Crimean crisis

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Map of the Crimean peninsula

The Crimean crisis is a political, at times armed conflict around the Crimean peninsula , the course of which was initially determined by covert interventions and by the annexation by Russia in March 2014. The opportunity for the Russian Federation arose from a crisis in Ukraine , which later developed into open war in parts of the Ukrainian east with Russian intervention on the part of the separatists.

With Russia breaking international treaties such as the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on respect for Ukraine's existing borders and other principles of the CSCE Final Act of 1975 , the Charter of Paris 1990 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997, an international crisis has arisen.

Overview

4th - 12th February 2014: A strategy paper, allegedly from the Kremlin ( Konstantin Valerjewitsch Malofejew or IRSS) and handed over to President Putin in mid-February, describes in seven points the possible Russian behavior towards Ukraine. The strategy corresponds in many respects to later events, it also concerns the “accession of Crimea” to the Russian Federation.

On February 20, three Russian admirals held talks with Leonid Gratsch in Crimea to persuade him to become the new Prime Minister. The inscription on the Russian medal for the return of the Crimea dates the start of the deployment of the Russian troops on this day .

On February 21, after months of protests by Euromaidan and the resignation of the Ukrainian government at the end of January 2014, an agreement was reached in Kiev to resolve the crisis in Ukraine .

On February 22, the Ukrainian parliament declared the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, who had fled Kiev the night before, to be deposed. In the Party of Regions, which had an absolute majority of the seats in the Crimean parliament, secession was not discussed during this period .

On the morning of February 23, according to Russian sources, President Putin declared that preparations had to be made to “bring Crimea back to Russia”, “to give the residents the opportunity to decide their own fate”.

On February 25, there were violent clashes between pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars and pro-Russian demonstrators in front of the parliament building in Simferopol , where, according to media reports, parliament was already about to decide whether the Autonomous Republic of Crimea should remain in Ukraine.

On February 27, the first direct reports on the deployment of Russian troops stationed in Crimea were reported; the military occupied strategically important buildings and facilities.

In the days that followed, there was a change of power in the government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in camera and under the protection of these troops. Together with Russia, the new government of Crimea, which itself was not democratically legitimized, denied the legitimacy of the transitional government of Ukraine.

On March 6, parliament voted in favor of annexation to Russia.

On March 16, a referendum on the status of Crimea , illegal under Ukrainian law, was held at short notice . According to the published results, 96.77 percent of the participants were in favor of Crimea joining the Russian Federation, while voter turnout was 83.1 percent. The Russian Human Rights confirmed after talks with journalists, human rights activists, lawyers and other inhabitants of the Crimea in April 2014 that the official results do not match and the actual turnout was in the city of Sevastopol only 30-50% with an approval rate of 50-60%.

On March 17, the Republic of Crimea applied for membership to the Russian Federation.

On March 18, following a speech by Putin , the treaty on the accession of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as 84th and 85th federal subjects to the Russian state association was signed in the Kremlin .

On March 21, 2014, this treaty was ratified by the Russian Federation Council . Since then, the Russian Federation has considered the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol to be part of Russia. Ukraine does not recognize this, but continues to regard the entire Crimea as Ukrainian territory .

Russia, which was largely isolated in the UN and the Security Council, had vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have obliged the international community not to recognize the result of the referendum. The principle applies, however, without a resolution: The port the annexation of the Crimea can by international law not to be recognized current rules. The UN General Assembly declared the referendum and the secession of Crimea to be invalid with resolution 68/262 . The decision was taken with a majority of 100 votes in favor, 11 against, with 58 abstentions.

According to the UN, around 10,000 people were displaced between the start of the Crimean crisis and May 2014. The displaced are mainly Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians.

background

Changing political affiliation

In the course of history the Crimea went through an eventful political development; Before the 300-year Ottoman rule from 1475 , it was Mongolian and Genoese and, with the principality of Theodoro , the last remaining area of ​​the Byzantine empire. In the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774) the peninsula came under Russian control; Even the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 did not change anything in terms of membership of the Russian Empire , despite the Russian defeat .

There were also phases of autonomy again and again - for example in 1917/18 as the People's Republic of Crimea and from 1921 to 1946 as the Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Crimea . From 1946 to 1954, the peninsula was part of the Soviet Union as an oblast to the Russian , then until 1991 to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic .

In the course of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became an independent Ukrainian state on August 24, 1991 within the existing borders, including Crimea.

In the December 1991 referendum on Ukraine's independence, 54 percent of voters in the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Crimea voted “Yes”.

Crimean crisis (1992-1994)

As early as 1992 to 1994 there was a crisis between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation because of Russian attempts to secede the Crimea, which is considered to be the first post-Soviet conflict . In this context, the Crimean Parliament passed two different versions of the constitutional text in 1992.

Population of Crimea

Proportion of Russian native speakers in the total population in the regions of Ukraine (2001)
Share of votes of the Party of Regions (blue) in the 2012 parliamentary election

After the Russian conquest of Crimea in the 18th century, an increasing number of Russians and Ukrainians settled in the Crimea. Until the end of the 19th century, the predominantly Sunni Crimean Tatars still made up the majority of the population.

Under Josef Stalin , in 1944 the entire Tatar population, who were generally accused of collaborating with the German invaders , was deported to the Ural region , Siberia and Uzbekistan and replaced by newly settled Russians. Tatar historians estimate that up to 45 percent of the Tatar population were killed in the deportations and forced settlements.

The surviving Crimean Tatars and their descendants were not allowed to return to their homeland until 1988. Their share of the population increased from 1.9% in 1989 to 12.1% in 2001. In the 2001 census, Russians were the largest ethnic group with 58.5% , followed by Ukrainians with 24.4%. In addition to the Crimean Tatars, according to the 2001 census, there are also Belarusians , Tatars , Jews, Germans, Armenians, Bulgarians , Greeks, Koreans and the like. a. to the minorities. Russian is the dominant language in Crimea; around 5% of the students attended Ukrainian-speaking schools in 2005 .

Russian naval base

Guided missile cruiser Moskva in Sevastopol

The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been stationed on the Crimean peninsula since it was founded in 1783. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation and Ukraine shared the fleet and in 1997 signed a lease agreement to allow Russian forces to continue their stay in Crimea. In 2010, the original lease, which would have expired in 2017, was extended to 2042. In 2008, then-President Viktor Yushchenko threatened Russia with the closure of the Crimean ports during the Caucasus War .

The upper limits of the contract are 388 ships, 161 aircraft and 25,000 soldiers. In 2010 there were more than 16,000 soldiers and over 40 ships in the Russian Black Sea Fleet. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, there were around 19,000 Russian soldiers in Crimea on March 10, 2014. The Russian Navy has an area of ​​180 km² in the Crimea, 30 km² of which is port area in Sevastopol.

Political upheaval in Ukraine in 2014

The mass protests in Ukraine on Maidan Nezalezhnosti on December 8, 2013

On February 21, 2014, following the escalation of the Euromaidan protests, Ukrainian President Yanukovych signed an agreement to settle the crisis with opposition leaders Vitali Klitschko , Oleh Tjahnybok and Arseniy Yatsenjuk . The agreement brokered by the foreign ministers of Germany , Poland and France , Frank-Walter Steinmeier , Radosław Sikorski and Laurent Fabius , not only provided for the disarming of right-wing extremists, but also a return to the 2004 constitution , the formation of a government of national unity and an early presidential election . The agreement was not signed by the Russian mediator Vladimir Lukin and was rejected by the “ Maidan Council ”. As a result, a large part of the police and security forces defected to the Maidan, the existing power structure collapsed and Yanukovych initially fled to Kharkiv , later he fled to Russia.

On February 22, 2014, the incumbent Ukrainian parliament declared Yanukovych to be deposed. From a purely constitutional point of view, the procedure was not constitutional, as the reason given by Parliament of “forfeiting the presidency by leaving the country” was not provided for in the constitution. Nonetheless, all former Soviet republics outside Russia recognized the Ukrainian interim government, at least implicitly. Russia, on the other hand, explicitly refused to recognize the transitional government after actively helping Yanukovych to flee.

Arseniy Yatsenyuk was confirmed by parliament as prime minister of the transitional government. Three members of the right-wing populist Svoboda party were also accepted into the cabinet .

The Ukrainian parliament then passed a series of legislative changes. A draft law to abolish the Language Act of 2012 was vetoed by interim President Oleksandr Turchynov . This language law, which had already been politically instrumentalized before, referred to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages , although Russian was never a " regional or minority language that was" gradually disappearing "according to its preamble. In addition, the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea of ​​1998 guaranteed the use of the Russian language in all areas of public life, which is why the language law was never used there.

The uncertainty that did arise was intensified by the Russian media through propaganda reporting, which also made use of obvious forgeries. The Russian state media and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev have repeatedly spread the assertion that the residents of Crimea are threatened by both the paramilitary , radical nationalist right-wing sector and the new Kiev government, which consists of fascists and extremists .

Russian propaganda

Russian support for separatism efforts was known in the Crimea as far back as 10 years, according to Mykola Ryabchuk , but in November 2013 it began to develop into an information war.

In its report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine in April 2014, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote that propaganda on television in the Russian Federation had increased significantly in parallel with developments in Crimea, including hate propaganda that was outlawed under international law . The German political scientist Andreas Umland said at the beginning of March 2014 that the first 20 minutes of the Russian news were "partly pure hate propaganda". There is also organized Russian internet propaganda , which has been used on a massive scale since the Ukraine conflict and the Crimean crisis.

Economic situation

The support of the people of Crimea for the action of Russia, but also in the whole of Russia, was directly dependent on the expectations of the economic situation, as well as on the promise to adjust the previous pensions to the Russian ones and thus to double them. In Ukraine, old-age pensions were even no longer paid out in full because of the impending Ukrainian bankruptcy . The per capita income in Crimea before the annexation was less than a third of that of Russia; According to critics, the Ukrainian state invested too little in the region. The annual budget deficit of the Crimea was estimated at the equivalent of 55 billion rubles (about 1.1 billion euros ) in spring 2014 .

Oil and gas fields in the Black Sea

Large, as yet undeveloped oil and gas reserves lie off the coast of Crimea. For the development of the Skifska gas field , the Ukrainian government had planned an agreement with an international consortium led by ExxonMobil at the end of 2013 , the signing of which was postponed. Their Russian competitor Lukoil was defeated in a bidding process in 2012. Starting in 2017, up to ten billion cubic meters of gas should be produced annually; the exploitation of all offshore supplies could have replaced about a fifth of Ukrainian gas imports. The total reserves are estimated by the Ukrainian Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources to be up to eight trillion cubic meters.

course

Russian intervention in Crimea

Loss of power of the local government

Soldiers without national emblems at Simferopol airport on February 28, 2014
Military base in Perewalne during the Crimean crisis

On February 19, 2014, a possible constitutional amendment of Ukraine was discussed in the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea . It adopted a statement that "the active participation of the regions of Ukraine" in the preparations for a constitutional amendment is appropriate. A representative from the lectern also called for Crimea to return to Russia "if the situation in Ukraine does not resolve itself". On the same day, the President of Parliament, Vladimir Andreevich Konstantinov , traveled to Moscow . There he spoke about the secession of Crimea from Ukraine, by revoking the decision of 1954 (decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the handover of the Crimean peninsula from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian Union Republic), "if the country falls apart". There is still a chance of saving the country. The current fighting is not about Crimea, but about Kiev; only if this struggle is lost will the Crimean Autonomous Government decide its future. Konstantinov was of the opinion that a foreign army of 5,000 men was in fact deployed in Kiev, which practically challenged the entire Russian world, the Ukraine was just a stage and asked for Russia to intervene to save the central power. "A referendum will not be necessary in 'the first stage' for the exit from Ukraine," said Konstantinov, which is currently not pending. "If we deal with the exit now, we will ruin the country."

Following the continuation of the violent clashes in Kiev on February 21, 2014, parts of the Crimean parliament wanted to turn to Russian President Vladimir Putin for support in a session on the same day. The parliamentary appeal, however, was prevented by extra-parliamentary Crimean Tatars, who previously threatened to occupy the parliament and to hinder parliamentary work. As a result, a parliamentary request to Russia was not made. The question of a possible secession of Crimea from Ukraine was also not raised by any MP during the entire parliamentary session.

Vladimir Putin reported in February 2015 that he himself had declared on the morning of February 23, 2014 in the Kremlin because of Yanukovych's increasing loss of power to his employees: “We have to start bringing Crimea back to Russia”. In March 2014, Putin publicly replied to the question of whether he was considering Crimea joining Russia: “No, we are not considering that.” And further: “We will not bring about such a decision or arouse such feelings.” In May In 2014, Putin also denied that members of the Russian army intervened in what was happening there. However, he had already admitted it in June 2014.

On February 26, 2014, supporters of the new Ukrainian leadership and pro-Russian demonstrators clashed at the parliament building in Simferopol. Two people were killed and several dozen were injured. While Russian President Vladimir Putin initially denied the involvement of Russian military personnel, it became known in June 2014 that he was honoring compatriots who “had made a contribution” to the annexation of Crimea. Many have a criminal history and have a criminal record for breaking into their homes, robbery or fraud.

Occupation of Parliament

On February 27, 2014, armed men who described themselves as “self-defenders of the Russian-speaking population of Crimea” occupied the parliament building. They demanded that MPs immediately set a date for a referendum on Crimea as a state. The following special session was not open to the public and journalists were excluded. Access was only granted to MPs who had been “invited” by Sergei Aksyonov , who was then still an ordinary MP, who had only been elected as chief during that session . They were searched and had to hand over their cell phones. During the meeting there were armed men with bazookas in the room. The Russian field commander Igor Girkin said: “It was the fighters who rounded up the MPs and forced them to vote. Yes, I was one of the commanders of these fighters. "

According to an announcement made by telephone and via a parliamentary website, 61 out of 64 MPs present voted for a referendum on the independence of Crimea, which was to be held on May 25, 2014, at the same time as the presidential elections in Ukraine. However, media research revealed that too few people entitled to vote were present to meet the quorum of 51 members for the quorum; votes were counted by members of parliament who said they were not present. This affects at least 10 of the votes cast, for which duplicates of voting cards stolen from Parliament's safe were used. Some MPs whose votes were registered said they had not even been to Simferopol. The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten spoke of 36 present, Ukrainian sources of 43 present.

At the same meeting, Anatoly Mohilev from the Party of Regions , who had been Prime Minister of Crimea since November 8, 2011, was deposed, and Sergei Aksyonov from the marginal Russian Unity party was appointed the new Prime Minister. Aksyonov was not recognized as Prime Minister of Crimea by the Ukrainian interim government; he himself continued to regard Yanukovych as the rightful president of Ukraine and asked Russia for "protection from violent Ukrainian nationalists and extremists".

Ukraine and Russia in conflict over the Russian military presence

The Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov assessed the events in Crimea as an armed invasion and occupation by the Russian army. According to him, armed units of the Russian Black Sea Fleet also blocked Belbek Airport near Sevastopol. According to the Ukrainian interim government, up to 2,000 Russian soldiers landed in Crimea by air on February 27, 2014. The Russian government did not confirm this information, the Russian representative at the UN stated in an emergency meeting of the Security Council in New York that all activities of the Russian troops were within the framework of the agreement on the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainian interim president Oleksandr Turchynow called on Russia's President Vladimir Putin to immediately stop the "naked aggression against Ukraine". Turchynov's spokesman Serhiy Kunitsyn said in a TV interview on February 28th that he would veto the abolition of the language law as interim president .

On February 27, 2014, members of the Berkut special unit , which had been declared disbanded the day before by the interior minister of the Ukrainian interim government Arsen Avakov, were celebrated like heroes in the Crimea. They publicly asked for forgiveness for "not being able to stop the fascists in Kiev". The following night gunmen broke into Simferopol Airport and briefly occupied it. Flight operations were not affected.

On February 28, the Ukrainian parliament asked the UN Security Council for help. Yuri Serheyev , Ukrainian representative at the UN, called on the Security Council to do everything in its power to stop the "brutal aggression of the Russian Federation".

On March 1, 2014, Russian President Putin asked the Federation Council for permission to use Russian forces in Ukraine. In view of the extraordinary situation, this is necessary to protect Russian citizens and the armed forces stationed in Crimea until the situation has normalized. The Federation Council authorized Putin to deploy troops on the same day. On March 4, he said in a TV interview that it was not Russian troops but “local self-defense forces” that had taken control of the Crimea. A deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine has not yet been necessary. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said of the pictures of Russian military equipment held by the “unknown” soldiers on March 5: “This is a provocation”. When asked about a video in which uniformed men refer to themselves as Russians, he said "This is pure nonsense", and when asked where the armored vehicles "Tiger" and "Luchs" came from, he replied: "I have no idea."

Ukrainian interim president Turchynov ordered all Ukrainian military units to be on alert in a televised speech on the evening of March 1 . Russia has no basis for its "act of aggression". Reports of dangers for Russian citizens or Russian-speaking Ukrainians in Crimea are fictitious. The human rights organization Human Rights Watch , on the other hand, documented several cases in which pro-Russian militias, assigned to the so-called “self-defense forces” in Crimea, mistreated civilians and abducted pro-Ukrainian activists. After his kidnapping by unknown paramilitaries on Lenin Square in Simferopol on March 3, the handcuffed body of one of the missing activists was found on March 16 in a wooded area near Bilohirsk . The human rights activists demanded clarification of the fate of the other displaced persons and demanded the dissolution of the self-defense forces or their integration into the command structure and operations of the regular security authorities in Crimea, which did not seem to exist until the referendum on the 16th.

Russian and Ukrainian media reported on March 2, 2014 that the flagship of the Ukrainian Navy , the frigate Hetman Sahajdachny , hoisted the Saint Andrew flag of the Russian Navy on its way back from Somalia to Sevastopol . The new Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk had asked Turkey not to allow the ship to sail through the Bosporus into the Black Sea . The Ukrainian Defense Ministry contradicted this account. The crew of the ship never violated their oath on Ukraine or raised another flag. The frigate is in Crete and will return to its home port as planned in the next few days. The rear admiral Denys Berezovskyi , appointed the day before by the Ukrainian interim president Turchynov as the new commander of the Ukrainian navy, submitted to the government of Crimea on March 2. The Ukrainian government said it had opened proceedings against Berezovsky for treason . On the same day, the heads of the security service , the interior ministry, civil defense and border guards with Crimea also confessed . On March 3, the Russian government commissioned the state-owned Russian infrastructure company Avtodor to establish a subsidiary for the construction of the Kerch Bridge .

On March 4, 2014, the OSCE decided to send unarmed military observers at Ukraine's request . The observers were denied access to the Crimea.

On March 6, 2014 Asked decommissioned in August 2011 Russian anti-submarine cruiser was Otschakow the Kara-class cruiser of the Russian armed forces in the driveway of the Ukrainian naval base Novoozerne scuttled in the Crimea, to block the driveway. Only the Kostjantyn Olschanskyj and two minesweepers initially evaded the access of the Russian troops, while the other Ukrainian ships were stormed in the port of Nowooserne or their crews were ordered to overflow. On March 12th, Turchynov ruled out a military operation in the Crimea, which would expose the Ukrainian eastern border.

According to Ukrainian information, Russian troops advanced on the Arabat Spit into the Ukrainian Oblast of Kherson on March 15 . 60 to 80 soldiers are said to have landed with helicopters and occupied a natural gas station near Strilkowe . According to the government of the Republic of Crimea, however, it was self-defense forces who wanted to protect the Ukrainian station from raids. On March 24, Turchynov announced that the Ukrainian government had ordered the withdrawal of its troops from Crimea.

According to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Ihor Tenjuch , 4,300 of the total of 18,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea decided not to join the Russian armed forces, but to continue their service with the Ukrainian armed forces. On March 28, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the last Ukrainian soldiers loyal to Kiev had left Crimea and that the exchange of state symbols for Ukrainian ships and military units that had switched to Russia had been completed. However, on April 6, Russian soldiers shot and killed a major in the Ukrainian army after an argument while he and his family were preparing to leave for Ukraine.

On April 16, 2014, Russian President Putin admitted in a TV question time that Russian troops in Crimea had actively supported local "self-defense forces". On April 21, Russia returned 13 of the 70 former Ukrainian warships to Ukraine. The ships were handed over to the Ukrainian crews in neutral waters and transferred to Odessa. Three warships had previously been handed over to Ukraine.

The 76th Airborne Division received the Order of Suvorov on August 18 for the execution of command tasks . On the same August 18, a unit soldier presumably died in Ukraine.

Referendum and secession

page 1 Page 2
Decision of the Sevastopol City Council on the referendum
Request from the Crimean authorities to a Ukrainian anti-aircraft regiment to place its weapons under the control of the Black Sea Fleet until the referendum

The Prime Minister of the Crimea, Aksjonov, who came to power on February 27, announced on March 1, 2014 that he would hold the independence referendum on March 30, 2014. On March 6, the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea decided to bring the date forward again to March 16, 2014.

Restrictions on freedom of the press

By 7 March, the transmissions of the regional Ukrainian TV channel Black Sea TV at the same frequency by those of were in the Crimea Rossiya 24 replaced the terrestrial signals of the channels Inter, Briz, 1 + 1 , 5 Channel , Perschyj Natsionalnyj and STB were switched off and replaced by Russian programs. Journalists were threatened, intimidated and kidnapped in Crimea, equipment confiscated or damaged. The organization Reporters Without Borders reported in the period before the referendum of an increasing climate of censorship in the Crimea.

In Russia, several websites critical of the government were shut down, including the blog of oppositionist Alexei Navalny . Nawalny's blog was reactivated on March 13th. Putin had already dissolved RIA Novosti as an independent news agency in December 2013 and incorporated it into the state-controlled Rossiya Sevodnja under Dmitri Kisselev , who is considered an ideological hardliner and an advocate of presidential autocratic tendencies.

Russian television stations were accused of spreading false reports of firefights in Kiev, assaults on pro-Russian civilians and the mass exodus of Russian Ukrainians, while ignoring the presence of Russian troops in Crimea in their coverage. As a result, on March 11, the Ukrainian supervisory authority banned the broadcasting of Russian television channels Rossiya 1 , Pervy kanal , NTV and Rossiya 24 across the country. The Russian Foreign Ministry complained that some Russian journalists had been refused entry to Ukraine. There was also pressure and violence against Russian journalists in Ukraine.

The encroachments on the freedom of the press in Crimea, the crackdown on independent media in Russia and the shutdown of Russian television channels in the Ukraine also triggered criticism from international organizations.

Crimean Tatar media are harassed and threatened with closure. The self-advocacy organ of the Crimean Tatars - the Mejlis - is systematically rendered incapable of action.

Developments up to the referendum

The Ukrainian government under Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk (All-Ukrainian Association "Fatherland") in Kiev declared the change of power in Simferopol to be illegal. She also described the planned referendum in Crimea as illegal and incompatible with the Ukrainian constitution - the government of Crimea is thus exceeding its constitutional powers. Interim President Oleksandr Turchynov therefore issued a decree annulling the decision of the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, to which the latter responded by pointing out that only the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has the power to override its decisions. The German international lawyer Stefan Talmon described the decision of the Crimean Parliament as "irrelevant under constitutional and international law because it is not in accordance with the constitution of Ukraine".

Russian President Vladimir Putin previously stated that his country was not planning to join the Crimea, but that the people of the peninsula could decide freely. On February 28, the Just Russia party introduced a bill to the Russian Duma to simplify the admission of foreign territories that lack a functioning central government. The Sevastopol City Council, which is not part of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, also voted on March 6, 2014 to join Russia and to participate in the March 16 referendum.

On March 11, 2014, the Crimean parliament decided on the steps to be taken should the referendum vote in favor of secession from Ukraine. The independence of Crimea, including Sevastopol as the Republic of Crimea, should first be declared and then an application for admission to the Russian Federation should be submitted. They wanted to become a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic state and cited, among other things, the Kosovo opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 22, 2010 ( legal opinion on the validity of Kosovo's declaration of independence ), according to which a unilateral declaration of independence does not violate international law. The general ban on violence called for in the report is not mentioned by the new leadership of Crimea. The government of Crimea also announced that it would seize the Ukrainian naval bases and power plants located in Crimea in the event of a detachment from Ukraine. These steps took the Kiev central government as an opportunity to the Government of the Crimea ultimately ask to cancel the referendum by March 12.

On March 13, 2014, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court discussed the validity of the decision of the Crimean Parliament to hold the referendum. The planned referendum was declared inadmissible on March 14, 2014.

The Crimean Parliament invited the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to observe the referendum. The OSCE declined to observe it because the referendum was unconstitutional and there was no invitation from the Ukrainian state.

In the days leading up to the referendum, there was a large-scale campaign to join the Russian Federation. On election posters, the Crimea was contrasted with a Crimea in the colors of the Russian flag with a swastika and barbed wire . Others could read slogans like “Fascism will not get through. Everyone to the referendum. "

Declaration of Independence

On March 11, 2014, the Crimean Parliament passed the pre-referendum declaration of independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in the event of a referendum result.

Referendum on March 16, 2014

On March 16, 2014, the referendum on the status of Crimea took place. The following two options could be selected:

  1. Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia with the rights of a subject of the Russian Federation ?
  2. Are you in favor of restoring the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and for Crimea's status as part of Ukraine?

There was no option for remaining in Ukraine while maintaining the existing constitution - that is, for the status quo before the beginning of the crisis.

Post-secession measures by Ukraine

Against the background of the Crimean crisis, the Ukrainian parliament decided on March 12, 2014 to found the Ukrainian National Guard .

To combat secessionist tendencies in other parts of the country, modeled on the Crimea, their leaders were arrested and charged, such as Mychajlo Dobkin from Kharkiv or the “People's Governor” of Donetsk, Pavel Gubarew . To calm the situation, Prime Minister Yatsenjuk promised decentralization and more powers for the regions of Ukraine . This should be part of the new Ukrainian constitution.

On March 19, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry announced that it would suspend the presidency of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which it currently holds, with immediate effect in protest against Russian actions . On the same day Andrij Parubij announced the introduction of a visa requirement for Russian citizens. On March 20, however, Yatsenyuk spoke out against the visa requirement because a large number of citizens, primarily in the south and east of the country who work in Russia or have relatives, are interested in maintaining visa-free traffic.

On December 23, 2014, Parliament decided to revoke Ukraine's constitutional freedom of association. Ukraine temporarily switched off the electricity on the Crimean peninsula in protest about the annexation of Crimea by Russia; on December 26th, the train and bus connections from the mainland were also interrupted.

Admission by Russia and incorporation

Decision of the Russian President on the accession of Crimea
The signing of the accession treaty
Rally on March 18 in Red Square

Just one day after the referendum, the head of the voting committee announced that 96.77% of the electorate would vote for joining Russia. Prime Minister Aksyonov announced that the following day a request for admission to Russian President Putin would be sent. On March 17th, 2014 following the referendum, the regional parliament in Simferopol decided to take the following measures:

  • Time change from March 30th to Moscow time;
  • Ruble becomes second currency, Ukrainian currency hryvnia is due to expire on January 1, 2016 (Ukrainian currency as of October 2017)
  • Nationalization of the oil and gas industry, starting with Chornomornaftohas .

Aksyonov said the fate of the remaining Ukrainian troops in the Crimea would depend on whether they would swear allegiance to Russia. The soldiers who refused would have to leave the Crimea; they would be offered safe conduct .

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech on March 18, 2014 on Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation . On the same day, together with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea Sergei Aksjonow , the parliamentary chairman Volodymyr Konstantynov and the chairman of the coordination council for the organization of the city administration of Sevastopol, Alexei Chaly , he signed an accession treaty for Crimea to Russia and announced that there would be two new subjects of the Federation give. The press office of the Russian government announced that the Crimea would be "from today part of the Russian Federation". Transnistria applied for membership on the same day.

On March 18, the Russian state-owned company Gazprom also applied for a production concession for oil and gas reserves off the coast of Crimea, which, according to the Crimean government, are no longer in Ukrainian possession after the referendum.

The First Deputy Prime Minister of the Crimea Rustam Temirgaliyev announced that he wanted to partially reverse the conquest of the Crimean Tatars after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Tatars would have to leave the country because it is needed for unspecified social purposes. However, they are ready to legalize another part of the Tatar property.

The Russian Constitutional Court ruled on March 19 that the agreement was in accordance with the Russian Constitution . On March 20, the Duma voted 433 yes and one no for the admission of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation. The opposite vote came from Ilya Ponomarev , who announced that he had opposed the war. The next day, the Federation Council also approved the treaty. The Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol thus became two new federation subjects within the federal structure of Russia , both of which are part of the newly founded Federal District of Crimea .

The Russian Foreign Ministry announced on March 31 that foreigners would need a Russian visa to visit Crimea . The following day, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that only Ukrainian diplomatic missions could issue visas for Crimea. Those who fail to comply with these regulations face sanctions for “supporting the temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory”.

The Crimean border was mined before the referendum . On March 18, 2014, according to the spokesman for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, the Ukrainian Praporshchik (a senior non-commissioned officer) SW Kakurin was fatally wounded by a gunshot. Pro-Russian units had occupied the base where the incident occurred. Interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenjuk then approved the use of firearms for Ukrainian armed forces in Crimea if they were attacked. A police spokeswoman in Crimea said that a member of the "Self-Defense Forces" (pro-Russian militia) was also killed. The militia officer, like the Ukrainian soldier, was killed by a sniper that had not yet been identified .

Vladimir Putin on May 9, 2014. Flowers at the monument to the defenders of Sevastopol 1941–1942

Immediately after the seizure of power, Viktor Ivanov, head of the Russian drug control agency, canceled the drug addicts' methadone program there for 800 drug users in Crimea, which Ukraine had set up. With the change in Russian drug and health policy, the HIV epidemic is worsening again in Crimea.

The Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced on March 31, 2014 that he would establish a special economic zone in Crimea . Salaries and pensions are to be increased, and the education and health systems as well as the local infrastructure are to be improved. In the government of the Russian Federation , the post of Minister for Crimean Affairs was created on the same day and filled with Oleg Savelyev .

On April 2, 2014, the Crimean peninsula was incorporated into the South Military District .

After a transitional period until 1 January 2015 [date] the credit institutions in Crimea regulated by the Russian Central Bank shall be subject. Its deputy chairman Alexei Simanowski said that banks that did not fulfill their obligations to customers would be temporarily closed. Several major Russian banks stated that they did not want to do business directly in Crimea, but only through their Ukrainian subsidiaries. Foreign-controlled companies felt compelled to cease their activities in the Crimea, according to McDonald’s and Raiffeisen Bank International . Less than a month after accession, the Crimea adopted a new constitution , according to which it is referred to as an “unalterable part of the Russian Federation”. The official languages ​​are Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar.

In a television interview, the Russian head of state Putin said that one of the reasons for the annexation of Crimea was the expansion of the military infrastructure on Russia's borders in the course of NATO's eastward expansion . Russia had been pushed away from the Black Sea.

On May 3, 5,000 Crimean Tatars stormed the border between mainland Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, despite special forces trying to secure the border. They wanted to enable their leader Mustafa Abduldschemil Dschemilew to enter the Crimea, which Russia had forbidden him.

On June 1, 2014, the Russian ruble became the only official currency in Crimea, and the Ukrainian hryvnia was given the status of a foreign currency.

Russian law enforcement agencies tried several dozen Crimean Tatars who refused to accept their forcibly granted Russian citizenship. Participants in protests by the Crimean Tatars were also arrested for alleged terrorism .

Confrontation in 2018 around the Kerch Strait

Since the occupation of Crimea, Russia has been obstructing Ukrainian and international shipping traffic in the Sea of ​​Azov (see section " Shipping "). Ships can only navigate the Sea of ​​Azov via the Kerch Strait , which connects the waters with the Black Sea. According to a 2003 treaty, both countries' merchant ships and warships are free to use the strait. On November 25, 2018, Russian border patrol boats under the FSB's domestic intelligence service shot at a tugboat and two Hjursa patrol boats of the Ukrainian Navy on their way from the Ukrainian port city of Odessa on the Black Sea to Mariupol on the Sea of ​​Azov. In the previous months there had been increasing cases of cargo ships being seized by Russia, and as a result Ukraine had begun building a naval base there to ensure safe trade in the Sea of ​​Azov. On November 25th, a tug and two patrol boats were to be relocated from Odessa to Mariupol as planned, according to Ukrainian information.

To call at Mariupol, the three ships had to cross the Kerch Strait. First a Russian ship rammed the Ukrainian tug, later the Ukrainian ships were shot at in the Black Sea. Then Russian special forces stormed the ships, seized them and arrested 23 or 24 Ukrainian sailors. According to Ukrainian information, six sailors were injured, the FSB spoke of three wounded. The following day, the FSB confirmed that Ukrainian ships were stopped and boarded in the Black Sea at gunpoint . Russia blocked the Kerch Strait by positioning a tanker directly under the Crimean Bridge , blocking the passage for Ukrainian ships. Russia also used military ships and helicopters, as well as combat aircraft, to prevent Ukrainian ships from passing through.

In 2003, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on the common use of the Sea of ​​Azov, which defines the sea as the internal waters of both states. It guarantees the ships of both countries free passage . In addition, according to the rules of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, to which both Russia and Ukraine joined, ships are allowed to freely pass the Kerch Strait - even without the consent of the neighboring countries. However, since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has viewed the strait between the Azov and Black Seas as its sole territory and has accused Ukraine of violating Russia's territorial waters. Since this is the Crimean coast, Ukraine claims it as its own. The Black Sea, in which the ships were shot at, is free for navigation. As recently as September, a registered transfer of Ukrainian ships through the strait had worked under Articles 18 and 19 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council initiated by Kiev and Moscow on November 26, Russia's view that Ukraine had violated Russian borders by transferring Ukrainian ships to Ukrainian ports was rejected by a majority.

Due to the incident and alleged intelligence that Russia was preparing a major land attack, the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko asked parliament to impose martial law for 30 days, beginning on November 28 at 9 a.m. local time in the ten regions bordering Russia and Transnistria , which is under Russian control. Parliament approved the motion. The United States, the three Baltic States , Sweden, the Czech Republic, Romania, Turkey, the European Union, Great Britain, France, Poland, Denmark and Canada condemned the Russian approach. Russia did not respond to calls from other countries to release the detained Ukrainian sailors and ships and took the position that the captured seamen were not prisoners of war but criminals. Germany called on Russia and Ukraine for moderation and criticized the showing of Ukrainian prisoners on Russian television. The Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl said: "We are following the Russian military action in the Kerch Strait with great concern".

On November 30, the head of the Ukrainian border service, Petro Tsygykal, announced that male Russian citizens between the ages of 16 and 60 would be banned from entering the country. Ukrainian President Poroshenko said the refused entry was aimed at preventing Russians from forming " private armies " to fight on Ukrainian soil.

International reactions

All representatives of the G8 states (except Russia) as well as the presidents of the Council of Europe and the EU Commission declared on March 12, 2014 that they did not want to recognize the planned referendum in Crimea. A Russian annexation of Crimea would violate the United Nations Charter as well as Russia's obligations under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Friendship Treaty and the Naval Stationing Treaty with Ukraine of 1997 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

OSCE

The chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe , Didier Burkhalter , announced the dispatch of the representative Tim Guldimann to the Crimea. A week-long visit by unarmed military observers began on March 5, 2014 in Odessa . On March 8, 2014, civil and military OSCE observers were prevented from entering Crimea by pro-Russian armed forces at a checkpoint near Arryansk . According to the OSCE, the armed men shot in the air, saying no one was injured. Pro-Russian gunmen had also denied the observers access to Crimea at other checkpoints on March 6 and 7. The task of the OSCE observers was to observe Russia's military activities in Ukraine. At the request of Ukraine, the mission was extended until March 16, then until March 20.

Council of Europe

Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland said on March 11 that he saw no evidence of any threat to the Russian-speaking population of Crimea.

The Committee of Ministers underlined the importance of March 14 to seek a political solution to the crisis.

The “ Venice Commission ” of the Council of Europe, which is responsible for constitutional issues, found the referendum in Crimea to be illegal: neither the constitution of Ukraine nor the constitution of the Crimea region allowed a referendum on secession. The circumstances of the vote contradicted democratic standards.

On April 10, 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe withdrew the 18 representatives of the Russian Federation from voting until January 26, 2015. Furthermore, Russia is not allowed to take part in observation missions during this period and is excluded from the Bureau of the Assembly , the Presidential Committee and the Standing Committee . After three hours of debate, the resolution was adopted by 145 votes in favor, 21 against and 22 abstentions. The conduct of Russia has been described as a clear violation of the Budapest Memorandum. By disregarding Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity , Russia has endangered stability and peace in Europe. The Russian delegates, led by Alexei Pushkov , left the meeting room and boycotted the debate.

European Union

The European Union is linked to Ukraine through the Eastern Partnership . On March 13, 2014, the European Parliament passed a non-legislative resolution condemning the invasion of Crimea. It called for the immediate withdrawal of those Russian forces illegally stationed in Ukraine. The Russian allegations are unfounded. MPs urged the Ukrainian government to fully protect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, including the rights of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. They called for the introduction of a new, far-reaching language regime that would promote all minority languages. The existing cooperation between the European Parliament and the Russian State Duma as well as the Federation Council could not be continued as before.

On March 21, the political part of the association agreement negotiated with Ukraine was signed in Brussels. The economic part was not approved. The reason is that, in response, Russia might stop duty-free imports from eastern Ukraine, which would exacerbate the crisis in Ukraine.

NATO

The North Atlantic Council met in Brussels on March 2, 2014 in an extraordinary session to discuss the situation in Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen accused Russia of violating international law. Russia must de-escalate and call its armed forces back to their bases. Like Russia, Ukraine is a NATO partner country . Rasmussen called for the NATO-Russia Council to meet soon and for a political dialogue to be launched under the auspices of the UN or the OSCE.

It was decided to use AWACS aircraft over Poland and Romania in order to be able to monitor the airspace in the crisis area.

United States

US Secretary of State Kerry with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk (left) and Speaker of Parliament and Transitional President in personal union Turchynov (right) in Kiev

US President Barack Obama was “deeply concerned” about Russian actions. Any violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity will come at a price, Obama said. US Secretary of State John Kerry threatened to cancel the G8 summit planned for June 2014 in Sochi . Russia could lose its membership in the Group of Eight. He also stated that Russia had failed to meet its obligations under the trilateral Budapest Memorandum. In it, Russia, Great Britain and the USA had given assurances for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which in return delivered all nuclear weapons from former Soviet stocks to Russia. Therefore, a meeting of the foreign ministers according to Article 6 of the Memorandum was scheduled for March 5, 2014 in Paris. Russia declined to participate. The US, UK and Ukraine met and agreed that face-to-face talks were required and international monitors should be stationed in eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

The destroyer USS Truxtun (DDG-103) was transferred to the Black Sea and military cooperation with Russia was suspended.

United Kingdom

Foreign Ministers Hague and Kerry meet the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Deschytsia in Paris.

Foreign Minister William Hague warned against the division of Ukraine. On March 3, he also stated that Crimea was already under full Russian control. He sees the current situation as "the greatest crisis of the 21st century". Nevertheless, he expects a strong reaction from the international community. The foundations for cooperation in the G8 committee have been damaged.

Prime Minister David Cameron announced that Russia had violated Ukraine's sovereignty and state unity. Therefore, like Prince Edward, Earl of Wessex , the patron of the British Disabled Sports Federation, he will not travel to the 2014 Winter Paralympics in Sochi .

According to a government document that was photographed in the street, the British government wants to avoid economic sanctions against Russia, which endanger Russian trade in the financial center of London . In addition, the possibility of military preparations should be discouraged in all bodies. Europe should also look for alternative gas and oil supply options for Ukraine in case Russia cuts them off.

Germany

At the beginning of March 2014, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier was skeptical about Kerry's proposal to exclude Russia from the G8 if necessary: ​​one should contribute to de-escalation in Ukraine and not bring about every possible tightening that would not help in case of doubt. A week later, he announced the next level of EU sanctions if Russia did not move in talks.

Chancellor Angela Merkel accused Putin in a phone call on March 2 of having “violated international law with the unacceptable Russian intervention in Crimea”. In addition, Russia violated the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Treaty. Putin did not share this view, but accepted Merkel's suggestion to set up a fact-finding mission and a contact group to start a political dialogue. In a government statement on March 13, 2014, the Chancellor accused Russia of not having proven to be a “partner for stability”, but of exploiting the weakness of neighboring Ukraine. The “right of the strong” would be opposed to the “strength of the right”. Russia has committed a "clear breach of fundamental principles of international law". If it does not return "to the path of law and cooperation" very soon, this will cause massive political and economic damage to Russia.

The sanctions against Russia imposed by the EU in March 2014 are supported by all parties in the German Bundestag (with the exception of Die Linke ).

Switzerland

Switzerland did not join the EU's economic sanctions against Russia. However, circumvention transactions via Switzerland should be avoided. It also decided to stop the export of war material and certain dual-use goods to Russia and the Ukraine, reporting obligations for Russia for goods and services in connection with oil production and financial service providers, plus a ban on new business relationships for the financial sector. A planned business mission was canceled in 2014. After even the boycotting EU countries carried out such missions, the Minister of Economic Affairs traveled to Russia for the first time in 2017.

People's Republic of China

On March 4, the spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized: "China always adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine," while also taking into account "the historical and current factors of the Ukraine question ”.

A week before the planned Crimean referendum, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Wang Yi called on all sides to moderate the Ukraine conflict: “It is regrettable that the situation in Ukraine today has happened, but it is no accident that that point has been reached, ”he said at a press conference in Beijing. The crisis is complicated, but the priority now is that “calm and restraint is exercised and the situation is prevented from escalating further.” He rejected sanctions by the USA and the EU against Russia in principle. Wang described China-Russia relations as at the best in their history. China's President Xi Jinping and Russia's President Vladimir Putin have developed a deep friendship.

On March 10th, in a telephone conversation with US President Barack Obama, Xi called for calm and restraint in order to avoid an escalation. Xi pointed out the complex situation in Ukraine and urged that the differences be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

International observers see the PRC in a certain dilemma. On the one hand, they are interested in good relations with neighboring Russia, on the other hand, China also fears separatist movements in its own country ( Tibet , Xinjiang ) and therefore does not want to support them on the international stage. China has an independent diplomatic policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries that cannot be changed by a single incident.

United Nations responses

Mediation efforts of the UN Security Council

Letter from the representative of Ukraine to the President of the United Nations Security Council

The UN Security Council dealt with the conflict on February 28, March 1, 3, 10, 13, 15 and 19, 2014.

On March 15, 2014 Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution that would invalidate the Crimean independence referendum on March 16. The UN veto power China abstained, the other members of the council voted in favor. The fact that China did not oppose the resolution on the side of Russia was attributed by Western diplomats to the violation of the referendum in Crimea against the fundamental principles of territorial integrity and non-interference represented by China in the Security Council. The representative of the veto power France, Gérard Araud , described the veto as a Russian defeat.

Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations

Vote in the UN Security Council on March 15, 2014 on the planned referendum in Crimea:
  • Condemnation of the referendum
  • abstention
  • veto
  • United Nations General Assembly resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine:
  • Therefore
  • On the other hand
  • abstention
  • absence
  • Non-members
  • States that have de facto or de jure recognized the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation

    On March 15, 2014, the UN Security Council spoke out in favor of “respect for the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine” and called for a direct dialogue to be opened. A corresponding vote was not valid with 13: 1 votes (with the only dissenting vote from Russia) and one abstention (China).

    On March 27, at the request of Canada, Costa Rica , Germany, Lithuania , Poland and Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution invalidating the March 16 referendum. She confirmed the unity of Ukraine and called on all states, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any change in the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and to refrain from any act or business that could be interpreted as recognition of such a changed status. The resolution expressly refers to the primacy of the principle of territorial integrity of all member states enshrined in the UN Charter , the Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994 and the Ukrainian-Russian Friendship Treaty of May 1997. However, there are no general resolutions of the UN General Assembly binding.

    169 of the 194 member states of the United Nations took part in the vote, 100 voted for the resolution. 58 countries from Africa and Asia , including India and China, abstained . Eleven states voted against the resolution: in addition to Russia, Armenia , Bolivia , Cuba , Nicaragua , North Korea , Zimbabwe , Sudan , Syria , Venezuela and Belarus .

    Resolution of the Human Rights Committee of the UN General Assembly

    In autumn 2016, Ukraine tabled a draft resolution on human rights violations in Crimea, with the support of 40 countries, including the veto powers USA, France and Great Britain. The Human Rights Committee of the UN General Assembly passed the resolution in November 2016 with 73 votes in favor, 23 against and 76 abstentions. Russia, China and Syria, among others, voted against. The resolution urges Russia to allow UN observers to visit the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. The resolution condemns "the discriminatory attacks, measures and practices of the Russian occupation authorities against the inhabitants" of Crimea. It admonishes the unjust treatment of minorities, especially the Crimean Tatars, and calls on Russia to reverse its decision to dissolve the Mejlis . Cultural and religious institutions of the minority should be allowed to become active again.

    International sanctions

    European Union

    On March 6, 2014, the European Union decided to suspend negotiations with Russia on visa facilitation and the new basic agreement as a first step . Funds of 18 people have been blocked.

    On March 12, 2014, framework conditions for further sanctions were approved, which include the freezing of assets and entry bans and are coordinated with the United States, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan and Canada. The formal decision on this and a stipulation on certain natural and legal persons to whom these sanctions are to be applied should take place on March 17th at a meeting of EU foreign ministers.

    On March 17, 2014, the Council of the European Union put 21 people on a sanctions list, which includes travel restrictions and the freezing of funds and economic resources. The people are primarily held responsible for advocating the sending of Russian troops, for dismissing the previous and establishing the new government of Crimea and for participating in the organization of the referendum. These included the Prime Minister of Crimea Sergei Aksjonow and Volodymyr Konstantynow, chairman of the Crimean Parliament, but also Russian parliamentarians and senior Russian officers. On March 21, 2014, the EU published an additional list of sanctions with the names of 12 other people. The sanctions list was expanded several times until September 2014.

    On December 18, 2014, the EU introduced sanctions against Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which prohibit companies based in the EU from having economic relations with Crimea.

    United States

    US President Obama with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yatsenyuk in the Oval Office

    On March 6, 2014, US President Barack Obama decided to take sanctions against threats to the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine. He issued a preparatory executive order ("EO 13660"). On March 11, the United States Senate called for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Crimea and the exclusion of Russia from the G8. In addition, the world football association FIFA was asked to reconsider its decision to host the 2018 World Cup in Russia.

    On March 12, the Senate Foreign Policy Committee passed sanctions against Russians and Ukrainians involved in violence or human rights abuses during the Euromaidan, along with legal and financial assistance for the Ukrainian government and an allocation for the International Monetary Fund . Of the 18 committee members, only Republicans James Risch , Rand Paul and John Barrasso voted against the draft, which will be submitted to the Senate for a vote in the next step.

    On March 17th, US President Obama imposed “Executive Order 13661” sanctions against seven people from Russia accused by the US of taking part in the seizure of Crimea and interference in the national sovereignty of Ukraine. Entry bans have been imposed, assets have been frozen, and US citizens and companies are prohibited from doing business with those sanctioned. The Treasury Department of the United States also imposed sanctions on Ukrainian people because of the "EO 13660".

    On March 20, additional people and companies were added to the SDN list with “Executive Order 13662” . In addition, the export of armaments and dual-use products to Russia was restricted.

    Other countries

    Because Switzerland is part of the Schengen area , the EU's entry bans also apply to Switzerland, but not the economic sanctions.

    On April 2, 2014, the Swiss government decided that Swiss financial intermediaries are prohibited from establishing new business relationships with the 33 persons sanctioned by the EU. Existing relationships can be retained. On May 20, the list was expanded to include 13 people and two companies.

    As of March 17, Canada used the same sanctions list as the US's first list, but without Viktor Yanukovych. Norway also implemented a sanctions list on March 21. with the names of 21 people.

    On March 18, 2014, Japan announced that it would temporarily suspend negotiations on visa facilitation and agreements on mutual investment, military and space cooperation with Russia as sanctions. On July 28, 2014, the Foreign Ministry announced further sanctions, including the freezing of funds in Japan by persons and organizations believed to be involved in the annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine , and the importation of goods originating in or in Crimea Reduce Sevastopol; this is due to the Japanese stance never to recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia.

    Counter-sanctions by Russia

    In response to the sanctions imposed by the US government , on March 20, 2013 , the Russian State Department published a list of nine people who are banned from entering Russia. These included John Boehner , Speaker of the United States House of Representatives , and John McCain , US Senator from the Republican Party . In retaliation against Canada's sanctions, Russia banned thirteen Canadian officials on March 24, including a. against Andrew Scheer , Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons , and against MEP Chrystia Freeland .

    In particular, the Kremlin imposed economic counter-sanctions and in the following years extolled the advantages of import substitutions , until February 2019 for the first time officially there was talk of economic disadvantages due to the sanctions - there was hardly any talk of full import substitution that had previously been propagated.

    On May 27, 2015, Russia banned 89 European politicians from entering the country .

    Russian pronouncements

    Russia accused the West of having actively participated in the coup through visits and speeches by politicians like Guido Westerwelle on the Majdan Nesaleschnosti in Kiev and of having "allied with outspoken neo-Nazis" in Ukraine. This mainly meant the right-wing all-Ukrainian association “Swoboda” under the leadership of Oleh Tjahnybok and the right-wing sector around Dmytro Jarosch . Russia described its actions in Ukraine as “defending human rights”. Before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, it was declared that Moscow “primarily thinks of the Ukrainian citizens” in its engagement. The interim government in Kiev accused Russia of disregarding the human rights of Russians in Ukraine.

    Putin's press conference in Novo-Ogaryovo

    On March 4, Russian President Putin defended his government's actions: “We are concerned about the orgies of nationalists, extremists and anti-Semites in Ukraine. People are grieved because of this lawlessness . ”He cited a request for help from the deposed President Yanukovych. De jure , Yanukovych is still the Ukrainian president, even if he no longer has de facto power. Putin pointed out that Yanukovych no longer had a political future. He described the politician's admission to Russia as a humanitarian gesture. "Had he stayed in Ukraine, he would have been killed." Regarding the Budapest Memorandum, Putin said that after the " unconstitutional coup " the Ukraine was different from the one for which this memorandum was drawn up at the time. If a “ revolution ” had taken place in Kiev , then one was dealing with a “new state” there, which is why the obligations from the Budapest Memorandum would not apply.

    “ March for Peace and Freedom” in Moscow on March 15, 2014: Demonstration against the intervention in the neighboring country

    On February 21, Yanukovych agreed to the demands of the Ukrainian opposition , but then the government opponents would not have adhered to the agreements, Putin criticized. “It got the south and east of Ukraine going.” The coup in Kiev had been prepared for a long time, including by Western instructors. Putin admitted that the problems in Ukraine were great and showed sympathy for the people on Maidan Nezalezhnosti who were calling for radical changes. In his opinion, the path the opposition chose was wrong. The current government of Ukraine is illegitimate. If elections are held in Ukraine “under the kind of terror we are seeing now, we will not recognize them,” Putin stressed.

    In addition, he announced that the Russian armed forces could intervene in other parts of the country in an extreme case. Russia reserves all means to protect the Russians in Ukraine. “We will not stand by when they are persecuted and destroyed.” However, there is currently no need to send troops to Ukraine, which Putin has described as a brother state. He rejected criticism from the West and recalled the actions of the USA and its allies in the Iraq war and the civil war in Libya .

    Vladimir Putin in Sevastopol, May 9, 2014

    The Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin made a similar statement at the Security Council meeting on March 13th. The government in Kiev is not the "transitional government of national unity" agreed on February 21, but a "government of victors" that violates the agreement of February 21.

    In his speech on March 18, 2014, Putin expressed his gratitude to all who showed understanding for the Russian actions in Crimea, in particular "the Chinese people, whose leaders take into account the situation around Ukraine and Crimea in their historical and political context" . One also knows to appreciate India's “restraint and objectivity”.

    In September of the same year Viktor Shenderovich compared the referendum in the Crimea with the referendum on the independence of Scotland : He defined the long-term processes and clarifications in Scotland as a vote, the "green men" of the Crimea as "pornography"; the question is a pure blackmail in the sense of the question "Are you for Putin or sawing off your hand with a rusty saw?"

    On December 4, 2014, Putin delivered the annual State of the Union Address to the Federation Assembly (the two houses of the Russian Parliament) in the presence of numerous dignitaries. Putin reiterated his thesis that the accession of Crimea took place in full compliance with international law and stated: “The Crimea is of great civilizational and sacred significance - now and forever. Just like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for those who profess Islam or Judaism . "

    Legal actions

    European Court of Human Rights

    On March 13, 2014, Ukraine filed a state complaint against Russia with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). As a provisional measure, the parties were warned to refrain from any measures, and in particular military action, that could lead to violations of the rights of the civilian population enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR called on Russia to comment on the annexation of Crimea and what is going on in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine accused Moscow of numerous cases of torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary detention of Ukrainian civilians in the state lawsuit. The ECHR extended the re-registration period and gave the Russian Federation until September 25, 2015 to comment on two intergovernmental lawsuits brought by Ukraine - including those related to forced citizenship, discrimination, property rights and the right to private life. During this extended response period, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation decided on July 14, 2015 that Russia was not bound by the judgments of the ECHR. According to the OSCE Human Rights Ombudsman, the decision of the Russian Constitutional Court is in contradiction to Russia's obligations under international treaty law .

    International Criminal Court

    The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian war since April 25, 2014. On November 14, 2016, the ICC published its assessment of the conflict. The court classifies the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol as an international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine. According to the ICC, this armed conflict began no later than February 26, 2014 when Russia used its armed forces to gain control of parts of Ukrainian territory without the consent of the Ukrainian government. In the opinion of the court, the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol after March 18, 2014 constitutes an ongoing occupation to which the law on international armed conflicts continues to apply. The ICC names cases of possible war crimes since the Russian takeover of power in Crimea that may fall within the jurisdiction of the court. These include the prosecution of Crimean Tatars , the murder and kidnapping of opponents of the Russian occupation, ill-treatment in connection with arrest or kidnapping, and forced service in the Russian military.

    International Court of Justice

    On January 16, 2017, Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Russia in the International Court of Justice . Ukraine accuses Russia of violating the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination through the Persecution of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea, as well as violations of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism by Delivering Arms and Other Assistance to Armed Groups operating in Ukrainian Act area. The hearings began on March 6, 2017.

    On April 19, 2017, the highest court of the United Nations ruled with an interim decision against Russia in the matter of International Conventions for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination , thereby upholding Ukraine's action on one of the two counts. It obliged Russia to protect the Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea from discrimination and racism. The ethnic groups in Crimea have a right to their own organizations and instruction in their language. A large majority of the judges called on Russia to ensure that the Crimean Tatar community will continue to be able to maintain its representative organizations, including the Mejlis . It was unanimously decided that Russia must ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian. An early decision in the matter of International Conventions for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was rejected . The court thus rejected the Ukrainian demand for immediate measures against Russia. The judges did not consider the evidence sufficient at the given stage of the trial. At the time, the court had not yet opened the main proceedings for this lawsuit.

    Assessment under international law

    The separation of Crimea from Ukraine can be subdivided into several aspects under international and constitutional law: the question of the legality of the hastily improvised referendum, the presence of Russian security forces on Ukrainian territory, the separation and declared secession following the referendum and the declaration of accession to the Russian Federation. Another related issue of international law is the legality of the deployment of Russian troops during the Crimean crisis on the Crimean peninsula.

    Military intervention

    The unilateral military intervention by Russia in Crimea is seen by the majority as a violation of the prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2 No. 4 of the UN Charter . The military intervention of Russia as well as measures such as the sealing off of barracks, which prevented Ukraine from taking legal countermeasures, are considered acts of aggression and acts of aggression under Article 3 of the United Nations' 1974 definition of aggression ( UN resolution 3314). According to Article 3 lit. a and lit. e before. Russian troops, who were allowed to stay on leased military bases in Sevastopol under the 1997 agreement on the Black Sea Fleet , operated outside the permitted military bases and against the conditions provided for in the stationing agreement. The occupation of the peninsula and the isolation from the neighboring areas of Ukraine, the taking of control over its government, communication and supply facilities are also violations of the prohibition of violence. The activities of Russian units in Crimea also violate the Russian-Ukrainian friendship treaty of 1997, in which the two countries undertook to respect the mutual territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders between them, against the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Alma Ata Declaration of 1991 and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. President Putin's request The use of armed forces in Ukraine and the authorization by the Russian Federation Council can be interpreted as a threat of violence against Ukraine and thus as a violation of the general ban on violence.

    According to Russian sources, the military intervention was a measure to protect Russian citizens in Crimea. Such a right to intervene militarily in a neighboring country to protect one's own citizens does not exist in international law. In addition, the majority of the Russian-speaking residents of Crimea are not Russian citizens, but Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. The Russian military operation served to create a permanent military presence in the neighboring country and the acquisition of foreign national territory, which distinguishes it from the previously known protective operations, which aimed to evacuate their own citizens and return them safely to their home country. In addition, the attacks alleged by Russia against Crimean residents of Russian descent have not been confirmed internationally. International law experts point out that the human rights reports of the UN and OSCE before and during the Crimean crisis did not identify any human rights violations to the detriment of the Russian-speaking Crimean residents, but rather the Crimean Tatars and residents of Ukrainian origin were exposed to discrimination.

    referendum

    The peoples' right to self-determination does not include the right of secession (external self-determination) and therefore does not authorize a state established in the international community to withdraw from a state that has been established in the international community against its will, including part of the national territory. According to Theodore Christakis, there is no positive right to external self-determination, but one-sided secessions are not prohibited per se. Christakis goes on to say that the secession of Crimea is illegal not because of the unilateral declaration of independence, but because of the violence emanating from Russia.

    The referendum was devalued from the outset by the fact that the vote was prepared and carried out under the conditions of military intervention and occupation by Russia and thus in violation of the prohibition of violence. An effective exercise of the self-determination of the peoples was not possible because of the Russian use of force. In addition, according to the Venice Commission, when the referendum was held, elementary democratic standards were violated. According to Anne Peters, violations of minimum democratic standards include, among other things, the ambiguous referendum question, which left open which version of the Crimean Constitution of 1992 was meant, the multiple bringing forward of the implementation date and the lack of public freedom to remain in Ukraine to enter without fear of disadvantages or sanctions.

    Inclusion and declaration of independence

    According to the prevailing legal opinion , the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation is an annexation. Annexations have been in violation of international law since 1945. In contrast to this, Russian scholars see the connection to Crimea predominantly as conforming to international law.

    The unilateral declaration of independence does not automatically create a state. Between the declaration of independence on March 11 and 17, and the signing of the international agreement on joining the Russian state association on March 18, the "Republic of Crimea" failed to meet the criteria of statehood and one of Ukraine and Russia to establish independent state authority. Because the "Republic of Crimea" did not have the quality of a state, it could not conclude any valid treaties with the Russian Federation.

    According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 , treaties that contradict a mandatory standard of international law at the time of their conclusion are ineffective. The treaty violates the general prohibition of violence as a mandatory norm because the Russian Federation has created its contractual partner "Republic of Crimea" through military intervention in Crimea, as well as against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Since the "Republic of Crimea" was not an independent state from Ukraine at the time of its recognition by President Putin, the recognition constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine. International law obliges all states not to recognize the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation because the acquisition of territory came about through the use of force.

    The legal scholar Georg Nolte sees the referendum as incompatible with the Ukrainian constitution. The legal scholar Reinhard Merkel shares this assessment, but emphasizes that international law is simply indifferent to this question and is neutral. According to Hans-Joachim Heintze from the Institute for Peacekeeping Law and International Humanitarian Law, there is basically no right of secession derived from the right of self-determination that national minorities could make use of:

    “Under international law, it is a minority. This has a right to preserve its own identity, not to secession. "

    - Hans-Joachim Heintze

    Anne Peters lists the requirements for a referendum and notes: "Even if the referendum had been free and fair, that would not have compensated for the lack of substantive factors." As to the legality of the referendum, the question arises whether the presence of Russian military personnel on the Territory of Crimea before the formal declaration of independence was contrary to international law. In Nolte's opinion, the two questions cannot be separated:

    “You cannot separate Russian military action from the referendum. An attempt to split off, which is caused and made possible by the bayonets of a foreign authority, must not be recognized. "

    - Georg Nolte

    Nolte and Saxer see in the fact that the resolution was carried out during a Russian military action, a clear indication of an illegality according to the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine or the Litvinov Protocol .

    “The presence of Russian / Russian controlled troops, originally covered by a stationing agreement, mutates into a military threat and occupation, which violates the prohibition of violence in the UN Charter, a central norm of the international system. Under international law there is an obligation of states and international organizations not to recognize changes in territory as a result of the use or threat of violence. "

    - Urs Saxer

    According to different interpretations regarding the (international) legality of the secession, there are also different attitudes about the agreement on the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, which the government of the Republic of Crimea signed after the secession. With reference to similar splitting of individual regions from their mother country as in 1990 in Slovenia / Croatia , 1993 in Eritrea , 2002 in East Timor and 2011 in South Sudan , all of which were internationally recognized, the relevance of international law for such questions is denied by some authors. The legal scholar Milena Sterio from Cleveland State University takes the position that successful secessions depend less on the application of the principle of international law than on the approval of the global or regional great powers.

    Effects of the annexation

    Human rights

    Since the occupation and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the human rights situation has deteriorated considerably for a large number of its residents. Fundamental rights such as freedom of assembly , association , freedom of establishment , information and freedom of expression have been restricted and eroded by Russia in Crimea. Systematic human rights violations are mainly exposed to Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians who have spoken out against Russian annexation, rejected Russian citizenship or did not support the occupying powers. Serious human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests , illegal detention, enforced disappearances , ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial killings occurred during the Russian occupation . Prisoners were illegally transferred from Crimea to Russian prisons. The European Parliament condemned human rights violations in a resolution of March 16, 2017 on Ukrainian prisoners in Russia and the situation in Crimea.

    Amnesty International notes that there have been several enforced disappearances of Crimean Tatars since the annexation that have never been effectively resolved. On May 24, 2016, Erwin Ibragimov, a member of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, was dragged into a car by a group of men and driven away. Amnesty International calls on the Russian authorities to investigate the kidnapping.

    Russian legal system

    The international humanitarian law and the IV. Geneva Conventions stipulate that an occupying power with the applicable laws of the occupied territory must respect. In disregard of this obligation, Russia has replaced Ukrainian with Russian law and made Crimea under the Russian legal system. This led to a deterioration in the human rights situation.

    Refat Chubarov and other Crimean Tatars and Kremlin critics have been charged with “extremism” under Russian laws.

    Russian extremism and separatism laws are arbitrarily applied against peaceful gatherings, speeches and political activities - in some cases retrospectively to events prior to annexation, such as the Akhtyom Chijgos trial and outside of Crimea on mainland Ukraine. Criticism of the annexation is interpreted as "separatism" and punished under criminal law. Expressing opinion that Crimea belongs to Ukraine is punishable by up to five years in prison. In September 2014, the Prosecutor General of Crimea stated that any expression of non-recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation will be prosecuted. Provisions of Russian criminal law are regularly used to criminalize criticism of the Russian government. The Crimean Tatar politician Ilmi Umerov was found guilty of “separatism” and sentenced to two years in prison for criticizing the annexation and calling Crimea part of Ukraine. The journalist Mykola Semena received a two-and-a-half-year suspended sentence also for “separatist statements”, since in the course of his profession he had described the annexation as contrary to international law. Crimean Tatars and other critics are searched, intimidated and arrested under the pretext of combating extremism. Russia had the most important self-governing body of the Crimean Tatars - the Mejlis - classified as an "extremist organization" and banned. Since then, mere membership in the Mejlis has been a criminal offense. Crimean Tatar leaders have been expelled. The presidents of the Mejlis have been living in exile in Kiev since Russia prohibited them from entering Crimea and issued an arrest warrant for them. Since the annexation there have been repeated reports of missing Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians. Some were found dead. Pro-Ukrainian activists, minorities and journalists who are accused of “extremism” and “separatism” are not given the opportunity to enforce their right to a fair trial and to take action against any procedural deficiencies. No investigations or criminal proceedings were initiated against militias loyal to the Kremlin, although they are accused of serious human rights violations such as torture, kidnappings and extrajudicial killings during and after the annexation. A draft law was introduced in the Russian parliament to amnesty the violations of the law by pro-Russian militias in Crimea . In June 2014, the militias were incorporated into the Crimean police.

    Since the annexation, Russian anti-homosexual laws have been in force in Crimea , which prohibit publicly professing homosexuality. After the occupation, the Russian authorities announced that gays were no longer welcome on the peninsula and would not be allowed to hold public events. Gays fled Crimea to mainland Ukraine and other European countries.

    On February 11, 2016, the Crimean Tatar human rights activist Emir-Usein Kuku was arrested by Russian authorities. In 2014, Kuku joined the Crimean Human Rights Contact Group, which was involved in enforced disappearances on the peninsula. The Russian authorities accuse him of belonging to the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir , which he denies himself. Amnesty International launched a campaign for his release.

    In response to the political persecution of Crimean Tatars, the grassroots organization Crimean Solidarity was launched on April 9, 2016. One of its senior members Server Mustafayev was arrested on May 21, 2018 and charged with “membership in a terrorist organization”. He is also accused of having ties to Hizb ut-Tahrir. Amnesty International and Front Line Defenders are campaigning for his immediate release.

    On November 9, 2016, Ukrainians Oleksiy Bessarabow , Dmytro Shtyblykow and Volodymyr Dudka were arrested on charges of attempting to commit acts of sabotage on behalf of the Ukrainian secret service in the Crimea. Shtyblykov was sentenced to five, Bessarabov and Dudka each to fourteen years in prison. Freedom House and the human rights organization Memorial class them as political prisoners.

    Expropriations

    In the course of the expropriations, the Artek pioneer camp was also confiscated by Russia.

    Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power is prohibited from confiscating any public or private property in the occupied territories . Despite this, since March 2014 Russia has often forcibly confiscated and "nationalized" real estate and companies owned by the Ukrainian government, as well as private land and businesses belonging to Crimean residents. The seizures are reportedly taking place without adequate notice, compensation, legal basis or opportunity to appeal . In some cases, the seizures were carried out by militias loyal to the Kremlin. Already on March 18, 2018, expropriations took place when masked and heavily armed soldiers stormed private businesses such as car dealerships and took over the offices and salesrooms.

    According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, as of February 2015 alone, Russia had seized around 4,000 Ukrainian companies. Ukraine suffered an estimated damage of over US $ 1 trillion . In addition, numerous other public and private properties were confiscated - including a large part of the tourism and industrial sectors. An Associated Press investigation in Crimea found that by December 2014 thousands of private companies and real estate had been confiscated without a legal basis. Rightful owners have been evicted from their land, buildings, farms and other valuable real estate have been confiscated, prescribed compensation has not been paid, and representatives of the Crimean Tatar minority and independent news media and Ukrainian-friendly representatives of the Orthodox churches have been deliberately expropriated. The New York Times also reported such takeovers worth over 1 billion euros within a few weeks of the occupation. Banks, hotels, shipyards, companies in the energy and chemical industries, the film studios of Yalta, mobile communications companies, a large farm with 34,600 hectares of land, a gas station network, the largest bread maker and the most important dairy product producer in Crimea were "nationalized" by Moscow "(See section" Company and bank supply "). Since 2016, local entrepreneurs have held regular rallies in Sevastopol against the expropriation and nationalization of land that Ukraine had given to private companies.

    Crimean residents and the Ukraine filed complaints against the systematic expropriations based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights . The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had stated in an earlier judgment that an occupying power was responsible for the violation of property rights in the occupied territory. On May 10, 2018, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on the lawsuit of 18 expropriated Ukrainian companies and one private individual. According to the unanimous ruling, Russia is responsible for violating the rights of Ukrainian investors and has to pay compensation of around $ 160 million. Further lawsuits have already been filed and accepted by the Court of Arbitration. In November 2018, the Permanent Court of Justice ruled that Russia should pay Ukraine's State Savings Bank € 1.3 billion in compensation for its loss of property.

    Border security

    Since 2014, the border between Ukraine and the Russian-annexed Crimea has been running along the southern administrative border of Kherson Oblast across the Isthmus of Perekop . In December 2018, Russia separated the land connections by a solid metal fence almost 60 km long, 2.10 m high with a barbed wire crown and safety sensors.

    Culture and language

    Ukrainian music theater in Simferopol, whose name was shortened by the word “Ukrainian” after the annexation.

    Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars are increasingly controlled and put under pressure in the peaceful expression of their culture and the expression of political views. The space for Ukrainian culture has been significantly narrowed, and cultural and religious symbols of Ukraine are suppressed. Crimean people who wear Ukrainian state symbols or who celebrate important days or people in Ukrainian culture and history are exposed to hostility, warned and prosecuted. A Russian court sentenced three Crimean residents to forced labor for celebrating the birthday of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko and standing near a Ukrainian flag. The court classified the Ukrainian flag as “extremist” and “provocation”. Gatherings demanding the return of Crimea to Ukraine or expressing loyalty to Ukraine have been effectively banned. Traces of Ukrainian history in Crimea are being wiped out and pro-Ukrainian activity is dangerous. Facilities promoting Ukrainian culture have been closed. The Museum of Vyshyvanka - a traditional Ukrainian embroidery - was closed in February 2015 and people celebrating Wyshyvanka Day were arrested. A Ukrainian cultural center in Simferopol received regular phone calls from the police and the Russian domestic secret service FSB, and its activities were disrupted and prohibited. In 2017, the cultural center was closed and the leader moved to mainland Ukraine after receiving warnings of his impending arrest by the FSB. Books in Ukrainian, by Ukrainian authors, and on relevant subjects have been removed from public and school libraries. Books by Crimean Tatar human rights activists and politicians have been banned. School administrators, teachers, parents and children are being pressured to give up teaching in Ukrainian. Since the Russian occupation, the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages ​​have largely disappeared from teaching.

    According to the Association of Expellees and its President Bernd Fabritius , the German minority in Crimea is also exposed to repression that would not have existed before the Russian annexation. Germans can no longer use their language as usual in everyday life, have to adopt Russian citizenship and are subject to restrictions on freedom of assembly.

    Media, NGOs and religious institutions

    Russia has reduced the number and access to independent media in Crimea, cut off the free flow of information for the public (especially online and broadcast media) and threatened criminal sanctions against private and public actors who hold dissenting views on the annexation of Crimea. Immediately after the annexation, all Ukrainian television channels were removed from the cable network and replaced by Russian state television. Just one year after the annexation, almost all independent media were abolished. The broadcast of the largest independent television station in Crimea - the Black Sea TV and Radio Station (Chernomorskaya Teleradiokompanija) - was also discontinued and the station's property was confiscated. Ukrainian-language newspapers are no longer delivered to Crimea. Numerous radio stations in Crimea have also lost their broadcasting rights. Since then, Russian stations such as the radio of the Russian Defense Ministry have been broadcasting on their frequencies . The Russian telecommunications supervisory authority Roskomnadzor has not been issuing licenses for the Crimea since February 2015 and the registration page is blocked for Internet users from the Crimea. Journalists and bloggers are hindered, attacked and persecuted in their work. Cases of kidnappings are known. The license of the popular Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR was revoked and the channel had to move to Kiev. The license was withheld from the QHA news agency of the Crimean Tatars. The Tatar newspaper Advent was warned several times and employees were called in by the FSB secret service. The only Crimean Tatar radio station Medan lost its license. The Russian government confirmed that Internet sites have also been blocked for allegedly "extremist" content on the peninsula. A year after the annexation, the number of media operating in Crimea fell from 3,000 to 232.

    All previously registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as religious communities and associations were ordered after the annexation to re-register or to cease operations under Russian law. While more than 10,000 NGOs were registered in the Crimea before the annexation, their number was only 396 by the end of 2014. The new registration of NGOs was hampered, among other things, by Russian laws on “undesirable organizations” and “foreign agents”. For example, an environmental protection organization had to register as a “foreign agent” under Russian law because it was financed mainly through international grants. The NGO Field Mission for Human Rights in Crimea was proposed for inclusion in the list of “undesirable organizations”. Most of the NGOs ceased operations in Crimea and moved to mainland Ukraine. Some did so in protest against the occupation and others because of threats by militias loyal to the Kremlin against NGO members. Before the annexation, 1,400 religious associations were registered under Ukrainian law and a further 674 organizations from the muftiate operated without registration. According to the Russian government, as of August 2015, only 53 religious organizations were still active in Crimea. Registration of a religious association was only permitted for Russian citizens.

    citizenship

    On April 1, 2014, Russia declared all Ukrainians and stateless persons in Crimea to be Russian citizens, regardless of whether they wanted a change of citizenship and applied for a Russian passport or not. Since then, Crimean residents have been obliged to serve in the Russian armed forces . Residents who objected to naturalization were automatically given the status of “foreigners” even if they were born in the Crimea and their families had lived on the peninsula for generations like the Crimean Tatars. They had to apply for a residence permit, for which Russia set upper limits, lost important rights and their entitlement to social benefits such as old-age pensions. Crimean residents without a Russian passport have been severely restricted in their property rights since the annexation and, for example, are not allowed to own agricultural land or register or sell private real estate and vehicles. They are not allowed to vote or be elected, register a religious group, request public assemblies, and hold no positions in public administration. Access to state health care and finding and maintaining a job were also made dependent on having a Russian passport. A Ukrainian woman who had lived in Crimea for ten years died after a state hospital refused treatment for her because she had not applied for a residence permit in the Crimea after the annexation. Crimean residents without Russian citizenship no longer have the right to attend public schools and universities in Crimea since the annexation. In the public sector in particular, employees have either had to give up their Ukrainian citizenship or their jobs. Crimean residents who did not explicitly object to naturalization or did not object in time, but did not apply for a Russian passport, were also affected by restrictions on receiving social benefits and exercising other rights.

    Ukrainian prisoners such as Oleh Sentsov were illegally transferred from Crimea to Russian prisons and declared Russian citizens.

    Thousands of children without parental care, who could not make a declaration of their own will, as well as people imprisoned, were also forcibly naturalized. Crimean residents Oleh Sentsov and Oleksandr Kolchenko were two well-known political prisoners who had been declared Russian citizens against their will and denied Ukrainian consular assistance despite not having applied for Russian passports and insisting on retaining their Ukrainian citizenship. Both were released on September 7, 2019 as part of a prisoner exchange and brought to Kiev .

    The imposition of Russian citizenship is in conflict with international humanitarian law and the IV Geneva Convention. Specifically, it is inadmissible for an occupying power to force the inhabitants of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to it, because loyalty to the home state cannot be broken under duress. In the case of Crimea, the imposition of Russian citizenship led to special conflicts of loyalty that affect the private lives of Crimean residents. By naturalizing Ukrainian citizens, they were linked to a state that had committed an act of aggression against their homeland. They were obliged to defend this state with arms. Crimean residents were also forced, under threat of imprisonment, to report loyalty relationships with other states - such as residence permits in other countries or other nationalities - which constitutes a violation of the right to private life . With neither Russia nor Ukraine recognizing each other's official documents relating to Crimea, residents find themselves caught between two overlapping and contradicting legal and regulatory systems. Because of this, many residents have both kept their Ukrainian passports and applied for Russian passports, even though both countries do not recognize dual citizenship.

    Russia had already started issuing passports for Crimean residents in 2008, which in Ukraine was interpreted as a possible preparation for military intervention. The situation in Crimea differs from other areas in the post-Soviet space , where Russia is an occupying power. Similar to Crimea, Russia is also distributing Russian passports in occupied parts of Georgia and Moldova in order to gain influence over the affected population - a process known as passportization. The main difference to the situation in Crimea is that a declaration of intent to acquire Russian citizenship is necessary there, whereas in Crimea a collective naturalization process was carried out in a short time, which required an explicit renunciation of Russian citizenship and which was not was made possible comprehensively. Precedents for the collective naturalization of residents of occupied territories exist only from the time of the Second World War . The permanent military tribunal in Strasbourg and the American military tribunal in Nuremberg each sentenced Robert Wagner and Gottlob Berger for measures to Germanize the inhabitants of occupied areas and mobilize them as German citizens.

    Eviction and resettlement

    Since the Russian occupation of Crimea, the population structure has changed mainly due to the displacement of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar Crimean residents and other minorities as well as a continuous influx of people from the Russian Federation. Most Russian immigrants are civil servants and soldiers with their families and pensioners. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census, 2.4 million people lived on the peninsula. According to Russian data from September 2014, the population election had fallen by 4.8 percent to 2.285 million, although the proportion of Russian citizens had increased and the number of Ukrainians and minorities had decreased. The displacement of Ukrainians and minorities took place in waves and had several causes. The reasons given by displaced persons were the refusal to live under Russian control and avoidance of conscription in the Russian army, fear of discrimination and persecution, threats and attacks and study on mainland Ukraine. Those who refused to take on Russian citizenship either had to live in discriminatory conditions or flee the Crimea.

    In January 2018, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a declaration condemning the change in the demographic composition of Crimea through the expulsion of the pro-Ukrainian population and Crimean Tatars and increased migration from Russia. According to Geneva Convention IV “on the protection of civilians in times of war” (Art. 49), the resettlement of civilians who are nationals of an occupying power to the territory of an occupied area is prohibited, as is the expulsion of civilians from the occupied area.

    According to the Ukrainian commissioner for affairs of the Crimean Tatar people, Mustafa Dschemilyev , several hundred thousand people have immigrated to Crimea from Russia. According to Jemilev, Moscow kept the exact number of Russians resettled to Crimea a secret because the Russian government knew that resettlements of this kind were war crimes under the 1949 Geneva Convention.

    economy

    Business and banking

    One year after the annexation, over 60% of local businesses ceased operations and the number of sole proprietorships has tripled. International companies such as Apple and Google and retail chains have left the Crimea. Privately owned companies and Ukrainian state-owned companies have been expropriated by Russia (see section “ Expropriations ”). Companies that the Kremlin classified as friendly to the Ukraine, strategically important or “uneconomical” were targeted. The Ukrainian gas and oil company Chornomornaftoggaz, which is wholly owned by Naftohas , was also expropriated by Russia, ie "nationalized" and placed under the control of Gazprom . In December 2015, Naftohas estimated his Russian stolen assets at $ 15.7 billion. Russia has gained access to offshore fields of 2.3 trillion cubic meters of gas since it came to power in Crimea - enough to meet European gas demand for about 5 years. The Ukrainian energy minister said in April 2014 that Ukraine had lost key oil and gas fields in the Ukrainian Black Sea shelf (including the Holitsynske and Odeske gas fields) and income from the sale of shale gas , and estimated the initial damage at US $ 40 billion .

    Ukrainian banks in the Crimea were also affected by the closings and expropriations, such as the 339 branches of the private bank , which to date has been the largest credit institution in Crimea with more than 320,000 customers. Residents have since been unable to access their Ukrainian accounts and savings from Crimea. ATMs only accept Russian cards. Mastercard and Visa have stopped their payment services in the Crimea. Russian politicians criticized the lack of interest in Crimea. Despite this, large Russian banks such as Sberbank and VTB are also avoiding Crimea for fear of sanctions. Since the annexation, bank supply in the Crimea has largely been taken over by the Russian State Commerzbank (RNKB), which until then had only one branch in Moscow. In 2017, the RNKB received US $ 265 million from the Russian state budget in order to continue working in Crimea. In August 2017, the RNKB was separated from the SWIFT network due to international sanctions .

    Price development

    After the occupation of Crimea by Russia, there was an increase in the prices of goods and services. In 2013 prices were still falling slightly and there was deflation of 0.5%. After the annexation, inflation rose to 42.5% - the second highest inflation rate in the world after Venezuela . Food prices rose 52.9% and services prices rose 27% over the course of 2014. During a visit to Crimea in May 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev told a pensioner who complained about rising prices and low pensions that Russia had no money and called for perseverance.

    tourism

    The tourism sector, which is the peninsula's main source of income, has suffered losses. The number of foreign visitors fell after international air and sea traffic in the Crimea ceased. The International Civil Aviation Organization reported that Ukraine still has the sole right to control the airspace over Crimea. However, because Russia claims airspace security over the Crimea for itself, the European Aviation Safety Agency and the European Organization for the Safety of Aviation advised their member states and international airlines against flights to Crimea and over the Simferopol flight information area. Since the annexation, only Russian airlines have been flying to Crimea via Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Before the annexation, over 70% of tourists came from mainland Ukraine, but the number of Ukrainian visitors decreased. Since the Russian occupation, the majority of tourists have come from Russia mainly thanks to a massive state campaign promoting “patriotic vacations” in Crimea and because the trips to Crimea by officials, pensioners and young people are supported with subsidies . Nevertheless, the number of tourists collapsed after the occupation. Before the annexation, the Crimea had around 6 million visitors a year. In 2014, the number of vacationers dropped to 3.8 million, before falling another 35% in the first half of 2015.

    Export and agriculture

    Trade and export industries together make up almost a third of the Crimean economy. Before the occupation, 60% of exports went to countries outside the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and 25% went to the European Union. Since the annexation, the importation of goods originating in Crimea into the EU has been prohibited unless the goods are accompanied by a Ukrainian certificate of origin.

    Agriculture, which is one of the three most important economic sectors in Crimea, is suffering from the changes in the course of the annexation of Crimea. There is not enough water to irrigate agricultural land because Ukraine no longer fully takes over the water supply for the peninsula. Before the annexation, a large part of the water from the Ukraine reached the peninsula via the North Crimean Canal (see point water scarcity ). The lack of water meant that water-dependent cereals such as rice and corn could not be grown. In addition, international grain trading companies such as Cargill and Dreyfus have been avoiding the Crimea since then. The chairman of the farmers' association assessed the situation as critical. At the beginning of July 2018, Sergei Aksyonov asked the Russian government for urgent aid to compensate for drought-related damage and crop losses. The fishery is also suffering from being sealed off from mainland Ukraine, because Ukraine was the primary buyer for fish from the Crimea and Russia has little interest in imports due to the high prices.

    care

    Crimea is dependent on Ukraine for electricity, water and food supplies. The Crimea itself can only cover around 10% of its electricity needs. The rest is imported from Ukraine. Over a year after the annexation, Crimea continued to draw 70 to 90% of its energy from mainland Ukraine. In mid-2015, Russia commissioned the construction of a power line for 47.3 billion rubles to connect the Crimea to the Krasnodar region's electricity supply. Shortly after the annexation, 90% of food and industrial goods were imported via the land connection between mainland Ukraine and Crimea.

    Shipping

    Since the occupation of Crimea, Russia has blocked Ukrainian and international shipping traffic in the Sea of ​​Azov. Ships can only navigate the Sea of ​​Azov via the 40 km long Kerch Strait , which connects the water with the Black Sea. Since the occupation, Russia has controlled both sides of the Kerch Strait. The Sea of ​​Azov and especially the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk there are of great importance for the Ukrainian economy . Since the construction of the Crimean Bridge , the situation for Ukrainian shipping has become even more difficult. The bridge was built so low that only ships no higher than 33 meters can pass under it. As a result, shipping traffic and the number of ships that used to call at Mariupol and Berdyansk have halved. The port in Henichesk can also lose considerable income. Since the blockade, Ukrainian ports have been increasingly cut off from the world by water. Mariupol saw a 30% drop in revenue. According to estimates by the Ukrainian Ministry of Infrastructure, financial losses due to restrictions on shipping amount to between US $ 20 million and US $ 40 million annually. In addition, more and more Ukrainian and foreign ships sailing to Mariupol and Berdyansk are being detained and checked by the Russian domestic intelligence service FSB, sometimes several times, and the ship's crews are interrogated. Overall, the Russian Navy has increased its presence, and warships of the Caspian Flotilla have been partly moved across the Volga-Don Canal into the Sea of ​​Azov. Russia justifies the increasing number of interventions in Ukrainian shipping with safety concerns. Ukraine and the United States, however, speak of an economic blockade and ongoing attempts by Moscow to further destabilize Ukraine.

    Subsidies

    Before the annexation, Crimea received subsidies . A good two thirds of the budget came from Kiev. Since Russia occupied the peninsula, Moscow has had to bear the costs and compensate for the loss of subsidies from the Ukrainian government. Shortly after the annexation, Russia's economy minister put the budget deficit in Crimea at around one billion euros. After the Georgian republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Moldovan region of Transnistria, Crimea is the fourth sub-area of ​​another country that Russia has occupied and maintains at its own expense. Since the Crimea is many times larger in area and population than the other three occupied territories, the economic burden on Russia is comparatively great. In April 2015, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev estimated the total cost of the annexation in 2014 alone at $ 27 billion, or 1.5 percent of Russia's gross domestic product .

    environment

    Water scarcity

    Since the annexation, the Crimea has suffered from an acute water shortage and parts of the peninsula have become desertified. Before the annexation, Crimea received up to 85 percent of the required water supplies via the North Crimean Canal in southern Ukraine. Most of the water was used to irrigate agricultural areas and to run industrial companies. Since the Russian occupation in 2014, Ukraine no longer takes over the water supply. According to the fourth Geneva Convention (Articles 55 and 56) it is the task of the occupying power to supply the occupied territories with essential goods such as water. The peninsula was drilled for groundwater, but the water was too salty and further destroyed the soil. Due to acute water shortages, six Rajons in northern Crimea declared a state of emergency in June 2018 . The six rayons make up about 20 percent of the total area of ​​the peninsula. In July 2018, Ukraine released satellite images showing that large parts of the vegetation in northern Crimea have dried up.

    In connection with the water shortage, there was a chemical accident in the city of Armjansk in northern Crimea in August 2018 after sulfur dioxide escaped from an old chemical plant (see Armjansk # Chemical accident ).

    Sea conditions

    Since the construction of the Crimean Bridge as part of the annexation, drift ice has been blocked on the way from the Sea of ​​Azov across the Kerch Strait. The drift ice sticks to the bridge piers even in strong winds. The bridge therefore acts like a dam. The ice builds up and press ice mounds are created .

    The bridge is one of the main sources of pollution in the Black Sea. Since the construction, an increased concentration of suspended matter and increased algal blooms have been found in the surrounding waters. There was irreparable environmental damage on the island of Tusla . The exchange of water between the Azov and Black Seas was also significantly impaired after a dam was built for the bridge construction. This led to changes in temperature and ice conditions in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of ​​Azov, which have a negative impact on many species of fish.

    Trivia

    In September 2017, the Russian feature film Krim was released , which, according to a review by the daily newspaper Die Welt , describes the events as "a continuation of the propaganda into the cinema". The film goes back to an idea of ​​the Defense Minister and was partly funded by the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation and the State Film Foundation. The director was Alexei Pimanow, director of the media holding company for the Russian armed forces “Red Star”. The Ministry of Education issued a “recommendation” in advance to advertise it in schools. The performances remained extremely weak, although schools had even received orders to attend the performances.

    See also

    literature

    Web links

    Commons : Crimean Crisis  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

    Individual evidence

    1. a b c d e Urs Saxer, Associate Professor of International Law, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Media Law at the University of Zurich: The Crimean Conflict and International Law , NZZ of March 18, 2014.
    2. Herwig G. Höller: Russia: The time is of great political importance . In: The time . March 16, 2015, ISSN  0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed December 12, 2016]).
    3. ^ Ukraine conflict: Russia's strategy paper in full . In: The time . February 26, 2015, ISSN  0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed December 12, 2016]).
    4. Herwig G. Höller: Russia: When the annexation of Crimea really began . In: The time . March 16, 2015, ISSN  0044-2070 ( zeit.de [accessed December 12, 2016]).
    5. 20.02. Retrieved December 12, 2016 .
    6. Julia Smirova: What we know about the course of the annexation of Crimea , Welt Online , March 15, 2015; Julian Hans : Krim's fairy tales . In: Tagesanzeiger , March 12, 2015; Benjamin Bidder: Anniversary of the Russian annexation: Coup in Crimea , Spiegel Online, March 8, 2015; Andrei Illarionov, Dalibor Rohac: Former President Klaus's Flawed Defense of Crimea's Annexation . In: World Affairs , accessed October 1, 2016.
    7. a b Regions of Crimea meeting didn't address separation of Crimea from Ukraine - deputy prime minister of Crimea ( Memento from February 21, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Interfax, February 21, 2014.
    8. Crimea not to appeal for help to Russia for time being , ITAR-TASS of February 20, 2014.
    9. Tagesschau.de on March 11, 2015 on Putin's subsequent justification for the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 after a presentation on March 11, 2015 on Russian state television.
    10. Ann-Dorit Boy: Violence between Russians and Tatars in the Crimea , FAZ from February 26, 2014.
    11. ^ Friedrich Schmidt: Call for the big brother. FAZ, February 20, 2014, accessed on May 6, 2014 .
    12. a b Christoph Sydow: TV interview: Putin accuses Ukrainian government of serious crimes. Spiegel Online from April 17, 2014, accessed on April 17, 2014.
    13. Putin declares “supported by soldiers” ( Memento from May 4, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Die Zeit from April 17, 2014.
    14. ^ A b Andrew Higgins: Grab for Power in Crimea Raises Secession Threat , NYT, February 27, 2014, accessed March 10, 2014.
    15. Russia invaded with "attack helicopters" , Handelsblatt dated February 28, 2014, accessed on May 10, 2014.
    16. Alan Cullison: Russian soldiers surround Ukrainian military bases in the Crimea. wsj.de, March 1, 2014, archived from the original on November 25, 2015 ; accessed on February 17, 2018 .
    17. Jasper Finke: “Putin's arguments are threadbare” , tagesschau.de , March 5, 2014.
    18. Crimean parliament unanimously for reunification with Russia , RIA Novosti . Retrieved March 30, 2014. 
    19. ^ Sevastopol City Council votes for membership in Russia , RIA Novosti. Retrieved March 30, 2014. 
    20. ^ Crimean Parliament for connection to Moscow. tagesschau.de, March 6, 2014, archived from the original on March 9, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    21. Crimean referendum: 96.77 percent vote for reunification with Russia - final result , RIA Novosti of March 17, 2014.
    22. Putin's Human Rights Council confirms election fraud in Crimea , Zeit Online, May 5, 2014.
    23. Договор между Российской Федерацией и о Республикой Крым принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и в образовании составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов , March 18, 2014.
    24. Crimea applies to be part of the Russian Federation after vote to leave Ukraine , The Guardian . 17th March 2014. 
    25. a b General Assembly adopts Resolution calling upon States not to recognize changes in status of Crimea region , publication of the General Assembly on the website of the UN (with statements of several Permanent Representatives), Document No. GA / 11493 of March 27, 2014, accessed on April 14, 2016 (English).
    26. a b UN General Assembly adopts resolution affirming Ukraine's territorial integrity , Xinhua , March 28, 2014: "The General Assembly underscores that the March 16 referendum held in Crimea" having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol. ”“
    27. UN: 10,000 people on the run since the Crimean referendum , derStandard.at , May 20, 2014.
    28. Ukraine-Analyzes 12/06, p. 2 (PDF; 199 KB), accessed on October 2, 2014.
    29. Victor Zaborsky: Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, August 31, 1995, accessed September 5, 2017 .
    30. a b Crimean Tatars. UNPO , March 25, 2008, accessed March 14, 2014 .
    31. ^ Norman M. Naimark: Flammender Hass: ethnic cleansing in the 20th century , Munich 2004, ISBN 978-3-406-51757-0 , p. 132.
    32. Results of the 2001 census on the distribution of ethnic groups (Russian)
    33. ^ Andreas Kappeler : Brief history of the Ukraine . CH Beck, Munich 2009, ISBN 3-406-58780-1 , p. 305.
    34. a b Thomas Gutschker: The springboard into the Mediterranean , FAZ from March 9, 2014.
    35. a b Ukraine: Eggs and Fog Bombs in Parliament. Deutsche Welle , April 28, 2010, accessed April 28, 2010 .
    36. Background: The Russian Black Sea Fleet. Süddeutsche Zeitung , February 28, 2014, accessed on August 26, 2020 . .
    37. An Army Disappears , Die Zeit, March 20, 2014.
    38. Almost 19,000 Russian soldiers deployed in Crimea - Ukrainian Foreign Ministry , Interfax-Ukraine on March 11, 2014.
    39. Winfried Schneider-Deters: The Ukraine: Power Vacuum Between Russia and the European Union. Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-8305-3116-6 , p. 405.
    40. a b Uwe Klußmann: Conflict with Russia: The fatal mistakes of the government in Kiev. Spiegel Online , March 3, 2014, accessed March 6, 2014 .
    41. Agreement to resolve the crisis in Ukraine , Federal Foreign Office , accessed on March 3, 2014 (PDF, English).
    42. ^ Crisis in Ukraine , FAZ Live, February 21, 2014 (3:20 p.m.).
    43. a b Cyrill Stieger: Propaganda War for Ukraine: The Fairy Tale of Fascism in Kiev. Neue Zürcher Zeitung , March 12, 2014, accessed on March 12, 2014 .
    44. Munchausen Check: Putin and the legitimate President of Ukraine , Spiegel Online, March 6, 2014.
    45. Yanukovych after the fall: Fluchthelfer Putin , Spiegel Online, October 24, 2014, accessed on October 24, 2014.
    46. Putin confirms escape aid for ex-Ukraine head of state Yanukovych , blick.ch, October 24, 2014, accessed on October 24, 2014.
    47. Yatsenjuk is to become Prime Minister of Ukraine. RP Digital GmbH, February 26, 2014, accessed on March 6, 2014 .
    48. Matthias Guttke, Hartmut Rank: Analysis: With the languages for votes. On the current language legislation in Ukraine. Federal Agency for Civic Education , September 14, 2012, accessed on March 26, 2015 .
    49. Поіменне голосування про проект Закону про визнання таким, що втратив чинність, Закону України "Про засади державної мовної політики" (№1190) - за основу та в цілому. Verkhovna Rada , February 23, 2014, archived from the original on February 24, 2014 ; accessed on February 24, 2014 .
    50. Florian Hassel: Putin's Propaganda-Kampf , Süddeutsche.de , March 11, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014.
    51. Andrew Hilliar, Polina Myakinchenko: The fanciful claims of Russian propaganda amid Ukraine's crisis , France24 of March 2, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014 (English), YouTube video of the television report (Russian with English subtitles).
    52. Maxim Kireev: Putin's Problem with Propaganda , Die Zeit, February 28, 2014, accessed April 5, 2014.
    53. See Johannes Edelhoff, Johannes Jolmes, Nils Casjens: Putsch in Kiev: What role do the fascists play? , daserste.ndr.de, March 6, 2014.
    54. Example: Existential threat: 'Russians cannot allow Ukraine to be ruled by neo-fascists' , Russia Today from March 2, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014 (English).
    55. Christoph Herwartz: First march, then talk: How Russia created facts in Crimea , n-tv from March 2, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014.
    56. Russia intensifies propaganda before the Crimean referendum , Die Zeit from March 15, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014.
    57. ^ Tymoshenko can be treated in Berlin , Süddeutsche Zeitung of February 24, 2014.
    58. Mykola Ryabchuk : Ukraine: Russian propaganda and three disaster scenarios - The Russian leadership has become entangled in the logic of its own propaganda. , AlJazeera, April 11, 2014; "The Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda has been thoughtfully elaborated within the past ten years and transformed into a full-fledged information war since November 2013 to acquire the Russian population's support for action against Ukraine".
    59. ^ Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in April : “Media monitors indicated a significant raise of propaganda on the television of the Russian Federation, which was building up in parallel to developments in and around Crimea. Cases of hate propaganda were also reported. "
    60. Putin's TV propaganda , Blick , March 6, 2014.
    61. a b Vladimir Soldatkin: Russia allocates first funds for Crimea's budget , Reuters of March 28, 2014, accessed on April 5, 2014 (English).
    62. ^ Andreas Kappeler: Brief history of the Ukraine . CH Beck, Munich 2009, p. 354: "... [endorsement], many in the hope of a higher standard of living".
    63. Ukraine faces national bankruptcy. Tagesschau (ARD) , February 24, 2014, archived from the original on March 2, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    64. Analysis: Putin brings Crimea back to Russia ( Memento from March 20, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Zeit Online, March 17, 2014.
    65. Christoph Stein: And the Crimea is also about oil , in: Telepolis of March 21, 2014, accessed on April 6, 2014.
    66. ^ Roman Goncharenko: What is it really about in the Crimea , Deutsche Welle from March 10, 2014, accessed on April 6, 2014.
    67. Nick Cunningham: Russia Eyes Crimea's Oil and Gas Reserves on OilPrice.com of March 16, 2014, accessed on April 6, 2014.
    68. Carol Matlack: Losing Crimea Could Sink Ukraine's Offshore Oil and Gas Hopes , Business Week of March 11, 2014, accessed on April 6, 2014.
    69. Contested Peninsula - Who Owns the Crimea? , Deutschlandfunk, March 7, 2014, accessed April 6, 2014.
    70. The Crimea and the Ukrainian Crisis - Call for Big Brother , Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 20, 2014.
    71. Hubertus Volmer: The option of division - Crimea threatens to leave Ukraine. n-tv, February 21, 2014, accessed on February 17, 2018 .
    72. The secession is a myth , Ali Khamzin, Foreign Representative of the Crimean Tatars, taz of February 27, 2014.
    73. “We must begin to bring the Crimea back,” Welt Online, March 9, 2015.
    74. Thomas Gutschker: The Kremlin and the Truth: Putin's Lies. FAZ, June 21, 2014, accessed on June 28, 2015 .
    75. ^ Violence between Russians and Tatars in Crimea , FAZ from February 27, 2014.
    76. Russia woos Sevastopol , NZZ from March 1, 2014.
    77. Putin gives awards for “repatriation of the Crimea” , Tagesspiegel of June 18, 2014. He signed awards for “ services to strengthening friendship among peoples”.
    78. Crimea: Protesters call for independence referendum , RIA Novosti of February 27, 2014.
    79. Upheaval in Ukraine: Kiev warns Russia of troop movements , FAZ from February 27, 2014 (writes “Thursday” and an incorrect date of February 26).
    80. Christian Rothenberg: The Curious Rise of Aksjonov - Putin's henchman in the Crimea , n-tv from March 6, 2014, accessed on April 4, 2014.
    81. a b Simon Shuster: Putin's Man in Crimea Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare , Time Magazine, March 10, 2014, accessed April 4, 2014.
    82. a b Per Kristian Aale: Voting fraud secured pro-Russian majority in Crimean parliament , Aftenposten from March 9, 2014, accessed on April 4, 2014 (English).
    83. ^ Votum on Crimea under duress , in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 27, 2015, p. 5 ( genios link ).
    84. Number of Crimean deputies present at referendum resolution vote unclear. Interfax Ukraine, February 27, 2014, accessed July 18, 2015 .
    85. a b Alissa de Carbonnel: RPT-INSIGHT-How the separatists delivered Crimea to Moscow , Reuters of March 13, 2013, accessed on April 4, 2014 (English).
    86. Crimean parliament sacks regional government, approves referendum , RT News of February 27, 2014, accessed on March 12, 2014.
    87. Sergey Kunitsyn: The decision of Crimea to join Russia can only be carried out with bayonets , interview on Insider , March 6, 2014 (Ukrainian).
    88. ^ Parliament in Crimea as hostage , Frankfurter Rundschau, February 27, 2014.
    89. Sergei Aksjonow - Putin's man in the Crimea. Focus Online , March 2, 2014, accessed March 2, 2014 .
    90. Reaction to threats from Russia: Kiev orders readiness to fight , Neue Zürcher Zeitung of March 2, 2014.
    91. Ukraine accuses Russia of "military invasion" in Crimea , Tagesspiegel of February 28, 2014.
    92. Турчинов наложит вето на отмену закона о языках. February 28, 2014, accessed March 2, 2014 (Russian).
    93. Yanukovych's stormtroopers: We are Berkut, our blow is hard , Spiegel Online, February 27, 2014.
    94. Ukraine: Gunmen briefly occupy Simferopol airport in Crimea. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 28, 2014, accessed on March 3, 2014 .
    95. Simferopol Airport in Crimea in normal operation. Schweriner Volkszeitung , February 28, 2014, archived from the original on September 24, 2015 ; Retrieved March 3, 2014 .
    96. ^ Crimean crisis: Ukraine asks UN Security Council for help , Spiegel Online, February 28, 2014.
    97. Russia in the pillory of New York , FAZ from March 2, 2014.
    98. Federation Council of Russia approves military operation in Ukraine
    99. Putin does not want to move troops to Ukraine "for the time being" , FAZ from March 4, 2014.
    100. ^ Defense Minister Shoigu: Pictures of Russian military equipment in Crimea are provocation , RIA, March 5, 2014.
    101. RT (March 5, 2014): Sergei Shoigu has "no idea" where the new armored vehicles "Tiger" and "Luchs" in the Crimea come from.
    102. Crimea "Tiger" at the Victory Parade in Moscow (photo, video) , novayagazeta.ru, March 7, 2014 (there one of the pictures of Russian vehicles that Shoigu "had no idea" about).
    103. Interim President puts Ukrainian army on alert , Focus from March 1, 2014.
    104. Crimea: Attacks, 'Disappearances' by Illegal Forces , Human Rights Watch, March 14, 2014, accessed March 17, 2014.
    105. Crimea: Disappeared Man Found Killed , Human Rights Watch, March 18, 2014, accessed March 18, 2014.
    106. Фрегат «Гетьман Сагайдачный» идет в Севастополь
    107. "Гетман Сагайдачный" встал на сторону "защитников от фашизма"
    108. “Гетьман Сагайдачний” з гордістю продовжує нести прапор України. Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, March 2, 2014, archived from the original on May 15, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    109. Ukraines Navy Chief pro-Russian , Berliner Zeitung of March 2, 2014.
    110. Ukraine launches treason case against Navy chief who surrendered , website trust.org of March 2, 2014.
    111. ^ Five top military, security commanders take oath to Crimea
    112. "Subsidiary" of "Avtodor" became the contractor for the construction of the bridge over Kerch Street , TASS, March 3, 2014.
    113. Ukraine requests continuation of visit by unarmed personnel. OSCE press release. April 11, 2014, accessed March 25, 2015 .
    114. Russia Sinks Own Warship? The Maritime Executive, March 6, 2014, accessed March 22, 2014 .
    115. Kiev accuses Russia of sinking cruiser ship to blockade Ukraine fleet. DEMOTIX, March 6, 2014, archived from the original on May 6, 2014 ; accessed on March 22, 2014 (English).
    116. Russian Occupiers Sunk BOD "Ochakov" To Block Exit For Ukrainian Ships, Crimea. March 6, 2014, accessed March 22, 2014 .
    117. Julia Smirnova: The Last Ship to Resist the Russians , Welt Online, March 24, 2014, accessed on March 24, 2014.
    118. Ukraine fears Russian invasion in the east , n-tv from March 12, 2014.
    119. ^ Before the Crimean referendum: Ukraine accuses Russia of new territorial infringement , Spiegel Online from March 15, 2014, accessed on March 15, 2014.
    120. Kiev orders withdrawal , FAZ from March 24, 2014.
    121. ^ All military bases in Crimea in Russian hands , NZZ of March 26, 2014.
    122. Russia hands over part of the Crimean military technology to Ukraine , RIA Novosti. Retrieved March 30, 2014. 
    123. David M. Herszenhorn and Andrew Roth: Ukrainian Officer Is Killed Near Base in Crimea , NYT, April 7, 2014, accessed April 7, 2014.
    124. Christoph Sydow: TV interview: Putin reserves the right to intervene in the military in Ukraine , Spiegel Online from April 17, 2014, accessed on April 17, 2014.
    125. Kathy Lally: Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine . In: Washington Post , April 17, 2014.
    126. Russia returns 13 out of 70 navy ships in Crimea to Ukraine , Russian Radio, January 17, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014.
    127. Ukas 571 of the Russian President on the award of the medal
    128. Photographs from the place, the funeral of the Pskov paratroopers , slon.ru, August 25, 2014, accessed on August 26, 2014.
    129. Sergei L. Loiko: New Crimea leaders move up referendum date , LA Times, March 1, 2014, accessed March 6, 2014.
    130. Tim Sullivan and Yuras Karmanau: Crimea Referendum Vote On Joining Russia Scheduled For March 16 , Huffington Post March 6, 2014, accessed March 6, 2014.
    131. a b Media freedom under siege in Crimea, Ukraine, says OSCE representative , OSCE website , March 8, 2014, accessed on March 8, 2014.
    132. ^ André Eichhofer: Between the fronts of the information war , World Online. March 12, 2014. Retrieved March 15, 2014. 
    133. Crimea profile , BBC March 7, 2014, accessed March 16, 2014.
    134. AP: Russian propaganda was in full swing over Ukraine ( Memento from March 16, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Washington Post from March 15, 2014, accessed on March 16, 2014.
    135. ^ The logic of Russian Internet censorship , Washington Post, March 16, 2014, accessed April 4, 2014.
    136. Putin entrusts gay haters with state propaganda , Focus dated December 9, 2013, accessed on April 4, 2014.
    137. Putin founds a large propaganda apparatus , dpa / Handelsblatt dated December 9, 2013, accessed on April 4, 2014.
    138. Ann-Dorit Boy: About truth and lies in the Russian sense , FAZnet. March 10, 2014. Retrieved March 15, 2014. 
    139. Julia Sommerbauer: The media war over the Crimea , Zeit Online. March 4, 2014. Retrieved March 15, 2014. 
    140. Stephen Ennis: Ukraine hits back at Russian TV onslaught , BBC March 12, 2014, accessed March 16, 2014.
    141. ^ Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of March 12, 2014 ( Memento of March 17, 2014 in the Internet Archive ).
    142. FUEN : Crimean Tatars suffer from human rights violations - ban on assembly is supposed to muzzle minority , December 9, 2014 (press release on International Human Rights Day on December 10, 2014).
    143. Kiev describes the referendum as illegal. Neuer Zürcher Zeitung, accessed on March 12, 2014 .
    144. Ukrainian interim president bans Crimean referendum
    145. International lawyer on the situation in Crimea: "Crimea alone has nothing to decide". tagesschau.de, March 7, 2014, accessed March 8, 2014 .
    146. Interview on the crisis in Ukraine: “Putin's arguments are threadbare”. tagesschau.de, March 5, 2014, accessed on March 8, 2014 .
    147. Crimean Parliament for connection to Russia , NZZ of March 6, 2014.
    148. Russian Lawmakers Push to Simplify Annexing New Territories
    149. Crimean Lawmakers Coordinate With Russians To Push Annexation
    150. Депутаты Севастопольского городского совета приняли решение об участии населения города в проведении общекрымского референдума ( Memento of 11 March 2014 Internet Archive ).
    151. Sevastopol City Council votes in favor of joining Russia .
    152. Steven Erlanger and David M. Herszenhorn: Air Links Are Severed as Russia Tightens Its Grip on Crimean Peninsula , NYT, March 11, 2014, accessed March 11, 2014.
    153. Парламент Крыма принял Декларацию о независимости АРК и г. Севастополя. March 11, 2014, archived from the original on March 11, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    154. a b Parliament in Kiev issues ultimatum to the Crimean government. FAZ, accessed on March 12, 2014 .
    155. ПРЕС-СЛУЖБА КОНСТИТУЦІЙНОГО СУДУ УКРАЇНИ ( memento from March 13, 2014 in the web archive archive.today )
    156. Справа 1-13 / 2014 ( Memento of March 14, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
    157. Crimean Parliament Sends OSCE Invitation To Monitor Referendum , Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, March 10, 2014 (English).
    158. OSCE Chair says Crimean referendum in its current form is illegal and calls for alternative ways to address the Crimean issue
    159. The seven most important questions about the Crimean referendum , Focus from March 13, 2014.
    160. ^ Nervousness before the referendum , Deutsche Welle of March 14, 2014.
    161. ^ A b Anne Peters : The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum , Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law; University of Basel - Faculty of Law, 2014, p. 255.
    162. Ukraine: Parliament resolved to establish the National Guard , Der Standard of March 12, 2014.
    163. ^ The conflict has entered the military phase , Die Presse of March 18, 2014.
    164. Arrest of the ex-governor in Kharkiv: Eastern Ukraine as a source of conflict , Neue Zürcher Zeitung of March 11, 2014.
    165. The short reign of the "people's governor" Gubarev , The World March 9, 2014.
    166. ^ The conflict has entered the military phase , Die Presse of March 18, 2014.
    167. Ukraine is considering leaving the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) because of the Crimean crisis , Spiegel Online, March 19, 2014, accessed on March 19, 2014.
    168. ^ Crimean dispute: Ukraine introduces visa requirements for Russians
    169. Government will not rush introduction of visa regime with Russia , Council of Ministers web portal, March 20, 2014.
    170. Ukraine overturns non-alignment , NZZ of December 23, 2014.
    171. Russia supplies coal and electricity to Ukraine , Süddeutsche.de, December 28, 2014.
    172. Crimean referendum: 96.77 percent vote for reunification with Russia - final result. RIA Novosti, March 17, 2014, accessed March 17, 2014 .
    173. 93 percent want to go to Russia
    174. Ruble is coming, state property "nationalized" - Crimea recognized as an "independent state" , ORF.at of March 17, 2014.
    175. Shots fired, officer taken from Ukraine base in Crimea , Reuters, March 18, 2014, accessed March 18, 2014.
    176. Chronicle of political and social events in Russia in 2014. (PDF) Russia analyzes. In: country analyzes. German Society for Eastern European Studies and Research Center for Eastern Europe , pp. 25–29 , accessed on November 8, 2014 .
    177. Chronicle: March 13-27, 2014. In: Federal Agency for Political Education / bpb. March 31, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014 (excerpt from previous source).
    178. Chronology of the Crimean Crisis. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. April 7, 2014, p. 20 , accessed November 8, 2014 .
    179. Crimea is now part of Russia - accession sealed with a treaty. In: RIA Novosti . March 18, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014 .
    180. Transnistria wants to merge with Russia. In: Vestnik Kavkaza. March 18, 2014, accessed November 8, 2014 .
    181. Gazprom Seeks Access to Crimean Oil and Gas Deposits , RIA Novosti, March 19, 2014, accessed March 19, 2014.
    182. Crimean Tatars Will Have to Vacate Land - Official , RIA Novosti, March 19, 2014, accessed March 19, 2014.
    183. On 19 March 2014 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation established the Crimea Accession Treaty to be in compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation
    184. Russian parliament moves to ratify Crimea takeover; Obama announces new sanctions , March 20, 2014, accessed March 20, 2014.
    185. ^ Federation Council ratifies treaty on Crimea's accession to Russia
    186. Putin signs reunification laws for Crimea, Sevastopol
    187. Travelers need Russian visas for visits , dpa report on the NZZ website, accessed on April 7, 2014.
    188. Foreigners need Russian visa to enter Crimea , ITAR-TASS of March 31, 2014, accessed on April 7, 2014 (English).
    189. Ukraine insists on right of issuing Crimean visa , xinhua.net from April 1, 2014, accessed on April 7, 2014 (English).
    190. The Crimea on the eve of the referendum , novayagazeta.ru, March 12, 2014.
    191. ^ N24: The situation in the Crimea continues to worsen , March 18, 2014.
    192. ^ A super epidemic is brewing in Russia , Süddeutsche.de, September 30, 2016, accessed on October 1, 2016.
    193. Russia's homemade AIDS crisis , Süddeutsche.de, July 12, 2014, accessed October 1, 2016.
    194. ^ Special Economic Zone in Crimea , NZZ of March 31, 2014.
    195. Executive Order establishing the Ministry of Crimean Affairs and appointing Oleg Savelyev to the post of minister. Kremlin, March 31, 2014, archived from the original on April 4, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    196. Black Sea Peninsula Crimea incorporated into the Southern Defense District of Russia , in: Sputnik , April 2, 2014 (updated October 5, 2015).
    197. Sergei Shakhidzhanyan: Russian Central Bank may temporarily shut down certain banks in Crimea , ITAR-TASS of April 4, 2014, accessed on April 4, 2014 (English).
    198. Andrey Ostroukh: Russian Central Banker Says Country's Banks Wary of Crimea ( Memento from April 4, 2014 in the web archive archive.today ) Wall Street Journal from April 4, 2014, accessed on April 4, 2014 (English).
    199. McDonald's is closing restaurants on the Crimean peninsula
    200. Raiffeisen closes subsidiary branches in Crimea ( Memento of April 7, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Wirtschaftsblatt of April 5, 2014.
    201. Crimea gives itself a new constitution , Die Welt, April 11, 2014.
    202. Affront or Offensive? Russian OMON block Mustafa Jemiliev
    203. In the Crimea, the Tatars are Moscow's toughest opponents
    204. Crimean Tatars stormed the Russian police chain ( Memento from May 3, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
    205. Ruble becomes a single currency in Crimea ( Memento from August 12, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Düsseldorfer Abendblatt from June 1, 2014.
    206. Citizens of Ukraine captured in Russia. 88 cases researched by OVD-Info , in: Osteuropa 6/2018, pp. 3–48.
    207. a b c d Russia wears down the Ukraine from the sea . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung , July 12, 2018.
    208. a b c d Sea of ​​Azov , MDR , August 16, 2018.
    209. The legal maritime situation in the Sea of ​​Azov . In: Spiegel Online , November 27, 2018.
    210. a b c The sea becomes the third combat zone between Moscow and Kiev . In: Zeit Online , November 26, 2018.
    211. a b Russian attack on ships - Ukraine is considering declaring martial law . In: Welt Online , November 26, 2018.
    212. Crimea is a security hotspot . In: zdf.de , November 26, 2018; accessed on November 26, 2018.
    213. a b Russia-Ukraine tensions rise after Kerch Strait ship capture , BBC, November 26, 2018.
    214. a b c d Russia ignores Western protests over seized Ukrainian ships, Ukraine mulls martial law . In: Reuters , November 26, 2018.
    215. a b c Crimean conflict: Russia shoots naval ships from Ukraine . In: Spiegel Online , November 25, 2018.
    216. Russia fires on Ukrainian vessels in Black Sea; 2 wounded . In: Washington Post , November 26, 2018.
    217. Russia sizes three Ukrainian ships in Black Sea after firing on them . In: France24 , November 26, 2018.
    218. Russia 'fires on and captures' Ukrainian ships in new Crimea stand-off . In: The Telegraph , November 25, 2018.
    219. Ukraine claims Russia 'rammed our tugboat' off Crimea , BBC, November 25, 2018.
    220. ^ Sea of ​​Azov: Ukraine has the right, Russia control . In: Deutsche Welle , November 27, 2018.
    221. a b c The Ukrainian parliament approves the state of war . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung , November 26, 2018.
    222. A smoldering conflict comes to the surface . In: NZZ , November 27, 2018, page 5.
    223. ROUNDUP / Conflict with Ukraine: Russia isolated in the UN Security Council
    224. СБ ООН отказался считать инцидент в Керченском проливе нарушением границ РФ ( Eng . The United Nations Security Council refused to regard the Federal Union of the frontiers of the Russian Federation as a violation of the frontiers of the Russian Federation ) to consider the incident in violation of the Russian Federation . In: Rosbalt.ru , November 26, 2018.
    225. Matthew Bodner, Patrick Greenfield: Ukraine president proposes martial law after Russia seizes ships . The Guardian, November 26, 2018.
    226. USA condemns “illegal acts” by Russia after the incident in Crimea . In: zeit.de , November 26, 2018; accessed on November 26, 2018.
    227. ^ Estonia condemns Russian attack on Ukrainian vessels in Kerch Strait . In: Eesti Rahvusringhääling , November 26, 2018.
    228. ^ Russia's "aggressive actions" in Sea of ​​Azov condemned by Baltic states . In: LSM.lv , November 26, 2018.
    229. Lithuania condemns Russian naval 'aggression against Ukraine' . In: Poland Radio , November 26, 2018.
    230. ^ Wallström urges Russia to "stop provocative behavior" over Ukraine . In: Sveriges Radio , November 26, 2018.
    231. Czech Foreign Ministry criticizes Russia over Sea of ​​Azov incident . In: Český rozhlas , November 26, 2018.
    232. Romania reacts to Russia - Ukraine developments in Kerch strait . In: Romania-Insider , November 26, 2018.
    233. The President had a telephone conversation with the President of Turkey on president.gov.ua , November 28, 2018 (Ukrainian)
    234. Poshli na Samotaran. Novaya Gazeta , November 26, 2018.
    235. ^ Incident in the Sea of ​​Azov. Restraint and dialogue are the order of the day , Press and Information Office of the Federal Government , November 28, 2018.
    236. Karin Kneissl: Karin Kneissl: “Have to be more geopolitical thinkers and fewer bean counters.” Foreign Minister meets German counterpart Maas and attends the Berlin Security Conference , Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs , November 27, 2018.
    237. Ukraine no longer allows Russians between the ages of 16 and 60 to enter , Spiegel Online, November 30, 2018.
    238. ^ Statement of G-7 Leaders on Ukraine
    239. Peter Riesbeck: Forgotten promise , article from March 1, 2014 in the portal fr-online.de , accessed on March 20, 2014.
    240. Uwe Schmitt: America's concern that the Crimean invasion is only a prelude , Welt Online, March 3, 2014, accessed March 20, 2014.
    241. See also p. 8 No. 6 in: CSZE: Budapester Dokument 1994. The Path to Real Partnership in a New Era , accessed on the osce.org portal on March 20, 2014.
    242. OSCE Chair-in-Office announces visit of Personal Envoy and High Commissioner on National Minorities to Crimea
    243. ^ OSCE to send military personnel to Ukraine
    244. a b c Crimea: Warning shots stop OSCE observers , Zeit Online, March 8, 2014.
    245. Access to Crimea is denied warning shots at OSCE observers . In: Stuttgarter Zeitung , March 8, 2014.
    246. Military, civilian experts from OSCE states to stay in Ukraine until March 20 , OSCE, March 17, 2014.
    247. Political Solution to Crimea May No Longer Be Possible, Human Rights Watchdog Says
    248. Committee of Ministers decides on measures for Ukraine and expresses grave concern on proposed referendum
    249. Council of Europe report: Crimean referendum illegal , ORF.at, March 15, 2014, accessed on March 14, 2019.
    250. ^ Communication from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of April 10, 2014. Accessed on April 11, 2014.
    251. ^ Draft Resolution 1990. Retrieved April 11, 2014.
    252. Council of Europe deprives Russia of voting rights , FAZ of April 10, 2014. Retrieved on April 11, 2014.
    253. Parliament condemns invasion of Crimea and calls for the withdrawal of all armed forces
    254. Ukraine has to pay full price for gas , SRF on March 21, 2014.
    255. ^ Crimean Crisis: Troop Movements and Telephone Diplomacy , Spiegel Online, March 2, 2014.
    256. ^ NATO meeting on Ukraine: Rhetorical succession , NZZ of March 3, 2014.
    257. NATO flying radar stations peek into Ukraine , Reuters of March 12, 2014.
    258. ^ Russians land in Crimea , FAZ from March 1, 2014.
    259. ^ Elke Windisch, Albrecht Meier, Nina Jeglinski: Crisis in the Crimea: Kerry warns Russia of losing G8 membership. Der Tagesspiegel , March 2, 2014, accessed on March 2, 2014 .
    260. US / UK / Ukraine press release on the meeting on the Budapest Memorandum ( Memento from March 6, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
    261. ^ Destroyer USS Truxtun heads for Black Sea amid heightened tensions over Crimea
    262. ^ DOD Puts Military-to-military Activities With Russia on Hold
    263. Crisis in Ukraine - “No West Against East”. Tagesschau (ARD), February 26, 2014, archived from the original on March 2, 2014 ; accessed on March 2, 2014 .
    264. ^ Crimean crisis. RP Online , March 2, 2014, accessed March 2, 2014 .
    265. Nick Robinson: Ukraine crisis: UK warns Russia over Crimean incursion. BBC News , March 2, 2014, accessed March 2, 2014 .
    266. ^ Sochi: Paralympics take place despite the Ukraine crisis. Die Zeit, March 2, 2014, accessed on March 2, 2014 .
    267. Nicholas Watt: UK seeking to ensure Russia sanctions do not harm City of London , The Guardian, March 3, 2014, accessed April 4, 2014.
    268. Steinmeier is skeptical about excluding Russia from the G8 . Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 2, 2014, accessed on August 26, 2020 . .
    269. Steinmeier expects a decision on new Moscow sanctions shortly , Die Welt of March 9, 2014.
    270. a b Merkel attacks Putin on the phone
    271. Merkel accuses Putin of violating international law , Spiegel Online, March 2, 2014 (according to the deputy government spokesman Georg Streiter ).
    272. ^ Government declaration in the Bundestag: Merkel warns Russia. tagesschau.de, March 13, 2014, archived from the original on March 13, 2014 ; accessed on March 13, 2014 .
    273. Gysi interview on Ukraine: “The West has also done everything wrong”. Spiegel Online, May 9, 2014, accessed May 10, 2014 .
    274. ^ Economic mission with Schneider-Ammann. Russia is socially acceptable again , NZZ , June 21, 2017, p. 15.
    275. ^ Schneider-Ammanns Reise: His Mission, his Hope , Bilanz.ch, July 12, 2017.
    276. a b Analysis: Is China on Putin's side in the Crimean crisis? Süddeutsche Zeitung , March 4, 2014, accessed on August 26, 2020 . .
    277. Kai Lange: China backs Russia. In: Manager Magazin. March 9, 2014, accessed March 10, 2014 .
    278. Diplomats: Soon tougher sanctions against Russia. FAZ.net , March 10, 2014, accessed April 4, 2014 .
    279. Ruth Kirchner: Crisis in the Ukraine: China's Dilemma. tagesschau.de, March 12, 2014, archived from the original on March 15, 2014 ; accessed on March 13, 2014 .
    280. ^ Meeting Records
    281. Security Council fails to adopt text urging Member States not to recognize
    282. a b Russia vetoes UN resolution against Crimea referendum , Reuters of March 15, 2014, accessed on March 15, 2014.
    283. La résolution sur la Crimée rejetée à l'ONU , Le Monde, March 15, 2014, accessed on March 15, 2014.
    284. Ukraine crisis: Russia isolated in UN Crimea vote. BBC News, April 11, 2014, accessed April 11, 2014 .
    285. Mattew Rosenberg: Breaking With the West, Afghan Leader Supports Russia's annexation of Crimea. The New York Times, March 23, 2014, accessed April 11, 2014 .
    286. Afghanistan respects Crimea's right to self-determination - Karzai. rt.com, March 22, 2014, accessed April 11, 2014 .
    287. Alexander Smith: North Korea, Syria, Cuba Back Russia's Crimea Incursion at UN. NBC News, March 28, 2014, accessed April 11, 2014 .
    288. a b Backing Ukraine's territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea referendum invalid , United Nations News Center , March 27, 2014, accessed on April 10, 2014.
    289. United Nations Official Document A / 68 / L.39: Territorial integrity of Ukraine , March 24, 2014 (PDF; 110 kB).
    290. United Nations General Assembly Vote Isolates Russia , New York Times, March 27, 2014.
    291. Backing Ukraine's territorial integrity, UN Assembly declares Crimea referendum invalid , UN News Center, March 27, 2014.
    292. a b UN court strengthens Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea. Dispute between Ukraine and Russia. In: Deutsche Welle's news portal. Deutsche Welle, April 19, 2017, accessed April 20, 2017 .
    293. EU imposes sanctions - Crimea wants to split
    294. ^ Council Regulation (EU) No. 208/2014 of March 5, 2014 (PDF), accessed on January 31, 2015
    295. Exclusive: EU approves framework for asset freezes, travel bans on Russia , Reuters of March 12, 2014.
    296. ^ Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 of March 17, 2014 (PDF), accessed on January 31, 2015
    297. Implementing Decision of the Council on the implementation of Decision 2014/145 / CFSP on restrictive measures in the face of acts that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine - Annex
    298. ^ White House on Visa Restrictions, Sanctions in Support of Ukraine
    299. Executive Order 13660
    300. Crimean Crisis: USA demands tougher sanctions
    301. Patricia Zengerle: Ukraine bill with sanctions, IMF reforms clears hurdle in US Senate , Reuters of March 12, 2014.
    302. Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014
    303. FACT SHEET: Ukraine-Related Sanctions
    304. Ukraine-Related Sanctions
    305. Ukraine-related Designations , United States Treasury Department, March 20, 2014.
    306. US bans licenses for military exports to Russia , Reuters of March 27, 2014.
    307. Ukraine: Against circumvention of international sanctions
    308. See measures to avoid circumventing international sanctions in connection with the situation in Ukraine , State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO, December 22, 2017.
    309. Prime Minister of Canada: Sanctions List ( Memento of March 21, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
    310. ^ Measures against individuals whose actions threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity
    311. Forskrift on the restrictive tiltak vedrørende handlinger som undergraver or truer Ukraine's territorial integrity, suverenitet and uavhengighet. Archived from the original on March 28, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    312. Japan to impose sanctions on Russia for Crimea move , Reuters of March 18, 2014.
    313. Japan Imposes Sanctions on Russia Over Crimea , ABC News, March 18, 2014.
    314. ^ Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Additional Measures over the situation in Ukraine . From: mofa.go.jp , accessed August 22, 2016.
    315. Список официальных лиц и членов Конгресса США, которым закрывается въезд в Российскую Федерацию на основе взаимности в связи с американскими санкциями по Украине и Крыму
    316. Russia slaps entry ban on 13 Canadian lawmakers, officials in retaliation for Ukraine sanctions. National Post , March 24, 2014, accessed May 1, 2014 .
    317. Список официальных лиц, депутатов Парламента и общественных деятелей Канады, которым закрывается въезд в Российскую Федерацию в ответ на канадские санкции по Украине и Крыму
    318. That's the damage! , Novaya Gazeta, February 19, 2019 (Russian).
    319. Russia outraged by Westerwelle. Tagesschau (ARD), December 6, 2013, archived from the original on January 8, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    320. Why not a referendum all over Ukraine? , Die Welt of March 20, 2014.
    321. EU suspends Visa talks with Russia , n-tv from March 3, 2014.
    322. a b c Declaration on the Crimean crisis: Putin keeps "all options" open in Ukraine , Spiegel Online, March 4, 2014.
    323. Putin: Russia doesn't need to honor the Budapest Memorandum. Kharkov News Agency, March 4, 2014, archived from the original March 16, 2014 ; accessed on June 22, 2016 .
    324. Security Council 7134th meeting , the Security Council on March 13, 2014.
    325. Address to the Federation Assembly. Speech on the occasion of the referendum in Crimea. Kremlin website, March 18, 2014, accessed April 5, 2014 .
    326. ^ Viktor Anatoljewitsch Schenderowitsch : Special Opinion , Echo Moskwy, September 18, 2014.
    327. kremlin.ru: Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly (full text of the speech in English).
    328. FAZ.net (December 4, 2014): A "Message from Above"
    329. FAZ (December 4, 2014): Nationalist Fire - “After Putin's speech riddled with threats and wild conspiracy theories, one must fear more than ever that the crisis in Eastern Europe will continue to smolder” (Comment).
    330. FAZ.net (December 3, 2014): Barack Obama: "Putin's policy is nationalistic and backward-looking" .
    331. ^ Zeit Online (December 4, 2014): Putin threatens the strength of his army .
    332. Focus: Appearance of the Russian President Putin: Crimea is as holy as the Temple Mount ( Memento from December 5, 2014 in the web archive archive.today )
    333. The Crimean Peninsula. In: State Center for Political Education Baden-Württemberg . Retrieved December 14, 2016 .
    334. Interim measure granted in inter-State case brought by Ukraine against Russia , European Court of Human Rights, March 13, 2014.
    335. ^ Annexation of Crimea: Russia has to declare itself in front of the human rights court . In: Spiegel Online , November 26, 2014.
    336. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 6.
    337. ^ Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016 . International Criminal Court, November 14, 2016.
    338. Paul Roderick Gregory: International Criminal Court: Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Is A 'Crime,' Not A Civil War . In: Forbes , November 20, 2016.
    339. Mike Eckel: Hague Prosecutor's Finding On Ukraine Conflict Gives Kyiv Legal Heft, But Little Else . In: Radio Free Europe , November 15, 2016.
    340. Ukraine Files Action against Russia in International Court of Justice , press release of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, January 16, 2017.
    341. Ukraine is suing Russia in the highest UN court. Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 6, 2017, accessed on March 7, 2017 .
    342. International Court of Justice : Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) - Order - Request for the indication of Provisional Measures. (PDF; 316 kB) April 19, 2017, archived from the original on May 8, 2017 ; accessed on April 20, 2017 (English).
    343. ^ A b Reinhard Merkel: Crimea and international law: Cool irony of history , in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 7, 2014.
    344. ↑ On this Veronika Bílková: The Use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea , ZaöRV 75 (2015), p. 27 ff.
    345. Umut Özsu: Ukraine, International Law, and the Political Economy of Self-Deterministic nation . In: German Law Journal 16, No. 3, 2015, pp. 343–451, here pp. 440 f .: “First and foremost, Russia's unilateral military intervention into and eventual annexation of Crimea has typically and justifiably been understood to constitute an act of aggression. As such, it has been condemned as a flagrant violation of the prohibition on non-defensive use of force, enshrined in classical form in Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter ... "
    346. a b c d Graf Vitzthum / Alexander Proelß (ed.): Völkerrecht . 7th edition, de Gruyter, Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-11-044130-7 , p. 356 .
    347. A / RES / 3314 (XXIX) ( English , PDF) UN. Retrieved July 3, 2019.
    348. Paul Kalinichenko, in: Dimitry Cookingov and Elena Basheska (eds.): Good Neighborliness in the European Legal Context . Brill , Leiden 2015, ISBN 978-90-04-29977-1 , p. 340 : “There is no debate in the academic community outside Russia: scholars consider the Russian action in the Crimea as 'illegal annexation' […]. Russian academics differ in their appraisal of the Crimean situation. Some recognize the illegality of the annexation of Crimea, others support the official Russian position on the reunification of Russia and the Crimea. "
    349. ^ Andreas von Arnauld : Völkerrecht . 2nd, revised edition, CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8114-7142-9 , p. 26 .
    350. a b c d Veronika Bílková: The Use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea . In: Journal for Foreign Public Law and International Law 75, No. 1, 2015, pp. 27–50.
    351. a b Claus Kreß , Christian Tams: Against the normative force of the factual: The Crimean crisis from an international law perspective . In: Internationale Politik 3, May / June 2014, pp. 16–19.
    352. Malcolm Shaw : International Law . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, 7th edition, ISBN 978-1-107-04086-1 , p. 818 .
    353. ^ A b Antonello Tancredi: The Russian annexation of the Crimea: questions relating to the use of force (PDF). In: Questions in International Law 1, 2014, pp. 3–34.
    354. a b c d Otto Luchterhandt : The connection of Crimea to Russia from an international law perspective . In: Archiv des Völkerrechts 52, Nr. 2, 2014, pp. 137–174. doi: 10.1628 / 000389214X684276 .
    355. a b Hans-Joachim Heintze : The international legal status of the Crimea and its inhabitants . In: Die Friedens-Warte 89, No. 1/2, 2014, pp. 153–179.
    356. ^ Jacob Thomas Staib: Russian and Western Views of International Law: The Case of Crimea . In Janne Haaland Matlary and Tormod Heier: Ukraine and Beyond: Russia's Strategic Security Challenge to Europe . Springer , 2016, ISBN 978-3-319-32530-9 , p. 217 f. doi: 978-3-319-32529-3 .
    357. a b c d Peter Hilpold : The Ukraine crisis from an international law perspective: a dispute between law, history and politics . In: Swiss Review of International and European Law 25, No. 2, 2015, pp. 171–182.
    358. ^ Andreas von Arnauld: Völkerrecht . 2nd, revised edition, CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, p. 469 .
    359. Volodymyr Motyl: Annexation of Crimea and use of military force by Russia against Ukraine: Is there a justification for this under international law? In: Journal for Foreign and Security Policy 8, No. 3, July 2015, pp. 315–325. doi: 10.1007 / s12399-015-0510-8 .
    360. James A. Green: Editorial Comment: The Annexation of Crimea: Russia, Passportisation and the Protection of Nationals Revisited . In: Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 1, No. 1, 2014, pp. 3–10. doi: 10.5235 / 20531702.1.1.3 .
    361. Christian Walter: Post-Script: Self-Determiniation, Secession and the Crimean Crisis 2014 . In: Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Kavus Abushov (eds.): Self-Determination and Secession in International Law . Oxford University Press , Oxford 2014, ISBN 978-0-19-870237-5 , pp. 307 ff.
    362. a b Thomas D. Grant: Annexation of Crimea . In: American Journal of International Law 109, No. 1, January 2015, pp. 68–95. doi: 10.5305 / amerjintelaw.109.1.0068 : “In February 2014, when Russia asserted that a crisis had erupted in which the ethnic Russian population of Crimea was in peril, this was an auto-appreciation shared by no other international actor; it was not in accord with Russia's own recent practice in this main international human rights organ. "
    363. ^ Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine , Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 15, 2014.
    364. Statement by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities on her recent visits to Ukraine , OSCE, April 4, 2014.
    365. ^ Peter Hilpold: Ukraine, Crimea and New International Law: Balancing International Law with Arguments Drawn from History . In: Chinese Journal of International Law 14, No. 2, 2015, pp. 237–270.
    366. January Klabbers: International Law . 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, ISBN 978-1-107-14155-1 , p. 499 .
    367. ^ Simone F. van den Driest: Crimea's Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right to Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law . In: Netherlands International Law Review 62, No. 3, December 2015, pp. 329–363. doi: 10.1007 / s40802-015-0043-9 .
    368. ^ Theodore Christakis: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and Fait Accompli in the Case of Crimea . In: Journal for Foreign Public Law and International Law 75, No. 1, 2015, pp. 75–100.
    369. ^ Christian Walter: Post-Script: Self-Determination, Secession and the Crimean Crisis 2014 . In: Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Kavus Abushov (eds.): Self-Determination and Secession in International Law . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, ISBN 978-0-19-870237-5 , p. 306 .
    370. a b c Veronika Bílková: Territorial (Ce) Session in Light of Recent Events in Crimea . In: Matteo Nicolini, Francesco Palermo, Enrico Milano: Law, Territory and Conflict Resolution . Brill, Leiden 2016, ISBN 978-90-04-31129-9 , p. 203 .
    371. Theodore Christakis: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and Fait Accompli in the Case of Crimea , ZaöRV 75 (2015), pp. 80–90 f.
    372. Theodore Christakis: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and Fait Accompli in the Case of Crimea , ZaöRV 75 (2015), p. 96 f.
    373. Opinion on “whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organize a referendum on becoming the constituent territory of the Russian Federation or restoring Crimea's 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional principles” . Venice Commission, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 762/2014, March 21, 2014.
    374. ^ Anne Peters: The international law of the area referendums: The example of the Ukraine 1991-2014 . In: Zerreißprobe. Ukraine: conflict, crisis, war (=  Eastern Europe . Volume 5-6 , no. 64 ). 2014, p. 101-134 .
    375. ^ A b Paul Kalinichenko in Dimitry Kochov and Elena Basheska (eds.): Good Neighborliness in the European Legal Context . Brill , Leiden 2015, ISBN 978-90-04-29977-1 , p. 340 .
    376. Matthias Guttke: Who Owns the Crimea? Putin's justification for annexing Crimea . In: Zeitschrift für Slawistik 60, No. 2, July 2015, pp. 312–327. doi: 10.1515 / slaw-2015-0021 .
    377. ^ Karl Doehring : Völkerrecht: a textbook . 2nd Edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2004, ISBN 978-3-8114-0834-0 (p. 51 ).
    378. Caroline von Gall: Analysis: Is the Crimea really Russian? Russian lawyers discuss the legality of admitting Crimea . In: Federal Agency for Civic Education , May 11, 2015.
    379. ^ Christian Walter: Post-Script: Self-Determination, Secession and the Crimean Crisis 2014 . In: Christian Walter, Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Kavus Abushov (eds.): Self-Determination and Secession in International Law . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, ISBN 978-0-19-870237-5 , pp. 303 f.
    380. ^ Andreas von Arnauld : Völkerrecht . 2nd Edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8114-7142-9 ( p. 39 ).
    381. ^ Luzius Wildhaber : Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and international law . In: Swiss Review of International and European Law 25, No. 2, 2015, pp. 159–170.
    382. Oliver Dörr: Use of Force, Prohibition of . In: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law , September 2015, accessed on August 22, 2016 (“This duty of non-recognition was taken up by the ICJ in the Construction of a Wall advisory opinion, when it held that as a corollary of the prohibition of the use of force any territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force was illegal and must be treated as such by other States (at para. 87). This view was confirmed in the recent case of the Russian annexation of Crimea ... ").
    383. a b c Does the Crimea have a right to secession? Der Tagesspiegel, accessed on March 25, 2014 .
    384. International lawyer Heintze on the Crimean referendum: "It is an expression of will". Frankfurter Rundschau , accessed on March 25, 2014 .
    385. "The annexation of Crimea was grossly contrary to international law" , Giessener-anzeiger.de, January 22, 2015.
    386. Andreas Zielcke: Controversial Crimean referendum: Every split is an amputation , Süddeutsche.de, March 14, 2014.
    387. a b ODIHR and HCNM report identifies widespread human rights violations, discrimination and legal irregularities in Crimea . OSCE , September 17, 2015.
    388. ^ New UN report details grave human rights violations in Crimea . United Nations , September 25, 2017.
    389. a b 71/205. The human rights situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, General Assembly resolution, adopted December 19, 2016.
    390. ^ The situation of national minorities in Crimea following its annexation by Russia . Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), European Parliament, April 2016.
    391. a b c d e f g h UN report details grave human rights violations in Russian-occupied Crimea . United Nations Human Rights - Office of the High Commissioner, September 25, 2017.
    392. Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia and the situation in the Crimea . European Parliament, Texts adopted, P8_TA (2017) 0087.
    393. Urgent Action: CRIMEAN TATAR ACTIVIST FORCIBLY DISAPPEARED . Amnesty International.
    394. Q&A: Russia, Ukraine, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights . Human Rights Watch, March 22, 2014.
    395. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 30.
    396. a b c d e Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, pp. 5-6.
    397. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 10.
    398. Video: Crimean dissidents silenced by Moscow . In: France 24 , March 24, 2017.
    399. a b c Crimea still erasing its Ukrainian past a year after Russia's takeover . In: The Guardian , March 13, 2015.
    400. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 21f.
    401. Crimean Tatar leader convicted of 'separatism' will not seek clemency . In: The Guardian , September 29, 2017.
    402. Myth of Crimea (4/5): Tatars fight against annexation . In: Deutschlandrundfunk , November 30, 2017.
    403. Human rights situation in the Crimea . Federal Government, September 29, 2017.
    404. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 43.
    405. a b c d Crimean Tatars in Russia's sights . In: Deutsche Welle , April 21, 2016.
    406. Opening Remarks by Adam Abdelmoula, Director Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the international monitoring of the human rights situation in crimea: findings and perspectives . United Nations, June 17, 2016.
    407. Human rights in the Crimea: murder, torture and displacement . In: the daily newspaper , October 12, 2016.
    408. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 14.
    409. a b Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, pp. 2, 10.
    410. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 58 f.
    411. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 12.
    412. Crimea does not need gay people, says top official . In: The Guardian , September 2, 2014.
    413. How Russia Drove Crimea's LGBT Community Underground . In: The Daily Beast , February 10, 2018.
    414. Crimea's Gay Community Moves Out as Russian Homophobia Sets In . In: Time Magazine , October 15, 2014.
    415. CRIMEAN TATAR: NEVER SILENT IN THE FACE OF INJUSTICE . In: Amnesty International .
    416. Amnesty International: HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSES WITHOUT MEDICAL SUPPLY. Retrieved May 26, 2020 .
    417. Front Line Defenders: ARREST OF SERVER MUSTAFAYEV. Retrieved May 26, 2020 (English).
    418. Mykhailo Gonchar: Sentsov list: What's next? Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).
    419. a b c d After annexing Crimea, Russians move to carve up the spoils . In: Financial Times , March 18, 2014.
    420. a b c d e Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 31 ff.
    421. a b Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 24.
    422. Laura Mills, John-Thor Dahlburg, Associated Press: Crimea's New Russian Overlords Are Seizing Thousands Of Businesses . In: Businessinsider , December 2, 2014.
    423. a b Seizing Assets in Crimea, From Shipyards to Film Studio . In: The New York Times , January 10, 2015.
    424. В Севастополе около 300 человек вышли на митинг против правительства города (dt. "In Sevastopol gather about 300 people to protest the city government"). In: Novaya Gazeta , June 4, 2018.
    425. Crimean Businessmen Launch Angry Protests Against Russian Expropriation . In: The Moscow Times , June 6, 2018.
    426. a b Ukraine: Russia and the expropriations in the Crimea . In: Europamagazin , July 15, 2018.
    427. ↑ The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague obliges Russia to pay compensation to Ukrainian companies . In: Russland.ru , May 10, 2018.
    428. U Bardyn, Ch Dumitrescu, V Marchan: Ukraine . In: The International Arbitration Review , Edition 9, August 2018.
    429. Ukraine's Oschadbank awarded $ 1.3 bln from Russia over Crimea loss . In: Reuters , November 27, 2018.
    430. The border is also increasingly being cordoned off on land , Spiegel Online, December 29, 2018; Russia pulls a 60 km long fence on Crimea ( Memento from December 31, 2018 in the Internet Archive ), MDR, December 28, 2018.
    431. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 91.
    432. a b Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 3.
    433. ^ A b Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 7.
    434. ^ Was in Ukraine: Searching for the Disappeared in Putin's Crimea Fortress . In: The Daily Beast , March 16, 2015.
    435. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 21.
    436. ^ What the West Should Do Next in Ukraine . In: Newsweek , April 27, 2016.
    437. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 23.
    438. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 69.
    439. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 26.
    440. Russia's treatment of Crimean Tatars echoes mistakes made by Soviets . In: The Guardian , November 25, 2018.
    441. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, pp. 6 and 8.
    442. ^ Repressions against Germans in the Crimea . In: Welt Online , December 26, 2014.
    443. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 66 f.
    444. a b c Switched off: Independent media in the Crimea . In: Eastern Europe . No. 3, 2015, pp. 139f.
    445. annexation of Crimea: Putin switches media on . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , March 15, 2015.
    446. Oppositionists in the Crimea are threatened with torture and kidnapping . In: Zeit Online , March 18, 2015.
    447. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 46.
    448. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 34.
    449. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 23.
    450. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, pp. 36-40.
    451. a b c d e f g h Sergiy Zayets: Forced citizenship as new human rights violations and as a means of aggressive expansion of the Russian Federation in the context of the occupation of Crimea . Institute for European Politics, March 2017.
    452. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 9.
    453. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 69.
    454. ^ A b Carolina de Stefano: Three Years On, Russia Faces New Challenges In Crimea . In: Russian Analytical Digest No. 208, October 2017, pp. 2–5.
    455. ^ Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 8.
    456. With the prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine, there are new hopes for Donbass. The New Zurich Times.
    457. ^ A b Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 19 f.
    458. ^ Russia 'distributing passports in the Crimea' . In: The Telegraph , August 17, 2008.
    459. ^ Fears That Crimea Could Be Next Flashpoint For Conflict With Russia . In: Radio Free Europe , August 24, 2008.
    460. Sam Brighton: Authoritarian regime stabilization through legitimation, popular co-optation, and exclusion: Russian pasportizatsiya strategies in Crimea . In: Globalizations . 15, No. 2, pp. 283-300. doi: 10.1080 / 14747731.2017.1396798 .
    461. Agnia Grigas: Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire . Yale University Press, New Haven 2016, ISBN 978-0-300-21450-5 , pp. 119 ff.
    462. Toru Nagashima: Russia's Passportization Policy toward Unrecognized Republics . In: Problems of Post-Communism . December 2017. doi: 10.1080 / 10758216.2017.1388182 .
    463. a b Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine) . United Nations, September 2017, p. 7.
    464. ^ Report of the Human Rights Assessment Mission on Crimea . OSCE, July 2015, p. 65 f.
    465. ^ A b Humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine . Resolution 2198 (2018), PACE, January 23, 2018.
    466. Chronicle: January 22 - February 4, 2018 . In: Ukraine-Analyzes , No. 95, February 2018.
    467. Shifting Loyalty: Moscow Accused Of Reshaping Annexed Crimea's Demographics . In: Radio Free Europe , May 31, 2018.
    468. a b Crimea is becoming a Russian money pit . In: World Policy , October 24, 2016.
    469. a b c The High Price of Putin's Takeover of Crimea . In: Bloomberg , March 31, 2017.
    470. Google Joins Apple, Others Cutting Off Crimea, Blocks AdWords, AdSense, Google Play . In: TechCrunch , January 23, 2015.
    471. Russia Delivers a New Shock to Crimean Business: Forced Nationalization . In: Bloomberg , November 18, 2014.
    472. Ukraine says Russia looted two Crimean oil rigs . In: Reuters , December 16, 2015.
    473. Farmers In Annexed Crimea Are Running Out Of Water - And They Can Only Get It From Ukraine . In: Businessinsider , June 5, 2014.
    474. Ukrainian minister: 'Gas can stop flowing at any moment' . In: Euractiv , April 9, 2014.
    475. Special Report: Crimean savers ask: Where's our money? In: Reuters , November 20, 2014.
    476. ^ Money crisis in Crimea: how sanctions against Russia have made cash king . In: The Guardian , April 7, 2015.
    477. Sanctions trump patriotism for Russian banks in Crimea . In: Reuters , April 9, 2014.
    478. Resurrection from sanctions . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung , May 4, 2016.
    479. Russian gov't gives cash injection to Crimea bank . In: Reuters , April 13, 2017.
    480. Крупнейший банк в Крыму остался без американского софта (German: "Biggest bank in Crimea remains without American software"). In: Vedemosti , August 24, 2017.
    481. Inflation in Russia-Annexed Crimea Hits 42.5 Percent in 2014 . In: The Moscow Times , January 15, 2015.
    482. Why Crimea Now Has the Second-Highest Inflation Rate in the World . In: Bloomberg , January 15, 2015.
    483. a b Promised Prosperity Never Arrived in Russian-Held Crimea, Locals Say . In: Fortune , August 21, 2016.
    484. a b Three years after the annexation of Crimea: “Hold on!” In: Deutschlandfunk Kultur , October 29, 2017.
    485. Crimean airspace belongs to Ukraine, aviation group says . In: Washington Post , July 8, 2014.
    486. Europe safety agency urges airlines to avoid Crimean airspace . In: Reuters , April 3, 2014.
    487. Russian airlines in Ukraine: The battle for the sky . In: The Economist , May 13, 2014.
    488. ^ Putin Paradise Becomes Economic No-Go Zone Where Cash Rules . In: Bloomberg , February 16, 2015.
    489. Putin discount for vacation in Crimea . In: Zeit Online , March 12, 2015.
    490. a b The Hidden Costs of a Russian Statelet in Ukraine . In: The Atlantic , March 4, 2014.
    491. EU sanctions against Russia due to the crisis in Ukraine . European Union, accessed September 13, 2018.
    492. a b Aid Elusive, Crimea Farms Face Hurdles . In: The New York Times , July 7, 2014.
    493. a b c Everyday life in the Crimea: The consequences of the annexation . In: Die Presse , March 24, 2014.
    494. Constantine Pleshakov : The Crimean Nexus: Putin's War and the Clash of Civilizations . Yale University Press, New Haven 2017, ISBN 978-0-300-21488-8 , p. 146 .
    495. a b Crimea water crisis resolution unlikely, risk of further Russian incursion into Ukraine rises in three-year outlook . In: Jane's Information Group , July 5, 2018.
    496. Supply is difficult: Crimea depends on the Ukraine . In: n-tv , September 9, 2014.
    497. Russia to Spend Over $ 800 Million on Electricity Cable to Crimea . In: Moscow Times , July 17, 2015.
    498. Sea Of Troubles: Azov Emerging As 'Tinderbox' In Russia-Ukraine Conflict . In: Radio Free Europe , August 7, 2018.
    499. a b c d MI Romashchenko et al .: About Some Environmental Consequences of Kerch Strait Bridge Construction . In: Hydrology ( Science Publishing Group ). 6, No. 1, 2018, pp. 1-9. doi: 0.11648 / j.hyd.20180601.11 .
    500. A closely watched basin: The Russian-Ukrainians tensions in the Sea of ​​Azov . Center of Eastern Studies, number 279, August 8, 2018.
    501. Russia Is Blocking 'Hundreds' of Ships From Ukraine's Ports and the US Wants It to Stop . In: Newsweek , August 31, 2018.
    502. Ukraine Complains Russia Is Using New Crimea Bridge to Disrupt Shipping . In: Bloomberg , July 25, 2018.
    503. Crimea: Russia's takeover of Crimea will be expensive . In: Zeit Online , March 26, 2014.
    504. Crimea's annexation: Bad memory . In: The Economist , June 11, 2015.
    505. a b J Kusznir: Russian infrastructure projects in the Crimea - an inventory . In: Ukraine Analysis . No. 201, May 2018.
    506. ^ The Law of the Belligerent Occupation . In LR Blank, GP Noone: International Law and Armed Conflict: Fundamental Principles and Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War (2nd edition). Wolters Kluwer, New York 2019, ISBN 978-1-4548-8135-3 , p. 204 ff .
    507. Putin's Peninsula Is a Lonely Island . In: Foreign Policy , February 6, 2015.
    508. There is drilling for water in the Crimea . In: '' Tages-Anzeiger '', September 10, 2014.
    509. ^ New Maps Appear To Show Crimea Is Drying Up . In: Radio Free Europe , July 13, 2018.
    510. ^ Crimea: Mysterious chemical incident evokes memories of Chernobyl disaster . In: Deutsche Welle , September 6, 2018.
    511. Crimea: Thousands of people evacuated after a chemical accident covered up . In: Spiegel Online , September 7, 2018.
    512. OJ Lavrowa, MI Mitjagina, AG Kostjanoi: Ледовая обстановка в Керченском проливе в текущем столетии. Ретроспективный анализ на основе спутниковых данных ( Eng . "Ice conditions in the Kerch Strait in the current century. Retrospective analysis based on satellite data "). In: Современные проблемы дистанционного зондирования Земли из космоса ( Institute for Space Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences ). 14, No. 2, 2017, pp. 148–166. doi: 10.21046 / 2070-7401-2017-14-2-148-166
    513. OY Lavrova, MI Mityagina, TY Bocharova, AG Kostianoy: Long-term monitoring of sea ice conditions in the Kerch Strait by remote sensing data . In: Proceedings of SPIE , October 2017. doi: 10.1117 / 12.2277829 .
    514. OY Lavrov, MI Mityagina, AG Kostianoy, MA Strochnov: Satellite monitoring of the Black Sea Ecological Risk Areas . In: Ecologica Montenegrina . No. 14, 2017, pp. 1–13.
    515. Pavel Lokshin: Propaganda film "Crimea" - the love sucker for annexation , Die Welt from September 18, 2017.
    516. The film "Crimea" is shown in St. Petersburg in front of empty halls , rosbalt.ru, October 3, 2017.
    517. Putin propaganda film “Crimea” failed at the Russian box office with a scandal , Liveleak, October 4, 2017.