Battle for Moscow

Battle for Moscow

Part of: German-Soviet War ( Second World War )

Changes to the front from June 22nd to December 5th, 1941

date	October 2, 1941 to January 31, 1942
place	near Moscow , Soviet Union
output	Soviet victory

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Soviet Union
Commander
Fedor von Bock Heinz Guderian Albert Kesselring	Georgi Zhukov Alexander Vasilevsky
Troop strength
Army Group Center	Western front
losses
Nov. 1941: 145,000 Dec. 1941: 103,600 Jan. 1942: 144,900	1,026,000 men (654,000 fallen and prisoners)

The Battle of Moscow was a battle on the German-Soviet front in World War II . It began on October 2, 1941 with the resumption of the offensive of Army Group Center against the Western , Reserve and Brjansk Fronts . The aim of the operation was to take advantage of the favorable conditions created by the double battles at Vyazma and Bryansk to capture the Soviet capital Moscow . After the advance in the double battle had stalled by October 30, 1941 due to the autumn mud and the increased Soviet resistance, the offensive could be continued about two weeks later. The second offensive failed, however, after the Red Army undertook a large-scale counter-offensive on December 5, 1941 , which led to a withdrawal order from Hitler on January 15, 1942. In the Moscow offensive operation (December 5, 1941 to January 7, 1942) the Red Army advanced up to 250 km to the west on a front about 1000 km wide. The actual goal, the annihilation of Army Group Center, was not achieved.

background

How the war went so far

In the course of the war against the Soviet Union , the three army groups of the German Wehrmacht and the armed forces of the states allied with the German Reich had penetrated far into Soviet territory since June 22, 1941. In the Battle of Smolensk , a first Soviet defensive position was penetrated in front of Moscow. Hitler, however, prevented an immediate advance on Moscow by the Friday, July 28, the 3rd Panzer Group under Colonel General Hermann Hoth to the north and the Panzer Group 2 under Colonel General Heinz Guderian with the 2nd Army under the command of Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs to the south turn left, since in his opinion the conquest of the economically important areas of Ukraine and the conquest of Leningrad had a higher priority. The Armored Group 4 took part in the advance on Leningrad part, while Panzer Group 2 and the 2nd Army at the Battle of Kiev involved.

Disagreements in the run-up to the offensive

According to Hitler's plans, the Soviet military defense force should largely be switched off before the conquest of Moscow and at the same time the economically most important areas in the north and south of Russia and the Ukraine should be taken over. In addition, Hitler wanted the capture of the Crimea in order to avoid the threat to the Romanian oil fields from air strikes by the Red Air Fleet. In contrast, the German generals saw the primary goal alone in the immediate capture of Moscow. Moscow was not only of great importance from a geographical point of view, but also as a traffic and news center, as a political center and as an important industrial area. (See: August Crisis (1941) )

German planning

According to the instructions of the Army General Staff of August 18, 1941, two wings were to be formed to encircle and encircle the Soviet capital north and south. The southern wing was to run over the Bryansk - Roslavl and Kaluga - Medyn lines, the northern wing was to have two approaches. The first was planned from the Bjeloj area and the second from the Toropez area. In general, attacks should be made to the east via Rzhev . According to this plan, the central section should remain mainly defensive with ten infantry divisions. In the opinion of the General Staff of the Army, the decision should be made about the two offensively oriented wings. How to proceed after a successful breakthrough was made dependent on the situation at the front. In his instructions of September 6, 1941, Adolf Hitler gave the order to prepare for the decisive operation against the "Tymoshenko Army Group, which was committed to aggressive fighting in front of the army center".

Hitler's operational order initially only provided for the "Tymoshenko Army Group" to be surrounded in "general direction Vyazma " by strong armored units that were grouped together for this purpose. Hitler limited the forces on the south wing to the 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions , the north wing was to consist of the 9th Army including units from the area of Army Group North .

The second part envisaged the pursuit of the Soviet troops in the direction of Moscow after most of the western front had been smashed in the “tightly held together extermination operation”. The Oka on the right and the upper Volga on the left should serve as operational boundaries . The attack was to be covered by troops released from the Kiev area of Army Group South in the south and by advances along both sides of Lake Ilmen in the north.

Field Marshal General von Bock, Commander in Chief of Army Group Center (October 1941)

On September 10, 1941, following Hitler's instructions, the Army High Command issued the “Instructions to continue operations”. The chief of staff of the OKH Franz Halder gained freedom by succeeding in changing the combat mission with apparently the same formulations. Halder thus went far beyond his tasks and interpreted Hitler's instructions in favor of his plans, which corresponded to those of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock .

Halder's plans limited Hitler's clear priority to the destruction of the Western Front. Literally he noted:

"Only after safe enclosure and guarantee of the destruction of the enemy forces comprised east of Smolensk between the Roslavl Strait, Moscow and Bjeloj, the pursuit in the direction of Moscow can be initiated."

- Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army

Halder's plan extended Hitler's instructions to include a frontal attack by rapid formations and infantry divisions directly on Moscow, left out by the dictator. He specified the forces that were released by Hitler from the area of ​​Army Group South with the 2nd Army under Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs and Panzer Group 2 under the command of Colonel General Heinz Guderian. These two formations were supposed to lead the attack on the right wing against Oryol from the Romny area in a northeastern direction, in order to deploy the Soviet troops in front of the newly established 2nd Army from the south.

Other major differences to the original planning were the removal of the majority of the 2nd Army from the encirclement approach east of Kiev and the likely formation of a third group that was supposed to advance directly against the Soviet capital and was independent of the operations around Vyazma. For this reason, Halder was also very interested in releasing as many forces as possible from the area of ​​Army Group South, mentioned by Hitler in his instructions, from the Kiev operation within the shortest possible time. The Army Chief of Staff did not include the 6th Army , which stood directly next to the 2nd Army, in his planning. The Armored Group 1 under the command of Colonel General Ewald von Kleist was to attack with a focus against the line-Romny Sula following the Armored Group. 2 To protect the eastern flank, the majority of the 17th Army was to advance in the direction of attack Kharkov - Poltava . Contrary to Hitler's instructions, which said that fast forces should be released "from the area of ​​Army Group South" (presumably from Panzer Group 1), Halder instructed Panzer Group 2 and the 2nd Army to cover the attack in a staggered manner. The Army General Staff issued the following restriction:

“Order for 11th Army to take Crimea away remains unchanged. As far as possible according to the situation, the basis for early action by partial forces against the north coast of the Sea of Azov is to be created through the approach of individual faster - if necessary Hungarian and Romanian - units . "

- Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the Army

Meanwhile, Army Group Center began to concentrate its units and general staffs, since September 19, 1941 under the code name of the company Taifun . In addition to the advance on Moscow, the troops, in cooperation with Army Group North - as ordered by Halder on August 30 - were to improve the starting position for the attack on the northern wing.

Problems before the attack started

The transport of the tanks to form the planned concentrated focal points led to a heavy load on the entire traffic routes, as in addition to the transport of units of the tank groups 1 and 2 located far away on the north wing, the transfer of the fast troops from the area of ​​the army group north as well as the supply homeland had to be mastered. This led to delays compounded by the unplanned longer duration of the operations east of Kiev and the slower-than-expected advance on Leningrad. In the case of the 8th Panzer Division , this resulted in the repeal of the deployment order for Army Group Center.

Already during the planning phase, Halder took into account the further diminishing strength of the armored divisions due to the permanent missions without replenishment. As of September 4, 1941, 30% of the tanks had completely failed, and 23% were still being repaired. Overall, half of the tank divisions included in the operational planning had an average of around 34% of their target strength in tanks. This percentage improved only insignificantly due to the 125 newly added copies. The repairs of the tanks, which were carried out mainly at home and which were expected to have poor resistance, also turned out to be problematic. Due to this fact, Halder asked the OKW for another 181 tanks, which together with the new 125 units already standing at Orsa and Dünaburg would have meant a refreshment of the most weakened tank divisions by 10% of their stock. Overall, the numbers seem rather insignificant when you put the two ongoing operations and the term “campaign-decisive battle” in relation to them.

Another problem was the acute shortage of vehicles, which was estimated at more than 22% at the start of the offensive. Most of the vehicles still in use were only provisionally repaired types, most of which had been in continuous use since June and for which a high failure rate was to be expected. The result would have been that the army's mobility would have been considerably reduced due to the weather, the battle and the road conditions, although this problem could only be solved by Hitler personally having immediate authorization to manufacture new vehicles. According to calculations by the General Plenipotentiary for Motor Vehicles, Major General Adolf von Schell , there would then be enough vehicles left over to equip a tropicalized armored division. In his opinion, if the troops were to remain lying-down “on a broad front in deep Russian territory at the onset of winter”, the effects would be far more serious than that of the release, although this never took place.

The supply of fuel was also problematic, as the supplies of the supply bases of the Army Groups Central and South had largely been used up. Only Army Group North still had outsourcing in its supply base, as the supplies benefited from the rail network that was expanded and repaired there and the supply via the Baltic Sea. Mainly because of the supply network on rails, it was only possible for Army Group North and, to a limited extent, Army Group Center to store supplies. With four sets of consumption as a reserve, preparations for the attack on Moscow required 27 trains a day, of which the Wehrmacht High Command was able to promise 22 units until September 16 and 27 from September 30. A requirement of 29 trains was calculated for the period of the operations in October, of which only 20 could be promised. In November, the OKW promised three trains a day, as it was assumed that the operation would be completed and that it would be used to equip and store supplies for the winter. The infrastructure destroyed when the Red Army withdrew had to be rebuilt, but even then it was rather inadequate. There were hardly any paved roads and the railway could not simply be rebuilt, since the Russian broad gauge was not suitable for vehicles with European standard gauge.

It was generally not possible to compensate for the losses from previous battles.

Final decision to attack Moscow

After a presentation of the situation by the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel General Franz Halder, Hitler issued directive No. 34 on August 12, 1941, which stated that "Moscow as a center of state, armaments and transport should be withdrawn from the enemy before winter" . For the Army Chief of Staff, however, this was only a partial success, since Hitler recognized the importance of Moscow, which Halder had vigorously defended. However, he remained unchanged of the opinion that the order of the attack operations was determined by the breaking up of enemy formations and the conquest of economically important areas. Hitler also argued against the advance on Moscow, taking up his generals thesis that most of the Red Army was concentrated in front of the Soviet capital and that it was so weakened on the other fronts that, in his understanding, these weakened sections of the front had priority.

After the decision of August 22, 1941, based on a study by the dictator, which said that the operations against Moscow would be stopped until further notice, the final act of the debate about the decisive “last battle” began. In Hitler's opinion, all armies west of Moscow should be defeated once and for all before the attack can continue. This way of thinking, already advocated by Hitler in the early phase, stood in stark contrast to the strategic concept of the extensive enclosure of Halder, since the former inevitably left the initiative to the enemy.

In a memorandum submitted to Hitler on August 26, 1941, the OKW came to the conclusion that it was impossible to end the campaign in the east this year. This representation finally met with Hitler's approval. After the looming fiasco of the Red Army in the Kiev area at the beginning of September, however, Hitler surprisingly changed his mind and on September 6, 1941, with Führer instruction No. 35, he gave the order to Army Group Center to prepare for an attack on Moscow until the end of September complete. It literally means:

“The initial successes against the enemy forces located between the inner wings of Army Groups South and Central [...] created the basis for an operation seeking a decision against the Army Group Tymoshenko, which was in offensive fighting in front of the Army Group. It must be crushed in the limited time available until the onset of winter weather. It is important to summarize all forces of the army and the air force that are dispensable on the wings and can be brought in on time. "

- Adolf Hitler

Defense preparations in Moscow

Soviet anti-aircraft machine guns on the roof of the Moskva Hotel in the immediate vicinity of the Kremlin (August 1941)

Barricades in a street in Moscow (October 1941)

At the end of July 1941, after the first German air raids , Moscow slowly assumed the appearance of a front-line city. The shop windows were barricaded with sandbags or boards, some of which had huge propaganda posters on them. At night there was strict blackout and traffic was minimized to the bare minimum. No effort was spared in the camouflage efforts in front of the German Air Force . The outlines of almost the entire city have been redesigned in great detail. For example, Sverdlov Square and the Bolshoi Theater looked like a group of small houses from the air. The Kremlin walls were redesigned with paint to make row houses, the golden domes of the churches were painted green. Zigzag lines were drawn on all the major streets, which from above looked like house roofs. All large squares were painted with house roofs and open spaces such as sports stadiums were covered with mock wooden house roofs. Even some loops of the Moskva were completely covered with wood to make orientation difficult for the German airmen. Hundreds of anti-aircraft floodlights and heavy anti-aircraft batteries were set up in the forests of the suburbs, and tethered balloons rose from Moscow's arterial roads to deter low-flying aircraft . Moscow's air defense was more developed than that of Berlin and London together.

The Moscow subway OPERATION ran on only a few major routes as planned. Wooden boards were set up along the rails and the underground stations and train shafts were converted into a huge air raid shelter for the Moscow civilian population. Any Muscovite who wasn't involved in air defense in some way had to go to a basement. Violators were punished by fines or imprisonment. During the first night attack by the Germans, exactly one month after the start of the war, the German planes flew for the first and only time at a very low altitude over Moscow. The first night they usually came at a height of 300 meters. After that, the Germans changed their tactics and bombed Moscow from a great height. However, the number of incoming German bombers decreased from attack to attack. Was it on the night of 21./22. On July 1941, there were still 127 aircraft attacking Moscow; one night later there were 115, and on the night of July 24th 100 aircraft. By the end of 1941, fewer than ten German He 111 and Ju 88 aircraft were used in 59 of 76 attacks on Moscow .

Women dig an anti-tank ditch in front of Moscow (1941)

Moscow was preparing for the possibility of a sudden collapse of the front or the landing of parachute troops. For this purpose, Soviet fighter battalions and Komsomol brigades were brought together in individual barracks . The entire defense system, the so-called Moscow Defense Zone, was placed under the command of the Moscow Military District (Lieutenant General Pawel Artemjewitsch Artemjew ), which was responsible for mobilizing the population for fortification and fortification work as well as setting up and arming workers' battalions. Artemjew was also responsible for industrial production, transportation, communications and food supplies for the population. The most important vital functions of the capital were in the hands of the military, more precisely the NKVD .

Comparison of the armed forces

The structure of the Red Army differed from the German in the lack of a corps unit . In terms of divisional strengths, roughly 2 1/2 Soviet divisions corresponded to a German division. The air fleet was subordinate to the army and did not form a separate branch of service like the German air force .

The German armed forces

The Army Group Center (GFM von Bock ) was considerably reinforced for the attack on Moscow by Panzer Group 4 ( Hoepner ), which was withdrawn from Leningrad to the central front. In total, the Germans had 14 armored divisions , nine motorized divisions and 56 infantry divisions. Air support came from Air Fleet 2 ( Kesselring ) and parts of Air Fleet 4 ( Löhr ).

In particular, the motorized and armored units of Army Group Center were badly affected due to their high mileage on unsuitable roads under almost constant enemy influence and urgently needed an overhaul and refreshment, which was insufficient for time and organizational reasons.

In addition, the kettle battles won by the German armed forces were tactical successes in themselves, but they gave the Soviet armed forces time to prepare for defense in important sections. The German troops, on the other hand, became weaker, the planes, tanks and vehicles were worn out, and the limited resources of fuel and ammunition were used up. Replacements could only be provided in a makeshift manner. There was a complete lack of warm clothing for the soldiers, although the Russian winter would begin in a few weeks.

The losses of the Wehrmacht in the German-Soviet War from June 22 to September 26, 1941 amounted to 534,086 dead, wounded and missing, i.e. around 15% of the initial strength.

The Soviet armed forces

Soviet air defense position in Moscow (July 1941)

The Red Army was able to secure and expand the front in front of Moscow, which ran east of Smolensk about 300 km west of the capital, in the course of the summer. In some sections, the Red Army carried out violent counter-attacks. At the beginning of September 1941, Army Group Center had to evacuate a promontory at Jelnja , about 70 km southeast of Smolensk, under pressure from the Red Army. The Jelnja offensive was the first important operational withdrawal of German troops in World War II.

To the north and south of the Smolensk – Moscow runway, eight Soviet armies on the Western Front were under the command of Marshal Tymoshenko and had their headquarters in Vyazma . In addition, the almost 300 km long Moshaisk defense line was built from Kalinin in the north via Wolokolamsk , Borodino and Moshaisk to south of Kaluga in the rear area around 100 km from Moscow. This defensive position consisted of three main lines with pitfalls, tank traps, minefields wide, electrically controlled flamethrowers and PaK -positions.

In the Moscow area, much of the Soviet was Stawka - reserves ; The Soviet air forces concentrated almost 40% of the operational aircraft there and had the advantage that they had peacefully developed airfields close to the front.

Mid-August 1941 sparked from Japan to the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung camouflaged Agent Dr. Richard Sorge went to Moscow that the Japanese Privy Council had decided to finally end the fight against the Soviet Union from Manchukuo . Japan would be more willing to accept a war against the USA and the United Kingdom than to forego the raw material deposits of southern Indochina . This information, which was historically decisive for the war, gave the Soviet high command the strategic opportunity to move larger reserves in the form of Siberian troops from the Far East to the west. The Siberian troops, almost 700,000 men, were the last well-equipped reserve units of the Red Army at the time. The troop transports took several weeks for the 8,000 km long route between Moscow and Vladivostok . While only the remainder of the commandos remained on site to simulate the presence of the troops with fake radio messages, the military transports drove directly on sight , dispensing with the usual block system, and rolled westwards with absolute priority with a daily output of around 750 km.

German offensive on Moscow

Vyazma and Bryansk basin battles

→ Main article : Double battle near Vyazma and Bryansk

Map of the Kessel Battle in the Vyazma area (October 1941)

Panzer Group 2 began the attack on September 29 and, coming from the Gluchow area, should begin the pincer grip from the southwest. Guderian's troops had to cover the longest route via Oryol and Tula to Moscow, over 600 km. At the same time the attack by Army Group South on Kursk , Kharkov and the Donets Basin began.

At dawn on the first day of the attack, Hitler's order of the day was read to the German soldiers , announcing the beginning of the last decisive battle of that year, with reference to the great danger “ which since the times of the Huns and later the Mongol storms has no longer been more terrible over the continent floated ”.

On October 2, 1941 at 5:30 a.m., about 350 km from Moscow from north to south: 9th Army ( Strauss ), Panzer Group 3 ( Hoth ), Panzer Group 4 ( Hoepner ), 4th Army ( von Kluge ), the Panzer Group 2 ( Guderian ) and the 2nd Army ( von Weichs ). The intention was to proceed on both sides of the Smolensk – Moscow taxiway and to pass Moscow through PzGr. 3 in the north and the PzGr. 4 to include in the south. The so-called "taxiway" was the main road between Moscow and Smolensk, which was partially expanded to four lanes (today Magistrale No. 1 ). However, some sections of the route still consisted of unpaved sand paths or cobblestones.

At this point in time, the motorized units of Army Group Center only had about 30–40% of their inventory. Supplying the troops caused problems for the Wehrmacht, as the Soviet railway was designed for broad gauge and the rails therefore had to be nailed down first. In addition, the transport capacities of the Deutsche Reichsbahn reached their limits, aggravated by attacks by Soviet partisans .

On October 3rd, the city of Oryol was taken so surprisingly by the XXIV Army Corps (mot.) Of Panzer Group 2 that the electric railways were still running in the city. An evidently planned evacuation of the industrial facilities could no longer be carried out. Large areas of machines and boxes with tools and raw materials lay on the streets between the factories and the train station. From the west, the German 2nd Army advanced east from the Potschep area and held the front troops of the Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies. After the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions swung north-west, Bryansk was conquered on October 6 and the Soviet 50th Army deployed northeast of the city encircled. Army General Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad by Stalin and charged with defending Moscow. The next day another pocket closed around the Soviet 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Army at Vyazma . The Soviet State Defense Committee decided to build a semicircular defensive position about 15 to 20 km from Moscow, which should consist of several lines of defense. Also on October 7, Hitler forbade any acceptance of a possibly proposed surrender by Moscow. The Reich press chief Otto Dietrich informed the domestic and foreign press on October 8th that the "Russian war had been decided with the destruction of Army Group Tymoshenko" and that the USSR had been defeated.

On October 14th and 17th, the Vyazma and Brjansk pockets were evacuated. The OKW reported the destruction of 80 divisions; 663,000 prisoners were taken, 1,242 tanks and 5,412 guns destroyed or captured.

Reorganization of the Soviet defense

In order to reorganize the defense in the western apron of Moscow, the reserve front was disbanded on October 10th and its armies were annexed to the western front and Army General G.K. Subordinate to Zhukov .

Zhukov in (October 1941)

Mud made the German advance difficult (October 1941)

The western front, which was reorganized to protect Moscow, counted 6 armies on October 10 after the incorporation of the reserve front units with again 62 rifle and 9 cavalry divisions, supported by 11th tank brigades:

• 31st Army , Major General VA Yushkevich
• 16th Army , Major General KK Rokossovsky
• 5th Army , Lieutenant General Lelyuschenko , from October 15th LA Goworow
• 33rd Army , Lieutenant General MG Yefremov
• 43rd Army , Major General KD Golubjew
• 49th Army , Lieutenant General IG Sacharkin

On October 12th, units of the German 4th Army captured Kaluga . Around this time the mud period ( Rasputiza ) began, and the first combat contacts between the Wehrmacht and troops of the Far East Army took place . On October 14th, the German VI. Army Corps of the 9th Army with the capture of Rzhev crossing the Volga . Advancing to the northeast to the right, the XXXXI. Motorized Army Corps on October 14th, Kalinin . The right wing of the Soviet Western Front, the 22nd, 29th and 30th Armies were then placed under Konev's unified command on October 17th, and the Kalinin Front was formed. On October 23rd, the 31st Army from the Western Front transferred to the Kalinin Front.

On October 14th reached the tank tops of the XXXXVI. Panzer Corps the Moscow protective position at Moshaisk , which stretched almost 300 km from Kalinin via Wolokolamsk to Kaluga. Initially, the Soviet 33rd Army was tasked with building the fortifications in the Moshaisk area, but these troops were soon relocated to the threatened front between Rshew and Vyazma. Major General Lelyushenko then commanded this important section with Moscow militias and the newly formed 5th Army, which had been formed from the staff and troops of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps. The 32nd Rifle Division under Colonel Polosuchin , which was soon to be delivered , occupied the central defensive section of the Moscow protective position at Borodino with around 12,000 men and supported the Moscow militia in defending the entrances to Moshaisk. On October 14th, several days of heavy fighting began on the historic battlefield of Borodino, in which the SS division Das Reich met fresh Siberian elite troops and on October 17th was able to take the village of Gorki. The 10th Panzer Division was able to break through in these fighting at Utizy, encompass Psarewo in the south and take Moshaisk on October 18. During this time, the 16th Army with two cavalry divisions under Major General LM Dowator, the 316th Rifle Division (Major General Ivan Panfilow), a cadet regiment under Colonel S. Mladentsev and the 18th Army, formed from Moscow workers, were still in the Moscow protective position. Militia Rifle Division (Major General P. Chernyshev). The Soviet 43rd Army secured the protective position at Malojaroslawez , the 49th Army at Kaluga and the 50th Army began to form at Tula .

In Moscow, mass panic broke out among the population between October 16 and 18 after they were first informed of the threat posed by the Germans. At that point, nearly two million people had been evacuated from the city. Workers' battalions were set up in the city districts. Many works of art from the museums and the Kremlin  - even the embalmed corpse of Lenin  - were moved from the city east to safety. Over 200,000 workers left the city with their work equipment. Most businesses were idle, many shops and department stores were looted, and significant parts of the population tried to leave the city. On October 19, the martial law was imposed on Moscow and blocking units of the NKVD under the command of Lieutenant General Pavel Artemjew cracked down on. Mutineers were shot, deserters hanged. On that day Richard Sorge was arrested by the Japanese secret police Tokkō in Tokyo . With his radio operator Clausen (alias Fritz), he had sent a total of 141 reports with over 65,000 words to Moscow since 1939 and sent numerous microfilms by courier. In the meantime, all major authorities, the Politburo and almost all foreign diplomats from Moscow have been evacuated to Kuibyshev (now Samara ). Stalin and the headquarters of the Supreme Command (Stawka) remained in the city. In a secret mission Moscow was prepared for demolition by two companies of mining specialists. Meanwhile, 500,000 Muscovites, mostly women, built fortifications in front of Moscow.

Counter attacks and mud period

Rasputitsa : Muddy road in the Soviet Union in autumn 1941

On October 18, the Soviet 29th Army (Lieutenant General Maslennikow ) began a counterattack in the section of Panzer Group 3 near Kalinin: on the following day the XXXXI. Army Corps (mot) clear the railway bridge at Mjednoye including the bridgehead there. The intervention of the 8th Air Corps stabilized the already threatening situation with the German 1st Panzer Division . The muddy season that began in mid-October with the sodden paths and roads soon proved to be an effective helper for the Soviet Union in the fight against the Wehrmacht. The supply of the divisions directly involved in the attack operations fell suddenly from 900 tons per day to only around 20 tons. The Soviet troops used the slowdown in the German attack to expand their defenses.

From November 1st, the Smolensk-Moscow taxiway was only allowed to be used with a special permit, in order not to “stir it up” until November 3rd, when a light frost set in and the streets and paths became more passable. However, it took the Wehrmacht almost two weeks until ammunition and fuel could be brought in to resume the attack. When a severe frost set in on November 6th, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht were still without winter clothing. On the same day a solemn meeting of the Moscow Soviet took place in the Mayakovskaya metro station , in which Stalin, in a passionate speech, evoked the fighting strength of his soldiers and the resilience of the Soviet population. The next day, despite the danger of German air strikes, a military parade was held on Red Square to commemorate the October Revolution . The participating Red Army troops then marched directly to the nearby front. On the German side, however, the 8th Army Corps (8th and 28th Infantry Divisions ) was even pulled out of the front in order to be converted in France.

On November 13th, Soviet troops attacked the right wing of the 4th Army with the aim of splitting up the German attack front. During these battles, the Red Army used the time to bring additional reserve armies in preparation for the offensive and to integrate them into the front as unnoticed as possible for the German reconnaissance.

Second German attack phase in advance of Moscow

Wehrmacht soldiers on guard, west of Moscow

German tank attack near Istra on November 25, 1941

In mid-November, the second phase of the German attack began on the northern section of Army Group Center, which met dogged resistance from the Red Army. Since larger parts of the German Air Fleet 2 (Kesselring) had been relocated to the Mediterranean area, the necessary air support was lacking. The Soviet armed forces, on the other hand, were able to gain control of the air in the most important sections . The XXVII started on November 15th . Army Corps (86th and 161st Infantry Divisions) of the German 9th Army launched an attack north of Selenzino-Ilyinskoye on the northern edge of the Volga reservoir. While the XXXXI. Army Corps (motorized) was stuck in front of Kalinin, tried the regrouped LVI. Army Corps (motorized) to break through Lataschino on both sides in the direction of Klin. The 6th Panzer Division reached the Lama and formed a bridgehead.

On November 18, during the Battle of Tula in the south, Jepifan was captured by troops of XXXXVII. Army Corps (motorized) and from Dedilowo by units the XXIV Army Corps (motorized). Despite heavy losses from anti-tank positions, the 2nd Panzer Army achieved a breakthrough on Stalinogorsk on November 22nd and threatened Moscow from the southeast. On the same day, by order of the commanding officer of the Western Front, General AN Yermakov , who was in charge of the Tula area, was dismissed, arrested on December 19 and brought before a court martial.

On November 23, the 10th Motorized Infantry Division took Mikhailov, the 29th Infantry Division crossed the Don section and gained more than 40 km of ground to the north. The 18th Panzer Division penetrated on the right flank through the village of Skopin to Gorlowo. On the same day, Field Marshal von Bock reported the threatening situation and the exhaustion of the troops to the Army High Command. However, the Army Group Center received orders to continue the offensive with the "last force". The German leadership assumed that the last battalion was deployed on both sides .

In Panzer Group 3, on November 25th, the contested Klin (100 km northwest of Moscow) was finally completely occupied by the 7th Panzer Division . On the following day the 6th Panzer Division succeeded in taking the town of Rogachevo and on November 27th the breakthrough to Yachroma , where the combat group Manteuffel built a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Volga-Moscow Canal .

On November 26th, the city of Istra 35 km from Moscow by the IX. and XXXX. Army Corps (motorized) of Panzer Group 4 taken. On November 27th, the temperatures dropped below 35 degrees below zero and demanded high levels of frostbite among the Germans, while the Red Army had been fully equipped with warm clothing since mid-November.

On November 30, the 5th Army Corps (General Ruoff ) regrouped to the north of Moscow, in cooperation with the XXXXVI. Army Corps (mot.) The towns of Krasnaya Polyana and Putschki (today both part of the town of Lobnja ) and thus came within 18 km of the town. On the same day, Zhukov reported readiness for a counter-offensive. But Stalin decided to wait until December 6th before launching the attack in order to better coordinate the forces and bring in further reserves.

The XXXX attacked at the end of November. Motorized army corps came to a standstill in front of Krasnaya Polyana. Panzer Group 3 (Colonel General Hoth) still had around 80 tanks in the assigned 1st, 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions and Panzer Group 4 (Colonel General Hoepner) in the 2nd, 5th, 10th and 11th tanks -Division over about 170 tanks. Army Group Center had 45,735 dead in the fighting in November and lost another 300 tanks and assault guns. The fuel and ammunition were scarce, nevertheless succeeded on December 2, a scouting party of the Armored Engineer Battalion 62, until the Moscow suburb of Khimki penetrate. (About eight kilometers from the city limits, Jeschi memorial since 1976 ). It was the closest point to the Kremlin (23.7 km away) that the Wehrmacht reached; its towers could be seen through the telescopic telescopes . The Moscow fortress batteries now shot into the foremost German lines. The new attacks by the 2nd Panzer Army on Tula , which were also initiated on the southern sector on these days, were repulsed by the Soviet 50th Army (Lieutenant General IW Boldin ).

Soviet counter-offensive

Planning

Fresh Soviet units on their way to the front, Moscow, December 1941

On November 25th, Marshal Shaposhnikov presented a plan for a counteroffensive to Stalin. 21 of the 34 Far East units in the Moscow area were already ready and played a decisive role in the planning. On that day Stalin ordered the 20th Army ( AA Vlasov ) and other divisions from the Stawka strategic reserve to prepare for a counter-offensive in the front front. The Stawka also activated two other reserve armies: the 1st Shock Army (Lieutenant General VI Kuznetsov ) was concentrated in the Dmitrov area to protect the Moscow-Volga Canal and the 10th Army (General Golikow ) in the Ryazan area on the southern section . The air reconnaissance reports about detected troop unloading in the Moscow area were viewed by the German leadership as "ghosts".

On November 30th, Stalin approved the plan for a counter-offensive and entrusted General Zhukov with the leadership, who had already been named Hero of the Soviet Union for his successes in the 1939 Battle of Chalchin Gol against Japan . As early as the middle of November 1941, the Red Army carried out counter offensives on the wings with ambitious goals. However, these were primarily intended to recapture strategically important points and not part of a major cross-front offensive to destroy the German troops. As a result of these first Soviet counter-offensives, the evacuation of Rostov-on-Don by the 1st Panzer Army and the abandonment of Tikhvin by the 16th Army . The Soviet counterattack planned to encircle, cut off and destroy the German units of Panzer Groups 3 and 4, which were most dangerous for Moscow. Thereafter, in the course of operations and tank battles reaching far to the west, the entire Army Group Center was to be eliminated, while simultaneous disruptive and camouflaged attacks on the other front sections in the north and south were intended to make it impossible to withdraw German reserves to the center of the front. The Soviet high command provided around 1,060,000 men, almost 700 tanks and strong artillery forces from the strategic reserve. The Soviet air force was able to use almost 1,400 aircraft for this.

Offensives on the western and Kalinin fronts

A Soviet reconnaissance unit on the way to the front, December 1941

One day before the start of the major offensive on the Kalininer Front and the Western Front on December 5, the " Foreign Armies East " department of the Army General Staff assessed the situation in such a way that the Soviet troops "at the moment" would not launch a major attack without any significant reinforcements Section of Army Group Center are in a position. In reality, the Stawka had brought the Kalinin and West Fronts to 106 major formations in division strength, including 21 fresh elite divisions from Siberia. On the other hand, Field Marshal von Bock was only able to oppose 68 mostly worn-out divisions; the troop ratio was now 1.5: 1 in favor of the Red Army. The Soviet Air Force was also able to achieve a clear superiority in the air force with 1,370 aircraft compared to around 550 German aircraft.

The unexpectedly strong attacks on the sections of the front occupied by the 9th Army and by Panzer Groups 3 and 4 began on December 5, 1941. The main Soviet attack was in the north on both sides of the Volga Dam with a south-westerly attack on Klin by the Kalinin Front (Colonel General Konev ) guided. Subsequently, the Western Front (Army General Zhukov) carried out frontal attacks on both sides of the Moscow – Smolensk taxiway to the west. The 30th Army (Lelyuschenko) had to beat the enemy in the Rogachevo-Borschtschewo area and, together with the 1st Shock Army, advance over the Resetnikowo-Klin section to the Kostljakowo and Lotoschino line. The 1st Shock Army (Kuznetsov) had to destroy the parts of the German Panzer Group 3, which had advanced over the Volga-Moskva Canal, then to concentrate in the Dmitrov-Jachroma area and together with the 30th and 20th Armies (Vlasov) to proceed via Klin on Terjaeva Sloboda. South, the 5th Army (Govorov) from the space Polyana Krasnaya should together with the right wing of the 16th Army on Solnechnogorsk attack. The left wing of the 16th Army (Rokossowski) had to break through to Istra via Krjukowo. The 5th, 33rd, 43rd and 49th Armies, which had hitherto been in the middle of the Western Front, were too weak to attack and only had to tie up the enemy (German 4th Army). The 50th Army (Boldin), which was still in defensive fighting in the Tula area, was supposed to start a counterattack in the direction of Bolochowo and Shchekino. The Below cavalry group had to attack via Wenew in the direction of Stalinogorsk and Dedilowo, while along the Serebrjanje Prudy-Michailow line the newly arrived 10th Army (Golikow) was to begin its attack between Uslowaya and Bogorodizk and advance south of the Upa River. On the night of December 5, 416 Soviet paratroopers landed near the town of Juchnow and were supposed to secure the airfield there; at the same time, Soviet partisans destroyed the few usable railways in the hinterland and the tracks that had been re-tracked by German pioneers to European standard gauge (the few intact tracks conquered had those from Russian broad gauge not usable by the Germans) or occupied important intersections. The German 2nd Panzer Army, attacked by the Soviet 10th Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps at Wenew and Michailow, had to break off their last attack on Tula and abandon the front arc there. Further south, on December 6th, the 13th Army (General Gorodnjanski) of the Southwest Front (Tymoshenko) attacked and broke through the front of the German XXXIV at Jelez . Army Corps.

Due to the general Soviet counter-offensive and the discovered enemy reserves, the cessation of the German attack and the orderly retreat to an operationally convenient winter position seemed urgently necessary. Further problems were the declining combat strength, the precarious situation with regard to troop replacement and the extreme exhaustion of the soldiers, which made a quick decision necessary. This resulted in an announcement of the new line of retreat of the 4th Army and the tank groups by the command of Army Group Center. It was planned that the withdrawal could begin on December 6th, after a special order, for which around two nights had been estimated. The final date for the start of the withdrawal was tied to Hitler's consent and a new instruction to trigger the withdrawal. However, the problematic situation prevailed that most of Army Group Center had neither troops nor resources available that would have enabled the construction of a position that could intercept Soviet advances or a major offensive. As a result of this fact, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center, Fedor von Bock, came to the conclusion that large-scale retreats to expanded positions were not possible and therefore only a hold order remained as an option. The basic requirement for this decision was the immediate replenishment of the troops through the supply of new personnel.

At the beginning of the major Soviet offensive, the top priority of the German military leadership was to prevent the Red Army from breaking through, which is why all units were forbidden from any solution from the enemy. The Soviet troops were well prepared for winter and had ski and snowshoe units at their disposal, which enabled the infantry to move freely in the snow-covered terrain. In addition, the Red Army was equipped with the new T-34 tank, which was superior to the German tank models in many ways and against which the Wehrmacht had no effective anti-tank defense. The German Army Group Command reacted only hesitantly to the Soviet attack until it recognized it as a major attack. It was not until the evening of December 6 that they gave orders to stop their own attack on Moscow and to move to the defensive positions.

On December 7th, the Soviet population was informed for the first time by the Sowinformbüro about the offensive against the “German-Fascist troops”, who had suffered heavy losses while their own troops were advancing. On the same day, the Japanese Navy Air Forces carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor , in which the US Pacific fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor was badly hit. The next day, December 8, 1941, the USA entered the war .

On the night of 7./8. December, Soviet Cossack regiments were increasingly deployed. Behind the front they attacked supply stores, hawsers and rear poles and caused some confusion. Two days later, Army Group Center ordered a general retreat to the winter position. Germany and Italy declared war on the United States on December 11th .

On December 16, Hitler rejected any further disengagement and formulated new guidelines for fighting in a Führer directive of December 18, thereby forcing the troops to "fanatically" hold out in their positions.

To Army Group Center

1. The Führer has ordered:

“ Larger evasive movements cannot be carried out. They lead to the complete loss of heavy weapons and equipment. With the personal commitment of the commanders, commanders and officers, the troops are to be forced to fanatical resistance in their positions, regardless of the enemy who has broken through on the flank and rear. It is only through this kind of warfare that the time can be gained that is necessary to bring in the reinforcements from home and the west that I have ordered. Only when reserves have arrived in the posterior tendon positions can one think about moving into these positions . "

2.….

The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet 16th Army Konstantin Rokossowski and his staff inspect captured German vehicles, December 10, 1941

On December 16, Kalinin was liberated by two divisions of the 29th Army (General Schwezow ) in cooperation with the 256th Rifle Division of the 31st Army. On December 19, Hitler dismissed von Brauchitsch and took over command of the army himself. On December 21st, the Red Army tried to occupy Kaluga in a flash and street fighting began for three days. On December 25, the Red Army liberated Istra , Rusa and Wolokolamsk . Colonel-General Guderian took back his troops in these days against express stop orders arbitrarily and was therefore relieved of his command and transferred to the Führerreserve . The 2nd Panzer Army was then subordinated to General Schmidt's Panzer Force.

The combat report of the AOK of the 3rd Panzer Army of December 21, 1941 describes the withdrawal with the words:

“There are increasing numbers of soldiers retreating on foot, without a weapon, a calf on a rope, a sledge of potatoes behind them, pulling westwards without guidance. The soldiers killed by aerial bombs are no longer buried. The often driverless hawsers set the tone on the road, while the fencing troops of all weapons including flak hold the front with the last of their strength. The entire appendix of the troops (army troops, air force, supply traffic) rushes backwards without leadership. A psychosis, almost panic, has gripped the hawser, which are only used to stormy advance. Without food, freezing, headless, it goes backwards. "

Mine clearance by Soviet soldiers after the retaking of Naro-Fominsk , December 28, 1941

On December 30, Kaluga finally fell back into Soviet hands, and on January 7, Moshaisk. On January 8th, Hoepner had to withdraw his troops in order to avoid the impending encirclement. Here, too, there was a strict stop order from the OKH. Since such “rebellions” accumulated, Hitler made an example of Hoepner by relieving him of his command and dishonorably expelling him from the Wehrmacht. From that day on, every withdrawal order until the end of the war had to be personally approved by Hitler.

On January 15, Hitler ordered the retreat to the winter position in view of the necessities. But this order came much too late, and the German troops, mostly retreating on foot, had to leave all heavy equipment behind for lack of horses , tractors or fuel. The term “winter position” had its origins in Nazi propaganda , which was intended to fool the German people into an orderly retreat to expanded positions. There was no mention of a position developed in the military sense with trenches, bunkers, artillery positions and other fortifications. In fact, here was a line drawn arbitrarily by Hitler on the map, which was mainly due to logistical necessities in the sense of nearby supply points and short distances along the unloading stations of the replenishment, which was almost entirely done with the Deutsche Reichsbahn , as well as possible strategically favorable deployment areas for upcoming offensives oriented, referred to as "winter position".

consequences

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Destruction in the city of Moscow

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Rescue of the wounded in the winter of 1941 at the gates of Moscow

In the German offensive operation (September 30 to December 5, 1941) the Red Army was pushed back 250 to 300 km to the east on the 700 to 1110 km wide front and suffered enormous losses of around 656,000 men (514,000 dead). In the Moscow offensive operation (December 5, 1941 to January 7, 1942) the Red Army advanced eleven to 250 km west on a front approximately 1000 km wide, losing 370,000 men (140,000 of them dead).

Remnants of German unity surrender, December 1941

During the entire period, the German Wehrmacht lost an estimated 500,000 dead or wounded as well as at least 100,000 men from frostbite as well as 1,300 tanks , 2,500 artillery pieces and over 15,000 motor vehicles. Nevertheless, at the end of January 1942, the Wehrmacht was able to achieve major defensive successes at Rzhev and Juchnow , which made it possible to build a new line of defense. Stalin was only able to carry out part of his plan, since Army Group Center was not destroyed, but the battle for Moscow was lost for the German Reich.

In the course of the Soviet winter and counter-offensive, larger German troop units were included in Demyansk ( Kesselschlacht von Demyansk ) and Cholm at the interface with Army Group North, which could only be detained in the spring of 1942 after a laborious and lossy air supply.

The failure of the "Operation Taifun" also meant the complete failure of the entire " Operation Barbarossa " and the German blitzkrieg strategy in the Soviet Union. The desired line Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan was beyond reach, the Red Army was weakened not critical and the enemy coalition began effectively to regroup against Germany. After Hitler's declaration of war on the USA immediately after Pearl Harbor and in the middle of the Soviet counter-offensive in the winter off Moscow, the war also expanded into a real global military confrontation with all its consequences. The balance of power shifted to the disadvantage of Germany, which was decisive for the war. Militarily and economically, the war could no longer be won for the German Reich by the end of 1941.

reception

Soviet commemorative coin from 1991

After the Soviet Union got into serious military difficulties as a result of the German attack, it was able to level the situation again with the first major victory over Germany. Not only did this improve morale among the population and the Red Army, but the Western Allies also recognized the Soviet Union as an equal ally and paved the way for the Tehran Conference . On the occasion of the successful defense of Moscow, Stalin donated the medal "For the defense of Moscow" on May 1, 1944 . In 1991, on the 50th anniversary of the battle, the Soviet State Bank issued a commemorative coin worth 3 rubles. After the disastrous debacle of the German army outside Moscow, the German leadership issued the directives on the winter war.

literature

• Günther Blumentritt : Battle for Moscow. Memories about Army Group Center. (In: Seymour Freidin, William Richardson (eds.): The Fatal Decisions. New York 1958.)
• Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The Battle for Moscow. The frozen offensive. Lübbe, Bergisch Gladbach 1982, ISBN 3-7857-0290-6 .
• Percy Ernst Schramm (Ed.): War Diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht , Volume I: 1940/41 edited by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen , Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main 1965.

Web links

Commons : Battle for Moscow  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• United International Biographical Center: Soldier 20 weka. Battle of Moscow (Russian)
• Moscow Defense Operation in Russian Civilization ( Memento of January 8, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (Russian)
• Moscow attack operation in Russian civilization ( Memento of January 8, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (Russian)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ http://militera.lib.ru/research/myagkov/index.html
2. ↑ ^{a b c d} Horst Boog , Jürgen Förster , Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink , Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 568.
3. ↑ Walther Hubatsch (Ed.): Hitler's instructions for warfare 1939–1945. Munich 1965, p. 150 ff.
4. ↑ ^{a b c d} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 569.
5. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 570.
6. ^ ^{A b c} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 572.
7. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 571.
8. ↑ Klaus Reinhardt: The turning point before Moscow - The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. Stuttgart 1972, p. 52 f.
9. ↑ ^{a b} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 503.
10. ^ Franz Halder: War diary. Daily record of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army 1939–1942. Volume 3. The Russian campaign up to the march on Stalingrad. June 22, 1941 - September 24, 1942. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer 1962–1964, p. 207.
11. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The Second World War. Volume 2, ECON Verlag, Vienna 1985, p. 513.
12. ↑ Walther Hubatsch (Ed.): Hitler's instructions for warfare 1939–1945. Munich 1965, pp. 174-177.
13. ↑ Erskine Caldwell: This is how they saw the war. Eyewitnesses report on World War II. New York 1942, published by Wilhelm Heyne Verlag Munich, Heyne-Sachbuch no. 127, Stuttgart 1966.
14. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 573 .
15. ^ J. Piekalkiewicz: Battle for Moscow. P. 99. The front arch held by the 4th Army had to be evacuated under pressure from the Soviet 24th Army (GenMaj. KI Rakutin ). Compare also Percy E. Schramm (ed.): War diary of the OKW. 1940-1941. Volume 2, page 614 with entry from September 5, 1941: ...  The relocation of the HKL west of Jelna is proceeding according to plan  ...
16. ^ J. Piekalkiewicz: Battle for Moscow. Page 95. The first to be relocated were: seven rifle and two cavalry divisions, two tank brigades and three air squadrons from the Baikal regions; from Outer Mongolia a rifle division, a tank brigade, an air squadron; from the area around Ussuri five rifle and one cavalry divisions and three tank brigades.
17. ↑ Heinz Guderian: memories of a soldier. 15th edition, Motorbuch Verlag, 1996, p. 209.
18. ↑ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: The battle for Moscow. Lübbe Verlag, 1981, p. 136. After the bloody experience of the city of Kiev, which was largely undermined by time fuses, Hitler forbade the Wehrmacht to enter Moscow and Leningrad.
19. ↑ Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 600.
20. ^ Karl-Heinz Janßen: Until Chimki - Why the German Musketeer Didn't Get to the Kremlin , DIE ZEIT No. 51/1991, December 13, 1991.
21. ↑ How the Red Army crushed the Wehrmacht , Stern
22. ^ J. Piekalkiewicz: The battle for Moscow. P. 205. also Christian Zentner: The Second World War - A Lexicon. P. 381.
23. ↑ Klaus Reinhardt: The turning point before Moscow - The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42. Stuttgart 1972, p. 164 f.
24. ↑ OKH / GenStdH / Department Fr. H. Ost, Situation Report East No. 172 of December 4, 1941.
25. ↑ Henning Stühring: As the East burned, Berlin 2011, p. 227.
26. ↑ ^{a b} Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The attack on the Soviet Union. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , p. 601.
27. ↑ Fedor von Bock: Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock. Between Duty and Refusal - The War Diary. Edited by Klaus Gerbet, Herbig, Munich 1995, p. 121 ff.
28. ↑ Percy E. Schramm (Ed.): War diary of the OKW 1940–1941. Part II, pp. 1084f, telex to H. Gr. Middle of December 18, 1941, GenStdH Op.Abt. (III), No. 1736/41 g.Kdos. Bosses.
29. ^ Friedrich Hoßbach : Infantry in the Eastern Campaign 1941/42 . Osterode 1951, p. 233 f.
30. ↑ МОСКОВСКАЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ ОБОРОНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ ( Memento from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
31. ↑ МОСКОВСКАЯ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКАЯ НАСТУПАТЕЛЬНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИЯ ( Memento from March 30, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
32. ↑ cf. on this: Karl-Heinz Frieser in the introduction by: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Klaus Schmider , Klaus Schönherr , Gerhard Schreiber , Krisztián Ungváry , Bernd Wegner: The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. On behalf of the MGFA ed. by Karl-Heinz Frieser, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 , p. XV.
33. ↑ Christian Zentner (ed.): The Second World War - A Lexicon. Tosa Verlag, Vienna 1998, ISBN 3-85001-863-6 , p. 508. It appears to be guaranteed that when Kalinin fell, Stalin even thought of surrendering and that Beria ordered Hitler's conditions for the "worst case" to be met to explore a "second Brest". From Manfred Hildermeier: History of the Soviet Union. Verlag CH Beck, Munich, p. 604 ff.

Remarks

1. ↑ The background of the directive was therefore not the destruction of the mass of the living fighting force of the Red Army, which, in Halder's view, was in Moscow.
2. ↑ There was no "Tymoshenko Army Group". Marshal of the Soviet Union SK Tymoshenko was at this time only commander of the "Western Front".