Islam in Russia

The Islam is one of the traditional religions on the territory of the present Russian Federation and in some regions such as the North Caucasus spreads for over 1300 years. The political and cultural center of Islam in Russia was and is Kazan . Kazan is considered the secret "Islamic capital" next to the official capital Moscow.

The dome of the newly built Moscow Cathedral Mosque

Current situation

“I remind you that Russia is not only a Christian but also an Islamic country and we live in peace with our Islamic brothers who have lived on the territory of Russia for many centuries. This coexistence was absolutely normal and calm. "

- Dmitri Anatoljewitsch Medvedev : Handelsblatt dated February 12, 2016, pages 58/59

Demography and geography

Areas in Russia with a Muslim majority

There is no agreement on the total number of Muslims living in the Russian Federation. Official statistics do not exist on this. Government organizations do not have such data either. All official numbers are derived from counts of the ethnic groups that are considered Muslim. One problem, however, is that many so-called ethnic Muslims are actually atheists or non-denominational. Since it is impossible to determine an exact number of practicing Islamic followers compared to “ethnic Muslims” and followers of other religions, only estimates are available, which, however, vary widely. According to the Fischer World Almanac of 2008, the number of Muslims is 19–22 million, which corresponds to 13–15% of the total population. The US American Shireen Hunter estimated the number of Muslims in 2002 at 18 to 20 million, making them 12 to 13.8 percent of the population of the Russian Federation. Russia Today estimates the proportion of Russian Muslims at 15%

The Muslim communities live across the 85 federal subjects of the Russian Federation. There are even 30,000 Muslims living on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Most Muslims, however, live in the North Caucasus as well as the central Volga and the Urals. The greatest concentration of Muslims in the Volga-Urals region is in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan , which together have an estimated Muslim population of four million. Another 3.2 million Muslims live in central Russia . An additional two to three million live in and around Moscow and Saint Petersburg .

Ethnic distribution

Above all, Islam is the religion of numerous ethnic minorities in Russia. The most numerous Muslim people in Russia are the Tatars . With around 6 million members, they are the second largest people (4%) after the Russians (80%) and at the same time also the largest minority of the multi-ethnic state . Only a third of the Tatars live in Tatarstan (Kazan), where they make up a good 50% of the population, almost 40% are Russians. Outside the autonomous republic, their settlement area extends along the Volga and the Urals , together with the other Muslim peoples as far as the North Caucasus and Central Asia .

Other significant Muslim peoples are the Tatar-related and neighboring Bashkirs (1.5 million), two thirds of whom live in their autonomous republic ( Bashkortostan is the largest and most populous of the Muslim autonomies of Russia in terms of area), but only about 30% of the population there (compared to 40% Russians and 25% Tatars).

Most of the Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis immigrated to Russia from their former Soviet neighbors in Central Asia and the Caucasus . More numerically large majority Muslim peoples are the Chechens and their closely related Ingush , distributed on three Caucasus republics Circassians , the Avars and the Dargins in Dagestan, as well as in Dagestan and neighboring Azerbaijan living Lezgins .

Indigenous, predominantly Muslim peoples of the Caucasus republics make up the majority of the population in Chechnya , Ingushetia , Kabardino-Balkaria , Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia . This makes the North Caucasus the second most important, compact Muslim settlement area in Russia; about 10% of all Muslims in Russia live e.g. B. in Dagestan.

The Chuvashes of Turkic origin (Cheboksary on the Volga) and the Ossetians of Iranian origin (Vladikavkas in the Caucasus) are predominantly Christian Orthodox, but a minority of both peoples and their two republics profess Islam. Numerous Muslims also live in the major Russian cities of Moscow , Saint Petersburg , Ivanovo , Tver , Yaroslavl , Kaliningrad , Astrakhan , Orenburg , Nizhny Novgorod and Troitsk, as well as in the Chelyabinsk , Kurgan and Tyumen regions and in the Khanty and Mansi Autonomous Okrug .

There are also some Russian converts in Tatarstan - especially in Kazan, where roughly every third marriage is an intermarriage. Today there are 7000 mosques in Russia, 5000 of them in the North Caucasus, among them the (until 2005) largest mosque in Russia in Makhachkala (Dagestan).

The birth rate of the Muslim peoples of Russia is higher than that of the Russians and Christian peoples. Despite the war, the number of Chechens is said to have risen by 50% since Russia's independence, the number of Lesgians by 60% and that of Ingush by 90%. However, these official numbers are questioned by Russian opposition politicians. In fact, the birth rate of the Tatars as the largest Islamic minority is well below the reproductive level.

The DUM system and the Muftirate

President Putin receiving various Russian-Islamic dignitaries in 2001, including Rawil Gainutdin , whom he is shaking hands with, and Talgat Tajuddin (far right).

While in the Soviet period the religious life of the Muslim regions on the territory of today's Russian Federation was organized by only two institutions, namely the "Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia" ( Duchownoje uprawlenije Musulman ewropejskowo Tschasti SSSR i Sibiri ; DUMES) based in Ufa and the "Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the North Caucasus" ( Duchownoje uprawlenije Musulman Severnowo Kawkasa ; DUM SK) based in Makhachkala , today there are a large number of Islamic organizations, which has resulted in a strong fragmentation of the Islamic administrative structures. At the end of 2000, there were 1,099 Muslim organizations in the Republic of Dagestan alone . According to the traditional model, many of these organizations refer to themselves as the “Spiritual Administration of the Muslims” ( Duchownoje uprawlenije Musulman ; abbreviated DUM) of a certain area in order to express their general claim to representation for the Muslims in this region.

The two largest Muslim umbrella organizations in the Russian Federation are currently the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Russia (ZDUM), which is in the tradition of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, and the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR) , which claims to be the authority of all muftis to represent the Russian Federation. Both organizations have several regional sub-organizations. The Muftirate includes, for example, the DUM of the European part of Russia under the direction of Rawil Gainutdin, the DUM of the Asian part of Russia under the direction of Nafigulla Aschirow , the DUM of the Republic of Tatarstan under Kamil Samigullin and the DUM of the Republic of Bashkortostan under Nurmuchamet Magafurowitsch Nigmatullin . The ZDUM is headed by Mufti Talgat Tajuddin , the Muftirate of Mufti Rawil Ismagilowitsch Gainutdin . The two men - one Bashkire, the other Tatar - also personally rival each other for influence within the Muslim community and with the Russian leadership. In September 2014, Rawil Gainutdin renamed his DUM, which was previously restricted to the European part of Russia, to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Russian Federation ( Duchownoje uprawlenije musulman Rossijskoj Federazii ; DUM RF) in order to express their all-Russian representation claim.

Islamic infrastructure

Kadyrov Mosque in Grozny

While at the beginning of the liberalization process under Gorbachev there were only 94 mosques in what is now the Russian Federation, their number rose to a total of 7,000 by the year 2000. In Dagestan alone, 1,585 mosques had been built by the year 2000. In 2005 the Kul Sharif Mosque was built in Kazan (Tatarstan) as the largest mosque in Russia (in the opinion of the Russian government the largest mosque in Europe); it was surpassed by the Akhmat Kadyrov Mosque in Grozny, Chechnya, which opened in 2008 .

In addition, numerous Islamic educational institutions have been founded since 1990, for example the Russian Islamic Institute in Kazan . In 2002 there were a total of 419 Muslim organizations in Bashkortestan that offered basic Islamic education. Moscow also has a number of Islamic educational institutions, such as the Moscow Islamic College, which offers imam training and is affiliated with DUMER. Since Putin came to power, the Russian leadership has endeavored to bring the Muslim educational system more under state control.

In addition, there are a large number of Islamic media outlets. The most important Muslim magazines appearing in Moscow include the monthly Islam Minbare , founded in 1994, published by DUMER and reflecting the view of the Russian Mufti Council, and Tribuna Islam , also published by DUMER since 1994, and a Has a circulation of 10,000. DUMER also has its own radio and television program. In 2003 the Muslim journalists of the Russian Federation joined forces in the Union of Muslim Journalists , an organization close to the Russian Mufti Council. The two websites Islam.ru and Islamnews.ru are also of great importance for the exchange of information among Muslims in Russia. Islamnews.ru has been an information agency since 2007 and also sponsors concerts.

In the early 1990s, various efforts were made to establish an Islamic economic sector in Russia with Islamic banks , Islamic insurance companies, waqf foundations and organizations for the collection and distribution of zakāt . Most of these efforts, however, were unsuccessful.

Different shades of Islam

Due to the historical development of Islam in Russia, there are three traditional variants of Islam. The majority of Muslims in the Russian Federation belong to the Hanafi legal school of Islam. In the North Caucasus, and especially in Dagestan, the Shafiite school of law and Sufism prevailed due to the historical interaction with the Arab countries . Under the influence of the reforms of Catherine II , an Islamic reform movement emerged in Russia in the 19th century, which culminated in Jadidism in the early 20th century . As a continuation of the jadidism that emerged in Tatarstan in the 18th century, modern and liberal Euro-Islam can be found today, especially in the areas of the Volga Urals.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, other forms of Islam eventually poured into Russia. These are Salafism and Wahhabism . The Salafist or Wahhabi movements in Russia that are jihadist , i.e. militant, include:

• the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, since 1999
• United Command of the Mujahideen of Dagestan, since 1998
• Army for the Liberation of Dagestan, since 1999
• Imam's Dagestani rebel army, since 1999.

Muslim parties

Muslim parties at the national level are:

• Islamic Party of Russia, since 2001
• Party of Islamic Rebirth (PIW), however, broke up in 1992 into regional successor parties
• All-Russian Party of Islamic Revival (GRPIW), emerged from the fragmentation of the PIW
• Islamic Committee of Russia, the Islamist party also emerged from the fragmentation of the PIW
• Union of Muslims of Russia (UMR or SMR), secular PIW wing since 1995
• All-Russian Muslim Social Movement “Nur” (light), also since 1995
• Congress of Muslims of Russia
• All-Russian Islamic Congress (ARIK) since 1998
• Zhamaat Muslimi, Islamic Democratic Party, Islamic Center (all Daghestan)

Social and economic situation

The Tatars, initially nomadic cattle breeders, became sedentary farmers after the Russian conquest (like the Bashkirs). The rural population in particular is in favor of Tatarstan's turning to Islam and the oriental “brother states”. Today, however, the majority of the Tatars live in Kazan , Ufa and other cities, where handicrafts and trade (unlike the Bashkirs) build on long and successful traditions.

Lately, however, the oil wealth of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in particular has brought great prosperity, which is reflected in a high level of education (Tatars are traditionally regarded as the intellectual elite of Russia's Muslims), but also gradually in an aging population and a lower birth rate. A majority of the urban Tatars (Muslims and atheists) have high educational qualifications, are politically and socially emancipated and orientate themselves towards the West or westernized Turkey (a large part of the Bashkirs favors the alliance with Kazakhstan and the other former Soviet republics of Central Asia).

Perception of Muslims in Russia

There are therefore also significant differences in the public perception of the Muslim peoples by the Russians. Since the attacks in connection with the Chechnya war, many of them see all Caucasians as potential terrorists and mafiosi For example, kidnapping people to extort ransom - the Chechens among them, in turn, as the “kings” of organized crime who also controlled Moscow's underworld. In contrast to the Tatars, for example, all mountain peoples of the Caucasus are traditionally considered uncivilized, militant and fanatical in Moscow, and some Chechens and Ingush are still considered to be “fascists” or their collaborators. Another important catchphrase is the branding of Caucasian Muslims as supposed " Wahhabis ", and the rival Muftis themselves brand each other in this way.

The results of a survey in Russia's “Islamic heart”, in Kazan, are exemplary of these questions of orientation and the inner turmoil: a clear majority of (Muslim) Tatars (and converted mixed race) see themselves as part of Europe, but fear an economic one Exploitation by the West is more than an aggressive policy of oriental countries. A common future with Islamic states like Saudi Arabia is therefore improbable or impossible, but a majority of the atheist Tatars see a future with westernized Turkey . At least most of the Tatars are clearly oriented towards Turkey or the West, and the emancipation of women is very advanced (since the Soviet era and in some cases even earlier) in Kazan, but even there, highly educated women often stick to (traditional) oriental ones Family relationships.

In view of the allegedly high birth rate of the Muslim peoples of Russia and the simultaneous sustained sharp decline in the population of Russia (1991: 148–149 million inhabitants, 2001: 143–144 million, tendency persistent), some Russian Orthodox nationalists evoke the fear of a substantial shift in weight the Muslim proportion of the population within a then smaller total population in favor of an alleged "Islamization" of Russia by the end of the 21st century (from 15 to 50%).

history

The history of Islam on today's territory of Russia goes back almost 1,300 years, the city of Kazan was founded by Muslim Volga Bulgarians about 150 years before Moscow .

Early Islam in today's territory of Russia

Derbent was the first city in what is now Russia to become Muslim in the 7th century, and the first Russian state emerged in the 9th century.

The main mosque of Derbent, built by the Arabs under Maslama in the 8th century, is considered Russia's oldest mosque.

As early as the middle of the 7th century, the Islamic expansion of the Arab caliphate reached the southern border of today's Russia with the conquest of Transcaucasia . The North Caucasian city of Derbent in Dagestan also became Islamic for the first time in 642/654, and became permanently Islamic in 728 (and remained Azerbaijani or Persian for centuries until the first Russian conquest in 1806). The Caucasian Dargins (Dagestans) were the first people of today's Russia to take over as early as the 8th century Islam on. Lesgier followed quickly . After a brief occupation of the Volga estuary by Muslim Arabs (737) were some of the Southern Federal District and the eastern Ukraine dominant Khazars converted to Islam. After the restoration of their independence (740), the majority of the Khazars then turned to Judaism, see also Islam in Ukraine .

Nevertheless, there were mosques and Muslim communities in the Khazar cities in southern Russia and in the northern Caucasus, e. B. Atil (near Astra Chan ), Samandar (near Kizlyar ) and Balandschar (near Buinaksk ). There were garrisons of Muslim mercenaries (Arsija) in Sarkel (today the Zimlyansk Reservoir ), Kiev and the Crimea. These Khazar Muslim mercenaries destroyed a Russian army platoon in 912 on its return from an attack on Muslim areas of Transcaucasia and Transcaspia (the areas on the Asian side of the Caspian Sea ). The rulers of the Kievan Rus destroyed the Khazar Empire between 965 and 969, the last Khazar ruler is said to have accepted Islam again and placed himself under the protection of the Khazarians .

Also before the Christianization of the Russians in the 10th century, the Volga Bulgarians (the descendants of today's Tatars and Chuvashes see themselves as their descendants) converted to Islam (mission of Ibn Fadlan 922), as did parts of the Kipchaks . The Kievans, however, in 988 preferred the adoption of Orthodox Christianity to Muslim missionary attempts. The Muslim successes on the Volga also seemed to be ruined with the Mongol storm from 1237 (end of the Bulgarian empire and Russia). But as early as 1252, Berke Khan, the first Mongol ruler of the Golden Horde, converted to Islam. His successors sided with the Caliphate in Cairo in the fight against the also Mongolian Ilkhane of Persia .

Russian Empire

Until 1380 or 1480 the Rus or Russia was under Tatar-Mongolian rule, after which the Horde broke up into rival khanates, which made the Russian conquest easier. After the conquest of the Kazan Khanate (1552), the Astrakhan Khanate (1556) and the Sibir Khanate (1580), the tsarist empire used the Tatars as mediators, harbingers and middlemen to influence Central Asia (beginning of the conquest in 1731). Even some leading Russians, such as B. Boris Godunov , Turgenev and Lenin had Tatar ancestors. In contrast to the Tatars, the Bashkirs rose up in numerous uprisings (1616, 1645, 1662/64, 1681/84, 1705/06, 1707/11, 1735/40), most recently together with the Tatars on the side of Pugachev (1773 / 74).

In the 19th century, however, with the immediate conquest of Central Asia (1868 subjugation of Bukhara , 1873 also Choresms , 1876 destruction of Kokand) and the Caucasus (1859 defeat of Imam Shamil , 1864 emigration of the Circassians, 1878 annexation of Kars ) the influence of the Tartars was already declining Since the 18th century, the ideological opposition between Islam and Orthodoxy had intensified due to the Russian Turkish Wars (since 1736 Russian claims to Constantinople , 1755 “Holy War” of the Volga Tatars against Russian settlement policy, 1783 conquest of the Crimean Khanate ). A now Pan-Slavic Russia claimed the Balkans, Armenia and even Istanbul as well as Sinkiang, hundreds of thousands of Caucasians and Turkmens fled to the Ottoman Empire . At the same time as Pan-Slavism , the intellectual reform movement of Jadidism emerged , which originated from the Tatars and which in turn gave rise to Turkish nationalist Panturanism and Muslim communist Sultangalievism (later referred to as defamation).

Soviet time

After the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman empires, the February and October revolutions of 1917 initially strengthened the striving of Russian Muslims for autonomy and religious freedom, and the traditional Islamic-Turkish-Russian hostility decreased. During the civil war that followed, the peoples found themselves on different sides. Volga Tatars and Ossetians fought for the Soviets; Bashkirs, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs and almost all other Caucasian peoples fought against them.

The Stalinist nationality policy was intended to destroy any unity or solidarity between the Muslim peoples of the Soviet Union: dozens of small autonomous entities ( ASSR ) were created and played off against each other. Stalin had the majority of the Crimean Tatars , Chechens, Ingush, Kumyks , Balkars and Karachay ("mountain Tatars") deported (to Central Asia and Siberia) in 1944 , and these peoples were not rehabilitated until 1957 (the Crimean Tatars not until 1967), accused of collaboration with Hitler's Germany. and got their autonomies back (apart from the Crimean Tatars, who were only granted a right of return, and the Circassians and Karachayers, who were combined in a common autonomous area).

Thousands of mosques fell victim to state-imposed atheism , of 25,000 (1,700 of them in Dagestan) before the revolution (1917) in 1989 only 500 (27 of them in Dagestan) existed, and Muslim foundations were expropriated. Muslim clergy were trained and appointed exclusively by the communist state, so. from 1944 z. B. the Muftis (Grand Muftis) of Makhachkala or Buinaksk (responsible for the North Caucasus and European Russia) and Ufa (Siberian Russia). The Islamic scholar Lucian Ippolitowitsch Klimowitsch , for example, had a strong influence on the CPSU's understanding of Islam . At the end of the 1980s, the Tatars began an Islamic return. It was initially part of the democracy movement in Russia during perestroika and the end of the Soviet Union.

It was not until perestroika that KP leader Gorbachev opened his party to Muslims in 1987. For his planned new union treaty, he particularly campaigned for the support of Kazakhstan , whose Communist Party leader Nursultan Nazarbayev he lured in vain with the office of vice-president in a renewed USSR until 1991 . Tatarstan, on the other hand, unsuccessfully demanded the status of its own Union republic and referred to a more numerous titular nation than z. B. those of the Baltic republics.

A number of Islamic parties, organizations, and movements emerged in the Gorbachev era. These included:

• Islamic Revival Party (PIW)
• Muslims of Russia (Musul'mane Rossii)
• Ittifaq
• Muslims of Tatarstan (Musul'mane tatarstana)
• Islamic Party of Turkestan
• Islamic Democratic Party (IDP)
• Islamic Party of Dagestan (IPD)
• Islamic Nation (Chechnya)
• Islamic Path (Chechnya)
• Al-Islamiyya (Dagestan)
• Jamaat-ul-Muslim (Society of Muslims) in Dagestan

After the collapse of the Soviet Union

The Naberezhnye Chelny mosque in Tatarstan, opened in 1992

In 1990 the Tatars in Astrakhan and Moscow founded the “Party of Islamic Rebirth” (PIW; or “Islamic Party of Rebirth” ). Initially, the goal was political equality and unity for Muslims in all Union republics , so since the fall of the USSR, the PIW has also existed in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (see: Tajik Civil War ) and formally also in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. It strove for a strong Muslim faction in the Soviet and Russian parliament and soon spread from the Volga into the North Caucasus. But other Muslim parties emerged, and there was soon no longer any question of Muslim unity. The PIW lacked a sufficiently broad base, suffered from financial worries (which it exacerbated with unsuccessful speculations), failed to create its own mass media, and had prominent front-runners but not experienced politicians.

The PIW therefore effectively dissolved in 1994. The political scientist and philosopher Gejdar Dschemal , co-chairman and pioneer of the Islamist PIW wing, later founded the “Islamic Committee”. Two other important parties emerged from the PIW environment: the Muslim movement “Nur” (light) and the “Union of Muslims in Russia” (SMR). Both parties have cells and organizational structures in over half of all 89 regions of Russia, as well as Muslim sponsors at home and abroad. Another Muslim organization that was relatively short-lived was the Supreme Coordination Center of Spiritual Administration of Muslims in Russia , based in Moscow. It only existed from 1992 to 1996.

The “Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia” under the leadership of Talgat Tajuddin experienced a severe loss of authority in the early 1990s. While Tajuddin claimed the role of the undisputed leader of the Russian Muslims supported by the Kremlin , young clergymen demanded the creation of new spiritual institutions. The starting point of the conflict was the opening of the Great Mosque in Naberezhnye Chelny in Tatarstan in August 1992. On the instructions of Tajuddin, its stained glass had a cross and a six-pointed star. Many believers saw this as a scandal, which was exploited by ambitious young imams. Tajuddin's reputation among Muslims fell sharply after this incident.

The resurgence of imperialism in the 1990s led to the political orientation of Russia being hotly debated. Atlanticists and liberals advocated rapprochement with the EU and the US. Eurasians and communists, on the other hand, emphasized a being derived from “Soviet” upbringing and communist ideals. Russia must therefore reflect on this and, according to the supporters of Primakov's idea , take an “eastern” counterweight with China and India or take a so-called “ special path ” alongside Asian states.

Contrary to initial fears, the Chechnya war did not trigger any substantial solidarity or polarization among the Muslims in Russia - just as it did not trigger the Iranian revolution or the Soviet war in Afghanistan . Although Muslims, Orthodox Christians and atheists live with one another largely free of conflict, which is often interpreted as a model role model, in Kazan and on the Volga, attitudes hostile to the Caucasus and Islam have spread among the population, which has led to massive discrimination and discrimination against Muslim minority leads. Tatar intellectuals and clergy even criticized the fact that barely a million Chechens placed their national interests above the welfare of the entire Muslim community and thus poisoned the good relations between Russia and the Islamic world, which are important for a billion Muslims. The Chechens even received help from Christian Georgia, according to a Tatar allegation. (The Ingush, who are close to the Chechens, were the only Caucasus people to support Georgian nationalism against the Ossetians.) In contrast, the "Confederation of the Caucasus Peoples" approves and promotes the struggle for independence without, however, joining it.

Developments after 2000

In 2003, the US Third Gulf War against Iraq deepened the division among Russia's Muslims. While Grand Mufti Talgat Tajuddin wanted to recruit volunteers for the “Holy War” in Ufa, Grand Mufti Ravil Gainutdin in Moscow called for moderation and condemned terrorist attacks in Chechnya as well as suicide bombings in Iraq. As a result of the cartoon dispute, Danish products were boycotted in Tatarstan and Chechnya, while the Moscow muftis defended the Danish right to freedom of the press, while even Putin preached friendship with Muslims. The split between Moscow (or Kazan) and Ufa is also promoted by the traditional opposition between Russians (or Tatars) and the Bashkirs.

The ideas of the Tatars and Chechens about a “Third Way” are sometimes different; in general, traditionalism and religiosity, but also nationalism, seem more pronounced in the Caucasus than in Kazan. Islamists z. B. in Chechnya therefore advocate a reference to Saudi Arabia instead of Turkey (the Chechen government-in-exile is in Qatar ). 2006 also welcomed z. For example, political scientist and philosopher Gejdar Jemal, co-chairman and pioneer of the Islamist PIW wing, expressly invited Moscow to Hamas (as did a majority of Russians), while Mowladi Udugov, on the other hand, regretted that the Palestinian fellow believers gave the Russian president shook hands.

Since the 2010s the “Islamic factor” has played an increasingly important role in Russian migration policy. Since almost all of the migrant workers in Russia from the Central Asian republics are Muslims, the Russian government has a keen interest in preventing radical tendencies among them and therefore promotes cooperation between Muslim clergy from Russia and the Central Asian republics. At the Seventh Muslim Forum “Russia and the Islamic World: Vectors for Modernization in the CIS Region”, which took place in Moscow in November 2011, the plan was presented to set up a “real acting council of the Muftis of the CIS countries and a council of the To found scholars of the CIS countries as a means of consolidating the spiritual administrations of the Muslims of the CIS countries, primarily on the basis of our common beginning, the Hanafi madhhab . "

Timetable

• 7th century - Derbent (Dagestan) becomes Arabic-Islamic
• 8th century - Dargier (Dagestaner) and Lesgier become Muslims, Arab advances as far as the Volga, a minority of Khazars becomes Muslim
• 9th century - founding of the Kievan Rus
• 10th century - Volga Bulgarians adopt Islam, but Kievan Rus adopt Christianity
• 11th century - a minority of the Kipchaks becomes Muslim
• 13th century - Mongols and Tatars destroy the Kievan Rus and the Bulgarian Empire, but adopt Islam and settle on the Volga, the Bashkirs also become Muslims
• 15th century - disintegration of the Mongol-Tatar Golden Horde, Crimean Tatars fall under Ottoman-Turkish rule
• 16th century - Russians conquer the Tatar khanates Kazan, Astrakhan and Sibir, the Crimean khanate is now on the defensive too, but Chechens adopt Islam in the Caucasus
• 17th century - Circassians and Karachays become Muslims, Volga Tatars become mediators of Russia in Central Asia and Crimea
• 18th century - the Russian wars against the Turks intensified, Central Asia began to be subjugated, the Balkars became Muslims
• 19th century - defeat of the Ottoman Turks, completion of the conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus, start of Tatar reform movements
• 20th century - Tatars support the Soviets, but Stalinist nationality policy divides and banishes the Muslims, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics become independent through the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Chechnya also declares its independence and Tatarstan its sovereignty, the Chechnya war affects the relationship between Russians and Muslims in the Caucasus and worldwide

Islam in individual regions of the Russian Federation

Tatarstan

Mosque in Nizhnekamsk in Tatarstan

Mosque in Jelabuga in Tatarstan

Already in 1990 Tatarstan had declared its sovereignty within the Soviet Union, today it is the only autonomous republic within the Russian Federation , neither the Federation Treaty of 1991 ratified its later modifications. However, Kazan (unlike Chechnya) renounced a declaration of independence and negotiated special rights in a basic treaty in 1994 (the special provisions of the treaty take effect when Tatar sovereignty and Russian federalism / centralism contradict each other).

As early as 1992, in the wake of the strengthening of the Tatar national movement, the " Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan " ( Duchownoje uprawlenije musulman Respubliki Tatarstan ; DUMRT) was created. Until 1995, under the leadership of its first mufti Gabdulla Galiulla, the DUMRT was more of a political than an Islamic institution. The DUMRT, however, had serious problems formulating its political positions and was able to gain little sympathy from the Muslim community. Hence the Islamic awakening in Tatarstan bypassed the DUMRT. In addition, DUMRT did not succeed in developing successful organizational structures.

This situation changed when Gusman Iskhakov was elected DUMRT's new Mufti in 1998. Under his leadership, with political and legal support from the government, the DUMRT was able to establish a strict administrative hierarchy that encompassed all Islamic organizations and institutions, and also developed a new Islamic education system. The starting point for this was a letter that DUMRT sent to Prime Minister Mintimer Sharipovich Shaimiyev in November , in which it called for partial state funding of the Islamic education system in order to suppress radical influences from abroad. The government complied with this request and enabled DUMRT to limit the number of recognized Islamic educational institutions to eight. Among these recognized Islamic educational institutions were the Islamic University of the Russian Federation , the Muhammadiyya Madrasa and the Millennial Madrasa of Islam in Kazan, the Risaliyya Madrasa in Nizhnekamsk, and two madrasas in Buinsk and Nurlat . After a congress of the Muslims of Tatarstan took place in 1998, DUMRT tried to develop a standardized curriculum for Islamic teaching institutions. This was presented to the DUMRT plenary in February 2000.

North Caucasus

The " Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus " was founded as early as 1989 and 1991, and has since been renamed the "Confederation of the Caucasus Peoples ". It not only includes the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus , but also the South Caucasian Abkhazians and Ossetians of Georgia . The confederation of 16 peoples sees itself as an oppositional gathering movement against the bureaucrats loyal to Moscow and post-communist elites that are still established in the Caucasus republics. The aim of the organization was a common counterbalance to the central government and the amalgamation of the Muslim mountain peoples in a common republic, as it was in the form of the " ASSR of the mountain peoples " (Kabardines, Chechens, Ingush, Circassians, Ossetians, Balkars and Karachays) before briefly existed.

The confederation was declared illegal by Moscow, but supported the secessions of Chechnya from Russia and Abkhazia from Georgia, without breaking with Moscow itself. Moscow refuses to mediate in the conflicts that broke out in the North Caucasus after 1991.

• Unlike the Chechens, the Ingush voted in a referendum in 1991 against independence and in favor of remaining with Russia, which led to the division of the 1934–1944 and 1957–1992 common ASSR of the two peoples. Another referendum scheduled for 1999 was banned by Moscow, and in 2001 the long-standing President of the Republic Ruslan Auschew resigned after trying in vain with Russia's former Prime Minister Primakov to prevent or end the Chechen war. In addition, since 1992 Ingushetia has been fighting with North Ossetia about its capital Vladikavkaz (at least about the right of return to the same), which until 1944 belonged to Checheno-Ingushetia.

• For the War of Independence in “Chechenistan” (“Ichkeriya”) see Chechen History , First Chechen War and Second Chechen War . In fact, there was a long time three Chechen Conflict Parties: loyal to Moscow Chechens (as Akhmad Kadyrov and Boris Gantamirov), nationalist Chechens (as Dzhokhar Dudayev and Aslan Maskhadov ) and Islamist Chechens (such as Shamil Basayev and Movladi Udugov), the one "holy war" in Want to carry neighboring republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia. Nevertheless, it was the nationalist ex-communist Dudayev who had proclaimed the “holy war”. A failed coup attempt by those loyal to Moscow triggered the first war in 1994 and an attack by the Islamists on Dagestan in 1999 the second.

• The Chechen attacks primarily destabilize the unstable equilibrium in Dagestan , the largest and most populous of the Russian Caucasus republics in terms of area, but also one of the poorest regions in Russia, in which over 100 Muslim and non-Muslim, Caucasian and non-Caucasian peoples live together. The most populous are the Avars (30%), Dargins (16%), Kumyks (14%) and Lesgier (13%), whose brothers in Azerbaijan do not have minority rights.

• Since the regional presidential elections in Karachay-Cherkessia in 1999 , the division of this autonomous republic has threatened. The Circassians and Abasins , who were inferior to the more numerous and traditionally Moscow-loyal Karachayers , advocate their own autonomous republic (as it had existed until 1957). As early as 1996 , the Balkars had also tried in vain to split off from the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic.

The spiritual leader of the Muslim peoples of the Russian North Caucasus has been the Grand Mufti Allahşükür Paşazadə since 1980 , and in 1992 he was also recognized as religious leader by the Muslims of Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The Union of Muslims is considered to be rather secular or secular. Her goal is to overcome the national division and to allow Muslims to participate in the government in Moscow, but she seems to have almost reached this goal alone. It sees itself in its parliamentarism as the successor to the former "Union of Muslims" of Tsarist Russia and has most of its supporters in the North Caucasus and Bashkortostan. The “Nur” movement, on the other hand, is less political and concentrates on cultural and educational issues such as human rights, religious freedom and the maintenance of tradition. This makes it more moderate, because it is more present in social life even when there is no election success. The majority of the Muslim ulama are behind “Nur” , the stronghold of the movement is Tatarstan.

Both parties had good contacts with the Russian LDPR for a long time, as Shirinovsky's nationalists and the Muslim parties saw each other as potential coalition partners. Failures of both the Union and the movement in the parliamentary elections from 1995 to 2003 as well as the electoral defeat of the now divided LDPR and their move to the government camp put a clear end to such visions. Since Niyazov (Eurasian Refah party) left the Russian parliament, there has been no member of a Muslim party, the other two Islamic parties are inactive.

See also: Coordination Center for the Muslims of the North Caucasus .

Parties and organizations at regional level

• Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ingushetia
• Spiritual administration of the Muslims of Dagestan
• Ittifaq (Tatarstan)
• Islamic Party of Dagestan
• Union of Muslims (Chuvashia)
• Islamic Way (Chechnya)
• Union of Young Muslims (Bashkortostan)
• Tatar social center (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chuvashia)

Table of the predominantly Muslim peoples of Russia

The following table is based on data from the Russian census of 2002 and includes all peoples of Russia whose members are predominantly Muslim. However, the number does not take into account atheists or those who have converted to other religions (such as Christianity) among the “ethnic Muslims”, nor the number of Muslims and converts among the Russians and other non-Muslim nationalities of Russia. Likewise, Muslim immigrants from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, etc. are not included as they are formally foreigners. Therefore this list is of very limited informative value.

Ethnic group	Population (2002)	% Population
Tajiks	120,136	0.18%
Deeds	2,303	0.00%
Tatars	5,554,601	3.83%
Bashkirs	1,673,389	1.15%
Kazakhs	653,962	0.45%
Azerbaijanis	621.840	0.43%
Kumyks	422,409	0.29%
Karachay	192.182	0.13%
Uzbeks	122.916	0.08%
Balkars	108,426	0.07%
Turks	95,672	0.06%
Nogaier	90,666	0.06%
Circassian (only the titular nation )	60,517	0.04%
Turkmen	33.053	0.02%
Kyrgyz	31,808	0.02%
Crimean Tatars	4.131	0.00%
Chechens	1,360,253	0.94%
Avars	814.473	0.56%
Kabardiner ( titular nation of the Circassians )	519,958	0.36%
Darginer	510.156	0.35%
Ingush	413.016	0.28%
Greed	411,535	0.28%
Sheets	156,545	0.11%
Tabassarans	131,785	0.09%
Adygei ( titular of Tscherkessen )	128,528	0.09%
Abasins and Abkhazians	37,942	0.03%
Rutules	29,929	0.02%
Agulate	28,297	0.02%
Zachuren	10,366	0.01%
Total	14,340,794

See also

• Islam in Europe
• Religion in Russia
• Political organization of Russia and federal subjects
• History of the Soviet Union and Russian Orthodox Church
• Islam in Poland, Lithuania and Belarus
• Moscow-Kazan Wars
• Russian Islam Fund
• Russian Association of Islamic Consensus
• Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia (DSM RF)
• Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus
• Supreme Religious Council of the Caucasus Peoples
• Moscow Wasatiyya Center
• List of abbreviations related to Islam in Russia

literature

• Elmira Akhmetova: "Russia" in Jørgen Nielsen u. a. (Ed.): Yearbook of Muslims in Europe V (2013) pp. 547-568.
• Hans Bräker: "The Muslim Renewal Movement in Russia" in Katkov, George u. a. (Ed.): Russia's departure into the 20th century. Politics-Society-Culture 1894–1917. Walter-Verlag 1970.
• Moshe Gammer (Ed.): Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder. Routledge, London 2008, ISBN 978-0-415-42345-8 .
• Uwe Halbach: Islam in Russia (reports by the Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies, No. 34). Cologne 1996.
• Hans-Georg Heinrich, Ludmilla Lobova, Alexey Malashenko (eds.): Will Russia Become a Muslim Society . Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. u. a., 2011.
• Shireen Hunter: Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security . Center for Strategic and International Studies, Armonk, New York, 2004.
• Juliet Johnson, Marietta Stepaniants, Benjamin Forest: Religion and identity in modern Russia. The revival of Orthodoxy and Islam . Ashgate, Aldershot 2005, ISBN 0-7546-4272-0 .
• Andreas Kappeler : The Muslims in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. Identity. Politics. Resistance. Cologne 1989
• Kügelgen / Kemper / Yermakov: Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries. Berlin 1996
• Aleksei V. Malashenko,: Transition. Prague December 29, 1995.
• Roman A. Silantjew : Novejschaja istorija islamskowo soobschtschestva Rossii. Ichtios, Moscow, 2006.
• Roman A. Silantjew: Islam w sovremennoj Rossii, enziklopedija . Algoritm, Moscow, 2008.
• Erhard Stölting : A world power is falling apart - nationalities and religions of the USSR. Frankfurt 1990.
• Dilyara Usmanova et alii .: "Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Tatarstan" in Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika and Stefan Reichmuth (eds.): Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States . Routledge, London, 2010. pp. 21-66.
• Frankfurter Zeitung and Handelsblatt: The Mohammedans in Russia (historical e-paper), Frankfurter Zeitung , Frankfurt

July 12, 1914 ( archive PDF )

Web links

• Uwe Halbach: Russia's Muslim Ethnic Groups and Neighbors Federal Agency for Civic Education, May 2003
• Uwe Halbach: Russia's Worlds of Islam Science and Politics Foundation, April 2003 (PDF)
• Kai Ehlers: Model Kazan: Islam in Russia - Front in the clash of cultures or approach for an alternative? Eurasian magazine
• Said Abdulagatow: Russian Orthodoxy and Islam: Problems and Statistics on Islam in Russia Analyzes of Russia, May 2005 (PDF; 179 kB)
• Islam in Russia
• Boris Schumatsky: Muslims: Russia's Unloved Minority , Deutschlandfunk - “ Background ” from June 20, 2014

swell

1. ↑ Handelsblatt dated February 12, 2016, pages 52-59: Fear of the Third World War (interview with Dmitri Anatoljewitsch Medvedev )
2. ^ According to Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, page 394 and Spiegel Almanach 2002, page 328, up to 33–35% of all citizens are non-denominational.
3. ↑ See Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, pages 394 and 617, but President Putin also spoke of 20 million in 2003 to Gazeta (No. 148 of August 15, 2003).
4. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 44.
5. ↑ Closed streets, sea of ​​people: 200,000+ Muslims celebrate Eid al-Fitr in Moscow (IMAGES) . In: RT International . ( rt.com [accessed June 22, 2017]).
6. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 45f.
7. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 46.
8. ↑ http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0279/barom03.php
9. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 46f.
10. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 50.
11. ↑ Cf. Michael Kemper: Mufti Ravil 'Gainutdin: The Translation of Islam into Language of Patriotism and Humanism in Alfrid K. Bustanov and Michael Kemper (eds.): Islamic Authority and the Russian Language: Studies on Texts from European Russia, the North Caucasus and West Sibiria . Pegasus, Amsterdam, 2012. pp. 105-142. Here pp. 105–107.
12. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, pp. 103-112.
13. ↑ See the report of August 21, 2014 on the DUM RF website.
14. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 64.
15. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 66.
16. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 71.
17. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 72.
18. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 74.
19. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 75.
20. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 77f.
21. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 76.
22. ↑ Akhmetova mentions other websites: "Russia". 2013, p. 563.
23. ↑ See Dm. W. Makarow: "Islamnews.ru" in Damir Z. Chajretdinov (ed.): Islam w Moskwe: enziklopeditscheskij slowarj . ID “Medina”, Nizhny Novgorod, 2008. pp. 92b-93a.
24. ↑ See Renat I. Bekkin: Islamskaja ekonomika: kratkij kurs . AST, Moskva, 2008. pp. 216-244.
25. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 90f.
26. ↑ Russia between East and West: Tendency to Islam? (Research study by the political scientist X. Antsiferova, University of Augsburg, January 2005)
27. ↑ http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2007/0279/barom03.php
28. ↑ Andreas Roth: Chasaren - The forgotten large empire of the Jews , pages 39, 42, 59f, 83–89, 165–167 and 173f. Melzer-Verlag Neu-Isenburg 2006
29. ^ Encyclopaedia Judaica : Khazars ", Vol. 10, pp. 944-953
30. ↑ See Hunter: Islam in Russia . 2004, p. 63f.
31. ↑ Cf. Ruslan Kurbanov: “The Clerical Board of Russian Muslims. Contradictions and Developmental Dynamics ”in Heinrich / Lobova / Malashenko 2011, pp. 85–120. Here p. 97.
32. ↑ Aleksei Starostin, “'Islamic factor' in russian migration policy,” Russian International Affairs Council, April 28, 2012, archive link ( memento of the original from 23 August 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
33. ^ Roman A. Silantʹev: Sovet muftiev Rossii, istorija odnoj fitny . RISI, Moskva, 2015. p. 245. No. 5.
34. ↑ See Usmanova et alii .: “Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Tatarstan”. 2010, p. 50f.
35. ↑ See Usmanova et alii .: “Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Tatarstan”. 2010, p. 51.
36. ↑ See Usmanova et alii .: “Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Tatarstan”. 2010, p. 51.
37. ↑ See Usmanova et alii .: “Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Tatarstan”. 2010, p. 56.