1940 Summer Olympics

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Games of the XII. Olympics
canceled
← Berlin 1936
London 1944 →
The official poster for the 1940 Summer Olympics was designed by Wada Sanzo .

The 1940 Summer Olympics (officially called the XII Olympiad Games ) were originally scheduled to take place in Tokyo from September 21 to October 6, 1940 . The Japanese capital was the first city outside of Europe and the United States to successfully apply to host the Olympic Games, arguing that the Games would only be truly universal if they could also take place in Asia. The Tokyo application set new standards and challenged the International Olympic Committee (IOC) because the application campaign was not limited to the Olympic movement, but Japan also used diplomatic channels to make a favorable decision. The aggressive campaign by the Japanese meant that the 1940 Summer Olympics were not awarded at the 1935 IOC session as planned , but only at the 1936 Berlin session. In the meantime, the IOC President Henri de Baillet-Latour , who was initially critical, had been won over by Tokyo as the venue on a trip to Japan, while Rome and London had been persuaded to withdraw their candidacies through diplomatic negotiations. The only competitor remained Helsinki , against which Tokyo prevailed in the election.

Preparations for the Olympic Games were slow. In its course, three major controversies arose: The use of the stadium on the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine as an Olympic stadium was controversial, as was the implementation and possible route of the torch relay and the opening of the Games by the Tennō , whose voice was to be transmitted with a microphone, what was considered blasphemous at the time. The dispute over the location of the stadium in particular delayed preparations and led to criticism from the IOC. When resources became increasingly scarce due to the widespread war in China , the Japanese government withdrew support from the organizing committee.

In July 1938, Tokyo officially returned the hosting rights to the IOC. Helsinki was chosen as the new venue, where the games were to take place from July 20 to August 4, 1940. Because of the Second World War , the games could not be held in the end. It was not until 1948 that the summer games were held again in London . Helsinki received the Games in 1952 , and Tokyo finally took place in 1964 . At these summer games, many of the debates around 1940 had lost their meaning, but existing plans from the first attempt were also used.

Application and choice of the venue

Tokyo was the first city outside the European-American world to successfully compete to host the Olympic Games. Japan was a fairly young member of the Olympic movement and the Olympics were largely unknown in the country. The initiative for the application campaign came from the Tokyo city administration, and the state only gradually began to get involved. In the hot phase of the application in 1935 and 1936, the government used its diplomatic opportunities in favor of Tokyo. The application for the Olympic Games in 1940 set the standard for future application campaigns; to this day they follow the pattern established at the time.

Right from the start, the application was in the context of the preparation of the 2600th anniversary of the imperial line, which was to be celebrated internationally with the Olympic Games and the World Exhibition . Both the first application by an Asian metropolis to host and the award of the games by the IOC were based on numerous misconceptions and misunderstandings on both sides. They were a symptom of the crisis in the Olympic movement in the 1930s, but also proved to be an important step in opening it up.

Idea for application and national campaign

The mayor of Tokyo , Nagata Hidejirō , began planning the 2600th anniversary of the imperial line in 1940. In March of that year, the city had a three-day festival on the occasion of the rebuilding of Tokyo as a modern metropolis after the great Kantō Given earthquake of 1923 . The celebrations to commemorate the origin of the ruling house were part of Japan's self-definition as a modern nation and should be celebrated in a particularly pompous manner. Nagata viewed the anniversary as politically significant for Japan and as an economic opportunity for his city. In order to attract international tourists, he planned to apply for the 1940 Summer Olympics. The mayor asked Yamamoto Tadaoki , a professor at Waseda University who was traveling to Europe, to get an opinion on a Tokyo application. On his return to Nagata in early December 1930, Tadaoki reported that the reactions from Europe and America had been largely positive. Encouraged by this in his idea, the mayor gave a press conference on December 4, 1930, in which he announced Tokyo's bid for the 1940 Summer Olympics. At the same time, Nagata announced that the World's Fair planned for 1935 would also be postponed to 1940. At the time of the announcement, Tokyo's mayor still had no support from the Olympic movement in Japan, which is why no Japanese IOC member or member of the "Japanese Amateur Athletic Association" (JAAA, also JASA, JPEA and other, English for "Great Japanese Sports Association", Dai) -Nippon Taiiku Kyōkai ) was present. The idea of ​​applying to host the Olympic Games thus arose entirely outside the Japanese sports world.

Kanō Jigorō was the first Japanese IOC member and was skeptical of the plan.

The first supporter from national politics was the Minister of Railways . However, the Japanese sports world was critical of the idea. The application had to be submitted to the IOC by the National Olympic Committee - in the case of Japan the JAAA. The attitude of the JAAA was strongly influenced by the two Japanese IOC members Kanō Jigorō and Kishi Seiichi . Both were skeptical of Nagata's efforts. They did not see Japan as ready to host the Olympic Games yet. Before taking this step, Japan should first prove itself as a leading sports nation at the Olympic Games. There were also concerns about Tokyo’s sports facility infrastructure and hotel capacity for foreign guests.

Despite these concerns, the Tokyo City Council unanimously passed an ordinance on October 28, 1931, emphasizing the city's support for an application. A month earlier there was the so-called Mukden incident , which marked the beginning of the Manchurian crisis and thus Japan's military engagement in China. These events led to the international isolation of Japan, which in the following year established the puppet state of Manchukuo . In March 1933, Japan left the League of Nations after the League of Nations had accepted the Lytton Report , which criticized the creation of Manchukuo, and wanted to achieve the demilitarization of Manchuria. Japan presented itself as a victim of international opinion. In this situation, Nagata, with the support of the city, promoted the Olympic Games both nationally and internationally as a possible diplomatic channel. He sent telegrams to the Japanese consulates in Sweden , Great Britain , France , Germany and the United States asking for support for the candidacy . With this positioning of the application Nagata turned again to the Olympic movement in Japan. Kishi now viewed the application neutrally, but assumed it would be defeat. At the end of 1931, almost a year after the idea was announced, the two Japanese IOC members agreed to formally submit an application from Tokyo to the IOC. They suggested that the application should not be submitted by the city of Tokyo but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , in order to emphasize the diplomatic importance of the 1940 Olympic Games.

Within Japan, the application was justified with the economic opportunities and as a form of cultural diplomacy, which should represent a counterbalance to the Japanese aggression felt by the world public. Financing first an application and then the event itself in a time of internal and external crises was justified by the fact that sport was of great national importance. Participation in and hosting of the Olympic Games was defined as a national task. Successful participation in the 1932 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles was an important contribution to increasing the acceptance of the application among the Japanese population, as was the commitment of various personalities who allowed different positions to be included in the discussion. On July 25, 1932, in advance of the official application to the IOC, the Tokyo city council passed a new ordinance underlining its support for the 1940 Summer Olympics, while the mayor asked the State Department for advice.

International campaign

When the Japanese IOC members presented their application at the 1932 IOC session in Los Angeles, Alexandria , Barcelona , Budapest , Buenos Aires , Dublin , Helsinki , Milan , Montreal , Rio de Janeiro , Rome and Toronto were already contending for the Summer Olympics Advertised in 1940. Kanō emphasized the connection of the Tokyo Games with the 2600th anniversary of the imperial line and the contribution to the Olympic idea that this connection could make. Kishi then explained the concept of the Tokyo application. The Tokyo application received its first international support from the Swedish IOC member Sigfrid Edström , with whom there had already been contact. The IOC President assessed the large number of applicants from different regions as a sign of the strength of the Olympic idea.

On August 5, 1932, during the Los Angeles Games, which were extremely successful for Japan, the Tokyo city council decided to finance the application with 25,000 yen (50,000 US dollars). After returning from the United States, Kishi presented Tokyo's application to the Tennō and emphasized Benito Mussolini's commitment to Rome as the venue. At the same time, he conveyed the positive reaction of the founder of the modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin , to the possibility of holding the Olympic Games in Asia. The interest of the emperor and other high government officials showed that the application had moved from an urban idea to a matter of national concern, even if the government continued to be inactive.

The favorite for the Summer Olympics was Rome, which in 1906 had returned the 1908 Games to the IOC after the eruption of Vesuvius and was also located in Europe and therefore close to the nations that dominated the Olympic movement. Given this situation, the Tokyo bid committee pursued an aggressive strategy that included diplomatic negotiations with Mussolini and the British government. This form of the application campaign challenged the IOC, which saw itself as independent of external political influence, and should set standards for future campaigns to this day. At the beginning of the application, the Tokyo-based people focused on classic forms of the campaign as envisaged by the Olympic protocol. Tokyo, for example, used the annual IOC sessions as an opportunity to present itself as a worthy host for the Olympic Games. Japanese IOC members gave presentations at the 1933 session in Vienna , held a banquet, and promoted Tokyo informally among IOC members. It was emphasized that Asia, as the continent with the largest population, would have to host the Olympic Games if they were to be truly universal.

After the Vienna session, Mussolini declared the application of Rome to be a matter of high national priority. This commitment by the Italian government led Kanō to consider a greater national anchoring of the Tokyo application to be necessary. For a campaign to be successful, the entire nation, not just the city, would have to support the plans. To achieve this, the city and the JAAA jointly submitted the application. The application committee was reorganized and subsequently also included members of the government. The committee's budget for the three years of the campaign was provided by the city and was 300,000 yen. In addition, the application committee approached actors outside the IOC such as ambassadors and other diplomats. The Belgian ambassador advised that Japan's position in the east should be emphasized even more. At the 1934 session in Athens , a brochure was therefore distributed that promoted Tokyo as the center of sport in the Orient and mainly comprised photos showing Japan as a country that combined Eastern tradition with Western modernity. This mediating discourse between West and East followed on from nationalist discourses within Japan and from then on dominated Tokyo's application. Also on the advice of the Belgian ambassador, the Tokyo city council decided that travel to the Olympic Games would be subsidized with one million yen for the foreign teams. The new Tokyo Mayor Ushizuka Toratarō tried in vain to meet the Prime Minister, but was able to speak to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki without getting any direct support. Internationally, the application committee turned to the IOC president and asked him for direct involvement in Tokyo. Competitor Helsinki followed similar paths within the Olympic community with IOC member Ernst Krogius , while the Japanese used every opportunity to advertise themselves on the political stage. Krogius did not understand the special significance of 1940 for the Japanese and feared a Japanese bid for the games of 1944 in the event that Rome had been promised to host it in 1940.

The decision postponed at the 1935 IOC session

In the run-up to the planned decision on the venue for the 1935 IOC session in Oslo , Rome was the favorite. The city of Tokyo commissioned the two IOC members Soeshima and Sugimura Yotaro to persuade Mussolini to withdraw the Roman candidacy. The meeting took place on February 8, 1935, when the Japanese convinced the Italian prime minister of their mission. The reasons for Mussolini's withdrawal are unclear. It is believed that the connection to the anniversary of the imperial line impressed him, as well as that the Abyssinian War was now in focus. In return for the waiver, the Japanese IOC members pledged their support for a Roman candidacy for the 1944 Olympic Games.

In Japan, the result of the conversation with Mussolini marked the beginning of further intensified efforts: The mayor of Tokyo secured the support of the application from Prime Minister Okada Keisuke , Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki and both chambers of the Reichstag . Hirota also instructed the embassies and consulates to provide support. These measures were intended, on the one hand, to convey to IOC members that this is a company with national support and, on the other hand, to strengthen approval for the Olympic Games in Japan itself. At the IOC, however, the events met with criticism because they violated the traditional protocol of the application process, which only provided for advertising within the framework of the IOC itself. The IOC President rejected external political influence on decisions of the IOC. This was the first attempt in the history of the Olympic movement to influence internal processes through political representatives. In addition, the Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano and the Italian IOC member Alberto Bonacossa protested against the political influence and stuck to Rome's application.

At the 1935 IOC session in Oslo , the intergovernmental negotiations threatened the IOC's control of the Olympic Games and created insoluble problems. The status of Rome's application should only be decided on the last day of the session. Therefore, all three candidates - Tokyo, Rome and Helsinki - presented their applications on the opening day to the IOC members, many of whom wanted to award the Games to Europe. The dispute between Bonacossa and Sugimura over Mussolini's assurance could not be settled. Even Mussolini's instruction by telegram to withdraw Rome as a candidate did not lead to a solution, especially since it was consensus in the IOC that the Italian prime minister had no influence on this question. Bonacossa eventually withdrew the Roman candidacy, but IOC President Baillet-Latour announced that the decision on who to host the 1940 Olympic Games had been postponed to the 1936 IOC session in Berlin . The IOC president also turned to the Japanese and asked them to stop their efforts outside the Olympic institutions. In Finland the postponement of the decision was interpreted as a development in favor of Helsinki’s application.

As a result, the Japanese side tried to convince the IOC president of Tokyo as the venue. In this context, those responsible dared to take another step that was not previously part of the application process, but has since established itself as a normal procedure: Baillet-Latour was invited to Tokyo for a visit. The President of the IOC gave the Application Committee advice on how this invitation should be structured. So the costs were covered and the trip presented as purely private. Despite the coup on February 26, 1936 , Baillet-Latour arrived in Yokohama on March 19 and spent 20 days in Tokyo. During the stay he took part in various conferences, visited possible sports facilities and also met the emperor. The trip actually convinced him of the Tokyo candidacy and he subsequently publicly supported it. He tied this support to certain conditions: Tokyo should increase the travel expenses support for foreign athletes to one million yen, employ a technical advisor appointed by the IOC and also sufficient translators. In addition, the costs for the participating nations should be limited and the period of the games should be set to the last week of August and the first week of September. The trip was accompanied by the press both in Japan and internationally. In Finland, the visit met with clear criticism. Baillet-Latour visited Helsinki for five days and looked at the new stadium, among other things. Still, he ultimately supported Tokyo.

The London candidacy

The looming success of the Tokyo candidacy motivated British Olympic officials to apply for the 1940 Olympic Games in 1935. The Lord Mayor of London , Percy Vincent , informed the British Government of the intention to apply. After positive feedback, he informed the IOC President of London's application, and at the same time the British Olympic Association (BOA) informed the IOC delegates. This development sparked further political activity by Japanese officials. The Mayor of Tokyo turned to the Lord Mayor on June 30, 1935 to persuade him to withdraw from the candidacy of London, but received a negative answer. He also went to the British Ambassador to Japan, Robert Henry Clive , and asked him for British support for the Tokyo application. Japan's IOC member Soeshima also contacted Prime Minister Okada Keisuke in July 1935 with a request to use his influence on Tokyo. The reactions to these efforts were muted, however, as the British refused to exert political influence on Olympic matters.

While the mayor of London continued to pursue the candidacy and highlighted the suitability of the city, the political mood changed in the summer of 1936. The British Cabinet and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office took a cabinet decision on July 9, 1936, influence over the BOA and the city, so that the application of the British capital would be withdrawn. On July 14, Robert Vansittart informed the BOA, which bowed to government pressure a week later and withdrew. The British IOC member Clarence Bruce, 3rd Baron Aberdare , had already expressed his support for Tokyo and the IOC president had also clearly positioned himself in favor of Tokyo in a letter to the IOC members. The British government hoped that the withdrawal of the candidacy would improve relations with Japan. In addition, under the impression of the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin, at which the National Socialists presented themselves to the international public as peaceful and cosmopolitan, it was hoped that Japan would have a similar liberalizing effect. The government made its decision before the start of the 1936 Games; The experiences there, however, had a further influence on British action as they strengthened the opinion that diplomatic pressure on sporting events could influence and moderate a country's actions.

The award at the IOC session in 1936

IOC member Soeshima and IOC President Baillet-Latour on a balcony of the Hotel Adlon after the decision in favor of Tokyo as the organizer of the 1940 Summer Olympics at the IOC session in Berlin on August 1, 1936.

One year late, the 1940 Olympic Games were awarded at the 1936 IOC session in Berlin. On July 29th this session opened with a statement on the reasons for the delay, the withdrawal from Rome and the candidacy of London by the IOC President. When Baron Aberdare was supposed to present the London application, he announced that he would forgo the 1940 Games and instead apply for the 1944 Summer Olympics . As a result, the Japanese IOC members presented Tokyo's application again, as did Ernst Krogius's from Helsinki. The IOC President expressed his belief that Helsinki would be able to host the Olympic Games while recommending Tokyo. The election fell on August 1, 1936 with 36 to 27 votes for Tokyo. The votes came from IOC members from Egypt, Belgium, China, Germany, France, Great Britain, India, Iran, Italy, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the United States. For many, this approval coincided with the position of their respective governments and was in the context of a desire to position the Olympic movement as truly universal. The decision was sent by telegram to Tokyo, where there were immediate positive reactions. The city held a three-day celebration and the press coverage was also positive.

The IOC's decision in favor of Tokyo also had internal ideological implications. The modern Olympic Games were seen as an expression of modernization. They should - with the institutional superstructure through the IOC - promote justice, understanding and peace. Especially after the First World War , they were intended to strengthen international goodwill and become a symbol of peace. The representatives of the Olympic movement not only worked in their countries of origin in order to spread the Olympic values ​​and the idea of ​​Olympism, but also wanted to win over other nations internationally for the Olympic Games. From this consideration, Pierre de Coubertin, among others, drew the conclusion that the Olympic Games can only have a truly international impact if they are held outside the Euro-American area.

This international claim and the propagated political neutrality of the IOC led to a phase of constant unrest within the Olympic movement in the 1930s. The propagandistic use of the Olympic Games in 1936 by the National Socialist dictatorship in the German Reich led to some protests. Nevertheless, a clear majority chose the Japanese capital as the venue for the next games. From the beginning, however, these were in the context of Japan's imperialist project in Asia. Entrusting the event confirmed the Japanese ideology of being the only Asian nation that can meet the Western powers on an equal footing. In addition, the country, which was increasingly isolated internationally in the mid-1930s, moved back into the limelight of the world following the decision of the IOC. Japanese officials viewed the Olympic Games as an opportunity to re-establish diplomatic contact with the world after leaving the League of Nations in 1932. In March 1938, the IOC showed its support for Tokyo as the venue for the 1940s Games by awarding the Winter Games to Sapporo for the same year .

preparation

If it was difficult to organize national support for the campaign during the application phase, there was no shortage of it after the success at the Berlin IOC session. Even the intensification of the conflict with China in 1936 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War initially did not diminish support for the Olympic Games, but led to heightened conflicts over the character of the Summer Olympics in 1940. The IOC therefore became increasingly concerned and active Japanese officials urged not to associate the Olympic Games with national politics. It recalled that the Games had been entrusted to the city of Tokyo and not to the country of Japan. The ideological conflicts as well as the numerous cabinet reshuffles hampered the organization of the Olympic Games in 1940. The Japanese side repeatedly presented the Olympic Games as a connecting element between Orient and Occident , which established a topos that later Olympic organizers would rely on Games sourced in Asia.

The Olympic Games of 1940 were defined by the Japanese organizers as a means of articulating Japanese values ​​in front of their own people and the world. They put these games in relation to the spiritual essence of Japan ( nihon seishin ), the code of conduct of the Bushido and the national community ( kokutai ). The international significance of the Olympic Games should therefore be closely linked to nationalist concepts. The different ideological positions were particularly evident in three conflicts: First, the use of the stadium on the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine as an Olympic stadium was controversial, which was the most intense dispute in the course of the preparation. Second, there were discussions about the possible route of the torch relay and its general implementation. And thirdly there was the conflict over the opening of the games by the Tennō , in which his voice would have been transmitted with a microphone contrary to the protocol.

The organizing committee

After the successful application, the "Japanese Amateur Athletic Association" (JAAA) tried to found an organizing committee (OK), but did not involve the city of Tokyo. Despite the later offer to include city officials, the conflict continued. Therefore, the city administration also took steps to set up an organizing committee. As the disputes progressed, the JAAA's attempts to gain control over the organization of the 1940 Games were increasingly undermined by negative press and internal structural problems. The IOC, on the other hand, took the position that the JAAA, as Japan's NOK , had to assume the leading role in the organization of the Olympic Games. After the IOC member Kanō Jigorō arrived back in Japan on November 12, 1936, he took on the problem. He wanted to prevent a monopoly of the organization under the JAAA as well as under the city of Tokyo and instead brought an organizing committee at the national level with close ties to the government into discussion. Soeshima, the second Japanese IOC member, opposed this national monopoly of the Olympic Games by the Japanese state. He met with Education Minister Hirao Hachisaburō in November 1936 , who continued to insist on the invitation of government officials. His participation by the Army Ministry in the preparations for an organizing committee was seen by the public as ensuring the necessary support for the Army. The preparatory meeting took place on December 7, 1936.

The first meeting of the Organizing Committee took place on December 24, 1936. It resided in the Mantetsu Building. The President of the OC was Prince Tokugawa Iyesato , who had previously also headed the application committee. In the relatively short time until the last meeting before the return of the right to host the IOC on July 16, 1938, the OK was often reorganized, which was mainly due to the unstable political situation. The organizing committee, which was constituted at the beginning of 1938, consisted of 26 members. In addition to the president, there were two vice-presidents: the mayor of Tokyo, Kobashi Ichita , and the president of the JAAA Shimomura Hiroshi , member of the manor . In addition, the three Japanese members of the IOC, the president of the JAAA, the vice ministers for foreign affairs, interior affairs, finances, the army, navy, education, communication, railways and welfare were represented. After it had been decided at the end of 1937 to also incorporate the organization of the 1940 Winter Olympics in Sapporo with the Tokyo OK, this OK also included the governor of Hokkaidō and three members of the Executive Committee of the Sapporo Games. The OC was divided into a general committee and sub-committees for finance, construction, sports and public relations.

Until March 1937, the OK could not make any decisions about the implementation of the Olympic Games. That is why there was considerable criticism from the IOC at the IOC session in Warsaw between June 7 and 12, 1937. Baillet-Latour gave Kanō to understand that the IOC could withdraw the Tokyo Games again if the conflicts within the organization were not resolved. Despite the poor progress made by the OC, Tokyo continued to receive support from the IOC. Soeshima also met one of Baillet-Latour's conditions for supporting the application by hiring Werner Klingeberg as a technical consultant in Warsaw . He had previously been involved in organizing the Berlin Summer Olympics.

The debate about the location of the stadium

Aerial view of the outer district of the Meiji Shrine with sports facilities, 2005. At the top left is the Tokyo Olympic Stadium , which was used for the 1964 Summer Olympics . It was built on the area where the stadium that was to be expanded for the 1940 Summer Olympics was located.

At the beginning of the bid for the 1940 Summer Olympics, the city of Tokyo planned to build the central stadium complex on the newly reclaimed land of Tsukishima or Shibaura . With this use, the land prices in these areas should have been increased. In the course of the campaign, the city increasingly supported the Tsukishima proposal. Mayor Ushizuka Toratarō was a big supporter of this idea because he wanted to build a new town hall there. The plan provided for a rectangular area in which the various sports facilities were to be arranged.

However, these plans were not pursued after the participation of personalities from Japanese sports and the Olympic movement. Instead, the Komazawa golf course in the suburb of Komazawa , which was incorporated in 1932, and the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine moved into the center of considerations. The latter was favored because of the symbolic meaning associated with it and presented in the application as the location of the Olympic Stadium: The location associated with the Meiji- Tennō was intended to serve the encounter between the West and the Eastern civilization. In particular, IOC member Soeshima Michimasa aggressively promoted this plan. The stadium in the outer district of the Meiji Shrine was identified in the application documents as the Olympic Stadium and was also shown to the IOC President during his visit to Tokyo in 1936 - it was a new form of the campaign for the Olympic Games promoted by the Japanese. Baillet-Latour was impressed by the location, and he later stated that this visit to the Meiji Shrine had significantly influenced his decision to support the Tokyo candidacy.

The decision to locate the Olympic Stadium on the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine created tension between the Tokyo administration, the organizing committee, the Ministry of Interior and the shrine office. Different ideas about this question were also found within these institutions. Leading members of the OC in particular supported this plan, as the outer district of the shrine, due to its importance, would provide an appropriate environment for the occasion. The city of Tokyo criticized that the outer district of the Meiji Shrine would not offer enough space for a modern stadium if it would meet the requirements of the Olympic Games. In doing so, she relied primarily on the expertise of Kishida Hidenobu , who taught architecture at the Imperial University of Tokyo and traveled to Berlin for the 1936 Summer Olympics to inspect the sports facilities there. Kishida took the view that the outer district of the Meiji Shrine could not meet the standards set in Berlin, which is why a completely new Olympic complex should be built. The city was also angry about the vote on the Meiji Shrine stadium. Mayor Ushizuka was not invited and was late, so the decision was made without objection. Prince Tokugawa disregarded his request to discuss the matter further. Ushizuka received support from the second Japanese IOC member Kanō Jigorō, who also thought the site had not been adequately investigated. The Shrine Office, which oversaw all shrines , and the Home Office also opposed the plan to use Meiji Shrine as a site for the Olympic Games. They feared the natural beauty that is an essential part of the shrine would be destroyed by the construction work required for such a large event. They also feared that the presence of western visitors could disrupt the celebrations for the 2600th anniversary of the establishment of the imperial line and the memory of the Meiji-Tennō in the shrine. On the occasion of the celebrations in 1940, the Ministry of the Interior also planned to expand the outer district of the Meiji Shrine.

Due to the hardened fronts between the JAAA and the city of Tokyo, the organizing committee set up a commission to clarify the question of the best location for the Olympic Stadium. Nine locations were discussed: Yoyogi, Shibaura, the Komazawa golf course, Sagimiya, Kamitakaitō, Kinuta, Suginami, Iogi and the Meiji Shrine. The commission quickly came to a conclusion, but the dispute over the location in the OC continued for a long time. The first suggestion was Yoyogi, followed by Meiji Shrine and Komazawa Golf Course. The final decision was postponed four times until March 1937 due to the discrepancies. The city of Tokyo, but also the military, disagreed with Yoyogi and the shrine. This delay caused concern at the IOC and led to the intervention of the IOC President.

Despite the numerous dissenting votes, the majority of the OC supported the original plan: The existing stadium in the outer district of the Meiji Shrine was to be enlarged to a capacity of 100,000 spectators, which would have resulted in costs of around 2.5 million yen. Soeshima, who stated that he had the support of high officials such as Prime Minister Hayashi Senjūrō , Finance Minister Yūki Toyotarō and one of the two military ministers and 23 OOC members, was able to implement his plan. Seven months after the games were awarded to Tokyo, the location of the most important stadium seemed to have been determined. The position of the Ministry of the Interior was undermined by the fact that Kodama Kōichi , the chairman of the shrine office, presented the extension of the outskirts of the Meiji shrine from the question of hosting Olympic competitions there as separate issues. Hiranuma Ryozo , Vice President of the JAAA and member of both the OK and the mansion, took up this argument when he told the press that the Ministry of the Interior was planning to expand the facility and the stadium anyway and that this would not endanger the natural beauty. This view prevailed and so the House of Representatives passed a law on March 30, 1937 to expand the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine, which also included the expansion and reconstruction of the stadium.

Even this parliamentary decision could not resolve the conflict. Shortly before the IOC session in Warsaw in June 1937, the shrine office announced that it would reject the expansion of the stadium because the beauty of the Meiji shrine was in danger. The OK took note of this position, but continued to represent the Meiji plan to the IOC. At that time, however, the media were already speculating about the choice of an alternative location for the stadium. Meanwhile, Soeshima, who was already in Europe, stressed that expanding the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine and the stadium there was important in order to preserve Japan's international reputation. Since the IOC president indicated to the Tokyo organizers that the games could also be withdrawn due to the ongoing problems, there was hectic activity in the OK. Prince Tokugawa used his personal connections to promote Meiji Shrine Park as the site of the Olympic Stadium. In personal negotiations with liaisons in the shrine office, he reduced the target capacity for the stadium from 120,000 to 75,000 so as not to destroy the landscape. However, this proposal came under fire within the Japanese sports world because it would have lowered the demands of the Olympic Games. The city of Tokyo also opposed this compromise proposal because it wanted a large, representative stadium as the main financier. However, the Home Secretary was convinced by Prince Tokugawa, which is why this issue appeared to be resolved.

Aerial view of the Komazawa Olympic Park with the sports facilities for the 1964 , 1989 Summer Olympics . When establishing the sports facilities, the organizers of the 1964 Games referred to the plans for 1940.

The shrine office upheld its refusal, which is why alternatives were considered in late 1937. Soeshima also spoke out in favor of an alternative when the compromise in the OK could no longer be kept. At the beginning of 1938 it became clear that no agreement would be reached with the shrine office. Added to this were the increasing limitations on the use of resources as a result of the war in China, which is why the state funding of the Olympic Games and the Olympic Stadium as a whole became increasingly questionable. Therefore, the final decision on the location of the Olympic Stadium was not made until the beginning of April 1938. The city of Tokyo decided to build the Olympia Complex in Komazawa and not pursue the plans in the outer district of the Meiji Shrine. The OK agreed to these plans. In the official English report, the OK stated that the decision had been made because it was not possible to increase the spectator capacity from 50,000 to 100,000 at the stadium in the Meiji Shrine. However, the Japanese report stated that no consensus could be reached with the Home Office. The Olympic News reported also that the new complex should be built in to leave a lasting reminder of the games in the city. On May 1, 1938, Soeshima officially announced the plan to the IOC President. On May 23, the city of Tokyo confirmed the plan and approved the budget for the Komazawa Stadium, which means that the sports center of Tokyo was relocated to the southwest of the city.

The plans for the torch relay

Olympic torch-bearers, 1936.

A new ritual, the torch relay, was introduced for the 1936 Summer Olympics . For Carl Diem , who was the driving force behind this introduction, and the Berlin Organizing Committee, in addition to the connection between ancient Greece and the German Empire, it symbolized the continuity between the Olympic Games of antiquity and those of the modern era . Diem was personally committed to establishing the torch relay for the following games. The symbolism of the fire was not entirely new, but had been established since the 1928 Summer Olympics in Amsterdam , where an Olympic fire was lit.

Carl Diem was not only committed to the establishment of a torch relay, but also drafted plans for such a run at the Olympic Games in 1940. He proposed that the Olympic flame be transported from the ignition in Olympia to Tokyo via the Silk Road . He presented this plan to some Japanese during the 1936 Olympic Games and shortly afterwards to the IOC President. The latter suggested that Diem be included in the planning. Diem corresponded with the Swede Sven Hedin about his idea for the torch relay. He estimated 30 days for the 10,000 kilometers that the fire had to cover. 3000 should be covered on foot, 7000 on horseback. The route that Diem envisioned should go from Olympia via Athens , Saloniki , Edirne , Istanbul , Ankara , Erzurum , Tabriz , Tehran , Mashhad , Herat , Kabul , Peshawar , Delhi , Benares , Calcutta , Mandalay , Hanoi , Guangzhou , Hankou , Tianjin , Shenyang , Seoul , Busan , then by sea to Okayama and from there via Kobe and Nagoya to Tokyo. The organizing committee did not respond to these efforts, however, which Diem heavily criticized, although he acknowledged that the war in China could hamper the project. He pursued his plan away from the Japanese organizers and wanted to integrate the torch relay into the preparations for the Olympic Games through pressure from the Olympic movement. To this end, the plan was discussed at the IOC session in Cairo in March 1938. In addition, Hedin and Diem wanted to publish their plans, but this only happened years later in the Olympic Review .

Although the organizing committee paid no attention to Diem's ​​plan, there were separate considerations for a torch relay. In October 1936 the newspaper Asahi Shimbun published Soeshima's plan: the torch relay was to begin in Athens and then to Aden , Mumbai , Singapore , the Philippines , Shanghai , Takachiho and Ise and finally to end in the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo. Both in Takachiho and in Ise, where the Ise shrine is the most important Shinto shrine , the Olympic flame should visit important Japanese places of worship and so the torch relay should be connected with national rituals. The organizing committee was therefore quite ready to take on the new Olympic ritual. The national part of the torch relay was the more important: Takachiho was identified as the place of origin of the first Tennō Jimmu , the torch relay from this place would have had a direct reference to the imperial anniversary to be celebrated. The question of whether the torch relay should be a more national or international ritual remained a point of contention. Public opinion favored the former, while there were also nationalist voices that generally opposed the run with a foreign fire. Despite these conflicts, the organizing committee stated at the IOC session in Cairo that a torch relay was planned, for which several routes were possible. These should be further investigated. But there were also individual voices right up to the end that spoke out in favor of Diem's ​​solution. So the general secretary of the OK, Nagai, tried on June 10, 1938 to advertise his plan to the OK. Ultimately, however, there was no solution to the dispute and no binding planning of a torch relay until the right to host the 1940s Games was returned by the OK to the IOC.

The voice of the Tennō

Tennō Hirohito, 1932.

To ensure the special character of the Olympic Games, which differentiated them from other sporting events, it was part of the protocol that the IOC President invited the respective head of state to open the Games. In 1930 the opening formula was also determined. For the Japanese organizers, this meant another area of ​​conflict, as the role of the Tennō in this context was up for negotiation. Especially the MP Kōno Ichirō criticized the Olympic Games for this reason. The Tennō was a religiously charged personality. His appearance at such a mass event as the opening ceremony and in particular the technical transmission of his voice would have been a blasphemous act for the critics . At that time it was common for the Japanese broadcaster NHK to take measures to prevent the emperor's speeches from being broadcast. It was not until the declaration of Japan's surrender that the voice of Tennō Hirohito could be heard technically transmitted in the radio address Gyokuon-hōsō . No solution was found for this protocol problem until the right to host was returned.

Scheduled competitions

The organizing committee proposed 22 sports for the program at the 1937 IOC session in Warsaw. These were the 14 traditional Olympic sports, four selected sports that were particularly popular in Japan ( water polo , soccer , hockey and basketball ), the two new sports in Berlin, canoe racing and handball, and the demonstration sports Budo and baseball . Then there were the art competitions . The first half of October was suggested as the period for the Olympic Games. The IOC decided to place the date of the games on the last week of September and the first week of October. The proposed sporting program was accepted, but handball and canoe racing were subject to the conditions that the international associations must guarantee at least five participating nations within six months. These two sports were then definitely included in the program at the IOC session in Cairo in 1938.

Delegates from the Organizing Committee, including Werner Klingeberg , took part in meetings of the International Amateur Athletic Federation , FIFA , Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique , FILA , Fédération Equestre Internationale and Fédération Internationale de Boxe Amateur in 1938 . There was no further cooperation with other associations due to the return of the right to host to the IOC. The planned competition calendar published in the official report ultimately showed 18 sports.

Legend: E. Planned opening V Planned event S. Scheduled closing ceremony
Planned schedule for the 1940 Summer Olympics
date September October
21st 22nd 23. 24. 25th 26th 27. 28. 29 30th 1. 2. 3. 4th 5. 6th
opening E.
basketball V V V V V V V V V V V
Boxing V V V V V
fencing V V V V V V V V V V V V V
Soccer V V V V V V V V V V
Weightlifting V V
Handball V V V V V
hockey V V V V V V V V V
canoe V V
athletics V V V V V V V V
Modern pentathlon V V V V V
Cycling V V V
horse riding V V V V V V
Wrestling V V V V V V V
rowing V V V V
shoot V V V
swim V V V V V V V V
sailing V V V V V V V
do gymnastics V V
graduation S.
date 21st 22nd 23. 24. 25th 26th 27. 28. 29 30th 1. 2. 3. 4th 5. 6th
September October

The cancellation of the Tokyo Summer Olympics

Although the opinion is widespread that Japan had been withdrawn from the Olympic Games in 1940 because of the armed conflict, it was a question of a voluntary return of the right to host for domestic political reasons. Nevertheless, there were international boycott efforts in 1937 and 1938 . The external and internal pressure on the organizers did not lead to the games being canceled immediately. Only after a phase of decreasing support and increasing pressure did they return the right to host the event to the IOC.

International boycott efforts

The discussion about the boycott of the Tokyo Games came from the British Olympic Association (BOA), which did not want to send a team in 1940. The Associated Press news agency reported on February 1, 1938 that the BOA was discussing the possibility of bidding as an alternative venue. This report sparked international speculation about an official boycott. In contrast to the British Olympic Committee, the American IOC member Avery Brundage took the position that sport was above politics, which is why a boycott was out of the question for him. But the boycott movement also grew in the USA. In contrast, it was the British who made their boycott official. Nevertheless, IOC members from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, France and Belgium continued to confirm their support for Tokyo. The position of Great Britain in the run-up to the IOC session, which took place in Cairo from March 10 to 18, 1938, remained somewhat unclear, as Baron Aberdare also brought up and emphasized the possibility of a voluntary return of the right to host by Tokyo to the press that he would prefer this option to the will of other nations to boycott. The French IOC member François Piétri opposed such considerations, since the games were awarded to Tokyo in accordance with the Olympic protocol in Berlin and this protocol did not provide for the withdrawal of these games.

The Chinese IOC member Wang Zhengting , who was unable to attend the IOC session in Cairo in person because he had been transferred to Washington, DC as ambassador, wrote to request that Japan withdraw the Olympic Games and host them in an alternative location. In his telegram he pointed out that the Olympic Games serve international friendship and should therefore not be awarded to a warring party. IOC President Baillet-Latour rejected this request, pointing out that there was no basis for such a measure in the Olympic Charter . After reading the telegram, however, the IOC President instructed the Japanese OC to decide soon whether it would host the Games. Despite the preference of China, Great Britain and Finland to withdraw the Games from Japan, the Japanese organizers stressed the importance of the Games for their country and their willingness to host them. However, this conflict situation was not as decisive for the IOC as the concern that the planned world exhibition would clash with the Olympic Games. It called for a gap of one month between the planned end of the World's Fair on August 24, 1940 and the beginning of the Summer Games on September 24. Should this distance be violated, the IOC Tokyo would withdraw the games. The IOC President set the deadline for the decision on this point on May 8, 1938. This point of dispute was finally resolved with a negotiated three-week period between the two events, which was accepted by the IOC President. Despite this official adherence to Tokyo as the host of the Summer Olympics in 1940, Baillet-Latour also prepared steps in the background that would enable the voluntary return of the right to host the event in view of the growing criticism from within Japan and the choice of a new venue.

After the IOC session in Cairo was over, the British IOC member Baron Aberdare wrote to the IOC President that Japan was in a likely protracted war and was therefore not a suitable venue for the Olympic Games. He feared that sticking to Tokyo could damage the Olympic Games as a whole, so he advocated Helsinki as an alternative. However, the IOC had voted in Cairo and came to the conclusion that the safety of athletes had absolute priority. As long as the war has not reached the host country, the Olympic Games can be held with confidence. The Tokyo OK, however, continued to have influential advocates with the IOC president, but also the American IOC members Avery Brundage and William M. Garland . Baillet-Latour publicly stressed that he would oppose a boycott of the 1940 Olympic Games as he would have against a Jewish boycott of the 1936 Olympic Games.

The return of the games to the IOC

The international discussion did not lead to the Olympic Games being withdrawn. Instead, problems within Japan led to the right to host the event being returned to the IOC. The leadership of the influential military was critical of the Olympic Games because they feared the adaptation of Western customs by the Japanese. That is why she rejected the games with the Western foreigners coming into the country through her from the beginning. With the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937, these voices grew louder and also indicated that the war effort would not allow resources to be used for the Olympic Games. On the day the war broke out, the lower house member Kōno Ichirō called for the Olympic Games to be canceled. At the end of August 1937, Soeshima responded to these demands by speaking out in favor of returning the right to host the event and thus giving another organizer the opportunity to host the event if the necessary resources could not be made available. He also took the position vis-à-vis Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro that a rejection too late could damage Japan's reputation further. After this meeting and consultations with other members of the government, however, Konoe officially announced that it would hold on to hosting the 1940 Olympic Games.

This did not end the discussion about hosting the Olympic Games, but continued seamlessly. On September 6, 1937, during the budget negotiations in parliament, Kōno demanded that equestrian sport be deleted from the planned program, as the military was prohibited from holding horse-riding exercises, and this should also apply to civilians. He was referring to a ban by the Army Minister, who had forbidden Takeichi Nishi to train for the Olympic Games. The Prime Minister responded to Konos criticism by announcing that the future of the hosting of the Games should be decided soon. This development led to hectic activity among the organizers. Prince Tokugawa held an OC meeting to discuss whether to play or cancel. The Tokyo city council held a crisis meeting at which they called for the Olympic Games to be held, as the award to Japan was an expression of international trust in Japan and this trust should not be disappointed. The Ministry of Education and the JAAA also wanted to hold on to the event. On September 10, 1937, the cabinet declared that developments should be observed for some time before a final decision could be made. Despite the indifferent attitude of the government and the public discussion on this topic, the press maintained its positive attitude towards the hosting of the Olympic Games, but in some cases placed it clearly in a nationalist context that corresponded to the hostilities in China. And the IOC President also stuck to Tokyo as the venue and wanted to counter international criticism, provided the OC could prove progress in the organization at the 1938 IOC session.

Meeting to cancel the 1940 Summer Olympics on July 14, 1938. From left to right: Vice President of the Organizing Committee, Kobashi Ichita , Minister of Social Affairs Kido Kōichi , Vice President of the Organizing Committee, Shimomura Hiroshi , and its Secretary General, Nagai Matsuzō .

On June 23, 1938, the Prime Minister presented his austerity plan , which included cuts in the state budget. The Ministry of Finance should therefore reduce the issuance of bonds . This also had a direct impact on the OC, which was instructed to use existing sports facilities if possible. The aim was to reduce the budget by 30 to 40%, and the allocation of resources such as steel should also be limited. Since the city of Tokyo was banned from issuing bonds for the Olympic Games, observers expected the event to be greatly reduced in size. Despite such cuts, the government stated that it did not want the Games to be canceled. Klingeberg, the technical advisor to the OK, reported to the IOC on July 12th that the world exhibition had been canceled and that a decision on the Olympic Games should be made in the cabinet at the end of the month. He assumed that this decision would be positive.

Even if the Japanese government had rejected speculation about a possible cancellation by then, the Ministry of Welfare under Kido Kōichi withdrew the organizing committee's support on July 14, 1938 and asked the city of Tokyo to revoke the invitation to the games. The next day, as the responsible minister, he informed parliament about the withdrawal of Tokyo as the venue. On July 16, 1938, the IOC President Baillet-Latour, who had been held among others by Klingeberg on developments to date, was officially just like the Winter Olympics 1940 in by telegram about the cancellation of the Summer Olympics in 1940 in Tokyo Sapporo informed . The rejection was justified with the need to concentrate national resources on the Sino-Japanese War . At the same time, a renewed candidacy for the 1944 Summer Olympics was cited as a possibility. International observers suspected, on the one hand, that the military, which was skeptical of Western influences on Japan, was the driving force behind the cancellation, and on the other, that the threatened loss of face caused by the boycott threats from Switzerland, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries should be prevented.

The 1940 Summer Olympics in Helsinki

The Helsinki Olympic Stadium in the 1930s.

On the morning of July 16, 1938, before the telegram was officially rejected by the Tokyo Organizing Committee, IOC President Baillet-Latour contacted Finnish IOC member Ernst Krogius with a request for alternative plans for hosting the 1940 Summer Olympics. Three Days later, on July 19, 1938, Baillet-Latour officially offered the games for 1940 to Helsinki , which in 1932 Berlin and 1936 Tokyo were still defeated. On July 26th, the Finnish government accepted this decision. As a result, the organizing committee was quickly constituted under the leadership of IOC member Johan Wilhelm Rangell . The Scandinavian country was expected to host the Games more modestly. The preparations, following Erik von Frenckell's plans , proceeded rapidly. An Olympic village was built in Käpylä , and the Olympic stadium was already completed. Other facilities such as the swimming stadium were under construction. But the 1940 Helsinki Games could not be played either, as the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939 and the Winter War broke out, which ended on March 13, 1940. After the German Reich had also occupied Denmark and Norway, Baillet-Latour officially canceled the Olympic Games on May 2, 1940.

At the first IOC session after World War II in Lausanne in 1946 , Helsinki was awarded the Olympic Cup for preparation for the 1940 Olympic Games . This award marked the beginning of renewed efforts to host the Olympic Games. The Finnish government provided the city with funds to restore the sports facilities and build new ones. On April 23, 1947, Helsinki City Council decided to compete for the 1952 Olympic Games . In the same year, the Finnish capital was able to prevail against the competition at the IOC session in Stockholm , and from July 19 to August 3, 1952, it hosted the Olympic Games. As part of the preparation, a lot of preparatory work for 1940 was used in order to save costs. For example, the capacity of the former Olympic Stadium was increased from 45,000 to 70,000 spectators instead of building a completely new facility.

aftermath

The canceled Summer Olympics in 1940 marked an important milestone in the history of the Olympic movement. Tokyo's application campaign broke with the usual customs and established the application process as it does today with IOC delegations traveling to the candidate cities and the involvement of political officials. Until the IOC sessions in 1936 and 1937, the Olympic Games were still viewed as a domain that was basically ruled by the officials of the IOC and the NOKs. The direct assignment of political meaning with the hope that the Olympic Games would keep Japan in contact with the world in times of increasing isolation was new and continued thereafter. The award of the 1988 Summer Olympics to Seoul by the IOC was also seen as a measure to strengthen the democratic tendencies in South Korea.

Ceremony for the Olympic flame on September 7, 1964 in Naha , Okinawa .

In addition, the games planned for 1940 had an impact on future Olympic Games in Asia. These are most evident at the 1964 Summer Olympics , which took place in Tokyo. These games followed the tradition of combining nationalism and internationalism in major sporting events since the Far Eastern Games of 1923 in Osaka , which had had a particular impact on the preparations for the 1940 Olympic Games. After the right to host the event was returned to the IOC, an international sporting event took place in Tokyo in 1940. From June 6 to 9, 700 athletes from Japan, Manchuria , Thailand , the Philippines , Hawaii and the Occupied Chinese Territories took part in the East Asian Games organized by the city and the JAAA . As part of the celebrations for the 2600th anniversary of the imperial line, a torch relay was held that carried a sacred fire from the Kashihara Shrine to the Meiji Shrine. This event was very likely inspired by the discussions surrounding the Olympic torch relay. When Tokyo was awarded the 1964 Summer Olympics at the 1959 IOC session in Munich , the three major conflicts in preparation for the 1940s games were no longer valid. After the address on the surrender by the Tennō , the opening of the Olympic Games by him was no longer a problem. The torch relay, which was in conflict between international and national interests during the preparations in the 1930s, also took place without such discussions. He largely followed Carl Diem's plan and was charged with nationalism and pacifism when the fire was lit by Sakai Yoshinori , who was born on the day of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima . The conflict over the location of the sports facilities was also resolved. The Tokyo Olympic Stadium was located on the outskirts of the Meiji Shrine, while two other centers, the Komazawa Olympic Park and Yoyogi Park , were built in locations that had already been discussed with regard to 1940.

The bidding and preparation of Tokyo for the 1940 Summer Olympics shaped the following Olympic Games in Asia ideologically. Both the 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo and the 1972 Winter Olympics in Sapporo, the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano and the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing were each staged in different ways as a connection between Orient and Occident . They should convey a positive image of Asia towards the West and obtain its recognition. At the same time, they formed a stage on which the host countries could present themselves as modern, progressive nations, while at the same time the western exoticism was also partially met.

literature

  • The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940.
  • Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics. Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement (= Sport in the Global Society), London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-37317-3 .
  • Martin Polley, Olympic diplomacy: the British government and the projected 1940 Olympic games, in: The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 9, No. 1992, 2: 169-187.
  • Anonymous, To Helsingfors, in: Time, Vol. 32 (4), July 25, 1938, 28.
  • Andreas Niehaus & Max Seinsch (eds.), Olympic Japan. Ideals and Realities of (Inter) Nationalism, Würzburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-89913-588-6 .

Web links

Commons : 1940 Summer Olympics  - Collection of Images, Videos, and Audio Files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games: The Missing Olympics. Japan, the Asian Olympics and the Olympic Movement (= Sport in the Global Society), London 2007, 2.
  2. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 2f.
  3. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, Jan.
  4. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 24.
  5. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 25.
  6. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 26f.
  7. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, Jan.
  8. ^ Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford 2003, ISBN 978-0-19993-015-9 , 190.
  9. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 29-39.
  10. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, Jan.
  11. ↑ Eriko Yamamoto, Cheers for Japanese Athletes: The 1932 Los Angeles Olympics and the Japanese American Community, in: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (August 2000), 399-430, here: 409-11.
  12. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 34.
  13. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 35.
  14. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 41.
  15. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 49.
  16. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 51.
  17. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 52f.
  18. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 53.
  19. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 56.
  20. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 58.
  21. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 59f.
  22. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 61.
  23. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 63f.
  24. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 67.
  25. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 68f.
  26. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 71.
  27. ↑ Martin Polley, Olympic diplomacy: the British government and the projected 1940 Olympic games, in: The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 9, No. 1992, 2, 169-187, 174f.
  28. ^ Polley, Olympic diplomacy, 179-82.
  29. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 72.
  30. ^ Polley, Olympic diplomacy, 169f.
  31. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 74f.
  32. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 3.
  33. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 5.
  34. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 88.
  35. ^ A b David Rowe, Mediating the Asian Olympics: The Summer Games - Image Projection and Gaze Reception, in: The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 29, No. 16, 2231-2243, here: 2240.
  36. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 89.
  37. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 91f.
  38. ^ A b The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 14f.
  39. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 100f.
  40. ^ The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 16.
  41. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 102.
  42. ^ The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 20.
  43. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 112.
  44. ^ A b c Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 113.
  45. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 114.
  46. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 114f.
  47. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 116.
  48. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 117.
  49. ↑ a b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 118.
  50. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 119.
  51. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 120.
  52. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 121.
  53. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 122.
  54. ↑ a b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 123.
  55. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 124.
  56. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 126.
  57. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 127.
  58. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 128f.
  59. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 130f.
  60. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 133.
  61. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 134.
  62. ^ The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 33f.
  63. ^ The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 35.
  64. ^ The Organizing Committee of the XIIth Olympiad, Report of the Organizing Committee on its Work for the XIIth Olympic Games of 1940 in Tokyo until the Relinquishment, Tokyo 1940, 32.
  65. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 143.
  66. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 149.
  67. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 150.
  68. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 152f.
  69. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 153.
  70. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 157.
  71. ↑ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 154f.
  72. ↑ Arnd Krüger : Germany and the Olympic Movement (1918 - 1945), in: Horst Ueberhorst (Hrsg.): Geschichte der Leibesübungen, Vol. 3/2, Berlin: Bartels & Wernitz, 1982, 1026 - 1047.
  73. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 144.
  74. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 145.
  75. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 147.
  76. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 158f.
  77. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 160.
  78. ^ Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 162.
  79. ^ A b Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 165.
  80. ^ A b Anonym, To Helsingfors, in: Time, Vol. 32 (4), July 25, 1938, 28.
  81. ^ Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 166.
  82. ↑ Volker Kluge, Olympic Summer Games. The Chronicle II. London 1948-Tokyo 1964, Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-328-00740-7 , 165.
  83. ↑ a b Volker Kluge, Olympic Summer Games. Chronicle II, 169.
  84. ↑ a b Volker Kluge, Olympic Summer Games. Chronicle II, 166.
  85. ↑ David Black & Byron Peacock, Catching up: Understanding the pursuit of major games by rising developmental states, The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 28, No. 16 (2011), 2271-2289, 2278.
  86. ↑ Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 179f.
  87. ^ Sandra Collins, The 1940 Tokyo Games, 183f.
  88. ^ David Rowe, Mediating the Asian Olympics, 2239.
  89. ↑ Sandra Collins, 'Samurai' politics: Japanese cultural identity in global sport - The Olympic Games as a representational strategy, in: The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol. 24, No. 3, 357-374, here: 360.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on November 18, 2014 .