State crisis in Egypt 2013/2014

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After recurring protests against President Mohammed Morsi since November 2012 had become increasingly violent in June 2013 , the military staged a coup on July 3, 2013 , overthrew the government, suspended the constitution and took power. Protests by opponents of the coup, especially supporters of the ousted president, have continued for months since the coup. There were bloody clashes and mass killings, in which well over a thousand people, mostly coup opponents, have died.

That the Military Council chief Abdel Fattah El-Sisi led military described the coup as a "second revolution", claiming the overthrow Mursi was willed by people who had been dissatisfied with political and economic grievances. The generals also accused the Muslim Brotherhood of following a US and EU agenda while pursuing a policy of terror by supporting the Islamist insurgents who fought the military in Sinai . Western media reported that Morsi was deposed after he disappointed many Egyptians' hopes for democratization after the fall of Mubarak in 2011. Supporters of the ousted President Morsi and human rights groups accused the military of having overthrown the elected president in a coup and of wanting to return to the regime of the long-time ruler Mubarak .

An alliance of the military, the judiciary and the security apparatus worked together in the fall of Morsi. The coup was led by the Coptic patriarch , Pope Tawadros II , the imam of Cairo's al-Azhar University , Grand Sheikh Ahmed Tayeb , representatives of the Tamarod protest movement and, at least initially, by the left-liberal leader of the opposition alliance National Salvation Front , Mohammed el-Baradei , and representatives of the Salafists Party-only officially endorsed and welcomed.

Before and after the establishment of a partially civil, anti-Islamist and unelected transitional government under interim prime minister Hasim al-Beblawi by the military in July, the situation escalated again into mass killings of members of the Muslim Brotherhood by Egyptian security forces. A high point of the violence was the bloodbath caused by the security forces during the evacuation of the pro-Mursi protest camps on Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya and Nahda Squares in Cairo on August 14, 2013. When the two protest camps in Cairo were stormed According to the military-backed transitional government, at least 378 people were killed and thousands more injured on the following day, according to recent reports by international human rights organizations and Western media around 1000 and according to the Muslim Brotherhood more than 2000 pro-Morsi demonstrators. Almost all of the more than 1,000 people killed in July and August were civilians who had demonstrated against military chief Sisi and were shot dead by the security forces. In the summer of 2013 alone, the ruthless crackdown on the anti-coup protests in Cairo by the security forces killed at least 1,400 people, some of them through systematic shootings.

The state of emergency, imposed by the military-backed transitional government on August 14 and extended by two months in mid-September to mid-November 2013, gave authorities and emergency services special rights in dealing with protests and gatherings and made it difficult for the media to work in the country. The Vice President Mohammed el-Baradei, who resigned in protest, fled abroad to avoid arrest. Freedom of the press has been restricted, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has been imprisoned and thousands of Muslim Brotherhood arrested. All Muslim Brotherhood organizations have been banned and their property has been confiscated. The ban was seen as an indication that the Muslim Brotherhood should be excluded from the military-installed transitional government promised for 2014. Following a court order, the interim government declared the end of the state of emergency on November 14th.

The ousted President Morsi has been held in an undisclosed location since the coup on July 3rd until his trial began on November 4th. He and 14 other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were tried for inciting violence. They face life imprisonment or the death penalty . The upcoming trial sparked concerns at home and abroad that the army led by military chief Sisi would turn the country, which had been hoping for a democratic course since the fall of Mubarak in 2011 , back into a police state .

By the beginning of October, the number of people killed since the coup had risen to 2,000 and continued to grow every week. The series of violence that has continued since the fall of Morsi has been interpreted as an indication of a growing instability in Egypt. In the months after the coup, significantly fewer tourists came to Egypt. On October 9, the US government, which initially justified the coup, froze parts of its military aid to Egypt for the time being.

At the end of March, military chief Sisi officially announced that he would run for the presidential election. He will resign from his post as army chief and step down as defense minister and vice prime minister. There was only one other candidate for office, Hamdin Sabahi. Sisi received almost 97 percent of the votes cast.

A few weeks before the presidential election, Egypt, which was in fact ruled by the military, was classified by scholars and observers as an increasingly repressive military dictatorship or as a repressive system in which democracy, the rule of law and human dignity were practically eliminated. At that time, the US stuck to the resumption of its previously limited military aid to Egypt, which had already been decided .

Overview

chronology

The fall of Mubarak:

  • January 25, 2011: For the first time tens of thousands demonstrate nationwide against the regime of Hosni Mubarak and demand the resignation of the autocratic President Mubarak in Cairo after the uprisings in Tunisia . The state power under Mubarak is using force against the protesters. Hundreds of demonstrators were killed as a result.

The Tantawi Military Government:

  • February 11, 2011: After 30 years of authoritarian rule and an 18-day revolt, Mubarak resigns from mainly young people and appoints his Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq as head of cabinet. The crowd in Tahrir Square responded to the announcement with “God is great” shouts. The Supreme Military Council takes power . In the West, despite his authoritarian regime, Mubarak was recognized as a guarantor of stability and a fighter against radical Islamists. The military dissolves parliament and suspends the constitution, as the demonstrators demanded. Mubarak is arrested.
  • February 14, 2011: The ruling military officers present a timetable according to which constitutional amendments are to be worked out and put to referendum and a new government elected within six months. The day before, the military had consolidated its power by dissolving the weak parliament and overriding the constitution, sparking a debate about the military's long-term intentions.
  • 2011: Tourism, which offers almost three million people direct jobs and accounts for 20 percent of state currencies, begins to collapse. The more lucrative cultural tourists in particular are reluctant to return to Egypt over the next two years. While the police, ubiquitous under Husni Mubarak, had stopped sexual harassment from public places, the withdrawal of the security forces in the next two years since Mubarak's resignation has led to a surge in sexual assaults against women in the open air. In spring 2013 this led to violent disputes about those responsible for this development.
  • March 8, 2011: The military council sets up a transitional government, which is subsequently reorganized again and again due to popular dissatisfaction.
  • Spring 2011: Since spring, the anger of the population has shifted increasingly to the military council, which is accused of disregarding freedom of expression, of having tried 12,000 civilians in military courts, of wanting to anchor the power of the military in the constitution and the security forces brutally oppose it to let protesting demonstrators go ahead.
  • March 19, 2011: The Egyptians vote in a constitutional referendum for a constitutional amendment that limits the president's term of office to a maximum of eight years and makes the declaration of a state of emergency subject to parliamentary approval.
  • October 9, 2011: The Coptic Maspero protests , taking place against the background of sectarian tension , lead to the most serious outbreak of violence since Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. At least 25 people are killed, according to eyewitness reports, some of them by deliberately being run over by army vehicles. The Supreme Military Council blames foreign "conspiracies", sectarian tensions or the demonstrators.
  • November 1, 2011: While the election date is being postponed, the military, which a few months previously had been hailed as the savior of the Mubarak regime, is seizing more and more power, preventing freedom of the press and banning demonstrations. Since many people no longer trust traditional media, people are increasingly getting information via Facebook, blogs and online newspapers.
  • November 21, 2011: The interim government under Essam Sharaf resigns. The military council then appoints Kamal al-Ganzuri as head of government. The efforts of the opaque military council in the previous months are seen as an attempt to secure the power of the military in Egypt for the period after the elections on November 28th. The military council is accused of prescribing the guidelines for the still-to-be-drafted constitution and of wanting to prevent the parliament, which consists of the lower house and the Shura council, from gaining control over the military budget. The actions of the military council are supposed to be more brutal than the Mubaraks. The state of emergency is still not lifted.
  • November 22, 2011: The Military Council announces the presidential election for June 2012. Shortly thereafter, the military allegedly wants to give up power. The street fights between the demonstrators and the military continue.
  • November 28, 2011 to 3rd / 4th January 2012: The Muslim Brotherhood wins almost half in the parliamentary elections , the ultra-conservative Salafists get a quarter of the seats in the lower house, so that the Islamists have 70 percent of the seats. The liberal Wafd party took third place with 8 percent. The election of the upper house (Shura Council) as the second chamber of parliament was also won by the Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood with 38 percent, party-only with 16 percent), while the liberal Wafd party received five percent.
  • January 2012: Mohammed el-Baradei withdraws his presidential candidacy on the grounds that democracy in the country is not yet ready for him to run with a clear conscience.
  • January 25, 2012: The state of emergency that has existed since 1981 is lifted.
  • February 1, 2012: 74 people died as a result of riots at Port Said football stadium . The military council and the police are suspected, among other things, of specifically promoting this and other riots in order to cement the desire of the population for solid leadership.
  • March 24, 2012: Both chambers of parliament elect a constitutional commission to revise the constitution one more time.
  • April 10, 2012: In response to a complaint by liberal parties, a court declares the constitutional commission illegitimate because the parliament exceeded its powers in putting together the commission.
  • 23/24 May 2012: In the first round of the presidential election, Mohammed Morsi, candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ahmed Schafik, the last head of government under Mubarak, achieve the best results and reach the runoff election.
  • June 2, 2012: A criminal court in Cairo sentenced the ousted Egyptian President Mubarak to life imprisonment for the ordered killing of over 800 demonstrators with a guilty verdict that state television referred to as the “verdict of the century”. The defense announces that they will appeal. In several cities, thousands of people are protesting against what they consider to be too mild a judgment.
  • June 12, 2012: Both chambers of parliament elect a new constitutional commission, which is dominated by Islamists. Decisions should be made with a two-thirds majority.
  • June 14, 2012: The Supreme Constitutional Court declares the election of the lower house to be invalid and decides to dissolve parliament two days before the runoff to the presidential election. Court President Faruk Sultan declares that the Military Council will take over the legislature until new elections for a new House of Commons have taken place. At the same time, the court decides that Ahmad Schafiq , who is preferred by the military as a candidate , can run for the runoff election, the air force commander, aviation minister and last prime minister of President Mubarak, who the Muslim Brotherhood suspect as a representative of the military council. The parliament had previously passed a law against the political activities of officials of the old regime, but the supreme electoral commission had declared it to be inconsistent. After the two rulings, protesters clash with the security forces before the Constitutional Court. Egypt now has neither a parliament nor a constitution, while the Supreme Military Council controls both legislative and executive powers. The event is rated as a "silent coup by the military". Mohammed Morsi later declared the judgment null and void as the new president, but the Constitutional Court upheld it and Morsi relented.
  • 16./17. June 2012: Former Muslim Brother Mohammed Morsi wins the runoff election against Ahmad Schafiq in the presidential election with 51.7% of the vote.
  • June 24, 2012: Mohammed Morsi becomes the first democratically elected president as the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood after the runoff election . However, due to the powers conferred on it by the most recent constitutional amendments, the Military Council controls the legislative process, the budget, the composition of the Constituent Commission and the contents of the new constitution, and thus de facto the entire constituent process.
  • June 29, 2012: Mursi takes the oath of office as President on Cairo's Tahrir Square in the presence of his supporters in an unofficial procedure and opens his jacket to show that he is not wearing a bulletproof vest. The unofficial oath is seen by various commentators as an artifice by Mursi to defy the Supreme Military Council, which, through a constitutional declaration of March 2011 and an amendment during the presidential election of June 2012, reserved large parts of power for itself.

Mursi's Presidency:

  • June 30, 2012: Morsi was officially sworn in as President after his election victory before the Supreme Constitutional Court in Cairo instead of before the People's Assembly in the lower house. The Supreme Military Council had previously ordered the dissolution of the People's Assembly in June, in which the Muslim Brotherhood held a majority, after the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that a legal error had been committed in the election to the People's Assembly.
  • July 9 to July 11, 2012: Morsi orders that the dissolved people's assembly be reinstated, which is to exercise its function until another people's assembly has been elected two months after a constitution to be drafted. On July 11, the President accepted a July 10 order from the Supreme Constitutional Court suspending Morsi's decision to reinstate the House of Commons, citing his respect for judicial decisions as a reason for accepting the court decision. Morsi's re-convening of the democratically elected parliament, which had been dissolved by the generals following an urgent court decision, was followed by an escalation of the power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military in July. The Supreme Court of Egypt and the generals reject Morsi's order, but in disregard of the Supreme Court and the military, Parliament rallies and votes to appeal the court decision. What follows is a jumble of opposing judicial authorities and jurisdictions. The power struggle reflects competing claims in emerging Egyptian politics, with each side trying to portray the debate as a contest of ideals, legitimacy and democracy.
  • July 19, 2012: Mursi orders the release of 572 detainees who had been detained by the military during the transition period led by the Supreme Military Council after the January 2011 revolution. A broad campaign called "No to Military Courts" had previously called for the release of all those arrested through military tribunals or sentenced to prison terms.
  • July 30, 2012: Morsi pardons 26 Islamist convicts in his capacity as president, most of whom belong to al-Jamāʿa al-islāmiyya and other hard-line Islamist groups as well as the Muslim Brotherhood. Some had been sentenced to the death penalty by State Security Courts.
  • August 2, 2012: Morsi appoints Hisham Kandil , the Islamist-leaning Minister for Irrigation and Water Management of the expiring government of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzuri , as Prime Minister. For the first time in Egyptian history, Kandil appoints a cabinet that includes ministers from the Muslim Brotherhood and allies.
  • August 8, 2012: After an attack by unknown militants on a security checkpoint , in which 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed, Morsi orders a restructuring of the security area and dismisses the secret service chief Murad Muwafi , the governor of North Sinai and various officials from the Interior Ministry .
  • August 12, 2012: Morsi amends the March 2012 constitutional declaration, significantly restricts the prerogatives of the military in power since the overthrow of the former ruler Husni Mubarak and overrides constitutional amendments of the Supreme Military Council, which restricted the power of the president in favor of the military . Lawyers criticize that he has exceeded his competencies. With the same decree, Morsi sends the Chief of the Supreme Military Council and Defense Minister Field Marshal, Mohammed Hussein Tantawi , as well as the second most important figure in the Military Council, Sami Enan , into retirement and appoints the military intelligence chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi as the future Defense Minister to head the armed forces .
  • August 14, 2012: Mursi awards Tantawi the highest state award and Enan a state award. Both will now become advisors to the President following the decree that retired them. The move is described as a “soft coup” against the military, but some opposition activists criticize that the Supreme Military Council should be held accountable for violence against demonstrators during the military regime.
  • August 15, 2012: On his second state visit to Saudi Arabia - the only country visited by the Egyptian President until then - Morsi calls for an end to the rule of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where a "civil war" between the Syrian military and armed forces Insurgents rages.
  • August 23, 2012: Morsi enacts a law that prohibits journalists from pre-trial detention for media-related violations.
  • August 27, 2012: President Morsi appoints personal advisors, including Christians, Liberals, Salafists and many members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • August 30, 2012: In a move causing concern in the US, the Egyptian President visits Iran - for the first time in 30 years - to attend a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement . Morsi criticizes Iran's support for the Syrian regime.
  • October 9, 2012: Morsi, in his capacity as president, issues amnesty to citizens arrested for acts in support of the revolution between the beginning of the January 25th revolution and June 30th, 2012.
  • October to November 2012: Legal disputes and constitutional declaration.
  • October 12, 2012: Riots broke out in Cairo because former Mubarak people, who are believed to be responsible for camel attacks on demonstrators in 2011, were acquitted. Mursi then wants to dismiss the attorney general, but ultimately it does not come to that.
  • November 21, 2012: Morsi receives US praise for his role in brokering a ceasefire between Hamas, ruling Palestinian Gaza, and the government of Israel after over 160 people were killed in Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket attacks within a week .
  • November 22, 2012: Morsi decides to restrict the powers of the judiciary with a constitutional amendment and tries to dismiss Prosecutor General Abdel Meguid Mahmud by appointing him as Egyptian ambassador to the Vatican state. After Mahmud and other judges challenge Morsi, who under Egyptian law does not have the power to dismiss the attorney general, Morsi gives in. Public unrest is forcing Morsis to reverse some of the proposals.
  • 29./30. November 2012: The constitutional commission, dominated by Islamist representatives and boycotted by the opposition, pushes through its draft of a new constitution in an urgent manner. Women's rights activists, Christians and liberals criticize the constitutional text. The mass protests continue.
  • 8/9 December 2012: Mursi gives in to the conflict with the opposition after massive pressure and revokes his special powers, which were extended by decree.
  • 15./22./24. December 2012: Almost two thirds of the population vote for the Egyptian government's draft constitution. While mainly secular critics describe the document as a fraud in the revolution, the Islamists disagree. Mass protests followed, with some fatal violence.
  • December 29, 2012: As stipulated in the new constitution, Morsi officially hands over authority to the Upper House of Parliament in one language before the now complete Shura Council. He emphasizes the right to vote of the House of Representatives (formerly the People's Assembly, the lower house of Parliament) as urgent.
  • January 24, 2013: On the second anniversary of the uprising against Mubarak, over 50 people were killed in one week.
  • January 25, 2013: The Tahrir Square in Cairo is once again a focal point of Egyptian protesters. On the second anniversary of the start of the revolt against Mubarak, the angry crowd calls on President Morsi to resign.
  • January 6, 2013: Mursi carries out his promised government restructuring, 10 new ministers are sworn in, including key positions in the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance. Contrary to calls for a less partisan government, the new cabinet includes eight FJP members instead of five prior to the restructuring. The new finance minister, Morsi El Sayed Hegazy, is an Islamist financial expert.
  • 26./27. January 2013: In Cairo, judges sentenced 21 people to death for their involvement in football riots that killed 74 people in Port Said in February 2012 . Many consider the February 2012 event to be a “massacre” of fans of the football club orchestrated by the then ruling Supreme Military Council in complicity with the Ministry of the Interior. Following the verdict, violent football fans organized rioting in Port Said, leading to an escalation of violence with dozens of dead and hundreds of injuries. Mursi imposed on 27./28. January the state of emergency over Port Said, Suez and Ismailia on the Suez Canal. Nonetheless, the unrest continues.
  • January 28, 2013: The most important opposition alliance, the National Salvation Front , refuses to enter into a dialogue with Morsi. Opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei says the National Salvation Front rejects a “fake” dialogue.
  • January 29, 2013: Military chief Sisi announces that national security is threatened and that the state is threatened with collapse.
  • January 30th: On a short trip to Europe, which was canceled due to the escalating violence in Egypt, Morsi's attempt to obtain debt relief in Germany and to strengthen the confidence of German investors in Egypt failed.
  • February to March 2013: Loss of the Salafists as the main allies of the Peace and Justice Party.
  • February 5, 2013: Morsi welcomes Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , who wants to attend a meeting of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation in Egypt, at Cairo Airport. It is the first such visit since the worsening Egyptian-Iranian relationship in 1979. Egyptian Salafists criticize the visit and warn of Shia influence in Egypt.
  • February 11, 2013: Over ten thousand Egyptians demonstrate on the second anniversary of Mubarak's resignation. Violent protests continued in several cities in the weeks that followed.
  • February 21, 2013: The Egyptian President announces that the first post-constitution election for the lower house of the House of Representatives will be held in April while the House of Lords Shura Council prepares a new electoral law.
  • February 26, 2013: Another meeting of the “national dialogue” with Morsi to discuss the upcoming parliamentary election is boycotted by the National Salvation Front . Disagreements between the President and the Muslim Brotherhood, on the one hand, and the Nur party's former allies emerged when Nur party leader Younis Makhioun criticized Morsi's decision to announce a date for the election without the Nur party or the most recent joint Having consulted the initiative of the Nur party with the National Salvation Front. Makhioun accuses the Muslim Brotherhood of trying to monopolize state institutions.
  • March 6, 2013: The Egyptian administrative court rejects Morsi's decree calling for parliamentary elections to be held in April on the grounds that an article of the electoral law needs to be re-examined by the constitutional court. In a statement, the President declares that he will respect the court's decision.
  • March 8, 2013: The election commission joins the decision of the Constitutional Court and decides to postpone the parliamentary election planned for April . A few days later, Mursi appeals against it. A broad alliance of Egyptian opposition parties had called for an election boycott. The opposition has repeatedly criticized the electoral laws, which they claim give the Islamic parties an advantage.
  • March 24, 2013: Numerous attacks on Freedom and Justice Party's offices and clashes between supporters and opponents of the president in Egypt seem to indicate a rise in sentiment against the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • March 28, 2013: State news agencies report that Morsi hopes the general election will take place in October.
  • April to May 2013: Diplomatic tensions and solidification of the opposition.
  • April 10, 2013: Morsi orders the withdrawal of all legal complaints against Egyptian journalists when his regime is attacked to investigate media personalities for "insulting the president".
  • April 20, 2013: Morsi announces an upcoming restructuring of the government.
  • April 21, 2013: The Supreme Administrative Court of Egypt rejects the President's appeal against the decision to suspend the parliamentary elections.
  • May 7, 2013: Mursi reshuffles his cabinet, but fails to appease the opposition. The number of ministers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood increases by three to eleven from 35.
  • June 2, 2013: The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt denies the legitimacy of the upper house of parliament, which is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists . The constitution enforced by Mursi declares it to have not come into existence under legal circumstances.
  • June 4, 2013: The judiciary issued prison sentences of several years in some cases against 43 domestic and foreign employees of non-governmental organizations, including the CDU-affiliated Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, for illegal activities. International protests follow.
  • June 6, 2013: According to media reports , the anti-Morsi signature campaign Tamarod , which was founded in May and aims to force Morsi out of office, allegedly wants 15 million signatures for the petition to withdraw trust in the president Millions more than he received votes in the election). Tamarod announces plans for mass demonstrations and sit-ins at the presidential palace for June 30, the first anniversary of Morsi's inauguration, to enforce their demands.
  • June 17, 2013: Morsi appoints seven Muslim Brotherhoods to the posts out of 16 newly appointed provincial governors. Critics refer to this as an example of an Islamist attempt to monopolize power and exclude other forces from the decision-making process, as 27 of the Egyptian provinces are under the control of governors with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Among the newly filled posts is the Provincial Governor of Luxor, a member of the former terrorist group Gamaa Islamija . The Gamaa Islamija member later resigns under public pressure. The appointments sparked a wave of protests and clashes between supporters and opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood in various governorates. This contributes to the general unrest in the country when clashes broke out across the country between supporters of Morsi and supporters of the Tamarod campaign in the run-up to the June 30 demonstrations.
  • June 20, 2013: The Tamarod campaign wants to force Mursi to resign. Media reports that she apparently collected several million signatures.
  • June 21, 2013: Tens of thousands of people demonstrate in the streets in support of Morsi.
  • June 23, 2013: The military threatens military intervention if the protests escalate.
  • June 24th, 2013: The Freedom and Justice Party confirmed on Friday (June 28th) before the nationwide planned protests of June 30th of the "unlimited demonstration" "Legitimacy is a red line" to participate. The sit-in is to take place at Cairo's Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque in Nasr City, a traditional meeting place for supporters of Mursi.
  • June 28, 2013: Thousands of Egyptians take to the streets in the run-up to new large-scale demonstrations to demand the resignation of Morsi. At least three people, including a US citizen, die in clashes. After the killing of the US citizen, the US government allows some of its embassy staff to leave Egypt.
  • June 29, 2013: The opposition Tamarod campaign declares that it has collected more than 22 million signatures for Morsi's resignation.
  • June 30, 2013: On the occasion of the one-year existence of President Morsi's term of office, hundreds of thousands of people gathered for mass protests after the signature campaign of the “Tamarod” campaign to demand Morsi's resignation. The media also speak of "millions" of protesters. At the same time there are solidarity rallies for Mursi. Eight people are killed in clashes and shootings in front of the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo.

The Sisis military coup:

  • July 1, 2013: Opponents of the government storm and devastate the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. Tamarod sets Mursi a resignation ultimatum until the following day. The military gives President Morsi an ultimatum to reach an agreement with the opposition within 48 hours. Otherwise the military will push through its own solution.
  • July 2, 2013: Mursi refuses to resign and lets Tamarod's ultimatum expire.
  • July 3, 2013: Morsi refuses to resign from the military even after the ultimatum has expired. The military decides that the country has reached a political impasse, removes President Morsi, places him under arrest, repeals the constitution and orders a technocratic interim government. Military chief General Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi appoints the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court , Adli Mansur, as transitional president. Mursi is taken to an unknown given location. Muslim Brotherhood leaders are arrested. Tens of thousands of Mursi supporters take part in permanent sit-down protest camps at the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque in the Nasr City district of Cairo and on Nahda Square in Giza.
  • July 4, 2013: The highest constitutional judge, Adli Mansur, is sworn in as interim president. Cairo's Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque becomes the scene of ongoing bloody battles with security forces as a protest camp for pro-Mursi supporters. Many people die in clashes with the military. Leading Muslim Brotherhoods are arrested.
  • July 5, 2013: Interim President Mansur dissolves the House of Lords (Shura Council) as the first official act as the last representative body in which Islamist parties had won a clear majority through elections. Dozens of people die in clashes between pro and anti-Morsi groups. US President Barack Obama and other world leaders are urging Egypt to swiftly restore civilian government. Supporters of the ousted President Morsi accuse the new interim authorities of brutally acting against their remaining leaders.
  • July 7, 2013: Hundreds of thousands protest across Egypt for and against the overthrow of Morsi by the military. A spokesman for interim president Mansur denies previous reports that Mohammed el-Baradei will become head of the interim government as interim prime minister. Instead, el-Baradei is given the post of vice-president.
  • July 8, 2013: Security forces shoot 53 Mursi supporters at a protest camp on the grounds of the Republican Guard in the bloodiest state carnage since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 , where Morsi is rumored to be held. Mansur presented a timetable for a revision of the constitution and election of a new president as well as parliamentary elections for mid-February. The Muslim Brotherhood rejects the proposals and insists on the reinstatement of Morsi.
  • July 9, 2013: Mansur appoints the opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei as deputy president and the economist Hasim al-Beblawi as interim prime minister. The Egyptian military supports the appointments. Mansur announces the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections after a previous referendum on a revised draft constitution for 2014 at the latest.
  • July 12, 2013: Thousands of Mursi supporters demonstrate in mass protests across the country. The German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle demands the release of the detained ex-President Mursi.
The Sisis Military Government / Transitional Government
Mansur Presidency - Beblawi Cabinet:
  • July 16, 2013: An interim government without the participation of Islamist parties is sworn in. The Muslim Brotherhood does not participate in the government and reject it as illegitimate. The military has a strong political role in the cabinet. The army chief Sisi, who was responsible for the overthrow of Morsi, is appointed as deputy to interim prime minister Hasem al-Beblawi. At least seven people are killed and more than 200 injured in riots in Cairo.
  • July 19, 2013: The British daily The Guardian publishes research according to which the military targeted attacks and apparently shot 54 people at the protest rally in front of the headquarters of the Republican Guard in Cairo on July 8, 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood is signaling its willingness to accept the EU as a mediator.
  • July 20, 2013: Interim President Mansur instructs a committee of legal experts to revise the Egyptian constitution.
  • July 24, 2013: Army chief Sisi calls on the Egyptians to show their solidarity with the military through demonstrations in a fight against “terrorism”. His speech is interpreted as a request for a "mandate" for crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies. The Muslim Brotherhood calls on its supporters to counter protests and describes Sisi's statements as an “invitation to civil war”.
  • July 26, 2013: Prosecutors announce that Morsi is being investigated on a number of charges, including murder and treason by conspiracy with members of Palestinian Hamas for a prison break during the 2011 revolution. Remaining detained in an unknown location, Morsi arrives thus formally in pre-trial detention on judicial instruction. Depending on the source, hundreds of thousands or millions of opponents and supporters of Morsi take to the streets for rival rallies across the country. The Morsi opponents respond to General Al-Sisi's army appeal to give the military leadership a “mandate to fight terrorism” to end “potential terrorism” through Morsi supporters. Five people are killed in clashes between pro and anti-Mursi groups. Previously, the Egyptian military gave the Muslim Brotherhood an ultimatum and announced tougher action against "extremists".
  • July 27, 2013: Police kill 95 pro-Mursi protesters on a street leading to the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya mosque in Cairo. The media sometimes speak of clashes between security forces and armed men in civilian clothes on the one hand and Mursi supporters on the other in the protest camp in front of the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya mosque in Cairo. According to witness statements, the demonstrators were unarmed and ambushed.
  • July 28, 2013: Interim President Mansur issues a decree that allows the military to arrest civilians. At the same time, the military-backed transitional government is threatening the Morsi supporters with “decisive and tough measures” in the event that the “violent” protests continue.
  • 30 July 2013: EU Foreign Affairs Representative Catherine Ashton met with officials and opposition leaders, including - in a secret location - Mursi. Ashton, as well as John McCain and Lindsey Graham, are among the international envoys visiting Egypt on an arbitration mandate. Germany, the USA and France again demand Morsi's release.
  • July 31, 2013: The military-backed transitional government resolves to forcefully evacuate the two sit-ins on Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Square and Nahda Square in Cairo, which Mursi supporters have been maintaining for weeks. Amnesty International sees the resolution as a "template for a disaster" and the US government calls on the coup leaders to respect freedom of assembly. The prosecution brought charges against the fugitive head of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Badi'e, and two imprisoned leaders, on charges of “inciting murder” in late June 2013.
  • August 1, 2013: US Secretary of State Kerry defends the military coup of July 3 as a restoration of democracy, in which not the military but a civil transitional government took the lead, and justifies it with popular displeasure. He is criticized for this statement.
  • August 4: Prosecutors announce the start of a trial of six Muslim Brotherhood leaders for "incitement to murder" on August 25.
  • August 7th: The Egyptian interim president Mansur declares the efforts of international diplomats for a peaceful solution between the military-backed interim government and the Muslim Brotherhood to have failed and holds the Muslim Brotherhood responsible. The EU Foreign Affairs Representative Catherine Ashton and US Secretary of State John Kerry do not want to end their diplomatic attempts. The interim government is threatening to crack down on pro-Morsi demonstrations after showing restraint during Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims. She has announced several times that the largest protest camps with thousands of Morsi supporters will be forcibly cleared. The international community fears new bloodshed in the event of an evacuation.
  • August 8, 2013: At the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, tens of thousands of demonstrators demand the reinstatement of Morsi. At the entrance to their central protest camp in front of the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque, the Muslim Brotherhood erect barricades to prevent the camp from being evacuated.
  • August 11, 2013: The security forces threatened the demonstrators to disband the ongoing pro-Mursi protest camps at the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque and Nahda Square within 24 hours. In preparation for a police action, the protesters are strengthening their barricades around their tent camps at the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque and on Nahda Square.
  • August 12, 2013: Authorities postpone planned actions against demonstrators, saying they would like to avoid bloodshed after Morsi supporters fortified their positions and thousands more demonstrators stepped up their sit-ins. Morsi's pre-trial detention is extended for another 15 days. This led to renewed protests and clashes between the two camps.
  • August 14, 2013: After a week of false alarms, bloodbath during the forcible evacuation of two protest camps with over hundreds of pro-Mursi protesters killed in Cairo, during which riot police drove protesters out of the extensive protest camps. According to a well-known local human rights group, the police and military killed at least 904 people during the evacuation of the protest camp in Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Square. A few armed demonstrators fight back and kill nine police officers. The interim government imposed a one-month state of emergency in Egypt and a night curfew in over ten provinces. Resignation of the interim vice-president Mohammed el-Baradei in protest against state power. A wave of arrests of high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood begins. Retaliatory attacks by radical Islamists on police stations in several Egyptian cities, including a bloodbath of 11 police officers in Kerdasa. Retaliatory attacks on Christians and Christian property by radical Islamists and pro-Morsi groups, mainly in Upper Egypt, claim at least four lives after the Christian minority is held responsible for the overthrow of Morsi. The largest wave of violence in recent Egyptian history unleashed with over 1,000 deaths within a week, most of which were Islamists killed by the security forces.
  • August 15, 2013: The Egyptian security forces were given permission to shoot at people in the event of the use of force. In a televised address, interim Prime Minister Hasem el-Beblawi defends the crackdown and the dissolution of protest camps of the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • August 16, 2013: Pro-Mursi groups march through Cairo in protest of the massacre in Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Square and are gunned down by police in the fourth mass killing of Morsi supporters since the fall of Morsi. 95 people are killed in Cairo alone. Beblawi proposes to legally dissolve the Muslim Brotherhood. The international criticism of the military leadership is getting sharper. According to EU Foreign Affairs Representative Catherine Ashton, the transitional government is primarily to blame for the violence.
  • August 17, 2013: The police cleared the Fetah Mosque in Cairo from anti-coup protesters trapped in the building after a day-long siege with shootings, tear gas volleys and attacks by the mob on the protesters. According to official figures, at least 173 people have been killed since August 16. According to a report in the Washington Post, military chief Sisi allegedly failed a few days earlier a peace agreement brokered by the USA and its partners from Europe and the Gulf States between the warring parties, as the bloodshed with hundreds of deaths could have been avoided.
  • August 18, 2013: 37 detainees on remand arrested on August 14 at the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya protest camp died from suffocation in police custody during a prisoner transport after a police officer shot CS gas into the police vehicle carrying the prisoners. Most of the prisoners are said to have been supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Authorities arrest senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including chief Muhammad Badi'e. The interim vice-president Mohammed el-Baradei, who resigned in protest, evaded arrest by fleeing to Vienna. For the first time since Morsi's fall, General Sisi addressed the Egyptians in a speech. He calls on the population not to tolerate any further violence, and he urges the anti-coup protesters to “revise their national position”. The Muslim Brotherhood cancels two demonstrations planned for this day at short notice and justifies this with concerns for the safety of the demonstrators and military snipers allegedly located on the roofs along the route. According to the military-backed transitional government, almost 900 people have died in the four days of unrest since the protest camps were cleared.
  • August 19, 2013: Reports announce the imminent release of former autocratic President Husni Mubarak from custody. Public prosecutors are investigating Morsi for responsibility for the killing of demonstrators in December 2012. Later a charge of libel follows. Presumably Islamist extremists kill 25 police officers on the Sinai Peninsula near Rafah. Islamist extremists kill 25 police recruits in a massacre in Sinai as the riot escalates there. The number of attacks on security officers and soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula is increasing. If there were attacks in the following months, at least 100 police officers and soldiers died in similar attacks.
  • August 20, 2013: As one of the last leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to be found at large, Muhammad Badi'e is arrested by security forces on the orders of the military-led government.
  • August 21, 2013: The European Union stops arms deliveries to Egypt. Civil aid programs are to continue for the time being. A court orders the release of Mubarak. The next day, he is transferred to a military hospital and remains under house arrest.
  • August 25, 2013: The trial of Badi'e and about three dozen other Muslim Brotherhood begins. The indictment is incitement to violence, which is said to have led to the deaths of Morsi opponents on June 30, 2013. The trial is adjourned to October almost immediately.
  • August 30, 2013: Nine people are killed in clashes between supporters and opponents of Morsi. In Egypt, Islamist coup opponents regularly protest on Fridays after midday prayer.
  • September 5, 2013: The Egyptian Interior Minister survived a bomb attack in the Nasr City district of Cairo when the jihadist uprising spilled over from the Sinai Peninsula to the continent.
  • September 7, 2013: Beginning of the largest military offensive in recent history on Sinai against Islamist extremists .
  • September 11, 2013: Two suicide attacks committed by the militant group Jund al-Islam on a local headquarters of the Egyptian security forces and a checkpoint of the military claimed at least six lives.
  • September 12, 2013: Extension of the state of emergency over 14 provinces for another two months.
  • September 16, 2013: Police regain control of the town of Delga, held since August 14 by hard-line Islamist raiders who looted churches in the town.
  • September 23, 2013: A court in Cairo rushed to declare the Muslim Brotherhood and all branches of the organization illegal and order the confiscation of their assets.
  • October 1, 2013: For the first time since the coup at the beginning of July, a march of supporters of Morsi reached Tahrir Square again to demonstrate.
  • October 4, 2013: The Muslim Brotherhood began three-day protests against the military coup. At least four Muslim Brotherhood members are shot dead in the largest demonstrations since the evacuation of the protest camps in Cairo on August 14.
  • October 6, 2013: In the nationwide protests of the Muslim Brotherhood that began on October 4 and at the same time the Yom Kippur War was celebrated by supporters of the military , police officers in Cairo and two southern provinces killed at least 57 people in the fifth mass killing since the fall of Morsi. Mursi supporters as they march through West Cairo. According to witness reports, the demonstrators were said to have been unarmed. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon strongly condemns the violence.
  • October 7, 2013: 18 members of the army and police are killed in nationwide attacks.
  • October 9, 2013: The USA announced that it would freeze part of its military aid to Egypt for the time being. The Egyptian interim government has now also revoked the status of the Muslim Brotherhood as a non-governmental organization.
  • October 11, 2013: After Friday prayers, thousands of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood again took to the streets across the country to protest against the military and the coup that took place 100 days ago.
  • October 20, 2013: In Cairo violent clashes broke out between students and security forces, who were demanding the reinstatement of Morsi.
  • October 22, 2013: Sections of the banned Muslim Brotherhood want to reorganize. A group called “Brothers Without Violence” applies to the Ministry of Social Affairs in Cairo for approval as a charity.
  • October 28, 2013: Mursi contests the legality of the court a week before the trial against him begins.
  • October 29, 2013: The judges in the Badi'e trial against the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood put down the case for incitement to murder and declare themselves biased after security forces refused to allow the accused to be in the courtroom during the proceedings.
  • November 3, 2013: US Secretary of State John Kerry declares on his first visit to Egypt since the coup against Morsi that the US government is obliged to cooperate with the Egyptian interim rulers.
  • November 4, 2013: The criminal trial begins in Cairo against Morsi, who is charged with inciting the murder of protesters in front of his presidential palace in December 2012. In his first public appearance since his fall and his stay in solitary confinement since July 3, Morsi refuses to recognize the court and causes a tumult among the attending lawyers and journalists. Supporters had called for protests in advance.
  • November 6, 2013: An appeals court upheld the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • November 14, 2013: The Egyptian business tycoon and billionaire Naguib Sawiris calls on the Reuters news agency for an immediate one-year ban on all protests, as otherwise the total collapse of Egypt is imminent. He is ready to invest a billion dollars for 2014.
  • 24./25. November 2013: Interim President Mansur signs a controversial restrictive demonstration law, according to which demonstrations must now be announced three days in advance. The introduction of the law leads to fears that the transitional government is now striving, as before, mainly Islamists, to also sharply fight secular activists.
  • November 27, 2013: Arrest warrants against highly respected secular activists of the anti-Mubarak uprising of 2011 such as Alaa Abd el-Fattah and Ahmed Maher , who also called for the overthrow of Morsi in June 2013, confirm in the eyes of many that the transitional government is striving to each Eliminate form of dissenting opinion.
  • December 1, 2013: Completion of the draft constitution, on the contents of which a referendum is scheduled for January 2014. While the previous version, written under Morsi, was perceived by critics as pioneering religious rule, the new draft lacks some religious paragraphs and is praised for several new additions, but critics complain that it continues to grant the army too many privileges.
  • December 14, 2013: It is announced that interim president Adli Mansur will hold a referendum on the newly drafted constitution on January 14th and 15th.
  • December 18, 2013: New charges are brought against Morsi, accusing him, despite traditionally difficult relations between Shiite Iran and the Sunni Brotherhood, of masterminding an elaborate seven-year plot that includes the Palestinian Hamas and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard .
  • December 24, 2013: At least 15 people died in the deadliest bomb explosion by militant assassins against security forces since the coup against Morsi in July 2013. The second attack on a police headquarters north of Cairo is the worst attack outside the anarchic Sinai and once again raises doubts as to whether the transitional government will be able to guarantee security a few weeks before the referendum on the draft constitution.
  • December 25, 2013: The Egyptian interim government officially classifies the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. She justifies the terror classification with the bomb attack in Mansura the day before, although the jihadist-Islamist group Beit Ansar al-Makdess , which comes from Sinai and is closely related to the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, had previously claimed responsibility for the bomb attack on December 24th in Mansura.
  • January 12, 2014: Army chief Sisi announces that he will run for the presidency if the Egyptian people and the army so choose.
  • 14./15. January 2014: Constitutional referendum held. The constitution put to the vote does not differ radically from the constitution drawn up under Morsi. Formally it contains more rights for citizens than previous constitutions, but privileges the military. The Muslim Brotherhood calls for a boycott. With a turnout of 38.6 percent, according to a later announcement by the electoral commission, 98.1 percent of the votes are in favor of the constitution. The transitional government hailed the election victory as a clear demonstration of support for its policies after the fall of Morsi. However, the turnout, which corresponds to over 20 million Egyptians, is rated as low in view of the repression of constitutional critics.
  • January 24, 2014: In Cairo, a city that has been one of the most stable in the Arab world for decades, on the eve of the third anniversary of the uprising against Mubarak, four independent bomb explosions, apparently all against the police, kill at least six people and injure more as 70. Apparently the attacks sparked spontaneous gatherings of supporters of General Sisi.
  • January 25, 2014: On the third anniversary of the revolution against Hosni Mubarak, dozens of people died in pro-Morsi and anti-government demonstrations across the country, including 64 in Cairo and Giza, of whom at least 58 were shot. In the Matariya district of Cairo alone, 26 people were killed during the violent breakup of a pro-Mursi demonstration by the police. According to independent information, however, 108 people were killed.
  • January 27, 2014: The head of the military junta, General Sisi, gives himself the title of Field Marshal and takes the first formal step to become the new Egyptian President, while insisting on "free choice of the masses" and the " Call of Duty ”to add. The highest military institution gives the military chief approval for the presidential candidacy.
  • January 28, 2014: Morsi faces trial on a prison break allegation that released more than 20,000 prisoners from Egyptian prisons in 2011, including Morsi himself.
  • February 11, 2014: Third anniversary of Mubarak's deposition.
  • February 13, 2014: Russian President Vladimir Putin said he would support a presidential candidacy from Army Chief Sisi.
  • February 16, 2014: Several people are killed in an explosion in an attack on a tourist bus on the Sinai near the Israeli border. Mursi is being tried in an espionage case in which allegations in the trial relate to the deaths of at least 10 people who attended rallies outside the presidential palace in December 2012.
  • February 19, 2014: Mubarak and his two sons are charged again with corruption allegedly wasting millions of dollars in public money renovating presidential palaces.
  • February 22, 2014: Six police officers were acquitted of charges of killing 83 protesters during the 2011 uprising.
  • 24./25. February 2014: On February 24, 2014, the Beblawi cabinet submitted its resignation to interim president Adli Mansur, which was accepted the following day. To the on Hazem Al Beblawi following, designated cabinet chief is Ibrahim Mahlab made, which is entrusted with the formation of a successor government.
  • February 26, 2014: A court sentenced 26 people to death convicted of attacking ships as a "terrorist group" while they were crossing the Suez Canal.
  • February 27, 2014: 21 students from Al-Azhar University in Cairo are sentenced by a Cairo court to three years' imprisonment each for illegal pro-Mursi demonstrations on the university campus, which occurred in late 2013.
The Sisis Military Government / Transitional Government
Presidency of Mansur - Mahlab's cabinet:
  • March 1, 2014: Official swearing-in of a new cabinet under Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab.
  • March 4, 2014: The Palestinian Hamas group, which is active near the Gaza Strip, is legally banned from all activities in Egypt, its property is confiscated and its offices are ordered to close.
  • March 22, 2014: More than 1,200 people are brought to justice as supporters of Mursi.
  • March 24, 2014: An Egyptian criminal court sentenced 529 people to death after a single session of a mass trial that the court found guilty of killing a police officer during the riots in Minya city in the summer of 2013 that followed Morsi's fall. Legal experts call the case the largest mass litigation in Egypt's recent history. Another court is continuing the trial in Cairo of several Al Jazeera journalists who are accused of misreporting the riots in Egypt as part of a conspiracy to overthrow the new government.
  • March 26, 2014: General Sisi, who had previously given himself the title of Field Marshal, officially declares that he is retiring from the army and running for president. It is almost universally expected that he will win the election and give formal form to his current de facto power.
The Sobhis Military Government / Transitional Government
Presidency of Mansur - Mahlab's cabinet:
  • March 27, 2014: Sisi's successor at the top of the army and as defense minister will take over as Chief of Staff Sidki Sobhi , who will be sworn in for both offices on March 27.
  • March 28, 2014: Four people, including the Egyptian journalist Mayada Ashraf, are killed in Cairo during police “clashes” with demonstrators protesting against the presidential candidacy of the former army chief Sisis.
  • March 30, 2014: The Election Commission announced May 26th and 27th as the date for holding presidential elections.
  • April 3, 2014: Former President Mubarak declares his support for Sisi's presidential candidacy, describes Sisi as the “best” candidate and describes his challenger, Hamdin Sabahi, as “useless”.
  • April 28, 2014: In the largest mass trial in Egyptian history, 683 people are sentenced to death by a court in Minya, including leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as its chairman, Mohammed Badie.
  • May 3, 2014: Start of the presidential campaign campaign.
  • May 21, 2014: A criminal court sentenced Husni Mubarak, who lived in a military prison, to three years in prison for embezzling millions of dollars in public funds for private use in private homes and palaces. His sons Gamal and Alaa each received a four-year sentence for their role in embezzlement. According to lawyers, the current interim prime minister and the espionage chief could also be involved in the case.
  • 26./27. May 2014: Start of the originally two-day presidential election vote, the winner of which is generally expected to be former army chief Sisi against the only challenger Hamdin Sabahi.
  • May 28, 2014: The vote is extended by one day in an attempt to increase the low turnout, which threatens to undermine the credibility of the election, the likely winner of which is former Army Chief Sisi.
  • May 30, 2014: Former army chief Sisi wins the presidential election in what was described as a "landslide" victory by gaining over 90 percent of the vote. His only challenger, Hamdin Sabahi, only receives 3 percent of the vote. He admits defeat after declaring that the vote was unfair.
  • June 3, 2014: The electoral commission declares Sisi the next Egyptian president and states that he received 96.91 percent of the valid votes in the presidential election.
  • June 6, 2014: The outgoing interim president, Adli Mansur, issued a decree declaring sexual harassment a criminal offense in Egypt, punishable by up to five years in prison.
  • June 8, 2014: General Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, who had previously awarded himself the title of field marshal and had led the military's takeover almost a year earlier, is sworn in as president of the constitutional court. Previously, he had won the “ pro forma presidential election” (New York Times) with almost 97 percent of the votes cast. The turnout of 47 percent of the electorate was far lower than he had aimed for as a mandate for leadership and was below the turnout of 52 percent in the 2012 election, which was won by Mohammed Morsi, who was ousted by Sisi in 2013. According to foreign observers, the election won by Sisi did not meet international standards.
  • June 9, 2014: Resignation of the military-backed transitional government. Interim head of government Ibrahim Mahlab said after his resignation that the new head of state Sisi should be given the opportunity to put together a cabinet of his confidence.
  • June 23, 2014: After a month-long trial of four accused foreigners and 16 Egyptians in Cairo, three journalists from Al Jazeera's English-speaking service , Mohammed Fahmy , Peter Greste and Baher Mohammed , are sentenced to long prison terms by an Egyptian court. The court found the convicts guilty of "supporting a terrorist organization" or conspiracy with the Muslim Brotherhood and of "spreading false news" about civil unrest in Egypt. The convictions come one day after US Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Cairo, during which Kerry said that President Sisi had given him “a very strong sense of his commitment” to “a reassessment of human rights law”. The court judgments later condemned in the western media as “arbitrary judgments” in “show trials” (Die Zeit) are commented on by the New York Times as “a potentially embarrassing turnaround for the US government”. Kerry later called the sentence "creepy" and "draconian", the UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay criticized the Egyptian judicial practice as "disgusting". In July 2014, Sisi will finally admit for the first time that the judgment was a mistake and that it had seriously damaged Egypt's international reputation.

Interim reports on the development of the crisis and the death toll

The ruthless repression of the military-backed transitional government since the military coup of July 3 did not lead to a stabilization, but to a destabilization of the situation in Egypt (as of early April 2014). The country was considered bankrupt, almost ungovernable and increasingly insecure. In a hotspot ranking as the indicator assessments of political risks (security and stability) of the country analysis company Economist Intelligence Unit were taken over, Egypt is in the first half of 2014, together with Kosovo , Libya , Syria , the Lebanon and the Ukraine to the six countries in the neighborhood of the European Union whose situation is classified as very risky.

Comparison of the death toll in the first half of 2013 with that of the second half of 2013
(military coup: July 3, 2013)
The statistical data come from the Wiki Thawra website and are mainly based on reports from independent non-governmental organizations, including the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) , the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC) and the Front to Defend Egypt's Protesters (FDEP)
Cause of deaths January to June 2013
(during Morsi's presidency)
July to December 2013
(during Mansur's interim presidency)
Political disputes 153 2273
Denominational disputes 29 32
Violence in detention centers 24 62
Terrorist attacks 4th 200 (including 36 civilians)

A comparison of the development of violence shows a drastic increase after the military coup in 2013. According to the website Wiki Thawra (also "Wiki Thaura"), whose statistics a group of 14 human rights groups referred to in early January 2014, lost in 2011, at 18 days Uprising against Mubarak, 1075 people lost their lives. During Mohammed Morsi's one-year term in office, there were a total of 470 victims. By contrast, since Morsi was overthrown on July 3, 2013, 2,665 people were killed by the end of 2013 alone, over 1,000 of them in the bloody evacuation of the two Pro Mursi protest camps on August 14, 2013 in Cairo.

The biggest death toll within a single day since the start of the popular uprising in 2011 was the break-up of two pro-Morsi protest camps on August 14, 2013 by the military-backed transitional government, which according to official figures, had at least 650 civilians, called the “Rābiʿa massacre” by various human rights organizations were killed. Both before and after the breaking up of the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya sit-in , further serious human rights violations occurred in 2013.

In their 195-page report, "All According to Plan - The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt," published on August 12, 2014 after more than a year of research, Human Rights Watch counted six extrajudicial mass executions by the Egyptian security forces for that period alone July and August 2013 and came to the conclusion that the "systematic, large-scale killings of at least 1,150 demonstrators by Egyptian security forces in July and August 2013" are likely crimes against humanity . In the evacuation of the protest camp in Rabaa-al-Adawija Square on August 14, Human Rights Watch said, "the security forces calculated several thousand deaths and, without a doubt, killed 817, probably at least 1,000 people." According to Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch , the Egyptian security forces "committed one of the most brutal mass executions of demonstrators in recent world history in one day in Rabaa Square."

Incidents with the killings of demonstrators by security forces
after the military coup on July 3, 2013
The data are based on the opinion of an alliance of 13 Egyptian and international human rights organizations on December 10, 2013
date Place of the main event Participating forces Casualty (civil) Fatalities (emergency services) Human Rights Watch data as of August 2014
5th July 2013 In front of the headquarters of the Republican Guard in Cairo military 5 protesters - Extrajudicial mass execution. One of the people executed had only tried to put a Mursi poster on a fence outside the headquarters. There are video recordings of the execution.
July 8, 2013 In front of the headquarters of the Republican Guard in Cairo military 61 protesters 1 soldier, 1 policeman Extrajudicial mass execution. Police and soldiers opened fire on a group of Mursi supporters who were demonstrating peacefully in front of the headquarters. Two police officers and at least 61 protesters were killed.
July 27, 2013 Nasr Street in Cairo police 95 demonstrators 1 policeman Extrajudicial mass execution. Police attacked a demonstration by Morsi supporters near the Manassa monument in eastern Cairo, killing at least 95 people. A police officer died in the clashes.
August 14, 2013 Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins on Nahda and Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Squares in Cairo police Up to 1000 demonstrators (according to interim Prime Minister Hasim al-Beblawi) 9 policemen Extrajudicial mass executions. Security forces evacuated the protest camps in Rābiʿa Square and Nahda Square and killed at least 817 people, probably at least 1,000 people in Rābiʿa Square and at least 87 people in Nahda Square. Eight police officers died in the clashes in Rābiʿa Square and two in Nahda Square.
August 16, 2013 Clashes at the center of the protests in Ramses Square in Cairo and on the protest marches to the square police At least 120 people 2 policemen Extrajudicial mass execution. Police shot hundreds of protesters near Ramses Square in central Cairo, killing at least 120 people. Two policemen died.
October 6, 2013 Dissolution of the marches from Dokki and Ramses Square to Tahrir Square in Cairo Police and military At least 57 protesters -
Number of Egyptians killed in acts of political violence
(July 3, 2013 to January 31, 2014)
The data are based on estimates by the open source initiative Wiki Thawra of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) and are considered to be the most recent (as of: March 24, 2014) most extensive available.
Cause of deaths Civilians police officers soldiers total
Demonstrations and clashes 2528 59 1 2588
terrorism 57 150 74 281
Other acts of violence 274

While the number of people killed by the coup in July 2013 to early March 2014 rose to 3,000, according to human rights organizations, that of the injured to 16,000 and that of the arrested to 22,000, the ruthless action of the security forces did not stop the growing wave of protests in the country demanded the restoration of democracy, accused the military-dominated regime of reestablishing a police state with police brutality, mass imprisonment and torture and, according to observers, felt provoked to counter violence.

In the first eight months since the military overthrew President Morsi, Egyptians suffered the highest intensity of human rights violations and terrorism in their recent history. The extent of the violence has been largely masked due to the lack of reliable data, but estimates suggest that more than 2,500 Egyptians have been killed, over 17,000 wounded and more than 16,000 arrested in demonstrations and clashes since the military coup on July 3, 2013 (as of end of March 2014). In addition, hundreds were killed in terrorist attacks. These numbers exceeded even Egypt's darkest period in terms of human rights violations since the military coup in Egypt in 1952, and reflect an unprecedented use of violence in Egypt's recent political history. In the 1950s, the number of political prisoners under Gamal Abdel Nasser had at times assumed similar dimensions, but the police repression against street protests at that time hardly claimed any victims.

The number of people arrested by the police since the fall of Morsi rose according to data from Wiki Thawra or according to the count of the "Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights" (ECESR) until May 15, 2014, a good ten months after Coup, to over 41,000. The website, which is considered to be independent, only evaluated arrests that took place under the responsibility of the transitional government of the former military chief and later Egyptian President Sisi. The figures are aggregated data from several independent non-governmental organizations such as the ECESR. The report only evaluated arrests made on charges of political, social or “denominational” activities or “terrorist acts”. On the massacre of Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya in mid-August 2013, for which Sisi was responsible, in which, according to human rights activists, more than 900 demonstrators were killed by security forces - most of them with targeted shots in the head, neck, heart or thighs - and that of Amnesty International rated “the most serious unlawful mass killings in the modern history of Egypt”, followed by a growing wave of terrorism by jihadist groups close to al-Qaeda, killing over 500 police officers and soldiers within ten months.

Democracy / autocracy rating for the period before and after the coup

In the months preceding the July 3, 2013 military coup, many Egyptian and Western analysts claimed that Morsi's one-year term in office had been manifestly “undemocratic”. Morsi was described with terms such as "new pharaoh", "budding dictator" or as a pioneer for a new, dangerous form of "fascism". A study of the reign of Mohammed Morsi by the US Middle East experts Shadi Hamdi and Meredith Wheeler from the Brookings Institution , who used the popular Polity IV index with parameters of democracy customary in political science for the development of transition societies after the fall autocratic regime, on the other hand, resulted in the finding that in a global comparison, despite mistakes caused by presumptuousness and incompetence, Morsi had an average record, i.e. Egypt was not placed in the lower range on the scale between democracy and autocracy during his tenure . While Egypt under Morsi showed average values ​​of the democracy measurement compared to other countries that went through a “positive regime change” or a “democratic transition”, according to the experts it cut in the more relevant comparison with other countries that had a “social Transition process ”, during which not only elites but also ordinary citizens got into political and social turmoil, were significantly more positive than the average. Morsi had proven to be an incompetent politician, but he was not responsible for serious human rights violations or systematic repression and imprisonment of the opposition. The military coup was therefore legitimized “by a fundamental misinterpretation and distortion of what happened before”.

For the transitional government that the military installed after the military coup of July 3, 2013, Hamdi and Wheeler used the same procedure to determine that the new regime would operate in the months after the coup on the Polity IV, which ranges from +10 to −10. Index scale compared to Morsi's reign by six full points and, in the event of the widely expected official consolidation of Sisi's power, fell by eight points in the direction of autocracy. Unlike Morsi, and even in contrast to Husni Mubarak and Anwar as-Sadat , the post-coup military government under Sisi presided over both mass arrests of political opponents and mass killings such as the crackdown on the pro-Morsi protest camps on August 14, 2013 , in which at least hundreds died. In addition, there was a law effectively preventing oppositional demonstrations and the continued use of deadly force against demonstrators by the security forces. After the coup, political competition was only tolerated within the regime's own political coalition. The development of Egypt towards autocracy in the months after the coup was seen by analysts as a typical and predictable development of a country after a military coup. In view of the particular peculiarity of the ideological split in Egypt, the international toleration and downright support for the coup, as well as the pronounced anti-Muslim Brotherhood mood of a significant part of the population, the fall of Morsi deviated from the usual and led into a more repressive phase than it did the majority of modern coups are the case, making the situation in Egypt comparable to that of Chile and Argentina in the 1970s or that of Algeria in the 1990s.

Power political actors

In the western perspective, the political power struggle in Egypt was often understood as a confrontation between one camp that was determined to establish a dictatorship , while the other camp was fighting for “ freedom ” and “ democracy ”. However, even before the military coup against President Mohammed Morsi, political scientists such as Nagwan El Ashwal from the Science and Politics Foundation (SWP) were of the opinion that all politically relevant Egyptian parties acted in a way that was unsuitable to avert a state crisis in Egypt. Political and Islamic scholar Loay Mudhoon, Middle East expert at Deutsche Welle, took the view that the question of identity about the secular, liberal or Islamic orientation of the Islamic countries in question was not a real but a one in the revolutionary wave subsumed in the West as the “Arab Spring” constructed subject of dispute. Islamists have put the question of identity on the agenda to distract from their economic and political ineptitude. In fact, it was mainly about "bread, freedom and social justice", which are summarized in Arabic as "Karama" (German: "dignity"). The citizens would have asked for their point of view to be taken into account politically by the elites, who since the era of the post-colonial military dictatorships had the privilege of sole control of politics.

While Islamist groups initially benefited most from the collapse of the Mubarak regime, many Egyptian and international observers saw the danger of an “Islamization of Egypt” or in the fundamental social and political development processes that were initiated after the political upheaval called the revolution in Egypt an "Islamist counter-revolution". It was often overlooked that after the fall of Mubarak, the leitmotif of those who were attributed to Islamism was political pragmatism and that no closed group of “Islamists” existed. In Egypt in particular, the spectrum of Islamist actors was very heterogeneous. The Islamist organizations and groups were busy agreeing on their political agendas and developing party structures. They were also subject to a large number of restrictions in their political approach and had to assert themselves against other political forces and state and semi-state institutions.

military

Hussi Mubarak in 1981: During the Mubarak system, military rule, a state of emergency, and US military aid lasted for over 30 years.

The leadership of the Egyptian military is social and very homogeneous in terms of their background. Some families have been employed in the military for decades and have occupied the officer ranks there as a separate “political class” since the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser , for example at the level from middle to upper middle class. The attitudes and attitudes of the lower ranks and those doing military service have not been researched, but dissent within the military is severely punished.

From 1981 until the revolution of 2011 , Egypt was ruled by Hosni Mubarak . His predecessor Anwar as-Sadat was assassinated in Cairo in 1981 after he signed the Camp David Agreement brokered by US President Jimmy Carter in 1978 . In 1979, the agreement led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and later to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula and brought Sadat the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 and Egypt initially brought about political isolation within the Arab states. Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years in an authoritarian manner and in a permanent state of emergency as a country marked by corruption , unemployment and poverty, backed by constant financial support from the USA alone of 1.3 billion dollars in military aid. Votes were manipulated, critics of the regime were tortured and murdered by the state security, companies and associations paid homage to Mubarak in the style of leader cult, around 2,500 employees of the US embassy , some of whom worked for the US intelligence service CIA , exerted political influence over the country, while Western democracies always the regime again certified progress in "political reforms" until Mubarak was overthrown on February 11, 2011 with the participation of mass uprisings.

After Mubarak's fall, the ruling structure, often personalized as the “Mubarak System”, turned out to be military rule that allowed Mubarak or his family to act as long as it was beneficial to the generals' own interests. In the Egyptian system, the boundaries between the military, politics and economics blended into one another or were often nonexistent. The military was intertwined with politics, justice, economy and administration to form a "deep state". The state institutions were controlled and abused by these powerful groups of actors, for whom the focus was not on the common good but on maximizing the profits of the groups themselves.

Mohammed Hussein Tantawi , military ruler of Egypt until August 2012 after the fall of Mubarak

After the fall of Mubarak, the military took over or retained power in the form of military rule, but did not pursue the “goals of the revolution” as emerged in the mass protests against Mubarak, whereupon the street protests soon turned against the military. At the time, the protest movement accused the military of authoritarian governance, a desolate economic and social situation and “theft” of the revolution, similar to what it did in 2013 against Morsi's government, which in turn was put into a coup by the military supported by the protest movement.

The interests of the military continued to shape the Egyptian state structurally even after the so-called “revolution” of 2011 and also set limits to the scope of action of President Morsi's government after his victory in Egypt's first democratic election. Morsi acted cautiously towards the army and did not affect its economic interests. According to Shana Marshall, director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University in Washington DC, the popular discontent and lack of popularity of the Islamist president and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of the Muslim Brotherhood provided the army with the not content with just part of the economic power under the FJP, but an ideal pretext to reach for complete control.

Abdul Fatah al-Sisi , military chief, defense minister and, following the military coup, de facto ruler in Egypt since July 3, 2013

With the coup against President Morsi, the military reappeared as a political actor. The military described itself as a guarantor of public order, which it sees in danger in view of the escalating protests. But with the ousting of Morsi and the suspension of the Egyptian constitution, the generals suspended the entire political system. The "old guard" from the Mubarak era returned. The military used the protest movement to achieve its own goals. The military acted not only as a security actor, but also as an important economic actor. The military's motivation was not to promote democracy , participation or the rule of law , but to preserve their own economic advantages. In this sense, Stephan Roll from the Near / Middle East and Africa research group of the Science and Politics Foundation judged the military coup: “This coup was by no means a spontaneous reaction to the riots or an attempt to strengthen democracy. It was a long-planned takeover in his own interest. "

Since the revolution of 2011, the generals have been consolidating their economic power thanks to foreign aid. While private companies have suffered from general chaos and political uncertainty since the revolution, the army has apparently been barely affected by the crisis, but has benefited, according to some observers, from it. Since Morsi was overthrown by the military in July 2013, the generals have been awarded several billion-dollar projects. In the months after the military coup, the military-backed transitional government commissioned army construction companies to undertake several large infrastructure projects. In November 2013, the interim president, Adli Mansur, who was appointed by the military, issued a decree that enables the interim government to award construction contracts without a tendering process, which benefits primarily the companies in the armed forces. According to the journalist and economic expert Sherif Zaazaabeim, many investors openly approached the army, which they knew was the only one who exercised actual control in the country. The Egyptian army, the largest army in the Middle East and eleventh largest army in the world, maintained a "bloated, largely deficit economic empire with enormous additional income opportunities for senior officers", through which the army, depending on the estimate, directly accounts for between five and 60 percent of the Egyptian economy or indirectly controlled. In the event of national bankruptcy , which is said to have threatened in view of the country's economic situation, observers believe that this system would hardly have been financially viable. After the coup, the generals did business with foreign investors in particular. In March 2014, for example, an agreement was signed between the Egyptian army and a construction company from the United Arab Emirates on a US $ 40 billion housing project. The Egyptian army also worked closely with partners from the Gulf States in the energy supply sector and other economic sectors. According to Shana Marshall, many of these deals were made “because the rulers of the Gulf States want to support the Egyptian army in this way. They want to make sure that the army maintains its influence and power in Egypt. "

The extremely self-confident demeanor of the Egyptian generals is mainly explained by the enormous financial aid from the Gulf region . Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait promised the new military-backed Egyptian leadership $ 12 billion in emergency aid and loans within 24 hours of taking power. This massive support was seen as a necessary condition for the coup and as evidence of the corresponding agreements that had been made before the coup: “Without the knowledge that the Gulf states were willing to pay”, Roll concludes, “the generals would hardly have been interested in to take over the power and thus also the responsibility for the economy. Ultimately, it is the Gulf billions that can avert the economic collapse of Egypt and thus enable the political leadership to consolidate their power. ”While the generals as an authority outside the political system continued to have unlimited power, there was the prospect of foreign financial aid and to secure internal peace to temporarily stabilize the political and economic situation. According to the media, by 2015 Egypt had received around 30 billion US dollars from the Gulf states allied with the coup leader Sisi, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, after the military coup against Morsi in 2013, while the annual economic growth of seven percent before the fall Husni Mubaraks had fallen to two percent in 2011.

The generals could therefore obviously count on the outside world to support their intervention from the outset . The willingness of the three Gulf monarchies to pay can be explained by the fact that they had no interest in a model democratic state in the Arab region and supported the coup in Egypt. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that, through the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt , they feared a strengthening of the opposition Muslim Brotherhood in their own rich but less democratic Gulf monarchies and thus an increase in the desires of their population towards an “Arab Spring”. In addition, Saudi Arabia should be interested in supporting the Egyptian Salafists who are close to the royal family and who interpret Islam in social policy in a much more fundamentalist way than the Muslim Brotherhood. The largest Egyptian Salafist party, the Party of Light , supported the military coup and was able to become the strongest Islamist force in the new parliament through the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to the liberal opposition, young activists and the Party of Light , the military leadership also succeeded in winning over the Coptic Church and al-Azhar University as the most important Islamic authority in the country for their actions in the coup. With Mansur, no military was appointed as the interim president, but the supreme constitutional judge of the country, personally protected by Mubarak in the Mubarak era, who now united legislative and executive powers in his hands as the “puppet of the military” , even if the disputes in the formation of the government Showed instability of this heterogeneous alliance. In the new alliance, the revolutionaries of 2011 were in league with their former opponents, Mubarak's disempowered elites and the representatives of the authoritarian deep state. Later, the resignation of Vice President el-Baradei in protest against the August 14 bloodbath was seen as evidence that civilian forces were not sufficiently involved in the “civil” transitional government, but that the military made all key decisions. While the military took power after the coup, the interim president, prime minister and interior minister, who unreservedly stood behind the military and against the Muslim Brotherhood and were ready to use massive violence, merely served as a “civilian facade”. The assurances of the military that after the fall of Morsi no permanent takeover of power were planned were considered "not very credible" by observers such as Cilja Harders, head of the Department of Politics of the Middle East at the Free University of Berlin.

Secretary Kerry Meets With Egyptian Defense Minister al-Sisi.jpg
Military chief Sisi and US Secretary of State Kerry in March 2013, after Sisi had declared to Morsi in February 2013 that Morsi had failed and that his “project” was over.
US Secretary of State Kerry Meets With Egyptian Military Leader General al-Sisi in Cairo 2013-11-03.jpg
On his first visit to Egypt after the coup, Kerry assured the new rulers on November 3, 2013 that the US would work with the military-backed transitional government.


The coup generals could also rely on their traditional allies, the US and the European Union (EU). It was to be expected that the US, as one of its most important allies in the Middle East, would not withhold support and annual military aid of US $ 1.3 billion to Egypt because of a coup. There was also the possibility that for the European states - despite critical statements on the events - a continuity of the situation would be in the foreground.

A reform of the corrupt and oversized state apparatus, however, stood in the way of close links with the military. A profound modernization of the Egyptian economy is ruled out, among other things, from the scientific side, since this is contrary to the interest of the generals in the maintenance of their "economic empire". At the top of the army companies were mostly retired military personnel, who thereby secured a lucrative old-age income and whose incentive to participate in politics was thus reduced. According to the economic expert Sherif Zaazaa, it was important for the coup leader, military chief and later presidential candidate Sisi to offer potential critics from the army a lucrative field of employment, since it was unclear how great the support within the army was for Sisi. In order to remain competitive in spite of the lack of economic expertise of the army entrepreneurs, the army secured a competitive advantage because its companies mostly paid no taxes and benefited from massive subsidies and from the possibility of using recruits as cheap labor. While many Egyptians still demanded an end to these practices immediately after the revolution of January 25, 2011, such voices fell after the 2013 coup thanks in part to the state-controlled media that celebrated the military as the savior from the Islamists. The Middle East expert Michael Lüders saw the problem for a lack of foreign investment not in the lack of investment facilitation, but in the "small clique in power" made up of the generals who control an estimated 40 percent of the country's economic output, but neither pays nor taxes Investing in the development of Egypt such as education. In his view, a solution to Egypt's economic problems would require “radical” disempowerment of the military, confining its powers to national defense and making its financial resources available to the people.

Structures of the Mubarak era

The power of Mubarak and his regime was based on a system supported by the security forces and the state administration, which offered few participants the opportunity to become wealthy and the rest of the country remained in economic stagnation. Internationally, this system, which maintained peace with Israel, was considered predictable; neither the USA nor the Gulf monarchies allied with them saw themselves compelled to take action against the structures established under Mubarak. Even after Mubarak's fall in 2011, the USA continued to provide military aid to Egypt at the usual rate of 1.5 billion dollars a year.

In the opinion of the political scientist Maha Azzam, who advised the Morsi government on foreign policy issues after the fall of Mubarak, the fall of Mubarak, known as the "2011 revolution", was merely a matter of revolutionary change called for on January 25, 2011 by parts of the population to overthrow the president, but not the regime.

After Mohammed Morsi was elected president, he faced the risk of the old order returning from the start. The judiciary, the military, the police and the media did not recognize the authority of the elected, democratically legitimized head of state during his presidency. The bureaucracy established within 60 years under three autocratic leaderships was able to remain intact. Supporters of the old Mubarak regime had "holed up" in the Egyptian institutions and the power structures of the old Mubarak regime continued. In the ministries in particular, the Mubarak elite, which is closely linked to the military through rope teams, was able to maintain its position, especially in the Justice Ministry. In the Interior Ministry, for example, the prevailing "security doctrine" stated that demonstrators were not politically active citizens, but rather "traitors" who acted in the interests of others. State security agents who had been promoted to judges in Mubarak's time had been infiltrated into the judiciary. Police officers and other security sector personnel continued to be systematically acquitted by prosecutors and allegedly for lack of evidence, causing public displeasure.

Since Mubarak's fall, the police have sabotaged their mandate as law enforcement officers. As a result, the Egyptians experienced a decline in public order and a crime rate of hitherto unknown proportions. Although Morsi refrained from reforming the police, increased the salaries of the officials and publicly praised the police, which the people hated, many officials did not show up for months. Public outrage blamed the new government under Morsi and blamed it for blatant ineptitude. Investors also stayed away under the circumstances.

The heads of the judiciary and large sections of the old state bureaucratic elite did not accept Morsi's election victory and campaigned to slow down his policy. After Morsi had been elected President of Egypt in Egypt's first free election, the courts dissolved the parliament that had emerged from the election and, according to the election results, largely Islamistically composed parliament, pointing out formal errors, which was a politically motivated measure on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood was taken. With that, President Mursi remained, alongside the only partially elected upper house, as the only authority legitimized by free elections. The judiciary rejected drafts for a new electoral law and other legislative proposals several times. Urgently necessary economic and social reform projects as well as the conclusion of the laboriously negotiated credit agreement with the International Monetary Fund could not be implemented. Fearing that the courts were preparing a similar attack on the presidency and other legislative bodies of the state to weaken it completely, Morsi spoke to himself, the upper house of parliament and the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly, which was working on a new constitution, in November 2012 legal immunity granted by decree. From the point of view of the Muslim Brotherhood, such a legal coup should be prevented. Critics saw it as a seizure of power that did not take into account the sensitivity of a people who only recently escaped the “dictatorship”. Alongside the army, the judiciary became the key institution in overthrowing Morsi.

75 judges who criticized Morsi's overthrow by the military were suspended from the influential judges' association. With the military coup, the old constitution was suspended and a new Egyptian constitution was later drawn up, according to which the judiciary now formed a closed circle. In the event that a judge at the constitutional court resigned, his colleagues could choose the successor. The judges also elected the chief prosecutor and the judiciary had to approve new laws governing the judiciary before they could be brought before parliament. This constellation, which appeared to be pronounced independence, harbored the danger of the judiciary being isolated from all social and political processes. With the help of the military coup, it had sealed itself off as a separate caste from any attempt at reform from outside. As a result, she prosecuted opponents of the regime on charges of an international conspiracy that was dangerous to the state, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and took a clear position on the side of the military regime and against opposition groups, which means that in a politically polarized situation, the third power as a neutral judiciary failed.

Even in the state-controlled economy, the Mubarak elites, linked to the military through rope teams, held on. The bottlenecks in the petrol and power supply shortly before the fall of Morsi are interpreted as an indication of manipulations by the Mubarak elites working in the energy sector on the oil and power supply in preparation for the military coup. The coup against Morsi was ultimately led by the military chief and defense minister Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, who had been chief of military intelligence under Mubarak.

Business elite

In the last decade of the Mubarak era, a few large entrepreneurs gained control over large parts of the Egyptian economy and thus also became part of the politically relevant elite, whose members influenced fundamental strategic decisions in Egypt. From since 2004 dominated by the IMF and EU -based structural adjustment and liberalization policies forced privatization - and liberalization thrust especially those economic elites that the president's son benefited Gamal Mubarak were close and played in the strategy for takeover by inherit his father's an important role. You were represented in the cabinet until the protests in January 2011. Compared to the elites of the 1990s, the central actors of the oligarchy that developed in this way were increasingly shifting the consequences of liberalization and privatization such as inflation , food crises, unemployment, rising real estate and land prices and the reduction of subsidies to the impoverished majority of the population, thus intensifying them Willingness to protest of so far little resistance-oriented population groups.

However, even before the fall of Mubarak, the economic elites began to split according to their economic orientation and thus also after their approval or rejection of the successor arrangement for Gamal Mubarak, which had lasting consequences for the role of the military: After Mubarak's fall, economically globally oriented actors dominated the reduce the importance of the old, nationally oriented capital. As a result, the military threatened to be politically and economically marginalized as an important economic player such as the operator of shopping centers or tourist facilities . The military leaders therefore strictly rejected the policies of Gamal Mubarak's group in economic and political terms, which contributed significantly to the rift among the elites. This ultimately led the ruling officers to be willing to sacrifice a representative from their own ranks and not to use systematic military force against the demonstrators at the height of the mass protests. As in the entire Arab region, neo-liberal reforms were implemented through authoritarian structures.

Even in the post-Mubarak era, the Egyptian business elite were very successful in maintaining both their economic power and their political influence. Although the anger of many Egyptian citizens during the protests against the Mubarak regime in 2011 was also directed against the business elite, which was considered corrupt, most members of the business elite benefited from the corruption and mismanagement of the Supreme Military Council , which was held after the end of the Mubarak -Government had initially taken over the leadership of the country, were only neglected and there was a deficit in transparency and rule of law standards. In this way, most members of the economic elite managed to maintain their own economic empires beyond the overthrow of Mubarak, while very few large entrepreneurs had to answer to court in the months following the political upheaval.

Even before the election victory of its candidate Mohammed Morsi in the 2012 presidential election, the Muslim Brotherhood was striving for an alliance with the established business elite and was programmatically based on the guidelines of the growth- and private-sector-oriented economic policy of the Mubarak era, whose course the international donor community repeatedly followed had been praised and from which the Egyptian top entrepreneurs in particular had benefited. Instead of supporting civil society's demand for a comprehensive investigation of past misconduct by economic actors, the Muslim Brotherhood relied on the use of out-of-court settlement procedures and tried to integrate the established business elite into their own ruling networks. However, both the attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to accept the business elite and its own efforts to expand economic activities failed. Only a few large entrepreneurs came to terms with the Muslim Brotherhood and accepted their claim to political power. In contrast, the greater part of the big business community supported the opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood through funding from opposition parties and politicians as well as through private media. Many of the mostly secular big businessmen did not trust representatives of political Islam, most of whom did not belong to their social circles. This distance was exacerbated by the government's unprofessional economic policy work during Morsi's presidency. Egyptian big business began to obstruct the Morsi government by all means, while foreign investors withdrew from Cairo. The conflict between the officially ruling Muslim Brotherhood and parts of the politically powerful business elite meant that the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to consolidate the power it had gained through the election.

Slump in tourism
after the military coup:
Data source: CAPMAS / GTAI
Month 2013 Percentage change
in visitor numbers
compared to 2012
May +14.6
June +16.4
July Data are missing because of the coup
August −45.6
September −69.7
October −52.0
November −39.0
December −30.7

The displeasure against Mubarak and Mursi was also justified by the poor economic situation, for which tourism, which brought in foreign currency, was of great importance with an eleven percent share of the gross domestic product. However, the Egyptian tourism industry, in which many of the major entrepreneurs are heavily involved, was particularly damaged as a result of the 2011 uprising against Mubarak. In the first half of 2013 it had partially recovered. A large part of the business elite welcomed the military coup against Morsi at the beginning of July 2013, which has since led to violence between the security forces and supporters of the overthrown president and attacks by radical groups that have shaken confidence in Egypt as a safe travel destination, so that the tourism industry has again suffered severe damage took. Since the end of June 2013, when the national crisis broke out, almost all hotels in Egypt had been empty. After the coup against President Morsi, the number of vacationers across the country fell by 25 percent, and in July alone the number of overnight stays fell by 40 percent according to official figures. The decisive break-in took place in August and September 2013, when travel warnings for Egypt were issued worldwide after the bloody eviction of the Pro Mursi protest camps in Cairo, which left around a thousand dead. In this situation, many businesspeople blame the Islamists alone and rely on the support of the military government to find a solution.

After the fall of Morsi, the old Mubarak clanships, which are considered to be the economic beneficiaries of the Mubarak regime, continued to work closely with the army and prevented a balanced social policy and a socially regulative economy corresponding to the social market economy. Instead, by maintaining Egypt's position as a low-wage country , the elites strove to maximize their own profits, which were hardly taxed but were mainly to be invested abroad. In the opinion of Middle East expert Michael Lüders, the “egoism of the business elite” contributed to “moving Egypt towards the abyss”. The political scientist and former foreign policy advisor to the Morsi Maha Azzam government accused entrepreneurs like Samih Sawiris , who had become extraordinarily prosperous in the Mubarak regime, of profiting from the fall of Morsi, while they had previously feared that the Morsi government was corruption seriously and could also collect taxes from particularly wealthy citizens. After the ruthless crackdown by the security forces in August 2013 and the arrests of leading Muslim Brotherhoods, the first business tycoons to leave Egypt under Morsi returned to the country. The Coptic multi-billionaire Samih Sawiris, known as one of the richest entrepreneurs in Egypt and in Switzerland as a major investor in Andermatt , denied the lawsuits against large entrepreneurs before the military coup for corruption, money laundering, tax fraud or illegal transactions as "politically motivated", called his Entry into Germany's fifth largest package tour operator FTI with 25 percent of the shares as a signal for a resurgence of the travel destination Egypt, criticized the travel warnings of several countries like Germany and Switzerland for Egypt in April 2014 as "unacceptable patronizing of the citizens" and claimed at a time when the The imminent collapse of the Egyptian economy was considered possible that tourism, which collapsed after a positive first half of 2013 with the military coup against Morsi, was replaced by the election of a new president by the military regime, whose victor Sisi was expected will normalize again in 2014, but at the latest in 2015.

The applicable as the richest person in Egypt business tycoon and billionaire Naguib Sawiris, a brother of Samih Sawiris, the infiltrated the Egyptian intelligence tamarod - campaign , financed the tamarod organization claims to the infrastructure of its anti-Mursi Free Egyptians Party provided and thus allegedly promoting the state crisis through the growing gap between liberals and Islamists, in November 2013, arguing that the Egyptian economy would otherwise collapse, demanded an immediate one-year ban on all protest actions, two weeks before the signing of a restrictive demonstration law, the introduction of which sparked fears, that after the persecution of Islamists, the transitional government is now also striving to crack down on secular activists. His private TV broadcaster ONTV , which shortly after the military coup, suspected Syrian refugees in Egypt as sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood and incited them against them, has a reputation for being particularly close to the head of the military junta, Sisi. On February 12, 2014, at a time when grave allegations of torture were being leveled against the Interior Ministry of the military-backed transitional regimes under the Sisis military regime, Sawiris publicly advocated Sisi's presidential nomination, calling Morsi's presidency a "black comedy" and claiming that the people would Seeing Sisi as a "savior" who saved her from the "tyranny" of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Tamarod campaign

In June 2013 the leaders of the Tamarod campaign (German: "Rebellion"), financed by the Coptic billionaire Naguib Sawiris and infiltrated to the top by the Egyptian State Security, released the dem with its propagandistic misstatement of allegedly 22 million anti-Morsi signatures Mass protests against the elected Egyptian government that preceded the military coup without having submitted the signatures to independent bodies or had them certified by them. On July 1, 2013, on the same day as the military, Tamarod Morsi issued an “ultimatum” under the threat of “a campaign of total civil disobedience” to surrender power within 24 hours and allow the authorities to take action to organize early presidential elections ”.

The Tamarod campaign's allegation that it had raised 22 million signatures for the petition it had drawn up against Morsi and the government led to astonishment around the world at the ability of the Egyptian population to mobilize, but initially only a few individual voices responded regarding the enormous Numbers and perfect staging of the protests against the Muslim Brotherhood reported suspicions. On the other hand, the public largely accepted the declaration that the fall of Mubarak had already proven the mass mobilization for protests in Egypt. Research on the specific people behind the sudden emergence of the alleged youth movement Tamarod , however, yielded only sparse results. At the end of June 2013, more or less reliable information about the origins of Tamarod was circulating that the campaign emerged from the grassroots movement Kifaja (German: " Enough !") Founded by the Coptic teacher George Ishaq , in which four of the Tamarod leaders, Moheb Doss , Walid el-Masry , Mohammed Abdel Aziz and the only journalist and television producer Mahmoud Badr known to a wider public , who were previously engaged as guides. A fifth Tamarod founder, Hassan Shahin , is said to have been friendly to the Kifaja movement. The Kifaja movement had confirmed the personal connections, but at the same time distanced itself, since the Tamarod campaign was not an official project of the Kifaja movement. In the western media, shortly before and after the military coup , the Tamarod campaign was described as a “grassroots movement”, “opposition alliance” or “new party”, which managed to “mobilize the rural population as well” (Rainer Hermann / FAZ). According to the Tamarod organizers' original account , the network allegedly prompted 22 million Egyptians in less than three months to demand the immediate resignation of the president, but these signatures of the action that sparked the decisive mass protests were not counted by any independent force been. It was soon doubted that the petition may actually have been organized against Mursi by a network of youth activists alone. There are reports that the initiative was supported by the military and the secret services.

Instead, the entrepreneur Naguib Sawiris , who is considered the richest man in Egypt and a member of the Coptic Christians, appeared on his television channel ONTV and stated that he had made the infrastructure of his Muslim Brotherhood-critical party of the Free Egyptians available to Tamarod to organize their action. Later, the Tamarod leadership had to admit their false information and stated - as reported in the media in February 2014 - that a maximum of 8.5 million petitions had come together against Morsi before the coup. According to a Reuters report, the Tamarod campaign had contacts with the Interior Ministry, which played a central role in the preparations for the overthrow of Morsi.

On the day of the military coup, the Tamarod campaign held a press conference calling on the President's Guards to arrest President Morsi on charges of instigating civil war and demanding that the Muslim Brotherhood be tried. When military chief Sisi officially announced the military coup on state television, Mahmoud Badr took up the microphone as spokesman and co-founder of the Tamarod campaign and welcomed the intervention of the military.

After the military coup it was again in particular the "youth movement" Tamarod , which uncritically covered the military and took part in the demonization and dehumanization campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, which Tamarod portrayed as a "proto-fascist group" and which the military was the only significant opposition in the The country wanted to eliminate comprehensively and with methods that surpassed those of the Mubarak period. In addition, Tamarod called on the population to protect their houses, mosques and churches from "attacks by Islamists" and to set up vigilante groups. The Tamarod spokesman Mahmoud Badr denied that a military coup had taken place in Egypt, presented this as propaganda by the Muslim Brotherhood and demonstratively welcomed the alleged "terrorism mandate" of Army Chief Sisi against the Muslim Brotherhood. Tamarod leaders described the ruthless mass killing of hundreds of pro- Morsi protesters by security forces when the anti-coup camps were broken up on August 14, 2013 as a “complete success” and an indispensable necessity in cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood, which they call a “fascist group” and whose supporters in the battered protest camps presented them as consisting of "terrorists" without exception. According to Tamarod, the Rābiʿa camp was an armed camp that could not have been cleared more gently. In the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War , which ended in a bloodbath , Tamarod once again spoke of a “Brotherhood of Terror” and called on the population to support the military with the slogan “Hand in hand: All Egypt fights terrorism”. After the Muslim Brotherhood's status as a non-governmental organization was stripped of its status by the military regime on October 9 and all organizations working for or financed by the Muslim Brotherhood had their legal basis as an NGO withdrawn, the Tamarod movement, which itself had neither party status nor a political program, resigned to take part in the parliamentary elections planned for early 2014. However, the Tamarod leadership denied any future cooperation with former representatives of the Mubarak regime in the upcoming election campaign. The left-wing Nassist movement Egyptian Popular Current , led by Hamdin Sabahi , announced a coalition with Tamarod for the upcoming general election.

The Tamarod group repeatedly spoke out in favor of the presidential candidacy of military chief Sisi. Two of the Tamarod founders, Mohammed Abdel Aziz and Mahmoud Badr, were appointed to represent the 50-member constitutional committee. Badr denied that the role of the military is not limited in the new constitution.

As a result, the Tamarod campaign issued a declaration against its top leadership on November 26, 2013 , according to which both representatives of the constitutional committee Mahmoud Badr and Mohamed Abdel Aziz, as well as the two Tamarod spokesmen Hassan Shahine and May Wahba, would not take over the organization would represent more. Several Tamarod members were arrested by security forces. In early December, Tamarod started a campaign in support of the new constitution.

In April 2014, one of the five founding members of the Tamarod campaign, Moheb Doss , stated for the first time that the Tamarod movement had carried out orders from the military. According to this, the Tamarod campaign played the role of a Trojan horse for the Egyptian army and the Ministry of the Interior. Even before June 2013 there had been intensive contacts between the Tamarod leaders and the Ministry of the Interior and the army. The Tamarod leaders received instructions and let outsiders guide them.

According to the New York Times , the constitutional judge Tahani al-Gebali , a lawyer from the Mubarak period, had put herself in the service of Tamarod and helped formulate the demands. A year before the coup, the New York Times reported that top judge Gebali had worked with leading generals to block the rise of the Islamists.

After Morsi was overthrown, Tamarod leaders gradually distanced themselves from the army's policies, which had nothing to do with their political goals.

Secular and Liberal Forces

The Middle East expert Mudhoon points out that a “liberal” orientation in the Arab region cannot be equated with a “democratic” character. The journalist de Bellaigue emphasizes in an analysis for BBC Radio 4 about the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt that, in addition to the attribute “liberal”, the term “secular” is also used in a misleading manner, since most members of the groups concerned are of the opinion that Islam is in the should reflect public life, even if they do not necessarily want to be governed by religious parties. The Egypt expert Nathan J. Brown of the George Washington University pointed out that the term " secularism " is inappropriate in the Egyptian context and that neither side in Egypt speaks of separating religion and state from one another or separating religion from public life .

The leaders of the most important opposition parties, who let themselves be described as “liberal”, outside of Egypt sometimes also as “secular”, were united in their efforts to make Morsi fail politically. To do this, they blocked the system, for example by announcing early on that they would boycott parliamentary elections that they could not win. Sometimes they rely on the use of force on the streets and on the intervention of the military in their favor. Observers characterized Egypt's middle class by a lack of citizenship. The overwhelming majority lack a sense of responsibility for the oppressive social policy they have supported for decades, which has kept over half of the population in ignorance and poverty. Many wealthy people hardly paid any taxes, but invested the money withheld from the state in private schools and universities for their own descendants, thereby contributing to the debt of the desolate and completely overloaded school system. At the political level, too, the middle class lacks a feeling for the common good and is largely limited to the apolitical pursuit of its own private interests.

The so-called secular parties entered into alliances with the remnants of the overthrown Mubarak regime, insofar as they openly turned against the Muslim Brotherhood. The so-called secular and liberal parties also tended to tolerate violence and initially pursued the goal of both weakening the elected President Morsi and postponing the parliamentary elections, as they feared that they would not have any prospect of winning enough seats due to a lack of popular support. During Morsi's presidency, the side of the so-called liberals and seculars had hardly any representatives with concrete political visions for Egypt, who would have had a broad social base. While the secular and liberal parties, on the one hand, demanded "freedom" in an externally effective and demonstrative way, on the other hand they called on the army to intervene in political processes. They demanded a civil state and at the same time demanded a political role for religious authorities such as al-Azhar University as Egypt's leading Islamic institution or the Orthodox Church.

The revolutionary youth of 2011 switched to the side of the military as early as the winter of 2012/2013, which was no longer regarded as the “main enemy”. The way in which Morsi enforced the new constitution in December 2012 was cited as evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood was striving for ideological dominance and that it was impossible to cooperate with their political Islam. After the fall, the Egyptian opposition insisted that they, as a “people” on their own and not through the military led by Sisi and now regarded by them as a neutral body, had eliminated the Islamist government under Morsi, elected a year earlier, in a “second revolution” .

Mohammed el-Baradei, who resigned from his post as interim vice-president of the military-backed transitional government on August 14, 2013 in protest against state authority

After the July 3rd coup against Morsi, many Egyptian seculars willingly took over the official line of the military. In an atmosphere of mass hysteria, they equate criticism of the security apparatus' actions with sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood. Critical voices from abroad were explained and denigrated with conspiracies. Liberal and left-wing politicians as well as many intellectuals and activists from 2011 supported the transitional government installed by the military, and interim Prime Minister Beblawi, who was part of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, succeeded in winning numerous respected personalities for ministerial posts. The resignation of Vice President el-Baradei on August 14th as a protest action by a liberal against the military-backed government after the bloody crackdown on the Pro-Morsi protest camps on August 14th, 2013 initially remained an exception. The resignation of other interim members of the government only followed after the repression by the security forces increasingly began to target activists of the 2011 uprising and critical intellectuals. While the declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by the military-backed transitional government at the end of December 2013 and the persecution of sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood were still welcomed by secular intellectuals, their dissatisfaction with the Beblawi cabinet grew when they left the country in early 2014 in view of the upcoming election of Military chief Sisi saw the Egyptian president as being thrown back into the authoritarian structures of the Mubarak period.

Single items

At the end of August 2013, the former Egyptian ambassador to Israel, Ezzedine Choukri Fishere , blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the deposition of Morsi, to which they practically invited the military. Although he himself described the military as undemocratic, he did not see the ousting of Morsi as a coup and saw no alternative to “democrats in Egypt coming to terms with the dictatorship” in order to “steer Egypt in the direction of a pluralistic democracy” when "hundreds of innocent civilians were killed" in the course of events.

In Germany, the German-Egyptian political scientist and publicist Hamed Abdel-Samad , who was present in the mass media, still took the view after the bloodbath of August 14, 2013 that the army was “not democratically minded”, but stood “for the rule of law and security”, which is why the “cooperation “Should be continued with the military. It was not a coup, but a revolt against the “dictatorial rule” of the Muslim Brotherhood due to the political and economic failure of the Muslim Brotherhood. Millions of people demonstrated on the street to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from expanding their “Islamist dictatorship in the Arab world”. The military had “no other choice”.

Youth Movement of April 6th

The youth movement of April 6th emerged in March 2008 from the left-wing political spectrum as a support movement for a strike by textile workers in the industrial city of Mahalla al-Kubra, which took place on April 6th, 2008. Tens of thousands of Egyptians joined the group via Facebook.

The leaders of the group then mobilized these supporters in January 2011 for the protests against the then President Husni Mubarak. After the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, in which the group is considered to be significantly involved, it was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in the same year . After the overthrow of Mubarak, the activists were considered “heroes of the nation” and the generals of the military government of Egypt following the overthrow of Mubarak conferred with the activists. However, the good contacts with the military did not last. The activists criticized the military leadership, which in turn propagated against the activists. The activists were accused of being foreign agents.

When Mohammed Morsi was elected president in Egypt's first free election in 2012 , he was initially supported by the April 6th youth movement .

Soon afterwards, however, the youth movement of April 6th also played an important role in what it called the “second revolution” in the summer of 2013 against the elected government and against President Morsi. Much of the April 6 youth movement supported the Tamarod campaign in 2013 , which propagated against Morsi and called for his overthrow. After Morsi was overthrown on July 3 by Sisi and the military, Ahmed Maher , one of the founders of the April 6 youth movement , stood behind the coup leader Sisi. Also the co-founder of the youth movement of April 6, Israa Abdel Fattah , who was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 as one of the representatives of the so-called Arab Spring with reference to her role in mobilizing protests and their non-violence against Mubarak , presided over democracy , Led the Egyptian Democratic Academy , which demanded human rights and political participation , and had received many other nominations and awards from Western groups, vilified the Freedom and Justice Party as a gang of foreign-backed terrorists and defended the "state-led massacres" as a member of a leading liberal party (The Daily Beast) to several hundred Islamists in the summer of 2013: "Our army should do whatever it wants to kill these terrorists." In a letter to the Washington Post editor, she wrote as a member of the June 30th front that it is There was no military coup when Morsi was overthrown, as the military "did not rule for even an hour", but handed over the office of President to the Constitutional Court. The roadmap that was used for this was drawn up by political forces representing millions of Egyptians who had called for this change on the street. She justified the military intervention by arguing that “terrorism and foreign interference” threatened Egypt and therefore require the support of the armed forces by “the great Egyptian people”.

Maher later described the protests against the Morsi government as a “serious mistake”. About the military regime under Sisi, Maher said that it was the old Mubarak regime again and that it was thrown back to the beginning: "The brutal regime is back". Finally, in early October 2013, the group started cautious protests against the transitional government installed by the military after Morsi's fall in July 2013. Among other things, the youth movement of April 6, referred to in the Western media as the democracy movement, criticized the army for its brutal crackdown on Morsi supporters. As a result, the government took action against the activists with increasing severity. When the military-backed transitional government passed a very restrictive demonstration law in November 2013, activists from the April 6th Youth Movement called for resistance. Many have been arrested and Maher and several other leading activists including Mohamed Adel, another leader and founding member of the April 6 Youth Movement , were sentenced to three years in prison on December 22 for unauthorized protests against the Sisi-led military. As a result, the April 6 youth movement barely appeared. At the end of April 2014, around a month before the announced presidential election, the same express court that had already declared the Muslim Brotherhood illegal after the coup in 2013 also banned the opposition youth movement , which is considered to be pro-democratic, secular, liberal and progressive April 6th all activities.

Coptic Church

The traditional reluctance of Egyptian Christians from politics in the country has changed in recent times. Younger Copts in particular already played an important role in the 2011 popular uprising known as the Revolution.

Meeting with Pope-Patriarch Tawadros II (8934428798) .jpg

Pope Tawadros II (right) and Bishop Damian (June 3, 2013)

While the Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenuda III. had led the church from 1971 until his death in March 2012 by avoiding political positions and striving for close cooperation with the state, the new Patriarch of Alexandria , Pope Tawadros II , had already followed suit at the time of the military coup in summer 2013 released from his predecessor's policy for a short term. Tawadros II has been accused of historical revisionism by observers in relation to the 2011 revolution in Egypt , which he described as a foreign conspiracy against the Arabs.

On the day of the military coup against the elected government and the first democratically elected President of Egypt on July 3, 2013, Pope Tawadros II attended General Sisi when the coup was announced on the speaker's stage and himself gave a speech in support of the coup in which he played the role Described by the police and armed forces as self-sacrificing. Tawadros II publicly praised the coup against Morsi with gestures of thanks to the army and clearly sided with the transitional government and against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Both Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood are said to have blamed the Copts for their position in the coup. While the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the attacks on churches after the bloody smashing of the Cairo protest camps by the security forces and called on their supporters to exercise restraint, they accused the Copts of complicity in opposing the Muslim Brotherhood and on the side of the putschists.

The Coptic Orthodox Church, on the other hand, on the night of August 16-17, declared its support in the fight against “armed violent groups and black terrorism” and its solidarity with the police and army, which a few months earlier had been declared enemies of Christians and killed Christian protesters during the Maspero protests in October 2011.

The Coptic Catholic Bishop of Asyut , Kyrillos William Samaan , also praised the military on August 14, 2013, the day of the largest mass killing in Egypt's recent history, much like the Coptic Catholic Patriarch Ibrahim Isaac Sidrak or the commissioner of the later German Bishops' Conference and Pastor of the German-speaking, Catholic St. Mark's Congregation in Cairo, Monsignor Joachim Schroedel .

Islamists believe that the Coptic entrepreneur Naguib Sawiris, who, in open rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood, financed the “Tamarod” campaign, which was undermined by the Egyptian state security and whose protest marches preceded the coup, also shared responsibility for the military coup.

After the resignation of the Beblawi cabinet , the CDU / CSU chairman Volker Kauder , who named the Coptic Bishop Damian, known for his controversial statements on the immigration of Muslims in European countries, as one of his “important advisors” on issues of development in Egypt, took part in talks Tawadros II and military chief Sisi and thereupon declared that "the Coptic Christians", as a voting potential with ten percent of the population, very much welcome and support the candidacy for the presidential election declared by military chief Sisi, by first promoting Sisi and the representatives in their circles would also publicly declare their support to the Coptic Church. Damian himself, who publicly stated that the proportion of Coptic Christians in the Egyptian population is given according to official or “official” sources “depending on political needs with six to eleven percent”, but assessed “realistically” according to the church registers according to the bishops is twenty percent, denied in mid-April 2014 that the Coptic Church in Egypt had a political impact on the faithful and emphasized that the Coptic Church in Egypt was not “going against anyone”, but was striving to improve the legal and social situation of the Parishioners and the "peaceful, prosperous coexistence of the people in Egypt".

The fact that Tawadros II repeatedly emphasized that Sisi had a “national duty” to become president in the upcoming election was described by the evangelical journalist Johannes Gerloff in view of the repressive course of the regime with the mass death sentences from the end of March 2014 as dangerous for Christians in Egypt and the "anti-Islamist concern" in the event of the failure of Sisi's policies. At the beginning of May Tawadros II expressly denied supporting Sisi in the presidential election. The fact that he sat behind the then Sisi when the military coup was publicly announced in July 2013 does not mean that he supports Sisi's candidacy for the highest office of the state. His support for Sisi during the coup was "institutional" but not political. He called on "every citizen, whether Christian or Muslim, to read the election manifestos of the candidates and to decide on this basis who they want as president". The Coptic Catholic Bishop of Minya, Kamal Fahim Awad Boutros Hanna , welcomed this positioning of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch and spoke of a step forward “compared to before, when some Orthodox bishops tried to convince the faithful when choosing a candidate to influence". Bishop Hanna described the presidential candidates Sisi and Sabahi as "very different, but both well suited to serve the country".

media

The Egyptian historian Mohamed Al Jawadi wrote in Al Jazeera that, according to the public opinion, exposed persons such as Tantawi, Mursi or Sisi have assumed influential positions, but the actual influencing factors to be considered are those people from the Mubarak era who work successfully from the background . They would have the financial means to maintain the media and authors economically. This is the reason for the media's partisanship for the military coup. The political influence of the media had been decisive since the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser , but was politically downplayed.

According to Hani Shukrallah, one of Egypt's most respected journalists, the media in Egypt has never been a free media . Instead of information, they would traditionally serve as propaganda machines to mobilize the population. The majority of journalists see themselves as “servants of power” and change their political views in journalistic work depending on the balance of power.

In his opinion, in addition to the Egyptian media, the Western media did not capture the complexity of the situation in Egypt, but instead contributed to further intensifying the polarization in the country. The Western perspective on the Arab world is characterized by prejudice. Since the Iranian Revolution , many Western intellectuals have viewed Muslims as refusers of democracy and the liberal market economy , which is why, in their opinion, there is only the alternative between a secular police state or an Islamic democracy as the only two possible systems in the Arab world . Autocrats like Mubarak and Ben Ali would have used this circumstance to present themselves as a "bulwark against radical Islamism".

After Mubarak was overthrown, the Muslim Brotherhood was initially able to take advantage of the West’s concern about terrorism , when Morsi mediated between all sides during the Gaza crisis in 2012 and the Western community of states hoped that it would be able to control the radical Islamists with the moderate Muslim Brotherhood hold. Although the Muslim Brotherhood had not succeeded in any power-sharing arrangements with the important state actors except with the military, the media, which are largely critical of the Muslim Brotherhood, repeatedly denounced an alleged "Ikhwanization", i.e. an infiltration of the institutions by the Brotherhood ( Ikhwan ).

Since the coup against Morsi, the imagery of the media in Egypt is comparable to that in the USA after the attacks of September 11, 2001 . The Egyptian media “celebrated” the “ fight against terrorism ” in the form of a hunt, glorifying the army and demonizing the Islamists as “clumsy staging of the enemy”. This resulted in a “completely exaggerated nationalism” in which “Mubarak's henchmen created a discourse of hysteria”.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had already pronounced a clear renunciation of violence in the first statutes of the organization founded in 1928 as an anti-colonialist, bourgeois-conservative social reform movement. At the same time, however, a militant wing already existed in the 1930s that carried out attacks and dispatched volunteers to the first Israeli-Arab conflict (1948) . As a result of a wave of repression marked by mass arrests and death sentences under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who came to power through the military coup of 1952, from 1954, the severity of which can be compared with the wave of repression under interim president Mansur after the 2013 Sisis military coup , others split extremist elements that became the basis of al-Qaeda .

After the militant jihadists split off at the end of the 1970s, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood renounced all violence around 40 years before the 2013 coup and subsequently became involved as a credible political actor, trying to get involved politically in the Mubarak system to bring in and to change the system out of itself. With their humanitarian programs , the Muslim Brotherhood provided millions of people with food and medical aid, effectively replacing the missing welfare state in Egypt. The officially banned brotherhood was considered moderate and took part in elections under Mubarak with independent candidates. Until the coup they had neither an arsenal nor a militia.

Despite electoral fraud by the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in entering parliament in 2005 with 88 members who, although they have little political influence, were able to gain experience in practical politics and later formed the most important political cadres. In 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to repeat its election success due to massive interventions by the Mubarak regime, but in contrast to the other opposition forces who boycotted it, it used the election campaign for a systematic campaign of political education about the political function of elections and the organization of resistance against election fraud. This withdrawal of legitimacy from the regime became one of the many factors that led to the outbreak of the so-called revolution a month and a half later.

The first democratically elected government in Egypt under President Mohammed Morsi met with a variety of opposition. Since the military coup, the ousted president has been detained in an undisclosed location for four months and brought to justice. His party was banned.

After the fall of the Mubarak regime in spring 2011 and its election victory, the Muslim Brotherhood established itself as a political authority and party. She tried to convert the political arm of her organization into a people's party by founding the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). In fact, thanks to its comparatively good organizational structure, the FJP succeeded in organizing majorities and gaining electoral victories. Nevertheless, it did not transform itself into a people's party that integrates as many political currents as possible and conducts an open program debate. Furthermore, the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members go through a multi-year admission process that is sealed off against infiltration, as the organization had internalized over decades during its ban and its suppression under Mubarak, remained suspicious of other political forces and acted very intransparently with regard to theirs Financing and the relationship of the brotherhood to the freedom and justice party founded out of the brotherhood , for example with regard to the decision-making bodies and decision-making structures.

Essentially, party positions were negotiated with an opaque governing body, the leadership office Maktab al-irshad of the Muslim Brotherhood, in which control was exercised over a small group of ideologically closed “conservative pragmatists” around the brotherhood's deputy leader, Kheirat al-Shater. Liberal-minded members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh were gradually ousted from the group's governing bodies. As a political actor, the FJP strove to control administration and institutions, but encountered difficulties due to the lack of appropriately trained personnel in its ranks. As president, Morsi often did not try to explain his decisions to the population. In addition to his unwillingness to communicate, the appearance of Morsis, who was largely unknown until his election, was also considered uncharismatic.

A lack of financial resources did not enable her to create additional jobs in the already overloaded bureaucracy . Instead of pressing ahead with structural reforms, it based its work on the institutions taken over from the old Mubarak regime and conducted political business with the circles that had established and strengthened Mubarak's rule. The main clientele of the very private-sector Muslim Brotherhood was the Egyptian middle class. In order to be able to meet the requirements of the IMF for loans with a volume of 4.8 billion dollars, according to Sonja Hegasy , Deputy Director of the Center for the Modern Orient , Muri's government was faced with problems such as the reduction of subsidies, which accounted for around a third of the Egyptian state budget (for example for gasoline, energy and food like wheat and bread). Morsi encountered broad, cross-class opposition in the population when discussing plans to cut subsidies of 22 billion dollars a year.

The military was the only important state actor with which the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in a power-sharing arrangement, apparently in the form of a " gentlemen's agreement " from 2012 with the military leadership, in which the military accepted the civilian President Morsi and in return the military accepted extensive autonomy through the the Muslim Brotherhood was granted a forced new constitution. The control over other established institutions such as the internal security apparatus and the judiciary, which the leadership of the brotherhood apparently hoped with this agreement, did not take place. Due to the lack of control by the Ministry of the Interior, the Muslim Brotherhood was subsequently unable to initiate an urgently needed reform of the security sector and to dismantle the informal networks and structures in the Egyptian police apparatus. The security apparatus set up under Mubarak was not dismantled, which had already operated with great brutality outside of legitimacy under Mubarak and which apparently operated without effective control after the fall of the Mubarak regime. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood condoned the violence perpetrated against Egyptian civilians by Interior Ministry security forces. The judicial apparatus working against the Muslim Brotherhood also blocked bills successfully initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood, such as changing the electoral law.

While Mubarak pursued a tough course against Islamists and presented Egypt as a “bulwark against jihadists”, during Morsi's presidency militant Islamists were able to operate more or less undisturbed by state power in some districts east of the city of Arish . The operations against extremists with ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network in the area during this period were “half-hearted” from the army's point of view. During the many attacks on security forces in Sinai, the military gave the impression that cooperation with the Palestinian Hamas was more important to Morsi than protecting his own people. This Mursi was interpreted as a weakness by part of the population.

In the monarchy of Saudi Arabia , the politics of the Muslim Brotherhood sparked fear of a competing, because more modern, republican and often revolutionary interpretation and representation of political Islam . There was growing concern that the Brotherhood of Egypt could pose a threat to the Gulf monarchies similar to that in the 1950s and 1960s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser called for pan-Arab nationalism , socialism and the overthrow of the monarchies in the region, whereupon a real "Arab Cold War" broke out, which was fought as a proxy conflict mainly in Yemen . This concern was fueled by the election victory of the Nahda party in the elections in Tunisia in November 2011 , which indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood and groups ideologically related to them would play an important role in the Arab transition states of the “Arab Spring”. The Saudi ruling family saw the government of a transnationally organized revolutionary movement like the Muslim Brotherhood in a country as important as Egypt as a threat to the internal stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, especially since Islamists influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood also existed in Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s strong opposition movement had dominated.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia therefore tried to bring the Egyptian military and parts of the "old regime" (from the Mubarak era) back to power in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood and for this purpose supported the Egyptian military coup in July 2013. After that Putsch, the Saudi King Abdallah greeted the Egyptian military chief and coup leader Sisi exuberantly for the successful coup and, together with the monarchies of the UAE and Kuwait, promised him financial aid of 12 billion US dollars within less than a week. After the new Egyptian leadership initially banned the Muslim Brotherhood and declared it a terrorist organization in December 2013 , Saudi Arabia followed suit in March 2014 for domestic political reasons in this "very far-reaching and factually incorrect categorization" (Guido Steinberg / SWP), regardless that the Muslim Brotherhood had not carried out an attack since the 1950s.

Despite claims to the contrary by proponents of the coup after the military coup against Morsi, according to observers, the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members often belonged to so-called modernization elites of the bourgeois-conservative middle class such as doctors, lawyers, natural scientists or political scientists, but were rarely preachers, was neither one Brotherhood of Arms is still a terrorist organization. It also lacked the ability to act like a military organization. Accusations that the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to establish a “state of God” or that Morsi had installed an authoritarian order, the development of which was towards dictatorship , are also denied by voices denying that he strives for a “targeted Islamization of Egypt” in the absence of a solution to urgent economic and social reforms accuse. A comparison with other cases of corresponding transition processes using parameters customary in political science showed that Morsi did not rule more autocratically in Egypt than is typical for state leaders during transition processes and that he proceeded more democratically than other state leaders during social transition processes.

Regardless of this, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was also put in connection with radical Islamists or terrorists in the western public, for example by the former US military and military intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters after the " Rābiʿa massacre " or by the defense expert of the Greens - Bundestag parliamentary group, Katja Keul , in connection with the financing by the state of Qatar, when it was accused of supporting the IS militia during the Iraq crisis .

Salafists

A fundamental difference between the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, who stand for a modernization of order and adaptation to the 20th and 21st centuries, is their focus on order at the time of Mohammed, who was venerated as a prophet in Islam .

Politically Participating Salafists

The Egyptian Salafists of today refer mainly to local founding fathers such as the legendary thinkers of the “Arab and Islamic Renaissance” ( Nahda ). The first Salafist organization emerged as an apolitical scholars' association in Cairo in 1926 - two years before the Muslim Brotherhood, but did not enjoy the same mass influx as the Muslim Brotherhood, who had been socially and politically active from the start. Salafism only spread massively in the 1980s and 1990s, when Saudi Arabia, which is financially strong thanks to the oil business, financially encouraged the spread of Wahhabi- Salafist ideology. Around 2000, the Mubarak regime gave Salafism a further boost. It tolerated numerous informal religious schools and approved TV channels of the purist and mainstream Salafists. The Mubarak regime, which presented itself to the West as an "anti-Islamist bulwark", pursued the goal of weakening the Muslim Brotherhood as the most powerful opposition group and undermining their social base by strengthening the supposedly apolitical Salafists.

Logo of the Nur-Party , the largest Salafist party

When the so-called “revolution” began in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, the largest Salafist groups and their scholars initially waited and hardly took part in the mass protests or spoke out against them. In the spring of 2011, however, they very quickly surprised with the founding of parties, even by former jihadists. After Mubarak's fall and the ensuing military rule under Mohammed Hussein Tantawi , the “Islamic Alliance” - a Salafist alliance made up of the dominant Party of Light (al-Nur) , the much smaller Authenticity Party (al-Asala) and the jihadist Gamaa Islamijja group emerged from the construction and development party (al-Benaa Wa Al-Tanmia) in the first democratic parliamentary election in Egyptian history 2011/2012 with over 7 million votes, around a quarter of the seats and, to the surprise of the Muslim Brotherhood and foreign observers, won the By far the second strongest force, far ahead of the fragmented "secular" old parties and the groups founded by "revolutionaries". Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists took up around three quarters of the seats. Since then, the Nur Party and Al-Dawa Al-Salafiyya have become major political actors. At the top of the state, Salafists acted as advisers to President Morsi. Until the upper house was dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court on June 2, 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists dominated the Shura Council. Once in office, the Salafists surprised observers with their political pragmatism and their willingness to collaborate with non-Islamist actors, in stark contrast to the conventional image of their ideological rigidity.

The Muslim Brotherhood ultimately failed to unite the Islamist spectrum in Egypt. Crucial to the success of the Salafists was their impressive charity work and their promise to permanently fight poverty in the country. The economic policy of the later years of the Mubarak regime had led to high unemployment and rising costs of living, thus increasing the attractiveness of the Salafist sheikhs, who focus on social justice and charitable projects in disadvantaged areas, compared to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is oriented towards private property and entrepreneurship. In contrast to the hierarchically structured Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafists were characterized by decentralized network structures that did not require any major material resources and into which new members were accepted solely on the basis of their ideological willingness. In addition, the Salafists succeeded in bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into connection with the compromised Mubarak regime among many Islamist voters and in presenting themselves as an alternative with moral integrity. Finally, in Egypt in particular, private and public funding, especially from the Gulf monarchies, promoted the dissemination of Salafist ideas, for example via satellite TV channels and charities that mainly operate in rural areas.

Although there had been an agreement in principle to leave the role of Sharia law in the newly drafted constitution as it had already been the case in Article 2 of the old constitution, amendment 219 in November 2012 was mainly at the urging of the Salafist spectrum introduced the draft constitution, which stipulated that the Sharia should be defined according to the Koran and the four current Sunni schools of law of Islam. The scope for interpretation of the Sharia has thus been restricted compared to the old constitution. This is seen as an occasion for the secular third to withdraw from the Constituent Assembly .

The Nur party continued to develop steadily, increasingly separated itself from the Muslim Brotherhood and its FJP and became almost the only force that called on the two warring camps to come to an agreement in the polarized run-up to the coup. Although the Nur party was significantly more conservative than the Muslim Brotherhood in socio-political positions, it was more willing to talk to the liberal opposition. Although she did not take part in the mass demonstrations against Morsi, but instead emphasized the legitimacy of the elected president, she unequivocally called on Morsi to call new elections and to form a neutral technocratic cabinet by then. This split the Islamist camp and the demands for resignation against Morsi could hardly be portrayed as an attack on the “Islamic identity of the country”, which the Muslim Brotherhood had successfully mobilized in the past.

The express endorsement of the military coup dated July 3, 2013 by the Nur party, its continuous accusations against the Muslim Brotherhood and its cooperation with “secular” forces were greeted with surprise by many observers. On the day of the coup, military chief Sisi also stood by representatives of the Nur party in his speech on the speaker's platform. The Nur party , the largest Egyptian Salafist party, which is more fundamentalist and interpretative than the Muslim Brotherhood , was given the opportunity to become the strongest Islamist force in a new parliament through the support of the military coup and the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the Nur party had been integrated into the anti-Morsi alliance by then, it announced that it would withdraw from the negotiations on the interim government due to the July 8th bloodbath. Observers such as the Egyptian political scientist Mustafa El-Labbad, however, see the withdrawal of the Salafists, who are mainly supported by Saudi Arabia, as a political tactic with the aim of countering the allegations of betrayal of political Islam by justifying further secularization of the Landes stopped and wrested valuable compromises from the Liberals. For their goal of "outstripping" the Muslim Brotherhood, they would therefore not resign from the coalition against the Muslim Brotherhood. While the transitional government set up by the army cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies with great severity, the Nur party, which had agreed to help shape the transition period, was subsequently exempted from state repression.

Before the referendum on the new constitution drawn up by the military regime in January 2014, the Nur party formed an unexpected alliance with supporters of the former Mubarak regime. Although the new draft constitution stipulated that in future there should no longer be any political parties with a religious identity in Egypt, the Islamic-conservative Nur-Party, as the largest party of the ultra-orthodox current of Salafism, together with secular Egyptians, campaigned for a “yes” to the Popular vote, while other political Salafist parties and even more moderate Islamic parties boycotted the new constitution. The only party thus participated in the two to three million US dollar PR campaign for the new constitution, which was carried out by advertising mogul Tarek Nour, who is rumored to be close to Husni Mubarak, and six other prominent, but anonymous businessmen , before the draft constitution was completed was founded and provided an important basis of legitimation for the new post-Islamist regime. Critics criticized the fact that the only party of the military-backed transitional government with its fraternization action offered the appropriate cover to exclude the once powerful Muslim Brotherhood from the election, to legitimize the coup and to approve of the regime, since it is merely a “cosmetic opposition” without any actual influence on it Form politics.

Jihadist Salafists

In contrast to all other Salafist groups, the jihadist Salafists advocate and practice armed struggle as a means of political change.

Until well into the 1990s, the nationalists dominated the jihadist movement internationally, with the Egyptian groups forming their avant-garde and having a very strong national character. When the struggle against the Mubarak regime during an uprising in Egypt from 1992–1997 appeared to be impossible to win, most nationalists renounced violence and reoriented themselves.

Only part of the jihad group under the current al-Qaeda leader Aiman ​​az-Zawahiri decided to expand the battle , which had become a holy war, beyond Egypt to the USA and joined al-Qaeda.

Since the so-called revolution of January 25, 2011, they have been mainly active in Sinai . They repeatedly stated that their actions were directed against Israel alone and called on the Egyptian army to leave them unmolested. The military accused them of attacking government buildings, security facilities and churches and of smuggling weapons. Their structures are little known, but they are considered attractive to radical youth who are dissatisfied with the Islamist movements involved in Egypt's political process.

prehistory

In order to be able to economically absorb the young Egyptians streaming into the labor market, the annual growth rate of the Egyptian gross domestic product must amount to at least 6 percent according to estimates by economists. Before the 2011 popular uprising, it had been 7 percent for several years. However, after Mubarak's fall in February 2011, tourism revenues fell and foreign investment collapsed. It was not the government of the Muslim Brotherhood that deterred investors, but rather strikes and demonstrations.

According to the Middle East expert Mudhoon, both the Islamist and the non-Islamist post-revolutionary elites in Egypt failed to limit the political influence of the military, which traditionally was the actual source of power in Egypt, leading to a return of the old system has come with a crumbling civil facade. While around a third of the population sympathized with the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi, the military generals relied primarily on the so-called " deep state ", i.e. the former Mubarak supporters who continued to hold positions in administration, justice and the police. These groups, which had lost a lot of power and financial resources since the Egyptian revolution of 2011 , had been pushing for a restoration for some time and were relying on a new head of government who would install a system similar to that under Mubarak through a counter-revolution .

Morsi met with great resistance in the institutions. The media, which Morsi did not control, made a front against him. The establishment in the judiciary and bureaucracy did its best to obstruct its policies. In 2012 the Constitutional Court dissolved the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly , where the Muslim Brotherhood had a majority. The constant attempts by the judiciary to dissolve the elected bodies could already be seen as attempts for an upcoming coup. After Mursi then defied the judiciary in November 2012 by means of a self-empowering decree in order to forestall a legal coup from the Muslim Brotherhood's point of view, the judiciary mobilized against their disempowerment in the months that followed. The media, civil society and the old security apparatus acted against the “dictatorial powers” ​​(Markus Bickel / FAZ), which Mursi initially secured and canceled at the beginning of December 2012 under pressure from the opposition.

The judiciary weakened elected bodies in favor of the Military Council from June 2012

After Mubarak was overthrown in the so-called "revolution" of 2011, the Supreme Military Council under Mohammed Hussein Tantawi , in close contact with the ally USA, took power and put down the ongoing protests of the youth movement, but also of Coptic Christians, often with extreme brutality. The Tantawi-led military council slowed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood through democratic elections with the dissolution of parliament and constitutional amendments that restricted the power of the first freely elected president, Mohammed Morsi.

procedure

On June 14, 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared the election of the lower house to be invalid and decided to dissolve parliament two days before the runoff to the presidential election. The court president, Faruk Sultan, officially declared that the military council would take over the legislature until new elections for a new lower house were held.

At the same time, the court ruled that Ahmad Schafiq , who is preferred by the military as a presidential candidate, was allowed to run for the runoff election, i.e. the air force commander, aviation minister and last prime minister in the authoritarian system under President Mubarak, who are considered by the Muslim Brotherhood to represent the military council. The parliament had previously passed a law against the political activities of officials of the old regime, but the supreme electoral commission had subsequently declared it to be inconsistent.

After the two judgments, protesters clashed with the security forces in front of the Constitutional Court. Egypt now had neither a parliament nor a constitution, while the Supreme Military Council controlled both legislative and executive powers.

Mohammed Morsi, as the new president, later declared the judgment null and void, but the Constitutional Court reaffirmed it, whereupon Morsi finally gave in.

meaning

The event was seen as a "silent military coup". Observers like Hamed Abdel-Samad assumed that the judiciary's decisions were guided by the military council, which, like the constitutional court and the entire judiciary, conformed to the old Mubarak structures. Even an election victory for Morsi would therefore not impair the power of the military council until the powers of the president have been defined in a constitution that has yet to be drawn up.

Due to the powers conferred on it by the most recent constitutional amendments, the Military Council continued to control the legislative process, the budget, the composition of the Constituent Committee and the content of the new constitution even after Morsi won the runoff election on June 24, 2012 for the first democratically elected President of Egypt and thus de facto the entire constitutional process.

Restriction of the judiciary and anti-government protests from August 2012

Tahrirplatz on November 27, 2012 - the scene of several days of anti-Mursi protests since November 23, 2012 against the new draft constitution

On August 12, 2012, Morsi invalidated the military's prerogatives and suspended amendments to the constitution that restricted presidential power in favor of the military . He sent the army commander and defense minister Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi into retirement and appointed Field Marshal Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi as his successor at the head of the armed forces.

However, lawyers then criticized Morsi for having exceeded his competencies as president. Morsi's decision to restrict the powers of the judiciary followed public unrest on November 22, which forced the president to reverse some proposals. On December 8, 2012, Morsi gave in to the conflict with the opposition and canceled his special powers.

Previously, women's rights activists, Christians and liberals had criticized the constitutional text of the constitution, which was passed by the constitutional committee on November 29, 2012 in an urgent procedure, whereupon the mass protests continued.

In the run-up to the constitutional referendum, which took place from mid to late December 2012, thousands of demonstrators have already gathered for rallies for and against the draft constitution.

During the referendum, nearly two-thirds of the population finally voted in favor of the government's draft constitution. Mainly secular critics described the document as a betrayal of the revolution. Islamists contradicted this against it. As a result, there were mass protests with sometimes fatal violence.

Riots in January 2013

procedure

Riots in January 2013

In January 2013, as at the time of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 against Housni Mubarak, ever larger parts of Egypt came into turmoil. The government blamed a growing number of people for the country's persistently poor economic situation, which resulted in household financial reserves being depleted, high unemployment and inflation persisting. Dissatisfaction also resulted from the security forces, which had not been reformed since the 2011 revolution in Egypt , and which aroused unbroken popular hatred of the police. Groups politically classified as “liberal” took an irreconcilable stance towards the constitution , which was passed through a referendum at the end of 2012 by the groups classified as “Islamists” , which they viewed as an instrument of power for the Muslim Brotherhood and not as a documentation of the broad will of the people and not as minorities and dissenters .

Not only in Cairo on Tahrir Square but in practically every major city in the country there were street battles, police stations were set on fire, prisoners were freed and the violence escalated.

On January 26, 2013, 21 football supporters were sentenced to death for the deadly Port Said stadium disaster in February 2012, in which 74 people were killed and more than 1,000 were injured. Of the more than 70 accused, nine police officers had to answer before the court in Cairo, who were accused of allowing the perpetrators to deliberately allow the perpetrators to do so in order to punish the supporters of Al-Ahli during the uprising against Husni Mubarak and later had played an important role in favor of the insurgents in protests against the military council. After the verdict was announced, “demonstrators” (Der Spiegel), including relatives of the convicted, tried to storm two police stations and a prison and set fire to an army building. Police headquarters were attacked in Suez. As a result, over 30 people died. Amnesty International criticized the "excessive and disproportionate police violence" and said that between 25 and 27 January 2013 at least 45 people died and more than 1,000 were injured. In the riots that began on January 24, more than 50 people were killed in clashes between demonstrators and security forces up to January 29. The UN stated the death of 53 people.

As a result of the events, President Morsi called on 27./28. January in Port Said , Suez and Ismailia suspended the state of emergency and a related night curfew for a period of 30 days, but the unrest continued.

At the same time, Mursi invited the opposition for talks in a televised address on January 28th. The Egyptian opposition turned down parts of Morsi's offer to speak. Mohamed el-Baradei wrote on Twitter that dialogue would be a waste of time as long as Morsi did not take responsibility for the violence and ensure the formation of a government of national salvation and a balanced constitutional committee. The leftist Hamdin Sabahi , who also belongs to the oppositional salvation front, refused a dialogue unless the bloodshed ended and the demands of the people were met.

A video was released on February 1, 2013 showing police officers beating a man with clubs, tearing his clothes off, and then dragging him to a van. As a result, the demonstrators and the main opposition groups have called for the president to resign. Mursi announced that he was "pained by these shocking images", but unlike his interior minister, he definitely refuses to resign.

The Shura Council (Upper House), which has exercised sole legislative power since the constitutional court decreed the dissolution of the House of Representatives in July 2012 , together with the Kandil cabinet approved a law that temporarily gave the army nationwide police powers beyond the areas affected by the state of emergency and gave soldiers the right to arrest civilians. The army received thus temporarily have the right to curfews and to impose bans on demonstrations. In addition, the arrest of all members of the “Black Bloc” was ordered, a group of demonstrators that first appeared in the protests on the second anniversary of the revolution, which, according to the prosecutor, had become particularly conspicuous in the riots in January and was suspected to have formed a terrorist group with the aim of overthrowing the Islamist government.

Scientific evaluation of the allegations against Mursi

Stephan Roll gave an assessment for the Science and Politics Foundation on January 29, 2013 with regard to the most important points of the violent criticism of President Muhammad Morsi, which should take into account the complex situation in Egypt:

  • Morsi was sharply criticized both by the Egyptian opposition and abroad for having placed himself above the law by a decree in November 2012, thereby preventing any foreseeable intervention by the judiciary in the constitutional process and violating fundamental democratic rules by abolishing the separation of powers.
Roll described the accusation as not "entirely consistent". Since Egypt was not a democracy up to this point and large parts of the judiciary came from the authoritarian Mubarak regime, the usual democratic standards were not sufficient for an appropriate assessment. Morsi's approach should have been better communicated, but the measures were limited in time from the start and after the new constitution came into force, the president was no longer above the law. That is why Morsi's influence on court cases such as the one dealing with the soccer massacre in Port Said should not be overestimated.
  • Morsis was accused of failing to negotiate with the opposition and of neglecting the "inclusion of all political forces" in the constitutional process called for by the opposition and western governments:
On the one hand, Roll confirmed that, since the beginning of his presidency, Morsi had not approached the non-Islamist opposition, which he should have tried to credibly include both in the constitutional process and in the formation of a government. On the other hand, the opposition itself made this more difficult for Morsi, as with the less constructive boycott of the constituent assembly by the opposition from September 2012. In addition, the new constitution is already a compromise between completely contrary positions. It would not only contain important positions of secular, liberal and left parties and groups, but also fundamentalist positions of the Salafist spectrum, which represents a not insignificant part of the population, would be absent or limited. Sections of the opposition that have come together in the "National Healing Front", on the other hand, represent maximum demands that cannot be implemented without the president losing face.
  • The central accusation raised by the opposition over time was that Morsi was not the president of all Egyptians, but the Muslim Brotherhood:
On the one hand, Roll confirms that Morsi did not use the election victory to receive support across party lines and from politically disenchanted sections of the population, but rather coordinated his political decisions primarily with key leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, even narrow election victories are not uncommon in democratic elections and the election was free and fair by Egyptian standards, which is also accepted by the majority of the opposition.
  • Morsi has been accused of alliance with the military. In addition, the replacement of a large part of the military leadership by Morsi in August 2012 was interpreted as a disempowerment of the military:
On the one hand, Roll confirmed the replacement of parts of the military leadership. On the other hand, the new constitution showed that the military retained extensive autonomy and that Morsi could not easily influence internal affairs of the armed forces, such as personnel or financial issues. He concluded that there was a power-sharing arrangement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military leadership. Although this arrangement is highly problematic for a democratic state and the opposition's criticism is justified, it is questionable whether the military could have been disempowered in the given situation.
  • For many western critics of Morsi, the most problematic allegation was that Morsi was an anti-Semite:
Roll confirms that Morsi had attracted attention in his past as a functionary of the Muslim Brotherhood through anti-Semitic remarks and later justified this by stating that his remarks had to be seen in the context of his criticism of Israel's policy towards the Palestinians. On the other hand, Morsi's statements were not seen as a problem in the Egyptian majority society; on the contrary, they found the support of large sections of the non-Islamist opposition. Morsi must, however, rather be measured by his concrete actions, according to which he showed himself to be extremely pragmatic towards Israel and was able to broker a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas, especially since, unlike Hosni Mubarak, he also enjoys the trust of the Palestinian Hamas and help the West move the Middle East peace process forward.

Riots in late June / early July 2013

The mass demonstrations of June 30, 2013 and the disempowerment of President Morsi were largely based on the work of Mubarak supporters, the Egyptian secret services and the Egyptian army . The members of these circles, viewed as "pillars of power", have held back since the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and waited for the opportunity to return to their positions of power.

Naguib Sawiris , known as the “richest man in Africa” , left the country after being charged with corruption and taking advantage and returned immediately after the coup.

The removal of President Morsi by the Egyptian military in early July 2013 took place after political pressure through demonstrations and protest actions . However, the decision to overthrow Morsis was made by the military leadership days before the mass protests. In the background, there were ultimately established interest groups such as the business elite who had worked for months towards the political failure of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was doubted that the signature campaign against Mursi could actually have been organized by a network of youth activists alone. There are reports that the initiative was supported by the military and the secret services. The presentation of the organizers of tamarod after should the network alleged to have caused 22 million Egyptians in less than three months to demand the immediate resignation of the president, but the signatures of the action, which had triggered the decisive mass protests were counted by any independent force. Instead, the entrepreneur Naguib Sawiris , who is considered the richest man in Egypt and a member of the Coptic Christians, appeared on his television channel ONTV and stated that he had made the infrastructure of his Muslim Brotherhood-critical party of the Free Egyptians available to Tamarod to organize their action. According to the New York Times , the constitutional judge Tahani al-Gebali , a lawyer from the Mubarak period, had put herself in the service of Tamarod and helped formulate the demands. A year before the coup, the New York Times reported that top judge Gebali had worked with leading generals to block the rise of the Islamists.

The Morsi government, which found diminishing support among the population, was unable to withstand the resistance of these interest groups and thus also of the business elite. Observers saw the sudden occurrence of supply shortages in electricity , gasoline and gas during Morsi's last days in office before the coup as an indication that supporters of the old regime were doing everything in their power to turn the people against the president. At the end of June 2013, the mass of people demonstrated against the government not because of impaired human rights such as police torture of arrested opposition members or limited freedom of the press , but because of supply bottlenecks such as power and water failures, food prices and gasoline shortages as well as unemployment . The fact that, since the coup, petrol was suddenly available again at the petrol stations , the power outages ended and the police, who had openly boycotted Morsi for a year during his presidency and thus promoted the rapid rise in street crime , resumed their work, was interpreted as an indication that the military coup was planned well in advance and that the disempowerment served to return the old system. In the same way, the unusually high activity of the domestic secret service in the affected phase, noted by observers, and the news that a day after the coup, several major investors announced that they would invest in Egypt again. Including Naguib Sawiris, who promised his family would “invest in Egypt like never before”.

Anti-government actions

Anti-Mursi protest march in Cairo on June 28, 2013
Anti-Mursi graffiti on a wall in Cairo on July 2, 2013

At the end of June 2013, the protests against Morsi's policies intensified again. One trigger was that on June 17, Morsi appointed new governors for 17 of the 27 Egyptian governorates , seven of which belonged to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. In particular, protests were made against the appointment of Adel al-Chajat , a former member of the former terrorist group Gamaa Islamija , as governor of the Luxor tourist region. Critics feared a complete takeover of power by the Muslim Brotherhood and negative consequences for tourism.

A general tension in the situation in Egypt was due to the massive economic problems in Egypt, which resulted in many citizens being unemployed, barely enough money for food, and making everyday life difficult due to supply bottlenecks such as gasoline shortages. Many Egyptians blamed the ruling Morsis party for the rise in unemployment, the crime rate and food prices, as well as the lack of gasoline and the poor electricity supply at the end of June. Morsi's opponents accused him of representing the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood alone. They also criticize the fact that he did not manage to get the economy going again to fight inflation. In addition, the tourism industry, which is important for Egypt, continued to collapse. Morsi attributed the problems to the legacies of the old regime and the attempts to disrupt the opposition and countered the accusations: "For economic growth we need political stability." Since you took office, Morsi had been increasingly criticized for his economic policy and his increasingly authoritarian style of government .

On June 29, 2013, several deaths were reported in attacks on offices of the Muslim Brotherhood in several cities.

The Tamarod campaign , which, according to its own unchecked statements, wanted to collect over 22 million signatures for the resignation of Morsi and an early presidential election, also called for mass protests on June 30, 2013 on the occasion of the first anniversary of Morsi's inauguration . According to media reports from February 2014, the leaders of the Tamarod movement, financed by the Coptic billionaire Naguib Sawiris and infiltrated up to the top by the Egyptian state security, later admitted that the number of these petition signatures, which had not been submitted to any independent body or had been certified by such a body, later admitted Mursi was not 22 million, but a maximum of 8.5 million.

On June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of Morsi's inauguration as president, more than a million protestors saw the largest demonstration in Egypt since the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak demanding his resignation. Army sources claimed that up to 14 million people could have participated in the protests. Activists called the protests the largest political rally in human history and said more than 30 million participants took part. By 2014, the number of over 30 million anti-Morsi demonstrators on the eve of the military coup, which observers regarded as completely unrealistic, was circulating in public.

"Ultimatum" from Tamarod

On July 1, 2013, Tamarod called on Morsi in an “ultimatum” to “surrender power and allow the authorities to organize an early presidential election” by July 2 at 5 p.m., and otherwise threatened “a campaign of full civilianism” Disobedience ”.

Military coup

Unlike in February 2011, the army did not act as a power holder during the military coup, but presented itself as an authority that ended the old and made the new possible. During his address on the coup, the chief of staff Sisi was represented by the heads of the Coptic Church, the Islamic al-Azhar institution , the left-liberal opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei , the initiators of the Tamarod movement and even the Salafists of the radical Islamist Nur party (Nur Party) to the side.

After the coup against Morsi, a return of the old elites was observed, who initially remained behind the military leadership, but were already striving to restore the old economic conditions. In the interim government set up by the military after the coup , mainly politicians and technocrats were represented who were close to the entrepreneurial camp, so that the interests of the large entrepreneurs had to be safeguarded as the political transition process continued. After the coup, the interim government again included many well-known personalities from the Mubarak era - a minister was already a member of the leadership of the ruling party under Mubarak. Also, most province - governors came as Mubarak out of the police and military apparatus. The new alliance , effectively led by army chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi , also included the business elites and a large part of the politicians who had become prominent after the revolution. Sisi herself was quickly proposed and discussed for a presidential run. At the same time, the temporary release of Hosni Mubarak increased the impression that all state institutions were behind him and helped to destroy or cover up evidence of crimes for which he was responsible, while the entire state apparatus was working against Morsi.

Coup course

After violent and armed attacks by “opponents of the government” on June 30, 2013 against the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the storming, looting and setting fire to the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood by “opponents of the government” and the setting up of the headquarters of the Wasat party in Cairo on July 1, 2013 According to official figures, 16 people died nationwide from 30 June to the afternoon of 1 July from so-called “demonstrators”, eight of them in clashes and shootings in front of the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.

The Egyptian military then issued an ultimatum calling on the country's political leadership to "resolve the conflict within 48 hours and meet the demands of the people".

Thousands of Islamists then gathered in front of Cairo University to protest against the ultimatum issued by the military. There were "serious clashes between supporters of Morsi and security forces". On the night of July 3, clashes left at least 22 dead, according to official figures, most of them in a single incident near Cairo University in which 16 people were killed.

On July 3, 2013, when the ultimatum expired, the military took power in Egypt and surrounded the presidential palace with army tanks. In the evening there was a massive troop contingent at the two large pro-Mursi rallies in Nasr City and near the University of Cairo and in Heliopolis .

Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi was seen as the leading figure behind the military coup and the establishment of the civil transitional government and as the de facto power holder in Egypt after the coup.

Defense minister and military chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi read a statement on television on the evening of July 3, in the presence and with the consent of the Muslim top cleric and grand imam of al-Azhar mosque Ahmed Tayeb, Pope of the Egyptian Coptic Church Tawadros II. and the opposition leader Mohammed el-Baradei, with whom he had conferred in a meeting before the end of the military ultimatum.

The military had therefore suspended the Egyptian constitution , deposed the democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi, installed the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court , Adli Mansur , as interim president of the country, and decided on a political “roadmap” together with politicians and other public figures.

Sisi's announcements from the TV speech as a political road map included the formation of a “strong and capable” government that would have “extensive powers” ​​and “include all national forces”, with Egypt being given an interim government of technocrats , the formation of one Body that is to revise the constitution that was repealed by the coup, as well as new elections planned for both the presidency and parliament at the end of the transition process. Literally, Sisi affirmed in his statement: "The army does not want to remain in power."

Morsi was no longer in the office of President, but Egypt was ruled by a transitional government under the control of the military and chaired by the President of the Constitutional Court. Mursi was held in an undisclosed location from July 3, 2013 until a trial against him began on November 4, 2013.

Follow-up events

The US government avoided the term coup, as did the new Egyptian rulers.

Since Morsi was overthrown by the military on July 3, 2013, the Egyptian mass media, which were still allowed to report, unanimously sided with the military and against the Muslim Brotherhood. Pro-Islamist television stations were closed, journalists arrested or jailed and their technical equipment confiscated. Journalists who report positively on the pro-Morsi demonstrations came under pressure. The view of the Muslim Brotherhood was almost completely ignored by the Egyptian media after the coup. The army firmly established itself again as a permanent supervisory authority.

Pro Mursi protesters in Damiette on July 5, 2013

After President Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, the Egyptian security authorities put the Islamists under massive pressure. The large number of arrests, the lack of transparency by the authorities and the speed of events all contributed to the fact that Egyptian human rights organizations found it difficult to document the arrests and other repressive measures. Observers suspected that representatives of the Interior Ministry tried to blame the Muslim Brotherhood for their own offenses. Gamal Eid, director of the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), criticized the Interior Ministry itself for denying errors from the time under Mubarak and instead ascribing any fault to the Muslim Brotherhood. Leaders were arrested on the one hand and supporters of the Islamists were arbitrarily arrested on the other. From June 30 to July 5, 2013, the number of deaths rose to 90.

Adli Mansur, sworn in as interim president on July 4, 2013, dissolved the previous transitional parliament, the Shura Council, in his first decree on July 5, in which the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists had a two-thirds majority. Mansur also appointed a new head of the secret service. Mansur later put forward a schedule that initially envisaged the revision of the constitution and then parliamentary elections within six months. Presidential elections should then follow after the meeting of parliament.

The anti-coup sit-in at the Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Mosque, where pro-Morsi protesters had been sleeping in tents for over a month, before the security forces stormed it .

On July 8, 2013, the mass killing of over 50 Morsi supporters of the protest camp in front of the headquarters of the Republican Guard by Egyptian security forces, in which two police officers and one soldier were also killed. According to Western estimates, it was the "bloodiest state-run massacre since the fall of Hosni Mubarak" and "one of the bloodiest incidents in recent Egyptian history". The ultra-conservative Party of Light of the radical Islamist Salafists, which until then had been on the side of the anti-Morsi alliance, thereupon declared its withdrawal from the negotiations on a transitional government and justified the decision as a reaction to the "massacre".

Installation of a transitional government by the military

Hasim al-Beblawi was appointed by the military as interim prime minister of Egypt after the coup.

On the night of July 16, 2013, when the transitional government was sworn in, seven Mursi supporters were again killed in protests. At least 92 people had been killed within two weeks since the military coup against President Morsi.

With the swearing-in of the “democratically illegitimate transitional government” on July 16, 2013, military chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi received an influential post in the transitional government and significantly more powers. In addition to the defense department, he has now also taken over the post of first deputy to interim prime minister Hasim al-Beblawi.

The "liberal economist" Hasim al-Beblawi , who was appointed interim minister- president of the transitional government on July 9, 2013 with the support of the coup leadership, had already served as social democratic finance minister for three months in 2011 before he resigned because of a massacre by security forces of demonstrators.

Most of the 33 members of the cabinet belonged to the liberal political camp or were experts not affiliated with the party. Neither of the two Islamist parties that had supported the previous government under President Morsi and that had jointly won five elections since the 2011 popular uprising (two parliamentary elections, one presidential election and two constitutional referendums) were involved in the new government.

Composition of the military-backed interim government (Beblawi cabinet):

Adli Mansur
Interim President
 
Vacant
Interim Vice President
until August 14, 2013:
Mohammed el-Baradei
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hasim al-Beblawi
interim prime minister
(application for resignation submitted: February 2014)
 
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi
Deputy
Interim Prime Minister
 
Ziad Bahaa El Din
Deputy
Interim Prime Minister
(until mid-January 2014)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 ministers
 
 
 
 
 
 

Blue: civil; Yellow: military; Green: civil and military

Military-backed transitional government - Beblawi cabinet

With the Beblawi cabinet , sworn in on July 16, 2013 , to which the military chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi himself belonged as defense minister, the Egyptian military set up an anti-Islamist and unelected transitional government under interim prime minister Hasim al-Beblawi , while the military chief Sisi is actually seen as the decisive power-political actor behind the coup and the transitional government.

Symptoms of crisis during the Beblawi government

R4bia sign used in solidarity with victims of Rabaa crackdown 23-Aug-2013.jpg
In solidarity with the victims of the stormed protest camps , demonstrators in Cairo use the R4bia symbol (23 August 2013).
Water cannon fired on female Islamist students - protest at Al-Azhar University Cairo 11-Dec-2013.jpg
Al-Azhar University in Cairo (December 11, 2013): "Students against the coup" protests have been spreading across the major universities since September 2013


Pro Sisi protester with Sisi portrait in Tahrir Square on the bloody third anniversary of the popular uprising (25 January 2014)

During the reign of the Beblawi cabinet, the state crisis in Egypt escalated. Protests by opponents of the coup, especially supporters of the ousted president, have continued since the coup. There were bloody clashes and mass killings in which well over a thousand people, largely civilian opponents of the coup and members of the Muslim Brotherhood , were shot by the security forces.

Among other things, there were mass killings of demonstrators by security forces on July 27, 2013 in Nasr Street in Cairo (according to independent sources 95 or 109 protesters killed, 1 police officer killed) on August 14, 2013 when the Muslim Brotherhood's sit-ins were broken up on Nahda and Rābiʿa-al-ʿAdawiyya Square in Cairo (according to independent sources up to or more than 1000 or 1400 protesters killed, 9 police officers killed), on August 16, 2013 in Cairo (at least 120 dead, 2 police officers killed) and on October 6, 2013 during the dissolution of the marches from Dokki and Ramses Square to Tahrir Square in Cairo (at least 57 protesters killed). Some of the most serious acts of violence in Egypt since the violent breakup of the two pro-Morsi sit-ins on August 14, 2013, which Human Rights Watch called "the most serious murderous incident in recent Egyptian history," occurred on January 25 2014 , the third anniversary of the 2011 popular uprising, when, according to independent sources, 108 people, mostly Muslim Brotherhood, were killed. The rulers were accused of impunity for crimes against Morsi supporters . After the resignation of the Beblawi cabinet, the first and so far only court ruling was issued in March 2014 in connection with the uprisings in Cairo in summer 2013 and their suppression in often brutal security forces, in which at least 1,400 people were killed, some of them systematic shootings. It was served as a prison sentence against a police officer found guilty of killing 37 prisoners on remand while in police custody.

In mid-August 2013 , the military-backed interim government imposed a three-month state of emergency , which granted authorities and emergency services special rights in dealing with protests and gatherings and made it difficult for the media to work in the country while simultaneously carrying out propaganda campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood . The Vice President Mohammed el-Baradei resigned in protest against state power and evaded arrest by fleeing abroad. Even after the state of emergency ended, freedom of the press was restricted by restrictive legislation , while the military-backed transitional government led a state campaign against foreign media . According to independent censuses, more than 21,000 people - mostly Morsi supporters - were arrested, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thousands of Muslims arrested. All organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood were banned, their assets were confiscated and the organization was finally declared a terrorist organization by the transitional government. Even before mid-January 2014, the death toll since the military coup had reached 2,665 people according to independent censuses. The US government, which initially justified the coup, froze parts of its military aid to Egypt for the time being in October 2013 .

The Beblawi interim government was accused of failing to effectively counter the skyrocketing terrorist attacks in the country, for which the military-backed government had blamed extremists with ties to Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood, even though experts considered the Muslim Brotherhood to be responsible for terrorist attacks as unlikely. The ousted President Morsi has been held in an undisclosed location since the coup on July 3 until the start of his trial on November 4, 2013 and brought to justice together with other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood on threats of life imprisonment or the death penalty . Serious charges and allegations of torture were made regarding the conditions of detention during the Beblawi government .

Despite billions in financial aid from the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia , Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates , the economic crisis in Egypt got out of hand during the reign of the Beblawi cabinet. The aggravation of political uncertainty and growing instability in Egypt caused by the power struggle between the transitional government set up by the military and the Muslim Brotherhood after the coup was also reflected in significant losses in the tourism industry, which is important for the country's economy . Massive strikes hit numerous areas of Egypt.

At the end of February 2014, the Beblawi cabinet surprisingly resigned.

Formation of a new transitional government

On February 25, 2014, Interim President Mansur Ibrahim appointed Mahlab as the new Prime Minister, who was entrusted with the formation of a new government. Mahlab was Minister of Housing in the Beblawi cabinet. He is also considered a Mubarak confidante who, before Mubarak was overthrown, was a member of the influential Political Committee of the then state party NDP, which was dissolved in 2011 and which was led by Mubarak's son, Gamal Mubarak, and has a reputation for benefiting the regime's favorites to have distributed. Under Mubarak he was a member of the upper house of the Egyptian parliament. The Western media interpreted Mahlab's appointment as a sign of a restoration of the “old political guard of the overthrown dictator Husni Mubarak”.

In his first press conference shortly after his appointment as prime minister, Ibrahim Mahlab announced that the members of his cabinet, which was still to be formed, would be “holy warriors” in the service of the Egyptians and named stabilizing the security situation as the top priority: “We will work together on the To fully restore security in Egypt and to destroy terror in every corner of the country ”, Mahlab said on February 25th,“ Security and stability throughout the country and the destruction of terrorism will pave the way for investments ”.

After the resignation of Interim Prime Minister Hasem al-Beblawi, the designated head of government Mahlab then relied mainly on resigned ministers to form a new military-backed transitional government. His government, the sixth since the overthrow of President Mubarak in February 2011, was reappointed Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim, Planning Minister Ashraf al-Arabi , Minister for Oil Sherif Ismail and Army Chief Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi as Defense Minister the government office would have to resign before an official submission of his presidential candidacy.

Military-backed transitional government - Mahlab cabinet

Ever since the shooting of hundreds of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood by security forces in anti-coup demonstrations, the arrest of thousands and the declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization” during the time of the Beblawi cabinet, the hope initially cherished, especially in the West, that military chief Sisi could act as the “ new strong man of Egypt "strive for a policy of national reconciliation, an assessment of the military chief's political line as a" policy of confrontation ".

According to observers, the formation of a new government with the Mahlab cabinet showed a shift in the alliance ruling in Egypt from a “secular anti-Muslim Brotherhood opposition”, which had backed the military coup, to “his allies of the Mubarak regime Business cronies and oligarchs who are needed to support Sisi's anticipated presidential candidacy ”(Emad El-Din Shahin). The postponement of the presidential election before the parliamentary election against the will of the democracy movement, which was announced before the swearing-in of the Mahlab cabinet by Interim President Mansur , was seen by observers as a suitable measure to consolidate the power of military chief Sisi and to counteract the political goals of the so-called "Arab Spring".

Political conflicts and wave of lawsuits

Men carry the body of the Giza police chief, Tarik al-Margawi, who was killed on April 2, 2014 in an assassination attempt by the Islamist group Ajnad Misr ("Soldiers of Egypt")

The unrest in Egypt continued under the military-backed transitional government of the Mahlab cabinet and shortly before the presidential election. Since the overthrow of the elected President Morsi by the military at the beginning of July 2013, attacks on security forces have increased, for which the military-backed transitional government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, which has meanwhile been banned by the new rulers, although radical Islamic splinter groups have repeatedly admitted to the acts and the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the allegations of the military regime. The ruthless repression of the military-backed transitional government led to a destabilization of the situation in Egypt. In spring 2014 Egypt was considered bankrupt, almost ungovernable and increasingly insecure.

In the Sinai, the causes of the conflict remained intact despite a military offensive. While the political and economic situation in Egypt became increasingly chaotic, the entire Sinai got caught up in an armed conflict between militant Islamists and the Egyptian interim authorities. On March 4, 2014, the radical Islamic Palestinian organization Hamas , which ruled the neighboring Gaza Strip , was banned by a court in Egypt . The military offensive worsened the situation on Sinai. Rigorous curfews in some cities partially brought the economy on the peninsula to a standstill and deterred business people and investors.

On March 7, 2014 Group adopted by 27 countries at the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva a declaration on human rights in Egypt , in which it concerns about the applied large-scale violence of the military-supported Egyptian transitional government against opposition protesters expressed. The joint statement stressed the need for justice for the killings of protesters and security forces since June 30, 2013 and since the installation of the military-backed government.

Australian Al Jazeera correspondent
Peter Greste, arrested in December 2013

The prosecution of opponents of the regime and journalists expanded and there was a wave of politicized mass trials . A few days after more than 500 opponents of the regime were sentenced to death in a short court session in a mass sentence in Minya , which was reacted with fierce criticism and outrage around the world and numerous student protests broke out at universities in Egypt over the course of weeks, with several deaths among the students, the announced de facto ruler Sisi officially resigned as army chief, defense minister and vice prime minister at the end of March 2014 in order to run for the upcoming presidential election. The trials against members or supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, which began after the coup in the form of the largest wave of trials in the 85-year history of the Muslim Brotherhood during the military-backed government of the Beblawi cabinet, were viewed by human rights organizations as opaque and politicized trials with the risk of show trials classified. The mass death sentence of March 24th was seen as an indication that after the imprisonment of 3,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the summer of 2013, the judiciary would crack down on the opponents of the new leadership appointed by the military, particularly Islamists. The trial of 20 Al-Jazeera employees , which began in mid-February 2014 when the Beblawi cabinet was in government, also increasingly became a burden for the military-backed interim government in March. The much-discussed case with the 20 defendants had triggered a worldwide outcry and fears that the authorities installed by the military would crack down on the press. Institutions like the White House , the European Union and the UN demanded the release of men and the preservation of the freedom of the press. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) pointed out in connection with the trial of the 20 Al-Jazeera employees that, following their research, the Egyptian authorities often used legal harassment and arbitrary arrests as a means to calm down critical journalists.

At the two-day summit meeting of the Arab League , which began on March 25, 2014 , at which the power-political struggle for supremacy in Egypt was a central theme of internal Arab politics, considerable doubts about the actions of the military regime in Cairo within the "Arab world" and one deep division in the Arab League on this issue. While countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain support the tough course of the Egyptian military chief Sisi, the classification of the Brotherhood as a terrorist group was rejected by a majority in the league. At the request of the military-backed Egyptian transitional government to the participants in the summit for support in the fight against "terrorism", some delegates of the closest allies also expressed concerns about the broad definition of terrorism by the Egyptian leadership. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Saudi Arabia were now officially regarded as a “terrorist group” and treated on a par with the al-Qaida terror network , the majority of Arab states rejected this view. The rule of the Egyptian military ruler Sisi remained dependent on financial support from Saudi Arabia.

Presidential election

Pro Mursi Friday demonstration in Cairo against Sisi's announcement of his presidential candidacy (March 28, 2014)
Voting in the controversial 2014 presidential election

May 26 and 27, 2014 were set as the date for the presidential election . While 13 candidates from all political directions were running in the 2012 presidential election, only left-wing politician Hamdin Sabahi competed in the 2014 presidential election against Sisi , who was not given any real chance against the clear favorite Sisi. Observers saw the low number of candidates in the 2014 election as another sign of increasing democratic deficits in Egypt.A Sisi's presidency was seen as tantamount to a return to ancient times in Egypt, in which the military had a strong influence, especially since the judiciary after the fall Morsis had taken massive action against the Muslim Brotherhood and also against other dissidents by the military chief Sisi and at the same time a real personality cult had developed around Sisi, which was celebrated in state and private media as the savior of the nation. After the election dates were announced, observers doubted whether the conditions for free and fair elections were guaranteed in Egypt. In mid-April, the candidacy of members and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections was forbidden by a court, and with it the movement, whose political arm had won the parliamentary and presidential elections with a large majority after the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, from the passive Participation in the parliamentary election excluded. At this point in time, the entire leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was already dead or in prison after the brutal wave of persecution by the regime. The announcement of Sisi's candidacy sparked further protests, which again resulted in deaths . In the run-up to the election campaign, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned by the military regime, demonstrated regularly against what it saw as the "republic of fear" established by presidential candidate Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi. The wave of mass trials and harsh general court judgments before the start of the election campaign was seen as a declaration of Sisi's will to show hardship before the election. The Salafists, who are considered ultra-religious, agreed to support Sisi before the start of the election campaign.

Political forces (groups and parties) in Egypt before and during the 2014 presidential election
Support from
Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi
Support from
Hamdin Sabahi
Participation without the support of
a specific candidate
Boycott of choice
Excluded from participation due to prohibition

The ballot initially set for May 26th and 27th was extended by one day on May 27th. According to unofficial and preliminary results, Sisi won the election with over 95 percent of the votes cast. Even before an official election result was available, Sisi's defeated challenger Hamdin Sabahi challenged the election. In western media reports, the suspicion was expressed that the officially stated voter turnout of 47.4 percent was possibly manipulated.

Resignation of the cabinet after Sisi's assumption of office as president

Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi , in his office as Egyptian President (right) with US Secretary of State John Kerry (Photo: July 2014)

One day after Sisi was sworn in as Egyptian President, the military-backed transitional government resigned on June 9, 2014. Interim head of government Ibrahim Mahlab said after the resignation that the new head of state should be given the opportunity to put together a cabinet of his confidence.

Judgmental outlook on Sisi's presidency

Even before the presidential election, Egypt, which was actually ruled by the military, had been classified by scholars and observers as a "military dictatorship" (Guido Steinberg / SWP) that was becoming "more authoritarian by the day" or as a "country led by the military more and more repressive", “In which democracy and the rule of law, despite all the ideals of the Arab revolutions, hardly anything counts - not to mention human dignity” (Rainer Sollich / Head of the Arabic editorial team at Deutsche Welle). The practically unlimited extension of the jurisdiction of the military courts - ten months earlier the most important civil rights issue in a public debate on the post-Morsi constitution - was now carried out by President Sisi in a fast-track process. The Egyptian legislature and judiciary could increasingly be seen as instruments of maintaining power. The cabinet passed new flexible legal provisions that were apparently intended to make it possible to declare any critical organization a terrorist cell. With "bizarre judgments, Egyptian judges paved the way for a disguised military dictatorship" (Martin Gehlen / correspondent in Cairo). The mass death sentences were interpreted as a signal that resistance to the military dictatorship would be broken and that opposition would not be tolerated. While protesters faced draconian prison terms and torture, the former dictator Hosni Mubarak, his notorious interior minister, and six high-ranking police generals charged with orders to shoot Arab Spring protesters, which resulted in 900 deaths, were acquitted in the spring of 2011. In his acquittal, Mubarak judge Mahmoud al-Rashidy alleged that the “Arab Spring” was the result of a Zionist -US conspiracy with the aim of destroying Egypt. The unpunished outcome of the Mubarak trial could also be interpreted as a signal from the judiciary to the police, army and political leadership that they did not have to fear later being brought to justice for their crimes against opposition members, demonstrators or prisoners. The leading al-Azhar scholar Ahmed Mohamed el-Tayeb, who had already stood by Sisi as an ally during the military coup, announced that it cannot be ruled out that, in addition to religious, political and economic factors, Israel's conspiracy was the cause of the emergence of the Islamic State is responsible, with the aim that Israel should remain the most powerful country in the region. Sisi himself countered a possible rational political discourse by announcing that in future everyone would be punished by law who “insulted” the two “revolutions” of the past four years, alluding to January 2011 and the military coup of June 2013.

The events in Egypt were compared with the events in Algeria in 1992 , where the army had put in a coup when the Islamists would win the election. In contrast to Algeria, the economic power of the military apparatus of power, which in Egypt - apart from the one-year democratic interregnum Morsis - has ruled the country without interruption since the fall of the monarchy in 1952, was not based on war-proof and crisis-proof resources of the country, but on income from the Suez Canal as well as control over large parts of the textile industry and above all the tourism industry, which has been weakened after three years of unrest. According to experts, an end to the budget crisis associated with the Egyptian economic crisis was not foreseeable in the long term (as of 2015). Since then, a further increase in the double-digit budget deficit in the 2012/2013 budget year has only been averted by aid payments, loans and raw material deliveries totaling 23 billion US dollars from the three Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, without their support Egypt under Sisi would have become insolvent long before . In terms of foreign policy, the dependence on aid from the Gulf states led the Egyptian regime to be obliged to provide military support to the donor states, as in the case of the 2015 military intervention in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia with the support of other Arab states and the USA .

The Sisi administration did not take any discernible steps to improve governance, which experts saw as an end to the political repression that was widespread under Sisi. The critical press, civil society and the political opposition, as actors who could have advocated better governance, were massively suppressed by the Sisi regime. In addition, the excessive persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood accelerated the radicalization of previously moderate actors, which could be seen in the increase in politically motivated violence and which had dramatic consequences - also for the Egyptian economy. A reintegration of the Muslim Brotherhood into the political process was therefore seen by Western experts as an indispensable prerequisite for the stabilization and economic development of Egypt.

The economic course of the Sisi administration with the endeavor to attract foreign direct investment was very similar to the last few years of the Mubarak era, when the investment boom had no positive, but rather negative effects on general living conditions in Egypt. The new investment strategy under Sisi has been criticized from circles of Egyptian civil society. The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights judged in a study from February 2015 that the investigation strategy under Sisi does not see the inflow of direct investment as a means of combating poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment , but as an end in itself and accordingly only attracts investments that pay off quickly , but hardly any sustainable employment. According to the national statistics agency, the proportion of young people living below or just above the poverty line was almost 52 percent for 2013/2014, while the state did not have the finances to increase social spending . In the summer of 2014, subsidies for fuel and electricity were cut, which resulted in price increases of up to 70 percent.

According to experts, the foreseeable economic stagnation and the associated deterioration in living conditions led to technical prognoses of new protests and further destabilization in Egypt.

According to a documentation by the Al-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence , 272 prisoners in police custody have been tortured to death or died in overcrowded cells in the twelve months since the beginning of Sisi's presidency in June 2014. In the first year of the Sisi presidency, Egypt experienced "the worst human rights violations since the center was founded in 1993". By relying exclusively on violence in dealing with his opposition, Sisi has, according to observers, pushed ever larger sections of the population underground and into following terrorists. In a documentary published on June 30, 2015, the human rights organization Amnesty International accused the Sisi regime of having reverted to “total repression” and of breaking the morals of the best and brightest minds in the country in order to nip any threat to its own rule in the bud . "Two years after President Mohammed Morsi was overthrown, mass protests were replaced by mass arrests," criticized Amnesty International . The Egyptian regime's foreign ministry then accused Amnesty International of using its report to be in the hands of terrorist organizations and "pursue bad goals", which raised questions about the links between Amnesty International and such groups.

Examples of authoritarian legislation after the military coup and during Sisi's presidency (as of end of December 2014)
measure time Content and comments
Tender Act September 2013 A decree by Mansur allows ministers of the unelected government to award contracts to companies without a public tender process. In the months following the decree, the army was awarded $ 1 billion in construction contracts.
Extension of pre-trial detention September 2013 The maximum length of pre-trial detention for cases of accusations of crimes punishable by life imprisonment will be removed, which will formally legally allow certain unpunished political dissidents to remain in pre-trial detention indefinitely.
Prohibition of demonstration November 2013 The ban on demonstrations became one of the state's main tools of repression and was used to arrest thousands of people.
Investment Act April 2014 It forbids third parties to appeal against the award of government contracts. According to human rights activist Ahmed Ezzat, the danger of the law is that citizens who discover corruption in the awarding of contracts cannot appeal, so the law serves to institutionalize corruption.
Electoral law June 2014 Experts warn that a new right to vote will privilege the old elites and block liberal parties that emerged after the so-called revolution of 2011. Amr Abdulrahman, director of civil rights for the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Right , said of the law: "The electoral law is tailored to ensure that the new parliament is exclusively for wealthy Muslim men."
University Act June 2014 Sisi gave himself the power of disposal to employ and remove the leadership of the universities, which enabled him to control the university grounds in the style of the Mubarak period, which had been the fulcrum of dissent since the fall of Morsi.
Crackdown on foreign funding September 2014 Requesting or receiving foreign funds with the purpose of “harming the national interest” is punishable by life imprisonment. The government says this is directed against terrorists. Right-wing groups, most of which are funded from abroad, say the vague phrase can be used against them and have withdrawn requests for assistance from abroad.
Expansion of military jurisdiction October 2014 The military was given jurisdiction over much of the public space, including roads, bridges, and universities. The measure was officially directed against terrorism, but also makes it easier for the government to bring members of the political opposition to justice in the opaque Egyptian military courts.
Ultimatum to right-wing groups November 2014 Right-wing groups were given a deadline to approve the restrictive and Mubara-era legislation or to look forward to their own dissolution. At the end of 2014, several right-wing groups had already reduced or even stopped their activities out of fear of the consequences.
Terrorism Act December 2014 (draft) The bill expanded the definition of terrorism to include anything that "harms national unity". The unclear formulation can also be used against the opposition.

In addition, there was a threat of an unprecedented escalation of violence between extremists and state power in Egypt in mid-2015. Sisi had promised the country stability and declared a “war on terror”, but the blanket demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood and the draconian crackdown on democracy activists led to a deep polarization of the population. In May, according to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), there were 138 attacks in Egypt, the highest number of terrorist attacks ever documented in the country within a month. On June 29, Hisham Barakat, chief prosecutor, who was believed to be the driving force behind the crackdown by the judiciary against democracy activists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, was killed with a car bomb in Cairo on June 29th. On July 1, 2015, 48 hours before the second anniversary of the fall of Mohammed Morsi, terror squads - according to media reports, fighters of the Islamic State (IS) - attacked 15 military posts and killed dozens of soldiers in the most serious attack in the country's history, resulting in the bloodiest battle the peninsula has developed since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. According to media reports, in addition to his violent fight against the political Egyptian opposition, Sisi was threatened with a second fight against the Egyptian offshoot of ISIS, whose attacks testify to a new quality in the guerrilla warfare that has been going on for years on the Sinai Peninsula.

Also on July 1st, Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb announced to his government that Egypt was "in a real state of war". The government immediately passed a much stricter “anti-terror law”, which Sisi wanted to put into effect immediately by decree in order to “quickly achieve justice and retribution” for the “martyrs”. According to information from judicial circles, it should no longer be possible to revise death sentences by the Supreme Court. Judges should also be empowered to ignore defense witnesses at their own discretion. The definition of terrorist organizations, to which organized supporters of football clubs were declared at this point in time, should be expanded again. Justice Minister Ahmed al-Zind, who was on record with the sentence “We judges are masters, everyone else is the slaves”, instructed the judiciary to use the law to retaliate by canceling the usual three-month legal vacation for the entire judicial system July to September 2015. Sisi called for hundreds of death sentences against regime opponents to be carried out more quickly and announced: “If there is a death sentence, the death sentence will also be carried out”. Sisi announced, "We won't spend five or ten years trying people who kill us." In mid-June 2015, a court had already imposed the death penalty on President Morsi, who had been pushed by Sisi. After Sisi's appeal, the police shot dead at least nine supporters of the opposition Muslim Brotherhood in a raid in Cairo on the night of July 2, after which the Muslim Brotherhood issued a communiqué calling for a revolution. This announced a change of course in the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and oldest opposition movement in Arabia, since Sisi's putsch. While the old leadership always pleaded for gradual change and tried for decades to cultivate an image of non-violence in order to appeal to the masses, after Sisi's coup and the repression that followed, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly gave in to the demands of young members to give limited support to violent resistance - against government institutions and infrastructure. The cautious old Muslim Brotherhood leadership had been eliminated as a result of the coup and the repression that followed. Almost all of the leaders had been killed, imprisoned, or exiled by Egyptian security services. At the same time, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly lost influence on its base in Egypt, which was also increasingly inclined to the strategy of violence because it believed that it had nothing more to lose: Many of its comrades-in-arms had been killed in the 2013 massacre. Hundreds of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had since been sentenced to death in mass trials. And many members of the group had been dispossessed, lost their jobs or university places, and faced social isolation. In internal elections, two thirds of the leadership were exchanged with "young members who have lost their faith in the democratic process and are therefore demanding that the Egyptian state be destroyed" (Gil Yaron / Die Welt).

See also

References

Web links

Commons : Protests in Egypt 2013  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Chronologies:

Chronologies (Sinai):

Dossiers and topic selections:

Video documentations:

TV discussion groups:

  • Again the state crisis in Egypt: Phoenix round on November 28, 2012 , phoenix, discussion round under the title "Again state crisis in Egypt - Mursi, the new Pharaoh?"; Moderation: Pınar Atalay; Interview partners: Stephan Roll (Science and Politics Foundation), Sonja Hegasy (Center for the Modern Orient), Melinda Crane (freelance journalist) and Rainer Stinner (FDP, foreign policy spokesperson)
  • Riots in Egypt - press club on August 18, 2013 , phoenix, moderation: WDR editor-in-chief Jörg Schönenborn; Interview partners: Bettina Gaus (taz), Richard Kiessler, Loay Mudhoon (Deutsche Welle), Cornelia Wegerhoff (WDR)
  • ZDF, “maybrit illner” from August 22, 2013 , moderation: Maybrit Illner; Interview partners: Philipp Missfelder (foreign policy spokesman for the Union parliamentary group), Peter Scholl-Latour, Hamed Abdel-Samad, Lubna Azzam (Science and Politics Foundation), Mazen Okasha.

Audio documentation:

  • Analysis - Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: Why Did They Fail? ( Transcript: PDF ( memento from October 26, 2013 on WebCite ), archived from the original (PDF; 226 kB) on October 26, 2013; audio version: MP3 , 28 minutes), BBC Radio 4 Analysis , September 30, 2013, by Christopher de Bellaigue. Interviews and analysis with insiders close to Mohammed Morsi about reasons for the failure of the government of the Muslim Brotherhood. Interview partners: Abdul Mawgoud Dardery, Hisham Hellyer, Omar Ashour, Angy Ghannam, Wael Haddara, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh.

Geographical information about the protest camps and places:

Publications from human rights organizations:

As of July 8, 2013:

As of July 27, 2013:

As of August 14, 2013:

As of October 6, 2013:

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d Mursi Trial in Egypt - The courtroom as a political stage ( memento from November 4, 2013 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 4, 2013, by Markus Bickel, archived from the original .
  2. a b c Egypt - military overthrows President Mursi ( memento of October 16, 2013 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  3. a b c d "For the good of the country" - Egyptian military deposed Morsi. ( Memento from October 17, 2013 on WebCite ) n-tv, July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  4. a b c d Mursi overthrown - cheers on Tahrir Square. ( Memento from October 13, 2013 on WebCite ) Rheinische Post (RP Online), July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  5. a b c d e Coup in Egypt: Military deposed Morsi. ( Memento from October 16, 2013 on WebCite ) Deutsche Welle, July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  6. a b c d e Coup in Cairo: Egypt's military overthrows Mursi ( memento of November 7, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online , July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  7. a b c d Egypt - A Bad Precedent ( Memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), Zeit Online, July 4, 2013, by Michael Thumann, archived from the original .
  8. a b c Current information on the situation in Egypt: the day on July 3, 2013 , phoenix, July 3, 2013, report on the situation in Egypt at the time of the coup; Moderation: Michael Kolz; u. a. with Guido Westerwelle (Federal Foreign Minister, FDP) and Prof. Andreas Dittmann (Middle East expert, University of Giessen).
  9. a b c d e f g Declaration on the deposition of Morsi on July 3, 2013 , phoenix, the declarations of Mohammed el-Baradei (leader of the opposition alliance National Salvation Front), Tawadros II (Coptic Pope) and Ahmed Tayeb ( al-Azhar Sheikh ) with synchronous translation.
  10. Egypt Violence: Death Toll In Cairo Clashes Climbs Above 600, Health Ministry Says ( Memento from October 24, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The Huffington Post, August 15, 2013, by Maggie Michael, archived from the original .
  11. Egypt's disastrous bloodshed requires urgent impartial investigation (English). Amnesty International, press release, AI Index: PRE01 / 421/2013, August 16, 2013
  12. ^ Egyptian police storm second Islamist stronghold ( Memento from September 21, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The Guardian, September 19, 2013, by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  13. Cairo under the curfew: all-night parties ( memento of October 7, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The Guardian, October 6, 2013, by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  14. a b c d e f g h i Egypt: No Acknowledgment or Justice for Mass Protester Killings ( Memento from December 25, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Human Rights Watch, December 10, 2013, archived from the original .
  15. ^ State of emergency in Egypt - government confirms more than 600 dead ( memento from August 16, 2013 on WebCite ), Zeit Online, August 15, 2013, archived from the original .
  16. a b c Egypt's military chief: How General Sisi secures his power ( memento from October 17, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, October 17, 2013, by Raniah Salloum, archived from the original .
  17. a b After protests in Cairo: Egyptian policeman convicted of manslaughter ( memento from March 18, 2014 on WebCite ) , Spiegel Online, March 18, 2014, archived from the original .
  18. a b Power struggle - Mansour extends the state of emergency ( memento from September 19, 2013 on WebCite ), Zeit Online, September 12, 2013, archived from the original .
  19. ^ A b Egypt - Muzzle for Egypt's media ( memento from October 7, 2013 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, September 29, 2013, by Markus Symank, archived from the original .
  20. a b Egypt's ousted President Morsi in court ( memento from November 3, 2013 on WebCite ), Reuters Germany, November 3, 2013, by Michael Georgy, archived from the original .
  21. ^ A b Conflicts - Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed with a complaint against the ban , Tiroler Tageszeitung, November 6, 2013.
  22. Transitional government surprised: court ends state of emergency in Egypt ( memento of November 13, 2013 on WebCite ), RP Online, November 12, 2013, archived from the original .
  23. Nocturnal curfew: State of emergency in Egypt should end Thursday ( memento of November 14, 2013 on WebCite ), RP Online, November 13, 2013, archived from the original .
  24. a b c Maximum security prison in Egypt: Mursi is now in solitary confinement ( memento from November 14, 2013 on WebCite ), RP Online, November 14, 2013, archived from the original .
  25. a b c d e f g Scandal at the trial of Egypt's ex-President Mursi ( Memento from November 5, 2013 on WebCite ) , Reuters Germany, November 4, 2013, archived from the original .
  26. a b c Egypt - USA admonishes democracy in Egypt ( memento of November 4, 2013 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, November 4, 2013, archived from the original .
  27. Egypt: from bad to worse - Try as he might, General Sisi cannot contain the continued protest against his takeover ( Memento from October 11, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The Guardian, October 9, 2013, editorial, archived from the original .
  28. Attackers kill Egyptian soldiers near the Suez Canal ( memento from October 9, 2013 on WebCite ), Reuters Germany, October 7, 2013, archived from the original .
  29. a b Support - USA stops military aid to Egypt ( memento October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), Die Welt, October 9, 2013, archived from the original .
  30. a b USA calls for political reforms - for the time being no US weapons for Egypt ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, October 10, 2013.
  31. a b Egypt - Egypt criticizes restrictions on US military aid ( memento of October 11, 2013 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, October 10, 2013, by Nils Naumann, archived from the original .
  32. a b Mighty Army Chief - Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi wants to become Egyptian President ( Memento from March 27, 2014 on WebCite ) , N24, March 27, 2014, archived from the original .
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  34. a b Guido Steinberg on the death sentences in Egypt - In Egypt 683 supporters of the forbidden Muslim Brotherhood were sentenced to death. A court also banned the opposition youth movement on April 6th. Background information Guido Steinberg from the Science and Politics Foundation in Berlin ( memento from April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) (audio: 02:28 min.), Deutsche Welle, April 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  35. a b Comment: Compliant justice in Egypt - again hundreds of death sentences against the Muslim Brotherhood - and the ban on a youth movement that was instrumental in the overthrow of Mubarak: Egypt's judiciary judges in favor of the regime, criticizes Rainer Sollich ( Memento from April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, April 28, 2014, by Rainer Sollich, archived from the original .
  36. Military aid - America no longer needs Egypt - The USA partially resumes military aid for Egypt, although the country is falling back into the autocracy. Russia has long since replaced America as a partner ( memento from April 24, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, April 23, 2014, by Carsten Luther, archived from the original .
  37. The same court, the same judgments - the death penalty is once again imposed hundreds of times in a political process in Egypt ( Memento from April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , Neues Deutschland, April 29, 2014, by Oliver Eberhardt, archived from the original .
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  41. a b Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down ( Memento from April 25, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, February 11, 2011, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
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  44. Egypt Army Sets 6-Month Blueprint, but Future Role Is Unclear ( Memento from April 25, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, February 14, 2011, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  45. ^ Egyptians Struggle as Wary Tourists Stay Away ( Memento from April 25, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, April 2, 2013, by Kareem Fahim, archived from the original .
  46. Rise in Sexual Assaults in Egypt Sets Off Clash Over Blame ( Memento from April 25, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, March 25, 2013, by Mayy El Sheikh and David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  47. a b Egypt - The agony of choice ( memento from November 1, 2013 on WebCite ), Focus Online, November 22, 2011, by Susanne Klaiber, archived from the original .
  48. a b Egypt: Military must answer for deaths in protests by Copts ( Memento from April 26, 2014 on WebCite ) , Amnesty International, October 11, 2011, archived from the original .
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  50. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae One year of President Mursi - Chronology of Failure ( Memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ) , n-tv, June 29, 2013, archived from the original .
  51. a b Trial against Egyptian ex-president - Mubarak sentenced to life imprisonment ( memento from November 1, 2013 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, June 2, 2012.
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  53. a b c d e f Parliament in Egypt dissolved - Desperate fight against chaos ( Memento from October 11, 2013 on WebCite ), Süddeutsche.de, June 15, 2012, by Sonja Zekri, archived from the original .
  54. a b c d e f Egyptians vote amid political uncertainty ( Memento from October 16, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Aljazeera, June 16, 2012, archived from the original .
  55. Islamist becomes Egyptian President - the military let Mursi win ( memento October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, June 24, 2012, archived from the original .
  56. a b Little room for maneuver for Egypt's new head of state ( Memento from October 28, 2013 on WebCite ), German Society for Foreign Policy. V. (DGAP), June 26, 2012, by Dina Fakoussa, archived from the original .
  57. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Egypt's President Morsi in power: A timeline (Part I) - Key events in the Egyptian president's first year in office: Morsi wins support as he wrestles power from the military but ends 2012 ratifying a controversial constitution ( Memento of 4 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, June 28, 2013, by Osman El Sharnoubi, archived from the original .
  58. New Egyptian President Morsi swears the oath of office ( memento of October 28, 2013 on WebCite ), Die Welt, June 30, 2012, archived from the original .
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  60. Egypt's Military and President Escalate Their Power Struggle ( Memento of 25 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). The New York Times, July 9, 2012, by Kareem Fahim, archived from the original on April 26, 2014.
  61. a b c d e Egyptian President cracks down - Morsi disempowered the military ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, August 12, 2012, archived from the original .
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  63. a b c Constitutional Declaration - Morsi makes himself Egypt's “new pharaoh” ( Memento from October 16, 2013 on WebCite ), Die Welt, November 22, 2012, archived from the original .
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  65. a b New constitution for Egypt - Islamists approve draft ( memento of October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, November 30, 2012, archived from the original .
  66. a b Mursi - Egypt strengthens the role of Sharia ( memento from October 16, 2013 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Rundschau, November 30, 2012, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  67. a b Egypt - Comparing Egypt's 1971 constitution to today ( Memento from October 16, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Al Jazeera, December 9, 2012, archived from the original .
  68. a b c Mursi cancels special powers - opposition only sees maneuvers ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, December 8, 2012, archived from the original .
  69. a b Official figure from Egypt - 63.8 percent for the constitution ( memento of October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, December 25, 2012, archived from the original .
  70. a b c d Protests in Egypt - Army chief warns of the collapse of the state. ( Memento from November 7, 2013 on WebCite ) Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 29, 2013, archived from the original .
  71. a b c d Unrest - Egypt's military warns opposition - Morsi shortens Berlin visit. ( Memento of November 7, 2013 on WebCite ) Focus Online, January 29, 2013, archived from the original .
  72. Anniversary of the revolution in Egypt - dead and injured during protests ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, January 25, 2013, archived from the original .
  73. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x Egypt's President Morsi in power: A timeline (Part II) - Key events in the Egyptian president's first year in office: 2013 opens with nationwide protests, parliamentary elections are postponed again and Egypt struggles with Nile dam crisis ( Memento of 4 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, June 28, 2013, by Osman El Sharnoubi, archived from the original .
  74. a b Protests, riots, death sentences - Egypt has a bloody anniversary ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, January 26, 2013, archived from the original .
  75. a b Death sentence against Egyptian football fans - riots overwhelm the police ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, January 27, 2013, archived from the original .
  76. a b Mursi declares a state of emergency - street battles continue ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, January 28, 2013, archived from the original .
  77. ^ After unrest in Egypt - military warns of state collapse ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, January 29, 2013, archived from the original .
  78. Two years after Mubarak's resignation - Thousands protest against Mursi ( memento October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, February 11, 2013, archived from the original .
  79. a b c d e Formal errors lead to delay - Egypt election is canceled ( memento of October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, March 8, 2013, archived from the original .
  80. Parliamentary elections in Egypt - Another opposition group announces boycott ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), n-tv, February 26, 2013, archived from the original .
  81. a b c Chronology: Unrest in Egypt - Cornerstones of the Revolution - Since January 2011, the Egyptians have been demonstrating again and again against their government. They forced Hosni Mubarak to resign, as did the elected President Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. Now, after the violent evacuation of two protest camps, the transitional government has again declared a state of emergency ( memento from January 8, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutschlandradio, August 30, 2013 (last change: October 2, 2013), archived from the original .
  82. a b c d e f g h i j k l m Five months after Morsi's fall - Egypt approves new constitution ( Memento from December 18, 2013 on WebCite ), Handelsblatt, December 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  83. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae Interactive timeline: Egypt in turmoil ( Memento from October 21, 2013 on WebCite ) (English ). Aljazeera, August 17, 2013 (last change: 14:31), archived from the original .
  84. a b c d e f g h i j Ultimatum in Egypt - Army demands political solution within 48 hours ( memento from October 18, 2013 on WebCite ), Süddeutsche.de, July 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  85. a b c d Egypt: Morsi opponents storm the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood ( memento from October 18, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, July 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  86. a b c d Egypt: Opposition sets Mursi ultimatum for resignation ( memento of October 18, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, July 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  87. a b c d e f g h Protocol - The day when the military deposed Mursi ( memento of October 13, 2013 on WebCite ), stern.de, July 3, 2013, archived from the original .
  88. a b c d e f g h i j k l m Egypt: Government classifies Islamist Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization ( Memento from December 27, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The Huffington Post - Edition: DE, December 25, 2013, contributed by Danuta Szarek (sza / dpa).
  89. Egypt's interim president dissolves Shura Council: State TV ( Memento of October 13, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, July 5, 2013, archived from the original .
  90. a b c d e f g h i Coup in Egypt - The Stolen Revolution ( Memento from October 13, 2013 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 6, 2013, by Markus Bickel, archived from the original .
  91. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Egypt after the deposition of Morsis - The Wut of the Muslim Brotherhood ( Memento from January 6, 2014 on WebCite ), South German. de, August 19, 2013, archived from the original .
  92. a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Egypt - Postscript to a revolution - After The Square: Egypt's tumultuous year - interactive timeline ( Memento from January 25, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The Guardian, January 24, 2014, by Patrick Kingsley, Nadja Popovich, Raya Jalabi and the Guardian US interactive team, archived from the original .
  93. Power struggle in Egypt: Government wants to ban pro-Morsi protests ( Memento from December 19, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, July 27, 2013, archived from the original .
  94. a b c d Chronicle: What happened since June? ( Memento from December 23, 2013 on WebCite ), Swiss Radio and Television, August 14, 2013, archived from the original .
  95. John Kerry Backtracks Egypt Comments That Military Was 'Restoring Democracy,' Not Taking Over ( Memento from August 21, 2013 on WebCite ). The Huffington Post, August 2, 2013, by Deb Riechmann, archived from the original .
  96. Egypt army 'restoring democracy', says John Kerry ( Memento of August 21, 2013 on WebCite ). BBC News, Aug 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  97. John Kerry Interview -01 Aug 2013 (English). dailymotion.com, published by the dailymotion channel Geo News on August 1st, 2013.
  98. a b c d Again massacres and many dead - Egypt is sinking into violence ( memento from August 29, 2013 on WebCite ), Der Tagesspiegel, August 19, 2013, by Martin Gehlen and Albrecht Meier, archived from the original .
  99. a b c d e f Interactive timeline: Egypt in turmoil ( Memento from November 5, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Aljazeera, November 4th 2013 (last change: 8:51 am), archived from the original .
  100. a b Ashton wants to initiate Egyptian dialogue ( memento from October 5, 2013 on WebCite ), derStandard.at, October 2, 2013 (print version: Der Standard, October 3, 2013), by Astrid Frefel, archived from the original .
  101. Mursi supporters protest on Tahrir Square in Cairo ( memento from October 6, 2013 on WebCite ), Reuters Germany, October 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  102. ^ Dead in riots in Egypt - On a new front ( memento from October 8, 2013 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 6, 2013, by Markus Bickel, archived from the original .
  103. Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations: Dead in riots in Egypt ( Memento from October 28, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online Video, October 5, 2013, archived from the original .
  104. Violence again in Egypt - deaths in protests in Cairo ( memento from October 5, 2013 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, October 5, 2013.
  105. Egypt - Violence and Impunity on the Nile ( Memento from October 18, 2013 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, October 7, 2013, archived from the original .
  106. Severe attacks on the Egyptian army ( memento from December 1, 2013 on WebCite ), Tages-Anzeiger, October 7, 2013, archived from the original .
  107. a b c d e f Muslim Brotherhood is a "terrorist organization" - all activities of the organization are prohibited in the future. Islamists confessed to attacking the police ( memento from January 7, 2014 on WebCite ), Kurier.at, December 25, 2013, archived from the original .
  108. a b Egyptian business tycoon warns of collapse ( memento from January 15, 2014 on WebCite ), Reuters Germany, November 14, 2013, by Michael Georgy and Yasmine Saleh, archived from the original .
  109. a b c d e f g Interactive timeline: Egypt in turmoil - Follow the ongoing political and social upheaval in the Arab world's most populous country ( Memento from January 26, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Aljazeera, January 24, 2014, archived from the original .
  110. a b Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt After Mubarak and Morsi ( January 6, 2014 memento on WebCite ), The New York Times, July 2, 2013 (nominal publication date), by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, archived from the original .
  111. ↑ Most serious attack outside of Sinai - bomb attack shakes Egypt ( memento from January 8, 2014 on WebCite ), n-tv, December 24, 2013, archived from the original .
  112. After the fatal attack in Egypt - the Muslim Brotherhood are now "terrorists" ( Memento from December 28, 2013 on WebCite ), the daily newspaper, December 25, 2013, archived from the original .
  113. a b c Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt After Mubarak and Morsi ( Memento from January 26, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, July 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  114. Death toll from uprising anniversary climbs to 64, mostly by gunshot: Forensics - At least 58 of the deaths on Saturday's anniversary of Egypt's popular revolt caused by gunshot wounds ( Memento from March 1, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, January 27, 2014, archived from the original .
  115. a b c 265 dead in January: Independent count - Independent statistical database Wiki Thawra reports 108 dead on revolution's third anniversary - nearly double the official count of 66 ( Memento from March 1, 2014 on WebCite ), Daily News Egypt, February 13 2014, by Rana Muhammad Taha, archived from the original .
  116. Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt After Mubarak and Morsi ( Memento from January 29, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, July 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  117. Egypt's Ruler Eyes Riskier Role: The Presidency ( Memento from April 22, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, January 27, 2014, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  118. Cairo court sentences 21 Al-Azhar students to 3 years in jail. (English). Al-Ahram online, February 27, 2014.
  119. Who's who: Egypt's new cabinet - 20 ministers from El-Beblawi's cabinet keep their posts, while 11 ministers are fresh appointees ( Memento from March 2, 2014 on WebCite ). Ahram Online, March 1, 2014, archived from the original .
  120. a b c Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt After Mubarak and Morsi - More than two years after the Egyptian uprising that ushered in Mohamed Morsi as the country's first elected leader, he was deposed by the military. Explore key moments of his rule and the aftermath ( Memento of 25 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). The New York Times, July 2, 2013 (nominal), by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, archived from the original .
  121. a b c Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt After Mubarak and Morsi ( Memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, July 2, 2013 (nominally), by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, archived from the original .
  122. a b General Who Led Takeover of Egypt to Run for President ( Memento from April 22, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, March 26, 2014, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  123. ^ Rallies also from supporters ( memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , ORF.at, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  124. Sedki Sobhi sworn in as Egypt's new military chief - Egypt's new armed forces chief and defense minister has been sworn in, a day after Abdul Fattah al-Sisi resigned so he could stand for the presidency ( Memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). BBC News, March 27, 2014, archived from the original .
  125. a b 683 Islamists sentenced to death in Egypt - 683 Islamists were sentenced to death in the largest mass trial in Egyptian history. A court in the Upper Egyptian city of Minia found the defendants guilty of participating in violent protests and of murder ( memento of April 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , stern.de, April 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  126. Egypt court sentences 683 Morsi supporters to death - Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie among 683 people sentenced to death by a court in Upper Egypt; court commutes death sentences passed 492 of 529 in at Earlier trial ( Memento of 29 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, by El-Sayed Gamal El-Deen, April 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  127. a b c Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt From Mubarak and Morsi to Sisi - Egypt's three-year experiment with democracy has ousted President Hosni Mubarak and deposed Mohamed Morsi, the country's first elected leader. Explore key moments of Their rule and the aftermath ( Memento of 16 June 2014 Webcite ) (English). The New York Times, July 2, 2013 (nominally), by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, archived from the original .
  128. a b Egypt: Cabinet resigns after al-Sisi's inauguration - the new president should put together a government he trusts. Some ministers are allowed to keep their offices ( memento from June 12, 2014 on WebCite ) , DiePresse.com, June 9, 2014, archived from the original .
  129. Timeline of Turmoil in Egypt From Mubarak and Morsi to Sisi - Egypt's three-year experiment with democracy has ousted Hosni Mubarak and deposed Mohamed Morsi, the country's first elected leader. Explore key moments of Their rule and the aftermath ( Memento of 24 March 2015 Webcite ) (English). The New York Times, July 2, 2013 (nominally), by Shreeya Sinha and Erin Banco, archived from the original .
  130. ^ Egypt Convicts 3 Journalists; US Is Critical ( Memento of 24 March 2015 Webcite ) (English). The New York Times, June 23, 2015, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  131. a b Egypt - The power cartel in Cairo shows first cracks The show trial against foreign journalists, a mistake - Egypt's President al-Sissi distances himself from the judiciary. That doesn't mean anything good ( memento from March 24, 2015 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, July 7, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  132. a b c Hotspots at the EU borders: Europe's difficult neighbors ( memento from April 3, 2014 on WebCite ) , Spiegel Online, April 3, 2014, by Raniah Salloum, archived from the original .
  133. a b c d e https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/06/brutality-torture-rape-egypt-military-rule - Ibrahim Mahlab's new cabinet confirms that the country is falling apart under a corrupt and authoritarian police state. The world must help us ( Memento of 5 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). The Guardian, March 6, 2014, by Emad El-Din Shahin, archived from the original .
  134. a b c d e 2013 a 'black year' for human rights ( Memento from January 26, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, December 30, 2013, by Rana Muhammad Taha, archived from the original .
  135. a b Less religion, more military, police and justice ( memento from January 12, 2014 on WebCite ) , SonntagsZeitung, January 12, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  136. a b c d e f g h i Egypt: Killings in Rabaa and other killings, probably crimes against humanity - No justice one year after series of fatal attacks on protesters ( Memento from August 13, 2014 on WebCite ) , Human Rights Watch, 12 August 2014, archived from the original .
  137. Egypt massacre premeditated thing, says Human Rights Watch - Rabaa killing of 817 people was a planned Tiananmen Square-style attack on unarmed protesters Largely, report Argues ( Memento of 13 August 2014 Webcite ) (English). The Guardian, Aug 12, 2014, by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  138. a b All According to Plan - The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt ( Memento August 13, 2014 on WebCite ) (English; PDF: 3.42 MB), Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014, archived from the original .
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  140. a b c d e f g h Egypt: No Acknowledgment or Justice for Mass Protester Killings Set Up a Fact-Finding Committee as a First Step ( Memento from December 25, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, December 10, 2013, archived from the original .
  141. Rights groups demand Egypt probe killings of Mursi supporters ( Memento from December 26, 2013 on WebCite ). Reuters Edition US, December 10, 2013, by Tom Perry, archived from the original .
  142. a b c All According to Plan - The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt ( Memento August 13, 2014 on WebCite ) (English; PDF: 3.42 MB), Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014 , P. 13, archived from the original .
  143. All According to Plan - The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt ( Memento August 13, 2014 on WebCite ) (English; PDF: 3.42 MB), Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014, p. 102, footnote 350, archived from the original . With reference to: الدكتور حازم الببلاوى رئيس الوزراء فى حوار ل "المصري اليوم": (1-2) الطوارئ "أبغض الحلال» .. وتمديدها شهرين الخيار الأقرب ( Memento of 13 August 2014 Webcite ) (Arabic), Al-Masry al-Youm, September 11, 2013, by Yasser Rizk and Mansour Kamel, archived from the original .
  144. All According to Plan - The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt ( Memento August 13, 2014 on WebCite ) (English; PDF: 3.42 MB), Human Rights Watch, August 12, 2014, p. 14, archived from the original .
  145. a b Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability by the Numbers ( Memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, March 24, 2014, by Michele Dunne and Scott Williamson, archived from the original .
  146. Shadi Hamid: "A Kind of Bloodlust" in Egypt ( Memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). brookings.edu March 26, 2014, by Fred Dews, archived from the original .
  147. 'Unprecedented' oppression in Egypt - Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution tells Christiane Amanpour there is “bloodlust” in Egypt ( Memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (Video: 7:00 min .; English). edition.cnn.com/video, from CNN account Amanpour , March 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  148. a b Mass trial of the Muslim Brotherhood - hundreds of death sentences in Egypt ( Memento from April 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 28, 2014, by Jürg Bischoff, archived from the original .
  149. a b Over 41,000 Egyptians arrested since the coup ( memento June 15, 2014 on WebCite ) , Kleine Zeitung, June 4, 2014, archived from the original .
  150. a b Egypt - Sissi's election victory against the people - An additional election day, closed shops, high penalties for non-voters: the Sissi regime tried cleverly to win the votes of the Egyptians. With moderate success ( memento from June 16, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, May 29, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  151. حصر المقبوض عليهم والملاحقين قضائياً خلال عهد السيسي / عدلي منصور, مُحَدَّث حتي 15 مايو 2014 ( Memento from June 16, 2014 on WebCite ) (Arabic). Wiki Thawra, January 9, 2014 (updated May 15, 2014), archived from the original .
  152. ويكي ثورة - حصاد عام مضي من عهد السيسي / عدلي منصور حصر 41 ألفا من المقبوض عليهم والملاحقين قضائيا ( Memento of 16 June 2014 Webcite ) (Arabic). ECESR, May 25, 2014, archived from the original .
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  159. a b c d e f g Loay Mudhoon; in: Presseclub (ARD), August 18, 2013, moderation: WDR editor-in-chief Jörg Schönenborn; Interview partners: Bettina Gaus (taz), Richard Kiessler, Loay Mudhoon (Deutsche Welle), Cornelia Wegerhoff (WDR), archived from the original ( memento of the original from October 14, 2013 on WebCite ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked . Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . At the same time: Riots in Egypt - press club on August 18, 2013 , YouTube, published by the YouTube channel on August 19, 2013 phoenix ; Riots in Egypt - will the Arab Spring turn into a bloody autumn? , ARD media library. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.phoenix.de
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  161. Stephan Roll: Islamist Actors in Egypt - Pragmatism as a leitmotif after the fall of Mubarak ( Memento from April 6, 2014 on WebCite ) , in: Sigrid Faath (Ed.): Islamic Actors in North Africa , Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 2012 , Pp. 29–55, archived from the original .
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  165. Defense Minister Tantawi deposed - The last relic of the Mubarak regime is gone ( memento from November 24, 2013 on WebCite ) , stern.de, August 13, 2012, archived from the original .
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  168. a b c d e f g Egypt - Egyptian army expands economic empire - Egypt suffers from growing poverty and unemployment. But the army does good business: since the revolution, the generals have consolidated their economic power - also thanks to foreign aid ( memento from May 4, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, May 4, 2014, by Markus Symank, archived from the original .
  169. a b c d e f g h i j k Putsch with a plan - Egypt's military safeguards its own interests by taking power. In the long term this will not bring peace ( Memento from October 8, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF), Süddeutsche Zeitung, p. 2, July 15, 2013, by Stephan Roll (collaboration: Max Gallien), archived from the Internet version on swp-berlin .org (PDF; 48 kB) on October 8, 2013.
  170. a b c d e Egypt - The Depths of the State ( Memento from October 9, 2013 on WebCite ), Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 7, 2013, by Martin Woker, archived from the original .
  171. a b c d The Paid Coup - Golf Games on the Nile as a Challenge for the West ( Memento from October 8, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF), WeltTrends - magazine for international politics, 92, September / October 2013 (21st volume), Pp. 142–143, by Stephan Roll, archived from the Internet version at swp-berlin.org (PDF; 485 kB) on October 8, 2013.
  172. New capital - Egypt plans to build a colossal desert city ( memento from March 24, 2015 on WebCite ) , Welt.de, March 21, 2015, by Brian Rohan, archived from the original .
  173. a b c Who is supporting the transitional government? - Egypt's generals have new friends ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, August 19, 2013, interview by Alexander Steininger with Gunter Mulack, archived from the original .
  174. ^ State crisis in Egypt "The Muslim Brotherhood only stand for hatred" ( Memento from August 21, 2013 on WebCite ), N24, August 16, 2013, interview by Johannes Altmeyer with Jürgen Chrobog, archived from the original .
  175. Five soldiers slain, blasts rock Egypt as deadly violence continues ( Memento from October 11, 2013 on WebCite ). Worldnews on NBCNews.com, undated [? 7. October 2013], by Henry Austin, archived from the original .
  176. In Cairo, John Kerry says US will work with Egypt interim rulers ( Memento December 13, 2013 on WebCite ). The Telegraph, November 3, 2013, AFP message edited by Hannah Strange, archived from the original .
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  184. a b Comment Justice in Egypt - Everyday Death Penalty - The Egyptian justice not only passes merciless judgments, it also fails mercilessly - and compromises itself as an angel of vengeance against the Muslim Brotherhood ( Memento from April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , taz.de, April 28 2014, by Karim El-Gawhary, archived from the original .
  185. Egypt: A judiciary executes itself - the judges pass 683 death sentences against opponents of the regime and are now also banning the secular April 6th movement: They are increasingly taking sides for those in power ( memento of April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , DiePresse. com, April 28, 2014 (print edition: “Die Presse”, April 29, 2014), by Karim El-Gawhary, archived from the original .
  186. Egypt's judiciary as an angel of revenge - court sentenced hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood to death again / Many judges see themselves as protectors of the state ( Memento from April 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , Badische Zeitung, April 29, 2014, by Karim El-Gawhary, archived from the original .
  187. Egypt: Violence escalates on the anniversary of the popular uprising ( memento from February 28, 2014 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, January 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  188. a b c d e f g h Stephan Roll: Egypt's business elite after Mubarak - Powerful actor between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood ( Memento from October 8, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF), SWP studies 2013 / S 14, Science and Politics Foundation - German Institute for International Politics and Security, Berlin, July 2013, here p. 5 f., Archived from the original (PDF; 461 kB) on October 8, 2013.
  189. a b Cilja Harders: The upheavals in the Arab world: Between revolution and restoration , in: Arbeitsstelle Politik des Vorderen Orients (Ed.): Protests, revolutions, transformations - the Arab world in upheaval ( Memento from October 14, 2013 on WebCite ) (PDF), Center for North African and Middle Eastern Politics, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, June 2011, Working Paper No. 1, July 2011, archived from the original (PDF; 1.4 MB) on October 14, 2013.
  190. a b c Tourism - Egypt is to be resurrected as a travel destination - Safe holiday destination: Egyptians like the billionaire Samih Sawiris want to attract more investors and travelers to their country. They show little understanding for the politics of the Foreign Office ( memento from March 16, 2014 on WebCite ) , Die Welt, March 16, 2014, by Birgit Svensson and Silke Mülherr, archived from the original .
  191. Land without tourists - the suffering of the Egyptian tourism industry ( memento from October 25, 2013 on WebCite ), Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung, October 25, 2013, archived from the original .
  192. Egypt - General Al-Sisi is supposed to bring tourists back ( memento of October 25, 2013 on WebCite ), Zeit Online, October 22, 2013, by Andrea Backhaus, archived from the original .
  193. Tourism crisis in Egypt: laid-off workers shoot at hotel near Pyramiden ( memento from November 2, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, November 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  194. a b Tagesschau from August 24, 2013, 7:30 p.m. - Egypt: The Return of Entrepreneurs ( Memento from January 11, 2014 on WebCite ) (2.23 min), Swiss radio and television (Tagesschau from August 24, 2013), 24. August 2013, archived from the original .
  195. a b Tourism - Why Billionaire Sawiris Is Eagerly Investing in Egypt - In Egypt, tourism is rocking. The billionaire entrepreneur Samih Sawiris, however, firmly believes in the future of his homeland. If only it weren't for the tiresome travel warnings ( memento from March 18, 2014 on WebCite ) , Die Welt, March 18, 2014, by Birgit Svensson and Silke Mülherr, archived from the original .
  196. a b Samih Sawiris: The Egypt boom is coming soon - Tourism: Is Egypt tourism at an end? Not at all, says Orascom boss Samih Sawiris. The investor is suffering heavily from the decline in Egypt tourism - but he sees an upswing this year ( memento from April 16, 2014 on WebCite ) , HandelsZeitung, April 16, 2014, by Gabriel Knupfer, archived from the original .
  197. a b c d e f g h "Egypt is on the verge of collapse" - Middle East expert Petra Ramsauer sees the country on the Nile as being close to civil war. Violence would only drive the Muslim Brotherhood into militancy ( memento from March 30, 2014 on WebCite ) , Kleine Zeitung, March 30, 2014, Interview by Stefan Winkler with Petra Ramsauer , archived from the original .
  198. Presidential election - EU sends observers to Egypt - For the first time the European Union wants to send observers to an election in Egypt ( Memento from April 11, 2014 on WebCite ) , Tageblatt Online, April 11, 2014, archived from the original .
  199. EU sends observers to Egypt's presidential election - Ashton agrees with Foreign Minister Fahmi on an agreement in principle ( Memento from April 11, 2014 on WebCite ) , derStandard.at, April 11, 2014, archived from the original .
  200. a b c d e f g Egypt - The Torn Nation ( Memento from February 24, 2014 on WebCite ), Der Tagesspiegel, February 24, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  201. a b c d e f g Egypt - The persecution of the Copts after the coup ( memento from 23 August 2013 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 August 2013, by Rainer Hermann, archived from the original .
  202. a b Egypt is sinking into the vortex of agitation - A wave of agitation and defamation of political opponents rolls over Egypt. Liberals fear that civil democracy is further away than before the overthrow of the hated President Mubarak ( memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) , Südwest Presse, July 17, 2013, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  203. Egypt's presidential candidate al-Sisi - the general awakens wishes - at the end of May Egypt will elect a new president, the winner seems to have already been determined: Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, former army chief and defense minister of the country. Its content remains vague, al-Sisi only becomes concrete when it comes to the Islamists ( Memento from May 8, 2014 on WebCite ) , Süddeutsche.de, May 7, 2014, by Tomas Avenarius, archived from the original .
  204. NCHR looks into reports of torture revolutionary anniversary detainees - Nation without Torture campaign condemns alleged torture amide Ministry of Interior's denial of validity of torture accounts ( Memento of 10 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, February 11, 2014, by Rana Muhammad Taha, archived from the original .
  205. Detainees detail stories of torture in Egypt jails - Interior ministry denies torture exists in Egyptian police stations and prisons despite Numerous testimonies by detainees and rights activists ( Memento of 15 March 2014 Webcite ) (English) Ahram Online, 12 February 2014 , by Salma Shukrallah, archived from the original .
  206. Sawiris backs El-Sisi for Egypt's presidency - Naguib Sawiris speaks to Al-Ahram Arabic newspaper about army chief El-Sisi's candidacy for president, and the hopes and challenges of the coming period ( Memento from May 30, 2014 on WebCite ) (English ). Ahram Online, February 12, 2014, archived from the original .
  207. a b c d e Egypt: The paid revolution - A Tamarod leader explains how the “revolutionary youth movement” was bought early for the project “Deposition of Mursi” by the army and the Ministry of the Interior ( Memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) , Telepolis , April 17, 2014, by Thomas Pany, archived from the original .
  208. a b c d e How Egypt's Rebel Movement Helped Pave The Way For A Sisi Presidency - For the first time, one of the five founders of the Tamarod, the movement that led the protests that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood last year, admits his movement was taking orders from the army. "We were naive, we were not responsible." ( Memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). BuzzFeed, April 15, 2014, by Sheera Frenkel and Maged Atef, archived from the original .
  209. a b c Egypt's Tamarrod party - rebels of the silent majority ( memento from November 6, 2013 on WebCite ) , Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 4, 2013, by Rainer Hermann, archived from the original .
  210. Kefaya says tamarod campaign is not under auspices of Kefaya movement - Kefaya: some members are Involved in the tamarod campaign but the campaign does not belong to Kefaya ( Memento of 18 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, April 30, 2013, by Hend Kortam, archived from the original .
  211. Profile: Egypt's Tamarod protest movement ( Memento from December 3, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). BBC News, July 1, 2013, archived from the original .
  212. ^ State crisis - Egypt's military plays a key role - The protests in Cairo continue. In the state crisis, the Egyptian army is assigned a decisive position. However, what she intends to do if the fronts remain hardened is unclear ( memento from March 30, 2014 on WebCite ) , Handelsblatt, July 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  213. ↑ Billionaire Sawiris wants to found the "Free Egyptians" party ( Memento from May 27, 2014 on WebCite ) , derStandard.at, April 3, 2011, archived from the original .
  214. Special Report - The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the state' ( Memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Reuters Edition UK, October 10, 2013, by Asma Alsharif and Yasmine Saleh, archived from the original .
  215. “The time of victory has come”: Tamarod - Petition campaign urges people to take to the streets and not to be afraid ( Memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, July 3, 2013, by Kanzy Mahmoud, archived from the original .
  216. Egyptian army suspends constitution and Removes President Morsi - as it happened ( Memento of 18 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). The Guardian, July 3, 2013 by Matthew Weaver and Tom McCarthy, archived from the original .
  217. a b Cairo - old henchmen with new power - under ex-dictator Mubarak, the political police were known for torture. That it was dissolved was a success of the revolution in Egypt. Under the new government, old cadres are now being reactivated ( memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) , Südwest Presse, July 30, 2013, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  218. a b Crisis in Egypt - Mursi opponents without remorse ( memento from December 13, 2013 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, August 16, 2013, by Andrea Backhaus, archived from the original .
  219. Why Mahmoud Badr is pro-Army, anti-Muslim Brotherhood - Interview: Mahmoud Badr, the activist whose online campaign helped to bring down Egypt's president, now supports the army attacks on the Muslim Brotherhood. Why? ( Memento from April 18, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The Christian Science Monitor, August 17, 2013, by Yasmine Saleh, archived from the original .
  220. a b tamarod: From rebellious youth to political actors - Egypt's young revolutionary face of June 30 is reinventing itself in order to maintain its privileged position on the political scene ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, November 5, 2013, by Mariam Rizk, archived from the original .
  221. Rebel campaign calls for Tahrir celebrations on 6 Oct holiday - Tamarod's call comes as a response to news Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups are planning to protest on 6 October, the anniversary of Egypt's 1973 war against Israel ( Memento from March 8, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, October 2, 2013, archived from the original .
  222. October 6 in Egypt - The military can be celebrated ( Memento from January 1, 2014 on WebCite ) , Berliner Zeitung, October 4, 2013, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  223. a b Egypt - Muslim Brotherhood no longer an NGO ( memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, October 9, 2013, archived from the original .
  224. Social Solidarity Ministry officially dissolves Brotherhood NGO ( Memento from October 11, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, October 9, 2013, archived from the original .
  225. tamarod to begin election rallies for Egypt parliament seats after Eid - Movement did sparked mass protests against Mohamed Morsi denies it wants to cooperate with the Mubarak regime figures in the upcoming election campaign ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, October 14, 2013, archived from english.ahram.org.eg on March 8, 2014.
  226. Leftist Popular Current to ally with Rebel in Egyptian elections - The Popular Current wants to form a coalition with the Rebel (tamarod) group in the upcoming parliamentary elections ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, October 29, 2013, archived from the original .
  227. Tamarod founder says Egypt's new constitution limits military - In an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor, Mahmoud Badr, the founder of the Egyptian Tamarod Movement, said that the military did not get any special privileges in the proposed new Egyptian constitution. Rather, the opposite is true when comparing with the other Egyptian constitutions since 1923. Badr clarified that the Tamarod Movement's closeness with the army stems from the fact that they are partners in implementing the Egyptian road map. He pointed out that the current phase Egypt is experiencing cannot handle talk about canceling the Camp David Accords with Israel. .According to Badr, the articles of the agreement Should be reviewed, but in the future ( Memento of 18 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). Al-Monitor, November 25, 2013, by Walaa Hussein, archived from the original .
  228. Egypt's tamarod campaign disavows leading members - tamarod says several members, Including two Representatives of the group in the country's constituent assembly, do not speak in the name of the organization ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, November 26, 2013, archived from the original .
  229. tamarod members arrested at protest in Aswan - Security forces in Upper Egypt briefly detain five members of the youthgroup during protest against dispersal of Cairo demonstrations ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, November 27, 2013, archived from the original .
  230. tamarod launches constitutional referendum campaign - New constitution better than 1971 and 2012, but reservations remain about provisions Allowing military trials of Civilians, says anti-Morsi campaign group ( Memento of 6 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, December 5, 2013, archived from the original .
  231. a b Judge Helped Egypt's Military to Cement Power ( Memento from October 10, 2013 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, July 3, 2012, by David D. Kirkpatrick, archived from the original .
  232. Rebel backtracks on support for possible El-Sisi presidential bid - Group that led protests against Islamist president Mohamed Morsi backpedals from leader's statement hinting at possible support for army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi if he runs for president ( Memento from March 8th 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, August 30, 2013, archived from the original .
  233. tamarod says Egypt draft protest law is unjust - Rebel campaign co-founder Mohamed Abdel-Aziz says a draft law currently being reviewed by the interim president betrays rights won by Egypt's popular uprisings ( Memento of 8 March 2014 Webcite ) (English) . Ahram Online, October 17, 2013, archived from the original .
  234. Rebel group retracts support for possible El-Sisi presidential bid - Tamarod, the group which ignited the mass protests that ended Islamist president Morsi's rule, officially backtracks on earlier support to Army Chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi if he runs for president ( Memento March 8, 2014 Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, December 18, 2013, archived from the original .
  235. Religion still leads the way in post-Morsi Egypt - President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi is not afraid to use faith to push the state's narrative - but the climate and the rhetoric have cooled ( Memento from September 19, 2014 on WebCite ) (English ). The Guardian, September 18, 2014, by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  236. Egypt - Now everyone is trying to save their privileges ( memento from November 28, 2013 on WebCite ), Der Tagesspiegel, July 8, 2013, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  237. ^ A b Sonja Hegasy, in: Again the state crisis in Egypt: Phoenix round on November 28, 2012 , phoenix, panel discussion entitled "Again state crisis in Egypt - Morsi, the new Pharaoh?"; Moderation: Pınar Atalay; Interview partners: Stephan Roll (Science and Politics Foundation), Sonja Hegasy (Center for the Modern Orient), Melinda Crane (freelance journalist) and Rainer Stinner (FDP, foreign policy spokesperson)
  238. a b Hundreds of dead when the protest camps were cleared - State of emergency imposed on Egypt - Vice President ElBaradei resigns ( memento from August 17, 2013 on WebCite ), derStandard.at, August 14, 2013, archived from the original .
  239. Egypt's TV star: Dr. Youssef tests the limits of freedom ( memento from November 2, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, November 1, 2013, by Raniah Salloum, archived from the original .
  240. a b c Change of power in Egypt - The way is clear for al-Sisi ( Memento from February 25, 2014 on WebCite ), Berliner Zeitung, February 24, 2014, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  241. ^ Egypt - Better late than never ( memento from February 25, 2014 on WebCite ), Berliner Zeitung, February 25, 2014, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  242. Egypt - There was no other way ( Memento from September 27, 2013 on WebCite ), Die Zeit, August 29, 2013, by Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, archived from the original .
  243. In der Geiselhaft des Islam ( Memento from October 13, 2013 on WebCite ), Focus Magazin, No. 34 (2013), August 19, 2013, by Hamed Abdel-Samad, archived from the original .
  244. Video Hamed Abdel-Samad: “Egypt between Faith and Violence - Is the West Expecting Too Much?”  In the ZDFmediathek , accessed on February 9, 2014. (offline), “maybrit illner” from August 22, 2013 ( Memento of the original from September 24, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , Moderation: Maybrit Illner; Interview partners: Philipp Missfelder (foreign policy spokesman for the Union parliamentary group), Peter Scholl-Latour, Hamed Abdel-Samad, Lubna Azzam (Science and Politics Foundation), Mazen Okasha. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.zdf.de
  245. a b c d e f g h i Judgment in Cairo: Egypt Bans Democracy Movement April 6th - The group organized the protest against dictator Husni Mubarak and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Now a court in Cairo has banned the youth movement on April 6th. Another blow against opponents of the military in Egypt ( Memento from April 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Spiegel Online, April 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  246. a b 6 April Youth Movement banned - Critics argue, dass die case did not belong in Cairo Court for Urgent Matters, question how ban will be Implemented ( Memento of 29 April 2014 Webcite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, April 28, 2014, by Aya Nader, archived from the original .
  247. a b Egypt's death sentences without a plausible basis - the quantitative and qualitatively record-breaking death sentences damage Egypt's reputation ( Memento from May 1, 2014 on WebCite ) , derStandard.at, April 29, 2014, by Gudrun Harrer, archived from the original .
  248. a b c d e f Muslim Brotherhood - Egypt Sentences 683 Morsi Followers to Death - An Egyptian court has sentenced almost 700 Islamists to death, including a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, other death sentences were lifted ( memento from April 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, April 28, 2014, archived from the original .
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  387. a b c Egypt's hijacked revolution ( memento from March 3, 2014 on WebCite ), DiePresse.com, January 26, 2014 (print edition: “Die Presse”, January 27, 2014), by Karim El-Gawhary, archived from Original .
  388. Egypt - Death and Terror for the Holiday ( Memento from February 27, 2014 on WebCite ), Frankfurter Rundschau, January 26, 2014, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  389. Egypt - Conflicts on the Anniversary of the Revolution ( Memento from February 28, 2014 on WebCite ), Berliner Zeitung, January 26, 2014, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original .
  390. 21,317 arrested since Morsi's ouster: independent count - Detention extended for 11 protesters who violated the Protest Law ( Memento from February 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Daily News Egypt, January 13, 2014, by Rana Muhammad Taha, archived from the original .
  391. ^ Egypt - Muslim Brotherhood declared a terrorist organization ( Memento from December 28, 2013 on WebCite ) , Süddeutsche.de, December 26, 2013, archived from the original .
  392. a b Cabinet is reshuffled - Egyptian government resigns ( memento from February 25, 2014 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, February 24, 2014.
  393. a b c d Egypt: Mubarak confidante Mahlab becomes new head of government ( memento from February 26, 2014 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, February 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  394. a b c Construction Minister Mahlab to form the Egyptian government ( memento from February 26, 2014 on WebCite ), derStandard.at, February 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  395. Audio: Transitional government resigned ( Memento from February 24, 2014 on WebCite ) ( MP3 ( Memento from February 24, 2014 on WebCite ), 1'07 min.), Tagesschau.de, February 24, 2014, by Jürgen Stryjak (SWR, Cairo).
  396. (), tagesschau.de, February 24, 2014, archived from the original ( MP4 ( Memento of the original from February 27, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link accordingly Instructions and then remove this notice. ) February 24, 2014. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / download.media.tagesschau.de
  397. Egypt's building minister Mahlab to form government ( memento from February 26, 2014 on WebCite ), DiePresse.com, February 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  398. a b Government of the Mubarak Elite - Egypt: Sixth Cabinet sworn in since 2011. Army chief Al-Sisi remains Minister of Defense ( memento from March 2, 2014 on WebCite ), Young World, Abroad / Page 6, March 3, 2014, by Sofian Philip Naceur, archived from the original .
  399. ^ Egypt - New government sworn in ( memento of March 2, 2014 on WebCite ), Tageblatt Online, March 2, 2014, archived from the original .
  400. Al-Sisi remains minister - New government in Egypt sworn in ( memento from March 2, 2014 on WebCite ), merkur-online.de, March 2, 2014, archived from the original .
  401. a b Sisi 'to remain' Egypt's defense minister ( Memento from April 5, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Al Arabiya News, Feb. 26, 2014, archived from the original .
  402. a b Egypt names Ibrahim Mahlab as new prime minister - former housing minister and party member Mubarak pledges to 'crush terrorism' and crack down on rise in violence ( Memento of 6 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). The Guardian, February 25, 2014, by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  403. Egypt on the Verge of a Social Explosion ( April 4, 2014 memento on WebCite ) , World Socialist Web Site, April 1, 2014, by Jean Shaoul, archived from the original .
  404. Federal Foreign Office tightened travel warning for Egypt ( memento from February 27, 2014 on WebCite ), Deutsche Welle, February 26, 2014, archived from the original .
  405. a b c d e Analysis - Revenge Justice deepens Egypt's split ( memento from March 26, 2014 on WebCite ) , RP Online, March 26, 2014, by Matthias Beermann, archived from the original .
  406. Politics - First the President, then Parliament - The election calendar in Egypt is fixed. Army chief al Sisi takes position ( memento from March 1, 2014 on WebCite ) , Der Tagesspiegel, January 27, 2014, by Astrid Frefel, archived from the original .
  407. Bloody clashes - "This is not the Egypt we want" ( Memento from February 27, 2014 on WebCite ), FAZ.net, January 26, 2014, by Markus Bickel, archived from the original .
  408. ^ Egypt first elects the president, then parliament ( memento from February 27, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, January 26, 2014, archived from the original .
  409. Bomb Blasts Near Cairo University ( Memento from April 3, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Voice Of America, April 2, 2014, archived from the original .
  410. Unknown Islamist group confesses to double attack in Cairo ( memento from April 4, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, April 3, 2014, archived from the original .
  411. a b Elections in Egypt - Sabahi versus al-Sisi: Who will be the next president? ( Memento April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , Focus Online, April 21, 2014, archived from the original .
  412. Two dead in an attack on security forces in Egypt ( memento from April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , derStandard.at, April 20, 2014, archived from the original .
  413. a b In the Sinai between the fronts - An offensive by the security forces on the peninsula in Egypt should have stopped the violence, but the causes were not fought ( Memento from April 23, 2014 on WebCite ) (with interactive timeline: Timeline: Violence on Sinai ) , derStandard.at, April 23, 2014, by Stefan Binder, archived from the original .
  414. ^ Upheaval in Egypt - Army chief Al-Sisi wants to become president ( Memento from March 5, 2014 on WebCite ), Süddeutsche.de, March 4, 2014, archived from the original .
  415. Court ruling in Cairo: Hamas has to close offices in Egypt ( Memento from March 5, 2014 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, March 4, 2014, archived from the original .
  416. ^ Court decision - Hamas banned in Egypt ( Memento from March 5, 2014 on WebCite ), tagesschau.de, March 4, 2014.
  417. UN Body Criticizes Egyptian Crackdown on Dissent ( Memento from March 17, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, March 7, 2014, archived from the original .
  418. Denmark and 26 other countries addresses human rights situation in Egypt at HRC25 - Item 2 - Joint statement ( Memento from March 17, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Permanent Mission To The UN In Geneva - Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Denmark, March 7, 2014, archived from the original .
  419. UN Human Rights Council: Egypt Rights Abuses in Spotlight - Member States Call on Cairo to End Violations, Ensure Justice ( Memento of March 17, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Human Rights Watch, March 7, 2014, archived from the original .
  420. Mass trial - protests against scandal verdict in Egypt ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , Handelsblatt, March 24, 2014, archived from the original .
  421. slamists in Egypt - Fast trial: 529 death sentences against supporters of Mohammed Mursi ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , Der Tagesspiegel, March 25, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  422. a b Egypt - Show trials in the fast-track process - Before the presidential election, the show trials against opponents of the regime cast a gloomy light on the human rights situation in Egypt. After the death sentences of 529 Muslim Brotherhoods, the judiciary begins another mass trial ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , FAZ.net, March 25, 2014, by Markus Bickel, archived from the original .
  423. a b Egypt: Escalations in protests by Mursi supporters ( memento from April 4, 2014 on WebCite ) , euronews, April 1, 2014, archived from the original .
  424. ^ Egypt - Justice plans new mass trials against Islamists ( Memento of March 27, 2014 on WebCite ) , RP Online, March 26, 2014, archived from the original .
  425. 529 Reasons to Doubt Egyptian Justice ( Memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). The New York Times, March 27, 2014, by Louisa Loveluck, archived from the original .
  426. ^ Riots in front of Al-Azhar University ( memento from April 4, 2014 on WebCite ) , euronews, March 30, 2014, archived from the original .
  427. ^ Egypt - Politicized Trials against Muslim Brothers ( Memento of March 24, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, December 6, 2013, by Markus Symank, archived from the original .
  428. Al-Jazeera process Egypt - Egypt is risking its reputation ( memento from March 24, 2014 on WebCite ) , Frankfurter Rundschau, March 24, 2014, by Julia Gerlach, archived from the original on March 24, 201
  429. Trial of Al Jazeera staff adjourned in Egypt - The trial of three Al Jazeera staff, jailed on charges of spreading false news, has been adjourned until March 31 ( Memento of 31 March 2014 Webcite ) (English). Al Jazeera, March 24, 2014, archived from the original .
  430. a b Journalist shot dead covering clashes in Egypt ( Memento from March 31, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Committee to Protect Journalists, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  431. Dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood - Arab Struggle for Egypt ( Memento from March 24, 2014 on WebCite ) , FAZ.net, March 24, 2014, by Rainer Hermann, archived from the original on March 25, 2014.
  432. No mercy for Islamists - The Mubarak method returns ( memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , n-tv, March 28, 2014, by Nora Schareika, archived from the original .
  433. Summit of the Arab League - Egypt asks for help against terror ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  434. ^ Egypt - deadline for 683 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhoods - just one day after the death sentences of 529 Muslim Brotherhoods, the trial of 683 other defendants was opened. The verdicts should fall at the end of April - there will probably be maximum sentences again ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , Die Welt, March 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  435. No concord in the Arab League ( memento from March 25, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, March 25, 2014, archived from the original .
  436. ^ Anti-Government Protests in Cairo ( Memento of March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Voice Of America, March 28, 2014, by Hamada Elrassam, archived from the original .
  437. Egypt - Presidential election will take place at the end of May - The first round of the presidential election in Egypt is to be held on May 26th and 27th. The previous military chief Abdel Fattah al-Sissi is given high chances ( memento from March 30, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, March 30, 2014, archived from the original .
  438. a b battle for presidency in Egypt - In the presidential election in Egypt at the end of May there is only one other candidate besides the favored ex-army chief al-Sisi, the left-wing politician Sabahi ( memento from April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, 20 April 2014, archived from the original .
  439. a b Al Sisi takes on Sabbahi in Egypt - two candidates for presidential election ( memento from April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , tagesschau.de, April 20, 2014.
  440. a b Presidential Election in Egypt - Only One Man Challenges Al-Sisi ( Memento April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , RP Online, April 20, 2014, archived from the original .
  441. Election of the head of state - only two candidates to vote in Egypt ( memento from April 21, 2014 on WebCite ) , N24, April 20, 2014, archived from the original .
  442. Egypt elects at the end of May ( memento from March 31, 2014 on WebCite ) , Die Welt, March 31, 2014, archived from the original .
  443. a b Court forbids candidacy - Muslim Brothers are not allowed to run for elections in Egypt - Since the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi by the military, difficult times have dawned for the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Now a court of the Islamist movement has banned the candidacy in the upcoming parliamentary elections ( memento from April 15, 2014 on WebCite ) , Focus Online, April 15, 2014, archived from the original .
  444. Egypt: Dead in protests against military chief al-Sisi in Cairo - With the announcement of his presidential candidacy, Egypt's military chief Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi triggered nationwide protests. At least four people were killed ( memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , Spiegel Online, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  445. ^ Egypt - dead in protests in Cairo ( memento from March 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  446. ^ Protests for and against al Sisi - dead during protests in Egypt ( memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , tagesschau.de, March 28, 2014.
  447. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt continue to demonstrate ( memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  448. Egyptian photo reporter shot dead during a protest in Cairo ( memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) , ORF.at, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  449. ^ Egyptian Dostour journalist covering Islamists-police clashes killed ( Memento from March 29, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online, March 28, 2014, archived from the original .
  450. Egypt - Who Killed Mayada Ashraf? - The work of journalists in Egypt is becoming more and more dangerous. After the death of a young photo reporter, Egyptian journalists demand more protection for their reporting from the street ( memento from March 31, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, March 30, 2014, by Khalid El Kaoutit, archived from the original .
  451. Egypt - 42 Muslim Brotherhood sentenced to imprisonment - In Egypt dozen of Muslim Brotherhood were sentenced to imprisonment - more could follow on Monday. Apparently, army chief al-Sissi wants to show hardship before the elections ( memento from April 28, 2014 on WebCite ) , Zeit Online, April 27, 2014, archived from the original .
  452. Presidential election in Egypt: Favorite al-Sisi rejects reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood ( Memento from May 6, 2014 on WebCite ) , euronews, May 6, 2014, archived from the original .
  453. Al-Sisi settles accounts with the Muslim Brotherhood - He is considered popular among Egypt's people and a favorite for the presidential elections. Ex-army chief al-Sisi has now made it clear that he does not rely on the support of the Muslim Brotherhood or that of the army ( memento from May 6, 2014 on WebCite ) , Deutsche Welle, May 5, 2014, archived from the original .
  454. a b c d e f Interactive: Egypt votes for president - Millions of Egyptians will elect a new president amid deepening divisions that continue to polarize the country ( Memento from May 28, 2014 on WebCite ) (English). Al Jazeera, update of May 25, 2014, by Alaa Bayoumi and Konstantinos Antonopoulos, archived from the original .
  455. Egyptian presidential election extended to third day - Critics say extension and last-minute public holiday are Attempts to boost credibility of probable winner Abdel Fatah al-Sisi ( Memento of 27 May 2014 Webcite ) (English). The Guardian, May 27, 2014 by Patrick Kingsley, archived from the original .
  456. Egypt's preliminary 2014 presidential election results - Unofficial results from Egypt's 27 governorates favor Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi with over 95 percent of the vote ( Memento of 29 May 2014 on Webcite ) (English). Ahram Online, May 29, 2014, archived from the original .
  457. Official result is not yet available - losing candidate contests election in Egypt ( memento June 3, 2014 on WebCite ) , RP Online, May 31, 2014, archived from the original .
  458. a b c Al-Sissi regime - Egypt loses contact with reality ( memento from June 22, 2015 on WebCite ) , zeit.de, December 4, 2014, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  459. a b Leading article Egypt - Egyptian Friedhofsruhe ( memento from April 1, 2014 on WebCite ) , Frankfurter Rundschau, March 27, 2014, by Thomas Schmid, archived from the original .
  460. a b c d e Stephan Roll and Matthias Sailer: Built on sand: Egypt's questionable strategy for growth and development ( Memento from April 23, 2015 on WebCite ) (PDF), SWP-Aktuell 2015 / A 25, March 2015, archived from Original .
  461. ^ Yemen - Egypt pays the price ( Memento from April 6, 2015 on WebCite ) , derwesten.de, March 29, 2015, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  462. (Video: tagesschau.de, March 28, 2015, by Alexander Stenzel), archived from the original ( Memento of the original from April 8, 2015 on WebCite ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. ( MP4 ( Memento of the original from December 22, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ) On April 8, 2015. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.tagesschau.de @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / download.media.tagesschau.de
  463. Why war against Yemen now? ( Memento from April 9, 2015 on WebCite ) , Telepolis, April 9, 2015, by Georg Meggle, archived from the original .
  464. Fight against the Houthi rebels - Yemen divides the region ( memento from April 14, 2015 on WebCite ) , tagesspiegel.de, April 14, 2015, by Martin Gehlen, archived from the original .
  465. Egypt dragged to was in Yemen? - With the possibility of a ground operation in Yemen growing, Egypt's domestic front is concerned ( Memento from April 18, 2015 on WebCite ) (English). Ahram Online (also published in: Al-Ahram Weekly, April 9, 2015), April 9, 2015, by Amira Howeidy and Dina Ezzat, archived from the original .
  466. a b c Egypt - Egyptian attorney general dies after bomb attack ( memento from July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) , zeit.de, June 29, 2015, by Martin Gehlen.
  467. Police responsible for 272 deaths Past 12 months, says rights group ( Memento of 4 July 2015 Webcite ) (English), madamasr.com, June 28, 2015.
  468. a b c d e f g h i j Violence in Egypt - Muslim Brothers proclaim the revolution ( Memento from July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) , welt.de, July 2, 2015, by Gil Yaron.
  469. Egypt: Generation of young activists imprisoned in ruthless bid to crush dissent ( Memento from July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) (English), amnesty.org, June 30, 2015.
  470. a b c d e f g Terrorism - Egypt's war against the extremists - After the attacks by terrorist squads in Sinai, the Egyptian regime sees itself in a war. Even stricter laws are on the way, the judges should take revenge ( memento from July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) , zeit.de, July 1, 2015, by Martin Gehlen.
  471. Amnesty slams Egypt over arrests of youths ( Memento of July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) (English), uk.reuters.com, June 30, 2015, by Shadi Bushra.
  472. Egypt slams Amnesty over claims of 'all-out repression' - The London-based group says mass arrests have replaced mass protests in its report released on the second anniversary of the demonstrations that led to Islamist president Mohamed Morsi's deposal ( Memento vom 4. July 2015 on WebCite ) , english.ahram.org.eg, June 30, 2015.
  473. a b c d e f g h i j k Worse than the dictators: Egypt's leaders bring pillars of freedom crashing down - Adly Mansour and now Abdel Fatah al-Sisi are ruling by decrees, banning protest and severely curbing freedom of speech ( Memento July 6, 2015 on WebCite ) , theguardian.com, December 26, 2014, by Patrick Kingsley.
  474. At least 70 dead on the Sinai - violence is escalating in Egypt ( memento from July 5, 2015 on WebCite ) , tagesspiegel.de, July 1, 2015 (update), by Martin Gehlen.
  475. a b Sisis Egypt - Completion of the Revolution or Back to Zero? ( Memento from July 4, 2015 on WebCite ) , GIGA-focus - Middle East, 2015, No. 1., by Annette Ranko and Najwa Sabra, ISSN  1862-3611 .

Remarks

  1. a b Western media reports based on news agency reports from the end of December 2013 stated that 1400 people were killed when the protest camps were broken up on August 14, 2013 by the security forces. Sources: for example 1. Egypt: Police catch ex-head of government on the run ( memento from December 24, 2013 on WebCite ), Spiegel Online, December 24, 2013, archived from the original ; 2nd bomb attack - Egypt: many dead in attack on police headquarters ( memento from December 28, 2013 on WebCite ), heute.de, December 24, 2013, archived from the original ; 3. Egypt - Muslim Brotherhood declared a terrorist organization ( memento from December 28, 2013 on WebCite ), Süddeutsche.de, December 26, 2013, archived from the original .