Deng Xiaoping
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Deng Xiaoping ( Chinese 鄧小平 / 邓小平 , Pinyin Dèng Xiǎopíng , W.-G. Teng Hsiao-p'ing ; ; * August 22, 1904 in Xiexing ; † February 19, 1997 in Beijing ) was a Chinese politician and Party leader who effectively ruled the People's Republic of China from 1979 to 1997. He was the core of the party's second generation of leadership , and in the role of the “ outstanding leader ” he was the successor of Mao Zedong , but largely did not continue his policies. He put China on a course of economic liberalization that led to a rapid improvement in the material situation of almost all Chinese. On the political side, however, China remained a totalitarian state, as Deng rejected any democratization. Deng was known as the “general architect of reform and opening ”.
Born in Sichuan Province , Deng was among the first Chinese working class students to come to France . Here Deng suffered from poor living conditions and joined the Communist Party. He studied in Moscow for a few months before returning to China to serve as political commissar in Feng Yuxiang's Northwest Army . After Feng's break with the communists, Deng was given the task of establishing a communist base in Guangxi , but failed. In the Jiangxi Soviet , Deng became a supporter of Mao Zedong, took part in the Long March and served as a political commissar in the 8th March Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War . Together with Liu Bocheng , he commanded several crucial operations of the 129th Division.
After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, he was initially the first party secretary of Southwest China, was brought to Beijing and then held the posts of finance minister, deputy prime minister and general secretary of the Central Committee. In these roles he drove Mao's campaigns such as the anti-rightist movement and the campaign against right-wing deviants. After the catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward , which Deng survived unscathed, Deng led economic consolidation efforts that Mao displeased. During the Cultural Revolution , Deng was attacked as a "capitalist trailblazer", was put under house arrest, was demoted and exiled to Jiangxi , where he repaired tractors. In 1973 he was rehabilitated and returned to his old positions after Lin Biao's attempted coup. In 1976 he lost it a third time.
After Mao's death, Deng worked actively to oust Hua Guofeng from power and to put China on an economic modernization and opening course . In 1977 he resumed the college extrance exam , which was canceled for 10 years during the Cultural Revolution. Deng started the " Boluan Fanzheng " program to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution and in December 1978 became the supreme leader of China. He initiated China's political reforms by imposing tenure limits on senior officials and proposed a systematic revision of the Chinese constitution. In 1982 the new constitution was adopted by the National People's Congress and most of its contents are still in effect today. In 1978 and 1985 he was named " Person of the Year " twice by Time Magazine . In 1986, he approved the " 863 Program " for China's Science and Technology.
On a foreign policy front, he sought closer cooperation with the United States, while limiting Soviet influence by waging war against Vietnam . Negotiations with Margaret Thatcher on the future of Hong Kong ended in an agreement that the United Kingdom would return the territory to China in 1997 under the principle of one country, two systems . Deng took back Mao Zedong's political unpredictability, but refused anything that could undermine the Communist Party's authority. He dropped his two designated successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang , because he thought they were too liberal. The protests in Tiananmen Square was Deng end with violence. He finally installed Jiang Zemin as his successor . In early 1992 took Deng Xiaoping's southern tour , the reform and opening up again and saved China's capital market .
Origin and childhood
Deng Xiaoping was born on August 22, 1904 (the 12th day of the 7th month according to the traditional Chinese calendar ) in a small town called Paifang in what is now Xiexing Town , Guang'an District , Sichuan Province , about 160 km from Chongqing . His father gave him the name Deng Xiansheng (邓 先 圣, to outstrip the wise , a little humble name in Chinese thinking), at the age of five he was given the name Deng Xixian (邓希贤) by his teacher . He only adopted the name Xiaoping ('little peace') in 1923.
Deng Xiaoping's ancestors immigrated to Sichuan from Jiangxi in the 14th century . An ancestor of Deng named Deng Shimin had passed the highest official examination and was a highest ranking official under Emperor Qianlong . An archway was also erected in his honor, bearing the emperor's inscription, but which was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution .
Deng's father, Deng Wenming, owned between seven and 20 hectares, farmed and raised silkworms and employed a few farm workers. He was progressive and highly educated; in Chengdu , he had a modern legal education, was a teacher in the only modern school in the community, which he co-founded, and was held in high regard. He was a practicing follower of Buddhism and Daoism and a member of a secret society that wanted to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty . In 1910, Father Deng demonstrated as part of the Movement to Secure the Railroad , and during the Xinhai Revolution he joined the Progressive Party that had seized power in Sichuan. He was appointed commander of a unit that was supposed to maintain the law and order in Sichuan. However, Deng's entry into politics brought him difficulties, so that he had to hide in Chongqing. Losses in gambling forced Deng to sell some of his property. Due to the absence of her husband, Deng's mother had to look after the children alone and with considerable financial difficulties. Deng's father married several times after her death; Deng Xiaoping had a total of one sister, two brothers, one half-brother and three half-sisters, and one stepsister; some of his siblings may never have seen Deng Xiaoping.
Father Deng, who wanted his son to have a steep career, attached great importance to education. At the age of five, Deng Xiaoping began a Confucian school education; Deng, like many boys of his time, found them incomprehensible. A year later he switched to a modern elementary school and then to the only modern middle school in Guang'an. During Deng's school days there were historical upheavals in China such as the fall of the Qing dynasty and the proclamation of the republic. When Deng Xiaoping was 14 years old, his father heard about a school in Chongqing that was preparing young Chinese for education in France. In the summer of 1919, Deng Xiaoping and his uncle Deng Shaosheng, who was only a little older, left their home village and went to school in Chongqing. It is unclear why Deng's father wanted his son to train abroad. It must have been clear to the father, however, that his son would never succeed him in this way - a very unsatisfactory prospect for Chinese thinking.
The school education in Chongqing in 1919/20 mainly comprised French and Chinese language as well as manual skills. The organization Deng joined was called the Hard Work and Determined Learning Movement . It was founded by the patriot , anarchist and Francophile Li Yuying and had the aim of bringing young Chinese to France who would work and study there and then strengthen scientific and social contacts between China and France. During this training, Deng actively participated in the May Fourth Movement and the boycott of Japanese products.
On September 11, 1920, Deng Xiaoping and Deng Shaosheng left, along with about 200 other worker students v. a. from Sichuan and Hunan , the port of Shanghai towards Marseille . In Shanghai and at the intermediate stops, Deng witnessed the degrading treatment of locals by European colonial rulers several times, which left a lasting impression on Deng.
School time in France
Deng and his colleagues reached France in October 1920, just as about 1,600 Chinese working-class students came to France between 1919 and 1921. They were divided into various high schools (lycées) across France, where they were supposed to study French above all, until they mastered it so well that they could follow a higher education. Deng and his uncle ended up in Bayeux . Deng later recalled learning nothing there , that the food was bad, and that he was treated like a child.
As early as January 1921, the students were informed that the foundation had run out of money and that from now on they were responsible for themselves. Deng could still count on modest family support, but had to look for work in various factories. At the age of 16, he was at the Schneider et cie blast furnace . in Le Creusot , later in a paper flower and rubber shoe factory of Hutchinson in Châlette-sur-Loing , from 1925 with Renault . Deng and many of his compatriots, who were in a similar situation, did jobs that the French could not win and earned less than French apprentices for it; however, they came from relatively wealthy Chinese families and were among the elite in China. Attempts to raise enough money to continue his education failed.
The hopeless situation of the Chinese working class students led to a very close cohesion of the group and to its radicalization. There were frequent protests against the governments of China and France; from 1922 there was an organization that became part of the Communist Youth League a year later . In 1924, all members of the Chinese Communist Organization in France automatically became members of the Chinese Communist Party ; a year later the KP and the KMT merged .
Deng turned communist by the summer of 1923, not theoretically, but through the experience of injustice and humiliation of the Chinese elite in jobs that the French did not want to do. He joined the Chinese Youth Socialist League in June 1923 and broke off relations with his family. From June 1923 he worked for the communist office in Paris, which was led by Zhou Enlai . Here he wrote articles for the newspaper Rotes Licht , some of which have been preserved. They believe that China needs an authoritarian state in order to survive the struggle with the imperialist powers. They show solid language, radical thinking, but little theoretical depth. Deng soon received political responsibilities, including a. for propaganda or leadership for the party office in Lyon, and took part in organizing demonstrations or in a raid on the Chinese legation in Paris, during which a minister present was forced to send protest notes to the French and Chinese governments about the behavior of foreign troops in China to sign. He pleaded for greater cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to achieve the goals of the Chinese communists.
His time in France and membership in the group around Zhou Enlai , Zhao Shiyan , Li Fuchun , Chen Yi , Nie Rongzhen and Li Weihan, which was important for the later development of the Communist Party, was decisive for Deng; Although these politicians did not form a faction within the party, based on their shared experiences they also had a common understanding of which way China should go.
The French police have been watching the Chinese radicals for a long time. On January 8, 1926, a raid was carried out in the newspaper's tiny editorial room on Rue Casteja , which Deng narrowly escaped, as he had set out for Moscow the day before .
Party school in Moscow
Deng arrived in Moscow on January 17, 1926. He first attended the Communist University for the Workers of the East , a few weeks later he came to Sun Yat-sen University , which was funded by the Nationalist Party of China and the CPSU . Deng had a very high academic target to cope with here, he studied very hard and achieved good results. However, he did not learn the Russian language, just as he had not learned French in France. In the young Soviet Union at that time the New Economic Policy prevailed , the Chinese students were well looked after and there was a cultural program. Conflicts broke out among different factions within the Chinese students; Deng was also involved in these conflicts and exercised party discipline. The direction of the study program rated Deng as very suitable for propaganda and party organization.
Deng stayed in Moscow for only eleven months. His return to China goes back to Feng Yuxiang , one of the warlords who ruled northern China during the Chinese Civil War . Feng was a Christian and a Chinese traditionalist; he was of the opinion that as a military leader he should also serve as a model for his subjects and the common people. As such, he was among the more respected leaders. In 1924 he asked for help in the Soviet Union, and was given money, weapons and military and political advisers. In 1926, after suffering a few defeats, he traveled to Moscow to seek further help. In addition to other advisors, he was also given Chinese communists led by Liu Bojian . In early 1927, Feng asked for further assistance in order to advance with his troops, who had just ended the siege of Xi'an , towards Henan , where they were to take part in Chiang Kai-shek's northern campaign . Moscow decided to send him some of the best Chinese students, including Deng. He left Moscow on January 12, 1927 with an excellent report card in his pocket.
Civil war
At the end of March, Deng arrived in Xi'an with twenty comrades. He was appointed head of the political department at Feng's Military Academy. There he taught about 100 NCOs in revolutionary history, the basics of communism, Leninism and Bolshevism . Within a short period of time, he was promoted to the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party Cell at the Military Academy.
Just a month after Deng's arrival in Xi'an, the alliance of nationalists and communists broke up; the result was the Shanghai massacre of April 12, 1927. Deng and other left-wing Kuomintang members launched an anti-Chiang campaign that culminated in a large demonstration outside Feng's house. After several political consultations, Feng decided to side with Chiang; in the summer of 1927 all communists had to leave the army and the city of Xi'an. Deng decided to leave for Wuhan , where the Communist Party had its headquarters at the time.
Work in the party headquarters
In Wuhan he met later political greats such as Zhou Enlai , Li Lisan or Li Weihan , whom he already knew from his stay in France. Deng started working for the party headquarters as the secretary of the central committee. He participated in numerous conferences and meetings, but usually as a secretary rather than a speaker; Deng's notes come from the emergency meeting on August 7, 1927, when it was decided to rebel against the Kuomintang with armed uprisings. It was also at this meeting that Deng met Mao Zedong for the first time , although neither of them were particularly impressed. The Communist Party of China received unworkable directives from Moscow at this stage. Under pressure from the Kuomintang, it was forced to go underground, and its membership dropped dramatically. For security reasons, Deng took the code name Xiaoping here .
In October 1927 the KP moved its headquarters to Shanghai - also for security reasons - and Deng worked there until September 1929. His functions here were largely limited to organizational activities, while at the same time he exercised civilian professions. It was here that he married for the first time, at the beginning of 1928, to a woman named Zhang Xiyuan, whom he knew from his student days in Moscow. At the same time, the CP organized some uprisings, such as the Nanchang uprising or the major strikes in Hong Kong and Guangzhou , all of which were bloodily suppressed and the party threatened to bleed to death. Deng did not take part in these uprisings and was not criticized , like Qu Qiubai , Zhou or Mao, for their failure. Since many high-ranking party members died in the uprisings or were arrested and executed by the Kuomintang, Deng rose rapidly in the party hierarchy, was respected and asked for his opinion.
Guangxi battlefield
In the autumn of 1929 Deng was sent to Guangxi to build a communist base with some local warlords who were inclined to communism. The fact that Deng was chosen for this task is a sign of the high standing he enjoyed among the party leadership; Above all, the 25-year-old was trusted to master the complex relationships with the warlords, the population and the party headquarters.
Deng and his comrade Gong Yinbing , who would later act as a courier, arrived in Nanning in September 1929 , using the code name Deng Bin . There they met two warlords named Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai , who had fallen out with Chiang Kai-shek and the most powerful warlord of Guangxi Li Zongren . Deng accepted a position as secretary in Yu Zuobai's office. Deng's influence grew rapidly as Yu also served as chairman of the Guangxi government. Yu and Li planned an attack on Chiang Kai-shek, which Deng considered hopeless, but Deng could not dissuade the two generals. Deng ordered that the remaining troops in Nanning, under the command of Zhang Yunyi , should rebel and leave the city if Yu and Li were defeated. Some of the soldiers loyal to the Communist Party were to retreat to Bose , the other to Longzhou . Both cities promised high tax revenues: Bose was the center of the opium trade , Longzhou was home to the customs post for trade with French Indochina .
The defeat of the two warlords occurred shortly afterwards. In October the communist-dominated troops withdrew; Deng arrived in Bose on October 11, 1929. He caused the troops and the local population to be exposed to communist propaganda only cautiously. Unreliable people were discharged from the army, only one commander was executed.
However, the establishment of a communist base failed because of the clan structure of the Zhuang population, the contrast between Zhuang, Han and Hakka , the language barrier and the unrealistic instructions from the party headquarters and the Comintern. On October 30th, an order came from Shanghai to set up a local front-line committee, whose secretary would be Deng. The 7th and 8th Red Armies were to be formed from the troops in Guangxi and an uprising was to take place within 10 days. Deng decided to wait with the uprising, however, as the taxes paid by the opium dealers enabled him to build strong and loyal troops. The uprising occurred in December 1929 when Deng was in Shanghai to report. However, he essentially limited himself to looting anyone who looked like they owned something. Upon his return to Guangxi, Deng was informed that Li had left for Nanning with the communist troops to avenge his defeat at Chiang. Despite his order to return immediately, the units were wiped out, effectively losing Bose's base. Deng and Yu Zuoyu decided to merge the remaining forces of the 7th and 8th Red Armies. At the beginning of March 1930 Deng set out with the 1st Company of the 7th Red Army, but was embroiled in protracted skirmishes with Kuomintang troops. On March 10, 1930, he left the company, which was then completely destroyed. The reason for Deng's decision is not exactly known; later - especially during the Cultural Revolution - he was accused of deserting .
A short time later, the Longzhou base also fell. Deng made his way to Donglan , where the local landowner Wei Baqun had set up his own small communist base; Deng supported them with weapons in the fall of 1929. It was not until May 1930 that the generals arrived with the remaining troops. Li Lisan's order came from Shanghai that the 7th Red Army and its remaining 7,000 soldiers should take the cities of Liuzhou , Guilin and Guangzhou , which was an absurdity in view of the balance of power with the Kuomintang. Deng and Zhang Yunyi were wandering with their soldiers in the mountainous area on the border between Guangxi, Hunan and Guangdong . An opportunity to occupy a larger town did not arise. In the absence of a radio link to Shanghai, they did not find out until February 1931 that Li Lisan had been deposed and his adventurous politics had ended. The 7th Army withdrew towards the Jiangxi Soviet , where Deng arrived on February 8, 1931. From there he traveled to Shanghai in March - again under questionable circumstances.
The attempt to set up a base in Guangxi had therefore failed, to which Deng's mistakes had also contributed. For Deng, the task was tantamount to military training. On his return to Shanghai, Deng found a completely different party leadership than a year earlier. Moscow's envoy Pavel Mif had reorganized the leadership of the Communist Party, and Chen Shaoyu was promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee . Chen and Deng knew each other from Moscow and did not value each other. Deng also learned that his wife had given birth to a daughter a year earlier, but that his wife and child had only survived the birth by a few days.
On April 29, 1931, Deng delivered a self-criticism in which he admitted all the mistakes that his critics accused him of. Deng was not branded as a class enemy, which is mainly due to his good relations with Zhou Enlai . In mid-July 1931 Deng got a new job in the Jiangxi Soviet .
Party secretary in Jiangxi Soviet
Shortly after arriving in the Jiangxi Soviet in mid-August 1931, Deng was appointed party secretary of Ruijin District. In this role he put an end to the excessive persecution of (alleged) Kuomintang spies and drove forward social transformation. There he married a second time, this time Jin Weiying (better known as Ah Jin), whom he already knew from his time in Shanghai. On the other hand, he got to know people he would meet frequently in his later career, such as Hu Yaobang or Mao's brother Mao Zetan . In March 1932 an investigation criticized the outcome of the land reform in Deng's district; the former large farmers had, in the opinion of the critics, been allocated land that was too good. Deng escaped the consequences of this serious accusation by being appointed party secretary of the three districts of Huichang , Xunwu and Anyuan in the newly conquered territory of the Soviet of Jiangxi in May 1932 at the instigation of his friend Li Fuchun . In July he also became political commissioner of the 3rd military sub-region. He had a huge workload to cope with, including the recruitment of 13,000 people for the militia under his leadership.
From 1931 the dispute over the correct tactics in the war against the Kuomintang intensified. The Soviet-influenced headquarters in Shanghai around Bo Gu and some Comintern advisers called for an offensive, while Mao Zedong had repulsed several attempts by the Kuomintang troops to destroy the Soviet with his guerrilla tactics. Mao's supporters included Luo Ming , the party secretary in Fujian , and Deng Xiaoping. When in November 1932 the Xunwu district , which was under Deng's administration, was lost to KMT troops, Deng was severely attacked; in May 1933 Deng was convicted of being a member of a clique of four who wanted to break away from communist principles. Deng was stripped of all his offices and had to surrender his service pistol in public; the real target of the critics, however, was Mao Zedong. In one of the criticism sessions Ah Jin also ended her relationship with Deng and from then on was the wife or friend of Li Weihan , one of the fiercest attackers on Deng.
Shortly thereafter, Deng was appointed director of his secretariat on the initiative of Director of Political Administration of the First Front Army, Wang Jiaxiang . A little later he took over the function of editor-in-chief of the communist newspaper Red China , with the entire editorial staff consisting of only two or three people. He stayed at this post for about a year without being significantly disturbed.
Long march
In October 1934, the military situation of the Jiangxi Soviet was so bad that it had to be evacuated and the communist troops had to be withdrawn to the west. This escape eventually became the Long March . Deng was chosen among those who were allowed to take part in the Long March; had it not been for that, it would probably have meant Deng's death.
At the beginning of the Long March, Deng continued to work for Red China and published 6 issues of the paper. Relatively suddenly, he was promoted back to higher positions and, as in Shanghai, began to act as secretary for leading politicians. As such, he took part in the Zunyi conference in January 1935 , at which the faction around Mao Zedong, Luo Fu , Wang Jiaxiang , Zhu De and Peng Dehuai attacked the existing party leadership around Bo Gu and Otto Braun and ultimately replaced it. From then on, Mao was Deng's most important supporter: in June 1935 he became director of the propaganda department of the Political Administration under Lin Biao .
Thanks to his strong health, Deng survived the Long March without becoming seriously ill, despite his high cigarette consumption and despite the loss of his horse, while tens of thousands of his comrades fell by the wayside. At the end of the Long March (officially October 22, 1935), Deng was one of the 5000 soldiers and officers who arrived in northern Shaanxi . By the end of 1935 Deng took part in numerous clashes with Kuomintang troops , in which he was almost killed. In May 1936 and December 1936 Deng was promoted again, first to deputy, then to head of the Political Department of the 1st Army Corps. In 1936 he was in the field against allies of the Kuomintang in northwest Gansu .
Army political commissioner in the Sino-Japanese War
In the first half of 1937, the communists and nationalists agreed to work together against the Japanese army in the Sino-Japanese War , although neither party should take this agreement seriously. The communists reorganized their forces into the 8th March Army , which consisted of three divisions (115th, 120th and 129th), and formally placed them under the government of Chiang Kai-shek . Mao Zedong, who was now the undisputed leader of the communists, initially appointed Deng as deputy political director of the front command, later, after several post shifts, he became political commissar of the 129th division. Mao's strategy was to set up communist bases behind the Japanese front with a guerrilla struggle, to win over the population and at the same time not to allow the Kuomintang troops to command him.
On January 5, 1938, Deng was appointed Political Commissar of the 129th Division, taking on one of the most powerful offices in the communist-ruled areas. In this role Deng worked with Liu Bocheng and Zhang Xiangqian , who were experienced generals and had little interest in party politics. Deng was primarily concerned with political work, propaganda, troop supply and mobilization, and his approach to the troops was considered to be tougher than Liu's. The base in the Taihang Mountains , which was initially set up by the 129th Division, could hardly supply the troops due to excessive poverty, so that Liu had to quickly set up further bases in the neighboring regions. In 1941, his division controlled an area of 23 million people in the border area between Shanxi , Hebei , Shandong and Henan . According to Mao, economic reforms were carried out in this area according to the Three Principles of the People by Sun Yat-sen in order to win the left of the Kuomintang over to the communists. These reforms, for which Deng was responsible, contributed to the rapid growth in popularity of the communists.
In 1945 Deng was elected to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party . Deng remained exempt from the measures that Mao took in 1945 to heroize the history of the party, to strengthen the cult around himself and to indoctrinate the party leadership.
Deng traveled back and forth frequently with the aim of coordinating between the grassroots and communist headquarters in Yan'an . In 1939, while staying in Yan'an, Deng married for the third time, this time Zhuo Lin , twelve years his junior , who was from Kunming, had studied in Beijing and, like many members of the progressive youth of the time, went to Beijing communist ruled Yan'an had come. By the end of the war, the couple had three children, all of whom were temporarily given to farming families because it was too dangerous to have an infant during the war. He stayed with Zhuo Lin until the end of his life; Deng did not talk about politics with his family.
Defeat the Kuomintang
After the capitulation of Japan , Deng was the secretary and most powerful man of the newly established Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Party Office and Military District, which was commanded by Liu Bocheng . Deng's duties were expanding the army and identifying talent; Personalities like Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang developed here under Deng's leadership. Mao gave Deng a lot of leeway, unlike Chiang, who gave his officers precise instructions. The 129th Division had many strategically important locations under its control that Chiang's National Revolutionary Army had to pass through to regain the upper hand in northern China. Although Deng's troops were inferior to the Kuomintang troops in terms of numbers and equipment, they won numerous victories. From 1946, the headquarters of the military district was in Handan , where Deng's family was reunited.
After talks between Mao and Chiang in Chongqing had failed, the war between the two parties broke out with full violence. The CP initially succeeded in infiltrating northeast China and in March 1946 brought it under its control; the Manchuria was thus its industrial and military base. In 1947, the communist troops in northern China became increasingly difficult, and Mao even had to give up Yan'an . In May 1947, Deng and Liu took on the task of pushing south with their troops, which were in the grip of the National Revolutionary Army, and establishing themselves in the Dabie Mountains . This foreseeable dangerous and loss-making operation tied up large enemy groups, as the communists threatened cities like Wuhan , Jiujiang and Nanchang in this way . The Dabie base was then one of the important starting points of the Huaihai campaign in late 1948, which was one of the most important clashes between communists and nationalists. In this campaign, all decisions were made by the trio Deng, Liu and Chen Yi .
The New Democracy policies pursued by Mao Zedong and the Kuomintang's inability to control corruption, inflation and other economic problems made the communists strong, although communist policies were also inconsistent. In 1948, at the invitation of Mao, Deng criticized the left-wing agricultural policy and its effects and proposed a moderate solution, as Deng had used in the Dabie region. After the successful Huaihai campaign, victory for the CP was foreseeable. Shanghai was conquered in May 1949, Deng stayed there for several weeks as head of the Military Control Commission, which took over the government and prepared the transition to communist rule. Chen Yi became the new mayor; Deng had previously suggested him for the role.
In September 1949, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference named Deng a member of the People's Central Government. When Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China at the Tiananmen Gate on October 1, 1949 , Deng and Liu were among the participants in the ceremony.
Career under Mao
Ruler of the southwest
Shortly after the proclamation of the People's Republic, Liu and Deng returned to the front in southwest China, where Deng's troops, now renamed the Second Field Army, advanced rapidly against the Kuomintang troops. In August 1949, a Southwest Bureau was formally established, the main task of which was to establish communist rule in southwest China. Deng was the first secretary of this office. At the beginning of December the communists marched into Chongqing ; a personal triumph for Deng, as he had left this city 30 years earlier as a student for France. He was appointed the city's mayor and served as the first secretary of the Chongqing Southwest Office for three years. After Tibet was incorporated, he ruled the southwest region, which included Sichuan , Guizhou , Yunnan , Xikang and Tibet . In his position as party secretary and deputy chairman of the military-administrative committee of the Southwest region, he was the most powerful man in the region, reporting directly to Mao Zedong and having extensive powers. Officially, he had two deputies, namely Liu Bocheng and He Long . Deng's nickname, Ruler of the Southwest , corresponded to his actual role.
One of Deng's tasks was to consolidate and implement communist rule. One of the most urgent tasks was to restore security because tens of thousands of bandits and the remnants of the Kuomintang troops still ravaged the country. After the resolution of the Central Committee on the stricter punishment of counterrevolutionary crimes, thousands were publicly executed in Deng's region, and six months later, Mao, concerned about the reputation, initiated a drastic reduction in executions. The land reform law passed in June 1950 was also implemented in the southwest region with sometimes excessive severity. Deng was able to report the first results to Mao as early as May 1951, and in 1953 he announced the execution. At the same time, repression against the bourgeoisie began in the cities, and the state's share in industry rose rapidly. On July 1, 1952, the Chengdu-Chongqing railway line was inaugurated, the construction of which had started on Deng's initiative.
One of Deng's special tasks in the southwest office was the solution of the Tibet problem, which was tackled after the People's Republic of China was recognized by Great Britain , India and Nepal . Deng and Mao chose a strategy that consisted of military threats while negotiating. From December 1949 to March 1950, Deng and Liu's troops conquered the West Xikang region as far as the Jinsha River . After the negotiations between special envoy from Mao and Zhou and the Dalai Lama were unsuccessful, the 2nd Field Army crossed the Jinsha River on October 7, 1950 and defeated the poorly equipped Tibetan army within two weeks. In May 1951, the Tibetans had to accept an agreement to return to mainland China. Deng did not take part in the military actions himself, but was involved in their planning.
Deng's private life developed very positively over the three years in Chongqing. His wife had two more children and worked in a school for children of party cadres. He and his family did not live in luxurious but comfortable circumstances near the Chongqing City People's Palace . Many of his family members from Paifang, including his stepmother Xia Bogen and his stepbrothers and sisters, attended Deng's house. Deng helped them out of the necessity of having belonged to the landowners with whom they were now settling accounts.
Ascension in Beijing
In July 1952 Deng was brought to Beijing by Mao - like all the other party secretaries in the regions - because Mao wanted to prevent the emergence of regional bases of power. On August 7th, he was named one of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai's five deputies.
By the time Deng arrived in Beijing, the party leadership had already split into two camps on the issue of economic development. The forces around Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai favored a gradual transition to socialism, while the camp around Gao Gang advocated an immediate building of socialism. Mao waved between the two views, but was closer to Gao's views, even though he knew that Stalin was calling for a slow transition. An open dispute arose in the tax concept that Bo Yibo had worked out and that put state-owned companies on an equal footing with private companies. Mao reacted surprisingly negatively to Bo's proposal and convened a conference on economic and financial issues in the summer of 1953. Gao Gang, hoping to take Mao's post one day, sharply attacked the moderate camp. Deng found the right mix of self-criticism, defense and counterattack in this situation, while Mao was not ready to overthrow Liu and Zhou anyway. As a result of the conference, Bo's tax concept was rejected, collectivization accelerated and the transition to socialism estimated at 15 years or more. Deng emerged stronger from this conference. In addition to his role as deputy prime minister, he was appointed deputy chairman of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council and finance minister in place of the sacked Bo Yibo.
Gao tried together with his ally Rao Shushi to form an alliance that was supposed to overthrow Liu, and was already distributing the posts in a new state and party leadership under his leadership. Deng was also among the people Gao courted. Mao was eventually informed of the incident by Chen Yun and Deng. At the Central Plenary in February 1954, Mao and Liu criticized those who undermine the unity of the party without naming Gao and Rao. Deng was given the task of writing a report on the Rao Shushi affair with Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin , while Zhou Enlai had to submit a report on Gao. These two reports uncovered enough material that led to the disempowerment of Gao and Rao. Deng was one of the winners of this first power struggle in the Communist Party leadership after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. He has now also been appointed chairman of the secretariat of the Central Committee and head of the organizational department of the Communist Party. In September 1954 he was confirmed as Deputy Prime Minister by the National People's Congress and accepted into the Central Military Commission . Deng refused an offer of promotion to the rank of marshal. In April 1955 he became a member of the Politburo . Deng's career reached its first climax here. He and his family moved into a siheyuan in Zhongnanhai . He played a central role at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China and was now among the six most powerful men in the country.
De-Stalinization and the Hundred Flower Movement
After Stalin's death in March 1953, Mao's politics became more free: the new Soviet head of state Khrushchev visited Beijing in the fall of 1954, pledged numerous projects and loans and showered the hosts with gifts. The Chinese side - including Deng - interpreted this as a weakness. In December 1956 Deng was part of the Chinese delegation led by Zhu De , which for the XX. CPSU party congress traveled. Immediately after this party congress Deng was informed by a special envoy of the CPSU about Khrushchev's secret speech , with which he had criticized Stalinism and Stalin's personality cult . The condemnation of Stalin shocked Deng, who immediately realized that it would also attack Mao and his personality cult and that the authority of the CP would be undermined. Deng was also taken aback by the manner in which the brother parties were informed.
The subsequent deliberations in Beijing showed that Khrushchev's approach also offered opportunities for the CPC. Given the humiliation of Stalin and his mistakes in treating the CPC during the civil war , it was agreed that Stalin was 70% right and 30% wrong. At Deng's suggestion, the existence of a personality cult in China was denied, and the media now emphasized that Mao had fought against the cult of the individual all his life. For the first time, Mao called for socialism to be achieved faster than the Soviet Union. Nobody - including Deng - should have understood what Mao was up to at the time.
In the autumn of 1956 the Polish October and the Hungarian People's Uprising broke out . It was clear to China that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization had led to these developments. After a letter from Poland asking for help, Deng was part of a Chinese delegation to Moscow that advised Khrushchev and was supposed to mediate. After nine days of discussions in Moscow, Khrushchev decided to withdraw the Soviet troops from Budapest, analogous to the procedure in Poland. Deng rebuked him that he could not leave the situation to the enemy and that the Red Army had to help the Hungarian communists regain control of the situation. Deng advocated the use of force and the bloodbath that followed. China's leadership concluded from these developments that “Soviet great-power chauvinism” was also viewed critically in the other communist-led countries and that constant efforts were required to prevent the return of capitalism.
Deng now called for increased re-education campaigns and the purification of counterrevolutionary ideology from the party. He became one of the main players in the Hundred Flowers Movement , which aimed to locate elements hostile to the party. In the ideological thaw that set in in the spring of 1957, intellectuals were encouraged to criticize conditions in the People's Republic. At the beginning of May even Mao called for ideological pluralism and criticism of Marxism-Leninism . As early as June 8th, however, the Central Committee passed a directive to combat right-wing deviating elements, which abolished freedom of speech and ushered in a phase of political-ideological terror. The campaign against the deviants led by Deng led to the deportation of half a million people to re-education camps , including an important part of the intellectuals, but also numerous bystanders. The Marxist-Leninist propaganda was intensified, Deng himself emphasized several times that “so-called freedom of the press and freedom of literature and art” cannot be accepted. Even many years later, he considered the action justified and only regretted the suffering of innocent people.
Big leap forward
In November 1957, Deng was part of the Chinese delegation to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. At these celebrations, Khrushchev and Mao outbid each other with their plans to build socialism quickly. Among other things, Mao announced that he would produce more steel than Great Britain within 15 years . The entire party leadership - including Deng Xiaoping - now joined Mao's adventurous policy. At the conferences in Hangzhou and Nanning in 1958 , those who opposed rushing forward blindly were criticized; Deng did not take part here, but received the same enthusiasm as the participants: agreeing that simply following the Soviet Union was wrong, Deng became a staunch advocate of the great leap forward . At the 2nd session of the 8th Party Congress, the new party line, according to which every effort should be made to advance the building of socialism faster, better and more economically, was approved.
The big leap was driven by the abolition of the cooperatives and the amalgamation of the farmers into huge people's communes. This was supposed to free the workers who were needed for the construction of infrastructure and dams, but especially for steelmaking in primitive blast furnaces. Deng spent the fall of 1958 traveling around the country inspecting projects. He was dissatisfied with the steel quality - as a young man in France he had stood by the blast furnace - and in November he began to worry about the harvest. While between 70,000 and 120,000 farmers starved to death in the winter of 1958/1959, Deng had to make a plan to build socialism in 15 years. At the beginning of 1959 the situation was talked about nicely, Deng in his speeches criticizing the chaos in the industry, that the plan had been messed up and that man-made difficulties had surfaced. He did not question the concept of the big leap, but attributed the problems to an epidemic of bragging rights. Like the rest of the party leadership, he firmly believed in a sudden upturn in the economy, but personally gathered information about problems in the people's communes.
In early July 1959 Deng was injured in a fall and was politically inactive until the end of 1959. During his absence, Peng Dehuai criticized the Great Leap in a personal letter to Mao; as a result, he and a number of his supporters were removed from the party leadership. The bad harvest of 1959 also led to supply bottlenecks at Deng; 20 to 40 million people died in the Great Chinese Famine . Relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly; in 1960 Khrushchev withdrew the Soviet aid pledges.
Economic pragmatism
From September 1960, Deng mainly took care of the economic problems. He traveled all over the country and said he was shocked by the conditions. He suggested Mao return to 1950s socialism. When Liu Shaoqi suddenly criticized Mao openly, Deng was on the side of Mao critics for the first time and described the Great Leap as a man-made catastrophe. Liu, Chen Yun and Deng advocated abandoning the people's communes and introducing the system of budget contracts . Mao fought against these ideas, he was strictly against a return to a decollectivized agriculture. At the extended plenary session in early 1962 with 7,000 participants, Mao was criticized like never before.
Mao, who had already given up the post of chairman of the People's Republic to Liu Shaoqi at the end of 1958, temporarily withdrew to "let the snake out of the hole". He was dissatisfied with Deng and his younger comrades and feared the rebirth of capitalism in China. The developments in the Soviet Union, where the CPSU had given itself a new statute and Stalin had removed from the Lenin mausoleum , were revisionism in his eyes . In Mao's absence - not least at Deng's instigation - party members who had been excluded from the party in the 1950s were rehabilitated and the system of budget contracts was introduced nationwide. Deng's most famous saying stems from this phase, according to which the best agricultural production system is that which the masses can accept and which can quickly revive production. And “if it's not legal then it has to be made legal. Yellow or black, a cat that catches mice is a good cat. ”Deng rejected class struggle at the expense of economic development or even defensive capabilities. The economy stabilized.
At the same time, Mao was concerned about the origin of revisionism. He was supplied with scandalous news about the bourgeois rebirth within the party organs by members of the left faction around Chen Boda , Kang Sheng and Lin Biao and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to change the worldview of every individual. He first demanded a socialist education campaign in the Ministry of Culture, which had to form a five-person working group for a cultural revolution. In January 1965, a working paper prepared by Chen Boda was adopted calling for the re-education of party cadres who wanted to tread the capitalist path. Meant were the moderate camp around Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao, who believed that Beijing was ruled by a counter-revolutionary gang made up of Liu, Deng, Peng Zhen and the liberal professor Wu Han , now attacked the moderate camp with the help of radicals from Shanghai and his wife Jiang Qing . Peng and Wu lost their posts, Deng initially remained passive about those who had fallen victim to the political cleansing. In spring 1966 Deng himself came into the focus of the radicals. In March, at an expanded meeting of the Politburo, Mao called for an end to certain circles that spread bourgeois culture. In May, a party communiqué, largely written by Mao, called for the Chinese Khrushchevs to be identified before they seize power. He called on the masses, especially the youth, to judge revisionist party members.
Deng and Liu wanted to contain the chaos in the education system that Mao had caused with these calls. They sent thousands of working groups to the schools to discuss with the young people. Mao used this as an opportunity in July to accuse Deng and Liu of suppressing the student movement. Mao made it clear that Deng and Liu were the two wanted Khrushchevs and forced them to criticize themselves in front of tens of thousands of students. Deng and Liu's posts were subsequently abolished or their competencies severely curtailed.
Exile during the Cultural Revolution
Serious personal attacks on Deng began in September and October, particularly by Lin Biao . On October 1, 1966, an editorial appeared that criticized the "second greatest ruler on the capitalist path". Although the article did not mention Deng by name, it was clear that Deng Xiaoping was now the main target of criticism. Deng, Liu and numerous other politicians had to confess their wrongdoings to the Red Guards in long criticism sessions . In late December, a demonstration organized by Zhang Chunqiao at Qinghua University called for Deng and Liu to be overthrown. In millions of wall newspapers, Deng was caricatured with a dog's head and a pig's nose and called the “great poisonous plant” or “main root of the reactionary line of the bourgeoisie”. On July 19, 1967, the Red Guards searched Deng's house, and on July 29, Deng and his wife were taken to criticism and fighting sessions, where they were abused and beaten. After another house search, Deng and Zhuo Lin were "sentenced" to house arrest in Zhongnanhai . There they were now protected from the Red Guards. Deng probably escaped worse abuse because of his good relations with Zhou Enlai and because Mao was aware that Deng might be needed at a later date. Mao had rejected proposals by the radicals to eliminate Deng entirely. His children, however, were repeatedly coerced by units of the Red Guards into confessing their father's misconduct and renouncing him. They were not allowed to have contact with their parents for two years. His son Deng Pufang fell out of the window during an "interrogation", sustained severe spinal injuries and was not operated on in the hospitals because he was "under criticism." He has been paraplegic ever since. For the rest of his life, Deng took pride in the fact that his children stood by him and that the terror made the family bond even stronger.
Deng had to practice self-criticism in writing several times. In 1968 an investigation group was even formed to investigate his "crimes". He was forced to write down his entire life and list all his contacts, especially those with the Kuomintang . Here he benefited from the fact that, since his stay in France, he had got used to not taking notes and remembering the most important things. There was also no incriminating material from the personnel file. After completing his self-criticism, it was ordered that he should no longer be treated as a class enemy. In his self-criticism, Deng dealt with his actions on the front in Guangxi in 1931, admitting that “his capitalist thinking was not yet completely eradicated” and that he “had not always properly obtained the opinion or approval of Mao”.
Finally, on October 26, 1969, Deng was exiled to Xinjian District (near Nanchang , Jiangxi Province ). Unlike Liu , for example , he retained his party membership, although Mao's wife Jiang Qing had campaigned for expulsion from the party in 1969. In Xinjian, Deng worked as an ordinary worker at a tractor repair factory, while his wife was employed as a cleaner in the same factory. Deng was denied contact with top management and access to sensitive information. To protect himself from the Red Guards, Deng was housed in a military complex; his low salary was only enough for him and his family to lead a rather spartan life.
During Deng's absence in Beijing, some major political upheavals were underway. The Brezhnev Doctrine increased fears of an attack by the Soviet Union, and military clashes broke out in 1969 . As a counter-strategy, the normalization of relations with the West was developed with Mao's approval. As a result, the People's Republic of China took Taiwan's place at the UN, and Henry Kissinger visited China. After Lin Biao , who had been regarded by Mao as his possible successor before the Cultural Revolution, died under obscure circumstances while trying to escape to the Soviet Union, Mao had to give his Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Marshal Ye Jianying more leeway in the absence of other competent management staff grant. As early as 1972, the first rehabilitation of politicians who had been mistreated during the Cultural Revolution took place. In the same year, Zhou was diagnosed with cancer.
For Deng, the exile in Jiangxi was a break. Here he was able to recover from the pressure of the criticism meetings in Beijing. He thought about a possible policy after his return to Beijing, about a strategy of work under Mao and also about approaches for a China after Mao. During this period he realized that demmaoification based on the model of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was not feasible and that change to alleviate the grave grievances in the country could only be achieved through a flexible interpretation of Maoism .
From his exile he wrote several letters to Beijing in which he made various requests, for example for better medical treatment for his paraplegic son or for visits from his children. In 1972 he was even allowed to travel to his former place of work, Ruijin . For himself, he asked in a deliberately modest tone whether he could not "give the party back something that it had done for him."
In August 1972, Deng finally wrote a letter to Mao in which he reinforced the self-criticism he had written in 1968 and assured him that he would not reverse the judgments made during the Cultural Revolution. So on February 22, 1973 Deng was finally brought back to Beijing. In March it was decided that he should take the position of Deputy Prime Minister and deal primarily with foreign policy matters. Deng made his first public appearance on April 12, 1973 during a visit by Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, during which Zhou is said to have said about Deng: "This is a man who has endured a lot and had to suffer a lot for his country." In 1973 Deng was promoted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, later to the Politburo and the Central Military Commission .
Consolidation
In 1973 the question of a successor became more and more urgent for Mao. His two original candidates were Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping. Lin was dead and was posthumously held responsible for all wrongdoings. Deng was disgraced. Mao had therefore brought three new candidates in his vicinity, namely Wang Hongwen , Hua Guofeng and Wu De . Mao expected all three not to question his legacy, namely the Cultural Revolution and the ongoing class struggle. Wang Hongwen was considered the most capable of the trio by Mao and rose quickly up the party hierarchy. At the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, Wang was made vice-chairman of the party. Mao's calculation was that Wang as the party leader and Deng, the vice-premier, as head of government would form a stable leadership.
Deng was initially only active in foreign policy. He and Zhou received state guests and represented Zhou, who was increasingly unable to attend due to his illness. When Mao was dissatisfied after a Kissinger visit, during which Zhou was allegedly too soft and forgiving , Zhou was condemned as a surrenderist in criticism sessions . Zhou remained prime minister, but the foreign affairs office of China was transferred to Deng. In this role, Deng led a delegation to a special session of the United Nations on raw materials issues. He gave a brilliant speech on Mao's three worlds theory prepared by Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua . This was the first speech by a representative from the People's Republic of China; Mao was also very satisfied with Deng's performance. By 1974 at the latest, it was clear to all observers that Deng was not providing support for Zhou, but had replaced him.
A year after his election, Mao confirmed his line: Wang was appointed the party's first vice-chairman in December 1974 and was now the third most powerful man in China. Deng became the first vice-premier and automatic successor to the seriously ill Zhou Enlai. In January 1975 he received the post of Vice-Chairman of the Defense Council and that of the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army. With the radical Maoist Wang in the higher position and with the entire propaganda machine in the hands of the radicals, foreign policy and government work in the hands of Deng, Mao hoped to have struck a balance of power that would ensure the continuation of his legacy. Mao still kept the option open to remove his successors if they did not act according to his ideas.
As chief of staff, Deng had also been given the task of increasing the clout of the People's Liberation Army, a task that was particularly urgent in view of fears of a Soviet attack. Deng called his program of measures zhengdun ( consolidation ); it included improving command and equipment, withdrawing from civilian areas, strengthening naval and air forces over land forces, and reducing troop strength by 1.6 million soldiers. Hundreds of army officers who had lost their posts during the Cultural Revolution were reinstated with Mao's approval. Military research could also be resumed after Deng, in collaboration with veterans Nie Rongzhen and Zhang Aiping , created the conditions for it. Deng found it easy to criticize and replace those responsible in the ministries, since in 1974 all attempts to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile had failed.
At the same time, Deng had to make the railroad, which fell apart after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, more efficient. In the absence of a motorway network, it was the only means of transport available in the event of war, but in 1973 it fell far short of its transport capacity and was plagued by numerous accidents. At Deng's suggestion, Wan Li was appointed Minister of Railways. Wan and Deng personally took care of the problems at the Xuzhou junction , where the local railroad administration was held by armed rebels who had even detained Communist Party officials. Deng transferred all political and military power over the railway system to the ministry, announced penalties for factionalism and personally signed the arrest warrant for the head of the Xuzhou Railway Administration. He assisted Wan Li in establishing discipline and order on the railroad, and where necessary, Deng and Wan also ordered the use of force. Similar approaches have been extended to other industries, most notably coal mining and steel production. In the industrial sector, Deng and Hu Qiaomu laid the foundations for relying on sober numbers and no longer on the power of will ; national planning conferences were held and the first technology imports were made possible.
Deng achieved these successes by tackling the obvious problems that even Mao had personally felt. In addition, he cleverly combined Maoist slogans into his own slogans, such as the "three directives" that he issued in a speech in May 1975:
- Fight revisionism
- Promote stability and unity
- Strengthen the economy
Although Mao never used these three slogans in context, Deng secured Mao's backing. Radical Maoists who fought Deng or other pragmatic forces were called back several times by Mao personally, for example in a Politburo meeting on May 3, 1975: Jiang Qing should not criticize Deng's "empiricism" without criticizing "dogmatism", and they should should "not form a gang of four ".
Wang Hongwen, meanwhile, was assigned the task of dealing with the problems in Zhejiang Province . Tensions remained high there after the Cultural Revolution and the economy shrank. In mid-1975, Wang was criticized for his failures in this job and for sticking too closely with Jiang Qing. At the end of the year he was removed from all management positions, although he initially retained his offices. Thus, Wang's inability led to Deng's greatest abundance of power for the time being: On May 27, 1975, Deng also took over the chairmanship of the Politburo and forced Jiang and Wang to practice self-criticism.
Deng used these newly acquired skills to strengthen the party structures, to criticize “fractionism” and to restore the leadership role to “experienced cadres”. Without explicitly mentioning it, he thereby weakened the radicals who had only come into their positions during the years of the Cultural Revolution. In collaboration with Hu Yaobang, he also created the conditions to revive the scientific life of the People's Republic: first the political research office within the party, which carried out theoretical work and was to form the basis for the revival of higher education, and later the re-establishment of the Chinese Academy of the sciences. Numerous scientists have been rehabilitated. However, approaches to increase the standards of university education that were developed in collaboration with Zhou Rongxin , such as the abolition of physical work before entering university, the rehabilitation of numerous professors or the re-establishment of the Academy of Social Sciences, were not feasible. At this point, Zhou Enlai Deng warned against proceeding too briskly on matters that were very important to Mao.
Third deposition
As early as the summer of 1975, Mao expressed concern that Deng could reverse his inheritance and defile his reputation after his death. However, he continued to support Deng's successful policy. This changed when Deng wanted to push his consolidation also in Qinghua University to focus on academic instead of political education. The leadership of the Maoist model institution ( Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi ) installed in the Cultural Revolution opposed Deng's actions in letters to Mao. Around the same time, Mao began using his nephew Mao Yuanxin as a middleman. Mao Yuanxin, a climber of the Cultural Revolution, denigrated Deng to Mao that “he does not praise the Cultural Revolution”, “does not criticize Liu Shaoqui, Lin Biao and Confucius”, “does not mention the class struggle” and after Mao's death the “structures before the Cultural Revolution would restore ”.
From that point on, Mao tried to wrest a public and written statement from Deng in which he approved the Cultural Revolution and presented the class struggle as a central element of Chinese development. However, Deng refused to do so even after Mao began criticizing Deng's supporters. The pressure on Deng reached a peak on November 24th, when the criticism hit the media, but initially without naming Deng's name. When Henry Kissinger and later Gerald Ford visited Beijing at the end of the year , however, they did not notice that Deng was being criticized and concluded that, due to Mao's poor health, Deng was now the key politician. As of December 1975, all initiatives that started from Deng were no longer continued. The reason for Deng's refusal to approve of the Cultural Revolution may have been, on the one hand, his personal fate. On the other hand, a calculation that he would have to distance himself from the Cultural Revolution for his plans for post-Mao China may also have played a role.
In January 1976, Zhou Enlai, one of the most popular politicians in Maoist China, died. Mao wanted to keep the funeral services small; however, when Zhou's coffin was driven through the streets of Beijing to the cemetery, about two million people lined the streets. Deng gave the funeral speech for Zhou.
At the end of the month, after two months of continuous criticism, he submitted his resignation to Mao. Mao handed over the office of prime minister on an interim basis to the hitherto largely unknown Hua Guofeng . The criticism of Deng continued, but limited to circles within the party. Wall newspapers against Deng were not allowed. On April 4th, 1976, Qingming Festival , many citizens wanted to pay tribute to Zhou Enlai because they believed he had been treated unfairly. When the government tried to contain this, a confrontation arose, with the people openly rebelling against Mao for the first time since the communist seizure of power. Deng was charged with organizing the Tian'anmen incident and lost all office that same month. However, he was not expelled from the party, but placed under house arrest in a secret location where he was safe from his critics.
During Deng's absence from politics, Zhu De died and on September 9, 1976 Mao Zedong died. Deng was not allowed to attend the funerals. Although Mao had overthrown and banished Deng several times, Deng set up a kind of altar in honor of Mao at home. Deng's life was again focused on the family during this period. Hua Guofeng automatically became Mao's successor. After legitimizing his successor, he had the Gang of Four arrested, gave up radical Maoism, began a policy of learning from abroad and allowed first experiments with special economic zones , while at the same time using theoretical texts to justify his policy as a continuation of Mao's legacy. However, his attempts to build a personality cult based on Mao's model failed, and even foreign observers only granted him the potential of a temporary solution.
Deng in power
Way to full power
The criticism of Deng, which Mao had started, was continued by Hua, because Hua knew that Deng was more capable and equipped with a stronger power base than he was. However, Hua also rejected the party expulsion demanded by Jiang Qing. From the end of 1976, however, veteran officials like Ye Jianying began increasingly demanding Deng's return. The decision to bring Deng back was made in January 1977; However, Hua preferred to wait another six months to consolidate his own position. In May 1977, Deng wrote that he accepted Hua's leadership and offered to do science and research. On July 17, 1977, at the 10th Party Congress, he got back all the positions he had held until 1976 and became the third most powerful man in China after Hua and Ye Jianying.
The two years after Mao's death were marked by a political polarization between those who had benefited from the Cultural Revolution and those who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guofeng had no choice but to proclaim the unconditional continuation of Maoism. In contrast, numerous influential party members called for the rehabilitation of victims of the Cultural Revolution and for the reversal of judgments from the Cultural Revolution and after the events of April 5.
Deng had agreed to limit his field of work to education, science and technology because he considered this to be the most important of the four modernizations. It made it possible for numerous academies that had been closed since the Cultural Revolution to resume their work and improved working conditions for scientists. It also made it possible for scientific articles with new ideological approaches to be published, which on the one hand fueled polarization, on the other hand deprived the Maoists of their monopoly on interpreting Mao Zedong thought. In order to counter reservations among the Maoist party faction, Deng argued that brain work also contributes to the country's progress and should be appreciated accordingly. In order to encourage the most capable - and not the most politically reliable - minds, he had the system of recommendations for university admission abolished and as early as 1977 the entrance exams were reintroduced. At the same time, study trips abroad put the political leadership in a spirit of optimism in view of the economic opportunities offered by foreign trade.
The central labor conference of the Communist Party in November / December 1978 turned the tide to the detriment of the conservative Maoists. The approximately 200 participants initially hesitantly and later vehemently demanded that false judgments from the past be reversed and that the party members concerned should be allowed to resume their work. This dynamic has forced Hua to withdraw its policy announced at the beginning of the conference. Wang Dongxing even had to apply to be released from some of his offices. At the Third Plenum that followed in December, it was decided to expand the Politburo so that rehabilitated politicians could enter without having to relinquish Politburo holders. Hua and Deng retained their positions, even though it was clear to all that Deng had now taken over the de facto leadership from his position as vice-premier. This arrangement was chosen to avoid the impression of a power struggle to the outside world, and to prevent too high a concentration of power in the hands of individuals.
Domestic politics
Limits to liberalization and democracy wall
In the months after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the question immediately arose of how far the party leadership should go in granting civil liberties. In view of the injustices suffered over the years, many people wanted to demand that those responsible be punished or to explain their suffering. But there was also fear of a relapse into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution if too many freedoms were granted. This question remained topical throughout the Deng era. Deng was pragmatic about her. He advocated more freedom for people. But if he saw public order in danger, he quickly had it restricted again.
The first such challenge came to the party leadership shortly after Mao's death. On November 19, 1978 , the first issue of the magazine of the Communist Youth Association was published on a large brick wall on Chang'an Street in Beijing, close to Tian'anmen . Wang Dongxing ordered it to be confiscated and destroyed because it contained criticism of Mao's personality cult. When no one was punished after this move and the rumor spread that Deng approved of posting articles on this wall, the people and the content of the articles became bolder. The place subsequently became known as the Democratic Wall. In March 1979 it became the starting point of protests and calls for respect for human rights were loud; foreign media became aware of them. On March 25, Wei Jingsheng published fundamental criticism of the one-party system and called for democracy to be the fifth alongside Deng's four modernizations . On March 28, a decree banned the publication of criticism of the political system. About 30 people, including Wei Jingsheng, were arrested and the Democracy Wall moved to remote Yuetan Park . Deng called for and supported the ban, whereas other high party members saw no danger in the posters and protests.
Four basic principles
From January 18 to February 15 and from March 16 to April 3, 1979, the conference on theoretical principles was held at the suggestion of Ye Jianying. Its aim was to end the struggles that divided the party between those party members who were part of the two was always and those who only wanted to derive the truth from practice . The participants, at times more than 400 selected party members, should initially only discuss how the propaganda work could support the four modernizations and then decide on the concrete implementation. The delegates accepted Hu Yaobang's invitation to free thought and speak openly. There was sharp criticism of the mistakes of Maoism. Deng then called for Mao Zedong's banner to be held up in order to defy the dangers China was exposed to. His Four Basic Principles , which he established in the context of this conference, are still today the yardstick for determining what is permitted. These are the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party's claim to leadership and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Mao-Zedong thinking. To this day, intellectuals are trying to wrest broader boundaries from state power.
Establishment of the Deng government and replacement of Maoism
When Deng Xiaoping took over de facto power in the Chinese government in December 1978, the party and state leadership consisted of members who had risen rapidly during the Cultural Revolution on the one hand, and long-serving and experienced leaders on the other. Deng now made it his task to put together a leadership that did not necessarily have to be loyal to him, but which consisted of the most technically qualified people in the whole country. In the summer of 1979, Deng, who was then 75 years old, symbolically announced major changes with a two-day ascent of Huang Shan .
Just a few days later, in one of his speeches, he announced that the questions about the goals for party and country and ideological issues had been resolved and that it was therefore time to renew the party. To this end, new party members would have to be recruited and new management staff, who would later take over from those in power at the time, would have to be trained. As early as the summer of 1979, the radical wing around Hua Guofeng was so weakened by the rehabilitation of high party members who replaced members who had quickly risen during the Cultural Revolution that it could no longer play a role in the renewal of the party. For the renewal of his party, Deng was specifically looking for people who could take care of things like foreign trade, technology or finance, which was a departure from previous criteria for advancement in the party, namely proletarian or peasant background. Deng was also willing to remove people from their positions who were not up to the task. The government and party leadership team ultimately included Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian , who were both about the same age as Deng himself, as well as Hu Yaobang , Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li , who were all about ten years younger. In addition, Deng Liqun as a speechwriter and secretary and Hu Qiaomu as an ideologist were very influential.
Deng was concerned that this leadership team had no obvious successors. For this reason he had the party look for talented and qualified personnel, from whom he was presented a list of 165 people in the summer of 1979. He was dismayed that only 31 of these candidates had university degrees. For this reason, Deng Xiaoping arranged for talents to be trained at all levels of the party’s hierarchy.
In order to further weaken the radicals in the party and to counteract a certain alienation of the population from the party, Deng arranged for a speech to be prepared for Marshal Ye Jianying on the national holiday in 1979. In this speech, which was worked on by 20 people and submitted to Deng several times, the party and its leaders cautiously took responsibility for mistakes made during the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution . But she also emphasized the party's successes and promised to build a powerful socialist country. This speech was received very positively, especially by the educated urban population, and marked the beginning of a reassessment of the party's history.
At the fifth party plenum in February 1980, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were admitted to the Politburo, the four main supporters of Hua Guofeng Wang Dongxing , Wu De , Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui were criticized and dismissed from the Politburo; the late President Liu Shaoqi has been rehabilitated. This party plenum thus marks the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reign. At this plenary session, Deng Xiaoping also presented the goals he wanted to achieve with China in the 1980s. This included outstripping Taiwan economically and reintegrating it into mainland China. He wanted to maintain political stability, pursue strong and consistent politics and train competent officials. He wanted to quadruple the gross domestic product between 1980 and 2000. He stressed the importance of the government at all levels being led by competent rather than ideologically correct personnel.
After the fifth party plenum, Deng was able to advance his agenda much more efficiently. Within a few months, the agricultural collectives were dissolved and responsibility for agricultural production was transferred to the households. He was also able to push ahead with the replacement of Hua Guofeng much faster. The disempowerment of Hua Guofeng ran parallel to a reassessment of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, as Hua stood for the continuation of Mao Zedong's policies . This assessment of history took place in 1980 with the involvement of thousands of senior party members and was completed by 1981. Deng succeeded in ensuring that Mao and Mao Zedong thinking were not criticized too much because he feared that too strong criticism could divide the party and the country and weaken the leadership legitimacy of the Communist Party. In contrast to the Soviet Union, where there was de-Stalinization under Khrushchev , there was no demaoification. A consensus was reached that Mao was 70% right and 30% wrong.
As part of the sixth party plenum, Hua Guofeng was finally criticized for wanting to establish a new personality cult, for promoting radical left slogans that had badly damaged the Chinese economy, and for lacking the political and organizational skills to be party chairman or chairman to be the military commission. After the sixth plenary session in June 1981, he remained a member of the Politburo, but out of bitterness he rarely attended the corresponding meetings.
Government system Deng
After Hua Guofeng was removed from office, Deng was at the height of his power. Although he was neither prime minister nor party leader, he effectively controlled the political process from his three offices. He was Deputy Prime Minister, Vice-Party Chairman and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Regarding the Hong Kong media, he said, “I already have names and fame, right? I do not need more! You have to be farsighted, not short-sighted! ”Deng set the general political direction, Hu Yaobang as general secretary of the party and Zhao Ziyang as prime minister implemented it. Deng only reserved the right to make important decisions without worrying about the details. The style of government was authoritarian and bold. Its power was limited only by the Politburo, in which the 25 highest-ranking party members were represented.
Deng believed in a kind of intra-party democracy , in which the actors should exchange constructive opinions in order to avoid mistakes like those during the Cultural Revolution. After the decision on the policy to be followed was made, he demanded discipline, as envisaged by Lenin's concept of democratic centralism . Not least because of his long military career, his actions were based on authority; instead of a separation of powers, there was an efficient command structure. If he wanted to initiate a measure, he first created the appropriate climate, discussed the content of speeches and documents with the relevant influential people, and then used his authority to implement the measure. He defended the Communist Party because he saw the CPSU's authority in the Soviet Union weaken. He advocated the death penalty for Jiang Qing or arrested dissidents like Wei Jingsheng . He had critics from inside the party removed from their offices, but in doing so he refrained from the usual public exposure. This is how he proceeded against Wang Ruowang , Liu Binyan and Fang Lizhi , for example . In order to maintain the authority of the party it was also necessary to hold cadres at a lower level in the hierarchy responsible for failure.
Under Deng, in contrast to before, the creation of a personality cult was dispensed with. It was part of Deng's policy to pack complex relationships into an aphorism or a catchy slogan and to make them popular; these included “ One Country, Two Systems ” for resolving the Hong Kong-Taiwan conflict and his famous quote, “It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white; as long as it catches mice, it is already a good cat ”. Many Chinese were familiar with these quotes, but no one was encouraged to memorize Deng quotes. Deng advocated allowing experiments and thinking long-term; as a politician who did not have to stand for regular elections, he could. He preferred to grapple with uncomfortable rather than embellished truths, and let party officials choose on the basis of ability rather than origin or family background.
Most of the communication with his Politburo colleagues took place in writing; Politburo meetings were seldom held. This was not least due to the old age of many members and especially the hearing damage of Deng and Chen Yun. Deng was not on friendly terms with most of the politicians of the same or higher rank. The only confidants Deng asked for personal assessments were his bureau chief Wang Ruilin and their peers Yang Shangkun , Wang Zhen and Bo Yibo . Apart from the factual level, Deng was not considered to be talkative. He was said to be seen only as a tool to achieve his goals.
Foreign policy
After the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, there was no Chinese politician who could meet foreign heads of state as equals as Deng, and who defended China's interests so vigorously. So from 1977 Deng was again responsible for foreign policy, albeit somewhat contrary to his personal wishes. Two topics dominated his work in this area. On the one hand, China continued to fear the Soviet Union and its allies. On the other hand, China needed foreign help in its modernization efforts and had to lay the foundation for it. However, some of China's neighbors were concerned because China had signed a 25-year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1978.
Deng was aware that China had to prevent the Soviet Union from finding further allies among China's neighbors. At the same time, he knew that there was great concern in the USA and Japan about the Soviet Union's supposed expansionist plans. He estimated that this situation would allow Japanese and American support for China's development to be obtained. For this reason, beginning in 1978, he undertook five major trips abroad.
From the early 1980s, Deng pursued the four great endeavors, namely normalization of relations with the USA, Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as the return of the crown colony of Hong Kong.
South and Southeast Asia
The first two countries Deng visited at this stage were Burma and Nepal in January 1978. These countries already had friendly relations with China, which Deng wanted to strengthen.
In November 1978 Deng visited Thailand , Malaysia and Singapore . Deng received a warm welcome in Thailand. Thailand, already closely allied with the USA at that time, was open to cooperation with China against a Soviet-Vietnamese supremacy in Southeast Asia. In Malaysia and Singapore, however, Deng was told that certain activities in China were viewed with much more concern than possible Soviet influence. Specifically, China ran radio stations calling on the people of Southeast Asia to revolution and supported the communist parties in the countries concerned. In Singapore, Deng also found out that the Singaporean communists had reported what they believed Beijing wanted to hear instead of truthful reports. Deng was impressed by how much the country had modernized since his trip to France. Here Deng was strengthening the opinion that far-reaching reforms were necessary in China. He developed a particularly trusting and respectful relationship with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew .
Shortly after that trip, the Chinese media stopped calling Singapore a bitch in heat for the American imperialists . The country was now presented as an example from which it was worth learning. In later speeches, Deng stated that the social order of Singapore could safely be described as excellent. He emphasized the strict system of administration and control that China should take over and improve because its political power can only be consolidated with dictatorship , namely the democratic dictatorship of the people . The Chinese in Southeast Asia were encouraged to become loyal citizens of their country of residence, but at the same time not to forget their origins and to invest in their places of origin. However, it took another two years until Deng was able to enforce the shutdown of the propaganda stations.
North Korea
In September 1978 Deng visited North Korea . The aim here was to inform the North Korean leadership that China was planning to improve its relations with Japan and the US. Fearing in China that North Korea might use these plans as an opportunity to bind itself more closely to the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung was flattered with a large high-level delegation on the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on September 10, 1978. Deng met Kim several times explained China's need for modernization to him and got North Korea to maintain good working relations with China. Kim later even defended the Chinese plans to open up to the West against criticism from the Eastern European countries.
Japan
Deng and numerous other members of the government saw better relations with Japan as necessary to the success of the four modernizations and to prevent a feared attack by the Soviet Union. After the events of the Second Sino-Japanese War , however, the country was hated by the population, not least because it was portrayed in the propaganda as the ultimate evil. Deng had fought against the Japanese troops for eight years during the war, which made him a suitable man to promote a reconciliation. Mao had normalized relations as early as 1972, but negotiations to formulate a peace and friendship treaty stagnated until 1977. Only under Deng did the negotiations begin to move and in August 1978 Deng decided to accommodate Japan on the controversial hegemonic clause.
In October 1978, Deng responded to Tanaka Kakuei's 1972 state visit . He was the highest-ranking Chinese politician to visit Japan. The ten-day trip, prepared by diplomat Liao Chengzhi , took place in a conciliatory mood, with many mutual gestures that could be interpreted as an apology or acceptance of the events of the past wars. As a result of the trip on which Deng sought the secret of modernization like Xu Fu once did , numerous institutions based on the Japanese model were established in China and delegations were sent to Japan. The Chinese media began to present a much more positive image of Japan. Japanese films, literature, and art were admitted in China. Management and quality found their way into the minds of Chinese officials, while Japanese companies became major investors and Japanese funds became China's largest lenders. During the Deng Xiaoping era, no country played a more important role in building China's industry and infrastructure.
Soviet Union
The relations between China and the Soviet Union engaged Deng intensively since the 1950s. In November 1957 he was a member of the Chinese delegation to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. As part of this trip, Deng also took part in two conferences that were supposed to end the ideological crisis of the communist camp after the de-Stalinization . Deng succeeded in persuading the Russian chief ideologist Mikhail Andreevich Suslov to largely agree to the Chinese proposal for the final declaration. After this success, foreign policy was one of Deng's main tasks. In the following year Deng took part in the talks in which Pawel Fyodorowitsch Yudin and Khrushchev were violently attacked for their proposal to build a joint Pacific fleet and operate radar stations together. When Khrushchev withdrew his aid pledges in response to Mao's insults, Deng was not involved in politics because of his injury. In 1960 and 1963 Deng traveled three times as head of a multi-member delegation to Moscow to negotiate with Suslov about the correct ideology of the socialist camp. Together with Kang Sheng, in July 1964 he also led the group that accused the Soviet Union of revisionism in several articles.
In the wake of the Sino-Soviet rift, Beijing feared a Soviet attack, which led Mao to seek normalization with the United States. After Zhou Enlai's meeting with Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin , the imminent danger of war seemed over. Deng Xiaoping had Vietnam attacked to prevent Soviet embrace . Shortly after the end of this war, Deng instructed Foreign Minister Huang Hua to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to deal with unresolved issues and improve international relations. Such meetings took place several times between April and October 1979. In August 1979, Deng stated that in the eyes of the Chinese leadership there were three obstacles to improved relations: the Soviet Union should withdraw its troops from the borders with China and Mongolia, withdraw from Afghanistan, and persuade Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Deng also suggested that none of the states should station troops at the common border. Deng instructed his negotiators not to show any weakness, even if the negotiations would not lead to any result for a long time. The Sino-Soviet friendship treaty, which expired on April 11, 1980, was not renewed by Beijing. Deng was waiting for the Soviet Union to exhaust its resources and, in turn, to improve its relations with China, and he was right.
In 1982 the first signs of rapprochement came from Moscow. In a speech in Tashkent , the Soviet head of state Brezhnev described China as a socialist country and announced Soviet support for China in the Taiwan conflict . Deng subsequently arranged for discussions on internal affairs of the Soviet Union in the Chinese press to be terminated. The final normalization to Deng's conditions did not come about until 1989; From May 15 to 18, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing, where, in talks with Deng and Zhao Ziyang, he also admitted certain mistakes by the Soviet Union that had led to friction . To ensure that normalization with the Soviet Union would not come at the expense of relations with the US, Deng had sent Wan Li to the US and Canada immediately before the talks and immediately afterwards Qian Qichen to brief the governments there. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union , Deng also asked himself whether the rule of the communist party would survive. He responded by accelerating reform and opening up policy.
Vietnam
China had supported Vietnam in the first and second Indochina wars and Deng had been partly involved in the related talks. After the withdrawal of American troops, the Soviet Union was happy to fill the vacuum, while Vietnam urgently needed Soviet help to rebuild the destroyed country. China feared being encircled by the Soviet Union. It therefore entered into an alliance with Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and pushed forward the normalization of its relations with Japan. The improvement in US-Chinese relations under Mao and the generous aid to Cambodia increased Vietnam’s traditional distrust of China. During the Cultural Revolution and Deng's absence from politics, China made impossible demands of Vietnam, including a condemnation of Soviet hegemonism, which Vietnam could not do; this led to a break in relations between the two neighbors. Vietnam was thus driven into an even greater dependence on Moscow. When Deng took over the foreign policy agendas, the Soviet Union and Vietnam had signed military cooperation agreements and Vietnam had joined the Mutual Economic Assistance Council . At the same time, Vietnam pushed collectivization , while the majority of the 1.5 million Chinese in Vietnam, including many small business owners, opposed it. Vietnam feared that its Chinese minority would ally itself with China in the event of war. The Chinese of Vietnam were put in camps or fled the country.
In the summer of 1978, cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union intensified and the Chinese government expected that Vietnam would use the following dry season to attack Cambodia. They feared that the Soviet sphere of influence could thereby expand towards Thailand and the Strait of Malacca , which would mean Soviet access to the Indian Ocean. Deng firmly believed that this required a strong response from China in the event of an attack. On his visits to other western countries, he had already told Jimmy Carter , among others , that it was necessary to show his readiness for war in order to curb Soviet expansion.
Pol Pot had already asked in the summer of 1978 whether China could send "volunteers" to Cambodia to fend off a Vietnamese attack. Deng was willing to cooperate with him despite the genocide that Pol Pot had committed and his poor reputation in the West. However, he had a brief dispute with Vietnam in mind, as China had already carried out on the Indian border in 1962 . His aim was to teach his neighbor a lesson and to show Vietnam and the Soviet Union that the cost of further expansion would be high. However, Deng encountered strong resistance from among the Chinese party and state leadership. Many believed that it was not wise to invest the resources necessary to modernize China in a war against Vietnam. Many knew that the People's Liberation Army was not ready for war. Others were of the opinion that an attack on a communist brother country was wrong on principle. In the end, there were strong fears that an attack on Vietnam could provoke the Soviet Union to attack China. Deng prevailed, however, and planning for a possible attack on Vietnam began in September 1978. Although Deng Xiaoping was well involved in his foreign and domestic affairs, he was familiar with almost every detail of the attack on Vietnam. In February / March 1979 , the war lasted only 29 days, but claimed up to 25,000 deaths and 37,000 wounded on the part of the Chinese attackers. Although Deng announced that China had successfully taught a lesson to Vietnam, the inadequacies in the People's Liberation Army had become so evident that the Western press was debating who was teaching whom a lesson.
However, as a result of this war and subsequent skirmishes, a large part of the Vietnamese military was tied to the country's northern border for a long time. There was no Soviet-Vietnamese expansion in Southeast Asia and the danger of encirclement by the Soviet Union was regarded by the Chinese government as low from now on.
Taiwan
Deng considered one of his most important tasks throughout his political life to reintegrate Taiwan and Hong Kong into mainland China. When he took over responsibility for foreign policy in 1979, he continued the policy of Zhou Enlai and announced that China would give both regions a high degree of autonomy for 100 years if they returned to China; in 1982 he developed this approach into One Country, Two Systems . In his New Year's speeches in 1979 and 1980, he described reunification with Taiwan as one of the most important tasks alongside the four modernizations and the normalization of relations with the United States. At the same time, Deng did not rule out the use of force against representatives of the US government. However, Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo responded to proposals from Beijing by announcing that he wanted to continue arming and conquering the mainland.
In April 1979, the United States passed the Taiwan Relations Act , which provided for arms deliveries to Taiwan, among other things, to ensure its defense capability. In the election campaign, the future US President Ronald Reagan even referred to Taiwan as a “country”. Deng reacted very angrily because American support for Taiwan meant Taiwan would not return to the motherland until Deng withdrew from politics. He let the American government know that recognition or further armament of Taiwan would lead to a downgrade of relations with the United States. In 1981, Ye Jianying presented a nine-point program, which included direct negotiations between the KP and KMT , simplified trade, transport and tourism, a high degree of autonomy including maintaining a separate Taiwanese army and maintaining the social security and economic system in the event of reunification. The Taiwan government did not respond.
In 1981, in the face of pressure from Beijing, the US promised to sell only carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan and canceled the delivery of F-15 fighter jets . Beijing called for a schedule to phase out arms shipments to Taiwan. To set an example, Beijing ignored an invitation from the United States and restricted relations with the Netherlands, which had just signed a contract to supply submarines to Taiwan. In the summer of 1982 there were direct talks between Vice President George HW Bush and Deng, which resulted in the communiqué of August 17, 1982. This communiqué contains a commitment by the United States to the one-China policy and a commitment by the United States to restrict arms sales to Taiwan. In 1985 Deng asked the Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to arrange a meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo, who was already seriously ill. Chiang refused, however, and in 1987 repealed martial law in Taiwan, thus paving the way for democratization and relaxation of relations with the mainland.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has been important to Deng Xiaoping since his return to politics for two reasons: he needed the city for his goals of modernizing China and he saw it as his task to restore Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. Thus, he began to improve relations with Hong Kong as early as 1977 after there had been attacks on Hong Kong territory during the Cultural Revolution. In the following year he set up a working group under Liao Chengzhi and invited entrepreneurs, especially YK Pao, for talks. In 1979 Deng met Governor MacLehose in Beijing to discuss modernization and the fate of Hong Kong as part of China; here he presented a concept for the first time that would later become the one country, two systems approach . The messages that MacLehose brought to Hong Kong businesspeople reassured investors and caused stock prices and property prices to soar.
After Hua Guofeng's conservatives were overthrown , Deng was finally able to offer Hong Kong that it could keep its capitalist social system for 50 years after the transfer of sovereignty to China. In contrast to the British government, he took the position that the unequal treaties were null and void and that a Chinese government that could not regain sovereignty over Hong Kong would have to cede. Deng did not recognize Britain's moral obligation to protect the free lifestyle of Hong Kong people; he also indicated a willingness to use force.
On September 22, 1982, Deng Xiaoping met Margaret Thatcher for negotiations ; the latter did not take its advisors seriously and interpreted the Chinese insistence on the surrender of Hong Kong as a negotiating strategy. Accordingly, she was surprised by Deng Xiaoping's harshness. Deng announced that it would give the UK two years to find a solution, after which China would unilaterally announce its plans for Hong Kong after 1997. The negotiations were conducted in 22 rounds between July 12, 1983 and September 6, 1984. After a period of no progress, Deng warned former British Prime Minister Edward Heath on September 10, 1983 that the British strategy would not work and that the Hong Kong issue would need to be resolved. At the same time, the Hong Kong economy slid into the deepest crisis in its history. In the end, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was signed and the Hong Kong Basic Law was negotiated between 1984 and 1989 . A liaison group with representatives from China, Hong Kong and Great Britain supervised the preparations for the handover .
To prepare for the transition of sovereignty, Deng sent Xu Jiatun, a high-ranking official to Hong Kong in 1983, and provided a liaison officer for Hong Kong with Ji Pengfei . Xu's task was to win over influential people in Hong Kong for the transition, to build up Beijing-loyal staff for the administration of the territory after 1997 and to deepen the understanding of Hong Kong among the Chinese leadership. Xu, who is popular in Hong Kong, had the courage to report on the distrust of many Hong Kong people towards the Communist Party. This led to Deng addressing the people of Hong Kong directly on several occasions and also getting involved in the negotiations on the Basic Law. Deng died four months before Hong Kong was surrendered to China.
military
The Chinese military was backward in several ways after the end of the Cultural Revolution. The People's Liberation Army, as Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong, was only capable of waging war in two extreme tactics: nuclear war on the one hand and a people's war in which, in the event of war, the local population is mobilized and a better-equipped enemy is brought down through the sheer mass of people should. Deng did not criticize Mao Zedong for this backwardness, but Lin Biao . Although Deng had already started to initiate improvements in the military field before his temporary removal by Mao Zedong, when he rejoined the government in 1977, he first formally began work on these under Hua Guofeng as chairman of the Central Military Commission together with Ye Jianying Points back on. In June 1981, Hua was deposed from this position and Deng took over the post of chairman of the Central Military Commission. After his retirement, he gave it up as the last of his post in autumn 1989. In contrast to the civilian sector, Deng chose people for high posts in the Chinese military with whom he had already fought in the Chinese civil war or who had other personal ties with him. These included Defense Minister Qin Jiwei , Political Affairs Director Yang Baibing , Secretary General of the Central Military Commission Yang Shangkun, and his own successor as Army Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi .
One of the most urgent measures was to downsize the inflated apparatus, reduce the number of soldiers, rejuvenate the staff and attract better trained recruits, strengthen discipline and improve training. Deng Xiaoping has been very successful in reducing the bloated military. In March 1978, Deng announced plans to move half a million People's Liberation Army officials to civilian positions. In 1975 the People's Liberation Army had 6.1 million soldiers, by 1979 the number of soldiers was reduced to 5.2 million, by 1982 to 4.2 million and by 1988 to 3.2 million. In 1982 the Central Advisory Commission was founded, and many of the superfluous high-ranking military officers were honored with membership in this commission and retired with their privileges. After the lack of Soviet retaliation after the Sino-Vietnamese War , the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the positive response to Chinese advances in détente, Deng decided to postpone investments in the military and instead use the resources available to modernize the economy to use. In his role as Army Chief of Staff, he was given the task of defending this position against dissatisfied generals who had been waiting for more modern technology for a long time. The share of expenditure on the military in the gross domestic product subsequently fell from 4.6% in 1979 to 1.4% in 1991.
As early as 1977 Deng began to set the course so that the training system of the military would be improved. He demanded that all units of the army form working groups that could absorb new technology. He had mechanisms put in place to identify and promote young talent. The first group of young Chinese people sent abroad to study were small groups of talented young recruits from the People's Liberation Army who studied not only military subjects but also management, science, technology, and international relations. In the 1980s, numerous programs were started to modernize the Chinese military technically and tactically. The strategy was to develop new technologies to produce large quantities of them when needed. Deng Xiaoping knew that China was also lagging behind other countries in the field of technology, which is why he already mentioned at his meeting with US President Jimmy Carter in January 1979 that he was interested in certain military interests from the Americans To buy technologies. By the end of 1979, the Americans had prepared a list of technologies they might deliver to China but not to the Soviet Union. In the 1980s there was then a rapidly growing military cooperation between the United States and China, with neither of the states seeking an alliance. This collaboration ended abruptly in 1989 after the violent crackdown on the protests in Tian'anmen Square .
When Deng Xiaoping took over the reform of the Chinese military, both civil and military companies that manufactured military goods were in deficit and put a heavy burden on the state budget. As early as the late 1970s, Deng encouraged companies to manufacture goods for the needs of the population and to sell them on the free market. Later it was allowed to separate companies from the military and to let them operate independently in the market. As a result, numerous jobs were created for personnel who had been cut in the military, while the state budget was relieved. This transition lasted several decades and posed numerous problems of corruption and abuse of office, but it was ultimately successful. From the companies that were founded on the basis of production units of the People's Liberation Army, some internationally successful companies have emerged.
The actual modernization and expansion of the Chinese armed forces took place under the successors of Deng Xiaoping when Taiwan threatened to declare its independence with American support and when it became apparent that China had to secure trade routes for its energy supply and export business.
economy
Deng was aware that he did not have enough expertise in economic issues. After his return to politics, he therefore relied on Chen Yun , and later on Zhao Ziyang, for economic issues . He himself, however, reserved the right to make decisions of great importance himself. Economic policy in the 1980s was marked by a struggle between Deng and Hu Yaobang , who wanted faster reforms and growth, and Chen, who acted cautiously, did not want to give up the planned economy entirely and wanted to keep inflation and deficit under control.
Agriculture
In 1978, China's farmers had an average annual income of the equivalent of 39 US dollars. Even after the end of the Cultural Revolution, people starved to death, and overall grain consumption per capita was lower in 1978 than in 1957. However, Prime Minister Hua Guofeng and Vice Prime Minister of Agriculture Chen Yonggui and his successor Wang Renzhong supported the Dazhai model . They wanted to solve the problem by keeping the large people's communes and improving them through the use of more fertilizers, tractors, pumps, and faster electrification of the country.
In 1978, Wan Li was named the first party secretary in Anhui Province. Deng Xiaoping encouraged him and the party officials Anhuis to allow the decentralization of agriculture in regions where people were still starving to the point of the hitherto banned family farms. Zhao Ziyang took similar measures in Sichuan Province , but without going so far as to allow family businesses. These measures were attacked by conservative politicians and newspapers and condemned as capitalist or bourgeois. The measures in Anhui and Sichuan, however, showed success in the very short term. Deng arranged through Hu Qiaomu that these successes were properly published; at a conference of party secretaries from all provinces this procedure was also allowed. A few years later, contracts were signed across the country between families and local authorities for the use of land, machinery and the delivery of produce.
After Hua Guofeng was ousted in 1980, Wan Li became chairman of the State Agriculture Commission. Under his leadership, the collectivization proclaimed by Mao in 1955 was reversed, and in 1982 the people's communes were officially abolished. In 1984 the harvest was finally so large that there was not enough storage space to store it. The abolished municipalities became municipal enterprises (乡镇 企业), which employed 28.3 million people in 1978 and 105.8 million in 1992. In 1994, 42% of total industrial production came from such joint ventures.
Economic opening policy
After the Cultural Revolution, the first contacts with foreign countries that Gu Mu , Hua Guofeng , Kang Shi'en , Yu Qiuli and Deng had made themselves were very positive. There was enthusiasm across the country about what technology imports could do. Chen Yun, on the other hand, watched over a balanced balance of payments, over loans and their repayment deadlines and the meaningfulness of projects in view of the lack of availability of trained workers and raw materials, he was also chairman of the planning commission and the central disciplinary commission of the party . The realization that not all initiated projects were affordable also supported Deng and criticized Hua Guofeng for unrealistic planning. Deng then took on the task of explaining to foreign partners, especially from Japan, that China has no money and therefore has to put projects on hold, postpone or cancel them entirely. On December 20, 1980, Li Xiannian suggested to the Yao Yilin State Planning Commission that birth planning be introduced as part of economic adjustment measures. Deng had already signaled his full support for this policy on March 23, 1979. The one-child policy emerged from this step .
The province of Guangdong were allowed to experiment in generating the necessary technology for imports foreign exchange. In 1977, Guangdong had little industry or foreign exchange to import foreign technology. The export of agricultural products and tourism were not very profitable. In 1978, Xi Zhongxun took over the post of First Provincial Party Secretary. He obtained permission from the central government to allow foreign investment. Initially, four special zones were set up where foreign companies could manufacture products for export. In 1980, at the request of Chen Yun, these zones were renamed special economic zones in order to ensure that only economic and no political experiments were carried out in these zones. However, Deng's approach was to use the Special Economic Zones for all of China to gain experience with markets, management and modern finance. Critics accused Deng of experimenting with capitalism without calling it by name. However, Deng never intended to question the position of the Chinese Communist Party. He wanted to maintain the dominance of state-owned companies in important branches of industry as well as state ownership of all land. He believed that markets should support the country's economic development. The third front policy , however, was abandoned. With the economic experiments in Guangdong Province, China successfully tapped the entrepreneurial potential of Chinese overseas and Hong Kong residents. In the 30 years after the opening policy began, exports from the People's Republic of China increased a hundredfold.
The rapid development of the special economic zones and, above all, the raw material requirements of foreign companies confused the plans drawn up centrally in Beijing. In addition, the economic opening in Guangdong was accompanied by problems such as smuggling, corruption and crime and party discipline suffered. Here, too, there were conflicts between Deng and Hu Yaobang on the one hand, who wanted to promote the development of the special economic zones, and Chen Yun, who urged caution and wanted to maintain party discipline. The politicians in Guangdong who pushed the opening up, especially Ren Zhongyi , had to appear before the Disciplinary Commission several times and criticize themselves . In the winter of 1982 Deng visited the province; however, Hu provided the support for the local politicians. Deng did not use his personal authority to develop the special economic zones and open up Guangdong Province.
By the end of 1982, the corruption and smuggling problems in Guangdong had been brought under control to such an extent that the party's Central Disciplinary Commission approved the opening policy. From then on, Deng encouraged everyone to learn from Shenzhen and Zhuhai . In the winter of 1984 Deng visited the south again. He had his tours of the modern factories, skyscrapers and office buildings in Shenzhen televised, which at the time had just gained wide coverage in China. In the summer of 1984, the opening policy was finally confirmed and, at Deng's initiative, expanded to 14 coastal cities.
Struggle for growth and reform
Thanks to Chen Yun's course, the Chinese economy was stable in 1982. Growth was 7.7% and the budget deficit was under control. Concerned about inflation and lack of raw materials, Chen warned against over-growth; However, Deng and Hu Yaobang pushed for faster growth. Like Deng and Hu, Chen approved of giving companies more freedom and the formation of prices through market forces. However, he defended the approach of drawing up centralized plans for the most important industries and stood for macroeconomic stability and party discipline.
In 1980, the People's Republic of China took over from Taiwan as a member of the World Bank . In April 1980 Deng met World Bank President Robert McNamara . As a result of this conversation, a three-month study trip of economists from the World Bank took place from October 1980 under the direction of the representative of the World Bank in China, Edwin Lim. The aim of this trip was to advise China on the transition from a planned to a market economy. A working group outside the party and state bureaucracy was set up in 1980 to cooperate with the World Bank and Japanese advisors. It should examine new directions of development for the economy. This group was headed by Zhao Ziyang. In 1981, Zhao's first World Bank report was approved and published. In 1983 Deng asked the new World Bank President Alden W. Clausen for an assessment of whether faster growth and the target of quadrupling the gross national product by the year 2000 would be possible. This question led to a new World Bank mission in China and a positive report in 1985.
Due to the strong growth in 1982 and 1983, Deng was at the height of his popularity. In this phase he coined the term socialism with Chinese characteristics at the third plenum of the 12th party congress . He got through that a reform of the economic structure was announced, in which more entrepreneurial freedoms should apply, in which prices would no longer be set by the state and where markets should generally rule. It also became apparent in this phase that a new tax system would be necessary. The conflicts over the economic course with Chen Yun became more serious during this phase. In late 1984 inflation reached worrying levels. Deng and Zhao Ziyang agreed to consolidation measures proposed by Chen in this situation. The fight against corruption has also been intensified.
In 1987, thanks to Chen's actions, the economy was back under control. Deng wanted to take advantage of the situation to push forward more strongly in the direction of liberalization. He enforced the language rule that planning is no longer the top priority . Against the advice of economists, he wanted to abolish the system of state-set prices. In mid-August 1988, Deng prevailed with these plans after heated discussions and the release of the prices for essential goods was announced in the party organ Renmin Ribao . There were panic buying and demonstrations against this plan. On August 30, Deng agreed to withdraw these measures. This mistake led to a great loss of influence and popularity for Deng as well as to criticism of Zhao Ziyang, who had to hand over the decision-making authority in economic matters to Li Peng . In the years 1988 to 1990 there was inflation; lending was cut, growth fell, unemployment rose. Deng was unable to mobilize resistance to Chen's economic course at this stage. Deng's goal of abandoning state-set prices was only implemented by Zhu Rongji in the mid-1990s .
Peak of power
Although Deng had not personally taken over the office of prime minister, but left it to one of his protégés, by the middle of 1981 he found himself in an unrestricted position of power. Regarding the Hong Kong media, he said, “I already have names and fame, right? I do not need more! You have to be farsighted, not short-sighted! ”From that point on, political and economic reforms became a higher priority.
In 1981, Deng began to reverse the Cultural Revolution in the sense that he let the Gang of Four and other leading figures from the Cultural Revolution try.
At the 12th party congress in September 1982, Deng then issued the following three goals for the work of the CP in the 1980s:
- Building a socialism with Chinese characteristics
- Reunification with Taiwan and resistance to the hegemony of the superpowers
- Build up the economy to reach an annual per capita income of $ 1,000 in 2000
Deng specified his goals for economic development in the so-called "three-step theory" as follows: From 1980 to 1990 the gross domestic product was supposed to double and the food and clothing problems of the population were to be solved. From 1990 to 2000, the gross domestic product was to double again and thus modest prosperity for the population should be achieved. In the next 50 years the connection to the moderately developed countries should be achieved.
retreat
After officially withdrawing from politics in 1990, Deng initially remained politically active for a few years. Supported by his family, especially his eldest son Deng Pufang , he continued to act as an advisor to the government, especially Jiang Zemins.
However, Deng repeatedly interfered in his affairs when he felt that his political legacy was in danger. Deng still wanted to exert influence, particularly in the formulation of the official statements during and after the fall of the communist governments in Eastern and Central Europe and the coup in Moscow in 1991. He frequently forced the conservative forces in government to remove "anti-capitalist" passages from their speeches.
Protests in Tian'anmen Square
On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, popular with the people, died after a brief illness. There were funeral rallies at which demands that became more radical over time were articulated. Deng Xiaoping, already 84 years old at the time, had no sympathy with the demonstrators because, in his opinion, they endangered the stability that he had ensured. In addition, the protesters implicitly criticized Deng by denouncing Hu as having been treated unfairly. The parallels to the student protests of 1976 were obvious. The reasons that fueled the protests, especially among students, included inflation, corrupt officials and lack of freedom in choosing a career in 1989, for which Deng was ultimately responsible.
When the funeral rallies turned to protest on April 18, 1989, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun Deng went to his home. Deng instructed toughness; a collapse of the authority of the Communist Party as it was going on in Eastern European countries at the time should not happen in China. Hu Qili and Hu Qiaomu were forced to write an editorial condemning the demonstrations and warning the students. At the same time he put the People's Liberation Army on alert. However, the leading article led to the expansion of the protests and the solidarity of party officials, state media and university staff with the students. In the ensuing disagreement between Zhao Ziyang , who wanted to withdraw the editorial and respond to the students' demands, and Li Peng, who insisted on rigor and discipline, Deng supported Li Peng in maintaining the authority of the CCP. Before Mikhail Gorbachev's visit , numerous students went on hunger strike, and party secretary Yan Mingfu was also unable to persuade the students to give up. On May 18, 1989, when Gorbachev was present, 1.2 million demonstrators were in Tian'anmen Square despite the rain. Deng felt so offended by this that he was ready to use force; Zhao personally did not manage to end the protests peacefully either.
The Standing Committee of the Politburo, under Deng's chairmanship, decided shortly afterwards to impose martial law. Zhao did not support this decision and resigned; before that, he had been Deng's designated successor and was supposed to take over his post as chairman of the Central Military Commission . After another attempt to personally persuade the students to leave Tian'anmen Square, Zhao was placed under house arrest; Zhao and Deng never met again afterwards. Martial law was subsequently proclaimed by Li Peng. After unarmed troops were forced to withdraw by popular resistance between May 20 and 22, it was clear that Deng was opposed to a mass movement. Deng ordered Yang Shangkun to prepare armed troops; Li Peng and Deng personally persuaded all senior party members and military officials of the need for hardship. After the demonstrators erected the goddess of democracy on May 29, Deng approved the plans to vacate the square on June 2 and on June 3 ordered General Chi Haotian to take all measures to restore order. An offer from the students to end the protests if their organizations were recognized was rejected. On June 3rd and 4th, Tian'anmen Square and the surrounding streets were forcibly cleared, the number of victims being unclear. Numerous demonstrators and intellectuals were arrested. Deng personally decided to punish Zhao Ziyang's assistant Bao Tong with seven years in prison.
Measures after the crackdown on the protests
On May 20, Deng had already started to consider restructuring the party and state leadership. It was important to him that Zhao Ziyang's economic policy would be continued, that corruption would be fought harder and that new personnel who would not be associated with the crackdown on the protests would take the lead. Jiang Zemin became general secretary of the party, Li Ruihuan took over from Hu Qili , Li Peng became prime minister, Yao Yilin became vice premier; Zhao was removed from the Politburo at the next plenary session and Deng announced his final retirement.
Deng believed for the rest of his life that he had made the right decision, even if he was said to be an insidious enemy of freedom. He considered maintaining the party's authority to be vital in order to modernize China and avoid the path of the Eastern European states. The later generations no longer dared to challenge the party leadership because, following the example of 1989, they had to expect a tough reaction and high costs.
He also personally campaigned for the lifting of the sanctions imposed by foreign countries after the Tiananmen protests were suppressed and received foreign guests of honor.
Deng's trip to southern China
Deng made the trip through the special economic zones in southern China in 1992 in order to strengthen the course of economic reform and to finally bring the party into line - against the resistance of orthodox communist currents around Li Peng, for example. Also in 1992, with a view to the time after his death, Deng proposed the hitherto unknown Hu Jintao , whose admission to the Politburo Standing Committee , as the successor to Jiang Zemin after his term in office. This proposal was approved in 2002 after Jiang Zemin left.
Starting with the events around Tian'anmen Square in 1989, reform-oriented circles put on hold due to the renewed strength of the party left. After stabilizing his course within the party, Deng, who was then 87 years old, traveled to southern China in March and April 1992 to encourage both party officials and the rest of the population to take reform steps. There he presented his idea of a “socialist market economy”. He said:
“You have to show a little more courage in reform and opening up policies , courage to experiment, not like women with bound feet. When you have recognized the goal, then bravely try, then bravely set off! Without bravado, without 'adventurism' everything will remain sap and powerless, then we will not take a good path, we will not take a new path and we will not be able to create anything new. ... Reforming cities and rural areas is not about debates, but about brave attempts, brave riot; our policy allows for attempts; allowing for attempts is much better than any coercion. ... You have to seize the opportunity and now is such an opportunity. I worry that the opportunity will be missed, the opportunity will not be seized; if you see an opportunity and don't take it, suddenly the right time is over. "
Deng's remarks were of particular importance because many of the reforms were first tried out in small districts, but there they often violated national laws. In this context, the support of Deng, who spoke of allowing attempts and courageous progress, was of great importance.
retirement
Deng's health continued to deteriorate, and the pictures televised on his 90th birthday in 1994 showed a man unable to function without the help of his daughters. His youngest daughter Deng Rong was his secretary and official spokeswoman for these last few years, as he was unable to speak even because of his Parkinson's disease . Public appearances became increasingly rare. Deng finally died in 1997 of complications from Parkinson's disease and a lung infection.
China to Deng
After Deng's death, his policy was not revised, as was the policy of his predecessor Mao Zedong . Deng's policies were legitimized by success, and he left power structures that were more stable than those that Mao had created. Since the institutions and the role of law were strengthened under Deng, a power struggle did not break out immediately after Deng's death, as did after Mao's death. After Deng's death, power struggles took place primarily within the party bodies, not in public as in the Cultural Revolution . The transition to the time after Deng went off quite smoothly because Deng only assumed the role of “watchdog” in the last years of his life, but was already building up his successors.
A major difference between the time after Deng and the time after Mao was that Mao wanted to force a communist society, while it was not clear with Deng whether he was more of a Confucian . When the former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt asked Deng that the Communist Party was no longer communist and that he himself wasn't a Communist, but rather a Confucian, Deng replied the famous: “So what?” ( English for “ So what?” " ).
Both the communist Mao and the nationalist Chiang had recognized the necessity of economic development and tried to implement it according to their ideas; However, Deng was the one who managed to do this most impressively. For hundreds of millions of people, the quality of life improved noticeably during Deng's reign. It is therefore said of Deng Xiaoping's reforms that they achieved the greatest welfare gain of all time that any individual has ever achieved. Under Deng it was possible to make the transition from revolutionaries to professional technocrats in terms of personnel selection .
On the other hand, the differences between rich and poor in China are intensifying more rapidly than in any other country, both geographically and socially. Since Deng's reforms, China has been moving rapidly away from the egalitarian society that Mao had in mind.
Deng Xiaoping's reforms put pragmatism above the values of Maoism and communism. The so-called "Dengism" is therefore also referred to as "philosophy without philosophy". The Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping include any philosophical treatises, such as those Mao left to posterity, but mostly administrative instructions and speeches at various conferences, which was smoothed by the party censorship the sometimes hefty language Deng. This shows that Deng was less someone looking for new ways than someone who complied with demands and was able to implement them efficiently.
Honors
1978 and 1985 he was a man of the year of Time Magazine.
A very large iron monument was erected in his place of honor as a model for all Chinese. Deng was a chain smoker, but the cigarette was cut out of his left hand in 2000.
In several cities in China, Deng Xiaoping is also honored with his image on central streets with the help of large billboards.
Deng Xiaoping, (sitting) in the park in his honor at the place of birth
Street billboard with Deng Xiaoping in Dujiangyan ( Sichuan )
literature
The following sources were used to compile this article:
- Benjamin Yang: Deng. A political biography. New York 1998, ISBN 1-56324-722-4 .
- Richard Evans: Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China. New York 1994, ISBN 0-14-026747-6 .
- Helmut Schmidt , Frank Sieren : Neighbor China. Helmut Schmidt in conversation with Frank Sieren. Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-430-30004-5
- Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China , Harvard University Press 2011.
Further literature:
- Uli Franz Deng Xiaoping, Chinas Renewer - A Biography DVA, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06371-0 .
- David SG Goodman Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution - A Political biography Routledge, London 1994.
- Wei Jingsheng Deng Xiaoping In: Time (23 Aug 1999), online source .
- Deng Maomao ( Deng Rong ): My Father Deng Xiaoping. New York 1995, ISBN 0-465-01625-1 and Deng Xiaoping and the Cultural Revolution. A Daughter Recalls the Critical Years. Translated from the Chinese by Sidney Shapiro. C. Bertelsmann, New York 2005, ISBN 0-385-51476-X .
- Barry Naughton Deng Xiaoping: The Economist In: David Shambaugh (Ed.) Deng Xiaoping - Portrait of a Chinese Statesman Clarendon 1995, pp. 83-106.
- Lucian W. Pye An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture In: David Shambaugh (Ed.) Deng Xiaoping - Portrait of a Chinese Statesman Clarendon 1995, pp. 4-35.
- Jonathan Spence Deng Xiaoping - The Maoist who reinvented himself, transformed a nation, and changed the world In: Time (2006), online source ( Memento of July 11, 2011 in the Internet Archive ).
- Jiang Zemin Our Beloved Leader: Speech Given at Deng Xiaoping's Memorial Meeting In: Asian Affairs , Volume 24, Issue 2 (1997), pp. 113–124.
Publications of Deng Xiaoping
- Selected works of Deng Xiaoping. (English; 3 volumes) Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1995/1995/1994.
- Report on the amendment of the party statutes. In: The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China, Documents , Volume I. Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, Beijing, 1956.
- The unity of the Chinese people and of all the peoples of the world. Written for Pravda on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, Beijing, 1959.
- Speech by Deng Hsiao-ping, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, at the special session of the UN General Assembly (April 10, 1974). Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, Beijing, 1974.
- Selected Writings (1975–1982). Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, Beijing, 1985.
- Obituary of Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping at the great funeral service in honor of Comrade Chou En-lai. In: “Roter Morgen”, central organ of the KPD / Marxist-Leninists, January 31, 1976, p. 9.
- Closing speech at the XI. Chinese Communist Party Congress. In: The XI. Chinese Communist Party Congress, documents. Foreign Language Literature Publishing House, Beijing, 1977.
- The reform of the revolution. A billion people on the way. Siedler, Berlin, 1988, ISBN 3-88680-316-3 .
Quotes
"Getting rich is glorious!"
"This person does not touch the class struggle."
"Look at Deng Xiaoping, he is small and may not make an appearance, but he is a good and capable comrade."
“Our Chinese donkeys are slow, but slowness also has its advantages - a car drives fast, but if you knock it over you have to pay for it with your death; a donkey walks slowly, but it definitely reaches its destination. "
Individual evidence
- ↑ 关于 “总设计师” 称谓 提法 的 来龙去脉 - 邓小平 纪念 网 - 人民网. Retrieved July 11, 2020 .
- ^ Chief Architect of China's Reform and Opening-up. Retrieved July 11, 2020 .
- ↑ Nele Noesselt: forms of governance in China: Theory and Practice of the Chinese model . Springer-Verlag, 2012, ISBN 978-3-658-00723-2 ( google.com [accessed July 11, 2020]).
- ↑ a b Tong Qinglin (童青林): 回首 1978—— 历史 在 这里 转折. In: Renmin Ribao . Retrieved July 11, 2020 .
- ↑ Chris Buckley, Adam Wu: Ending Term Limits for China's Xi Is a Big Deal. Here's why. In: The New York Times . March 10, 2018, ISSN 0362-4331 ( nytimes.com [accessed July 11, 2020]).
- ^ Chen Jianfu: The Revision of the Constitution in the PRC. A great leap forward or a symbolic gesture? In: China Perspectives . tape 2004 , no. 53 , May 1, 2004, ISSN 2070-3449 , doi : 10.4000 / chinaperspectives.2922 ( openedition.org [accessed July 11, 2020]).
- ↑ TIME Magazine Cover: Deng Xiaoping, Man of the Year - Jan. 6, 1986. Retrieved July 11, 2020 (American English).
- ↑ Michael Elliott: 1979 - Deng Xiaoping . In: Time . December 10, 2008, ISSN 0040-781X ( time.com [accessed July 11, 2020]).
- ↑ Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour . 2009.
- ↑ Yang Shengqun, Yan Jianqi: Deng Xiaoping nianpu (邓小平 年谱), Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) 2009, ISBN 978-7-5073-2767-0 , p. 1
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 15 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 12 .
- ↑ Yang Shengqun, Yan Jianqi: Deng Xiaoping nianpu (邓小平 年谱), Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) 2009, ISBN 978-7-5073-2767-0 , p. 2
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 13 .
- ↑ Geneviève Barman and Nicole Dulioust: Les années françaises de Deng Xiaoping , in: Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire. N ° 20, October / December 1988, p. 17
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 17 .
- ↑ a b c Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 16 f .
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- ↑ Yang Shengqun, Yan Jianqi: Deng Xiaoping nianpu (邓小平 年谱), Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) 2009, ISBN 978-7-5073-2767-0 , pp. 2-3
- ↑ Geneviève Barman and Nicole Dulioust: Les années françaises de Deng Xiaoping . In: Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire , No. 20, October / December 1988, p. 18
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- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 23 .
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- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 33 .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 34 .
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- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 35 .
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- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 37 .
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- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 151 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 150 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 153 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 155-159 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 38 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 159-163 .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 40 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 164-169 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 39 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 169-174 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 175-183 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 183-186 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 188-192 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 192-201 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 201-203 .
- ↑ a b Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 212-215 .
- ↑ Benjamin Yang: Deng. A political biography. New York 1998, ISBN 1-56324-722-4 , p. 151
-
↑ Original quote and context:
我们 的 人民 是 团结 的 ， 是 相信 党 ， 相信 毛主席 能够 领导 大家 克服 困难 好 起来 的。 经济 形势 是 不大 好 好 ， 情况 还 不能 一下子 改变 过来 ， 主要 决定 于 农业 的 恢复。 农业要 恢复 ， 主要 是 两个 方面 的 政策 ， 一是 把 农民 的 积极 性 调动 起来 ， 一是 工业 支援 农业。 调动 调动 农民 的 积极 性 ， 主要 还得 还得 从 生产 关系 上 解决。 生产 关系 究竟 以 什么 形式 为 最好 ，恐怕 要 采取 这样 一种 态度 ， 就是 哪种 形式 在 哪个 地方 能够 比较 容易 比较 快 地 恢复 和 发展 农业 生产 生产 ， 就 采取 哪种 形式 ； 群众 群众 愿意 采取 哪种 形式 ， 就 应该 采取 哪种 形式 ， 不 合法 的使它 合法 起来 ， 就像 四川 话 “黄 猫 、 黑猫 ， 只要 捉住 老鼠 就是 好 猫”。 现在 看来 ， 不论 工业 还是 农业 ， 非 退一步 不能 前进。
“Our people are united, they trust the party and it trusts that Chairman Mao can guide everyone through difficulties. The economic situation is not particularly good and it cannot be changed in an instant, so the most important decisions are the recovery of agriculture. Agricultural recovery is subject to two measures, adjustment of farmers' motivation and support from industry. With regard to the motivation of the farmers, one has to start with the production relationships. When deciding which production relationships are the best, one must approach with the following attitude: The system with which one can easily and quickly bring about the recovery and increase in agricultural production everywhere should be used if the masses want a certain system , this is how you should use this system, and if it is not legal you have to legalize it, just like they say in Sichuan: 'Yellow or black, a cat that catches mice is a good cat'. ”
Quoted from: Yang Shengqun, Yan Jianqi: Deng Xiaoping nianpu (邓小平 年谱), Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) 2009, ISBN 978-7-5073-2767-0 , p. 1714 - ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 220-233 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 233-238 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 238-246 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 246-251 .
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 43
- ↑ a b c Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 57
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 252 .
- ↑ a b c d e Teng: The main thing is that the cat catches mice . In: Der Spiegel . No. 3 , 1976, p. 68-76 ( Online - Jan. 12, 1976 ).
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 255-257 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 259-260 .
- ↑ a b c Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 44
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 53
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 45
- ↑ Black cat . In: Der Spiegel . No. 4 , 1974, p. 76-78 ( Online - Jan. 24, 1974 ).
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 68
- ↑ Yang Shengqun, Yan Jianqi: Deng Xiaoping nianpu (邓小平 年谱), Beijing (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) 2009, ISBN 978-7-5073-2767-0 , p. 1950
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 51
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 264-270 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 64
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 52
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 60
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 70
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 71
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 74
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 76
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 78
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 84
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 86
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 94
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 92
- ↑ Changshan Li: The Chinese Cultural Revolution ( Memento from July 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) , Friedrich Wilhelm University Bonn, p. 176
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 93
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 98
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 97
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 102
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 104
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 110
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 126
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 128
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 95
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 117
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 119
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 118
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 121
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 129
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 139
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 145
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 140
- ↑ Changshan Li: The Chinese Cultural Revolution ( Memento from July 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) , Friedrich Wilhelm University Bonn, p. 188
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 152
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 154
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 149
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 159
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 161
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 165
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 167
- ↑ Changshan Li: The Chinese Cultural Revolution ( Memento from July 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) , Friedrich Wilhelm University Bonn, p. 67
- ↑ Changshan Li: The Chinese Cultural Revolution ( Memento from July 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) , Friedrich Wilhelm University Bonn, p. 193
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 170
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 171
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 175
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; Pp. 172-190
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 181
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 183
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 197
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 200
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 209
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 210ff
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 207ff
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; Pp. 213-235
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; Pp. 229-238
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 239
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 246
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 247ff
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 257
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 258f
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 263f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 350f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 351
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 353f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 354
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 355f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 358f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 365
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 369
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 373
- ↑ Benjamin Yang: Deng. A political biography . New York 1998, ISBN 1-56324-722-4 , pp. 214 .
- ↑ a b c d Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; Pp. 380-387
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 266f.
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 283
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 295
- ^ A b c Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 186 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 277f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 291
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 290
- ^ A b Reform or decline . In: Der Spiegel . No. 14 , 1992, pp. 178-179 ( Online - Mar. 30, 1992 ).
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 292
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 280
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 294f.
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 297
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 299ff
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 309
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 187-189 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 203 .
- ↑ Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine: Deng Xiaoping, a revolutionary life . Oxford University Press, New York 2015, ISBN 978-0-19-062367-8 , pp. 231-233 .
- ↑ Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 185 .
- ^ A b Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 187 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 536.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 389 .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 610 ff .
- ↑ Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 191 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 613 ff .
- ↑ Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 194 f .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 270.
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 273ff.
- ↑ a b c Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 526ff.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 529.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 532.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 533.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 477 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 479 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 481 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 486 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 487 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 488 ff .
- ^ A b Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 41 f .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 493 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 498-507 .
- ↑ Ronald C. Keith: Deng Xiaoping and China's foreign policy . Routledge, London and New York 2018, ISBN 978-1-138-40018-4 , pp. 163 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 499 ff .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 543
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 524
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 523f
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 542
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 363
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 547
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 540.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 541.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 525
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 545.
- ↑ a b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 538ff.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 550f
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 552
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 424 f .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 434
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 439
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 436ff.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 441
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 542ff.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping ; P. 445f.
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 425-434 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 435 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 394 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 400 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 402 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 404 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 417 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 421 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 451 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 452 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 454 f .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 460 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 470 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 472 .
- ↑ Benjamin Yang: Deng. A political biography. New York 1998, ISBN 1-56324-722-4 , p. 214
- ↑ Review and Prospects: 1980-2020 (Part I). China's Comprehensive National Strength Keeps Rising In: China News September 15, 2004
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 598 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 599 f .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 605 f .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 616 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 607 f .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 615 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 618 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 621 f .
- ^ A b Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 628 ff .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 622 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 634 .
- ↑ Ezra F. Vogel: Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China . Harvard University Pess, 2011, ISBN 978-0-674-05544-5 , pp. 633 .
- ↑ On the situation of Chinese farmers, Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, 2004, p. 354
- ↑ On the situation of Chinese farmers, Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao, 2004, p. 363
- ↑ Heinz-Norbert Jocks: Interview: "China is a gigantic experiment" . Interview with Helmut Schmidt in Tagesspiegel, April 6, 2008.
Web links
- Literature by and about Deng Xiaoping in the catalog of the German National Library
- ARTE documentary about Deng Xiaoping
- Georg Blume: Comment: “Some have to get rich first” , Die Zeit 35/2004 of August 19, 2004
Chair: Mao Zedong | Hua Guofeng | Hu Yaobang
General Secretaries:
Chen Duxiu |
Xiang Zhongfa |
Deng Xiaoping |
Hu Yaobang |
Zhao Ziyang |
Jiang Zemin |
Hu Jintao |
Xi Jinping
| personal data | |
|---|---|
| SURNAME | Deng Xiaoping |
| ALTERNATIVE NAMES | v = 邓小平 (Chinese) |
| BRIEF DESCRIPTION | Chinese politician |
| DATE OF BIRTH | August 22, 1904 |
| PLACE OF BIRTH | Xiexing |
| DATE OF DEATH | February 19, 1997 |
| Place of death | Beijing |