artillery reserve and on the mobility of the material, but strategically on the mobility through rail and especially road transport. The effectiveness was increased by extensive equipment and different calibers, by rapid firing and long ranges. The trench artillery had to be able to shoot up to 2.5 km, the light artillery up to 10 km, the heavy short-barreled 10 to 15 km, the heavy long-barreled 15 to 20 km and the super-heavy artillery over 20 km.

From the equipment, the French army was left with considerable stocks of weapons and ammunition (including ten million 75mm shells), while the new budget drastically reduced expenditure. Except for a few experiments in the 1920s (for example the 145 mm GPF high-performance cannon Filloux, which was finally abandoned), new models did not come into use until 1936 (for example the 105 mm modèle cannon in 1936, the 25 mm anti-aircraft cannon in 1938, the 75 mm TAZ 1939, the 25 mm AA light anti-aircraft gun, the anti-tank guns Canon de 47 mm AC modèle 1934 and Canon antichar de 47 mm modèle 1937 ). A four-wheel drive truck or a half-track Citroën C 4 Kégresse was generally used as the towing vehicle. The programs for self-propelled guns were also reissued, and the orders were given as urgent to the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée and to the "Ateliers de construction de Rueil". The deliveries were scheduled for October 1940.

Finally, the evacuation and clearance of the old battlefield had to be completed. With the first reconquest of the occupied territories of the northeast, the clearing of the ground, which was littered with duds , metal parts, chemicals, equipment and bones, began. The French army had fired about 300 million artillery rounds, the Germans and the British together about 700 million. In total, around 200 million shells had not exploded. This mainly concerned the relatively narrow strip in which the trench warfare had taken place and which was called the "Red Zone" in France . After ammunition clearance (often by German prisoners of war) and the reconstruction of the infrastructure, this area has been largely re-cultivated since the beginning of the interwar period. Large areas passed into state ownership and are subject to state forest supervision as memorial sites (especially around Verdun) or have been converted into military training areas (such as Camp Suippes ). The munitions clearance was only carried out superficially here. A century after the fighting, the soils are still contaminated by large amounts of heavy metals, including lead from the shrapnel balls and mercury , while ordinary tap water in these areas still contains too much perchlorates .

Abbreviations

  • AFGG - Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre (standard work on the French armies in the First World War)
  • ALCA - Artillery lourde des corps d'armées (heavy artillery of the army corps)
  • JMO - Journal des marches et des opérations (war diaries)
  • AD - Artilleries divisionnaires (divisional artillery)
  • ALCA - Artilleries lourdes de corps d'armée (Heavy Artillery of the Army Corps)
  • ALVF - Artillery lourde sur voie ferrée (heavy railway gun)
  • CTR - court à tir rapide (short pipe, rapid fire)
  • DCA - Défense contre les aéronefs / or Défense contre les avions (airship defense / air defense)
  • GQG - Grand Quartier général (High Command)
  • RADCA - Régiments d'artillerie de defense against aeronefs (anti-airship regiments)
  • RA - Régiments d'artillerie (artillery regiments)
  • RAC - Régiments d'artillerie de campagne (field artillery regiments)
  • RAL - Régiments d'artillerie lourde (heavy artillery regiments)
  • RALGP - Régiments d'artillerie lourde à grande puissance (heavy artillery of great effect or high-performance artillery)
  • RALH - Régiments d'artillerie lourde hippomobile (heavy, horse-drawn artillery)
  • RALT - Régiments d'artillerie lourde à tracteurs (heavy, motor-drawn artillery)
  • RAP - Régiments d'artillerie à pied (foot artillery regiments)
  • RGA - Réserve générale d'artillerie (General Artillery Reserve)
  • TAZ - Tous azimuts (all around fire area)
  • TR - Tir rapide (rapid fire)

Footnotes

  1. ↑ When fired at a very small angle (less than 15 °), the 24/31 shell of the type 1899-1908, which was used on the 75 mm projectiles, detonated with a delay of 0.05 seconds, which is the projectile allowed to bounce off the ground and detonate immediately afterwards at a very low height.
  2. ↑ The 2nd and 4th foot artillery regiments, as well as 13 coastal artillery batteries, were disbanded on April 15, 1914 and were used to set up the 1st and 4th heavy artillery regiments.
  3. ^ The 9th and 10th groups of the "Artillerie d'Afrique" were set up on July 1, 1914.
  4. ↑ Corresponding to the Landwehr in Germany.
  5. ↑ without the outsourced divisions and the coastal batteries
  6. ↑ not ready for use
  7. ↑ not counting 1829 wagons of the "heavy artillery of great effect" with 88,651 shells of caliber 240 mm to 400 mm
  8. ↑ Journal des marches et opérations du 21 e régiment d'infanterie coloniale, pendant la Guerre contre l'Allemagne (1914–1918) from September 25, 1915 to December 31, 1916
  9. ^ The later chars de combat (armored troops)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Marie-Christine Thooris, Claudine Billoux: Ecole Polytechnique - une grande école dans la Grande Guerre. Palaiseau, École polytechnique, 2004.
  2. ↑ La tourelle de 75 R 05. In: Fortiff'Séré.
  3. ↑ Les casemates dites de Bourges pour pieces de 95 and de 75. In: Fortiff'Séré.
  4. ^ Règlement provisoire de manœuvre de l'artillerie de campagne. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. 1910 (updated October 1, 1913), Mark Imhaus & René Chapelot, Paris 1913, Art. 192, p. 88 ( digitized on Gallica ).
  5. ^ Règlement provisoire de manœuvre de l'artillerie de campagne. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. 1910 (updated October 1, 1913), Mark Imhaus & René Chapelot, Paris 1913, Art. 191, p. 87 ( digitized version ).
  6. ↑ Challéat, 1935, Volume 2, pp. 17, 285, 532.
  7. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, pp. 10, 13, 16-17, 19.
  8. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, pp. 26-27, 31, 33, 38-41.
  9. ↑ Loi du 24 juillet 1909, modified par la loi du 15 avril 1914, relative à la constitution des cadres & des effectifs de l'armée active et de l'armée territoriale en ce qui concerne l'artillerie. Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris 1914 ( digitized version ).
  10. ↑ Répartition et emplacement of the troupes de l'armée française. Ed .: État-major de l'Armée. Imprimerie nationale, Paris May 1, 1914.
  11. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1 (2nd edition), pp. 519, 529 ( digitized version ).
  12. ↑ Journal des marches et operations du 32 e Régiment d'Artillerie du 12 août 1914 to 25 July 1915. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Mémoire des hommes ( SHD , cote 26 N, carton 963, dossier 1).
  13. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1 (2nd edition), p. 521 ( digitized version ).
  14. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1 (2nd edition), pp. 538-585 ( digitized version ).
  15. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1 (2nd edition), p. 532 ( digitized version ).
  16. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1 (2nd edition), p. 538 ( digital copy ).
  17. ↑ Service des armées en compagne. Conduite des grandes unités. Décret portant règlement sur la conduite des grandes unités. Rambouillet, on October 28, 1913. In: Bulletin officiel du Ministère de la guerre. No. 76 1 , Berger-Levrault, Paris 1914, Art. 125, p. 42 ( digitized version ).
  18. ^ Règlement de 1913 sur la conduite des grandes unités. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. 1914, p. 176.
  19. ^ Règlement de 1913 sur la conduite des grandes unités. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. 1914, p. 183.
  20. ^ Règlement de 1913 sur la conduite des grandes unités. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. 1914, pp. 186-188.
  21. ^ Jean-Claude Laparra: La machine à vaincre. De l'espoir à la désillusion. Histoire de l'armée allemande, 1914–1918. 14–18 éditions, Saint-Cloud 2006, ISBN 2-9519-5398-4 , section 50.
  22. ↑ La base de données des canons survivants de la Grande Guerre classés par nation et type d'artillerie. Allemagne. In: Passion & Compassion 1914–1918. Ressentir la Grande Guerre aujourd'hui.
  23. ^ Artillery allemande - les projectiles. Ed .: 2 e bureau de l'état-major. Imprimerie nationale, Paris 1917.
  24. ↑ Olivier Cosson: Preparer la Grande Guerre. L'armée française et la guerre russo-japonaise (1899–1914). Les Indes savantes, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-84654-330-9 , pp. 119–128, 268–269.
  25. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1, p. 527 ( digitized version ).
  26. ↑ Journal des marches et opérations du 4 e RAC du 1 er août au 29 septembre 1914. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Mémoire des hommes (SHD, cote 26 N 909/1, pp. 34-35).
  27. ^ Journal de Marche du 39 e RAC (AD 39) du 31 juillet au 31 decembre 1914. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Mémoire des hommes (SHD, cote 26 N 975/1, pp. 13–15.)
  28. ↑ Situation du 20 e CA vers 9 h  30, 21 août. In: AFGG, 1922, Volume 1, Part 1, Appendices, Appendix No. 790, pp. 672-673 ( digitized version ).
  29. ↑ Le fort de Manonviller ou fort Haxo. In: Fortiff'Séré.
  30. ↑ AFGG, 1925, Volume 1, Part 2, p. 427 ( digitized version ).
  31. ↑ AFGG, 1925, Volume 1, Part 2, pp. 430-432 ( digitized version ).
  32. ↑ Laparra, 2006, p. 77.
  33. ↑ AFGG, 1925, Volume 1, Chap. 2, pp. 425-426 ( digitized version ).
  34. ↑ Compte rendu des opérations du 20 août 1914. In: AFGG, 1922, Volume 1, Part 1, Appendices, Appendix No. 791, pp. 673-674 ( digitized version ).
  35. ^ Original from a general instruction of the 3rd Army on August 23 at 9:30 a.m. In: AFGG, 1922, Volume 1, Part 1, Appendices, Appendix No. 1088, p. 865 ( digitized version ).
  36. ^ Jean-Claude Delhez: Le jour de deuil de l'armée française. Volume 2. Delhez, Thonne-la-Long 2012, pp. 473-480.
  37. ^ Jean-Claude Delhez: La bataille des Frontières. Joffre attaque au center 22–26 août 1914 (= Collection Campagnes & stratégies. No. 106). Economica, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-7178-6588-2 .
  38. ↑ Leroy, 1922, p. 5.
  39. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 52 ( digital copy ).
  40. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, pp. 9-10 ( digitized version ).
  41. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 53 ( digitized version ).
  42. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, pp. 55-56, 64 ( digitized version ).
  43. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, pp. 393-394 ( digital copy ).
  44. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, p. 392 ( digitized version ).
  45. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 11 ( digitized version ).
  46. ↑ General instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to the Army, No. 7413 of September 27, 1914, AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, pp. 394–395 ( digitized version ).
  47. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, pp. 486-487 ( digitized version ).
  48. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, Annexes 2, Annex No. 1495, pp. 300–301 ( digitized version ).
  49. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, p. 555 ( digitized version ).
  50. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 56 ( digitized version ).
  51. ↑ AFGG, 1931, Volume 2, Appendices 2, Appendix No. 942, pp. 276–277 ( digitized version ).
  52. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 391 ( digitized version ).
  53. ↑ Renoult, 2016, pp. 102-103.
  54. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, p. 204.
  55. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, pp. 22-23.
  56. ^ Décret du 7 octobre 1909, portant règlement sur le service de place. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. L. Fournier, 1916, pp. 62-63 ( digitized version ).
  57. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, pp. 45-46 ( digitized version ).
  58. ↑ AFGG, 1933, Volume 1, Part 4, p. 395 ( digitized version ).
  59. ↑ Le général commandant en chef à Monsieur le ministre de la Guerre (État-major de l'armée - 1 er bureau et 3 e direction), Bordeaux or Le ministre de la Guerre à Monsieur le général commandant en chef (request from Général Joffre of October 14, 1914 to the Minister of War or his answer of October 24th). In: AFGG, 1931, Volume 2, Appendix 1, Appendix No. 66, pp. 46–48 ( digital copy ) and Appendix No. 68, pp. 49-51 ( digital copy ).
  60. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, pp. 203-204 ( digitized version ).
  61. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, pp. 1008-1009, 1077-1078.
  62. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 393 ( digitized version ).
  63. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, p. 42.
  64. ^ Matériels d'artillerie mis en service sur les fronts alliés 1914–1917. Schneider et Cie, Paris 1917. In: Portail Archives Numériques et Données de la Recherche (Pandor).
  65. ↑ AFGG, 1936, Volume 1, Part 1, p. 523 ( digitized version ).
  66. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, pp. 44–45, 50–51.
  67. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, p. 52.
  68. ↑ Touzin / Vauvillier, 2009, pp. 54–55.
  69. ^ François, 2010, p. 18.
  70. ↑ Règlement de manœuvre de l'artillerie. Titre V 7 : description et entretien des matériels sur affût-truc à glissement à deux bogies, et de leurs ammunitions. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. Imprimerie nationale, Paris 1924, p. 2 ( digitized version ), 50 ( digitized version ).
  71. ↑ Le matériel de l'ALVF. In: Base documentaire artillery (Bas'Art).
  72. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, pp. 1008-1009, 1078.
  73. ↑ François, 2010, pp. 35–36.
  74. ↑ Louis Guiral: “Je les grignote…” Champagne 1914–1915 (= Collection Des faits et des hommes ). Le Livre d'histoire, Paris 2008 (first edition 1965), ISBN 978-2-7586-0232-3 , p. 130.
  75. ↑ Quelques fusées françaises. In: Passion & Compassion 1914–1918. Ressentir la Grande Guerre aujourd'hui.
  76. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 2, p. 700 ( digitized version ).
  77. ↑ Renoult, 2016, p. 111.
  78. ↑ Charles Fork: Les explosifs pendant la guerre 1914-1918 ( Memento of 28 June 2018 Internet Archive ). In: Bulletin mensuel de l'Association des Anciens Élèves de l'École Centrale Lyonnaise. September 1920, pp. 12-20 (PDF; 4 kB).
  79. ↑ Renoult, 2016, p. 108.
  80. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, pp. 199-200.
  81. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, pp. 198, 200.
  82. ↑ Parc annexe de Brienne-le-Château. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Mémoire des hommes.
  83. ↑ AFGG, 1937, Volume 11, pp. 952, 1082-1087, 1139-1140.
  84. ^ Général Jean-Étienne Valluy , Pierre Dufourcq: La première guerre mondiale. Volume 2. Chap. de Verdun à Rethondes. Hachette, Paris 1968.
  85. ↑ Bulletin de renseignement de l'artillerie , 1917, No. 3, pp. 11-12.
  86. ↑ Edmond Buat, Frédéric Guelton: Journal 1914-1923. Ed .: Ministère de la Défense. Perrin, Paris 2015, ISBN 978-2-262-06503-4 .
  87. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 6, Part 1, Annexes 1, Annex No. 295, pp. 580-582 ( digitized version ).
  88. ↑ AFGG, 1930, Volume 6, Part 1, Annexes 1, Annex No. 296, pp. 583-587 ( digitized version ).
  89. ^ Organization de l'artillerie pendant la guerre 1914–1918. In: Base documentaire artillery (Bas'Art).
  90. ↑ AFGG, 1931, Volume 2, Annexes 2, Annex No. 873, pp. 160–163 ( digitized version ).
  91. ↑ Emploi de l'artillerie dans la Defense. Ed .: Groupe d'armées du center. Imprimerie nationale, Paris 1916 ( digitized version ).
  92. ↑ Journal des marches et operations du 21 e régiment d'infanterie coloniale pendant la Guerre contre l'Allemagne (1914–1918) from September 25, 1915 to December 31, 1916. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Mémoire des hommes (SHD, cote 26 N 865/2, p. 33, 1 er juillet 1916).
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  96. ↑ Berry-au-Bac. Ed .: Ministère des armées. In: Chemins de mémoire.
  97. ^ Instruction sur le tir d'artillerie. Approuvée par le ministre de la Guerre on November 19, 1917. Ed .: Ministère de la Guerre. Imprimerie nationale, Paris 1917 ( first fascicle ), ( second fascicle: Appendices et annexes ).
  98. ↑ a b Instruction provisoire sur le service en campagne de l'artillerie. 15 June 1919. Ed .: Grand quartier de l'armée de l'est (État-major 3 e bureau et inspection générale de l'artillerie). Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris 1922, section 26 ( digitized version ).
  99. ↑ Les archéologues se penchent sur la Grande Guerre. In: 700000 (documentation about the search for the missing soldiers of the First World War).
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literature

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Standard work Les armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre

Ed .: Service historique de l'état-major des armées ( Service historique de la Défense ). Imprimerie nationale, Paris 1922–1939 (11 volumes with 21 part volumes and appendices):